Reviews

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In sentences such as Efter att ha ätit frukost ringde han till henne ‘After having breakfast he called her’ or Han lovade henne att komma ‘He promised her to come’, the implicit subjects of the nonfinite predicates are understood as being coreferential with the matrix subjects. In fact, in Swedish traditional grammars, we find the term SUBJEKTSREGENL ‘the subject rule’ (which is, by and large, a statement of a ‘rule of coreference with the matrix subject’). Within generative approaches, however, such data fall under a general theory about the reference of implicit subjects. This is referred to as Control Theory. Considering the amount of attention this issue has attracted, both traditionally and within generative grammar, it is remarkable that a comprehensive empirical survey exploring aspects of Control Theory has been lacking until this day. In order to understand the very complicated patterns underlying pragmatic control, for example, an accurate description cannot exclusively rely on construed data alone. In other words, the referring properties of implicit arguments sometimes require a context within which they may be evaluated.

Benjamin Lyngfelt presents a study of control in Swedish, combining the introspective method with a robust corpus survey. In his material, a wealth of authentic examples is complemented by numerous invented ones. Because of its empirical coverage, Lyngfelt’s book has all the prerequisites of becoming a standard reference. The data survey presented in chapters 5–12 is such that future research in the field can hardly do without it. Also, the exposition reveals didactic skills. The author succeeds in making theoretical notions comprehensible to the non-generative reader, and in making Scandinavianist discussion available to the non-Scandinavianist reader. Personally, I find the historical overview in chapter 3 particularly illuminating. Throughout, the subject rule emerges as a normative artefact. Although, when looked at statistically, it is found that those cases where implicit subjects refer to matrix subjects are most prevalent, this correlation is considered as merely epiphenomenal and should be understood as a result of the interaction between underlying mechanisms of different kinds.
In order to pursue this intuition, Lyngfelt formulates his analysis in terms of Optimality Theory (OT). A number of violable principles are assumed, all taken from the Principles & Parameters framework. There is a principle stating that the reference of PRO is settled by the way the interpretation is ‘oriented’ by the matrix predicate (called ORIENT). An important role is given to Principle B of Binding Theory (PRIN B), and the selectional properties of lexical items (SELECT). Furthermore, there is a principle ensuring that PRO needs an antecedent in the discourse (ANT), a principle of c-command (C-KOM), and one imposing minimal distance between the antecedent and PRO (MDP). Lastly, there is a principle of pragmatic reference (PRAG). These are ranked in the following way:

(1) Principle ranking

ORIENT >> PRIN B >> SELECT >> ANT >> C-KOM >> MDP >> PRAG

Lyngfelt justifies his choice of framework by the fact that control appears to be a highly compositional matter. In fact, it is argued that several different factors are involved in our way of interpreting control structures: lexical, syntactic and pragmatic. They are not all of equal strength: some of them actually seem to outrank others. Here lies the interest of the OT approach and, potentially, its major theoretical achievement.

The analysis presented in the book gives rise to a number of interesting questions concerning the precise definition of these principles, and the precise way in which they interact. Furthermore, some conceptual and empirical issues need clarification. In what follows, I will address some of the questions that I take to be of particular interest.

As Lyngfelt points out (p. 230), the OT approach is necessarily based on some independent theory which provides the principles to be ranked. Thus, as his point of departure, Lyngfelt adopts the Principles & Parameters framework (P&P), while staying fairly neutral with respect to the choices to be made between GB and Minimalism.

The discussion is concerned with the interpretation of sentences. The ‘input’ to the model is a linear string. The OT ranking discriminates between different ‘output’ candidates. The ‘output’ encompasses hierarchically structured syntactic representations. (In fact, the output has both syntactic and semantic structure (p. 273).) For instance, the difference between *Vakten släppte in dem för att hämta sina jackor* ‘The guard let them in to get their coats’ and *Vakten släppte in dem för att vara snäll* ‘The guard let them in (in order) to be nice’ is captured in terms of a difference in syntactic structure. In brief, the object, *dem*, is assumed to c-command the purpose clause in the former sentence, but not in the latter. Moreover, the output representation contains null elements such as PRO, pro and traces. However, Lyngfelt’s OT account does not pursue such ideas in the way P&P approaches normally do. This can be
illustrated with the example of EMBEDDED SUBJECT CONTROL as illustrated in (2) (Lyngfelt’s 9:20a, p. 186).

(2) För att PRO ytterligare stärka den amerikanska fackförbundsrörelsen for to PRO further strengthen the American union movement tror Kourpias att USA:s tre största fackförbundet innan år 2000 thinks Kourpias that USA's three biggest unions before year 2000 kommer att gå samman will unite

‘Kourpias thinks that USA's three biggest unions will unite before the year 2000 in order to further strengthen the American union movement.’

At the surface, the purpose clause containing PRO is not c-commanded by the embedded subject in (2), but a P&P account could, of course, take recourse to reconstruction. Consider (3) (my examples):

(3) a. Jag tror att Riksbanken kommer att höja räntan I think that National-bank-the will raise interest-the [för att PRO hejda inflationen]. for to PRO stop inflation-the ‘I think the National Bank will raise the rate of interest in order to stop inflation.’

b. [För att PRO hejda inflationen] tror jag att Riksbanken for to PRO stop inflation-the think I that National-bank-the kommer att höja räntan ___. will raise interest-the

‘In order to stop inflation, I think the National Bank will raise the rate of interest.’

As for control, there is no actual difference between (3a) and (3b). This is so quite simply because the anteposed purpose clause in (3b) is interpreted in its ‘basic’ position (marked by ____ in (3b)). Hence, the account could recur to c-command in both cases. Note that this kind of interpretation is sensitive to island effects:

(4) a. Jag beklagar att Riksbanken kommer att höja räntan I regret that National-bank-the will raise interest-the [för att PRO hejda inflationen]. for to PRO stop inflation-the ‘I regret that the National Bank will raise the rate of interest in order to stop inflation.’

b. *[För att PRO hejda inflationen] beklagar jag att Riksbanken for to PRO stop inflation-the regret I that National-bank-the kommer att höja räntan ___. will raise interest-the
‘In order to stop inflation, I regret that the National Bank will raise the rate of interest.’ [unacceptable in the relevant reading]

It is not obvious how these patterns could follow without the assumption of reconstruction. In other words, if, for instance, the OT analysis appeals to pragmatic control to explain (3b), it is not obvious why the explanation does not extend to (4b). (Note that Lyngfelt actually discusses the relevance of extraction though in a different context, pp. 206–209.)

A related issue to which Lyngfelt turns several times (e.g. pp. 296–301, 305–306) are the cases defined as OPTIONAL CONTROL. One example is (5) (Lyngfelt’s 16:33a, p. 305), where PRO may be interpreted as coreferential with the matrix subject or as arbitrary.

(5) Viå praterade om att PRO_i/arb spela fotboll på snö.

We talked about playing football in the snow.

The optionality in (5) is mentioned as a particular problem for the analysis. In fact, certain differences between the two interpretations suggest that some further assumptions about syntactic structure are needed. In a sense, the solution lies implicit in Lyngfelt’s discussion. Consider the sentences in (6) (my examples), where minimal contexts are provided in order to clarify the intended readings.

(6) a. Viå talade om att PRO_i skaffa hund (… till hösten möjligen).

we talked about to PRO_i get dog in autumn-the possibly

b. Vi talade om ?(det) att PRO skaffa hund (… det borde folk låta bli när de bor mitt i stan).

we talked about it to PROarb get dog that should people let be when they live middle in town-the

(‘… people shouldn’t do that when they live in the city’)

Simplifying, (6a) means ‘we are planning to buy a dog’, and (6b) something like ‘we were discussing the fact that people buy dogs’.

These examples raise two points. First, as Lyngfelt notes, in such contexts the expletive det ‘it’ may be inserted. In the case of (6b) the expletive is not really optional however: in my opinion, the intended arbitrary reading of (6b) is not readily available without the expletive. Secondly, a comparative remark could be of some interest. The reading associated with (6a) can be expressed with non-finite complements (gerunds or infinitives) in other languages, English and French, for example: We were talking about buying a dog, On a parlé d’acheter un chien. The infinitival construction in (6b), on the other hand, seems to be rather a Swedish (or perhaps Scandinavian) pattern. (6b) is not readily translated without the insertion of some nominal expression, such
as ‘the fact’: We were talking about the fact that . . ., On a parlé du fait que . . . (cf. Lyngfelt’s comment that the infinitival complement of such constructions is more ‘nominal-like’, p. 300). These observations point in the same direction: control is not optional. Rather, the two readings are the result of two distinct structures, with the arbitrary one involving a factive operator. Consider the fact that wh-extraction is possible only in (7a) and not in (7b) (in order to make the difference clearer we can add reflexive pronouns).

(7) a. Vad talade vi om att skaffa oss —?
   what spoke we about to get ourselves
b. *Vad talade vi om det att skaffa sig —?
   what spoke we about it to get oneself

In brief, if the OT account assumes a more elaborate output structure than is the case here, some further empirical issues could be solved.

The above discussion leads us to the question of how arbitrary control is generally treated in this approach. Arbitrary control emerges when other interpretation strategies are excluded. One of the principles, ANT, is explicitly intended to exclude arbitrary control (p. 249): the arbitrary interpretation of PRO is possible only if there is no explicit antecedent in the discourse. Generally speaking, one has the impression that such a treatment underestimates the possibility of arbitrary control. First, consider an example like (8) (my example).

(8) Nu får ni genomgå ett prov för att PROARB se om ni är lämpade
   now will you undergo a test for to PROARB see if you are fit
   för den här uppgiften.
   for this here task
   ‘Now you will undergo a test in order to see if you are fit for this task.’

In a decontextualised example like (8), arbitrary PRO is clearly possible in spite of the presence of an explicit potential antecedent ni ‘you’ (in fact, ni is not excluded as the antecedent of PRO in (8), but neither is it enforced). To my understanding, arbitrary PRO should be ruled out in (8), by virtue of the principle ANT. Of course, in a context, some antecedent other than ‘you’ could become salient, such as ‘we’ or ‘them’ (yielding the interpretation ‘You will undergo a test, for us/them to see . . .’). But this is far from exhaustive. Discussing patterns of pragmatic/arbitrary control, Lyngfelt gives the following example (his 16:22a, p. 295):

(9) För dem är det alltför energikrävande att PROi slåss hela tiden . . .
   for them is it too energy-demanding to PROi fight whole time-the
   ‘For them, it takes too much energy to fight all the time.’
(9) is considered as a subcase of pragmatic control. Lyngfelt points out (p. 295) that (9), where the antecedent is included within the same clause as PRO, is different from the cases where a possible antecedent is salient in context. Consider (10) (my examples):

(10) a. Att PRO arb röka är farligt.
   to PRO arb smoke is dangerous
   ‘Smoking is dangerous.’

b. Att PRO i röka är farligt för Johan i.
   to PRO i smoke is dangerous for Johan i
   ‘Smoking is dangerous for Johan’

c. Johan har rökt i 20 år men att PRO arb
   Johan has smoked for 20 years but to PRO arb
   röka är farligt, så nu tänker han sluta.
   smoke is dangerous so now will he stop
   ‘Johan has smoked for 20 years, but smoking is dangerous so now he will quit.’

In (10a), where no antecedent is present, PRO is arbitrary. In (10b), PRO obligatorily refers to Johan. Here, ANT rules out the arbitrary interpretation (i.e. (10b) does not imply that smoking is necessarily dangerous for anyone else but Johan). In (10c), Johan is salient in the context. Thus, arbitrary PRO should still be ruled out by virtue of ANT. Clearly, however, the reading of (10c) is of the same kind as (10a): like (10a), (10c) states that smoking is dangerous for people in general (hence also for Johan: but the interpretation of PRO in (10c) is still of an arbitrary kind). These contrasts show that the arbitrary reading is not overruled as easily as the OT treatment would suggest. This brings into question the very status of the principle ANT: in light of the above examples, invoking a constraint that bars the arbitrary reading whenever there is an explicit antecedent in the discourse does not seem to be justified.

A considerable part of what could be considered the ‘core case’ of syntactic control is derived from the interaction between the three principles ANT, C-KOM and MDP. Taken together, they would seem to equal Principle A of Binding Theory: $\alpha$ binds $\beta$ if $\alpha$ and $\beta$ are co-indexed ($=$ANT, essentially), if $\alpha$ c-commands $\beta$ ($=$C-KOM) within some sort of domain ($=$MDP). The precise definition of the domain, of course, may vary across frameworks. Recall that influential proposals within GB aimed at reducing obligatory control to A-binding. In fact, the OT account of control seems to assume a sort of decompositional approach to A-binding. This claim (which is never explicitly made) is highly interesting in principle. However, it calls for some robust argument in favour of the view that ANT, C-KOM and MDP indeed should be treated as independent principles instead of, say, parts of one and the same syntactic relation, as assumed in traditional GB approaches. This issue is not really addressed, at least not in explicit terms, and certain points in the discussion
rather seem to speak against the ‘decompositional’ view. First, recall that Principle B of Binding Theory is treated differently; it is in fact assumed with its ‘integrity’ uncompromised. Consider, for instance, that the definition of MDP has to be built on the notion of c-command; possible intervening elements, not unexpectedly, are defined in terms of c-command (p. 247, for example). Furthermore, c-commanding elements are necessarily potential antecedents (whereas an element may count as antecedent for PRO without c-commanding it: we will return to this shortly). In addition, a principle such as MDP is conceptually dependent on ANT, since MDP can only come into question if there is some antecedent to evaluate. During his discussion of OPTIONAL CONTROL (pp. 296–301; see above), Lyngfelt considers the possibility that the principle C-KOM can be somehow limited by a further interacting principle, Ö-BLOCK (Eng. ISLAND-BLOCK), which essentially introduces an island condition, limiting the domain in which C-KOM holds. The discussion is not conclusive, but clearly the way Ö-BLOCK, as well as MDP, are intended to work in this model is reminiscent of the ‘governing category’ in GB accounts.

Finally, recall that within OT linguistic variation should be captured in terms of different rankings of principles (and hence language change in terms of a reordering of such principles). However, it is indeed difficult to imagine a ranking of ANT, C-KOM and MDP different from the one suggested here. As Lyngfelt points out (on p. 249, for example) they seem to be restricted to this precise ordering for reasons of necessity.

This is enough to suspect that the three principles in question are better understood in terms of Principle A of Binding Theory. Now, consider the following case: Lyngfelt claims that PRO in (11a) may be pragmatically interpreted, whereas PRO in (11b) is coreferential with the matrix subject ‘some personnel’ ((11) is Lyngfelt’s 14:12a–b, p. 257):

(11) a. Genom att PRO flytta en produktionslinje till fabriken i Italien by to PRO move a production-line to factory-the in Italy blir en del personal överflödig.
   become some personnel superfluous
   ‘By moving a production-line to the factory in Italy some personnel become superfluous.’

b. En del personal blir överflödig genom att PRO flytta some personnel become superfluous by to PRO move en produktionslinje till fabriken i Italien.
   a production line to factory-the in Italy
   ‘Some personnel become superfluous by moving a production-line to the factory in Italy.’

The contrast made between (11a) and (11b) is intended to show that C-KOM is ranked higher than PRAG; the ‘pragmatic’ interpretation would have been equally
available in both cases but, in (11b), where the matrix subject c-commands PRO, PRAG is outranked by C-KOM. Following this line of reasoning, some effects of linear ordering could be captured. But there seems to be a problem here. Because an element does not have to c-command in order to qualify as ANT, the DP *en del personal* ‘some personnel’ should count as ANT in both cases. Because ANT outranks C-KOM, the optimal candidate for control ought to be *en del personal* in (11a) and (11b) alike. No contrast should emerge. The only obvious way to avoid this dilemma, as far as I can see, is to split the category ANT into two parts: c-commanding antecedents (say, ANT1) and non-c-commanding antecedents (ANT2), the former being ranked higher than C-KOM and the latter ranked lower than C-KOM, as in (12).

(12) Proposed (1st) reinterpretation of principle ranking

\[
\ldots \text{SELECT} \gg \text{ANT1} \gg \text{C-KOM} \gg \text{MDP} \gg \text{ANT2/PRAG}
\]

*En del personal* in (11a) is a non-commanding antecedent, ANT2, hence ranked lower than C-KOM, and the contrast between (11a) and (11b) follows. But then the only substantial reason to assume ANT1, C-KOM, and MDP as independent principles disappears: they can now, together, be spelled out in terms of binding. At this point, ANT2 becomes any nominal element emerging in the discourse. Under such a definition, ANT2 actually equals PRAG (defined on p. 254). This amounts to saying that the category ANT could be dispensed with, along the lines of (13):

(13) Proposed (2nd) reinterpretation of principle ranking

\[
\ldots \text{SELECT} \gg \text{Principle A of Binding Theory} \gg \text{PRAG}
\]

When eliminating ANT, we take away the principle intended to bar arbitrary control; but, as argued above, the principle ANT was questionable anyway on empirical grounds.

In addition, the OT approach now becomes considerably more similar to what could be described as a standard P&P view of control; selection (argument structure essentially) provides syntactic representations. Given these representations, A-binding accounts for the syntactic core case of control facts. Outside of the narrow syntactic domain, the interpretation of PRO is a pragmatic matter.

Summing up, Lyngfelt’s book is highly recommended reading for whoever wishes to have an overview of the field of control in Swedish. The study addresses a wide array of data and the OT format actually captures the insight that control interpretations emerge from the interaction of principles belonging to different components of the language faculty. It also makes the interesting claim that such principles are not of equal strength, but that some prevail over others. Although the account is descriptively convincing, the theoretical status of the principles that have been assumed is not always clear, nor are the relationships between them. If
future research is to be carried out along these lines, several conceptual issues need to be addressed.


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*Restrictiveness in Case Theory* is divided into eight chapters, including ‘Introduction’ and ‘Conclusions’. The other chapters are: ‘Argument case and case alternation’, ‘A typology of case systems’, ‘Linker interactions’, ‘Icelandic’, ‘Changes in linking’ and ‘Case semi-preservation’. The book also contains notes, references and a very thorough index. In this review I will comment on each chapter although I will not discuss the technical details of the theoretical framework, which are very complex. Instead I will focus on the parts of the book that deal with the linking of case and agreement in Icelandic.

In the ‘Introduction’, the term linking is defined as follows (p. 5):

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{(1) a. Direct linking: } & \text{ arguments } \rightarrow \text{ morphosyntax } \rightarrow \text{ grammatical functions} \\
\text{b. Mediated linking: } & \text{ arguments } \rightarrow \text{ grammatical functions } \rightarrow \text{ morphosyntax}
\end{align*}
\]

The main difference between the two is that ‘In mediated linking, some rule … assigns grammatical functions to arguments and then case is assigned to grammatical functions. In direct linking, rules assign case and other morphosyntactic categories to arguments directly and grammatical functions can be assigned to the resulting case-marked NP’ (p. 5).

Smith uses direct linking and the framework is closely related to Kiparsky’s Linking Theory (KLT). In the last part of the introduction, the framework is set out and the differences between it and KLT are explained. For instance, Smith does not assume that arguments have thematic roles or thematic role labels. Instead, a distinction is made between argument types and argument categories. According to Smith, argument types are thematic roles while argument categories are ‘syntactic classes of arguments that bear only a looser connection to corresponding argument types’ (p. 17). Experiencer arguments, for example, can be either dative or nominative in Icelandic. The theory would have to account for this with a rule like: ‘Experiencers are dative unless otherwise indicated by exception feature’ (p. 18). Instead Smith suggests
a syntactic category EXP, ‘whose members must be interpreted as experiencers in the semantic sense’ (p. 18).

In Smith’s system, obliqueness and non-obliqueness are parts of the specification of a linker (a linker links case to an argument). In Icelandic, morphologically oblique subjects are syntactically non-oblique, i.e. they have the syntactic behaviour of a non-oblique subject, while German morphologically oblique experiencers, such as 

\[
\text{mir ‘me (dative)’ in (2), are syntactically oblique because they do not behave like subjects: the verb in (2) shows agreement with } \text{diese Bäume ‘these trees’}. \]

(2) Mir gefallen diese Bäume.

\[
\text{me-DAT like-3PL these-NOM trees} \]

‘I like these trees.’

Another further assumption made by Smith is that there are three kinds of linkers: \text{CASE, AGREEMENT} and \text{WORD ORDER}. Agreement is not oriented towards the subject; ‘rather it is proposed that orientation towards highest (or lowest) argument will be taken care of by constraints otherwise needed for cases like nominative’ (p. 19).

In chapter 2, the theory is used to explain the following case alternations:

- \text{Dative Substitution (DS; also known in the literature as Dative Sickness)} where accusative subjects are replaced by dative subjects. DS is widely spread in Icelandic.
- \text{Nominative Substitution (NS) in German and Icelandic} where accusative and dative subjects are replaced by nominative subjects. Contrary to Smith’s claims, NS is very rare in Icelandic.

In fact the picture is somewhat more complicated. To begin with, nominative can also be substituted by dative and accusative. The verbs \text{hlakka til ‘look forward to’} and \text{kvíða fyrir ‘be anxious’} have nominative subjects in standard Modern Icelandic. However, many speakers allow these verbs with accusative and dative subjects:

(3) a. %Mér hlakkar til jólanna.

\[
\text{me-DAT look-forward-3SG to Christmas-the} \]

‘I look forward to Christmas.’

b. %Míg kvíðir fyrir prófunum.

\[
\text{me-ACC is-anxious-3SG for exams-the} \]

‘I am anxious about the exams.’

In her survey, Svavarsdóttir (1982) examined how widespread dative sickness was among Icelandic eleven-year-olds. She also checked how many of the children substituted accusative and dative subjects with nominative subjects. Less than 1.5% of the children had nominative subjects instead of accusative with the verbs \text{langa ‘want’, vanta ‘lack’ and svíða ‘itch’}, and a nominative subject instead of dative with the verbs \text{þykja ‘think’ and leiðast ‘be bored’}. 6.4% of the children in Reykjavík used
a nominative subject instead of accusative with the verb *dreyma* ‘dream’. Only in two cases did more than 10% of the children use a nominative subject instead of an accusative subject. One case was the verb *minna* ‘recall’ (20%), the other the verb *gruna* ‘doubt someone’s honour’ (11%). As Svavarsdóttir (1982:33) points out, this is perhaps no coincidence as both verbs can occur with a nominative subject in the standard language, only with a slightly different meaning, *minna* ‘remind’ and *gruna* ‘suspect’.

I agree with Svavarsdóttir that NS does not have the same status in Modern Icelandic as DS, and I do not think that the same mechanisms lie behind the two. This might, however, be the case in West-Icelandic, the language of the Icelandic emigrants in North America, where NS, due to language contact with English, is much more widespread than in Icelandic spoken in Iceland.

For German, Smith (p. 54–55) discusses two verbs: *hungern* ‘hunger’ and *ekeln* ‘be disgusted’. According to Smith, the two verbs have almost identical lexical entries:

(4) a. **hungern** < x\| EXP \> ‘hunger’
   \[\text{ACC: } \begin{array}{l}
   \text{ARG}\{\text{Exp}\,|\,1} \\
   \text{OBL}
   \end{array}\]

   b. **ekeln** < x\| EXP \> ‘be disgusted’
   \[\begin{array}{l}
   \text{ARG}\{\text{Exp}\,|\,1} \\
   \text{OBL}
   \end{array}\]

The difference is that while the lexical entry for *hungern* is specified for accusative, the lexical entry for *ekeln* is not. The EXP classification of *hungern* is optional. If a lexical entry with an EXP classification is chosen, accusative case is applicable; if not, nominative case is applicable. In the lexical entry of *ekeln*, the classifications EXP, ARG\| EXP \|1, and OBL are optional. Accusative applies if nothing is left out. Nominative applies if the EXP classification is left out and dative applies if the limitation on the highest argument is left out. The highest argument is oblique if accusative and dative apply; it is not oblique if nominative applies.

In the normal situation, both verbs have an accusative argument. Smith mentions that the accusative of *hungern* can be substituted by nominative and the accusative of *ekeln* can be substituted by either nominative or dative. This is true but the fact is that having accusative with *hungern* is marked *dichterisch* ‘poetic’ in the Duden German Concise Dictionary (*Deutsches Universalwörterbuch*, 4th ed.) and my informant says it is very archaic and can only be found in biblical texts and fairy tales.

It is a disadvantage of the current theory that it does not capture the semantic differences depending on which case is chosen. If nominative *ich* ‘I’ is chosen, the sentence *Ich hungere* ‘I-NOM hunger’ has the meaning *I am starving* (because of a diet, starvation, etc.). If accusative *mich* is chosen, the sentence *Mich hungert* ‘Me-ACC hungers’ the meaning is equivalent to the more modern *Ich bin hungrig* ‘I am hungry’ (Silke Fischer, p.c.). Smith overlooks that *hungern* can have a dative
argument as well as nominative and accusative. It should, therefore, not be treated differently from *ekeln*.

A further assumption has to be made for Icelandic because of the Linking Dissimilation Constraint (LDC), given in (5) below, which prohibits two occurrences of the same case with one verb. The second argument of ACC-ACC verbs such as *vanta* ‘lack’ has to be specified for accusative in the lexicon.

(5) Linking Dissimilation Constraint

Given two co-arguments, x and y, y high-/low-er than x, if y is linked by a linker B that has the same LINK value as the most restrictive linker of that type applicable by the AC [Applicability Constraint] to x, and there is a less restrictive linker C applicable by the AC to y, then the linking is disallowed. (p. 80)

In chapter 3, ‘A typology of case systems’, it is shown how the theory can be used to account for four different types of case systems. According to Smith, there are two different types of nominative-accusative languages. Icelandic, German and Classical Greek represent type 1 languages, and Japanese is a type 2 language. There are also two types of ergative-absolutive languages. Walpiri is a type 3 language and Karbardian is a type 4 language. The four different types are derived by two parameters, the LIMITATION PARAMETER, in (6a), and the PREFERENCE PARAMETER, in (6c).

(6) a. ‘Languages can have the limitation [–XA] in the LINK value of their any argument case’ (p. 8, (30)).

b. ‘[–XA] where X = H of the feature means “prohibited on highest arguments” and X = L if the feature means “prohibited on the lowest”’ (p. 80, (29)).

c. ‘Choose one of [high, low] in’ (5) and (6b) (p. 81, (31)).

Type 1 does not have a limitation on the [ARG] case and it has the value low for the Preference Parameter, i.e. a linker is not applicable to a lower argument if there is a less restrictive linker that is applicable. Type 2 languages have a limitation on the [ARG] case and the value high for the Preference Parameter, i.e. some [ARG] cases will be prohibited on either the highest or the lowest argument. In Japanese, accusative is the [ARG] case and it has the limitation [–HA], hence accusative will only surface on the lowest argument in Japanese. Type 3 languages have a limitation on the [ARG] case and the value high for the Preference Parameter. Type 4 languages have no limitation on the [ARG] case and the Preference Parameter has the value high.

In chapter 4, ‘Linker interactions’, Smith examines the following cases: The elsewhere pattern of Greek, Icelandic and Latin, passive in type 1 and type 2 languages, antipassive in type 3 and type 4 languages and word order.

The elsewhere pattern of Greek, Icelandic, German and Latin is that accusative is the default case that is assigned to non-arguments. In type 1 languages both
nominative and accusative are applicable on the argument that is being passivized while in type 2 languages only nominative is applicable because accusative is restricted to lower arguments. Type 3 and type 4 languages differ in which case is applicable to the argument that is being suppressed in the same way as type 1 and type 2 languages: in one type two cases are applicable, in the other only one case is applicable because some cases are restricted to higher arguments.

According to Smith, accusative is the elsewhere case in Greek, Icelandic, and Latin. It is the non-argument case of type 1 languages. One of the reasons for this is that in these languages accusative is assigned to adjuncts, in other words, the same way as accusative is assigned in type 1 languages, a feature [VP] is assigned to adjunct NPs:

(7) a. Er hat den ganzen Abend getanzt. (German)  
   he has the-acc whole evening danced  
   ‘He has danced the whole evening.’

b. Hann dansaði af miklum móði alt kvöldið (Icelandic)  
   he danced of much passion whole evening-the-acc  
   ‘He danced passionately the whole evening’

In chapter 5, ‘Icelandic’, Smith returns to dative subjects and nominative objects, and how the verb agrees with nominative objects. He also discusses double object constructions in Icelandic, including the issue of which of the two objects can be the subject of a passive.

In the case of verb agreement with nominative objects, Smith oversimplifies when he says that ‘the verb agrees only optionally with post-verbal nominatives’ (p. 174). The fact is that agreement with nominative objects probably isn’t optional (cf. Hrafnbjargarson 2001 and references there). For some speakers, agreement with third person plural nominative objects is obligatory, for other speakers, default agreement is obligatory. The verb never shows agreement with first or second person nominative objects. So the generalisation that the postverbal NP in the cases where the verb agrees is linked by agreement does not hold because a second person nominative object (in an obligatory agreement dialect) would not be linked by agreement while a third person plural nominative object would.

Chapter 6, ‘Changes in linking’, is focused on the diachronic aspects of linking theory. Linking theory might seem ideal in this respect, since language change can be linked directly to changes in which way arguments are linked. In this book, the cases that involve language change also involve linkers that become less restrictive. This is the core of the RESTRICTIVENESS CHANGE PREDICTION, which says that ‘[a]nalogical change in case frames will be relatively favoured in the direction which decreases the restrictiveness of the linker applying to a given argument’ (p. 234).

This makes correct predictions for the DS cases Smith discusses. In DS where accusative subjects are replaced by dative subjects, linkers become less restrictive.
The linker that links accusative to subjects in ACC-ACC constructions has the classification ARG|EXP I, but the linker that links dative to subjects has the classification ARG|EXP.

This, however, does not make correct predictions for the DS cases mentioned above, which are not mentioned in the book, i.e. the cases where nominative subjects are replaced by accusative or dative subjects. There, linkers become more restrictive. The linker that links nominative only has the classification ARG, but the linker that links dative case to subjects is more restricted because it has the classification ARG|EXP. The linker that links accusative case to subjects is even more restrictive because it has the classification ARG|EXP I. This is against the Restrictiveness Change Prediction because the change contradicts the generalisation that language change is reflected in linkers becoming less restrictive.

In the last chapter, ‘Case semi-preservation’, Smith shows how Faroese and Classical Greek have optional preservation of case in the passive. In Faroese, unlike in Icelandic, dative case usually is absorbed in the passive. In Faroese, the only exceptions to this are dative goals, which preserve their case in the passive. This is explained by optionality, i.e. in some cases, the linker that links dative is specified for a certain argument (e.g. the second argument of a verb) and dative is preserved in the passive; in other cases, the linker is not specified for any arguments and nominative will be linked as the most restrictive linker.

Restrictiveness in Case Theory is a very interesting book, which must be recommended as a source of inspiration to all linguists working on case. Its main strength lies in showing how the same theory can be used to analyse many different problems, such as dative subjects, nominative objects, word order and differences in case typology. However, the book is extremely hard to comprehend for a layman in linking theory, mainly because of the complex terminology and the intricacy of the theoretical framework. I have now read the book three times and I am only now beginning to understand the most complicated cases discussed in the book.

REFERENCES
