The Syntax and Pragmatics of Exclamations and other Expressive/Emotional Utterances

Beijer, Fabian

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FABIAN BEIJER

1   Introduction

In the linguistic literature we find discussions and descriptions of linguistic phenomena such as EXPRESSIVE UTTERANCES, EXCLAMATORY UTTERANCES, EXPRESSIVE SENTENCES, EXCLAMATIONS, EXCLAMATIVES, and EXPRESSIVE SPEECH ACTS. Linguists have thus observed that there are emotionally triggered utterances in the languages of the world, but there seems to be no consensus regarding which terminology to use when discussing the phenomena in question. Neither do the phenomena seem properly defined. In sum, there is a need for better definitions of the terms used, and in order to produce better definition we have to acquire a better understanding of the phenomena at hand. This paper is an attempt at improving the present situation.

Regardless of terminology and linguistic labelling, we are all aware of the fact that utterances like the following exist in English:

(1)   What scum we are! (Miller 1965: 63)
(2)   What a devil of a name! (Shaw 1941: 24)
(3)   How very curious! (Shaw 1941: 24)
(4)   But he was such a terrible referee! (Pinter 1993: 66)
(5)   That I have something to do with this monstrousness! (Miller 1965: 66)
(6)   Oh, won't that be something! (Miller 1995: 38)

It is not controversial to claim that there are exclamatory utterances among the examples above. The problem is, however, to distinguish between expressive/emotional utterances in general, and the type of utterances often called EXCLAMATIVES. The term EXCLAMATIVE is often used to refer to a specific sentence/clause type on par with the three clause types DECLARATIVES, INTERROGATIVES and IMPERATIVES, while other linguists consider the exclamative to be a minor sentence/clause type.

Quirk et al. (1985), for instance, use the term EXCLAMATIVE to refer to a grammatical category, i.e. a specific clause type, while they use the term EXCLAMATION to refer to the logical or semantic status of an utterance. This means that in Quirk et al.'s terminology, some EXCLAMATIONS are realised by EXCLAMATIVES, while some are not.

Radford (1997: 506) defines an EXCLAMATIVE as "a type of structure used to exclaim surprise, delight, annoyance etc." and goes on to say that "[i]n English syntax, the term is restricted

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[1] This is a short version of a paper I wrote in the spring of 1999 under the supervision of professor Inger Rosengren.
[2] I use the term 'emotional/expressive utterance' to refer any utterance in which the speaker in question is emotionally involved, and in which this involvement is linguistically expressed by means of intonation or by the use of performative expressions.

largely to clauses beginning with *wh*-exclamative words like *what!* or *how!*"[3]. The use of the word *structure* seems to indicate that he regards the exclamative as a syntactic phenomenon, whereas I, with Rosengren (1997) and others, argue that the exclamative is a pragmatic phenomenon.

2 Aim and hypotheses

Apart from arguing for the position that the term EXCLAMATIVE does not refer to a syntactic phenomenon, but to a pragmatic one, the main aim of this paper is to separate what has been called exclamatives from other kinds of expressive/emotional utterances. Related to this main aim is the question of what it is that makes us recognise an utterance as an expressive/emotional utterance. There must be something that distinguishes an ordinary declarative clause used assertively from the same clause used as an expressive/emotive utterance, for instance as an exclamative. Following Bolinger (1989), among others, I hypothesize that the intonation contour is of great importance here. A third aim is to determine what an exclamative is, in terms of speech act theory.

My hypotheses are as follows:

(i) There exists an exclamative speech act with the following features or characteristics:

- expressing strong positive or negative emotions (without explicitly stating that a specific feeling is involved) concerning a specific state of affairs.
- containing a scalar item which may be explicit or inferable.
- expressing a deviation from a norm (which may, or may not, be explicitly stated in the proposition), through a generalised implicature resulting from an inference process, triggered by emphatic stress.

This implies that the term EXCLAMATIVE does not refer to a clause type, but to declaratives or interrogatives mapped onto speech acts in a non-default way.

(ii) There are other expressive/emotional utterances, lacking at least one of the features described in (i), but which are distinguishable from ordinary assertions through their intonation and through the contexts in which they are uttered.

(iii) The types of utterances described in (i) and (ii) can be separated from each other, syntactically, as well as in terms of speech act theory.

(iv) The types of utterances described in (i) and (ii) are different from Searle's EXPRESSIVES in that they make use of two pragmatic sub-modules, ILLOCS (Illocutionary Structure) and INFOS (Information Structure), while Searle's expressives only make use of one, namely ILLOCS.

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[3] If we consider the examples above, (1) – (3) fall within the scope of Radford's (1997) definition above, as does perhaps example (4). The others, however, do not. In terms of clause type, (4) is declarative, but (1)-(3) are not as easily categorised.

3   Material

To get illustrative examples of the linguistic phenomena at hand, I have compiled a corpus consisting of drama texts in English. For a complete list of the drama texts included in the corpus, see the list of references at the end of the paper.

I have extracted all utterances in the corpus followed by exclamation marks, except imperatives, following Bolinger (1989:249) who states that "in the broadest sense, exclamations are thus anything at the end of which one would put an exclamation mark. This of course is circular, but it does give a basis for searching out a corpus of examples".

4   Previous accounts

Most grammarians have chosen to describe exclamations or exclamatives as either one of the major clause types on par with declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives, or as a minor clause type. This is not surprising since utterances lacking inversion, beginning with *what a* or *how*, do not function in the same way as ordinary declaratives or interrogatives. We know, however, that declarative clauses, for instance, can be used to fulfil many different functions in natural languages, i.e. there is no one-to-one relation between language form and language function. Consequently, the exclamative need not be a clause type, but may instead be a pragmatic phenomenon, a claim supported by the fact that those who consider exclamative/exclamation to be a sentence type (e.g. Quirk et al. 1972, 1985) have to introduce minor sentence types having the same exclamatory functions as the sentences they call exclamative.

Quirk et al. (1972) recognise four major classes into which simple sentences may be divided, and the division seems to have been made on the basis of (syntactic) form and (pragmatic) function:

(i)   STATEMENTS, i.e. sentences in which the subject is always present and generally precedes the verb, such as *John will speak to the boss today.*

(ii)   QUESTIONS, i.e. sentences marked by one of the following three criteria:
   a)   The placing of the operator in front of the subject, as in *Will John speak to the boss today?*
   b)   The initial positioning of a *wh*-element, as in *Who will John speak to?*
   c)   Rising question intonation[4]: *You will speak to the boss?*

(iii) COMMANDS, i.e. sentences which normally have no overt grammatical subject, and whose verb is in the imperative mood, e.g. *Speak to the boss today!*

(iv)   EXCLAMATIONS, i.e. sentences which have an initial phrase introduced by *what* or *how*, without inversion of subject and operator, e.g. *What nice clothes she wears!*.

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[4] Obviously, a declarative clause with rising intonation is still a declarative clause. This indicates that Quirk et. al (1972) are not careful enough when it comes to separating form and function.

When referring to clauses and not to sentences, i.e. when I take it that they discuss purely syntactic features of clauses, Quirk et al. (1972) use the following adjectives corresponding to the four sentence types just described: DECLARATIVE (clause), INTERROGATIVE (clause), IMPERATIVE (clause) and EXCLAMATORY (clause).

In their later work (Quirk et al. 1985), the authors do not make a difference between clauses and simple sentences. They recognise four grammatical types of sentences or clauses: DECLARATIVE (clauses/sentences), INTERROGATIVE (clauses/sentences), IMPERATIVES, and EXCLAMATIVE (clauses/sentences). They go on to say that there are four discourse functions associated with the four clause/sentence types, namely STATEMENTS, QUESTIONS, DIRECTIVES (corresponding to COMMANDS above) and EXCLAMATIONS.

Summing up, it is not entirely clear what Quirk et. al (1972) mean by their distinction between sentences and clauses. It may be the case that what they intend to indicate is the same difference between the grammatical status of a sentence and its discourse function as the one explicitly discussed in Quirk et. al (1985). If that is the case, it is indeed strange that they use syntactic criteria to define STATEMENTS, QUESTIONS, COMMANDS, and EXCLAMATIONS (see above).

However, while Quirk et al. (1972) seem to consider exclamations to constitute a sentence type of their own, they still recognise other constructions that can be used when making exclamations. They discuss EXCLAMATORY QUESTIONS, like *Hasn't she grown!* and *Has she grown!*, and say that they are "questions in form, but functionally like exclamations" (Quirk et al. (1972 §7.70)). They also recognise exclamations in which the "emphatic degree items" *so* and *such* are used as intensifiers and determiners respectively in statements and questions: *We've had such a time* and *Why did you use to hate geography so?* (Quirk et al. 1972: §7.79). They also mention *echo exclamations*, which repeat part or all of the preceding utterance:

(7)   A: I'm going to London for a holiday.
        B: To LONdon! That's not my idea of a rest. (Quirk et al. (1972: 7.84)

Quirk et al. (1972:7.85-7.89) also discuss various formulaic utterances, some of which they consider to be exclamations:

(8)   If only I'd listened to my parents!

Also in Quirk et. al (1985) it is observed that there is not always a one-to-one match between sentence/clause type and discourse function. Consider (9):

(9)   Isn't Christine clever!

Quirk et al. (1985) take this utterance to be syntactically interrogative but semantically (or, rather, pragmatically) an exclamation, while an utterance like (10) is said to be syntactically as well as semantically (pragmatically) an exclamation:

(10)   How clever Christine is!

In conclusion, this means that both Quirk et al. (1972) and Quirk et. al (1985) recognize several different form types that can be used as exclamations, but still prevail in the belief that there exists an exclamatory form type on par with declaratives, interrogatives and imperatives.

Radford (1997) recognises the same types of clauses/sentences as Quirk et al. (1985) do, namely DECLARATIVE, INTERROGATIVE, IMPERATIVE and EXCLAMATIVE sentences. Sadock & Zwicky (1985), on the other hand, hold that there are three major sentence types, DECLARATIVES, INTERROGATIVES and IMPERATIVES, and some minor sentence types such as EXCLAMATIONS, IMPRECATIVES and OPTATIVES. It may be important to make clear here that Sadock & Zwicky (1985) do not here discuss CLAUSE TYPES, but SENTENCE TYPES[5]. They consider exclamatives introduced by *what (a)* or *how* to constitute a minor sentence type. They claim that there are also a number of exclamatory types. In my opinion, a better solution would be to consider the exclamative to be a pragmatic phenomenon that can be realized by different form types, the most frequent and typical of which is the one introduced by the *wh*-elements *what (a)* and *how*.

Reis (1999) uses the term SYNTACTIC SENTENCE TYPES as opposed to "so-called sentence types". She holds that there are only three syntactic sentence types: DECLARATIVES, which are characterised by the syntactic feature [-wh], INTERROGATIVES, which are [+wh], and IMPERATIVES, which have the syntactic feature [+imp] (imperative). These syntactic features [±wh] and [±imp] are carriers of sentence moods, and the sentence moods are thus DECLARATIVE sentence mood, INTERROGATIVE sentence mood and IMPERATIVE sentence mood. All clauses are specified for sentence mood. All their functional meanings/illocutionary use potentials can be derived on the bases of the three syntactic sentence types/sentence moods plus the interpretively relevant properties of the additional (structural, lexical, prosodic etc.) elements involved. This view is developed and adapted to the minimalist program in Platzack & Rosengren (1998), and this is the view I adhere to in the present paper.

4.1 The standard theory of speech acts

A speech act is created when speaker/writer S makes an utterance U to hearer/reader H in context C. The various speech acts are distinguished by a number of dimensions, three of which are the most important, namely ILLOCUTIONARY POINT, EXPRESSED PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES, and DIRECTION OF FIT BETWEEN WORDS AND THE WORLD (Searle 1975).

The dimension ILLOCUTIONARY POINT concerns the purpose or aim of a speech act (e.g. the point of DIRECTIVES is get the hearer to do something). This dimension has five values, corresponding to the five basic speech act types, called THE ASSERTIVE POINT, THE DIRECTIVE POINT, THE COMMISSIVE POINT, THE EXPRESSIVE POINT and THE DECLARATIVE POINT.

The dimension EXPRESSED PSYCHOLOGICAL STATES is related to Grice's MAXIM OF QUALITY (Grice 1989:27), i.e. a STATEMENT that the proposition *p* expresses the speaker S's belief that *p*. A PROMISE expresses S's intention to do something, and a REQUEST expresses S's desire that hearer H do something. In other words: there has to be a match between the speaker's psychological state and the content of what he expresses if the speech act is to be successful.

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[5] "The speakers of any language can accomplish a great many communicative tasks with the sentences of their language: they can start a conversation, order someone to do something, narrate a tale, ask for information, promise to do something at some future time, report what they know or have heard, express surprise or dismay at what is going on about them, suggest a joint action, give permission for someone to do something, make a bet, offer something to someone, and so on. For some of these *uses* of sentences a language will have specific syntactic constructions, or even specific *forms*, reserved for just these uses - special particles, affixes, word order, intonations, missing elements, or even phonological alterations (or several of these in concert); when a sentence shows one of these it is to be understood as being used in a specific way. Such a coincidence of grammatical structure and conventional conversational use we call a SENTENCE TYPE" (Sadock & Zwicky 1985: 155).

The dimension DIRECTION OF FIT BETWEEN WORDS AND THE WORLD (e.g. Vanderveken 1998: 172-173) concerns the relation between the words uttered and the world they relate to. According to Searle (1969) there are five basic speech acts, which show the following directions of fit and have the following basic characteristics:

(i)   A REPRESENTATIVE have a WORDS-TO-WORLD direction of fit, i.e. their truth values are assigned on the basis of whether or not the words describe things as they are in the world spoken of. A REPRESENTATIVE is characterised by the fact that the speaker commits himself to the truth of the expressed proposition, as in an assertion or a conclusion.

(ii) A DIRECTIVE is an attempt to get H to do something, therefore they show WORLD-TO-WORDS fit, and express S's wish or desire that H do A. When asking a question, S wants H to answer the question, and when making a command, S wants H to perform the action A.

(iii) A COMMISSIVE indicates that the speaker commits himself to a future course of action, as when you promise, threat or offer. Commissives show WORLD-TO-WORDS fit, and S expresses the intention that S do A.

(iv) A DECLARATION is the archetypal speech act. When performing a declarative speech act you are not only saying something, but the utterance in itself has certain practical implications in the real world, granted that you are an individual in possession of the required power or status. The purpose of making a declaration is to get the world to match the propositional content by saying that the propositional content matches the world. Hence: declarations have *the double direction of fit*, i.e. both *world-to-words* and *words-to-world*.

(v)   An EXPRESSIVE expresses a psychological state, i.e. S's attitude with respect to a certain state of affairs, which need not be explicitly mentioned. Expressives have the NULL OR EMPTY direction of fit, since there is no question of success or failure of fit. Their point is only to express the speaker's propositional attitude to the state of affairs represented by the propositional content. Paradigm cases include, for instance, 'thanking', 'apologising', and 'welcoming'.

DECLARATIVE SENTENCES can be used to perform all five types of speech acts, i.e. DECLARATIONS (*I hereby christen you John.*), REPRESENTATIVES (*She is a linguist.*), DIRECTIVES (*You're English?*), COMMISSIVES (*I'll do it tomorrow.*) and EXPRESSIVES (*I apologise for being rude.*). The default case is, however, that declaratives are used to perform representative speech acts.
INTERROGATIVE SENTENCES, in Searle's system, are only used to ask questions that require answers, that is, to perform directives (*Aren't you Mr Miller?*).
IMPERATIVE SENTENCES are used to perform directives that require actions (*Leave immediately!*).
      There is thus no one-to-one correspondence between sentence type and illocution, as the declarative sentences just mentioned illustrate. Neither is there a one-to-one correspondence in the case of expressive/emotional utterances. Expressive/emotional utterances in general, including exclamatives, are similar to Searle's EXPRESSIVES in that they principally express social interaction with H and show no direction of fit, but they are not identical to them, which seems to be a problem for standard speech act theory.

4.2   A modification of Searle's theory of speech acts

Brandt et al. (1992) distinguish four kinds of direct speech acts: REPRESENTATIONS, REGULATIONS, EXPRESSIVES, and DECLARATIONS. The speech act type REPRESENTATIONS has two subtypes, ASSERTIONS and QUESTIONS. This is a deviation from standard classifications, since the problematic speech act type QUESTION, which has previously been analysed as a DIRECTIVE by Searle and his successors (cf. Searle 1969:69, Searle & Vanderveken 1985:199) or as a type of act on the same level as all other types (cf. Wunderlich 1976), is here considered to be a subtype under representations. This means that both declaratives and interrogatives may be used to perform the speech act REPRESENTATIONS. Representations stand for word-to-world direction of fit.

In Brandt et al. (1992) Searle's COMMISSIVES and DIRECTIVES are grouped together under REGULATIONS; a speech act type which here comprise all interactional speech act types. The defining criteria for this speech act type are the following variables:

1. Who (S or H) wants the event to happen?
2. Who (S or H) decides who of them is acting?
3. Who (S or H) acts?

According to Rosengren (pc) the difference between a COMMAND and a REQUEST is that in the case of a command, it is the speaker who is deciding and the hearer who is acting, and in the case of a request, it is the hearer who both decides and acts. Regulations show world-to-word direction of fit.

The speech act EXPRESSIVES requires a performative expression. The reason that a performative expression such as *welcome* or *thank* is required is, according to Brandt et al. (1992), that no expressive sentence type exists and that the referring proposition of the embedded clause only refers to an event, concerning which the speaker has certain emotions. What he feels must thus be explicitly stated in the matrix clause. As in Searle's system, EXPRESSIVES have no direction of fit. DECLARATIONS, finally, are defined in the same way in Brandt et. al's system as they are defined in Searle's system.

EXPRESSIVE/EMOTIONAL UTTERANCES, that is, EXCLAMATIVES and other expressive/emotional utterances that do not belong to the speech act EXPRESSIVES, are problematic, since they do not seem to belong to any of these four speech act-types. Rosengren (1997) argues that exclamatives are different from standard illocutions, since they are direct expressive/emotional expressions, and do not propositionalise their emotional meaning in the way expressives proper do. They are somehow related to Searle's/Brandt et al.'s expressives, but they are likely to constitute an illocutionary act of their own. This act, according to Rosengren (1997), is much closer to grammar than the usual direct and indirect speech acts.

I have chosen to adopt Brandt et al's (1992) speech act system, since their system has a certain appeal, is more up-to-date than Searle's, and, last but not least, has been proved to be particularly suitable for work within the GB-framework, a framework allowing a modular approach.

4.3   Speech acts and sentence types, a minimalist-modular approach

In contemporary works within generative grammar (Chomsky 1995[6]), the following language model is standardly assumed:

(11)   Lexicon

                           /
                      Spell-out
                      /   \
                  LF   PF

I will avoid going into more technical details than is necessary for my present purpose. Of particular interest to us are LF (Logical Form) and PF (Phonetic Form). LF is the interface between grammar and the conceptual-intentional systems, i.e. the cognitive processes dealing with the meaning of utterances. PF is the interface between grammar and articulatory-perceptual systems.

Rosengren (pc) proposes that there exist at least two pragmatic sub-modules, IllocS (Illocution Structure) at LF and InfoS (Information Structure) at PF. I will follow Rosengren here, and thus use the following extended model to schematically describe the relationship between grammar and pragmatics:

(12)   Lexicon

                                /
                           Spell-out
                           /   \
                       LF   PF
                       | |
                   IllocS ←→ InfoS

At the interface LF, the clause maps onto IllocS, the pragmatic sub module consisting of the system of speech acts. The default mappings are: a DECLARATIVE CLAUSE (in LF) onto an ASSERTION (in IllocS), an INTERROGATIVE CLAUSE (in LF) onto a QUESTION (in IllocS), and an IMPERATIVE CLAUSE (in LF) onto an ORDER/REQUEST (i.e. a REGULATION, in IllocS). In order for other mappings to occur, i.e. in order for, say, a declarative clause to be mapped onto a question, other modules of language, notably intonation, have to provide information in conflict with the default mapping (see below).

The notion of clause type in this model can be described as follows: There are three clause types: DECLARATIVE, INTERROGATIVE and IMPERATIVE. What clause type a specific clause belongs to is dependent on the clause type feature in ForceP (Rizzi1997). The feature [+wh] in ForceP makes the clause/sentence interrogative, [–wh] makes the clause/sentence imperative, and clauses lacking clause type feature in ForceP are declarative (c.f. section 4.2 above).

At the interface PF, the clause maps onto InfoS. The smallest entity relevant in this module is the INFORMATION UNIT. This module does not operate on speech act types at all, but with

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[6] I am aware that the program has changed since Chomsky (1995), but the changes are not directly relevant to the discussion in this paper.

Rosengren (p.c.) I claim that there is correspondence, or interaction, between IllocS and InfoS, as the arrow in the model (12) suggests, since the same sentence has to be mapped both onto a speech act type and onto an information unit. As I pointed out above, this interaction is necessary when it comes to cases that deviate from the default mapping of clauses onto speech acts just described. If, for instance, a declarative clause is to be accepted at IllocS as, say, a question, other features like intonation (or syntax/semantics) has to back it up and interact with the sentence type. In other words, a declarative clause like (13) would not be accepted as a question without the right intonation contour, since there is no [+wh] feature in Force[0]:

(13)   You're the one? (My example)

According to Rosengren (pc) and Reis (1999[7]), this interaction between IllocS and InfoS is likely to be responsible for the successful use of exclamatives and other expressive/emotional utterances, which will be discussed further below.

5   Emotives and Exclamatives

There is a difference between expressive/emotional utterances in general and what has been called EXCLAMATIVES. As pointed out in the introduction The term 'emotional/expressive utterance' refers to any utterance in which the speaker in question is emotionally involved, and in which this involvement is linguistically expressed by means of intonation or by the use of performative expressions. No particular syntactic features have to be present to make an utterance acceptable as an expressive/emotional utterance. Instead, other linguistic modules, as well as context, are involved. I use the term EXPRESSIVE/EMOTIONAL UTTERANCE as a cover term for all utterances that are emotionally triggered, i.e. EXCLAMATIVES (as defined below), Searle's/Brandt et al.'s EXPRESSIVES, EMOTIVES (i.e. emotional utterances lacking performative verbs), and INTERJECTIONS.

We thus want EXCLAMATIVES to be distinguishable from emotional utterances in general. Rosengren (1992, 1997) shows that the exclamatory/emotive function of exclamatives is triggered by the sentence mood, the propositional properties, and the stress pattern. The proposition is described as a predicate inducing a scale of some sort: DEGREE or QUANTITY. Generally, a speaker is expected to produce a proposition of a certain value on some scale, that is, a proposition in accordance with the norm in question. When uttering an exclamative, however, the speaker has found a deviation from that norm, which she thus expresses, using either a declarative clause (14) or a negated interrogative clause (15)[8]:

(14)   How fast she can run! (Quirk et al. 1985: 15.7)
(15)   Isn't she beautiful! (Rosengren 1997)

In example (14) the speaker expresses his/her feelings concerning the fact that the female in question is able to run very fast, and in example (15) the female in question is not only beautiful, but beautiful to a high degree on the scale of beauty (unless it is uttered ironically).

Rosengren's pragmatic definition of the exclamative seems plausible, at least in the case of the standard exclamative beginning with *how* or *what* (*a*). Rosengren (1997) points out, however,

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[7] Reis (1999) does not use the terms IllocS and InfoS, but her reasoning is similar to Rosengren's.
[8] A non-negative interrogative clause would also have been possible, but see section 6.2 below.

that exclamatives consisting of *that*-clauses are slightly different from the exclamatives just described. A *that*-clause denotes a real or hypothetical state of affairs, and when using a *that*-clause exclamatorily, the speaker in question considers the existence of the state-of-affairs denoted by the *that*-clause to be a deviation from a certain norm. Exclamative *that*-clauses need thus not have a predicate inducing a scale (16), but they may have one, as in (17), and then it is often introduced by *so* or *such*:

(16)   That I have something to do with this monstrousness! (Miller 1965: 66)
(17)   That she could be so ruthless! (similar to an example in Quirk et al. 1985: 11.41)

In example (16) the speaker considers the very fact that someone believes that he has something to do with something described as *a monstrousness* to be remarkable. In example (17) the existence of the fact that she could be *so ruthless* is in itself a deviation from a norm.

Exclamatives, thus, do not only express deviations from certain norms, but also various feelings, such as astonishment, joy, surprise and disappointment in relation to this deviation. These feelings regarding the propositional content of an utterance are conveyed via certain intonation patterns. The importance of intonation in relation to the correct interpretation of exclamations has already been mentioned many times in this paper. The question is now exactly in which ways intonation contour is involved.

Bolinger (1989: 248) discusses this matter thoroughly. He agrees with Quirk et al. (1972, 1985) in saying that exclamations are primarily used to express the speaker's own feelings, and he argues that this means that if intonation is basically affective, the connection between intonation and exclamation must be "both broad and deep".

Bolinger (1989) stresses that part of the problem concerning intonation and exclamations is related to the fact that there is a great deal of variation concerning the intonations that can be used in exclamations. There is no such thing as an "intonation of exclamation" according to Bolinger (1989: 248), not even in the more general sense in which we talk about the intonation of questions and the intonation of commands, where certain contours do predominate.

What characterises the intonation of exclamations is instead, according to Bolinger (1989: 248) that it "reaches for the extreme". In the default case, an exclamation is spoken with an extremely high pitch, but the pitch may also be lower than usual, as long as it is extreme. Related to this is the fact that the intonation contour may be either extremely varied, or extremely monotone. The important thing here is that exclamations are, in some way or another, expected to show the voice in some manner "out of control". This "out of control" feature is naturally related to the fact that exclamations are directly emotionally triggered.

According to Bolinger (1989) *wh*-exclamations, i.e. exclamations with initial *wh*-elements, almost universally have an intonation contour in which the degree-word has the (exclamatory) accent and much higher pitch than the rest of the utterance. In that way it is indicated that the degree-word is the most important word in the proposition.

Bolinger (1989) also discusses exclamative *yes/no*-interrogatives, saying that they are fully interrogative in syntax (form), but highly frequent as exclamations (function). Concerning this type of exclamative, he states that "a conductive question interpreted as an exclamation is a rhetorical question (*won't we have the best time ever*! = *We'll have the best time ever*!), and should not sound too much as if it were being asked for information" (Bolinger 1989: 257), i.e. an interrogative used as an exclamative should not have the usual question intonation contour.

In conclusion, there does not seem to exist an expressive/emotional or exclamative intonation contour in English. Instead there are more or less typical contours associated to each of the exclamative types. What these exclamative intonation contours have in common is that they tend to reach for the extreme, i.e. there are extremely big differences in pitch between different syllables in a typical exclamative utterance, and the pitch is usually extraordinarily high. An exclamative is supposed to show the voice in some sense "out of control".

In Rosengren (1997) there is an explanation of the relation between the sentence type/mood, the propositional content and the stress pattern. Explaining this, she follows Bierwisch (1988) and Fries (1991, 1994) introducing a conceptual system and an emotive system outside grammar, which the exclamatives make reference to when uttered. These two systems differ in the way they are linked to reality.

The conceptual system contains our knowledge of the world, and the reference of a clause to this system is determined by the sentence mood and the propositional content. The emotive system consists of the emotions that are our emotive evaluation of objects and states of affairs in the actual world. Rosengren (1997) further assumes that this emotive system has two dimensions, EMint (int for intensity) and EM $\pm$ (for positive and negative emotions). The following model is presented in Fries (1991 and 1994):

(18)   EMint

EM $\pm$ _____|_____

The underlying assumption is that emotions can only be expressed in non-propositional form. In other words, they are expressed directly. We can propositionalise an emotion by talking about it, as in (19) and (20), and thus referring to the conceptual system described above, but in doing this we do not express the emotion directly:

(19)   I am very surprised that he did not come.
(20)   I am astonished that he wouldn't leave.

Examples (19) and (20) should be compared to the exclamative *that*-clauses (21) and (22), in which the emotion is not expressed in propositional form, but through the intonation:

(21)   That he didn't come!
(22)   That he wouldn't leave!

In some sense of the word, examples (19) and (21) have the same meaning, but (19) is not an exclamative, since it does not express the emotion directly. Example (21), however, is an exclamative, since it does. In other words: Example (19) is an assertion in terms of speech acts, while (21) belongs to some other speech act type. The relation between (20) and (22) is the same. It remains to be proved, however, to what speech act type (21) and (22) belong.

If it is actually the case that the exclamative constitutes an illocution of its own, being a direct emotive expression concerning a state of affairs and expressing a deviation from a norm without explicitly stating it, the exclamatory part cannot be realised by a proposition. The

consequence of this is that there cannot exist an exclamative sentence type on the same level and of the same kind as the three basic sentence types, DECLARATIVE, INTERROGATIVE and IMPERATIVE (Rosengren 1997). This would be a contradiction in terms, and Quirk et al. (1985) and Radford (1997) among others seem to be wrong in viewing the exclamative as a separate sentence type.

6   Exclamatives in my material

In this section I discuss the various kinds of exclamatives found in my corpus. I refer them to five different categories: 5.1.1 Prototypical exclamatives, 5.1.2 Exclamatives with interrogative form, 5.1.3 *Such* (*a*) and *so* exclamatives, 5.1.4 Exclamative that-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses, 5.1.5 DPs used as exclamatives.

6.1   Prototypical exclamatives

All expressive/emotional utterances in my material introduced by *what* (*a*) or *how* are clearly exclamatives according to Rosengren's (1997) definition, adopted here. The utterances as such are all scalar; they all refer to phenomena on high positions on various scales. They also express deviations from norms, not explicitly, but through a generalised implicature triggered by emphatic stress[9]. As pointed out above, there is no intonation of exclamatives, but the intonation contours tend to reach for the extreme (Bolinger 1989). Examples include (23) through (25):

(23)   What a fool I was not to think of it before! (Shaw 1941: 138)
(24)   What stupendous good fortune! (Christie 1954: 13)
(25)   What tempers you men do have! (Osbourne 1965: 50)

6.2   Exclamatives with interrogative form

Another type of exclamative that has been recognised in the literature is the interrogatively formed V1 (verb first)-exclamative. There are only two instances of exclamatives in interrogative form in my material, which indicates that this exclamative type is not very common, or at least not common in written drama dialogue. Both instances in my material are negated. It has been noted (e.g. Rosengren 1997:156 and Quirk et al. 1985:11.22) that the negation has to be clitic (*n't*) in exclamatives. It is doubtful whether or not (and how) the negation actually changes the meaning and function of the utterances. Quirk et al. (1985) propose, however, that there is a slight difference between (26) and (27):

(26)   Has SHE grown! (Quirk et al. 1985:11.22)
(27)   Hasn't she GROWN! (Quirk et al. 1985:11.22)

The difference is that the negative interrogative in (27) has a feature that is an appeal for the listener's confirmation, while the positive interrogative in (26) implies that the listener is in no position

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[9] Since I only use written material, it is obviously impossible to actually hear the emphatic stress. I view, however, the exclamation mark as an indication of this emphatic stress, and I thus think it is acceptable to talk about stress here as well. Had the "utterances" in question been spoken, this emphatic stress would have been used, something which certainly would be revealed, were one to make an investigation of authentic spoken material.

to disagree (example (27) is thus more of a true question than example (26) is). This may be correct, which in that case indicates that the negation is not entirely pleonastic. The crucial part of the definition of an exclamative above was that it expresses a deviation from a norm. The expressive/emotional utterances belonging to this category definitely do so, which means that exclamatives with interrogative form are exclamatives according to the definition.

6.3   *Such* (*a*) and *so*-exclamatives

A function similar to that fulfilled by *what a* in prototypical exclamations can be fulfilled by *such a*, and almost the same function as that fulfilled by *how* in a prototypical exclamation may be fulfilled by *so*:

(28)   You're such a boy! (Miller 1995: 59) [cf. What a boy you are!]
(29)   We drank so much tea in those days! (Pinter 1993: 16) [cf. How
        much tea we drank in those days!]

The constructions with *so* and *such* are pragmatically similar to the constructions with *what* and *how*. The words *so* and *such* in themselves indicate extreme positions on scales, and the utterances are to be regarded as exclamatives. The constructions with *such* and *so* are obviously declarative sentences. Rosengren (1997) assumes that the exclamatives introduced by *what* (*a*) and *how* are declarative as well. She has argued convincingly that parallel constructions in Swedish, French and German are also declarative, which strengthens her claim.

6.4   Exclamative *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses

Quirk et al. (1985:11.41) and Rosengren (1997) also mention *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses used expressively/emotionally. According to Rosengren, subclauses used as independent clauses must be analysed in terms of the three sentence types. With Rosengren (1997) I claim that *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses used as exclamatives are actually declarative clauses used as exclamatives.

One must ask oneself what actually makes these sub-clauses function as exclamatives. They do not include adjectives or adverbs that indicate extreme positions on scales, but when someone utters an exclamatory *that*-clause, he conveys that the very existence of the fact in question is a deviation from a certain norm. Rosengren (1997: 176) holds that exclamative *that*-clauses do not require the same stress pattern as other exclamatives. I argue, however, that the intonation contour is important here too. I hold that without an exclamative intonation contour, that is, in Bolinger's (1989) words above, an intonation contour reaching for the extreme, a *that*-clause is not interpreted as an exclamative. If one utters a *that*-clause with the normal sub-clause intonation contour, it could not possibly stand on its own (except as an answer to a *wh*-question). Thus, (30) is unacceptable, though syntactically well-formed, while (31) and (32) are acceptable:

(30)   *That he should have left without me.
(31)   That he should have left without me![10]
(32)   That he should have left without me, seems impossible.

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[10] The exclamation mark here indicates that this utterance is spoken with an intonation contour that is different from the usual sub-clause intonation contour, used in, for instance, example (29).

In addition to the intonation contour, the scalar feature used to define exclamatives above can be used to explain the exclamative function of these kinds of subordinated clauses as well. Exclamative *that*-clauses and *to*-infinitive clauses are scalar in that they refer to states of affairs that the speaker reacts emotionally to, since he/she finds them highly unlikely, extraordinary, or seemingly impossible. The states of affairs denoted have to be remarkable in some manner in order for an exclamative *that*-clause, or an exclamative *to*-infinitive clause, to be acceptable, semantically and pragmatically.

6.5   DPs used as exclamatives

A DP can also be used as an exclamative, as long as the NP is modified by a restricted relative clause (Quirk et al. 1985:11.53):

(33)   The way they obey him! (Miller 1995: 41)
(34)   The fuss they made! (Quirk et al. (1985 §11.53)

Quirk et al. (1985) call the utterances in (33) and (34) NONSENTENCES, since they are DPs used as if they were complete sentences. This exclamative type naturally relies on the intonation contour.
    According to Quirk et al. (1985:11.53) DP-exclamatives generally expresse disapproval, i.e. the speaker does not approve of the fuss they made. Another example taken from the same page in Quirk et al. (1985) is (35):

(35)   The clothes she wears!

From what I have stated above, it follows that the speaker (probably) finds the clothes extraordinarily ugly or inappropriate, making reference to an extreme position on an imagined ugliness-scale. The exclamative interpretation of the utterance, i.e. that the utterance expresses a deviation from a certain norm, is once again triggered by the intonation contour and the emphatic stress. The speaker finds the state of affairs in question, i.e. the status of the clothes, to be a deviation from a norm concerning clothes. It may be true that this type of construction generally expresses disapproval, but this is likely to be a language-specific convention, not directly relevant to the present discussion.

7   Other expressive/emotional utterances

So far I have only discussed good exclamative candidates, most of which are also mentioned by Quirk et al (1985) and Rosengren (1997). In my material, however, I found a number of other kinds of expressive/emotional utterances, which I will call EMOTIVES. These emotives have been categorised on functional or pragmatic grounds.

7.1   Strengthening emotives

There are some instances in my material of speakers who strengthen what they have just said by use of expressive/emotional utterances:

(36)   I begged him to go. I ordered him to go! (Miller 1995:90)
(37)   It's not true - it's not true! (Christie 1954: 38)
(38)   It matters very much to me. Very much to me! (Miller 1965: 66)

The word *order* in (36) is obviously a semantically stronger word than *beg*, in terms of wanting somebody to do something, i.e. performing a kind of DIRECTIVE in Searle's terminology, or a kind of REGULATION in the modified model described above. The two sentences in example (36) are assertions about illocutions, which makes this example different from examples (37) and (38). The exclamation mark in (36) indicates that the second part of the example has a higher pitch or emphatic stress. The emphatic stress is used to emphasize the speaker's change from *beg* to *order*, i.e. from a soft directive to a hard one.

The second part of the example in (37) strengthens what has just been said, but in another way than in example (36), since it is not an assertion about an illocution, and since the exact same words are repeated. The intonation pattern of the first instance of *it's not true* is likely to be neutral, while both the negation *not* and the adjective *true* are likely to be intonationally marked in the second instance. First the speaker mainly asserts that it is not true, but then he strengthens the assertion, as if he expects the interlocutors to doubt him. Example (38) could be analysed in a similar way.

These strengthening utterances are, however, not exclamatives. They differ from exclamatives in several ways. When uttering an exclamative, the speaker expresses his feelings towards a state of affairs, which he considers to be a deviation from a certain norm (by the use of a scalar word which denotes an extreme position on a scale), without explicitly stating his feelings. This is not the case here. The speakers in the examples (37) and (38) merely strengthens the assertions they have just made, and the speaker in example (36) changes his mind concerning the right performative verb with which to refer to a specific speech act discussed.

The speakers in examples (37) and (38) are obviously emotionally involved, since they feel a need to strengthen what they have just said, as if it were not strong enough. The utterances in (37) and (38) are thus emotive utterances, but they do not qualify as EXCLAMATIVES in our sense, since they do not include scalar features, or express deviations from norms. In terms of sentence types and speech acts, the sentences in question are all declarative sentences used to make assertions. Since the default mapping of a declarative sentence at LF is onto an assertion (c.f. 4.4 above), there is thus no conflict involved. The emphatic stress, then, only marks speaker involvement. In conclusion, exclamatives do not seem to belong to any of the traditional speech acts, while emotives, such as those in examples (36) - (38), are nothing but EMOTIVE ASSERTIONS.

7.2   Emotives with remarkable semantic contents

Another kind of expressive/emotional utterance that could be argued to qualify as exclamatives are expressive/emotional utterances in which the semantic content is remarkable in various ways. However, they do not qualify as exclamatives, since in these cases, the speakers merely assert propositions with marked semantic content. The assertions do not cease to be assertions, just because the speaker finds their semantic content to be remarkable and thus uses intonation contours that are different from the contours usually found in assertions. Some examples:

(39)   He flunked the subject, and laid down and died like a hammer hit him!
        (Miller 1995: 91)

(40)   But the whole thing's crazy! (Christie 1954: 26)
(41)   I sometimes think I'm married to a raving lunatic! (Pinter 1993: 19)
(42)   I get failed just cos I'm more well read than the friggin' examiner!
         (Russell 1991: 24)

In conclusion, each of these utterances is an ordinary statement, in which the speaker in question is emotionally involved. As already stated, I call such utterances EMOTIVES.

7.3   Utterances about something that is extraordinary in a certain context

In my material there are also a number of expressive/emotional utterances that do not express things that are remarkable in themselves, but things which are remarkable in their particular contexts. These expressive/emotional utterances are no more exclamative than the ones in the previous section. Here are some examples anyway:

(43)   I went to London. So did you! (Christie 1954: 47)
(44)   That makes your commission…Two hundred - my God! Two   hundred and
twelve dollars! (Miller 1995: 41)
(45)   There's something in the bathtub, Willy, and it's moving!
         (Miller 1995: 113)

In an ordinary context, example (43) would not be expressive/emotional, since there is nothing extraordinary about the semantic content of the utterance in itself. The context here is, however, that both the speaker and the hearer have denied being in London during a specific period of time. There is no reason, however, to call it an exclamative. *So did you!* is a declarative sentence used to perform an assertion. That the speaker is emotionally involved, that the intonation contour can be expected to be reaching for the extreme, and that the semantic content is extraordinary and sensational in this context, does not change this.

        Example (44) is uttered in the following context: the person being addressed is a salesman, who has been away from home only two days on a selling tour. The short amount of time spent selling, and the fact that the action takes place in the fifties, makes this commission highly unlikely.

        The state of affairs denoted in example (45) is also extraordinary, and one may tentatively suppose the intonation to be marked, in that the first vowel sound in the word *moving* is extraordinarily long. Whether or not this is so is not important for the present discussion, since the utterance in question is still definitely not an exclamative.

7.4   Expressive/emotional utterances of insult

I also found cases in which the speaker insults the hearer using derogatory words. The expressions discussed are of the form *You* + NP/DP, e.g. *You liar!*.
        The speakers uttering these "expressions of insult" are obviously emotionally involved, and one could argue that they consider their interlocutors' behaviour to deviate from social norms, but I do not, however, consider these utterances to be exclamatives. One reason being that they differ from exclamatives intonationally, in that they do not have the emphatic stress on words referring to extreme positions on semantic scales. Neither do they seem to involve the feature of surprise, normally found in true exclamatives. In my corpus, I found several instances of such insults:

(46)   You'll find all you want *there*, you quivering, scheming
        little sissy! (Osbourne 1965: 89)
(47)   You damned impudent slut, you! (Shaw 1941: 138)
(48)   You rotten little louse! (Miller 1995: 108)
(49)   You vengeful, spiteful mutt! (Miller 1995: 125)

The speakers use strong derogatory words to illustrate how upset they are about the hearers' behaviour etc.

These insulting emotive utterances are difficult to analyse. The utterance in example (46) is a declarative sentence used as an assertion. It ends, however, with a kind of derogatory "vocative", i.e. a derogatory phrase directly referring to the addressee. This "vocative" is of course emotionally triggered, but I would find it very awkward to analyse this string of words as constituting an exclamative, and the same goes for the insulting "vocatives" in examples (47) to (49).

I take the exclamation marks used after the utterances in (46) - (49) to mark that there is emphatic stress on every word in the "vocatives", and that it is this emphatic stress in combination with the semantically strong words (*sissy*, *slut*, *mutt*, etc), which make us interpret these expressions as insults. The emotive content is thus not expressed explicitly.

Apart from the emotives hitherto discussed, there were a number of miscellaneous emotives in my material. All in all, categorizing emotive utterances, and separating Exclamatives from emotives is a difficult task, and there are many borderline cases.

7.5   Summary

I have followed Rosengren (1997) in my categorisation of the expressive/emotional utterances in my material. As stated, if the proposition in an expressive/emotional utterance indicates a high or extreme position on a semantic scale, and a deviation from a norm, without explicitly stating this deviation, this expressive/emotional utterance is an exclamative

In the material I found, however, a number of expressive/emotional utterances of many different forms, which are pragmatically similar, but not identical, to exclamatives. The reasons why they should not be seen as EXCLAMATIVES are that they are not scalar and do not express deviations from norms. I call them EMOTIVES.

There seem to exist a number of borderline cases between exclamatives and emotives. I think, however, that it is possible, but difficult, to distinguish between exclamatives and emotives in this way, building on Rosengren's (1997) definition of an exclamative.

8   Exclamatives, emotives, and speech acts

In terms of speech act theory EXCLAMATIVES and EMOTIVES are, by virtue of their expressive/emotional nature, related to Searle's EXPRESSIVES. Exclamatives and emotives do not, however, propositionalise the emotions involved in the way the paradigm expressives ('thanking', 'apologizing', etc.) do.

However, Vanderveken (1994) discusses the five primitive illocutionary forces, which, according to him, are the simplest possible forces; all other illocutionary forces being more complex.

These five forces correspond to the five basic speech acts in Searle's system (ASSERTIONS, COMMISSIVES, DIRECTIVES, DECLARATIONS and EXPRESSIVES), and, according to Vanderveken, one of the five primitive forces is THE PRIMITIVE EXPRESSIVE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE, which is realized by exclamatory sentences. According to Vanderveken, exclamatory utterances/sentences are thus used to realize the primitive expressive illocutionary force. If Vanderveken is correct, exclamatory utterances are expressives in Searle's system of speech acts.

It is not clear, however, how Vanderveken deals with the fact that exclamatory utterances do not propositionalise (explicitly express) their emotive content. Perhaps he does not think this is a crucial criterion for expressives. It would seem that Vanderveken suggests that all utterances that I have called emotives are expressives in terms of speech acts. To me it seems fairly obvious that EXCLAMATIVES and EMOTIVES, in addition to being expressive/emotional, also assert propositions, while Searle's EXPRESSIVES propositionalize their emotive content. Sadock & Zwicky (1985) seem to agree with me when they say that "the function of exclamatory sentences is much like that of declarative sentences, except that exclamations are intended to be expressive whereas declaratives are intended to be informative. Both represent a proposition as being true, but in an exclamation, the speaker emphasises his strong emotional reaction to what he takes to be a fact, whereas in a declarative, the speaker emphasises his intellectual appraisal that the proposition is true." (Sadock & Zwicky 1985:162). Let us consider some examples:

(50)   How lonely he was till he could come home to you!
          (Miller 1995: 61)

(51)   Vienna is so dull! (Osbourne 1965: 76)

(52)   You're a pair of animals! (Miller 1995: 118)

(53)   I never did like that man! (Christie 1954: 29)

(54)   It's contacts, Charley, I got important contacts! (Miller 1995: 55)

These expressive/emotional utterances are all both assertive and emotional/expressive. Syntactically they are declarative sentences, which means that their default mapping is onto assertions. It is thus not surprising that they are assertive. What is more surprising is the fact that they are simultaneously expressive. It seems as if the best way to explain the nature of EMOTIVES and EXCLAMATIVES is to say that they are declarative and interrogative sentences with specific intonation contours that in terms of speech acts are hybrids between assertions and expressives. Rosengren (1997: 179) is thus correct in stating that "exclamations seem to be a kind of illocutionary act of their own" and that "exclamations, then, are some kind of illocution not fitting into the standard system defined by Searle".

9   Summary and conclusions

Expressive/emotional utterances are, in my opinion, not satisfactorily accounted for in standard grammars. After having made this study, this fact is not surprising, since the nature of

expressive/emotive utterances and exclamatives, and their relation to syntax, sentence mood, intonation contour, semantics and speech act theory is a complicated issue.

In this paper I have separated exclamatives from expressive/emotional utterances in general, and shown how exclamatives and other expressive/emotional utterances may be analysed in terms of sentence types and speech act types. I adopted the idea suggested by Rosengren (1992, 1997) that exclamatives indicate an extreme position on a (semantic) scale of some kind, and express deviations from norms. I have shown that what I have called expressive/emotional utterances can be divided into three categories[11]:

(i)   EXCLAMATIVES, which constitute a speech act of their own and have the following features:

- They are emotionally triggered, but they do not propositionalise their emotive content, i.e. they are directly emotive.
- They have propositional contents indicating high positions on degree or quantity scales. These scalar features may be explicit or inferable.
- They express deviations from norms, not explicitly, but through a generalised implicature triggered by the emphatic stress.

(ii) EMOTIVES, which are directly emotive utterances lending some features from expressives.

(iii) EXPRESSIVES, which have performative verbs

My view on the matter of expressive/emotional utterances is illustrated and summarised in figure (52):

Expressive/emotional utterances	Exclamatives	Expressives	Emotive utterances
Directly emotive	██████		███████
Propositionalise emotional content		█████	
Scalar feature, deviation from norm	██████		

Figure 52. The relevant features of the three kinds of expressive/emotional utterances

This figure shows that exclamatives and emotives are directly emotive, while expressives are not, since they propositionalise their emotive content. The scalar feature and the (not explicitly stated) deviation from a norm are only present in the exclamatives. I hold that exclamatives constitute a speech act of their own, but a speech act somewhat different from the other speech acts, since it is directly emotive. Neither do the emotive utterances propositionalise their emotive content. This makes them similar to exclamatives, but they lack scalar features indicating extreme positions on various semantic scales. Emotive utterances do not constitute a speech act of their own. They are assertions that lend some features from the expressives.

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[11] Disregarding utterances consisting of interjections, e.g. *Gosh!*.

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