



LUND UNIVERSITY

Teaching the Russian War Against Ukraine

Ukraine as a Microcosm of the Paradigm Shift from International Relations to Planetary Politics

Manners, Ian

Published in:
Teaching IR in Wartime

2025

Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Manners, I. (2025). Teaching the Russian War Against Ukraine: Ukraine as a Microcosm of the Paradigm Shift from International Relations to Planetary Politics . In K. Zarembo, M. Knodt, & M. Yakovlyev (Eds.), *Teaching IR in Wartime: Experiences of University Lecturers during Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine* (pp. 21-52). Ibidem-Verlag.

Total number of authors:
1

Creative Commons License:
CC BY-NC-ND

General rights

Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply:
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

Read more about Creative commons licenses: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/>

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

LUND UNIVERSITY

PO Box 117
221 00 Lund
+46 46-222 00 00



Kateryna Zarembo, Michèle Knodt, and
Maksym Yakovlyev (eds.)

TEACHING IR IN TIMES OF WAR

*Experiences of University Lecturers during
Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine*

ibidem

Teaching the Russian War Against Ukraine Ukraine as a Microcosm of the Paradigm Shift from International Relations to Planetary Politics

*Ian Manners*¹

The 30-year period of Ukrainian independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union did not feature much, if at all, in the teaching of IR in western European universities. The 2013–2014 Maidan Revolution and 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the Donbas featured as interesting events in IR, while the 2016 EU-Ukraine Free Trade Area and 2017 Association Agreement were also interesting to EU studies. However, neither Ukraine nor these events were widely taught in western European IR or EU studies prior to the Russian invasion on 24 February 2022. This article analyzes the impact of the Russian war against Ukraine on the teaching of IR and EU studies in Europe. It argues that Ukrainian resistance to the invasion is part of an important shift in thinking about IR and the EU in empirical and theoretical terms, as well as accelerating a changed pedagogic paradigm to teaching IR and EU studies within holistic planetary politics.

The article does this in four steps by drawing on personal experiences of teaching, research publications and textbooks from the period 1991–2024. First, the article introduces the terminologies and technologies of teaching IR and EU studies, Ukraine and Russia, EU enlargement and the “post-Soviet space” after the end of the Cold War. Second, the article analyzes the conventional teaching of IR and EU studies in Western Europe, 1991–2022, by looking at what

1 I am very grateful to Kateryna Zarembo, Michèle Knodt, Maksym Yakovlyev, Thomas Fetzer, Mridula Ghosh, Olena Khylyko, Galyna Solovei, Nina Krickel-Choi, Simon Stattin, Ted Svensson, and Anders Uhlin for their thoughtful reflections and critical comments.

was included and excluded in the study of these disciplines using Clarivate Web of Science (SSCI). Third, the article examines the transformation of teaching IR and EU studies after the invasion and counter-offensive of 2022–2024, focusing on the rapid process of re-education and rethinking of teaching about Ukraine and Russia in IR and EU studies courses. Fourth, the article concludes by thinking ahead to the necessary paradigm shift to teaching planetary politics that the Russian war against Ukraine and other 21st-century crises demand. This paradigm shift centers the planet as a whole and de-centers Western and Eurocentric IR and EU studies, ensuring that peripheralized, marginalized, or colonized subjects such as post-colonial Africa, Asia, or post-Soviet Eastern Europe, as well as ecology, stateless peoples, and planetary justice, are properly part of constituting 21st century planetary politics. Thus, the article argues the need to understand Ukraine as a microcosm of symbiotic planetary politics, an example of the wider planetary organic crisis of five symbiotic dimensions of economy, society, ecology, conflict, and polity.

My personal experiences of teaching, research publication, and textbooks come from teaching IR and EU studies at the University of Bristol, Swansea University, University of Kent, Brussels School of International Studies, Malmö University, Roskilde University, University of Copenhagen, and Lund University from 1991 to 2024. During this period, the author taught IR and EU studies at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels almost every year for three decades and has seen trends and fashions come and go. Nevertheless, during this period, these two disciplines have become more confident about teaching disciplinary history and theory as the core, much to the expense of peripheral, marginal, or colonized subjects such as Ukraine. This article addresses this problem by asking questions about the new teaching challenges driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

1. Introduction: Teaching the Russian War Against Ukraine

Americans and Europeans were guided through the new century by a tale about “the end of history,” by what I will call the *politics of inevitability*, a sense that the future is just more of the present, that the laws of progress are known, that there are not alternatives, and therefore nothing really to be done.... Americans and Europeans kept telling themselves their tales of inevitability for a quarter of a century after the end of communism, and so raised a millennial generation without history.... The fates of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus after 1991 showed well enough that the fall of one system did not create a blank slate on which nature generated markets and markets generated rights (Snyder 2018: 7).

The terminologies and technologies of teaching IR and EU studies in western European universities evolved rapidly with the end of the Cold War and the birth of the “New Europe” following Timothy Snyder’s “politics of inevitability.” Narrating the interim period 1991–2022 in terms of teaching IR is impossible; every teaching experience was and is so different, Europe West and Europe East, Global North and Global South. However, there are two features that Timothy Snyder, one of the leading scholars of IR in and between Russia, Europe, and America, uses to describe this period: the *politics of inevitability* and the *politics of eternity*. The *politics of inevitability* since the 1980s is the assumption that there is no alternative to neoliberalism, defined as the privatization of public life, including the deregulation and privatization of nationalized industries, financial services, the welfare state, and government (Manners 2018, 1225). While these neoliberal assumptions survived the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2008 and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis of 2009–2012, the COVID-19 pandemic and the return of the *politics of eternity* challenged hyper-globalization. In contrast, the *politics of eternity* “places one nation at the center of a cyclical story of victimhood” where “eternity politicians manufacture crisis and manipulate the resultant emotion” (Snyder 2018, 8). The past 18 years of democratic decline since 2005 have seen the rise of the *politics of eternity* and eternity politicians across the world (Freedom House 2024).

Reflecting personally on teaching based on syllabi and textbooks provides one route to the experiences of teaching IR and EU studies prior to and after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Having taught courses in IR and EU studies in seven different departments across at least three different countries brings some comparative experience and overview of teaching. These personal reflections will be strengthened by using and developing Felix Berenskötter's (2018) review of "How textbooks cover theories" to assess what extent and how transatlantic IR textbooks cover theories and issues in contemporary IR. A second route to understanding the changes in teaching IR in wartime is to examine the intellectual context in which teaching takes place through a series of longitudinal research publication trends generated using the Clarivate Web of Science SSCI. While SSCI generates a number of analytical problems, it does help provide an overview of the incidence of certain research terms in IR during 1990-2023.² In Section 2, the research terms include "Ukraine," "Crimea," "Donbas(s)" and "environmental," "climate change," and "green." In Section 3, the research terms include "geopolitics," "multipolar," and "neoimperial/neocolonial." In the concluding Section 4, the research terms include "ecology," "climate crisis/emergency," and "planetary politics." These analyses show how the core of IR and EU studies focus on certain subjects, such as geopolitics, in contrast to the peripheralized Ukraine and the climate crisis. Where possible, these terms will also be used to examine the textbooks.

The article then provides both a personal experience of an international university professor during the Russian war against Ukraine but also tries to narrate the terminologies and technologies of teaching IR and EU studies. The analysis of syllabi and textbooks illustrates the changing technologies of teaching IR and EU studies. The analysis of both (pre-)wartime terms and planetary political terms illustrates the changing terminologies of teaching IR and EU

2 The SSCI produces path-dependent citation patterns emphasising US-institutional bias.

studies. The combination of these analyses leads to the argument that Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion is part of an important shift in thinking about IR and the EU in empirical and theoretical terms, accelerating the need for a change in pedagogic paradigms to teaching IR and EU studies.

2. International Relations of the 20th Century

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming the paramount importance of the Charter of the United Nations in the promotion of the rule of law among nations,

1. *Affirms* its commitment to the sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders;

2. *Calls upon* all States to desist and refrain from actions aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine, including any attempts to modify Ukraine's borders through the threat or use of force or other unlawful means;

(United Nations (UN) General Assembly Resolution 68/262 2014)

In general, the teaching of IR over the past 100 years has focused on the conservative state-centric concerns of the 20th century, placing the League of Nations and the UN at the center of study. The February to March 2014 Russian occupation and annexation of Ukrainian Crimea and Donbas led to the 7th March 2014 UN GA resolution 68/262 on the "Territorial integrity of Ukraine" (above). One hundred members voted to defend the principles of the UN Charter and international peace. Ninety-three members declined to defend the UN and international peace. While the failure of so many members to defend UN principles was not unique, this vote and subsequent UN GA votes in 2022 marked the end of 20th-century IR.

Early post-Cold War courses and textbooks were marked by a simultaneous loosening of the intellectual straitjacket and the desire to repack the period into existing intellectual frames. The earliest IR textbooks to capture the post-Cold War shift in thinking included Burchill and Linklater (1996), Brown (1997), and Baylis and Smith (1997). In contrast, the earliest EU textbooks included Nugent

(1994), Wallace and Wallace (1996), McCormick (1999), and Bretherton and Vogler (1999). None of these textbooks considered Ukraine to any extent except as a brief historical footnote in the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Instead, IR and EU courses mixed the ‘classical’ story of IR state-centrism with the ‘new’ story of IR borderless liberalism. The neoliberal aspects of IR, such as globalization and corporatization, focused on the “globalization of world politics” (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2022) and “supraterritoriality” (Scholte 2000), which left Ukraine and its sovereignty, democracy, and politics to the markets of the *politics of inevitability*. The neo-statist aspects of IR, such as nationalism and egoism, focused on “how states think” (Mearsheimer and Rosato 2023) and “rationality in foreign policy” (Stein 2016), which left Ukraine and its sovereignty, security, and politics to the power games of the *politics of eternity*.

During 2000–2004, I taught a master’s course, “European Union Enlargement,” which included topics on Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia (Manners 1999, 2010). However, in general, during this period, there were a number of aspects of Ukraine that we did not teach, such as the 1000-year-old origins of European Kyivan Rus or Ukraine as a founding member of the UN in 1945, and there were a number that we mistaught such as the acquiescence of Ukraine in the Soviet Union and the idea of post-Cold War Eastern Europe as a “post-soviet space.” As charts 1 and 2 (below) demonstrate, IR research on Ukraine, Crimea, and Donbas broadly reflected this absence of teaching and textbook consideration during the period 1990–2014, but also the belated inclusion of these topics since the Russian occupation and invasion of Ukraine.

Charts 1 and 2: SSCI references to "International Relations," "Ukraine," "Crimea," and "Donbas(s)," 1990–2023 expressed absolutely and in percentages.




Chart 1 (left) shows the comparative incidence of the phrases “International Relations” plus “Ukraine,” “Crimea,” and “Donbas(s)” from 1990 to 2023 in the SSCI. A few references to Ukraine occurred during the 1990s and have increased steadily since the 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea and Donbas. Articles referring to Crimea increased after 2014, but Donbas references are effectively zero. Chart 2 (right) shows the comparative incidence of the phrases “International Relations” plus “Ukraine,” “Crimea,” and “Donbas(s)” as a percentage of the incidence of the phrase “International Relations” from 1990 to 2023 in the SSCI. This chart makes it possible to see whether references to Ukraine, Crimea, and Donbas are more or less common as a proportion of published articles over time. The chart shows that there was an interest in research articles between 1991 Ukrainian independence, 2004–2005 Orange Revolution, and 2013–2014 Maidan Revolution at less than 1% of overall IR articles. The 2014 Russian occupation and the 2022 Russian invasion led to a growth of over 7% of IR articles in 2023. Articles referring to “Crimea” peaked in 2017 (1% of IR articles), and “Donbas(s)” peaked in 2020 following the Russian occupation of these Ukrainian regions.

Overall, the IR research community had very little interest in Ukraine, Crimea, and Donbas in the 25 years from 1990 to 2014. However, Ukraine is hardly unique in this respect. To think more holistically about blind spots in IR teaching and research, the article will compare Ukraine with the broad issue of environmental climate change. Russia’s status as both a “petrostate” and one of the world’s worst fossil fuel polluters enables it to invade Ukraine and use “ecocide” as a weapon; hence, the comparison facilitates the discussion of planetary politics. Similar to charts 1 and 2, charts 3 and 4 (below) compare the absolute and relative references to “environmental,” “climate change,” and “green” in IR research.

Charts 3 and 4: SSCI references to "International Relations," "Green," "Environmental," and "Climate Change" 1990–2023 expressed absolutely and in percentages




Chart 3 (left) shows the relative occurrence of the phrases “International Relations” plus “Environmental,” “Climate Change,” and “Green” in SSCI articles from 1990 to 2023. Articles on “environmental” IR increased steadily from 1991 to 2011 and surged in 2017 and 2020 before declining in 2023. Articles on “Climate Change” and IR grew slowly between 2007 and 2017. Articles surged in 2020 before declining in 2022. Articles on “Green” IR have emerged slowly over the past decade but are not significant. The average of 25–40 environmental and climate change articles per year during 2017–2023 is about half the 60 articles on Ukraine and IR in 2023.

Chart 4 (right) shows the relative occurrence of the phrases “International Relations” plus “Environmental,” “Climate Change,” and “Green” as a percentage of the incidence of the phrase “International Relations” in the SSCI 1990 to 2023. Articles on “environmental” IR were erratically higher in 1992, 2011, and 2017. In contrast, articles on “climate change” increased above 3% after the 2015 Paris Agreement. In general, there was almost zero percentage interest in “green” IR during the period. IR interest in Ukraine rose to nearly 8% of SSCI articles published in 2023, and IR interest in environmental and climate change remains at about 3–4% of published IR articles. In other words, insignificant.

In contrast to the lack of IR interest in Ukraine, textbooks and courses since the late 1990s have generally had one chapter or one lecture on environmental politics. For example, Matthew Paterson’s chapters on green politics in Burchill and Linklater (1996) and Devatak and True (2022), Robyn Eckersley’s (latterly with Olaf Corry) chapter on green theory in Dunne, Kurki, Kušić, and Smith (2024), John Vogler’s chapter on environmental issues in Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2022), or Cynthia Weber’s (2021) chapter on Environmentalism. Uniquely among IR textbooks, Simon Dalby’s chapter on nature and Carl Death’s chapter on the planet represent two chapters in Edkins and Zehfuss (2018). However, in my experience, no widely-used textbook or widely-taught course has ever taken ecological and climate emergencies seriously by starting a

textbook with a framing chapter on the centrality of the environment or ecology as part of a holistic analysis of planetary politics. In this way, the lack of concern for teaching Ukrainian and planetary politics in IR is interwoven – Ukraine can be considered a microcosm in the paradigmatic shift from IR to planetary politics. Just as the peripheralized, marginalized, and colonized subject of Ukraine has not been adequately taught in the IR and EU studies of Western European universities, neither has ecological unsustainability. Clearly other subjects such as the postcolonial world or the non-human world could, and should, be part of genuinely planetary politics.

3. Geopolitics of the 19th Century

The sides underline that Russia and China, as world powers and permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, intend to firmly adhere to moral principles and accept their responsibility, strongly advocate the international system with the central coordinating role of the United Nations in international affairs, defend the world order based on international law, including the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, advance multipolarity and promote the democratization of international relations, together create an even more prospering, stable, and just world, jointly build international relations of a new type. (Putin and Xi 2022)

The transformation of teaching, including the elevation of ‘geopolitics’ during the Russian invasion and Ukrainian counter-offensive, 2022–2025, has focused on the rapid process of re-education and rethinking of teaching on Ukraine and Russia in IR and EU studies courses. The Russia-China Joint Statement on International Relations of 4 February 2022 claimed that the two countries intended to firmly adhere to the moral principles, central coordinating role, and international law of the UN. However, the illegal Russian annexation and human rights abuses in Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine since 2014, and Chinese human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other minorities in Xinjiang since 2014, demonstrate the failure to adhere to the moral principles and international law of the UN and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Just 20 days later, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the support of

China ridiculed Putin and Xi's joint declaration. During five votes in the UN General Assembly on 2 March 2022, 24 March 2022, 7 April 2022, 12 October 2022, and 23 February 2023, Russia consistently disregarded and broke the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN, supported by four other autocracies (Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, and Syria). China led a group of 30-plus other, largely autocratic countries to abstain from supporting the UN and Ukraine during these votes. In contrast, the purposes and principles of the UN and Ukraine were upheld by the support of 140-plus largely democratic countries during these votes. Thus, while the failure of so many members to defend the principles of the UN and the territorial integrity of Ukraine marked the end of 20th-century IR in 2014, the events of 2022 indicated that many countries were intent on returning to the geopolitics of the 19th century, prior to the establishment of the UN.

From 2021 to 2023, I taught and convened the required first-semester undergraduate/bachelor's course in international politics for approximately 150 Swedish students at Lund University. The course uses the 20th-century conventions of introducing theories and issues and is taught with a combination of a simple Swedish textbook (Gustavson and Tallberg 2021) and a more advanced English textbook (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2022). After the February 2022 invasion, we were able to adapt the course by adding a new secondary book, Mark Galeotti's (2022) *Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine*, to the book review section of the course, as well as introducing the war into the parts of the course on international conflict and international cooperation. These adaptations are clearly similar to so many IR courses and textbooks across Western Europe – existing paradigms and purveyors of IR knowledge remain hegemonic despite the radical transformations of 21st-century IR.

Charts 5 and 6: SSCI references to "International Relations," "Geopolitics," "Multipolar," and "Neoimperial/Neocolonial"³ 1990–2023 expressed absolutely and in percentages.




Chart 5 (left) shows the increasing amount of research referring to “International Relations” plus “Geopolitics” from 1990 to 2023, with a more subtle increase in research referring to “Multipolar” and “Neoimperial/Neocolonial.” Research referring to “geopolitics” has increased from zero articles in 1990 to 80 articles in 2023. The USA’s war on terror, Chinese foreign policy, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine appear to be driving this development. These developments are also reflected in the gradual but more subtle increases in articles referring to “multipolar” and “neoimperial/neo-colonial” to describe the rise of the BRICS since the 2007 GFC. Comparing Chart 5 with Chart 1 suggests that while there was a gradual increase in references to geopolitics from 2008 to 2015, the rapid increase in articles referring to geopolitics corresponds to the Russian occupation and invasion of Ukraine from 2014 to 2023. Chart 6 (right) shows the relative use of the phrases “International Relations” plus “Geopolitics,” “Multipolar,” and “Neoimperial/Neocolonial” as a percentage of the incidence of the phrase “International Relations” from 1990 to 2023. The chart shows how references to geopolitics, and a lesser extent multipolar, were relatively higher after the end of the Cold War (until 2004), then rising again after 2015. The relative patterns for geopolitics, post-2014, are obviously similar to those for Ukraine in charts 1 and 2.

These SSCI results and the survey of recently updated IR textbooks indicate two worrying trends in response to the Russian invasion. First, recently updated IR textbooks, such as Viotti and Kauppi (2023: 229) and Dunne, Kurki, Kušić, and Smith (2024), treat the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a case study in “realism” (Williams 2024, 68). While Baylis, Smith, and Owens (2022) provide a fairer analysis of the invasion in terms of globalization, new world dis-order, rising powers, global security, European integration,

3 “Neo-imperial” = (“neo-imperial” OR “neoimperial” OR “neo-imperialism” OR “neoimperialism”)
 “Neo-colonial” = (“neo-colonial” OR “neocolonial” OR “neo-colonialism” OR “neocolonialism”)

global trade and finance, the overall trend is that the Russian invasion can be understood and analyzed in terms of existing IR frameworks. Second, as the increasing amount of IR research referring to geopolitics demonstrates, the invasion is widely seen in conventional IR as part of a geopolitical struggle between global powers of the USA and EU vs. Russia and China.

In contrast to these 19th-century views of geopolitics, the Russian invasion of Ukraine suggests five lessons for teaching a more 21st-century IR that overcomes the “persistence of Cold War binaries” (Pishchikova 2023). First, the Russian invasion must be understood as an act of neoimperialism and neocolonialism rather than being “westsplained” as realist geopolitics (Kurylo 2023; Hendl Burlyuk, O’Sullivan, and Arystanbek 2024). Using Russian neoimperialism to reimpose the imperial Russian empire of 1721–1917 or the Soviet empire of 1917–1991 is the driving force behind Vladimir Putin, including the military interventions in Moldova 1990–1992, Chechnya 1994–1996 and 1999–2009, Georgia 2008, Ukraine 2014 and 2022 (Kuzio 2009; Snyder 2018; Oksamytna 2023). Neocolonialism involves self-identifying ethnic Russians in these countries acting as the colonial rulers of occupied territories such as Transnistria, Chechnya, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Donbas, which in 2022 led to the “postcolonial moment in Russia’s war against Ukraine” (Mälksoo 2023 in Burlyuk and Musliu 2023, 609; also Berglund and Bolkvadze 2024).

Second, the support for the Russian invasion and opposition to the purposes and principles of the UN charter must be understood within the context of a multipolar view of emergent international order with the ‘great powers’ of the USA, China, Russia, and India dominating. The absurdity of such a limited view of multipolarity in IR is that these four powers currently make up approximately 42% of the world’s population and will diminish to approximately 26% of the world’s population by 2100 (Vollset et al. 2020). A more accurate reading of this changing world order is that, in general, democracies support, and autocracies oppose, the UN and international rule of law. The UN GA votes on the occupation and

invasion of Ukraine demonstrate this reading, with Russia supported by the closed autocracies of Belarus, Cuba, North Korea, and Syria (plus China, Laos, Mali, Nicaragua, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam on one-off votes). In contrast, the UN and Ukraine are supported by 140 states, of which more than 75% are democracies (V-Dem Institute 2024). In this context, the need for support for the UN and the international rule of law in opposition to Russian imperialism was made clearly by Kenyan UN Ambassador Martin Kimani in a speech to the UN Security Council on 21 February 2022:

Rather than form nations that looked ever backward into history with a dangerous nostalgia, we chose to look forward to a greatness none of our many nations and peoples had ever known. We chose to follow the rules of the OAU and the United Nations Charter not because our borders satisfied us but because we wanted something greater forged in peace.... We further strongly condemn the trend—in the last few decades—of powerful states, including members of this Security Council, breaching International Law with little regard. Multilateralism lies on its deathbed tonight. It has been assaulted, as it has been by other powerful states in the recent past.... Let me conclude by reaffirming Kenya's respect for the territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders (Kimani 2022; Yakovlyev 2022).

Third, the Russian invasion must be seen as part of a wider campaign of disinformation, gray zones and hybrid warfare involving the state-funded private military company Wagner Group, the Patriot Media Group, the Internet Research Agency, the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, the Russia Today/RT, Sputnik news agency, and a myriad of state-backed disinformation operations (Khylyk 2023; Kormych and Malyarenko 2023; Krainikova and Prokopenko 2023; Solovei 2023). This disinformation and influence campaign began with Putin's appointment in 1999 and stretches across Europe to the USA and from the Middle East to Africa. The campaign has been most successful in undermining democracy in the UK, with highly placed individuals within politics and widespread interference in the 2014 Scottish independence and 2016 EU membership referenda (BREXIT) (Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee 2019; Mueller 2019; Intelligence and Security Committee 2020). In addition, the campaign has supported and shaped far-

right parties across the EU with ‘trojan horse’ parties such as UKIP, French National Front/Rally, Alternative for Germany, Italian Northern League, Netherlands Party for Freedom, and Sweden Democrats all serving the interests of Russia (Anton 2022; Oksanen 2015, 2022; Polyakova et al. 2016, 2017, 2018; Shekhovtsov 2023).

Fourth, tragically, the Russian invasion of Ukraine involves four mass atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In March 2022, the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened an investigation into the situation in Ukraine, including war crimes and crimes against humanity or genocide (ICC 2022). Crimes against humanity are the most widespread atrocity, defined as acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population” (article 7, ICC 1998: 3-5). In October 2023, the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry (UN IICI) on Ukraine documented evidence of “indiscriminate attacks by Russian armed forces, which have led to deaths and injuries of civilians and the destruction and damage of civilian objects” (UN IICI 2023: 2). Russian war crimes are equally prevalent, defined as “violations of international humanitarian law (treaty or customary law) that incur individual criminal responsibility under international law... war crimes must always take place in the context of an armed conflict, either international or non-international” (Geneva Conventions 1949; article 8, ICC 1998: 5-10). The UN ICI (2023) collected evidence showing that “Russian authorities have committed the war crimes of willful killing, torture, rape and other sexual violence, and the deportation of children to the Russian Federation.” In March 2023, the ICC (2023) issued arrest warrants against Vladimir Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova over allegations of involvement in the war crime of child abductions during the invasion of Ukraine.

Fifth, in complete contrast to teaching and scholarship on the “post-soviet space,” the Ukrainian response to the Russian invasion has demonstrated loudly and clearly across the world the determination and agency of Ukrainians to control their destiny (Kudlenko 2023; Poberezhna, Burlyuk, and van Heelsun 2024). Following the

Maidan Revolution, the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine, including a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, was agreed in 2014 leading to the 2019 amendment of the Constitution of Ukraine aiming to join the EU and NATO. After the Russian invasion, the process of Ukrainian EU membership was accelerated with an application to join in February 2022, leading to the European Council opening accession negotiations in December 2023 (Rabinovych and Pintsch 2024; Noutcheva and Zarembo 2024). Ukraine is not alone in seeking a more secure destiny within European organizations, with Denmark joining the EU's CSDP in 2022, Finland and Sweden joining NATO in 2023 and 2024, and at the same time, Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina have all sought greater security within NATO (Wiesner and Knodt 2024; Zarembo 2024).

These five lessons of Russian neoimperialism and neocolonialism, opposition to the purposes and principles of the UN charter, disinformation and manipulation, Russian mass atrocity crimes, and finally, Ukrainian independence and agency all demonstrate the importance of shifting IR teaching away from 19th-century geopolitics and four-power multipolarism, and towards 21st-century planetary politics that escapes the binary paradigm of the past 75 years.

4. Conclusion: Ukraine as a Microcosm of Planetary Politics in the 21st Century

Chernobyl perhaps marks the start of the wider public awareness of the fragility of the human environment. But even without a Chernobyl or a greenhouse effect, the result of a great lessening of the fear of nuclear war was always likely to be that mankind, the well-off section of it, anyway, would start to concentrate its anxieties on the health of the planet (Woollacott "Planet Politics" 1989).

The necessary paradigm shift to teaching the Russian war against Ukraine and other crises demands new thinking about planetary politics in the 21st century. As Martin Woollacott presciently observed in 1989, the events in Ukrainian Chornobyl marked the start

of a wider awareness of the fragility of the human environment, the greenhouse effect, and the health of the planet he called “planet politics.” It is only through understanding and coming to terms with the paradigm shift from IR to planetary politics over the past 35 years that it is possible to contribute in a meaningful way to teaching the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a microcosm of planetary politics (Manners 2002: 10; 2008: 37). Fourteen years after Wool-lacott labeled the era of planetary politics, Karen Litfin (2003: 481) argued that “planetary politics ... are characterized by truly planetary relations of causality that can only be understood and addressed holistically.” Planetary politics means that economic, social, ecological, conflictual and political relations and crises cannot be considered independently—they are symbiotic (Manners 2023, 2024a).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is a microcosm of the wider planetary organic crisis of five symbiotic dimensions of economy, society, ecology, conflict, and polity (Manners 2020, 2024b). Stephen Gill and Solomon Benatar (2020: 171) argue that a planetary organic crisis involves “interacting and deepening structural crises of economy/development, society, ecology, politics, culture and ethics—in ways that are unsustainable.” The invasion of Ukraine represents a microcosm of these crises and politics because of the way in which economic (in)equality, social (in)justice, ecological (un)sustainability, conflict (in)security, and political (ir)resilience are symbiotic to understanding both the driving forces and the prospects for Ukraine.

Economically, the Ukrainian and Russian economies both experienced negative growth during the period 1989–1997, but from 1998–2008, the Ukrainian economy outperformed the Russian economy. The GFC had a negative effect on both economies, but the Ukrainian economic downturn in 2014–2015 was particularly bad. The Russian invasion had a destructive effect on the Russian economy, but it was worse for the Ukrainian economy. However, in terms of economic (in)equality, the economies are quite different, with Ukraine having a 0.45 gini income inequality index, broadly


comparable to that of the EU, while Russia has an index of 0.60—one of the worst in the Global North (Alvaredo et al. 2022). The extent to which Russian wealth and inequality are being “sucked up” by wealthy oligarchs surrounding Putin is seen in the dominating role of Russia’s ultra-wealthy 1% taking 25% of the national income share, while the Russian super-wealthy 10% take 50% of the national income share. In comparison, Ukraine is broadly in line with EU averages, with the top 1% taking 10–12% of the national income share and the top 10% taking 35% of the national income share.

Socially, the Social Progress Index (SPI) ranks the EU at an average of 44th position out of 170 countries with an index score of 84 on 3 dimensions of basic human needs, foundations of wellbeing, and opportunity (Social Progress Imperative 2024). Ukraine ranks 59th on the SPI with an index score of 70 (up from 66 in 2011), similar to other EU applicants Albania, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia ranks 76th on the SPI with an index score of 67 (down from 68 in 2017), with a fall in opportunity and, most significantly, a collapse in rights and voice since 2011. Changing demographics will be one of the greatest challenges to social justice this century, with the EU 27 population falling from approximately 448 million today to roughly 308 million by 2100 or to approximately 340 million if the EU enlarges to 36 by 2100 (Vollset et al. 2020). Both Russia and Ukraine have low fertility rates, lowered by the invasion and war, which will lead the Russian population to drop from approx. 146 million today to approx. 106 million by 2100, and the Ukrainian population to drop from approx. 41 million today to approx. 18 million by 2100.

Ecologically, the invasion of Ukraine has involved “ecocide” with nuclear power stations such as Chornobyl and Zaporizhzhia put at risk, while munitions and landmines contaminate and condemn fields and forests, dams such as Kakhovka have been destroyed, and rivers such as the Desna poisoned (Yavorska et al. 2024; Shahini et al. 2024). As the world’s major exporter of natural gas and second-largest exporter of oil in 2022, Russia is both a ‘petrostate’ (making up 30–50% of the state budget) and one of the

world's worst fossil fuel polluters. Adriana Petryna (2023: 15) argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine centralizes a range of planetary challenges, including the need for "de-occupation as planetary politics," and shows how "genocide legitimizes both anti-human and anti-planetary violence." As Charts 7 and 8 illustrate below, the study of eco-centric "ecology" rather than the anthropocentric environment in IR only emerged since the 2010 Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 2015 Paris Agreement. In contrast, the realization of the "climate crisis" and "planetary politics" in IR are far more recent phenomena from 2020 onwards, possibly driven by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Charts 7 and 8: SSCI references to “International Relations,” “Ecology,”⁴ “Climate Crisis,”⁵ and “Planetary Politics.”⁶ 1990–2023 expressed absolutely and in percentages.



4 "Ecology" = "Ecology" OR "Ecological"

Chart 7 (left) shows the slowly increasing amount of research referring to “Ecology” in IR scholarship from 2009 until 2022. However, the amount of ecological IR research is tiny compared to the previous charts, perhaps reflecting psychological climate disavowal (Thierry, Horn, Von Hellermann, and Gardner 2023). In comparison, IR research on the climate crisis/emergency has only begun to emerge since the IPCC AR5 in 2014 and the Paris Agreement in 2015 demonstrated the failure to address the crisis/emergency. The anthropocentrism and egocentrism of contemporary IR scholarship remained hegemonic during the period, with planetary political attempts to escape the paradigm by Karen Litfin (2003), Paul Gilroy (2004), Gayatri Spivak (2003), and Achille Mbembe (2022) barely registering in IR. However, compared to the 400 plus references to environmental IR and 300 plus references to climate change since 2007, the 125 references to ecological IR lie 16 years behind in terms of research and publication.

Chart 8 (right) shows the relative use of the phrases “International Relations” plus “Ecology,” “Climate Crisis/Emergency,” and “Planetary Politics” as a percentage of the incidence of the phrase “International Relations” from 1990 to 2023. The chart shows how references to ecology have been sporadic since the end of the Cold War. While this pattern is somewhat similar to climate change IR research, the relative levels of research references are about half for ecological research.

In terms of conflict, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a microcosm of the increasing impunity with which neoimperial great powers take action in multipolar politics. Prior to 2010 interstate conflicts had been slowly falling in number across the world (there was only an interstate conflict between Eritrea and Djibouti during 2004-2010). Since 2010, interstate conflicts in the Middle East, South Asia, Caucasus, and Ukraine have thrown the world back into arms racing, with risks of regional conflict in the Sahel, Palestine,

5 “Climate Crisis” = “Climate Crisis” OR “Climate Emergency”

6 “Planetary Politics” = “Planet Politics” OR “Planetary Politics”

Yemen/Iran/Saudi Arabia, Kashmir, the Black Sea, the Baltic, and Taiwan. As Ukrainian scholars of the invasion have made clear, understanding conflict needs far greater knowledge than ‘westplain-ing’ the grabbing of territories like a game of *Risk* (Burlyuk and Musliu 2023: 607; Tyushka 2023: 652). As the discussions of economy, society, and ecology suggest, in unequal, unjust, and unsustainable countries such as Russia, the population and civil society are just too weak and fractured to form the foundation of a viable society and oppose the ruling kleptocracy. In this context, neoimperialism and neocolonialism with impunity are the foundation for the governing oligarchy, as Ukrainian scholars know all too well.

Finally, the general culmination of economic inequality, social injustice, ecological unsustainability, and conflict insecurity led to the observation that both freedom and democracy are under threat across the world. The Russian invasion of Ukraine represents a microcosm of this wider pattern, with Russian inequality, injustice, and unsustainability facilitating its aggression and impunity as part of the Russian decline of freedom and democracy. According to Freedom House (2024), the world has now seen 18 years of decline in global freedom, with Russia being at its most free in 1991, remaining “partly free” from 1991–2003, and dropping to “not free” from 2004 to 2024. Similar evidence is presented by the V-Dem Institute (2024), with autocratization continuing to be the dominant trend of the past 15 years. According to V-Dem, Russia was in the “autocratic grey zone” from 1992–1999, then became an “electoral autocracy” from 1999 onwards, where it is currently ranked 159th on the liberal democracy index (out of 179 countries). Thus, the long-term decline in Russian freedom and democracy since 1991 has led to it becoming a “not free” “electoral autocracy” since Putin came to power in 1999.

In contrast, according to Freedom House, Ukraine was “partly free” from 1991–2003, became “free” after the 2005 Orange Revolution between 2005–2010, returned to being “partly free” under Viktor Yanukovych in 2010 and has kept this status ever since. V-

Dem Institute data demonstrates how Ukraine was a form of autocracy between 1991–1993, 1998–2005, 2010–2018, and 2022–2023, and was a form of democracy between 1994–1997, 2006–2009, and 2019–2021, and is currently ranked 109th on the liberal democracy index. What these two sources of data demonstrate is that Russia is an ir-resilient autocracy without the capacity to recover from elected dictatorship since 1999, while Ukraine is a more resilient polity with the ability to spring back from autocracy to democracy as it did in 1994 (first parliamentary and presidential elections), 2006 (Orange Revolution and election of president Yushchenko), and 2019 (election of president Zelenskyy). Thus, the irresilience and decline of Russian democracy helped fuel its invasion of Ukraine, while the resilience of Ukrainian democracy helped it resist the Russian invasion.

These five dimensions of planetary politics illustrate how Ukraine is a microcosm of larger events but leaves plenty of space for Ukrainian determination and agency. The teaching of the Russian invasion and war against Ukraine must help students and teachers alike to understand the symbiotic relationships between inequality, injustice, unsustainability, insecurity, and resilience in the planetary politics of the 21st century. This article argues that the greatest challenge of teaching IR in the context of the Russian war against Ukraine is that Western IR is stuck in a 20th-century paradigm of thinking. The article then set out how incorporating the war into a first-semester introductory course on international politics initially involved adapting the course to empirical events, such as lectures on conflict and cooperation. However, the war has led to five lessons for rethinking the teaching of neoimperialism and neocolonialism, opposition to the purposes and principles of the UN charter, disinformation and manipulation, Russian mass atrocity crimes, and Ukrainian independence and agency. While the article did not discuss teaching methods and technology (these are covered in Tymofii Brik's chapter), it did demonstrate the need to shift pedagogical paradigms and address the need for Ukrainian

knowledge about the war (meaning more information from Ukrainian scholars who are on the ‘front line’). In this respect the article used the rich and wide range of Ukrainian scholarship and literature to discuss this knowledge, as the bibliography demonstrates. Finally, the article did not address the emotional and psychological impact of the war on students and staff, which is covered in Galyna Solovei’s chapter. However, it is clear from the experience in this volume that the planetary organic crisis is having an increasingly negative effect on the mental health of all involved in the conflict, including the effects of the rise of the Russian far-right autocrats and their neoimperialism, the Russian invasion, and the ecological and climate catastrophe in which Ukraine is a Microcosm.

References

- Alvaredo, Facundo, Atkinson, Anthony, Piketty, Thomas, and Saez, Emmanuel. (2022) *World Inequality Database*. Paris: World Inequality Lab. <http://wid.world/data>
- Anton, Wiebke. (2022) *“Russia” in the European Parliament: Voting Patterns, Discourse-Coalitions and Self-Other Representations*. Munich: Ludwig-Maximilians-University.
- Baylis, John, and Smith, Steve. (eds.) (1997) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Baylis, John, Smith, Steve, and Owens, Patricia. (eds.) (2022) *The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, 9th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Berenskötter, Felix. (2018) “E pluribus unum? How textbooks cover theories,” in Gofas, Andreas, Hamati-Ataya, Inanna, and Onuf, Nicholas (eds.) *Sage Handbook of History, Philosophy and Sociology of International Relations*. London: Sage, 446-68.
- Berglund, Christofer, and Bolkvadze, Ketevan. (2024) “Sons of the Soil or Servants of the Empire? Profiling the Guardians of Separatism in Abkhazia and South Ossetia,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 71(1): 37-48.
- Bretherton, Charlotte, and Vogler, John. (1999) *The European Union as a Global Actor*. London: Routledge.
- Brown, Chris. (1997) *Understanding International Relations*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Burchill, Scott, and Linklater, Andrew. (eds.) (1996) *Theories of International Relations*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Burlyuk, Olga, and Musliu, Vjosa. (2023) "The Responsibility to Remain Silent? On the Politics of Knowledge Production, Expertise and (Self-) Reflection in Russia's War against Ukraine," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 26(4): 605-18.
- Devetak, Richard, and True, Jacqui. (2022) *Theories of International Relations*, 6th edn. London: Bloomsbury.
- Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2019) *Disinformation and "Fake News"*, House of Commons (2017-19, HC 1791), 18 February.
- Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja, Kušić, Katarina, and Smith, Steve. (eds.) (2024) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 6th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Edkins, Jenny, and Zehfuss, Maja. (eds.) (2018) *Global Politics: A New Introduction*, 3rd edn. London: Routledge.
- Freedom House. (2024) *Freedom in the World 2024: The Mounting Damage of Flawed Elections and Armed Conflict*. Washington DC: Freedom House.
- Galeotti, Mark. (2022) *Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine*. Oxford: Osprey Publishing.
- Geneva Conventions. (1949) *Four Geneva Conventions and three Protocols on the treatment of soldiers, prisoners of war and non-combatants during war-time, 1949, 1977, and 2005*. Switzerland: International Committee of the Red Cross.
- Gill, Stephen, and Benatar, Solomon. (2020) "Reflections on the Political Economy of Planetary Health," *Review of International Political Economy* 27(1): 167-90.
- Gilroy, Paul. (2004) *After Empire: Melancholia or Convivial Culture?* Abingdon: Routledge.
- Gustavsson, Jakob, and Tallberg, Jonas. (eds.) (2021) *International relations*. Lund: Studentlitteratur.
- Hendl, Tereza, Burlyuk, Olga, O'Sullivan, Mila, and Arystanbek, Aizada. (2024) "(En)Countering Epistemic Imperialism: A Critique of 'Westspaining' and Coloniality in Dominant Debates on Russia's Invasion of Ukraine," *Contemporary Security Policy* 45(2): 171-209.
- Intelligence and Security Committee. (2020) *Russia Report*, House of Commons (2017-2019, HC 632) 21 July.
- International Criminal Court. (1998) *Rome Statute adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court*, 17 July.
- International Criminal Court. (2022) "Situation in Ukraine," ICC-01/22, 2 March. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine>

- International Criminal Court. (2023) "Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova," Press Release: 17 March. <https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and>
- Khylyko, Olena. (2023) "Resilience-Building in Grey Security Zone Countries," *Scientific Collection «InterConf+»* 34(159): 37-48.
- Kimani, Martin. (2022) "Statement during the UN SC Meeting on the Situation in Ukraine," Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya, 21 February.
- Kormych, Borys, and Malyarenko, Tetyana. (2023) "From Gray Zone to Conventional Warfare: the Russia-Ukraine Conflict in the Black Sea," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 34(7): 1235-70.
- Krainikova, Tetiana, and Prokopenko, Serhii. (2023) "Waves of Disinformation in the Hybrid Russian-Ukrainian War," *Current Issues of Mass Communication* 33: 12-25.
- Kudlenko, Anastasiia. (2023) "Roots of Ukrainian Resilience and the Agency of Ukrainian Society Before and After Russia's Full-Scale Invasion," *Contemporary Security Policy* 44(4): 513-29.
- Kurylo, Bohdana. (2023) "The Ukrainian Subject, Hierarchies of Knowledge Production and the Everyday: An Autoethnographic Narrative," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 26(4): 685-97.
- Kuzio, Taras. (2009) "Strident, Ambiguous and Duplicitous: Ukraine and the 2008 Russia-Georgia War," *Demokratizatsiya* 17(4): 350-72.
- Litfin, Karen. (2003) "Planetary Politics," in Agnew, John, Mitchell, Katharyne, and Toal, Gerard. (eds.) *A Companion to Political Geography*. Oxford: Blackwell, 470-82.
- McCormick, John. (1999) *Understanding the European Union: A Concise Introduction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Mälksoo, Maria. (2023) "The Postcolonial Moment in Russia's War against Ukraine," *Journal of Genocide Research* 25(3-4): 471-81.
- Manners, Ian. (1999) "The European Union and Moldova Beyond the PCA," in Bruton, Leilah (ed.) *The Republic of Moldova: Time for a New EU Strategy?* Brussels: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 57-77.
- Manners, Ian. (2002) *European [security] Union: from existential threat to ontological security*, COPRI working paper 5 (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Peace Research Institute). https://portal.research.lu.se/files/108768568/Ian_Manners_2002_European_security_Union_from_existential_threat_to_ontological_security_COPRI_5.pdf

- Manners, Ian. (2009) "The Normative Power of the European Union in a Globalised World," in Lai, Zaki (ed.) *EU Foreign Policy in a Globalized World: Normative Power and Social Preferences*. London: Routledge, 23-37.
- Manners, Ian. (2010) "As You Like It: European Union Normative Power in the European Neighbourhood Policy," in Whitman, Richard, and Wolff, Stefan (eds.) *The European Neighbourhood Policy in Perspective: Context, Implementation and Impact*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 29-50.
- Manners, Ian. (2018) "Political Psychology of European Integration: The (Re)production of Identity and Difference in the Brexit Debate," *Political Psychology* 39(6): 1213-32.
- Manners, Ian. (2020) "European Communion and Planetary Organic Crisis," in Brack, Nathalie, and Gürkan, Seda (eds.) *Theorising the Crises of the European Union*. London: Routledge, 159-82.
- Manners, Ian. (2023) "Planetary Politics in the Twenty-Second Century." in Horn, Laura, Mert, Ayşem, and Müller, Franziska. (eds.) *The Palgrave Handbook of Global Politics in the 22nd Century*. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 271-90.
- Manners, Ian. (2024a) "Arrival of Normative Power in Planetary Politics," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 62(3): 825-844.
- Manners, Ian. (2024b) "Normative Power in the Planetary Organic Crisis," *Cooperation and Conflict* 59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367241244954>
- Mbembe, Achille. (2022) "How to Develop a Planetary Consciousness," *Noema Magazine*, 11 January. <https://www.noemamag.com/how-to-develop-a-planetary-consciousness/>
- Mearsheimer, John, and Rosato, Sebastian. (2023) *How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Mueller, Robert. (2019) *Report on The Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election*. Washington: US Department of Justice, 18 April.
- Noutcheva, Gergana, and Zarembo, Kateryna. (2024) "Normative Power at its Unlikeliest: EU Democratic Norms and Security Service Reform in Ukraine," *Cooperation and Conflict* 59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/00108367241244978>
- Nugent, Neil. (1994) *The Government and Politics of the European Union*, 3rd edn. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Oksamytna, Kseniya. (2023) "Imperialism, Supremacy, and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine," *Contemporary Security Policy* 44(4): 497-512.

- Oksanen, Patrik. (2015) "Russia-index: 11 new EU-sceptic parties added," 10 January. <https://eublogg.wordpress.com/2015/01/10/russia-in-dex-11-new-eu-sceptic-parties-added/>
- Oksanen, Patrik. (2022) "SD:s rysslandsröster i Europaparlamentet sticker ut," Säkerhetsrådet, Frivärld, 7 September. <https://frivarld.se/sakerhetsradet/sds-rysslandsroster-sticker-ut-i-europaparlamentet/>
- Petryna, Adriana. (2023) "De-Occupation as Planetary Politics: On the Russian War in Ukraine," *American Ethnologist* 50(1): 10-18.
- Poberezhna, Anastasiia, Burlyuk, Olga, and van Heelsum, Anja. (2024) "A Superhero Army, a Courageous People and an Enchanted Land: War-time Political Myths and Ontological Security in the 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine," *Czech Journal of International Relations* 59(1): 59-92.
- Polyakova, Alina, Laruelle, Marlene, Meister, Stefan, and Barnett, Neil. (2016) *The Kremlin's Trojan Horses: Russian Influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom*. Washington DC: Atlantic Council.
- Polyakova, Alina, Kounalakis, Markos, Klapsis, Antonis, Germani, Luigi Sergio, Iacoboni, Jacopo, de Borja Lasheras, Francisco, and de Pedro, Nicolás. (2017) *The Kremlin's Trojan Horses 2.0: Russian influences in Greece, Italy, and Spain*. Washington DC: Atlantic Council.
- Polyakova, Alina, Splidsboel-Hansen, Flemming, van Der Noordaa, Robert, Bogen, Øystein, Sundbom, Henrik. (2018) *The Kremlin's Trojan Horses 3.0: Russian influences in Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden*. Washington DC: Atlantic Council.
- Pishchikova, Katerina. (2023) "What Ukraine Teaches Us About International Relations and Vice Versa," *Interdisciplinary Political Studies* 9(2): 97-107.
- Putin, Vladimir, and Xi, Jinping. (2022) "Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development," Beijing, 4 February.
- Rabinovych, Maryna, and Pintsch, Anne. (2024) "From the 2014 Annexation of Crimea to the 2022 Russian War on Ukraine: Path Dependence and Socialization in the EU-Ukraine Relations," *Journal of Common Market Studies*. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13572>
- Scholte, Jan Aarte. (2000) *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Shahini, Ermir, Shebanina, Olena, Kormyshkin, Iurii, Drobitko, Antonina, and Chernyavskaya, Natalya. (2024) "Environmental Consequences for the World of Russia's war against Ukraine," *International Journal of Environmental Studies* 81(1): 463-474.

- Shekhovtsov, Anton. (2023) *Russian Political Warfare: Essays on Kremlin Propaganda in Europe and the Neighbourhood, 2020-2023*. Hannover: Ibidem Press.
- Snyder, Timothy. (2018) *The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America*. New York: Tim Duggan Books.
- Social Progress Imperative. (2024) *2024 Social Progress Index*. Washington, DC: Social Progress Imperative. www.socialprogress.org
- Solovei, Galyna. (2023) "Russian Myths of 'One People' and 'NATO's Attack on Russia' in the Legitimization of the Russo-Ukrainian War," in Catalan-Matamoros, Daniel (ed.) *Disinformation and Fact-Checking in Contemporary Society*. Madrid: Dykinson, 101-16.
- Spivak, Gayatri. (2003) *Death of a Discipline*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Stein, Janice Gross. (2008) "Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Rational, Psychological, and Neurological Methods," in Smith, Steve, Hadfield, Amelia, and Dunne, Timothy (eds.) *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 130-46
- Thierry, Aaron, Horn, Laura, von Hellermann, Pauline, and Gardner, Charlie. (2023) "No Research on a Dead Planet': Preserving the Socio-Ecological Conditions for Academia," *Frontiers in Education* 8. <https://doi.org/10.3389/educ.2023.1237076>
- Tyushka, Andriy. (2023) "In 'Crisis' We Trust? On (Un)Intentional Knowledge Distortion and the Exigency of Terminological Clarity in Academic and Political Discourses on Russia's War against Ukraine," *Journal of International Relations and Development* 26(4): 643-59.
- United Nations General Assembly Resolution. (2014) Resolution 68/262, "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine," adopted by the sixty-eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly, 27 March.
- United Nations Independent International Commission of Inquiry. (2023) Inquiry on Ukraine pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 52/32, A/78/540. Geneva: UN Human Rights Council.
- V-Dem Institute. (2024) *Democracy Report 2024: Democracy Winning and Losing at the Ballot*. Gothenburg: V-Dem Institute.
- Viotti, Paul, and Kauppi, Mark. (2023) *International Relations Theory*, 7th edn. Harlow: Pearson.
- Vollset, Stein Emil, et al. (2020) "Fertility, mortality, migration, and population scenarios for 195 countries and territories from 2017 to 2100: a forecasting analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study," *The Lancet* 396(10258): 1285-306.
- Wallace, Helen, and Wallace, William. (eds.) (1996) *Policy-Making in the European Union*, 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Weber, Cynthia. (2021) *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction*, 5th edn. Abingdon: Routledge.
- Wiesner, Claudia, and Knodt, Michèle. (eds.) (2024) *The War Against Ukraine and the EU: Facing New Realities*. Cham: Springer Nature.
- Williams, Michael. (2024) "Classical Realism," in Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja, Kušić, Katarina, and Smith, Steve. (eds.) *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*, 6th edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 55-71.
- Woollacott, Martin (1989) "The Year Ahead: Planet Politics - Why 1989 Could and Should be a Year of Miracles," *The Guardian*, 2 January.
- Yakovlyev, Maksym (2022) "European Imperialism and Colonialism in Africa: Conceptual Lessons for Understanding the Former Soviet Union and Present-Day Russia," *African Journal of Economics, Politics and Social Studies* 1(1): 31-39.
- Yavorska, Victoria, Oleksii Buriachenko, Liudmyla Vasechko, Valerii Shapoval, Oleksii Vasechko, and Roman Yedeliev (2024) "Examining the International Political and Legal Accountability of States for Genocide, Ecocide, and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current Norms, Practices, and Political Implications", *Multidisciplinary Science Journal* 6, 2024ss0739. <https://doi.org/10.31893/multiscience.2024ss0739>
- Zaremba, Kateryna (2024) "Still Normative Power Europe? The Perception of the EU in Ukraine Amidst the Russian War of Aggression", in Claudia Wiesner and Michèle Knodt (eds.) *The War Against Ukraine and the EU: Facing New Realities*. Cham: Springer Nature, 189-206.