



LUND UNIVERSITY

A Break in the Representative Chain

Party Members' Ideological Disagreement with Candidates and Demands for Intra-Party Democracy

Kölln, Ann-Kristin; Polk, Jonathan

Published in:
Nordic Party Members

2019

Document Version:
Peer reviewed version (aka post-print)

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):
Kölln, A.-K., & Polk, J. (2019). A Break in the Representative Chain: Party Members' Ideological Disagreement with Candidates and Demands for Intra-Party Democracy. In M. Demker, K. Heidar, & K. Kosiara-Pedersen (Eds.), *Nordic Party Members: Linkages in Troubled Times* ECPR Press.

Total number of authors:
2

Creative Commons License:
CC BY-NC-ND

General rights

Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply:
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

Read more about Creative commons licenses: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/>

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

LUND UNIVERSITY

PO Box 117
221 00 Lund
+46 46-222 00 00

Chapter 11: A Break in the Representative Chain: Party Members' Ideological Disagreement with Candidates and Demands for Intra-Party Democracy

Ann-Kristin Kölln and Jonathan Polk¹

Abstract

Two of the major developments in European party organizations in the last decades are the almost universal decline of party membership and the expansion of membership rights. The combination of both developments means that today's party members have more intra-party powers and higher chances of standing for political office than ever before. In this chapter, we combine recent party membership surveys in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden with data from the Comparative Candidate Surveys in the same Scandinavian countries to study the extent to which the chain of representation within parties is connected to demands for intra-party democracy. Our findings suggest that greater member-candidate incongruence in ideology, as well as on particular issues, is associated with greater demand for membership voice within the party decision-making structure.

Party organizations in Europe have undergone substantial changes over the decades since the term ‘mass organizations’ was coined (Katz and Mair 1995). Today’s political parties are often characterized by at least two common features. Firstly, almost all European parties have suffered from substantial membership loss over the last decades and are today recording often record-low figures of formal membership (e.g., Kölln 2016; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke 2012). Secondly, and partly as a consequence of the membership decline, many European party organizations have increased the formal decision-making power of their members, even though, informally, the party leadership has often been empowered over this time period (e.g. Cross and Katz 2013; Katz and Mair 1995, 2009; Poguntke et al. 2016; Scarrow, Webb, and Farrell 2000; Schumacher and Giger 2017). The logical consequence of both developments is that today’s party members have more internal power (at least formally) and higher chances of eventually standing for and obtaining elected office than ever before.

Even though members and candidates share many important attitudes towards their party, several studies provide empirical evidence that breaks up the unitary actor assumption of a political party. We followed this tradition in chapter 5 and investigated May’s Law of Curvilinear Disparity (1973) across four countries and three levels of the party. This chapter uses this disagreement within parties on general ideology as well as on particular issues to study the potential consequences this may have for members’ preferences for intra-party democracy. We conceptualize internal party disagreement as differences in ideological leanings and issue preferences between party members and candidates running for national parliamentary elections across three Scandinavian countries: Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. We draw on the theory of exit, voice, and loyalty (Hirschman 1970) and institutionalist theories of delegation to study the consequences of tensions within parties.

Our chapter contributes to the book’s dimensions of membership representation and influence. Preceding chapters examined the role of members in the representation process with a focus on the descriptive representation of party members (chapter 4) and the ideological agreement between a party’s voters, members, and candidates (chapter 5). Here, we extend the analysis to a separate link in the chain of representation of societal interests in the political process: the relationship between a party’s members and its candidates for national legislative office. We further contribute to a deeper understanding of member-based representation by pushing beyond the general left-right dimension to look at member-candidate (dis)agreement on substantive issues other than (and often orthogonal to) left-right issues.

Another major theme of this book revolves around the amount and types of influence that party members have within their parties. Our work here clearly speaks to this topic in its focus on understanding variation in the demand within a party's membership for more influence in the party's decision making. Here, the chapter connects to the findings of both the preceding chapters' interest in ideological agreement within parties and chapter 10's examination of intra-party democracy. As the introductory chapter of the book anticipates, in practice, questions related to representation and influence connect with one another in theoretically explicable patterns.

Within this chapter, we seek to answer an overarching research question related to member-based representation and influence and hence on how party members contribute to parties' participatory linkage. Acknowledging the existence of intra-party disagreement, we ask if party members that see themselves as more ideologically distant from the positions of their parties' candidates are more likely to favour heightened power for members on internal party decision-making. In order to answer this question, we combine data on candidates from the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS) for the first time with independent surveys of party members in Denmark (Kosiara-Pedersen 2017), Norway (Jupskås and Heidar 2009), and Sweden (Kölln and Polk 2017).

The chapter's findings directly contribute to two of the book's themes: representation and influence. Our results show that ideological disagreement between party members and party candidates in the three Scandinavian countries is associated with more support for direct democratic internal party decision making from party members. More specifically, our analysis suggests that greater member-candidate incongruence on general left-right (all three countries), immigration preferences (only in Norway and Sweden), and European integration (only in Sweden) are each associated with more support for important decisions facing the party being taken directly by the entire membership.

Candidates, Members, and Ideological Preferences

Research stressing the representative character of political parties argues that party members fulfil functions of social and opinion representation that are important for democratic politics (see e.g., Kölln 2017; May 1973; Müller and Katz 1997; Scarrow and Gezgor 2010; Widfeldt 1995, 1999). Since members can directly influence policy output without being democratically legitimized, for example, via candidate selection (Lundell 2004), it is important to know if the opinions of party members resemble those of a party's candidates for elected office. In other words, according to

theories of representative democracy, party candidates should ideally match members' ideological position.

But ideological congruence between candidates and members is also important from an accountability point of view. The delegation model of representation stresses what happens within parties. Party members or congresses select candidates to run for office and thus delegate to candidates, which makes members or party congress the principal and candidates the agents (see Wolkenstein 2018; but also Müller 2000; Neto and Strøm 2006). If the political preferences of candidates do not match those of members, delegation has failed, at least in part. Both perspectives share the understanding that congruence in political preferences between party candidates and members is beneficial.

Existing theoretical and empirical literature has already investigated the opinion structure within political parties. John May (1973) famously asserted that mid-level elites, such as party members, are more likely to hold ideologically extreme views than the party elite (MPs, members of the executive, or election candidates) or the non-elite – party voters (May 1973, 135–36; Narud and Skare 1999, 46–47). Although many studies have looked at the ideological agreement between a party's leadership, its mid-level elite, and a party's voters, fewer have done so in a cross-national setting. Further, while a growing number of congruence studies examine the positions of parliamentary candidates (e.g., Andreadis and Stavrakakis, 2017; Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema, 2012; Leimgruber, Hangartner, and Leemann, 2010), we are not aware of any study that compares party members and parliamentary candidates within such a framework.

In this chapter, we take this up by examining the extent to which a distinct group of the mid-level elite, party members, differ in their ideological positions from a distinct part of the party elite, candidates for office, and if so, with what consequences. Our focus on the relationship between members and candidates concerns a key intermediary in the chain of representation and a possible source of tension for party-based governance.

Albert Hirschman's (1970) theory of exit, voice, and loyalty (EVL) has been widely used in various aspects of political science (see Clark, Golder, and Golder [2017] for a recent overview). From the perspective of research on party members, we see a number of ways that this general theory of varied responses to organizational decline could be productively applied to parties in an era of diminishing membership. For example, prior research provides evidence that members are more likely to consider voting for another party (disloyalty) or even quitting their current party (exit) if they disagree with

the ideological position of the party leadership (Kölln and Polk 2017; Kosiara-Pedersen 2016; Polk and Kölln 2018; van Haute and Carty 2012). Here we focus on a different aspect of the EVL framework, namely voice, by examining the effect of ideological disagreement (or incongruence) between members and candidates on members' attitudes towards intra-party decision-making.

This perspective complements research on principal-agent relationships in party-based parliamentary democracies (see Müller 2000; Neto and Strøm 2006; Wolkenstein 2018). While the traditional delegate model understands voters as principals and members of parliament as agents, recent research points out that such a model 'turns a blind eye to the internal life of parties' (Wolkenstein 2018, 440). Party members or a party congress usually select candidates, who are then available to the electorate for further delegation. Accordingly, party members and voters have to be conceived as 'co-principals' (Wolkenstein 2018, 440), and both members and candidates could arguably be conceived as part of the commonly known 'parliamentary chain of delegation' (Neto and Strøm 2006, 623).

Both theoretical frameworks – EVL and the chain of delegation – have similar implications for instances when party candidates' political preferences are not in line with those of members. But both first require one to assume that party members know about the *general* position of their own party candidates on major political issues. There are good reasons to think this might be the case. Candidates running for parliament have strong incentives to communicate their political positions. This is especially true for majoritarian electoral systems or those with open-list proportional representation, as in the three Scandinavian countries (Lijphart 2012). In addition, there is evidence from research on parliamentary voting behaviour that voters are able to obtain information about their candidates when it is useful to them (see e.g., Shugart et al. 2005). If this is true, then we should expect party members to be quite good at obtaining information about their candidates as well since they both have an incentive for and interest in doing so. In particular, we do not expect that they will have detailed information about all candidates and on all issues, but we think it is more likely that members have a general sense of who the party nominated for election. We therefore conceptualize ideological disagreement between members and candidates as the distance between candidates' *central tendency* on the left-right dimension and party members' own self-placement on the same scale.

Our expectation is that party members that are more ideologically distant from the mean position of their party's parliamentary candidates will voice their dissatisfaction and be more likely to favour decision-making structures within the party that privilege party members. Several studies show that,

in addition to other factors such as professional ambition, a major reason that citizens join political parties is to influence policy (Bruter and Harrison 2009; van Haute and Gauja 2015; see chapter 3 of this volume). If the issue preferences of a party member coincide or closely align with those of the candidates for parliament, that party member could be relatively confident that her policy preferences will be pursued by the party leadership and the party in parliament no matter the decision-making structure within the party or the style of representation of the candidates. However, if there is more ideological disagreement between the preferences of a party member and those of the party's parliamentary candidates, the member should be more inclined to forgo delegation altogether and prefer intra-party decision-making procedures that maximize the voice of party members in relation to other segments of the party, such as the leadership.

Greater decision-making power for individual members would be at the expense of individual candidates as well as the party leadership. Candidates enjoy a more prominent position within the party because they were chosen to be the public faces to win the national election. Those candidates that are successfully elected into parliament receive even more power, at least in relation to members. It means that even if candidates or elected candidates are still less powerful than the party leadership, they are more powerful than ordinary members. Therefore, we anticipate that ideological differences between members and the average candidates will lead members to demand a stronger role in the party's decision-making process to forgo delegation. This leads to our central hypothesis:

The larger the ideological distance between a party member and her party's parliamentary candidates, the more the member supports direct democratic features for party decision making.

Data and Research Design

Empirically, our analysis relies on the most recent membership surveys from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden as well as the Comparative Candidate Surveys in the same Scandinavian countries from a comparable time period. Party members are particularly difficult to survey because political parties often guard access to them. Therefore, coordinated cross-country efforts to survey members are difficult to achieve. However, the research community has recently started to harmonize existing data and has launched a new membership survey across Europe in order to arrive at a comparable data set (van Haute and Gauja 2015). For the current analysis, this means that the existing surveys are comparable across countries only to a limited extent. Nonetheless, survey researchers across the

Nordic countries have paid particular attention to lining up their surveys to similar projects, such as national election studies or candidate surveys. We take advantage of these efforts and use a combination of party membership and party candidate surveys to test our individual-level party member expectations.

For Denmark, we use the 2012 Party Membership Survey (Kosiara-Pedersen 2017), which contains information on 22,415 members of nine political parties. Unlike in most other chapters for Norway, we use the 2009 Norwegian Party Membership Survey (Jupskås and Heidar 2009), which records a total of 3,315 members belonging to seven political parties. We use this survey and not the 2016 wave in order to maximize temporal comparability with the Norwegian candidate study. Finally, 10,392 respondents from seven political parties participated in the 2015 Swedish Party Membership Survey (Kölln and Polk 2017). This means that we can test our hypothesis in three countries with a total of 23 parties and more than 36,000 party members. For more information on the party membership surveys, see chapter 1.

The candidate data come from the Comparative Candidate Survey (CCS), Module 1 (CCS 2016) and Module 2 (CCS 2018). The survey measures candidates' genuine preferences as opposed to the electorally revealed preferences because it is an anonymous survey (Willumsen and Öhberg 2017). The same questionnaires were sent out to the entire population of candidates standing for national election in Denmark in 2011, Norway in 2009, and Sweden in 2014. The membership surveys in Denmark and Sweden were fielded after the candidate surveys, while the Norwegian membership survey preceded the candidate survey. Unlike the Danish and Swedish cases, the timing of the surveys in Norway means that our measurement point for the members precedes that for the candidates by about six months. While this is certainly not ideal from a research design perspective, there is reason to assume that candidates did not significantly change their attitudes during this period. First, these were the six months leading up to the national election and candidates most likely knew about their candidacy then and had possibly announced it – if not publicly, then at least within the party. Any major change in preferences even over the course of six months is less likely because it would signal inconsistency. Second, our measures of political preferences are either very broad, such as left-right self-placement, or very salient, such as opinions on immigration issues. While it is certainly conceivable that a candidate would change her position over the course of the six months leading up to the election on some issues, we think that – given the breadth and salience of our issues – major attitudinal change is less likely. Thirdly, we do not measure individual candidates' positions but

aggregate them to a common average. We therefore assume that Norwegian party members already had a good idea of their candidates' average position on major political issues six months before the candidate survey was conducted.

Response rates for the CCS are around 50 per cent for all three countries, and the number of respondents per country is sufficiently high to conduct meaningful analyses. The Danish sample includes 375 respondents, the Norwegian 1,015, and the Swedish 1,872.ⁱⁱ The candidate survey in Sweden was conducted via Internet, while the Danish and Norwegian surveys were conducted with a written questionnaire.ⁱⁱⁱ

We use comparable operationalizations to test our hypothesis across the three countries. We begin with the idea that party members and candidates could report themselves at different positions on the general left-right ideological scale. This item is identical and available in all six surveys, ranging from 0 to 10. It means that we can directly compare the individual positions of candidates and members across and within countries. We operationalize ideological incongruence as the absolute distance between the self-placement of a party member on the 0–10 general left-right scale and the mean position of the parliamentary candidates from that member's party.

Left-right self-placement is a good and important first indicator for a general overview of ideological disagreement within a party (see chapter 5 in this volume). However, this general disagreement between members and candidates might be the result of particular issues. To test for that possibility, we move, in a second step, over to individual political issues and measure the level of (dis)agreement on important political statements.

In particular, we are interested in the extent to which contentious issues of party competition also play a role in members' demands for intra-party democracy. In Scandinavia, as well as elsewhere in Europe, the issue of immigration has become one such contentious policy area. Despite the historical dominance of left-right party competition in the region, changes in the party system dynamics of Europe suggest that specific issues such as immigration or European integration are mobilized by challenger parties, which have enhanced their electoral prospects by doing so (Hobolt and de Vries 2015; Hobolt and Tilley 2016; Pardos-Prado 2015; van der Wardt et al. 2014).

For the Norwegian and Swedish cases, a survey item asking about immigration attitudes is available that is comparable within and across countries. The strong relationship between attitudes towards


immigration and the liberal-authoritarian dimension (see, e.g., Borre and Andersen 1997; Kriesi et al. 2006) helps us examine the effect of socio-cultural candidate-member incongruence. The Norwegian surveys asked respondents for their level of support on the statement ‘It is important for immigrants to adapt to Norwegian customs and norms’, while the comparable item in the candidate survey reads ‘Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of [country].’ The items are obviously not identical because the candidate survey’s wording is stronger than the membership survey’s. However, these items are still sufficiently similar in meaning and direction that we can test our hypothesis on this item. A total of five response options are provided, ranging from ‘agree completely’ to ‘disagree completely’. In Sweden, both the membership survey and the CCS asked respondents about their support for the following statement: ‘Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of Sweden’, with response options ranging from ‘very good proposal’ (= 1) to ‘very bad proposal’ (= 5). For the analysis, we reversed the coding of all items to measure support for this cultural immigration item, and we calculated the absolute distance measures for these questions in the same way that we described above for the general left-right dimension.

In addition to these concrete political statements and issues, we also consider a European Union (EU)-related question, which was only available for both the membership and the candidate surveys in Sweden. Although party positions on European integration are interrelated with economic left-right and liberal-authoritarian positions, this varies substantially country to country, and in all member states, the inclusion of an EU-specific dimension adds explanatory power (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012). Additionally, voter-party incongruence on the EU dimension was associated with higher levels of vote switching in the 2014 European Parliament elections (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2018). The EU has been a somewhat contentious issue in Scandinavia, as evidenced by, for example, the rejection of the euro in Denmark and Sweden. Specifically, we measure support for the statement ‘Some think European integration should go further, others think it has already gone too far.’ The original response options range from 0 to 10, and our measures for party members are simply derived from computing again the absolute distance between individual members and their candidates’ mean position.

For our dependent variable, we require a measure that pertains to party members’ satisfaction with internal democracy. This is a relatively new measure that is (not yet) standardized across the surveys. It means that we do not have a single measure that is the same across the three countries. However, all three surveys asked party members about their assessments of intra-party democracy in some form and so we were able to find appropriate survey measures in the three countries. Membership ballots

are just one dimension of intra-party democracy, yet arguably a very important one that also regularly attracts media attention (see e.g., Bolin et al. 2017). For Norway, we take the share of members per party agreeing with the following statement on party policy: ‘On major and important matters, the decision should depend on the results of a *binding ballot* in which all members may vote.’ The alternative response options were that the national congress should have the final say (with and without an advisory ballot by members). And so we can take the share of members agreeing with the statement above as an individual-level measure of preferences for more intra-party democracy. The Swedish and Danish surveys contain a number of questions on intra-party democracy, and one in particular that is rather similar to the one found in the Norwegian survey. In Sweden, members were asked for their level of support for the following statement: ‘The most important decisions should be taken directly by all members.’ The Danish survey included a similar statement: ‘Membership ballots are necessary to strengthen party democracy.’ In both cases the five response options ranged from ‘strongly disagree’ (=1) to ‘strongly agree’ (=5), plus a ‘don’t know’ option. The upper panel of figure 11.1 shows the distribution of our intra-party democracy variable for the Danish case, while the middle and lower panels document the distribution within and across Norwegian and Swedish parties, respectively.

Figure 11.1: Distribution of members’ intra-party democracy demands in Danish (upper panel), Norwegian (middle panel), and Swedish (lower panel) parties.







Figure 11.1 Continued. Note: Figure shows the percentage of members per answer category and party. The parties are ordered based on their party family belonging from left to right.

Substantively, this first descriptive view of the dependent variable(s) shows that party members belonging to different parties hold very different views on how much direct power they should have. In Denmark, the highest support for more membership power can be found amongst members of the Left Socialist Party (Enhedslisten; EL), while several parties share similarly low levels of support for the same proposition, namely the Christian Democrats (KD), the Liberal Alliance (LA), and the Social Liberals (RV). In Norway, the highest and lowest levels of support are exhibited amongst members of the Progress Party (FrP) and the Conservative Party (H), respectively. Amongst Swedish parties, it is Green Party (Mp) members that show the highest level of support for direct power exerted by members. Perhaps surprisingly, the lowest level of support can be found amongst the Social Democrats (S).

In our models, we control for members' age, gender, and level of activity within the party with the expectation that those that are more engaged will be more satisfied and less demanding of a greater voice within the party. We also expect activity levels to be negatively associated with preferences for more intra-party democracy because those that are more engaged in the party or even belong to the mid-level elite (because they hold a local office) would not gain more power if more rights were passed to ordinary members. In fact, they would potentially lose power. Age and gender serve as very basic demographic control variables. For Denmark and Sweden, the activity variable is an ordinal variable that measured the hours spent on party activity per month, while we have a different measure available in Norway. Activity levels here are measured through a question that asked members to indicate how often they had participated in 'branch meetings, seminars, gatherings, parties' during the past year. Responses were measured on a five-point ordinal scale ranging from once to more than 20 times.

Results

Figure 11.2 first shows a portion of the data that was already presented in chapter 5. However, this figure is restricted to the positions of members and candidates alone and to the three countries of interest for this particular chapter. To quickly repeat, the results show that the average distances between candidates and members seem to be generally smaller compared to differences in the other countries. Interestingly, amongst Danish and Norwegian parties, candidates seem to be consistently more left leaning than their

own members – irrespective of the general political leaning of the party. Across all three countries, we see substantial variation in the level of ideological (dis)agreement between the average candidates’ and members’ positions.




Figure 11.2: Left-right self-placement of candidates and members across parties and countries.

But to what extent are these distances related to members’ preferences for more power within the party? According to our hypothesis, members that are more ideologically distant from their party’s candidate should prefer to forgo delegation and demand more direct power for members. We test our individual-level hypotheses by estimating several random intercept ordinary least square regression models (for the Danish and Swedish data) and general linear mixed-effects models (for the Norwegian data because of the binary nature of the dependent variable) with party as the grouping variable in order to deal with the nested structure of the data. With the exception of binary measures, we standardized all independent variables to a mean of 0 and a variance of 1 to facilitate comparisons (Gelman 2008).

Table 11.1: Results of modelling support for party membership decision making in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden: Random intercept regressions with coefficients and standard errors.

	DK		NO		SE	
	<i>B</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>Log-odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>std. Error</i>
Fixed Parts						
(Intercept)	3.33 ***	0.12	-2.01***	0.14	3.09 ***	0.05
age	0.11 ***	0.02	-0.58 ***	0.18	-0.09 ***	0.03
female	0.07 ***	0.02	0.29	0.17	-0.06 *	0.03
activity	-0.05 **	0.02	-0.23	0.17	-0.07 **	0.03
incongruence left-right (abs.)	0.10 ***	0.02	0.30	0.17	0.20 ***	0.03
Random Parts						
Residual variance	1.036		--		1.309	
Variance intercept _{party}	0.135		0.054		0.013	
N _{party}	9		7		7	
Observations	15137		1227		8000	
R ² / Tjur's D	.133		.019		.024	
AIC	43552.102		969.797		24889.645	

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

DVs: 'Membership ballots are necessary to strengthen party democracy' (DK); 'On major and important matters, the decision should depend on the results of a binding ballot in which all

members may vote' (1= selected, 0 = national congress final say (with and without advisory ballot by members) (NO); 'The most important decisions should be taken directly by all members' (SE).

We first test our hypothesis with respect to absolute ideological incongruence in all three countries with comparable variables across models. With respect to our central variable of interest, model 1 and model 3 on the Danish and Swedish data, respectively, show that ideological disagreement between a party member and the mean position of that party's parliamentary candidates has a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable. According to the models' results, it is also the strongest predictor of members demanding more influence. Although we cannot make any causal claims, this is consistent with our hypothesis that a larger ideological gap between a party member and the party's candidates will be associated with more support for membership-based decision making within the party. And although the coefficient on incongruence is also positive in the Norwegian case, it is not statistically significant and thus does not support our hypothesis. Table 11.1 further shows that across all three countries, the only uniform pattern that emerges for the control variables is that activity levels are negatively correlated with support for more member power, and significantly so in Denmark and Sweden: more active party members are less likely to favour members taking the most important decisions. This could be related to role of those members within the party since members that report spending a lot of time on party work are also likely to hold an office in the party.

Some results change when we include other relevant variables in the model. In Table 11.2, we estimate similar models based on the Norwegian data and Swedish data but this time making use of additional variables likely connected to intra-party disagreement and demands for more intra-party democracy available across the surveys: immigration attitudes and leadership dissatisfaction. We already know that dissatisfaction with leadership affects party members' exit and voice behaviour (Polk and Kölln 2018; Kölln and Polk 2017; van Haute and Carty 2012; see also chapter 7), and we therefore control for general leadership dissatisfaction, working from the expectation that less satisfaction with leadership will also increase demand for individual member influence. In the Norwegian survey, leadership dissatisfaction was measured with a five-point support scale for the statement 'The central party leadership

is good at paying attention to the views of ordinary party members.’ The Swedish membership survey asked directly about general satisfaction with the party leadership on a five-point scale. In both cases, we reversed the coding to measure dissatisfaction with the expectation that those members that are generally dissatisfied with the leadership will also be more likely to demand more influence and might see themselves as ideologically more distant from the next level of representation, that is, candidates. We again control for members’ age, gender, and activity levels, and include general dissatisfaction with the party leadership.

Table 11.2: Norway. Results of modelling support for party membership decision making in Norway and Sweden: Random intercept mixed-effects with coefficients and standard errors.

	Model 1(NO)		Model 2 (NO)		Model 3 (SE)		Model 4 (SE)	
	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>Log-Odds</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>std. Error</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>std. Error</i>
Fixed Parts								
(Intercept)	-2.03 ***	0.17	-2.17 ***	0.23	3.09 ***	0.05	3.09 ***	0.06
age	-0.63 ***	0.18	-0.72 ***	0.19	-0.09 ***	0.03	-0.07 *	0.03
female	0.32	0.17	0.35 *	0.18	-0.06 *	0.03	-0.03	0.03
activity	-0.23	0.17	-0.22	0.18	-0.06 *	0.03	-0.05	0.03
incongruence left-right (abs.)	0.28	0.17	0.36 *	0.18	0.18 ***	0.03	0.17 ***	0.03
incongruence immigration (abs.)	0.45 *	0.18	0.41 *	0.18	0.17 ***	0.03	0.15 ***	0.03
dissatisfaction leader			1.22 ***	0.18			0.34 ***	0.03

Random Parts

Residual variance	--	--	1.302	1.277
Variance intercept _{party}	0.106	0.273	0.014	0.024
N _{party}	7	7	7	7
Observations	1227	1227	8000	8000
Tjur's D/ R ²	.026	.081	.029	.048
AIC	965.722	917.507	24849.072	24700.497

Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$. Data not available for Denmark.

Despite some differences in survey items between the Swedish and Norwegian surveys, the results are surprisingly similar. Table 11.2 shows that older members tend not to support more grass-roots' decision-making power. But they also show for our variables of interest, firstly, that incongruence between members and candidates on the specific issue of cultural immigration has an independent effect on support for more membership power (models 1 and 3). It suggests that the contentious issue of immigration matters for members' demand for more influence within parties in these two countries. Secondly, the results of models 2 and 4 also show that this effect diminishes in size only slightly once we control for leadership dissatisfaction. What is more, model 2 on the Norwegian data also now shows a statistically significant effect of general left-right incongruence on more membership power within the party. On the basis of these most fully specified models on the Norwegian and Swedish data, it appears that members do take the chain of representation seriously and increase their support for more membership influence when their party candidates' have divergent attitudes on the general left-right dimension and immigration. These results are supportive of our hypothesis. In this context, it is worth mentioning that neither of these incongruence measures was the strongest predictor but that instead leadership dissatisfaction turned out to be the strongest correlate of members' desire to have more intra-party influence in Norwegian and Swedish parties.

Finally, and in order to potentially get more insight into the extent to which disagreement over particular issues is important, we bring a measure of incongruence on EU attitudes that is only available in Sweden in the fourth model. Table 11.3 documents that when we include the measure of EU incongruence, the sizes of the coefficients for the other substantive variables are reduced, and also that EU incongruence has a positive and statistically significant association with support for more intra-party influence for members. This further supports our hypothesis about the relationship between ideological disagreement and demand for more voice within the party from members because even when controlling for disagreement in individual issues, member-candidate incongruence on general ideology is still positively related to demand for more intra-party democracy.

Table 11.3: Sweden. Results of modelling support for party membership decision making in Sweden: Random intercept mixed-effects with coefficients and standard errors.

	SE	
	<i>B</i>	<i>std. Error</i>
Fixed Parts		
(Intercept)	3.08 ***	0.06
age	-0.06 *	0.03
female	-0.02	0.03
activity	-0.05	0.02
incongruence left-right (abs.)	0.15 ***	0.03
incongruence immigration (abs.)	0.13 ***	0.03
dissatisfaction leadership	0.32 ***	0.03
incongruence EU (abs.)	0.16 ***	0.03
Random Parts		
Residual variance	1.272	

Variance intercept _{party}	0.024
N _{party}	7
Observations	8000
R ²	.052
AIC	24666.448
Notes: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.	

Discussion

This chapter set out to compare the ideological preferences of party members and candidates for parliament in Scandinavian countries. We combined party membership surveys from Denmark, Norway, and Sweden with data from the Comparative Candidate Surveys in the same countries in order to examine the relationship between ideological disagreement (which we call incongruence) and party members voicing more demand for more intra-party democracy within their political party. Based on exit, voice, and loyalty theory and institutionalist theory, our central proposition was that larger distances between a party member and the mean position of that member's parliamentary candidates would be associated with greater demand for membership-based decision making within the party. The results of the analyses are consistent with our hypothesis on general left-right placement and for all three countries: with increasing ideological incongruence between members and candidates, party members are more likely to voice their dissatisfaction and express a preference for increased intra-party membership influence. Our more detailed analyses on individual issues in Norway and Sweden also indicate that larger distances between party members and candidates on immigration preferences (both countries) and a separate item on European integration (only Sweden) have independent associations with member preferences for more grass-roots' decision-making power.

The harmonization of party membership surveys in European countries is still in its early stages. In this chapter, we have wrestled with differences in question wording, survey mode, and survey timing that complicate comparative analysis and substantially qualify the generalizability of our findings. Nevertheless, progress is being made on this front, and this chapter presents a fuller comparison of members and candidates for parliament across these countries. The relationship between party members and

parliamentary candidates remains a promising area for future research on party-based representation across Europe.

This book is centrally concerned with understanding the role of party members in contemporary political parties in four areas: reach, representation, activity, and influence. These sub-topics all serve the more general purpose of examining whether or not ‘parties organize effective member-based linkages between civil society and the state’. Our results speak most clearly to questions related to the themes of representation and influence and provide preliminary support for the idea that ideological disagreements between parties and candidates for office, and thus issues related to the representational function of parties, have consequences for how members view their connection to their party and how they choose to express themselves within the organization. Members’ demands for more influence within their party also seem to be connected to how well the party works in representing their preferences.

Bibliography

- Andreadis, Ioannis, and Yannis Stavrakakis. 2017. "European Populist Parties in Government: How Well Are Voters Represented? Evidence from Greece." *Swiss Political Science Review* 23 (4): 485–508.
- Bakker, Ryan, Seth Jolly, and Jonathan Polk. 2012. "Complexity in the European Party Space: Exploring Dimensionality with Experts." *European Union Politics* 13 (2): 219–45.
- Bakker, Ryan, Seth Jolly, and Jonathan Polk. 2018. "Multidimensional Incongruence and Vote Switching in Europe." *Public Choice* 176 (1–2): 267–96.
- Bolin, Niklas, Nicholas Aylott, Benjamin von dem Berge, and Thomas Poguntke. 2017. "Patterns of Intra-Party Democracy across the World." In *Organizing Political Parties: Representation, Participation, and Power*, edited by Susan E. Scarrow, Paul Webb, and Thomas Poguntke, 158–86. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Borre, Ole, and Jørgen Goul Andersen. 1997. *Voting and Political Attitudes in Denmark: A Study of the 1994 Election*. Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.
- Bruter, Michael, and Sarah Harrison. 2009. "Tomorrow's Leaders? Understanding the Involvement of Young Party Members in Six European Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 42 (10): 1259–91.
- Clark, William Roberts, Matt Golder, and Sona N. Golder. 2017. "The British Academy Brian Barry Prize Essay: An Exit, Voice and Loyalty Model of Politics." *British Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 719–48.
- Costello, Rory, Jacques Thomassen, and Martin Rosema. 2012. "European Parliament Elections and Political Representation: Policy Congruence between Voters and Parties." *West European Politics* 35 (6): 1226–48.
- Cross, William P., and Richard S. Katz. 2013. *The Challenges of Intra-Party Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- CCS. 2016. Comparative Candidates Survey Module I – 2005–2013 [Dataset - cumulative file]. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne, 2016.
- CCS. 2018. Comparative Candidates Survey Module II – 2013–2016 [Dataset - cumulative file]. Distributed by FORS, Lausanne, 2018.
- Gelman, Andrew. 2008. “Scaling Regression Inputs by Dividing by Two Standard Deviations.” *Statistics in Medicine* 27: 2865–73.
- Hirschman, Albert. 1970. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hobolt, Sara B., and Catherine E. de Vries. 2015. “Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty Competition.” *Comparative Political Studies* 48 (9): 1159–85.
- Hobolt, Sara B., and James Tilley. 2016. “Fleeing the Centre: The Rise of Challenger Parties in the Aftermath of the Euro Crisis.” *West European Politics* 39 (5). Routledge: 971–91.
- Jupskås, Anders, and Knut Heidar. 2009. Norwegian Party Member Survey 2009. Department of Political Science, University of Oslo.
- Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 1995. “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party.” *Party Politics* 1 (1): 5–28.
- Katz, Richard S., and Peter Mair. 2009. “The Cartel Party Thesis: A Restatement.” *Perspectives on Politics* 7 (4): 753–66.
- Kölln, Ann-Kristin. 2016. “Party Membership in Europe: Testing Party-Level Explanations of Decline.” *Party Politics* 22 (4): 465–77.
- Kölln, Ann-Kristin. 2017. “Has Party Members’ Representativeness Changed Over Time?” In *Larmar Och Gör Sig till. SOM-Undersökningen 2016, SOM-Rapport Nr 70*, edited by Ulrika Andersson, Jonas Ohlsson, Henrik Oscarsson, and Maria Oskarson, 387–400. Gothenburg: SOM-Institut.

- Kölln, Ann-Kristin, and Jonathan Polk. 2017. "Emancipated Party Members: Examining Ideological Incongruence within Political Parties." *Party Politics* 23 (1): 18–29.
- Kosiara-Pedersen, Karina. 2016. "Why Are Members on the Way out of Their Political Youth Organization?" University of Gothenburg Centre for European Research Working Paper Series, 2016:8.
- Kosiara-Pedersen, Karina. 2017. *Demokratiets ildsjæle - Partimedlemmer i Danmark*. København: Djøf Forlag.
- Kriesi, Hanspeter, Edgar Grande, Romain Lachat, Martin Dolezal, Simon Bornschier, and Timotheos Frey. 2006. "Globalization and the Transformation of the National Political Space: Six European Countries Compared." *European Journal of Political Research* 45 (6): 921–56.
- Leimgruber, Philipp, Dominik Hangartner, and Lucas Leemann. 2010. "Comparing Candidates and Citizens in the Ideological Space." *Swiss Political Science Review* 16 (J3): 499–531.
- Lijphart, Arend. 2012. *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*, 2nd ed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lundell, Krister. 2004. "Determinants of Candidate Selection: The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 10 (1): 25–47.
- May, John D. 1973. "Opinion Structures of Political Parties: The Special Law of Curvilinear Disparity." *Political Studies* 21: 135–51.
- Müller, Wolfgang C., and Richard S. Katz. 1997. "Party as Linkage." *European Journal of Political Research* 31: 169–78.
- Müller, Wolfgang C. 2000. "Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work." *European Journal of Political Research* 37: 309–33.

- Narud, Hanne Marthe, and Audun Skare. 1999. "Are Party Activists the Party Extremists? The Structure of Opinion in Political Parties." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 22 (1): 45–65.
- Neto, Octavio Amorim, and Kaare Strøm. 2006. "Breaking the Parliamentary Chain of Delegation: Presidents and Non-Partisan Cabinet Members." *British Journal of Political Science* 36 (4): 619–43.
- Pardos-Prado, Sergi. 2015. "How Can Mainstream Parties Prevent Niche Party Success? Center-Right Parties and the Immigration Issue." *The Journal of Politics* 77 (2): 352–67.
- Poguntke, Thomas, Susan E. Scarrow, Paul D. Webb, Elin H. Allern, Nicholas Aylott, Ingrid van Biezen, Enrico Calossi, et al. 2016. "Party Rules, Party Resources and the Politics of Parliamentary Democracies." *Party Politics* 22 (6): 661–78.
- Polk, Jonathan, and Ann-Kristin Kölln. 2018. "Electoral Infidelity: Why Party Members Cast Defecting Votes." *European Journal of Political Research* 57 (2): 539–60.
- Scarrow, Susan E., and Burcu Gezgor. 2010. "Declining Memberships, Changing Members? European Political Party Members in a New Era." *Party Politics* 16 (6): 823–43.
- Scarrow, Susan E., Paul Webb, and David M. Farrell. 2000. "From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties." In *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, edited by Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, 129–53. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schumacher, Gijs, and Nathalie Giger. 2017. "Who Leads the Party? On Membership Size, Selectorates and Party Oligarchy." *Political Studies* 65 (IS): 162–81.
- Shugart, Matthew Søberg, Melody Ellis Valdini, and Kati Suominen. 2005. "Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2): 437–49.

- Van Biezen, Ingrid, Peter Mair, and Thomas Poguntke. 2012. "Going, Going, ... Gone? The Decline of Party Membership in Contemporary Europe." *European Journal of Political Research* 51 (1): 24–56.
- Van der Wardt, Marc. 2014. "Putting the damper on: Do parties de-emphasize issues in response to internal divisions among their supporters?" *Party Politics*, 20(3): 330–340.
- van Haute, Emilie, and R. Kenneth Carty. 2012. "Ideological Misfits: A Distinctive Class of Party Members." *Party Politics* 18 (6): 885–95.
- van Haute, Emilie, and Anika Gauja, eds. 2015. *Party Members and Activists*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Widfeldt, Anders. 1995. "Party Membership and Party Representativeness." In *Citizens and the State*, edited by Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, 134–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Widfeldt, Anders. 1999. "Losing Touch? The Political Representativeness of Swedish Parties, 1985-1994." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 22: 307–26.
- Willumsen, David M., and Patrik Öhberg. 2017. "Toe the Line, Break the Whip: Explaining Floor Dissent in Parliamentary Democracies." *West European Politics* 40 (4): 688–716.
- Wolkenstein, Fabio. 2018. "Membership Ballots and the Value of Intra-Party Democracy." *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* 21 (4): 433–55.

Appendix

Table 11.A1: Frequency distribution of respondents per party and country in the Comparative Candidate Survey.		
DK (2011)		N
	Enhedslisten	59
	Socialistisk Folkeparti	46
	Socialdemokratiet	35
	Radikale Venstre	35
	Kristendemokraterne	46
	Liberal Alliance	36
	Venstre	40
	Konservativt Folkeparti	36
	Dansk Folkeparti	42
NO (2009)	Sosialistisk Venstreparti	155
	Arbeiderpartiet	150
	Senterpartiet	147
	Kristelig Folkeparti	140
	Venstre	136
	Hoyre	131
	Fremskrittpartiet	147
SE (2014)	Vanstre	328
	Socialdemokraterna	307
	Miljopartiet	289
	Feministisk initiativ	20
	Kristdemokraterna	189
	Folkpartiet	264
	Moderaterna	327

¹ Authors are listed in alphabetical order; both authors contributed equally and to all parts of the chapter. The authors received funding from the Swedish Research Council project 2016-01810.

ⁱⁱ Table 11.A1 in the Appendix lists the number of respondents per party and country.

ⁱⁱⁱ For more information on the candidate surveys, please visit:

<http://www.comparativecandidates.org>