Liberal Barbarism: The European Destruction of the Palace of the Emperor of China

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Part I

Introduction
Chapter 1

Liberals and Barbarians

Yuanmingyuan was the palace of the emperor of China, but that is a hopelessly deficient description since it was not just a palace but instead a large compound filled with hundreds of different buildings, including pavilions, galleries, temples, pagodas, libraries, audience halls, and so on. Yet Yuanmingyuan was not only a set of buildings but also a set of gardens filled with trees, flowers, lakes, streams, man-made mountains, and much else besides. The Europeans called it a “summer palace,” but this is not correct either since this was where most Qing dynasty emperors spent most of their time, including the winters. The real summer palace was instead located in Chengde, in inner Mongolia, beyond the Great Wall. 1  

Yuanmingyuan is sometimes referred to as a “European palace,” and it is true that there were European-style buildings within the compound, but they occupied only a small fraction of the whole and replicas of various Chinese and many other kinds of buildings featured much more prominently. 2  

What, then, was Yuanmingyuan? “In order to describe it,” said Maurice d’Hérisson, an interpreter to the French a who came here in 1860, I would need to “dissolve all known precious stones in liquid gold and paint a picture with a diamond feather whose bristles contain all the fantasies of a poet of the East.” 3  

Yet an Englishman, John Barrow, who visited in 1791, found nothing much to praise: “I saw none of those extravagant beauties and picturesque embellishments which had made Yuanmingyuan famous throughout Europe.” 4  

The fact that the descriptions of Yuanmingyuan are contradictory, inconclusive, and often plain wrong is not surprising. The imperial garden compound was not built to be described, but instead it was quite explicitly built to be indescribable; it was not meant to be a place as much as a world, an alternative reality filled with as much detail, secrets, and surprises as the world outside. In addition, it was not intended to be shown but to be hidden. Obscured by a 15-foot wall, it was quite impossible for outsiders to see what was going on inside, and even those guests who occasionally were invited, never saw more than a small portion of the buildings and gardens. 5  

This was the secluded world intended for the exclusive use of only one
individual—the emperor of China. This was where he lived and worked, surrounded by his women, children, and eunuch courtiers, but it was also where he relaxed and was entertained. It was a perfect world; an ideal world that answered perfectly to the emperor’s wishes. Like all gardens, only more so, Yuanmingyuan was a vision of paradise, a place without worry or strife; a place of abundance, harmony, and peace. “There are flowerbeds, screens of trees,” wrote Emperor Yongzheng after he moved here in 1725, “and there is no need to water them to see them prosper.”

The birds in their nests, the fish in their ponds, happy to fly and swim, gather as they wish, no doubt because of the healthy and happy configuration of the site, so fertile and good. Everything comes together in serenity to prosper and reside here, to give peace and splendor.  

This was the world into which a combined Anglo-French army suddenly burst in the fall of 1860. In the evening of October 6, French troops under the command of General Charles Cousin-Montauban scaled the walls and took possession of the compound from which Emperor Xianfeng had departed hastily two weeks earlier. The following morning, despite orders from the commanders not to touch anything, the imperial collections were sacked. The soldiers, including many officers, ran from room to room, “decked out in the most ridiculous-looking costumes they could find,” looking for loot. The ceramics were smashed, the artwork pulled down, the jewelry pilfered, and rolls of the emperor’s best silk were used to tie up the army’s horses. “Officers and men seemed to have been seized with a temporary insanity”; “a furious thirst has taken hold of us”; it was an “orgiastic rampage of looting.” Then on October 18, James Bruce, the Eighth Lord Elgin, the highest-ranking diplomat and leader of the British mission to China, decided to burn the entire compound to the ground. Since most of the buildings were made of cedar wood, they burned easily and quickly, but since the compound was so large, it still took two days to complete the task. “When we first entered the gardens,” said Garnet Wolseley, a British officer and author of an eyewitness account of the campaign, “they reminded one of those magic grounds described in fairy tales; we marched from them upon the 19th October, leaving them a dreary waste of ruined nothings.” “Not a vestige remains of the palace of palaces,” said Robert M’Ghee, chaplain to the troops. “Now back again to Pekin, a good work has been done.”

There is a word for people who behave this way—we call them “barbarians.” To be a barbarian is the opposite of being civilized. Civilization is what distinguishes human beings from animals. Animals are completely determined by material circumstances and by their desire for food, drink, and sex. Humans are animals too, of course, but in addition we reflect on our circumstances and the results of our reflections leave traces in the form of philosophy, science, and arts. Human history is more than anything the stories that can be told about these traces. In the European tradition, barbarians are intruders who think nothing of laying in ruins that which human culture has built up; they are jealous of the achievements of others and
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destroy the things they cannot understand because they cannot understand them. By obliterating the traces of the past, they deny their own humanity as well as the humanity of others. As such they are the enemies not only of the people they are attacking but also of us all.

It was ostensibly for the exact opposite reason that the Europeans had arrived in China. They were there to civilize the Chinese; they were going to show them the superiority of European civilization and convince them to follow its examples. There are many ways to describe mid-nineteenth century European societies and no label will cover all complexities and nuances, but “liberal” captures an important, perhaps a dominant, aspect. As applied to relations between states, liberalism stood above all for freedom of exchange, a faith in the values of civilization and in international law. These three concerns were interrelated: the unimpeded circulation of goods, money, people, and ideas assured that civilization would spread, and the more civilized the countries of the world became, the more attentive they would be to the stipulations of international law. A lack of circulation, liberal Europeans were convinced, was China’s problem. The Chinese had closed themselves off from the rest of the world, built walls around their kingdom and their minds, and this had made them both ignorant and weak. The Europeans were going to open China up: expose the country to the world, that is, expose it to the forces of civilization.

The destruction of Yuanmingyuan does not fit easily into this account. Liberalism, according to the liberals’ own self-understanding, is a matter of fundamentally good people doing fundamentally good things for fundamentally good reasons. Since all connections to barbarism are ruled out by definition, liberals can never properly understand themselves. Instead liberal Europeans have preferred to blame the event on “bad apples” within their ranks, or, more commonly, they have preferred not to remember the event at all. History textbooks used in European schools rarely mention the North China Campaign of 1860; there is no book in English that exclusively deals with the destruction of the imperial palaces and gardens, and the event is quickly passed over in most accounts of British imperialism. Even eminent historians of European relations with Qing dynasty China deal with it only in a very cursory manner.

To the Chinese, the destruction of Yuanmingyuan only confirmed what they always had known—that the Europeans were ferocious, ignorant, and utterly devoid of cultural values. The Europeans were indeed barbarians, yet a barbarian, in the Chinese tradition, was not a destroyer of civilization as much as uncouth outsiders who had not yet benefited from the privileges of a Chinese-style education, and as such they were more to be pitied than feared. Barbarians were ignorant children—without knowledge of morality, philosophy, and proper ritual—and this was indeed why they had showed up at China’s borders. The foreigners had, in the Chinese expression, “come to be transformed.” Thus, if the Chinese only combined firmness with benevolence and patience, the foreigners would either go away by themselves or change to the point where they no longer constituted a problem. This was indeed the policy employed by the Qing dynasty in relation to the Europeans who arrived on their shores in the first part of the nineteenth century. Yet these particular foreigners did not go away and, in the end, it was China that was transformed. In fact, the defeat symbolized by the destruction of Yuanmingyuan was the beginning
of the end for the empire. In the showdown between Europe and China, European civilization won—thanks to its barbarian methods.

The European liberals were wrong about themselves and the Chinese were right. There is indeed an intrinsic connection between liberalism and barbarism, and it is this connection that the present book will explore. The object is to investigate not only which motives guided the Europeans but also how these motives can best can be understood and explained. To understand and explain motives is to put them into their historical context and to try as far as possible to recreate the worldview in which they once made sense. That is, we need to write a history of liberal aspirations, of free trade, international law, and the practices of warfare; of imperialist dreams and fears; of racism and aggression; and of mid-nineteenth century conceptions of self and other. Only by writing such a history can we hope to understand the contradiction that is a barbarian on a civilizing mission. Only in this way can we explain why the Allied armies destroyed Yuanmingyuan.

This, in other words, is not a book about China or even about the emperor’s palaces and gardens, but instead a book about Europe and the European way of relating to China and by implication to the rest of the world. Although this book may have the appearance of a book on a historical subject, that is, unfortunately, not the case. The story of European barbarism began far earlier than 1860 and in the twenty-first century new chapters continue to be added to it. What this book really tries to discover is who these people are—these Europeans and their cousins in the former European territories in North America. They appear so well intentioned and kindly and clearly, in many cases, they are personally quite attractive. Yet they unapologetically harbor the most megalomaniacal dreams of world conquest and domination. In their hubris, the Europeans have taken it upon themselves to impose their cultural values, their political systems, and their economic doctrines on everyone else. “Whose work are we engaged in,” as Lord Elgin asked himself while overseeing the bombing of Guangzhou in December 1857,

when we burst thus with hideous violence and brutal energy into these darkest and most mysterious recesses of the traditions of the past? I wish I could answer that question in a manner satisfactory to myself.\textsuperscript{17}

This book is an attempt to answer Elgin’s question. Hopefully in a manner satisfactory to ourselves.

Awe and Destruction

We may indeed wonder why the fury of the Europeans descended on a garden. Gardens are peaceful, secluded, places where anger is difficult to sustain and violence is out of place. There is surely something wrong with people who make war on pavilions of cedar wood, on gilded pagodas, hills, and trees. Such people remind us of Don Quixote, fighting not windmills but figments of their own imagination. That the destruction of Yuanmingyuan was no ordinary act of warfare is clear from the way both the sacking and the final incineration were executed. The sacking, mainly carried out by French soldiers on October 7, 8, and 9 was, the perpetrators
themelves admitted, an “act of temporary insanity,” an “orgiastic rampage of looting.” The decision to burn down the palace, on the other hand, carried out by the British on October 18 and 19, was reached after an extended period of rational deliberation. While Yuanmingyuan was looted in hot blood, it was burned down in cold. In order to make sense of these respective actions, it is necessary to understand more about the role that the palace of the emperor of China has played in Europe’s fantasies of the East.

From the time the first Europeans arrived in China, during Pax Mongolica in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the palace of its rulers was universally described in the language of awe. Traveling businessmen such as the Polo brothers, who visited Kublai Khan’s capital in Shangdu in 1275, and men of the church such as Odoric of Pordenone and William of Rubruck, discovered a palace where everything was great in size and number and also exceptionally beautiful. Plenitude and beauty, in turn, emphasized the emperor’s great wealth. The 24 pillars that surrounded the imperial palace were made of gold, Friar Odoric reported, and so were the artificial peacocks that entertained visitors by flapping their wings; the main hall contained a large jar carved from precious stones, which “exceeded the value of four great towns.” “In short, the court is truly magnificent, and the most perfectly ordered that there is in the world.” The reactions of the French soldiers who made their way into Yuanmingyuan in October 1860 were strikingly similar. The palace, the soldiers repeated in their journals and letters back home, cast a spell on them. “I was dumbfounded, stunned, bewildered by what I had seen,” wrote Armand Lucy, “suddenly Thousand and One Nights seem perfectly believable to me,” wrote d’Herisson, everything was “féerique,” like a fairytale. “I felt like Aladdin,” said Jean-Louis de Negroni, “filled with wonder in his enchanted palace, paved with gold and diamonds.”

In the European tradition, the notion of the enchanted, and enchanting, garden is a well-established, literary trope. Many a chivalresque novel featured a band of roving knights who stumbled into a garden that bewitched them and made them lose the use of their faculties. The Ur-text here is Homer’s tale of how Odysseus and his companions were turned into swine by the witch goddess Circe, and how they cunningly won their release. In the Renaissance, this trope was recycled by a large number of authors, most famously perhaps by Garci Rodríguez de Montalvo in his Amadís de Gaula, 1508, a meandering tale of love, monsters, and bewitchment. Another example is Orlando Furioso, in which Ludovico Ariosto described how Orlando, a gallant knight fighting in Charlemagne’s armies against the Moorish invaders, fell under the spell of Angelica, the beautiful daughter of the King of Cathay. When Angelica betrayed him with an African soldier, and the couple eloped together, Orlando flew into a blind rage and started destroying everything in his sight—he tore up trees by their roots, slaughtered entire herds of sheep and deer, and attacked mountains and streams. It was only once his wits were rediscovered—by a visitor to the moon, no less—and brought back to him in a jar, that Angelica’s spell eventually was broken and Orlando came back to his senses and was able to continue his journey.

Tales of knight-errantry such as these were the first runaway best sellers of the post-Gutenberg era, and the favorite reading material not least of generations of
Spaniards who embarked on various extravagant quests—including Ignatius de Loyola, Teresa of Avila, and, of course, Don Quixote himself. Real-life conquistadors read the novels too; they packed them into their saddlebags as they embarked for the New World, and the books not only helped them interpret what they encountered there, but they also inspired their own actions. In 1519, for example, as Hernán Cortés and his small band of soldiers made their way to the capital of the Aztecs in Mexico, they came across the town of Iztapalapan whose majestic buildings and wondrous gardens resembled nothing as much as “the fairy castles we read of in Amadis de Gaul.” “Indeed,” as Bernal Díaz, one of Cortés’s men explained, “I do not believe a country was ever discovered which was equal in splendour to this.” And then the Spaniards proceeded to destroy it all. “At the present moment,” Díaz recalled, “there is not a vestige of all this remaining, and not a stone of this beautiful town is now standing.” Perverse as this action may seem, it made perfect sense to a knight-errant. The Aztec gardens cast a spell on the conquistadors, which could only be broken through acts of violence. The destruction of Iztapalapan was an act of self-defense rather than of aggression. It was because the gardens were so indescribably beautiful that they had to be destroyed. The conquistadors too had to free themselves in order to continue their journey.

The French soldiers who entered the gates of Yuanmingyuan on October 7, 1860, were familiar with this literary canon. They may have read Amadis de Gaule, published in a new French translation in 1813 and endlessly extracted and anthologized thereafter; they may have read Orlando Furieux, which appeared in no fewer than three new prose translations between 1830 and 1843; or perhaps Díaz’s Histoire vériqude de la conquête de la Nouvelle-Espagne, which was also republished as adventure stories for both children and grownups. And as we saw, references to Mille et une nuits sprang readily to the French soldiers’ minds, no doubt since a new edition of the tales was published almost yearly in the decades before 1860. Or, if nothing else, the soldiers were certainly familiar with the Orientalist fiction of Gustave Flaubert, Victor Hugo, Alexandre Dumas, and Pierre Loti. There are many kinds of Romanticism to be sure, but romances of knight-errants, encountering perils in faraway lands, constitute a distinct, and much read, contribution to the genre.

Casting themselves in the role of enchanted knights, the French soldiers reacted in much the same way as Cortés’s men or as Orlando Furioso. Walking around the galleries and halls of Yuanmingyuan, they were at first filled with reverential awe. Much as in a museum, they explained, they were afraid to touch any of the objects lest they break, or they inspected them only by carefully lifting them up and carefully putting them back down again. But then, once the first jewelry case had disappeared into the pockets of the first soldier, the cupiditity of everyone else was aroused and they all began helping themselves to the contents of the palaces. Once released from their inhibitions, everything was suddenly permitted, and the mood soon turned perfectly carnivalesque. The soldiers lit their pipes with manuscripts taken from the imperial library, dressed up in the emperor’s robes of state, smashed mirrors and china with reckless abandon, and all throughout the night the chirping of the emperor’s mechanical birds could be heard from the soldiers’ tents. And then, on October 9, when it was all over, the French soldiers marched back to Beijing, exhausted and puzzled by the fury that temporarily had taken possession of them.
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The point is not that the French soldiers actually believed in these tales of Oriental enchantment, but rather that the well-established literary trope provided a means by which they could justify their actions both to themselves and to their audiences back in Europe. The tale of enchantments made the soldiers into conquering knights and relieved them of responsibility for their actions. They had no choice; the spell had to be broken; and they had to continue their journey.

Yet, once the deed was done, it was difficult to explain exactly what had happened and why. The soldiers were grappling with mixed emotions. While the commanders, in their official accounts, expressed no regrets, the soldiers, in their private letters and memoirs, were less certain. Most of them denied having taken a direct part in the destruction, or they confessed only to lesser crimes such as having picked up objects left on the floor by others. Most accounts end with a sigh and a phrase to the effect that war is a terrible thing and that crimes inevitably are committed by all parties. Occasionally, although never actually doubting the inevitability and justice of the actions they had committed, the soldiers lament the passing of a world of such exceptional beauty. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was heart-wrenching work, but someone had to do it. The soldiers were the agents of progress and modernity.

In Europe itself, some commentators took a sterner line, condemning the destruction in no uncertain terms. The most celebrated example is a letter written on November 25, 1861, by the French author Victor Hugo from his home in exile in Guernsey to Captain William Butler in response to a question regarding Hugo’s opinion of the recently concluded China war. Hugo began by describing the Yuanmingyuan. It was, on his account, a marvel as seen only in a European dream of the Orient: a palace built in marble, jade, cedar wood, bronze, and porcelain, and decorated with precious stones and draped in silk. Make it here a sanctuary, there a harem, elsewhere a citadel, put gods there, and monsters, varnish it, enamel it, gild it, paint it, have architects who are poets build the thousand and one dreams of the thousand and one nights, add gardens, basins, gushing water and foam, swans, ibis, peacocks, suppose in a word a sort of dazzling cavern of human fantasy with the face of a temple and palace, such was this building.

This wonder, Hugo explained, has now disappeared. One day two bandits entered, “one plundered, the other burned.”

What a great exploit, what a windfall! One of the two victors filled his pockets; when the other saw this he filled his coffers. And back they came to Europe, arm in arm, laughing away. Such is the story of the two bandits.

“We Europeans are the civilized ones,” runs Hugo’s conclusion, “and for us the Chinese are the barbarians. This is what civilization has done to barbarism.” Hugo’s letter is usually read as an indictment of the actions of the Europeans, and that it certainly was, and it is as such that it has constantly been referred to in Chinese historiography and in nationalistic propaganda. Yet the Yuanmingyuan that Hugo describes is not an actual place as much as a figment of his Orientalizing imagination. In the European tradition, the idea of a “paradise lost” is another well-established literary trope and the story of Yuanmingyuan soon took its place next to
the stories of other long-gone, imaginary, worlds—Atlantis, the Sunken Cathedral of Ys, Shangri-la, and El Dorado. Lost worlds helped the Europeans dream—of the power and wealth of faraway rulers; of veiled, alluring, women; and of lands without want, fear, and death. It was at the same immensely sad and absolutely wonderful. Having conquered the world, but feeling the emptiness of their victory, nineteenth century Europeans liked to imagine that there were alternatives to the rational world order they had created. Yuanmingyuan became a symbol of such an alternative, and through public expression of remorse at its destruction, such as that expressed by Hugo, the Europeans were able to think of themselves as less inhumane. By fantasizing about lost worlds, the hollowness of their achievements became bearable; wringing their hands they felt much better about themselves.

Liberalism and the Earthly Paradise

Consider next the decision to burn down Yuanmingyuan, taken by Lord Elgin and executed on October 18 and 19, 1860. This was emphatically not an impulsive action, there were no enchantments involved, and after the event, the people responsible expressed no regrets and no nostalgia. The final incineration was instead, Elgin made a point of emphasizing, a carefully considered decision reached after an elaborate process of deliberation. “Having, to the best of my judgment, examined the question in all its bearings,” he said, “I came to the conclusion that the destruction of Yuen-ming-yuen was the least objectionable of the several courses open to me.” Elgin’s reaction to Yuanmingyuan—indeed the reaction of all British officials who visited it—was entirely different from that of medieval travelers and French soldiers. As they had repeatedly made clear, and as the British commanders affirmed in 1860, there was actually nothing particularly exceptional or “wondrous” about the imperial compound. On the contrary, British visitors constantly expressed their disappointment at the Lilliputian size of many of the buildings, at their bad state of repair, and low standard of cleanliness. Lord Elgin was not awe-struck in the manner of a chivalrous knight, and as a result Yuanmingyuan had no power over him. It was instead he who exercised power over it. If the French loot was undertaken by a band of medieval knights in a carnivalesque mood, the final incineration was a thoroughly modern action. People in modern society, we are told, are rational, their world is disenchanted, and their actions are best explained in terms of means-end relationships. Lord Elgin’s only aim was to maximize the utility of his country and to further its foreign policy in the Far East. Despite the profoundly modern character of Elgin’s actions, the incineration of Yuanmingyuan came to unleash a fury the likes of which China had never previously experienced. This was the turning point: before the year 1860 the Chinese empire had lived in its own world, but after 1860 it was forced to live in a world of Europe’s making. And the destruction of Yuanmingyuan is the pivotal event in this replacement of one world by another. By entering into the very heart of the empire, and by destroying it, the Europeans made sure that China would never again be the same. It was not only a set of buildings and their contents that were destroyed but the pretensions of the empire, the traditions of Chinese society, its social fabric, structures of meaning, authorities, and gods. As a result of Elgin’s action, the country became fully exposed
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to a capitalist world market—dominated by Europeans and North Americans—in which China occupied the position of an inferior state. Before 1860, the Chinese could just be themselves, but after 1860 they were forced to become either pro- or anti-European, pro- or anti-modern, and pro- or anti-railroads, electricity, democracy, Darwinism, Spencerism, Freud, canned vegetables, the Charleston, and cigarettes. After 50 years of hesitant reforms, bold reorganizations, and rapid reversals, the whole imperial system was brought down in the nationalist revolution of 1911. Yet the new Chinese Republic did not bring an end to the country’s humiliations, and the fury of destruction continued throughout the twentieth century, sometimes brought on by foreigners but most commonly by Chinese fighting other Chinese. In consecutive waves of creative destruction, Chinese society was transformed, that is, simultaneously both developed and destroyed. And in the twenty-first century, these waves of creation and destruction still keep on coming.

Elgin’s decision to burn down Yuanmingyuan was made in cold blood, we said, yet the decision was not cold as such as chilling. More than anything it was what Wolseley called “an act of vengeance” and what Elgin himself referred to as “a solemn act of retribution.” The aim of the British army was to completely annihilate an undefended set of palaces and their surrounding gardens—places of learning, culture, and beauty—but such aims are difficult to reconcile with the process of rational, detached, deliberation, which Elgin himself described. In the end, Lord Elgin came down on the Chinese in the manner of the willful God of the Old Testament, laying his disproportionate vengeance on the people who had sinned. Indeed the expulsion of the emperor from his garden may remind us of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. Before we continue, it is worth exploring this curious parallel in some more detail. The Garden of Eden, after all, is another of the main tropes through which Europeans have thought about gardens.

In the Garden of Eden, according to the book of Genesis, Adam and Eve lived in a state of ignorance, without sin, and in faithful obedience to God’s commands. The Garden of Eden was a place of abundance—containing “every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food,” and there was plenty of gold, bdellium, and onyx too. Since all human needs were catered for by the Master Gardener himself, man had to “dress” and “keep” the garden, but there was no reason to actually work for a living. The Garden of Eden was a place of perfection, without decay or death, struggle or strife, toil or time. Eventually of course Adam and Eve ate the apple, were expelled for their disobedience, and in this way forced to discover what life outside the garden really was like. In the European tradition, before the modern era, this expulsion was always understood as a fall from grace—as the Fall—and as the greatest calamity ever to befall mankind.

It is instructive to compare the Garden of Eden with the gardens in which roving bands of knight-errants regularly found themselves entrapped. Clearly the Garden of Eden too was an enchanted place of sorts and there is hardly much difference between God’s scheme and the schemes of the enchantresses of the medieval fairy tales. God too had confined human beings within the walls of a garden, and within the illusions that he conjured up in their minds. God, from this perspective, is only the greatest of all enchanters. Yet, when they found out about the deception, Adam and Eve were the ones who were ashamed and hid themselves from God who, when
he learned about the apple and the snake, “sent them both forth” to eat bread “in
the sweat of thy face.” Discovering the truth, Adam and Eve were forced to be free,
as it were, but freedom here, as in the subsequent medieval European tradition, was
always associated with homelessness, with toil, and with sin. Consequently, man’s
most compelling dream concerned how to return to the Garden of Eden and to
its state of abundance, ignorance, and grace. If it did not happen at the end of our
individual human lives, perhaps it would happen at the final reckoning at the end
of all time.

Medieval Europeans were perfectly convinced that the Garden of Eden had a ter-
restrial rather than a celestial location. Although the description given in Genesis
was frustratingly vague, it did mention “east of Eden” as the direction in which to
search, and the names of the rivers that flowed out of the garden—Pison, Gihon,
Hiddekel, and Euphrates—surely also pointed investigators in an easterly direc-
tion. China was always considered a prime candidate, or if not China itself at least
some place in its close proximity. The reason was more than anything the country’s
astonishing fecundity. China, European travelers excitedly reported, was rich in all
things that humans require; it was a cornucopia from which life in its infinite pleni-
tude constantly came gushing forth. “This is the richest country in the world,”
as Pierre d’Avity put it in his popular geographical survey of 1613, “and things are
found in such abundance that in addition to providing for the Chinese they provide
for both neighboring and distant lands.” “[I] am almost tempted to own,” said
Jean Denis Attiret, a Jesuit priest and a painter working at the imperial Chinese
court, “that we are quite poor and barren in Comparison of them.” To Europeans
this provided an opportunity: they could go to China to replenish themselves or
to trade with the Chinese and thereby to bring some of the abundance with them
home. Indeed this Edenic connection, or the possibility of an Edenic connection,
contributed to the wondrous otherness with which things Chinese always were asso-
ciated in European minds.

However, from the end of the eighteenth century onward, the medieval search
for a terrestrial location for the Garden of Eden attracted considerably less atten-
tion, and by the middle of the nineteenth century it was completely abandoned. By
now the world was more or less fully explored—the last blank spaces on the
world map, the interior of Africa, were filled out in the 1870s—and not a single
Edenic trace had been found. Yet the search was abandoned above all since the idea
of the Garden of Eden no longer was particularly appealing. As Adam Smith had
explained in *The Wealth of Nations*, 1776, a country’s standard of living is not con-
stituted by its abundance in natural resources but instead purely by its productive
capacity; what matters is not what you have but what you, through your ingenuity
and hard labor, can produce. Yet in the Garden of Eden, there was no place for
ingenuity, labor, or indeed for any human initiatives of any kind. The Garden of
Eden was a paternalistic theocracy, which treated its inhabitants as though they
were helpless children.

In his essay “The Conjectural Beginning of the History of Mankind,” 1786,
Immanuel Kant retold the story of Genesis but purely in secular terms. Instead of
the “voice of God,” Adam and Eve listened to the “voice of instinct,” which advised
them not to eat certain fruit. Yet “reason soon began to manifest itself,” and the
couple sought to extend their knowledge of food as well as of other things. They discovered, said Kant, a faculty that allowed them to choose their own manner of life and “not to be bound like other animals to a single one.” They “stood, as it were, on the brink of an abyss”—before them lay an infinite number of possibilities among which they at first had no idea how to choose. Yet before long our first parents had discovered sex and death, work and time, and a future that extended endlessly before them. Clearly the Garden of Eden had become too small to accommodate their aspirations and in the end they simply left. Once on the outside, there was no going back. It was impossible for Adam, said Kant, “to return from this once tried state of liberty to that of thralldom (under the dominion of instinct).”

Mae West, the American actress and sex goddess, drew much the same conclusions in her scandalous performance as Eve on the popular radio show “Chase and Sanborn Hour,” on NBC on December 12, 1937. The Garden of Eden, she pointed out in her vampish lilt, was boring. Ever since creation she had done nothing but play solitaire. “I want something to happen. A little excitement. A little adventure. A girl’s gotta have a little fun once in a while . . . I’ve got to have room to expand my personality.” The only way, Eve/West concluded, was to leave. Adam, quite content with his lot, warned her regarding all the trouble that awaited them on the outside, but Eve/West was not convinced:

If trouble means something that makes you catch your breath. If trouble means something that makes your blood run through your veins like Seltzer water. Mmmm, Adam, my man, give me trouble!

Taking Immanuel Kant and Mae West as representatives of the modern outlook, we can conclude that the search for the Garden of Eden was abandoned once human beings came to realize that it did not designate a geographical location as much as a place that they themselves had the power to create. Eden still had a terrestrial location, but it was not an original home to which human beings longed to return as much as a destination that they, thanks to their powers of reason, their ingenuity, and hard work, gradually were approaching. Perfection lay in the future, not in the past.

As a place associated with the Garden of Eden, it is not surprising that China came to be reinterpreted in a closely related manner. China, Baron de Montesquieu decided in 1748, had a despotic government, which based its power on the fear it could instill in the people. And as subsequent generations of Europeans came to discover, the lives of the Chinese were characterized by many of the same shortcomings as the lives of Adam and Eve. China too after all was a paternalistic theocracy, which kept its inhabitants in a state of ignorance and where history was suspended in a perpetual present; the Chinese too were surrounded by walls, which made it impossible for them to trade and exchange ideas with the rest of the world. While Chinese chronicles documented events going back thousands of years, the country had no history in the European sense of a story of continuous progress. If anything, its abundance was holding back economic development since it reduced the incentives for innovation and entrepreneurship. And, what was particularly infuriating to the Europeans, the Chinese utterly failed to realize what a dire predicament they were in.
It would not be correct to say that liberalism is antigarden. Like everyone else in modern society, liberals too need occasionally to take a break from their single-minded pursuits, and when they do, gardens are a perfect place to relax. In their inefficiency and deliberate otherworldliness, gardens provide an escape from all means-ends relationships, and yet as such they only confirm how intrinsic to life in modern society means-ends relationships really are. In modern society, gardens make sense only to the extent that they provide the rational means of rejuvenating human spirits worn out by the imperatives of rationality. What no longer makes sense is the garden as an end in itself. To imagine oneself living in a garden of perfect abundance is to engage in a debilitating daydream. Such a life is a pretext for laziness, too much of a government hand-out, a welfare program of monstrous proportions. In modern society, freedom is thought to empower individuals and to work in the sweat of one's face is a virtue and not a punishment. By burning down Yuanmingyuan, Lord Elgin sought to convey these modern truths to the Chinese. Like the stern God of the Old Testament, he expelled the emperor from his infantilizing fantasy. By forcing the gates to the country to open, he let Europe-made goods and ideas in and thereby both enlightenment and social and economic progress. The Chinese too were now forced to grow up, forced to be free. Whether they wanted to or not, they were required to walk the path that Immanuel Kant and Mae West had indicated—out of the Garden of Eden and into a world of knowledge, work, and relentless improvement.

Opium Wars and Profit Motives

This is not to say that the Europeans acted without consideration for their own self-interest. On the contrary, they had no doubt that the eventual destruction of the walls that surrounded China would benefit them greatly too. New and previously unexplored markets would open up with millions and millions of eager customers who all had an insatiable demand for Europe-made goods. Fabulous profits were to be made by selling all the various products spewed out by the satanic mills of the industrial revolution. It was, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels put it in The Communist Manifesto, 1848, the “profit motive” that had brought the Europeans all the way to China:

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the production of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations.

The profit motive would soon destroy all feudal relations and replace them with market relations, and the privileges of traditional society would soon give way to the only freedom that matters: the freedom to trade. Eventually all nations would be forced, on the pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production. In this way, capitalism gradually draws all nations, even the most barbarian, into the same
commercial web, and civilizes them by remaking them in its own image. Marx and Engels were convinced, provides the best illustration of this thesis. Marx paid considerable attention to Chinese affairs, writing no fewer than 16 articles on the topic for the *New York Tribune* between 1857 and 1860, and the capitalist assault described in *The Communist Manifesto*, written six years after the conclusion of the First Opium War, is more than anything the capitalist assault on the Chinese.

“Cheap prices of commodities are the heavy artillery with which it batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces the barbarians’ intensely obstinate hatred of foreigners to capitulate.” Marx and Engels were wrong about China. Cheap prices of commodities never constituted a powerful enough artillery to bring down the walls that surrounded the country and they did not make the xenophobic Chinese any less antiforeign. In fact, the British had already for over half a century tried to convince the Chinese to open up their markets to foreign trade. In 1793, a British diplomatic delegation, led by Lord George Macartney, had arrived in Beijing with a request for trade concessions, and similar delegations arrived in China in 1816, under William Amherst, and in 1834, under William Napier. Yet while the British seemed to have a next-to insatiable demand for Chinese goods, especially tea, the Chinese interest in British products was limited. “[T]here is nothing we lack, as your principal envoy and others have themselves observed,” as Emperor Qianlong famously put it in his official response to George III’s requests, “We have never set much store on strange and ingenious objects, nor do we need any more of your country’s manufactures.” Instead of relying on cheap prices, as Marx and Engels had suggested, the walls of China were battered down by the heavy artillery of heavy artillery.

When British trade with China began in 1711, it was the exclusive monopoly of the British East India Company, which regularly visited Guangzhou—the city known in Europe as “Canton,” and the only trading port open to foreigners arriving in China by ship. Although the officials of the East India Company often complained about the various inconsiderate ways they were treated by the Chinese authorities, the arrangement was not only highly profitable but actually quite cozy. The Company’s monopoly corresponded on the Chinese side to a monopoly for the *gonghang* guild, a small group of Guangzhou merchants who alone had the right to trade with the foreigners. The East India Company bought various Chinese products, but above all tea, a once exotic beverage that by the early nineteenth century had become a regular staple of an Englishman’s life. It was instead only once the monopoly of the East India Company was abolished in December 1833 that the interests of the two countries came to clash. The new generation of British merchants who now appeared in Guangzhou was obsessed with the dream of “the enormous China market,” and in contrast to the officials of the Company they complained very loudly indeed about the way they were treated by the Chinese. Why, for example, was their trade confined only to the city of Guangzhou? Why had their activities no legal or diplomatic protection? Why could they only trade with the *gonghang* guild? And why were they constantly insulted and roughly treated by the Chinese authorities?

The conflict may not have come to a head but for the question of the opium trade. Opium consumption has a long tradition in Chinese society but before the nineteenth century its use was confined to members of the elite—including,
reputedly, several emperors. When broader segments of the middle classes came to emulate these habits, the volume of the trade increased, but it was only with the end of the East India Company’s monopoly that opium use became endemic. After 1833 the number of chests of opium sold quadrupled in the space of two decades. “The appetite for the drug increased with the increasing means of gratifying it,” as the Commercial Dictionary happily put it in 1842, “and there appeared to be no assignable limits to the quantity that might be disposed of in the empire.” Despite the loss of its trading monopoly, the East India Company continued to make good money on this trade since they were the sole opium supplier, refining and packing the drug in their factories in Patna and Ghazipour in India. To the Company, China emerged as the solution to the long-standing problem of how to finance its Indian empire. The Indians were by and large too poor to be taxed, and the British public categorically refused to pay for what after all was a private business venture. It was instead the Chinese opium smokers who footed the bill and before long the Company’s officials were as dependent on this revue as the Chinese were on the drug itself.

Officially of course, the trade was illegal but there were no real risks involved. If anything, the ban only served to increase the profit margins. British ships would anchor at well-known locations off the Chinese coast and small boats of locals would approach them for deliveries. Often the transactions took place at night and often the local officials were part of the deals, receiving a portion of the profits or the cargo. Some Europeans defended the trade as no more deleterious to the physical and moral health of the Chinese than the notorious British addiction to alcohol. Others pointed out that trade, freely engaged in, always is beneficial to both parties. “The Chinese were in the habit of frequently issuing proclamations against the importation of opium,” the Commercial Dictionary acknowledged, “but as no attempt was ever made to give the slightest effect to these proclamations, the parties engaged in the trade were naturally led to conclude that such would always be the case.”

It was the Chinese government’s attempt to finally put an end to this corrupt, and corrupting, practice, which brought about the first military confrontation. In 1838, a new governor, Lin Zexu, took office in Guangzhou, determined to back up the law with force. Governor Lin closed opium dens, and punished users and local officials who participated in the trade; cargoes of British smugglers were seized and large quantities of opium were poured into the ocean. Having suffered huge losses, the British merchants called on their government to act, and in November 1839, the Royal Navy put a blockade on Guangzhou. In the following three years, the British continued to block trade, bomb forts, and they eventually occupied both Zhoushan and Shanghai. Through the Treaty of Nanjing, August 29, 1842, which concluded the war, and a supplementary treaty signed at the Bogue in October the following year, the Chinese were forced to agree to a number of humiliating concessions: foreigners were to be given free access to Guangzhou and to four other Chinese cities, the monopoly of the gonghang merchants was abolished, and Britain was granted possession of the island of Hong Kong in perpetuity. It was inevitable, The Times commented, that “an adventurous maritime people like the English should force themselves into connexion with a feeble and unprogressive race like the Chinese, inhabiting a rich country open to our trade.”
British merchants attached great hopes to the Nanjing Treaty. Now finally that
wonderful commercial encounter was going to take place whereby 350 million eager
Chinese consumers came into contact with thousands of European manufacturers
with all of their factory-made wares.88 “It is impossible not to see,” said Viscount
Palmerston, the minister for Foreign Affairs, when thanking the troops in the House
of Commons on February 14, 1843, “that great and important advantages must
result from the successful termination of this war.”89 European missionary societies
were equally ecstatic. An open China was a China open to missionaries too and the
vast majority of Chinese had never heard of the Christian god.90 To both merchants
and missionaries, it seemed the British empire was an instrument in the hands of
higher authorities—Providence, God, or World History itself. These extravagant
hopes were not realized. Progress on both trade and conversions were limited, and
disappointed Europeans were quick to blame the Chinese authorities for these mea-
ger results. They did not respect the treaty they had entered into, the Europeans
argued; they were dragging their feet and not implementing several of the most
important provisions. As a means of reminding the Chinese of their promises, and
to demonstrate the might of European arms, the British began a new war—the
Second Opium War—in October 1856, bombarding Guangzhou, seizing its gov-
ernor, and occupying the city.91 A new treaty, the Treaty of Tianjin, was eventually
signed in June 1858, and here the Europeans obtained further concessions: the right
to station diplomats in Beijing and missionaries throughout the country; and access
to 11 new ports as well as to the interior of the country for purposes of trade.92 In
addition, the Chinese promised never again to refer to the Europeans as yí, mean-
ning “barbarian,” in official correspondence. In a supplementary agreement, signed
in the fall of 1858, the right to sell opium was finally officially acknowledged, and
import duties were set at a flat 5 percent rate.93
Ratification of the Tianjin Treaty proved more difficult to achieve. The Chinese
insisted that the event take place in Shanghai rather than in Beijing, but this the
Europeans refused to accept since the agreement itself clearly guaranteed them
access to the Chinese capital.94 In order to put emphasis on this point, a joint
Anglo-French army landed in China in May 1859. As they started making their
way northward, they ran into tough resistance at the Dagu Forts, a military instal-
lation that protected Tianjin from the sea and blocked access to the capital.95 That
the Europeans would be defeated by the Chinese was obviously unacceptable and
already in the fall of 1859 preparations were made for a new campaign that could
exact revenge. To provide a pretext, the British government sent the emperor an
ultimatum on March 8, 1860: he had to apologize for the Dagu incident, allow the
ratification of the treaty to take place in Beijing, and to pay a large indemnity.96
Without waiting for a reply, a new army set off for China, and when the emperor’s
“cheeky” reply eventually was received, the government declared war. It was as a
result of this campaign, the North China Campaign of 1860—a sort of postscript
to the Second Opium War—that Beijing was besieged and forced to open its gates.
And it was now that Yuanmingyuan was looted and burned.
This is consequently how the liberals turned into barbarians. Liberal barbarism
became the official, if unacknowledged, policy of the British government when the
creed of openness and free exchange ran into resistance from a country that did not
want to be opened and freed. Tempted by what they believed to be unimaginable riches, British merchants demanded that their trade missions be backed by force. In this way, a market was created that never would have come into existence by itself. Markets are not natural, as Marx and Engels had implied; instead they are created, and a policy of laissez-faire is viable only as a consequence of a prior government intervention, including interventions that rely on military force. About the bigger picture, however, Marx and Engels were surely correct. The profit motive had eventually taken the Europeans to the other side of the earth; they nestled here, and they settled here; and they replaced national seclusion and self-sufficiency with multidirectional intercourse and universal interdependence. The results were constant revolutions, uninterrupted disturbances of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty, and agitation. From this perspective, the destruction of Yuanmingyuan is a synecdoche for the fury that the Europeans unleashed on China as a whole.

The relative rise of Europe and the relative decline of China is a complex and drawn out process, but this is the symbolic turning point. It was at Yuanmingyuan in 1860 that the world finally became European. Before the destruction of the imperial palace, China had rejected European claims to supremacy and insisted on their own, radically different, interpretation of the world. Before 1860, China still constituted a self-confident, if arguably deluded, alternative to the European world order. After 1860 there were no such alternatives. The Europeans established themselves as world hegemons, and they put the Chinese firmly in their place. “At this moment,” Benjamin Disraeli, future Tory prime minister, noted in February 1861, when the British Parliament met to thank the troops engaged in the China campaign, “it is not merely this quarter of the globe, but we may say it is Western Europe that commands the world.” And before long the Europeans were joined in their claims by their cousins in the former European colonies in North America.

European imperialism reached its self-confident apogee only in the decades after 1860. As self-designated custodians of the world, the Europeans took direct control over vast territories in Africa and Asia and indirect control over vast territories elsewhere. Market principles were introduced and local markets were hooked up to the global market; natural resources were extracted, and labor employed and exploited. The Europeans exported their political and social institutions too, their religion, values, and ideas—and everywhere they went the old world began to fall apart. When they met resistance, the Europeans often acted aggressively, occasionally in a genocidal manner, or they carried out spectacular acts of barbarism of which the destruction of Yuanmingyuan provides an example. The story, arguably, is ongoing. For some 150 years now, people around the world have been “civilized” and “modernized” and “saved for democracy” and the consequences have often been devastating. However, perhaps this is unfair. Not everything the Europeans did had destructive consequences. They also improved the lives of the people who they colonized and controlled—their interventions raised living standards, improved health care and educational levels, and extended life spans. These are great achievements of which anyone should be proud. Instead of having purely negative consequences, in other words, Europe’s, post-1860, domination of the world is perhaps best characterized as a process of “creative destruction.” By commission and omission, the Europeans destroyed much of what they encountered, but above all as
a way of clearing a space for the construction of the new. Creative destruction is often said to be the essence of capitalism, and it was in these terms that Marx and Engels celebrated its progress across the world. They welcomed the way “[a]ll fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are swept away,” and how “[a]ll that is solid melts into air.” This is also how Robert Swinhoe, translator to the British troops and one of the participants in the final incineration of Yuanmingyuan, rationalized the destruction. “[T]here is time yet for China to regenerate herself,” he argued, torch in hand, “and by cultivating friendly relations with foreign empires, learn from them how...she may maintain order among her people, and keep pace with the march of progress.” How we assess the relative consequences of the forces of creation and destruction will vary, of course, and so will the verdict on whether European overlordship ultimately was worth it. Some will conclude that the destruction was too high a price to pay; others will join Marx and Engels in celebrating the progress of History. In its widest ramifications, the story of the destruction of Yuanmingyuan is the story of how the Europeans—and the North Americans who joined them—finally came to achieve world domination.
Chapter 2

An Awesome Performance

A striking feature of the events that transpired in China in the fall of 1860 is their inherently theatrical quality. The French soldiers who looted Yuanmingyuan were not just stealing and destroying, but they were staging a performance. They dressed up in the garments and jewelry of the imperial court, pranced around in the stately chambers speaking homemade Chinese, and made a racket with the emperor’s collection of mechanical birds and music boxes. It was a carnival, a world turned upside-down, a show that the soldiers put on for their own entertainment. Although Lord Elgin, for his part, never would have stooped to such inanities, the final incineration too has a distinctly theatrical quality. After all, Yuanmingyuan had no military significance whatsoever and was singled out only because of its symbolic importance. The final destruction was Elgin’s attempt to demonstrate not only to the Chinese, but also to his own troops and to the newspaper-reading public back home, just what the Europeans were capable of doing and what the emperor was too powerless to prevent. Through the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, China was humiliated and forced to interact with European countries on European terms. The causal connection between these three events—the destruction of a palace compound, the humiliation of a country, a radical change in foreign policy—can exist only in the context of a performance.

It is significant that neither of these performances could have taken place in Europe itself. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the kind of loutish behavior in which the allied soldiers engaged in the halls and gardens of Yuanmingyuan was severely punished by military authorities, and the way Lord Elgin destroyed cultural treasures was outlawed by the emerging provisions of international law. In Europe, among European heads of state and the general public alike, performances of this kind were rightly regarded as abominations. Such acts of barbarism have no place in Europe, among civilized people living in civilized societies. It was instead only in relation to non-European peoples and societies that such behavior was acceptable. Indeed, as liberal Europeans argued at the time, in relation to non-Europeans, their actions had to be barbarian or they would not achieve their intended goals. To stage
a barbarian performance was simply the most effective ways to communicate with people such as these. This sounds like a perfect example of hypocrisy, yet the conclusion followed quite naturally from the way liberal Europeans defined themselves, the way they defined everyone else, and the way they defined the relationship between self and other. In order to explore these definitions, consider first the idea of an “international system.”

The Euro-centric International System

International relations in Europe are best understood as a system made up of states which all maintain close and frequent interactions with each other. As a result of this proximity and repetition, European states have been forced to respond to each other and to take each other’s actions into account when planning their own. From the late Renaissance onward, wars and threats of war were a perennial feature of this interaction. Each state pursued its own interests, making sure above all that it was militarily prepared to meet any potential challenges. However, the Euro-centric international system also displayed a number of society like features. European states shared a range of practices associated with diplomacy, trade, international law, war-making, and so on. A practice is a certain well-established, taken-for-granted, way of doing something associated with a certain situation, circumstance, time, or place. When taken together, the practices in which the members of a society engage come to defined a certain shared way of life. The international system made up of European states provides an example. It was through practices of statecraft that the Euro-centric international system came to constitute itself as a society. The Europeans often disagreed with each other, and disagreed very violently indeed, but their disagreements were nevertheless formulated within the framework of a shared, international, way of life.

As an example, consider the practices of diplomacy as they first came to develop among the city states of northern Italy in the course of the Renaissance. When the various rulers made themselves independent both of the Holy Roman Empire and of the pope in Rome, their relations suddenly became both vastly more complicated and uncertain. In order to establish a permanent means of communicating with each other, the princes began dispatching ambassadors to each other’s courts. Despite mutual suspicions and recurring hostilities, this network provided not only a means of gathering information, of spying, but also a way of keeping in touch with one another, of carrying out negotiations, and concluding deals. A number of institutions developed that facilitated this work: extraterritoriality for the embassies, immunity for the diplomats themselves, inviolability of diplomatic dispatches, the right to worship the god of the diplomats’ own choice. Once the system of permanent resident ambassadors was fully developed, messages could quickly pass from one ruler to another. Moreover, the system made it possible for each prince, if he so desired, to assemble the representatives of all other princes before him at the same time. The resident ambassadors formed a corps diplomatique, a world in miniature, which in each capital replicated the world at large. These originally north Italian practices of diplomacy gradually expanded to embrace an increasing number of states.
and by the middle of the seventeenth century the system included France, Spain, Austria, England, Russia, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, and the Ottoman empire. Many of these diplomatic practices had a distinctly ritualistic aspect. Rituals provide a means by which a community can be visualized and its members publicly recognized. If the practices shared by a certain society largely are taken for granted and for that reason rarely explicitly noticed, rituals are publicly staged in a space dedicated for the purpose and associated with distinct bodily movements, words, and assorted paraphernalia. The practice constitutes a way of life that the ritual expresses and affirms; the ritual makes a shared way of life present to us and makes us present to it. As an example, consider the rituals associated with the practices of diplomacy. Borrowing heavily from the pan-European aristocratic culture from which the diplomats themselves almost universally hailed, there were rules for how diplomats should carry themselves, for how they should dress, walk, and talk; there were prescriptions for how to arrange audiences and dinners, for which presents to bring on what occasions, and for how letters of accreditation should be written, presented, and acknowledged. A large number of rules concerned matters of precedence: the way diplomats were to be seated during negotiations, in conferences, and at dinner tables; who had the right to enter a gate before whom; and the order in which treaties should be signed.

These diplomatic practices, and their ritual expressions, embodied a shared set of values that governed relations within the Euro-centric international system. The principal such value was sovereignty. In Europe, each state was regarded as a sovereign entity, which followed its own preferred course of action without external interference. The states were regarded as formally equal with no clear ranking between them. In reality, some states were of course always far more powerful than others, but even small states could occasionally join together and oppose the more powerful or switch allegiances if it was to their benefit to do so. Sovereignty and formal equality led to the problem of anarchy: to the problem, that is, of how to assure peace and order in a situation where everyone looked after themselves and no one looked after the international system as a whole. However, at least as strong as these centrifugal tendencies was the centripetal pressure for social conformity. Compare, again, the practices and rituals of diplomacy. The diplomats showed up in the same place at the same time, following the same elaborate protocol, carried in the same kinds of coaches, and wearing the same kinds of clothes and powdered wigs.

The Euro-centric international system as it came to develop in post-Renaissance Europe was a system of states, meaning a system made up of entities understood as institutional, coercive, structures, which used violence and threats of violence to maintain peace within their borders and their independence from each other. States were institutional machines, run by a small elite—the king and his advisers mainly, and the military and bureaucratic personnel which they could afford to employ. Beginning in the eighteenth century, however, this interstate system underwent a profound change, which best might be described as a process of internationalization. First coined by Jeremy Bentham in 1780, the term "international" refers, properly speaking, to the relations that obtain not between states but between "nation-states." A nation, in contrast to a state, constitutes a community of people
joined together by shared practices, rituals, and meanings. Communities of this kind have of course always existed, but toward the end of the eighteenth century they suddenly took on political importance. As a new breed of “nationalists” came to argue, the nation should take over the state and make use of its institutional structures in order to further the nation’s ends. The nation added an interior life to the state, as it were, which corresponded to the new, rich, vocabulary in which individual subject from the end of the eighteenth century onward increasingly came to express their emotions and sensibilities. Following the example set by the American and French revolutions, and the assorted nationalist revolutions in Europe in 1848, the Euro-centric system had by the middle of the nineteenth century been transformed into a system of nation-states.

In several respects, the new international system continued to operate in much the same manner as the classical interstate system of the post-Renaissance era. Nation states too continued to claim the right to sovereignty; they were formally equal to each other and together they interacted in an anarchical system in which power was decentralized and wars a constant threat. Yet the addition of the nation changed the nature of the interaction in important ways. Sovereignty came to be regarded as an issue not of the right of kings to follow their whims but of peoples to determine their own fates. As national self-determination came to be seen as a right, the claims of empires came to be seen as illegitimate, and so were the claims of political leaders who ruled without references to national communities. The nation state, that is, created a new criterion for membership in the Euro-centric international system, which gave newly created nation-states, such as Italy and Germany, an automatic legitimacy. In addition, there was a hope, expressed by Jeremy Bentham, Immanuel Kant, Abbé de Saint-Pierre, and others, that an international system of nation states was going to make peace more likely. Peoples, was their hope, have more interests in common than kings. In practice, however, it did not seem to work that way. If anything, nations engaged in more bloody, more “total,” wars, involving not only whatever armies that could be assembled, but the people as a whole and all of its shared resources.

When observed through the practices of diplomacy, the Euro-centric international system remained much the same as before. Foreign policy, the rulers of most countries decided, is one of the few areas of political life in which the will of the nation should have only a limited influence. Foreign policy is an art best practiced by experts. The rituals of diplomacy too remained as aristocratic and exclusionary as in previous centuries, providing a means of protecting the pan-European corps diplomatique from influences from below. This was a source of considerable frustration to Americans in particular who found the rituals of diplomacy badly suited to the requirements of their republic. As a result, until the end of the nineteenth century no foreign ambassadors were stationed in Washington DC, the Americans preferring diplomats of a lower status who made fewer exacting demands. Moreover, US diplomats were themselves, “whenever practicable,” required to appear “in the simple dress of an American citizen” when representing their country abroad. “It is our purpose to cultivate the most amicable relations with all countries,” said William L. Marcy, secretary of State, “and this we believe can be effectually done without requiring our diplomatic agents to depart in this respect from what is suited to the
general sentiments of our fellow citizens at home.” Diplomacy, as President Wilson famously put it in 1918, “shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.”

The Sino-centric International System

In East Asia too we find an international system made up of separate political entities with close and frequent relations between them, yet this international system relied on quite different practices than the European and it was expressed through different rituals. In East Asia, international relations were entirely dominated by China—by far the economically, scientifically and culturally most powerful state—and as a result, international relations were more than anything a reflection of China’s foreign policy. The Chinese authorities made a sharp distinction between the way they related to foreigners to the west and north of the country and to the east and south. To the west and the north were the great steppes of Asia occupied by the various troublesome tribes, which periodically had overrun China. Indeed, the Qing dynasty itself had its origin in the Manchu horsemen who ousted the native Ming rulers from Beijing in 1644. In order to control these peoples, the emperor relied on a combination of military means and Machiavellian tactics, including offensive wars, treaties, and marriage alliances.

As for relations with foreigners to the east and the south, they were controlled above all through ritual means. According to the official Chinese cosmology, the emperor was the “Son of Heaven” and as such it was his responsibility to perform the elaborate rituals that kept Heaven and Earth in harmony with each other. Much of the emperor’s day was taken up placating spirits and ancestors, praying at shrines, and making offerings, and much of his year was filled with rituals associated with the phases of the moon and changes in the seasons. If some natural calamity were to occur, it was regarded as a direct result of the emperor personally failing in his ritual duties. An important aspect of these rituals concerned relations with foreigners. It was the responsibility of all visitors to recognize the emperor’s unique position and to bring tributary gifts as a means of thanking him for the work he performed on behalf of mankind. To give tribute was a great privilege, graciously bestowed, and the means by which foreigners were admitted to share in the benefits of China’s civilization. During the Ming dynasty, some 123 states had participated in this tribute system, although many of those showed up only once and some of the more obscure kingdoms may well have been fictional. During Qing the records became more accurate with a core group of states regularly undertaking tributary missions: Korea, Siam, the Ryukyu Islands, Annam, Sulu, Burma, Laos, Turfan, but also, since they arrived from the south, the Portuguese, the Dutch, and the British. By correctly performing the required rituals, these states assumed their place in the system and affirmed that they could be relied on to carry out their duties.

Through the practices of tribute giving, the Chinese authorities gained recognition for their view of the world. The uncouth foreigners really did show up and they really did submit themselves to the emperor’s commands. As a result, China could credibly claim to be the “Middle Kingdom” and the emperor to be the “Son of Heaven.” However, the tribute-bearing states were recognized too. Whenever a new king ascended the throne of a tributary state, he sent an envoy to China and
if he was granted an audience he became the unquestionable ruler of his country, recognized by the emperor of China himself. Returning home he would bring the emperor’s official seal with him as a sign of his new status. Sometimes an heir-apparent was included in a tributary mission, a political device that effectively helped refute the claims of local rivals. In addition to such political matters, the missions to China provided great opportunities to carry out trade, and the foreign delegations often brought goods with them to sell either in Beijing or at the Chinese border. As a result, the gain to the imperial authorities was almost purely in terms of status; the foreigners gained in status too, but their long trips were at the same time more than adequately paid for by commercial profits.

A detailed protocol regulated these visits. Each mission was not to exceed 100 men, of whom 20 were allowed to proceed to the capital while the rest were to remain at the border. A mission coming by sea should not consist of more than three ships, of 100 men each. On their way to the capital, each delegation was fed, housed, and transported at the emperor’s expense, and in the capital they stayed in the official “Residence for Tributary Envoys,” where they were given a statutory amount of silver, rice, and fodder. In addition, the foreign delegation was repeatedly wined and dined by the imperial authorities. Both coming and going they were accompanied by imperial troops who both protected them and controlled their movements. When they arrived in Beijing, they were debriefed by court officials who inquired about the conditions obtaining in their respective countries of origin; they were then given ample opportunities to practice for the highlight of the visit—the audience with the emperor himself. The tributes they brought along, the rules stipulated, were to consist of “products native to each land,” and the Chinese state always spent far more money on the foreigners than they received in return. For example, the annual tribute of one chieftain from Inner Mongolia was not to exceed “one sheep and one bottle of milk-wine.”

Although relations within the Sino-centric international system were unquestionably hierarchical, the imperial center controlled the periphery only in the loosest sense. Most obviously, the imperial authorities laid no claims to sovereignty. In the Sino-centric system, space was conceptualized in relational rather than in territorial terms, and as a result the geographical area that a state occupied was less important than its relationship to the state in the center of the system. Everyone was watching the action taking place in front of them, as it were, and no one cared much about what went on behind their backs. Sovereignty in such a system can be shared and functionally divided or made relative to the time and place in which it is asserted and land, as a result, can have several masters or no master at all. What mattered in the Sino-centric system taken as a whole were relations between the units rather than the units themselves. Since relations were nonnegotiable, the only question was which unit should occupy which role. Occasionally, such as in relation to pirates in Taiwan at the end of the eighteenth century, and in the case of attacks on China’s allies in Malaya, the Chinese intervened militarily, but these were exceptions. As long as the foreigners were not making trouble, the imperial authorities much preferred to leave them alone.

Compare, briefly, the Euro-centric and the Sino-centric international systems. In East Asia, the rituals of diplomacy took place in relation to a symbolic center, which
An Awesome Performance

attracted and organized the units that constituted the system. The center stayed fixed and the power of the emperor was made manifest by the fact that others were made to move toward him. The Euro-centric system, by contrast, did not involve movement toward a center but instead the rituals took place in settings that themselves were transferred from one physical location to another—to yet another congress, world summit, or theater of war. The status of the participants varied greatly between the two systems. Membership in the European international system was restricted to a select group of states of which the diplomats were the official representatives. As such they had to be treated with the same dignity as the ruler who had sent them. Since order among them was not predetermined, everything depended on the way they were treated, and an affront against a diplomat was regarded as an affront against his state. In the Sino-centric system, by contrast, questions of membership were largely irrelevant. As long as the delegations that showed up only had a letter of accreditation from their prince, there was no reason not to include them. As the Chinese authorities saw it, the more people who participated in its rituals, the more successful the audience. Here diplomats were not considered as representatives of their respective states but instead only as the servants of the prince who had sent them. As a result, questions of order and precedence rarely arose.

Staging a Performance

These descriptions are radically flawed in one crucial respect: both the Euro-centric and the Sino-centric international systems are portrayed as far too well integrated, too coherent, neatly balanced, and conflict free. Or rather, the only kinds of conflicts that might occur in the systems thus described concern substantive matters and not the meaning of the systems themselves. There is no place for situations in which the practices are contested or where rituals have several meanings or no meaning at all. Yet in real life such situations are common. Statesmen and diplomats often fight over how rules should be interpreted, under which conditions they apply, and occasionally the viability of the entire system is put into question. As a result, the practices normally engaged in lose their persuasiveness, the rituals are emptied of meaning, and the international system may break down completely or in parts.

A performance provides a way of healing, or at least dealing with, such ruptures. By a performance, we mean an action that is performed, that is, an action that is staged and carried out in front of an audience. The most obvious example of a performance takes place on the stage of a theater, a confined space set off from the continuity and flow of ordinary life and instead organized by the rules of the imagination. What is being shown on the stage of a theater is a representation of the outside world, that is, a “making-present again” of the lives of individuals and the circumstances in which they find themselves. The purpose of the performance is to show this representation to the audience; the performance seeks to demonstrate, explain, or teach something, to convey sensations, emotions, and experiences. A performance achieves little if nothing in itself, and its effects are instead measured in terms of the reactions of the audiences it addresses. A performance heightens, distills, and intensifies ordinary life; it is a fake reality, an inauthentic ontology, which purports to be more real than reality itself.
Yet performances are not only taking place in theaters but elsewhere in society too. Indeed, most things that human beings do have a performative aspect. Whenever we do something in front of others, we present ourselves for their judgment; we want to impress them and show off. Yet there are, in addition, more explicitly staged social occasions when something not only is presented to others but also, and much as in a theater, represented. What is being staged is a performance that makes something present again, which stands for something that is other and more than itself. The aim of such representations is not to actually do something as much as to be seen to do something; the aim is to show and teach something to an audience, to convey sensations, emotions, and experiences. These performances too achieve little if nothing in themselves, and their effects are instead measured in terms of the reactions of the audiences they address. For these representations to be as powerful as possible, these performances too, much as in a theater, are often explicitly staged and they may involve elaborate props, sounds, lights, and assorted other thespian paraphernalia.

The representational aspect of an action is perhaps most obvious once it is reported in the media. It is by being discussed in newspapers and on radio and TV that social and political performers find their audience and most effectively can convey their points. A social or political performer is someone who knows how to achieve such representational effects and to convince mass audiences regarding the authenticity and truth of the points they are making. We see a group of people pulling down a statue. Understood as a presentation this is all they do; yet once the event is reported in the media, the demolishers become actors whose actions represent more than themselves—they become representatives of “the people” in the process of toppling “a brutal dictator.” We see a funeral procession. Understood as a presentation this is a statesman being buried, but once the event reaches the newspaper readers the following day, the event represents “the end of an era,” “the grief of a nation,” or the need for “national unity in the face of an uncertain future.” People can march down streets, and statesmen can be buried, without a representational aspect, but as such they have a limited social, political, or cultural impact.

Compare performances with practices. Practices, we said, are the behaviors in which we engage in certain situations, circumstances, times, and places; practices have a representational aspect only by accident; they are not explicitly staged with an audience in mind or in order to achieve certain effects. Practices concern praxis, not theoría; they concern form, not per-form; Stellung, a position, not Darstellung, the striking of a pose, Since they are utterly uneventful and of interest only to the people directly involved, practices never make it onto the evening news. Next compare performances with rituals. Rituals, we said, provide a means by which a community can be visualized and a way for its members to identifying themselves and become publicly recognized by others. As such, rituals too are both performed and representational. The crucial difference with a performance is that the ritual has no audience, only participants. The ritual has no outside, as it were, only an inside; rituals are ways of sharing meanings among the members of a community, but they are not ways of making points, arguing cases, or preaching and persuading outsiders. This is not to say, however, that a ritual cannot be transformed into a performance.
Taking communion in church is a ritual—indeed one of the basic community-building rituals in the European tradition—yet the transformation of the wine into the blood of Christ is a performance. It is an event, something that happens, and a literal representation of the body of Christ here on Earth. While the ritual aspect of the Eucharist reconfirms a certain world order, the performative aspect is provocative and preachy.

Performances, thus defined, are a crucial tool of statecraft and they play at least three distinct roles in relations between states: performances are staged as a way to establish the outlines of a new international system and to propose new practices and rituals; as a way to resolve conflicts and explicitly remind the members of the rules that apply in their system; or as a way to question or undermine the existing rules and suggest the outlines of an alternative system. As an example of the first of these functions, expressed in perfectly theatrical terms, consider the four performances of a ballet, “Ballet de la Paix,” staged in Münster in the Spring of 1645, at the time of the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Westphalia. In the seventeenth century such *ballets de cour* were one of the main ways in which rulers, especially the French kings, communicated with their subjects. The king and his courtiers staged allegories in which the main political issues of the day were given theatrical form. The ballet was a way to explain the country’s position, the king’s role, and an exhortation to his subjects to stay loyal and obedient. The author of the ballet staged in Münster, Charles Ogier, was not only a theologian and playwright but also the chief French negotiator at the Westphalian conference itself, and the dancers were all diplomats from the French delegation. The performance opened with a scene describing the horrors of war which, as Ogier pointed out, affected all of Europe and all levels of society. The Europeans wanted to get along, but constant quarrels—danced by a character called “Discord”—thwarted their efforts. Then “Peace” came on stage, accompanied by “Ceres” and “Abundance,” and through their benevolent influence, industry returned and the life of all improved. The ballet concluded in a scene where all Europeans united together in praise of each other and their good fortune.

Or consider the way a performance can be used to resolve conflicts and remind audiences of the rules that apply in their international system. On the occasion of the arrival of the Swedish ambassador in London on October 10, 1661, Charles II, the English king, had decided to give him an official reception and it was the custom on such occasions for all resident ambassadors in the capital to add their coaches to the procession. Such events provided a means by which the ambassadors could show off in front of each other and in front of the crowds which assembled to watch the spectacle. It mattered greatly in which order the coaches were arranged and the closer to the king’s own coach, the more important the country. The ambassadors of France and Spain had been quarreling about such issues for some time already and at the arrival of the Swedes the conflict came to a head. On the day the French ambassador, de l’Estrade, gathered all the French people he could find in London and dispatched them together with his coach to Tower Wharf; meanwhile, the Spanish ambassador, de Batteville, gathered all Spanish subjects and they accompanied his coach to the same spot. Once the two ambassadors arrived, they immediately began quarreling. The French opened fire, while the Spaniards found

AN AWESOME PERFORMANCE

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some bricks with which they pelted the French. In the end, the son and the brother-in-law of the French ambassador were killed, together with four of the six French horses. The Spanish ambassador took his place in the procession, cheered on by the notoriously anti-French crowds who had witnessed the event, many of whom, just to be sure, had been paid off by the Spaniards.48

Consider a final example illustrating the way a performance can be used to question and undermine an existing international system. European diplomatic rituals, we said, remained perfectly aristocratic well into the twentieth century despite the rise of the nation-state, and although Americans protested against these outdated practices, few changes were accomplished.49 Leon Trotsky was not going to give up as easily. A worker’s state, the People’s Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the new Soviet state boldly declared, had no need for a foreign policy. Trotsky’s intentions was simply to “issue a few revolutionary proclamations to the peoples of the world, and then shut up shop.”50 When he arrived for peace negotiations with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk in January 1918, Trotsky was dressed not in the regalia of an international diplomat, but in the simple clothes of an international revolutionary; he refused to be introduced to the assembled royalty, and he insisted that the Soviet delegation take their meals apart from the others.51 Trotsky also took the opportunity to preach. Occasionally, he reported smugly, the conference “was transformed into a Marxian propagandist class for beginners,” with himself explaining to the assembled aristocrats that the world revolution, which would bury them all, speedily was approaching. “Some of the titled and decorated gentlemen could do nothing at all during these discussions but look bewildered . . . They wanted some one to explain to them what, for heaven’s sake, all this meant!”52 Trotsky’s was a provocative performance and the aristocrats and generals were suitably provoked.53 “In Brest-Litovsk,” the Tägliche Rundschau, a liberal Berlin newspaper, reported, “Trotsky has created for himself a platform from which his voice is carried throughout the world.”54

Awesome Performances

The international systems of Europe and of East Asia are, we said, made up of entirely different practices and affirmed through entirely different rituals. For centuries, however, these stark differences had little political significance. The Chinese never visited Europe and the Europeans who showed up in China submitted themselves, by and large, to the Sino-centric rules.55 By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, when Europe and China came into far closer commercial contact with each other, it suddenly became imperative to work out how relations between the two were to be organized. Or so, at least, the British insisted. Combining the logic of the two systems, or somehow splitting the difference between them, was out of the question. Practices, we said, make up a taken-for-granted way of life, and as such they are often not fully verbalized and hence difficult to explicitly both teach and learn. Unless you share in the way of life, you will never fully understand it. For much the same reason, rituals, from an outsider’s point of view, are often either completely meaningless—“mere rituals”—or far too easy to misinterpret.

The problem here concerns incommensurability, not simply issues of translation. For a translation to be successful, the terms used in one system must have
a counterpart in terms used within the other system, yet such equivalences were precisely what was missing between Europe and East Asia. Somehow the members of the other system had to be made to understand things that they had no conceptual means of understanding. Or, as the British insisted, the Chinese had to be forced to understand the logic of international politics as practiced in Europe. In making these arguments, however, the Europeans ran up against a logical puzzle. If it only is by first inhabiting the alternative world that we can learn about the practices it makes possible, it follows that reasons regarding the advantages of those practices can play no role in our argumentation. It was only by first accepting, say, the European practices regarding the exchange of ambassadors and so on, that the Chinese would come to discover the logic that governed relations between sovereign states. Yet if that is the case, this alternative logic could not be used as an argument to convince the Chinese. They had instead to be convinced in some other, nonrational, manner.

It is such a nonrational reason that a performance may provide. In addition to the three functions we briefly discussed above, a performance will allow us to communicate also between international systems. As long as the performance in question is powerful enough it forces the audiences to drop whatever else they are doing and pay attention. The power that matters for these purposes is more than anything the power to strike an audience with a sense of awe. Awe is induced by the awesome and by the marvelous. You see something you never have seen before and never could have imagined, and you marvel. Or you are struck by awe in an encounter with the sublime. The sublime, as Edmund Burke noted in *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, 1757, is “a sort of delightful horror,” a “tranquility tinged with terror,” which the mind experiences whenever it temporarily is overwhelmed by an object or some sensation. Often sublime reactions are brought out by encounters with untamed nature. Burke’s favorite example is a stormy sea, but dark woods, spacious caverns, poisonous snakes, and large menacing felines can have the same effects. Man-made objects can be sublime too, provided they are sufficiently large, such as the Egyptian pyramids or St. Peter’s basilica in Rome. In general, experiences of the sublime are produced by the uncanny, the dark, the hidden, the vast, the deep, the ancient, the great, the tragic, the silent, the exalted, the infinite, and the eternal.

A performance induces a sense of awe in its audience to the extent that it draws on these sublime powers. The truly awesome temporarily short-circuits our cognitive processes, disables our rational faculties, and leaves us speechless and bedazzled. The mind, Burke explained, “is so entirely filled with its object that it cannot entertain any other, nor by consequence reason on that object which employs it.” This can be understood not only as a transcendental experience—as an intimation of the divine—but also as a sensation of being invaded by an external force, which takes temporary possession of our bodies and our minds. First our jaws drop, then we get dizzy, our knees go weak, and we fall to the ground. Such loss of control can be scary to be sure, but it can also be exciting, and as Burke pointed out, it is often exciting because it is scary. Our immediate instinct may be to resist but secretly we want to yield. Compare the nineteenth century fascination with rape. What a Victorian woman feared the most was at the same time, allegedly, her most secret
desire. And her husband, reading, for example, about the swarthy gangs of natives who had taken liberties with European women during the Indian Uprising of 1857, was not only outraged, but also strangely titillated.\textsuperscript{61}

Since awe strikes us down and temporarily disables our rational faculties, it is often relied on by political and religious authorities as a form of crowd control.\textsuperscript{62} By making themselves inaccessible and inscrutable; by acting harshly and arbitrarily; by being impossible to engage in conversation; and by never justifying their actions in public, both gods and kings have presented themselves as sublime. Organized religion has always relied on obscurantist mumbo jumbo to create a sense of reverence in their congregations and to convince them to accept the most preposterous beliefs. And the state has often done the same. The aim of Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes approvingly explained, is to keep its subjects “in awe.”\textsuperscript{63} A state is a “mortal God” and it should appear as “awful” before its own subjects. Confronting such sublime monsters, our knees go weak and our minds go wobbly, and we disqualify ourselves for self-rule.\textsuperscript{64} Although such authoritarian tactics are regarded as abominations during normal and peaceful times, they may during times of great social upheaval restore a modicum of order and social consensus. The awesome performance unites the people—in submission and obedience.

The Sino-centric international system, we said, was based on an elaborate protocol, which emphasized hierarchy and the acceptance of predetermined social obligations. The Sino-centric system was highly ritualistic, yet it relied on performances too. Or rather, it relied on one central performance—on the awe-inspiring performance carried out by the emperor himself. This was most obvious on the occasion of an imperial audience. On the chosen day, visitors were woken up as early as 3 am and taken to the imperial palace where they spent hours sipping tea and eating sweetmeats.\textsuperscript{65} “At last notice was given that the festival was going to begin,” as George Macartney reported from his visit to China in 1793, “and we immediately descended the stairs into the garden, where we found all the great men and Mandarins in their robes of state, drawn up before the Imperial pavilion.”

The Emperor did not show himself, but remained behind a screen, from whence, I presume, he could see and enjoy the ceremonies without inconvenience or interruption. All eyes were turned towards the place where His Majesty was imagined to be enthroned, and seemed to express an impatience to begin the devotions of the day. Slow, solemn music, muffled drums, and deep-toned bells were heard at a distance. On a sudden the sound ceased, and all was still; again it was renewed, and then intermitted with short pauses, during which several persons passed backwards and forwards, in the proscenium or foreground of the tent, as if engaged in preparing some grand coup de théâtre. At length the great band struck up with all their powers of harmony, and instantly the whole Court fell flat upon their faces before this invisible Nebuchadnezzar.\textsuperscript{66}

The act they performed was the \textit{koutou}—the “three prostrations and nine knockings of the head”—through which all visitors to Beijing were forced to give proof of their submission.\textsuperscript{67} Yet while the tribute bearers were performers, they were also and at the same time members of the audience. All eyes were fixed on the emperor and the fact that he initially remained invisible only emphasized his presence. When he
eventually appeared, it was not as a mortal but as a god who acted above all through the impact he had on the people who came into his presence. He graciously accepted their tributes, spoke kindly to them, and gave them gifts—all perfectly ordinary actions, yet at the same time extraordinary acts of benevolence carried out by the Son of Heaven himself.

This, we will argue, is the proper context in which to understand the European destruction of Yuanmingyuan. The destruction was not just a barbarian act, but a performance that took place before an audience made up of not only the emperor, the court, and the Chinese public, but also the European soldiers themselves and a general audience of newspaper readers back home in Europe. Lord Elgin’s aim was to stage an event that would strike the Chinese with awe and leave no doubt regarding the sublime nature of Europe’s power. The strike would be so spectacular, so terrifying, that the whole Sino-centric system would come undone. “The destruction of the emperor’s palace,” as Garnet Wolseley put it, “was the strongest proof of our superior strength; it served to undeceive all Chinamen in their absurd conviction of their monarch’s universal sovereignty.” Much as once the Chinese emperor himself, Lord Elgin appeared like a God before mere mortals, yet the awe his action inspired was the awe of an avenging and not of a creating divinity. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was a performance in the same genre as an assassination attempt on a politician, a plane steered into a tall building, or a bombing campaign undertaken with the aim to “shock and awe” a civilian population. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was the performance of an act of state-sponsored terrorism.
PART II

PARADISE DESTROYED
Yuanmingyuan was a large park and palace complex located in the northwestern outskirts of Beijing. Within its walls, covering some 5,100 mu—or almost exactly an area the size of Central Park in New York—was a series of connected gardens with trees, lakes, streams, gorges, ponds, fountains, man-made hills, and gigantic rock formations. In addition, there was a large collection of buildings—some 40 acres of man-made structures—including palaces, temples, shrines, pagodas, pavilions, terraces, gazebos, galleries, banquet and audience halls, government offices as well quarters for soldiers and servants. The various buildings were connected by means of corridors, walkways, and bridges, which took the inhabitants not only from one building to the next but also past scenic spots of particular interest and beauty. Yuanmingyuan had a library that contained all of China’s literary, philosophical and historical works, and galleries where assorted objets d’art, together with tributary gifts from visiting foreign delegations, were put on display.

Although the Europeans generally referred to it as a “summer palace,” implying that it somehow was of lesser importance than a real imperial palace, there was nothing temporary or incidental about Yuanmingyuan. In fact, the Qing emperors spent more time here than in any other place, and it was their main residence also in the winters. In an average year, the imperial family would spend New Year’s holiday in the Forbidden City where the emperor presided over the various ceremonies associated with the winter solstice. Soon afterward, however, the court made the move to Yuanmingyuan, which the emperor left only to attend to particular duties or, between the sixth and the middle of the ninth month, in order to take part in the annual hunt in Chengde, beyond the Great Wall. Thus, when the emperors returned home, they returned to Yuanmingyuan and not to the rather forbidding structures of the Forbidden City in the center of Beijing.

The reason they spent so much time here is obvious. Yuanmingyuan was the emperor’s secluded world, his personal refuge, the place where he lived and worked—received audiences, consulted with officials, and wrote memorandums. However, it was also here that he relaxed and was entertained, surrounded by his eunuch courtiers, his wives, consorts, and children. On most days, Emperor Qianlong would write
calligraphy and poems, spend time organizing and admiring his collections, and
often he would go boating, fishing, or simply drink tea while contemplating nature.
Occasionally the courtiers would put on firework displays, archery competitions, or
theatrical performances, including mock naval battles, and, in the winters, skating
competitions on the frozen lakes. It was at Yuanmingyuan that the emperor celebrated
his own as well as Buddha’s birthdays, the Lantern and the Dragon-Boat festivals.

The location north-west of Beijing was first discovered by Emperor Kangxi who
stopped here during one of his frequent excursions outside the city walls.7 He liked
the scenery, the refreshing breeze, and the taste of the water and decided to con-
struct a villa on the site. This first garden, finished in 1709, was intended as a gift
for his fourth son, Yongzheng, who later was to replace him on the throne.8 “When
the garden was completed,” wrote Yongzheng, “it was named Yuanmingyuan by
my father. He wrote the words on a wooden tablet to be hung over the entrance
and presented it to me.” The name Yuanmingyuan consists of three characters: 圆,
yuan, meaning “perfect” or “round”; 明, ming, meaning “clarity,” “brightness,” or
“enlightenment”; and 园, yuan, meaning “garden.” Yuanmingyuan was thus the
“garden of perfect clarity,” or as Emperor Qianlong explained:

The meaning of yuan, round or perfect, and ming, bright, is the golden mean of the
gentleman. My Imperial Grandfather bestowed this name on the garden, and it was
respectfully received by my Imperial Father as his own motto.11

Emperor Yongzheng was the first emperor to properly live here. He expanded the
garden relying on the help of fengshui experts who determined the best location for
hills, paths, and water features. He also added an audience hall together with vari-
ous offices where he and his advisers carried out government business.12 After the
required three years of mourning for his father, he moved in on October 3, 1725. “I
live in Yuanmingyuan,” he told his officials, “not in order to enjoy myself but since
the air in the garden is better than in the city,” yet “all affairs of state will be handled
according to custom”; “not for a single second will I allow myself any relaxation.”13
Yet Yongzheng was not true to the letter of his words. This is clear, if nothing else, from
the fact that he designated 28 separate locations in the park as spots of “outstanding
scenic beauty.”

It was during Yongzheng’s son, the long-reigning Emperor Qianlong, that the
original Yuanmingyuan was perfected and completed.14 Although the original gar-
den was finished in 1744, Qianlong added two subsidiary gardens: Changchunyuan,
the “Eternal Spring Garden,” in 1745, and the Qichunyuan, the “Variegated Spring
Garden,” in 1769.15 He also built a large number of new buildings and added vari-
ous attractions and amusements. As a result he increased the number of sites of out-
standing beauty to 40 and instructed two court artists to paint a picture of each one,
to which Qianlong appended a poem in his own hand.16 Although Qianlong paid
lip-service to the Spartan ideals of his father and grandfather, he abandoned them
in practice. As many a gardener has discovered, adding “features” to a garden can be
highly addictive. In a “Record of Yuanmingyuan,” Qianlong ostensibly referred to
his father, but he was surely talking about himself too:

He planted various flowers and trees which grew as though in rivalry and smiled
to greet him… The wind among the pines and the moon over the water entered his
An Imperial Theme Park

breast, inspiring thoughts of beauty. In small and large halls he received his officials and scholars and discussed with them literature, the classics, and history. His leisure hours were spent in singing, composing, poetry, and in meditation.\(^\text{17}\)

After emperor Qianlong died in 1799, his descendants continued to live here, but fewer new buildings and features were added. China's state finances worsened considerably in the first part of the nineteenth century and many of the buildings were clearly not as well maintained as previously.\(^\text{18}\) Emperor Xianfeng took up residence in the gardens in 1852, but moved out on the advice of his councilors since it was seen as an extravagance which the government could not afford. After three years of exile, however, Xianfeng moved back, and throughout his reign he spent almost ten months per year here.\(^\text{19}\) He only left again, in September 1860, as the Europeans approached Beijing.

The Main Buildings

To get to Yuanmingyuan the emperor would leave Beijing by a six mile granite-paved road, which took him through the Xizhi Gate in the city wall, across the moat at the Gaoliang Bridge, and on toward the village of Haidian to the northwest of the capital.\(^\text{20}\) Alternatively he could go by boat along the Changhe canal, which ran from the city gates to the Kunming Lake, next to Yuanmingyuan.\(^\text{21}\) When he arrived, royal princes, senior officials, scholars, and several rows of soldiers would line up on the square outside of the main entrance to welcome him back. The main entrance itself, one of altogether 18 gates in the walls surrounding the gardens, was a roofed building with a large door in the center and two smaller doors on the sides flanked by two gigantic bronze lions.\(^\text{22}\)

Once inside the garden, after passing a courtyard with a few offices and waiting rooms, the emperor would arrive at the great Audience Hall. This suitably impressive building had pillars all around it, each one different from the other and decorated with illustrations from Chinese mythology and history.\(^\text{23}\) The roof was covered with varnished luili tiles in yellow and green, with dragons in green faïence, and a sea monster on the nook of the roof whose long tail vigorously pointed toward the sky. The interior of the Audience Hall consisted of one large room, 100 by 42 feet, again with columns around it. The ceiling was high, some 20 feet, and decorated with circles, squares, and polygons in bright colors. The floor, of polished gray and white marble, was also cut in various geometrical shapes. A platform, elevated in three gradations, was where the emperor sat during audiences. The throne was carved in rosewood and decorated with dragons, including large dragon claws that formed its support. The throne was surrounded by a balustrade in the shape of flowers and by high screens decorated with blue enamel and peacock feathers. From a door to the right of the throne, the emperor had direct access to his private apartments. All along the upper portion of one of the walls was a painting that showed the grounds of Yuanmingyuan. Below it and along the opposing wall were side tables with books with yellow silk covers, porcelain bowls, a celestial and a terrestrial globe, and a musical clock made by George Clarke, Leadenhall Street, London, which could play “Catherine Ogie,” “Lillibullero,” and ten other English tunes.\(^\text{24}\) The Audience Hall also had a small reference library, which included the major classics of Chinese scholarship and the emperor’s edicts from the previous year.
The Audience Hall was where official visitors were received and it was for that reason the only building in Yuanmingyuan constructed in the grand style of the Forbidden Palace in Beijing. It was here that delegations bearing tributes from foreign rulers presented themselves, together with subjects making petitions, officials looking for instructions, and soldiers going off to, or coming back from, wars. This was also where the emperor inspected the curious technical gadgets brought along by the British diplomats who visited his court in 1793, and where an embassy from the Dutch India Company in 1795 watched a dance performance of the imperial bodyguard and received a glass of wine from the emperor's own hand. Moreover, it was in the Great Audience Hall that banquets were held at the emperors' birthdays and where examinations for the imperial bureaucracy were carried out. And it was here that the British soldiers slept on the night of October 18, 1860, half-way done with their work of destruction. The great Audience Hall was the last of the buildings in Yuanmingyuan that they burned.

North of the Great Audience Hall was a group of small islands, Jiuzhou, the “Nine Islets,” located in a round lake. The nine islands constituted the core of the original Yuanmingyuan. Nine was a number of particular ritual significance in the imperial cosmology, associated with harmony and social order. It was also the number of divisions that constituted China during the Xia dynasty, some 2,000 years BCE, and the number of continents that in classical times were said to make up the entirety of the world. The buildings on these islands were separated by artificial rock formations and gardens but linked by court-yards, bridges, and covered paths, which together formed an intricate maze. On another of the Nine Islets was a large square tank stocked with red goldfish, and on yet another—the tallest hill in the garden—there was a stone gateway of the kind sometimes seen in mountain passes.

This was also where the emperor had his own apartments. Since they never were to be visited by outsiders, they had no imposing features but were instead built in a simple, cheerful, style. The emperor's bedchamber was located here, with a niche in the wall covered by curtains, where he slept on silk mattresses, although, as a European intruder in 1860 pointed out, the mattresses were exceedingly hard. Here was also a study and a small library. The most distinguishing feature of these buildings, however, was the exceptionally large number of items of priceless bric-à-brac which they contained. There were vases and urns, chandeliers and mirrors; tables and chairs carved in teak and sandalwood; intarsia of marble and semiprecious stones; cups and dining sets in porcelain and jade; lacquerware and incense burners; statues in gold, silver, and bronze; picture scrolls and calligraphy; watches, clocks, mechanical toys, and music boxes; and jewelry, including strings of pearls, corals, broaches, necklaces, and belts. It was, said Garnet Wolseley who helped to burn it all down, like a “city composed only of Museums and Wardour Streets,” referring to a part of London famous for its antique dealers.

On the western-most of the Nine Islets were the living quarters of the empresses, imperial consorts, and favorites. Like the emperor's apartments, these buildings combined elegance with comfort, but they too were pleasant rather than imposing and they too contained a very large number of precious objects. This was the residence of Cixi, Emperor Xianfeng's favorite concubine, who survived him by nearly
50 years and became notorious in the late Qing dynasty as Cixi, the willful Empress Dowager and the de facto ruler of China. The Tongzhi emperor, who succeeded his father as a minor, only 5 years old, was born here in 1856. On the eastern-most of the nine islands were large storage rooms filled with rolls of silk, the robes of state, and the other garments required by the court, as well as expensive food stuffs—birds nests, tea, tobacco, dried fruits and nuts, medical plants, and ginseng. This was also where the eunuchs lived who waited on the emperor and his extended family.33

Together the official buildings and the private living quarters constituted the core of the original Yuanmingyuan, the part originally built by Kangxi and extended by Yongzheng. From here it was possible to wander off in different directions following various sinuous paths. Thus a visitor would encounter places of Buddhist and Daoist worship, Confucian ritual, and a temple dedicated to the Flower God; or, in the north-western corner, the Ancestral Shrine dedicated to the emperor’s family and by far the largest building in the gardens.34 Here the emperor worshiped on the first and the fifteenth day of each month. There was also a library, the Wenyuanko, which housed a very large collection of books including a copy of the *Complete Library of the Four Treasuries*, an encyclopedic 36,381 volume edition compiled in 1787 at Qianlong’s behest, which contained all officially recognized works of literature, history, science, and art.35 Close by was the palace school where an inscription in Emperor Yongzheng’s own hand explained that he and his brothers had studied there in their youth.36

The rest of the garden contained a great number of places designed for the emperor’s relaxation and entertainment. There were a number of model farms, complete with rice fields and assorted agricultural paraphernalia intended to honor the work of China’s peasant class. Near the southwestern corner was a large open space, the Drill Field, where acrobatics performances were staged and sometimes firework displays.37 There were also pavilions where the emperor could admire nature, write poetry, drink tea, or entertain his women, and several artificial bodies of water where he could go fishing. In fact, water featured prominently throughout Yuanmingyuan and there were numerous lakes, ponds, streams, and canals.38 The largest lake, Fuhai, the Happy Sea, contained three small islands with pavilions and a rustic retreat, and the water was filled with birds but above all with fish in a variety of colors and sizes.39 A large theater was located by the lake front, which made it possible to include boats and various water features in the performances.40 On the Happy Sea, boat races were organized for the Dragon Boat Festival, but mock naval battles were also held here and skating competitions, which was regarded as something of the Manchus’ national sport.41 If they were lucky, a visiting delegation might receive a fish from the lake for their dinner table as a sign of special imperial favor. Above all, however, this was where the emperor went boating. There were boats for large parties and for small, and Qianlong used them frequently. After summoning a group of high-ranking officials for a boat ride and a poetry recital in 1738, he wrote:

*The wind blows on the water and turns it to wrinkled silk. Riding together in one boat we must remember to act in harmony. So in these surroundings we must recall the hard labor of the farmers. As the rain of day before yesterday fell everywhere. So let everyone write a new poem in the same style in recognition of our happiness.*42
Taken together, these buildings constituted Yuanmingyuan proper, but in addition there was also the Changchunyuan and the Qichunyuan, the two large gardens added by Qianlong. Since they were directly adjacent to the main garden, they are usually considered as parts of the same large complex. The Changchunyuan had eight separate themed environments, several of them copies of gardens and palaces that Qianlong had visited on his travels to southern China, and here too there was a large lake, on the north side of which was an extensive garden famous above all for its collection of rocks from lake Taihu north of Hangzhou. Changchunyuan was a pleasure garden and there were few buildings with practical, ritual, or political significance. There were several theaters here and for nine days after the New Year each year, a large, make-believe, market was held on a street, Maimaijie, constructed expressly for the purpose. This perfect, slightly miniaturized, copy of a real Chinese street featured not only ordinary shops, vendors, and hawkers, but also beggars and thieves.

Just north of the Changchunyuan was a small garden, the Xiyanglou, which contained three European-style palaces built for Qianlong by Giuseppe Castiglione and Michel Benoist, two Jesuit fathers who worked at the imperial court. The palaces were rococo creations in three floors—the largest of them, the “Sea Calming Hall,” contained 36 rooms—complete with staircases and balustrades in marble, glass windows, and a moat. Father Benoist created an ingenious fountain here with statues of 12 animals, representing the hours of the day, each animal spewing out water at its designated hour. The interiors of the palaces were decorated in the European style and this was where the emperor kept many of his Europe-made objects, among them a set of tapestries made in Beauvais and a magnificent mirror that Qianlong had received from Louis XV of France. The only thing conspicuously missing were statues of nudes, so prominent in classical European gardens but absolutely inconceivable in China. Here Yuanmingyuan effectively ended, although clever use of perspective never allowed a visitor to realize that fact—the gardens seemed to go on endlessly until they blended with the far-distant mountains. On September 22, 1860, as the Europeans troops approached Beijing, it was through a gate in this northern wall that emperor Xianfeng, the favorite Cixi, and the court fled to safety in Chengde.

The buildings that house a country’s ruler are necessarily a part of the stagecraft of statecraft. The residence is a stage on which the rulers present themselves, and it is typically in relation to their residences that they are imagined by subjects and foreigners alike. Louis XIV would have been an entirely different monarch but for his Versailles and an American president who lives in an apartment would not be a president in the same way as the occupant of the White House. Rulers who want to be thought of as powerful must live in huge palaces, constructed of heavy slabs of granite, decorated with precious materials, surrounded by parks, moats, and exotic animals of various kinds. The imperial compound in the center of Beijing is a palace of just such a kind. At the Wumen, or “Noon Gate,” in the Forbidden City, where the emperor received victorious troops and their prisoners, he could look down from...
An Imperial Theme Park

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the top of a 40-feet wall onto a courtyard where more than 10,000 soldiers simultaneously would be prostrating themselves before him. As the very architecture made clear, the power of the emperor was infinite and the people, in their vast multitude, was no more significant than ants.

Yuanmingyuan, however, was emphatically not a palace of this kind. “Everything upon which the eye could rest was pretty and well designed,” Garnet Wolseley noted, “but there was nothing imposing in the tout ensemble.” The Chinese have no Egyptian pyramids, he pointed out, no colossal figures like those in Nineveh, Thebes, or Memphis. “Size, space, or grandeur, produce no sentiments of admiration in the Chinese mind… the Chinaman loses sight of grand or imposing effects, in his endeavours to load everything with ornament; he forgets the fine in his search after the curious.” Considering the awe that inspired visitors to the imperial palaces in the center of Beijing, Wolseley was clearly wrong about “the Chinese mind,” but he was correct about Yuanmingyuan. The palace compound was not intended to bedazzle and impress, and it was not a stage on which the emperor was going to present himself to his subjects and the world. Indeed, the high walls surrounding the gardens made it quite impossible for outsiders to see any of what was going on inside, and anyone caught climbing the tall walls was given hundred lashes.

Yuanmingyuan, let’s say, was turned inward toward itself, and to that extent it was an antitheatrical space, a non-stage. The ruler it presented was hidden, a deus absconditus, whose power was manifest everywhere throughout society but who himself had no identifiable location. Yet it would perhaps be more accurate to say that Yuanmingyuan was a stage intended only for the emperor himself. Here he was at liberty to put on any performance he fancied, for his entertainment, relaxation, or edification. Or maybe Yuanmingyuan was not a stage as much as a playground. The garden, said Wolseley, “resembles more the design of a child in front of her doll’s house than the work of grown-up men.” Again Wolseley is wrong but perceptive. Yuanmingyuan was indeed a play-house world, but what Wolseley forgot to mention is that not only children play. Although their games are different, grown-ups need to play too and perhaps sovereign rulers need to play more than most people. Yuanmingyuan was the doll-house world of the emperor of China, an oneric object, a puppet theater of which he was the master puppeteer. Here, as nowhere else, his wishes were everyone else’s commands.

This was why Yuanmingyuan was exquisite rather than imposing, beautiful rather than sublime. The buildings were generally constructed in one story only, and in cedar wood rather than in blocks of granite, and although there was a large number of them, each structure was only moderate in size. The design was playful, delightful, cute even, and the garden contained a large variety of forms, expressing different moods and providing different experiences. “Every Emperor and ruler,” as emperor Qianlong put it,

when he has retired from audience and has finished his public duties, must have a garden where he may stroll and look about and relax his heart. If he has a suitable place to do this, it will refresh his mind and regulate his emotions, but if not, he will become engrossed in sensual pleasure and lose his will power.
Instead of grand vistas and uniformity, Yuanmingyuan offered asymmetry and diversity. There were next to no straight lines in the garden, but instead all paths and waterways were winding, meandering, turning in on themselves, and even the bridges were zigzagging across the lakes. There was a philosophy behind this aesthetic ideal and a theory about creation—a fundamental assumption that reality is in constant flux and that nature always shows itself in new and unexpected configurations. The undulating paths of Yuanmingyuan resembled the Chinese dragon as it moves across the sky or an ink painting of a mountain that, despite its enormous weight, never can settle into a fixed position. Just like dragons and mountains, Yuanmingyuan could never be conclusively described. In this sense, the garden defeated even those who in 1860 took full military possession of it. They could destroy it, but they could not grasp it. “There are not enough words for describing the material and artistic treasures,” Paul Varin, a French officer, complained; “if I want to write a whole book on the subject,” Robert M’Ghee concluded, “I could not describe it nor could you even then imagine it.”

Descriptions were also made more difficult by fact that there was no point from which more than a portion of the garden could be surveyed. Everywhere there were artificial hills and buildings that obscured the view and the snaking paths and waterways made it impossible to see further than to the next bend. The only way to learn about the garden was to walk or row through it, and this is also what the emperor and his visitors did. After each turn, a different aspect would open up and there would always be something new to discover. This made for great variety in the number and kinds of impressions and provided a visitor with a large number of different experiences. The only way to describe it all was by means of the story that retraced the path that each person had taken on his journey. Yuanmingyuan, we could say, had a narrative structure. Yet the stories told about the visit often became very long indeed and since many different paths could be traced through the gardens, one person’s story would always be different from another person’s.

What was going on inside Yuanmingyuan, we said, was hidden to outsiders, but the converse was also true: from inside the garden there was no perception of an outside, except, on a clear day, a view of the far-distant mountains. The only way to pass from the outside to the inside was through the main gate, which more than anything resembled a border control between two countries. The lack of continuity between outside and inside decontextualized the garden and subjected its inhabitants to a strong sense of dislocation. It was simply not clear where Yuanmingyuan was located. It was a *u-topia*, a non-place, and just like Shangri-la, hidden away in a remote mountain valley, or the *hortus closus* of a medieval monastery, it was a world away from, and set in radical opposition to, the ordinary world.

In these respects, Yuanmingyuan, like all gardens both in Europe and in East Asia, made implicit references to the originally Persian idea of the Garden of Eden. Yuanmingyuan too was a perfect place. The garden showed no signs of toil or strife; there were no social problems, no crime nor political conflicts, and there were no signs of work. Instead all service activities took place along a walled road, which reached deep into the park, thereby allowing deliveries to be made, staff to be moved, and trash to be collected, with a minimum of disturbance. The emperors consequently never understood how their lives were sustained. Moreover, the
inhabitants of Yuanmingyuan had no use for money, and since everything existed in
perfect abundance, nothing in the garden had a price. The only economic trans-
actions took place in Maimaijie, the market street, but although the purchases made
here were real and made with real money, the emperor and the members of the court
were only pretending to be ruled by market forces. The market street was amusing
since it was entirely make-believe.

The ordinary sense of time was suspended in a similar fashion. In a perfect world,
there can be no change. There were few signs of temporal processes in the garden,
no decay, and no death. Instead everything living was constantly renewing itself
and presented a visitor with an ever-present youthfulness. The emphasis on rock
features and water contributed to this effect by giving the garden a timeless aspect.
Not even the Ancestral Shrine contradicted this impression since the rituals that the
emperors conducted here emphasized the presence of the dead, not their absence.
Without a past firmly situated in relation to a future, the present becomes infinitely
elongated much as the present moment as experienced by a child—childhood after
all is endless to the extent that time is not used in relation to any particular purpose.
Innocence and timelessness are both lost once means-ends relationships come to
take over our lives. Yet ny coming into Yuanmingyuan, the emperors could step
back into this infantile world.

In this refuge from the ordinary, the ordinary was instead recreated in idealized
form. Everything inside Yuanmingyuan was manmade and made to the emperor's
specifications. Idealization started with nature that was asked to "look natural,"
and despite their unconstrained look, all plants were constantly pruned and stunted
using bonzai techniques. In addition, there were manmade lakes, rivers and moun-
tains, and artificial rocks. Fake rocks have the advantage that they can be placed
exactly where they are needed and that they look more dramatic, more "rocky," than
the real thing. The same is true for animals. Thirteenth century European travelers
noticed the lions and leopards that Kublai Khan used for hunting, and they were
amazed at a tame lion who walked freely around the imperial palace and ate from
the emperor's hand. At Yuanmingyuan there was a substitute in the form of "lion-
dogs"—later popular in Europe as the "Pekingese"—who also ran around freely
in the gardens. In addition, Yuanmingyuan contained gently grazing deer, large
birds, and above all goldfish and carps of all colors and shapes. These animals too
"behaved themselves," and at least the dogs and the fish ate happily from the hands
of emperors and courtiers.

The same idealization apply to the model farms and to the copy of the mar-
ket street. What was being recreated here was not the misery and semistarvation
of real-life Chinese farmers but an idyllic vision of rural life where crops always
were plentiful and harvested without backbreaking toil. At first glance Maimaijie,
the market street, may have seemed far more realistic since it included both loud-
mouthed hawkers and pickpockets, yet the hawkers were actors and whatever objects
that were stolen were returned to their rightful owners at the end of the day. The
staff was given a similar treatment. The soldiers were selected not only for their
strength and height but also for the regularity of their physical traits. And, in a
rather extreme measure, the sexual organs of the members of staff were removed.
Many of the people working in the park, from menials to high-level administrators,
were eunuchs who constituted no threat to the emperor’s women and who had no children of their own who they could favor in carrying out their duties. Eunuchs, from this point of view, were the ideal subjects.

**Imperial Vertigo and the Themed Experience**

As idealized and decontextualized, Yuanmingyuan expressed the emperor’s view of himself and the world, but by walking around the gardens this worldview was also instantly validated. Yuanmingyuan, as a result, was an endlessly reassuring place. That emperors are in need of reassurance may sound like a contradiction in terms, yet there are reasons to believe that the Qing emperors, despite their power, had a particular need for it. The Manchus after all had risen to great power exceedingly quickly. After the occupation of Beijing in 1644 and the conquest of southern China in the subsequent two decades, these leaders of a small nomadic tribe from the steppes of north-eastern Asia suddenly found themselves the masters of the vast Chinese empire, the most populous, wealthy, and powerful country in the world. They were now the inheritors of all the cosmological pretensions of the imperial throne and personally responsible for assuring that the world was in harmony, that people were well fed and not rebellious, and that no natural disasters occurred. How the Manchus had been elevated to this position, and with what right they as foreigners and conquerors could rule, was not clear. In fact, as they had proven through their own example, what Heaven had given, Heaven could only too easily take away.

This need for reassurance can help explain a number of Yuanmingyuan’s most persistent features: the ever presence of models and automata, the use of miniatures, and the themed environments that were scattered throughout the park. Consider first the emperors’ love of mechanical gadgets. Already Odoric of Pordenone, who spent three years in China in the 1320s, described the mechanical peacocks he saw in the palace in Beijing. When the courtiers want to amuse their lord, he reported, they clap their hands and the birds flap their wings. “Now this must be done either by diabolic craft or by some engine underground.” When the British diplomat George Macartney visited Chengde in 1793, he found a large collection of “every kind of European toys and singsongs; with spheres, orreries, clocks, and musical automatons of...exquisite workmanship.” And yet he was told “that the fine things we have seen are far exceeded by others of the same kind in the apartments of the ladies and in the European repository at Yuen-min-yuen.” And sure enough, when the French soldiers in 1860 entered these closed quarters, they were amazed to find music boxes and mechanical toys of every conceivable kind: tambourine-playing rabbits, clocks that turned the wings of windmills, pecking hens that moved a saw up and down, waltzing rope dancers, and so on seemingly ad infinitum.

These gadgets, like so much else in the park, were pure idealizations. Automata take their inspiration from real-life objects but by emphasizing some features while neglecting others they show only essences. Mechanical gadgets communicate in a very direct manner, without dissimulation or guile, and since they are perfectly truthful they never cause any mischief. Since automatons have no will of their own, they too are ideal subjects. The world that the mechanical gadgets inhabit is a play-
house world which is both enticing and enchanting. The violin-playing monkeys, pecking hens, and waltzing rope dancers beckoned the emperor to come and play with them, and when he did he entered a *bijou* reality, which forced him to conform to its rules, but over which he at the same time had perfect control.

This also explains the frequent use of miniaturization throughout the gardens.78 “[E]very thing that is at Pekin in Large,” Father Attiret noted about the market-street, “is there represented in Miniature.”79 In Yuanmingyuan, the buildings themselves were often smaller than in real life, and canals, ponds, and bridges were built in proportionate dimensions, and even the trees were stunted.80 In addition, there were scaled-down models of famous buildings and other landmarks taken from all over China, including models of Yuanmingyuan itself. The mock naval battles on the Happy Sea were carried out by Lilliputian ships firing Lilliputian cannons. The largest manmade mountain too was a miniature of the real thing—Mount Sumeru, the mountain in India holy both to Hindus and Buddhists. And as we would expect, the emperor’s vast collection of expensive *bric-a-brac* contained a large number of miniatures, in particular lacquer boxes filled with diminutive objects: ivory balls, flowers, fruits and insects, tiny scrolls, books, and paintings.81

The political implications of such miniaturization are obvious. The small is easy to control; it can be put in one’s hand or in one’s pocket; we can manipulate it at will, inspect it from all directions, and survey the whole in one comprehensive glance. In addition, Chinese aesthetic theory regarded miniaturization as a means of distilling and condensing the essences of things.82 The more reduced something is, the more potent the forces it is likely to contain. The ultimate logic of this process was to shrink the whole world until it reached the size of a mustard seed or a grain of rice.83 In the Chinese tradition, this was indeed one of the meanings of a garden. Jiuzhou, the Nine Islets, constructed by Emperor Yongzheng in the heart of the original Yuanmingyuan provides an example. Together the island symbolized *tianxia*, “all under heaven,” all that there is.84 *Tianxia* was also the mandate the emperors had been given by Heaven, which gave legitimacy to their rule. From his residence on one of the nine islands, the emperor could easily survey this world, or if he made it to the top of the copy of Mount Sumeru, he could survey the world from above. From here he could communicate directly with Heaven.85 In this way, Heaven and Earth were brought into contact with each other, with the emperor providing the mediating link between the two.

Although Yuanmingyuan eventually was greatly expanded beyond its nine-island core, the same world-encompassing ambitions guided the extensions. Hence, the use of various themed experiences, or what Walt Disney might have referred to as “lands.”86 There were a large number of different buildings and environments taken from different parts of China and beyond: temples in the Mongolian and the Tibetan style, a hamlet and a river scene from Hunan, a library like that of the Fan family in Zhejiang, water features and flower beds like those of the provincial treasury in Nanjing, a wall from Sheweicheng, an Indian city connected with the life of Buddha, and so on.87 In addition, there were a number of gardens from Suzhou and Hangzhou, which the emperor had asked his artists to copy, in perfect detail, during his trips to the south.88 There were also collections of rocks taken from all over China, and trees moved to Beijing from as far away as Burma.89
To the Qing dynasty emperors, these various regional and ethnic references had a particular relevance since they provided a means of combining the various identities they claimed for themselves. In the official historiography, the emperors were both Manchu kings and Chinese emperors, but also, on occasion, Mongol khans and Tibetan bodhisattvas. Hence, the combination of Manchu, Tibetan, and Mongol references liberally scattered throughout the park. Yet Yuanmingyuan also featured many representations of the lives of ordinary Chinese people. There were, for example, no fewer than five different environments showing the lives and activities of peasants. Here the emperors could watch rice being planted and harvested, shepherds tending their flocks, weavers making clothes, or fishermen putting out nets. For a more urban flavor there was Maimaixjie, the market street. The point of this street, Father Attiret explained, is “to procure the Emperor the Pleasure of seeing all the Bustle and Hurry of a great City in little, whenever he might have a Mind for that sort of Diversion.”

This Man sells Furniture of all sorts; that, Cloaths and Ornaments for the Ladies: and a third has all kinds of Books, for the Learned and Curious. There are Coffee-houses too, and Taverns, of all sorts, good and bad: beside a Number of People that cry different Fruits about the Streets, and a great Variety of refreshing Liquors. The Mercers, as you pass their Shops, catch you by the Sleeve; and press you to buy some of their Goods. ’Tis all a Place of Liberty and Licence; and you can scarce distinguish the Emperor himself, from the meanest of his Subjects.

Yet the imperial pretensions extended far further, even if the emperors had a rather hazy notion of what exactly lay beyond their cultural horizon. There were references to India, to the Turkish and Muslim kingdoms in the west, and above all, thanks to the Jesuit fathers working for the imperial court, to Europe. The emperor’s mini-Versailles was not only used for storing his many Europe-made objects but also as the setting for various entertainments à la européenne. During the Moon Festival, for example, the emperor would organize a game where he asked his courtiers and guests, each one carrying a lantern, to find their way through the European-style maze:

they struggled through the dead ends, detours, and intersecting multiple routes in order to reach the emperor, who sat on his throne at the center of the maze. When they triumphantly arrived, the emperor delightfully showered them with candies and fruits and laughed loudly.

Putting it all together, we have a themed environment that was infinitely reassuring to its inhabitants. Walking through, or rowing around, his gardens the emperor could experience times past and times future, exotic animals, flora and fauna, high mountains, oceans, the countryside, and the city. There were buildings taken from all over China, from the kingdoms surrounding it, but also from foreign locations and far-away lands. And in addition to the copy of the physical world, there was a perfect copy of the world of ideas. The libraries located in the Yuanmingyuan contained knowledge of all languages, religions, and cultures, all thoughts and works of history, philosophy, sciences, and the arts. This indeed was tianxia, “all that there is...
under heaven”—and the emperor was the benign and undisputed ruler of the whole thing.

**LE JARDIN ANGLO-CHINOIS**

Surprisingly, Chinese gardens, and Yuanmingyuan in particular, play a prominent part in the history of European garden design. Before the eighteenth century, newly established European gardens had generally been modeled on classical patterns. Picking up themes employed in famous gardens such as that of Villa Adriana, near Rome, Renaissance architects laid out paths and flower beds in straight lines and according to rational principles. Bushes were cut in geometrical shapes, trees were ordered to stand to attention, and discipline was imposed even on humble vegetable patches. What these gardens proudly exhibited were more than anything the unexpected ways in which human ingenuity can impose itself on natural forms. The classical European garden celebrated the hard-won victory of human beings over nature, of civilization over barbarism.

Gardens of this kind were common in Tudor England too, and the same essentially post-Roman principles were reaffirmed after the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which made the English interested in Dutch garden design. But then the aesthetic principles suddenly and very radically changed. English gardens were laid out in far more relaxed patterns: the straight lines were replaced by meandering curves and the strict principles by casual arrangements. This was a romantic ideal that celebrated nature untamed by rational, human, design. Why this sudden transformation took place is disputed. The inclination of many English writers has been to ascribe the new ideals to an indigenous “genius,” often associating the free form of the English garden with the political liberties enjoyed by the English, and contrasting both favorably with the étatisme of the political system, and the gardens, of the French. More intriguingly, however, a case can be made for a direct influence from China.

Already in the first accounts of the new aesthetic—provided in the writings of William Temple and Joseph Addison—there are direct references to Chinese gardens. Temple, writing in 1685, claimed he had seen some examples of irregular gardens, “but heard more of it from others, who have lived much among the Chinese; a people, whose way of thinking seems to lie as wide of ours in Europe, as their country does.” Europeans like symmetry, but “the Chinese scorn this way of planting” and prefer gardens “without any order or disposition of parts.” Yet, since “we have hardly any notion of this sort of beauty” these “are adventures of too hard achievement for any common hands.” English gardens, Addison added, are too much like works of art; they display too much “neatness and elegance.” Chinese gardeners, by contrast, “always conceal the art by which they direct themselves,” and a Chinese garden “strike the imagination at first sight, without discovering what it is that has so agreeable an effect.” Yet neither Temple nor Addison had Yuanmingyuan in mind—after all, their writings predated the establishment of the imperial gardens in Beijing. Their sources were rather the descriptions of Chinese gardens provided by travelers to the southern city of Guangzhou, a city not known in China for its garden art. That Yuanmingyuan, and the principles
behind its design, became widely known throughout Europe was instead due to a detailed account provided in a letter from a Jesuit father, Denis Attiret, written in November 1743 and published in Paris in 1749, and in English in 1752.\(^\text{106}\) Attiret worked as a painter at the emperor's court, and in this capacity he had the opportunity to visit the gardens on a regular basis, although, as he explained, he did not have unimpeded access to the entire compound. What European readers found most intriguing about Attiret’s account was his descriptions of the way the gardens were laid out. In their Pleasure houses, he explained, the Chinese

choose a beautiful Disorder, and a wandering as far as possible from all the Rules of Art. They go entirely on this Principle, That what they are to represent there, is a natural and wild View of the Country; a rural Retirement, and not a Palace form’d according to all the Rules of Art.\(^\text{107}\)

“When you read this,” Attiret suspected, “you will be apt to imagine such Works very ridiculous; and that they must have a very bad Effect on the Eye: but were you to see them, you would admire the Art, with which all this Irregularity is conducted.”\(^\text{108}\) Attiret’s description was soon translated into most European languages and it seems to have been read by most owners of large estates. In Europe, where the fashion for chinoiserie already had a firm hold on the elites, kings and princes soon competed with each other in providing their gardens with Chinese-looking features. Adolf Fredrik, king of Sweden, built a Kina slott at Drottningholm in 1753; Fredrick the Great built a Chinesisches Haus at Sans Soucis in 1755; and Catherine the Great a Chinese palace at Oranienbaum in 1762.\(^\text{109}\) This mid-eighteenth century fad for Chinese buildings is striking not least since it spread at exactly the same time that Emperor Qianlong was building his European-style palaces at Yuanmingyuan itself.\(^\text{110}\) Worlds apart and unbeknown to each other, the rulers of China and of Europe amused and glorified themselves by copying each other.

No one did the Chinese style better than the English, and the most Chinese of English architects was William Chambers, the man behind the 50 meter pagoda in Kew Gardens, erected in 1761.\(^\text{111}\) Unusually, Chambers had actually been to China. As a young man he visited Guangzhou twice in the 1740s on board ships of the Swedish East India Company. Here he studied buildings and garden art, and once back in Europe he published, in 1757, a short pamphlet, On the Art of Laying out Gardens among the Chinese. “Nature is their pattern,” Chambers said of the Chinese garden designers, “and their aim is to imitate her in all her beautiful irregularities.”\(^\text{112}\) There are three species of scenes in a Chinese garden, Chambers explained, “the pleasing, the horrid and the enchanted.” While the pleasing and the enchanted corresponded to types of gardens that were well established in Europe, the idea of a “horrid garden” was something new. Chambers described scenes filled with assorted features both desolate and terrifying: ill-formed trees torn by tempests, impending rocks, impetuous cataracts, buildings half-consumed by fire, and so on.\(^\text{113}\) In the terrifying yet delightful frissons they provided their visitors, Chinese gardens were nothing short of sublime. In fact, as Chambers’s critics pointed out, it could be that the horrid scenes that the architect described had less to do with China than with the fact that ideas of the sublime were very much à la mode in the late
1750s. After all, Edmund Burke’s influential tract on the subject, *On the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful*, had appeared only a few weeks prior Chamber’s booklet. Reluctant to let go of a fashionable idea, Chambers expanded on the “scenes of terror” in a subsequent work, *A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening*, 1772, where he made explicit references to Attiret’s description of Yuanmingyuan. After describing the pleasures induced by the meandering paths and enchanting vistas, Chambers turned to “gloomy woods, deep vallies inaccessible to the sun, impending barren rocks, dark caverns, and impetuous cataracts rushing down the mountains from all parts.” This time, however, the critics were quite certain he had gone too far. They mercilessly lampooned Chambers’s combination of Chinese and Gothic sensibilities, and insisted that European neoclassical tastes were both more aesthetically pleasing and more manly than the Chinese. Moreover, they were far better attuned to the worldview of the subjects of a free society. After all, the forces of the sublime that Chambers invoked demanded submission, not engagement, of their visitors. By importing the Oriental style of gardening, British liberals feared, Oriental political habits would be imported too and their liberties would be compromised. Hurt by these attacks, Chambers inserted an apologetic preface when the *Dissertation* was republished, and there was absolutely nothing Chinese about his next major commission—Somerset House in central London, built according to uncompromisingly neoclassical specifications.

Although the English fashion for *chinoiserie* turned out to be something of a passing fad, the irregular aesthetics itself survived and it became the organizing principle of the English garden. To this day irregular, “natural,” gardens laid out in a picturesque manner represent the very essence of Englishness, while the French, to whom it was obvious that the aesthetic principles were imported from the East, often referred to the hybrid as “le jardin anglo-chinois.” Given this curious parentage, it is not surprising that British diplomats who showed up in China remarked on the many similarities they discovered between the emperor’s gardens and gardens they knew from back home. “I have enjoyed such vicissitudes of rural delight,” said George Macartney after visiting the park-lands at Chengde,

as I did not conceive could be felt out of England, being at different moments enchanted by scenes perfectly similar to those I had known there, to the magnificence of Stowe, the softer beauties of Wooburn, and the fairy-land of Paine’s Hill.

Neither did these similarities escape the British soldiers who came here in 1860. Lord Elgin himself, a few days before issuing his orders to destroy it all, called the gardens of Yuanmingyuan “fine, like an English park.”
In early July 1860, the Allied troops had finally reached their rendezvous points in the Bohai Gulf, as close as it was possible to get to Beijing by sea. Britain alone had some 200 ships. “It was a sight well calculated to impress every one with the greatness of our power,” wrote Garnet Wolseley, “and to awake feelings of pride in the breast of the most stony-hearted Briton.”\(^1\) They were all “fine, handsome, stalwart fellows,” James Hope Grant, the general in command of the British troops, concluded, “well dressed, very clean, and their horses all in rare condition and with shining coats.”\(^2\) The first troops landed close to Beitang, a town of some 20,000 inhabitants, on August 1. Since the coast was shallow, it was difficult to get the ships close to land and the heavy guns were particularly hard work to transport. Beitang had a fort, but it was not defended and the Allies encountered no opposition.\(^3\) All soldiers complained about the mud and the horrible stench of the town, but the lack of drinking water and of a dry place to pitch a tent were more immediate concerns.\(^4\) Despite the poverty of the inhabitants, the Allies found plenty of things to loot: they hunted pigs with pickaxes, shovels, bill-hooks and bludgeons, and the French army fed on pork for a week after they landed.\(^5\)

Slowly making its way through the mud, the Allies arrived at the village of Xinhe on August 12 where they had their first proper encounter with the enemy.\(^6\) The British applied their Armstrong guns, the French their rifled ordnance, and soon the imperial troops were in disarray. The land around Xinhe provided far better means of supplying the troops. There were vegetables for the soldiers to eat and fodder for the horses, and they broke up the wooden furniture, doors, and window frames of the houses and used it as fuel.\(^7\) On August 14, the same measures were applied to the forts at Tanggu. With the help of Armstrong guns and French cannons, “such a frightful fire was then brought to bear upon the place as no enemy could stand.”\(^8\) Some 400 Chinese were killed or wounded while the losses on the Allied side were very slight. At Tanggu, the armies discovered delicious grapes of a variety they never had tasted in Europe.

The North China Campaign had started well for the Europeans. The soldiers were in a rude state of health; their gunpowder was dry despite the persistent
rainfall; and although the heavy guns had been difficult to drag through the mud, after Tanggu the ground became more solid. And above all, the imperial troops provided little resistance. The Chinese were hesitant to engage with the Allied armies and when they did they were immediately outgunned. With each new town and village the Europeans captured, they discovered plenty of provisions, loot, and grass for the horses. Proceeding in this fashion, on August 18, they eventually found themselves at the Dagü Forts where they had suffered such a humiliating defeat the previous year. This time, however, everyone felt certain, they were going to get their revenge.

**Colonial Warfare**

When reading about nineteenth century European imperialism, it is notoriously difficult to think past the decades immediately prior to the First World War. The very end of the nineteenth century was when Europeans came to control some 85 percent of the world’s population, when imperial possessions were seen as reflections of the inherent superiority of “the European races,” and a cause for pomp, circumstance, and poetry by Rudyard Kipling. As late as in 1860, however, surprisingly little of this ideological superstructure was yet in place. What mattered for Britain in this earlier era was not colonies but trade, and free trade was commonly taken as antithetical to imperialism. The country had trading-posts scattered throughout the world to be sure, and a few settler colonies that best are regarded as byproducts of the activities of the great trading companies, yet the British never thought of themselves as “imperialists” and there was little general knowledge of, and less interest in, the country’s few foreign possessions.

This anti-imperialism was the official view also of the British government, as forcefully and repeatedly expressed by Henry John Temple, the Third Viscount of Palmerston. Lord Palmerston had started out as a Tory and was elected to parliament already in 1806. He joined the government in 1809, and continued in power, in various positions and with only short periods in opposition, for over half a century. In the latter half of the 1840s, he was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and from 1852 he was Prime Minister. At home Palmerston pursued a conservative agenda, fiercely resisting all demands for reform—of the suffrage, for example, or the Poor Laws. Yet as a person he was approachable, jovial, and more than willing to meet with deputations of workingmen to discuss their grievances. His popularity was also due to his stance on foreign policy. Palmerston was an aggressive advocate of British interests, and Britain, in his view, was a nation made up of manufacturers and merchants. This understanding defined Palmerston’s liberalism. He sought greater markets and freer trade, and he was prepared to back up these demands with force. In particular, he made a commitment to defend British subjects abroad. In Roman times, as he famously put it, a citizen could say “Civis Romanus sum,” and this simple statement protected him from harassment, “so also a British subject, in whatever land he may be, shall feel confident that the watchful eye and the strong arm of England, will protect him against injustice and wrong.”

“Imperialist,” mid-nineteenth century Britons liked to believe, was instead a label better applied to the French. France had since the general election in December
1848 been ruled by Louis Napoleon, Napoleon Bonaparte’s nephew, and since the coup d’état of December 1851, he had designated himself “Emperor Napoleon III.” For this ruler and his populist empire, British observers were convinced, gloire was always a far more important concern than commercial advantages. Much like his uncle, the policies of Napoleon III were seen as inherently expansionist—an impression to which his war against Austria in May 1859 lent a measure of credibility. Outside of Europe, however, French ambitions were always rather limited. The French did not have as extensive a trading network as Britain, nor the same powerful trading companies, and nothing like the same-size navy. France too would eventually develop a worldwide empire, but this too was a development pertaining to the latter part of the nineteenth century—after Jules Ferry and his liberals decided that the defeat in the war against Germany in 1871 best was avenged in non-European locations.

The main exception to this pattern of relative disinterest in colonial affairs concerns the British involvement in India and the French involvement in Algeria. These were large territories, requiring substantial commitments in terms of money and manpower. Algeria was first occupied in 1830 and in subsequent decades the African frontier was presented as a land of opportunity where regular French people could settle far more easily, and cheaply, than in North America. Algeria became a colony in 1834, and in 1848 it became an integral part of France itself, although ordinary Algerians enjoyed no citizenship rights in France. As for the British involvement in India, it started as a business venture undertaken by the East India Company who had established its first trading ports in Surat, Gujarat, already in 1612. Benefiting from the patronage of the Mughal emperors, they gradually expanded their influence, outmaneuvering competing French and Portuguese merchants, and playing various Indian rulers against each other. After the battle of Polashir Juddho in June 1757, where the Company’s army defeated the Nawab rulers of Bengal and their French supporters, the British became India’s de facto rulers. During the subsequent one hundred years, their control over India was consolidated into a formal, if privately run, colony—paid for in large parts by the revenues of the opium trade.

In both locations, however, the Europeans met considerable resistance from the locals. Algeria proved surprisingly difficult for the French to govern and indeed to control. The French army, and the French settlers, were repeatedly harassed by Arab guerrilla fighters, led by the legendary Abd al-Qadir, who eventually established their own independent Algerian state with its own administration, educational, and judicial system. The French sued for peace at Tafna in 1837, but once they had gathered sufficient military forces, they broke the agreement, restarted the war, and in 1847 Abd al-Qadir was captured. In India the British were having similar difficulties. Convinced that they had to defend the colony from a Russian attack from the north, the decision was taken to occupy Afghanistan. As other world powers subsequently have discovered, Afghanistan is easy to invade but difficult to control, and after the British army captured Kabul in the summer of 1839, they were increasing harassed by native guerrilla fighters. In January 1842, the officer in charge, William Elphinstone, decided to retreat back to India, but in the march to safety, during the winter and across high mountains, the entire army—4,500 soldiers and some 12,000 civilians—was obliterated and
Elphinstone himself was captured. The real scare for the British, however, came in May 1857, when the native troops of the East India Company’s army suddenly turned against their officers. This uprising—what the British to this day refer to as a “mutiny”—spread quickly across the North Indian plains, and for a while the Company came close to being ousted from the subcontinent. It was only once reinforcements had arrived, and once the British started cracking down on the rebels in a much more brutal manner, that they were able to reassert control.

These two wars—in Algeria and India—constituted formative experiences for many of the troops arriving in China in the summer of 1860. Several of them had personally participated in the wars, and this included the generals who commanded the armies. Indeed many of the British soldiers who relieved their desperate compatriots in India in 1857 had at the last moment been diverted from Lord Elgin’s war in China, and once the uprising was crushed, they simply returned to their original assignment. It was in Algeria and India that the Allies learned the basics of colonial warfare, and these were lessons which they later applied in China. Fighting wars in the colonies, it turned out, was nothing like fighting wars in Europe. Colonial enemies were far more barbarian, and so in the end were the reactions of the Europeans.

The Allied army which showed up in China was not the first example of military cooperation between Britain and France. In 1853, British politicians had convinced themselves that the weak Ottoman Empire was unable to stop Russia from pushing into the Middle East, and French politicians meanwhile convinced themselves that Catholic subjects in the Ottoman empire—the protector of whom the French declared themselves to be—were threatened by Russia’s plans. Britain wanted a multinational cover for the military action they contemplated, and France realized that once Britain had committed itself, it could reap considerable benefits at a marginal cost. The result was their joint intervention in the Crimean War. A similar rationale explains the joint intervention in China. Once again Britain was hesitant to act alone and the government approached a number of countries, including Russia and the United States, for a contribution, yet only France could be convinced to join them. For France, a defense of the Catholic religion provided once again the official rationale: a French priest, Père Auguste Chapdelaine, working as a clandestine missionary in Guizhou had recently been killed by an angry mob and this incident, the French government decided, needed avenging. Yet as secret documents prepared for the French government reveal, France also had its eyes on a trading post in China, their very own Hong Kong. In any case, given Britain’s prior commitment to a military solution, France would be able to play the role of a great power on the cheap.

Yet there was little trust between the two countries. The British, in particular, convinced themselves that Napoleon III was inherently duplicitous and that he, much as his uncle, was making plans to invade the British isles. This fear became a national obsession in the summer of 1859 when an invasion scare swept across the country and people as far north as in Scotland took up arms and began preparing themselves for the day—soon upon them, without doubt—when the French armies would arrive. The movement quickly grew to include some 120,000 people in a loosely organized militia which met on weekends for target practice and assorted
military exercises. As alarmist editorial writers pointed out, although Britain had
the largest navy in the world, it was not possible to simultaneously patrol the high
seas and to protect Britain itself. According to the most elaborate conspiracy theo-
ries, France’s participation in the China campaign was a part of this scheme. By
tying down a large force in the East, Britain’s home defense would be weakened and
thereby unable to resist a French attack.

Although they were allies in China, and officially on the best of terms, the sol-
diers of the two armies complained endlessly about each other. The French, the
British argued, were slow to assemble their forces; they had inferior military equip-
ment and their commanders were all more or less incompetent. Most annoyingly,
the French constantly objected to, and obstructed, Britain’s well laid-out plans. “It
is a thousand pities that the French were ever allowed to meddle with our affairs out
here,” said Harry Parkes, who accompanied the army as a translator:

They can’t colonise…and setting their missionaries aside, for whom neither Gov-
ernment nor people care very much I should imagine, they have no business here
whatever. There is not a Frenchman who can tell you what they have come here to
fight for; the result is they have done nothing but hamper and delay us.

Meanwhile, the French accused the British of being aggressive, overly sensitive to
insults, and too quick to pick a fight with the Chinese. The British, said General
Montauban, the commander of the French army, were “full of pride and without
any restraint.” Throughout the campaign, the British and the French soldiers con-
stantly competed with each other over symbolic victories: which army that first
could plant their flag on top of the ramparts of a captured fort, or who first could
enter Beijing. Indeed most of the casualties incurred by the Europeans took place
during such struggles over prestige.

The State of the Armies

The Allied armies that eventually disembarked in northern China consisted of less
than 20,000 men. It was a small contingent to be sure, especially when contrasted
with the enormous size and the resources of the Chinese empire, but they were well
equipped and self-confident. The British took particular pride in their cavalry that,
everyone agreed, looked “very smart.” The regular British soldiers wore their signa-
ture red coats, reflecting the view that soldiers who are easily spotted are more likely
to strike fear in an enemy. The artillery was equipped with Armstrong guns—the
latest, most lethal, military technology available, invented by William Armstrong
only a few years earlier and capable of hitting targets up to five miles away. In addi-
tion, the British Navy had several ships that could fire on fortifications on land or go
up the Chinese rivers and threaten cities such as Tianjin. “You can’t imagine what a
fine little force we have got; so well equipped and taken care of (perhaps rather too
much so), in such good health, and behaving so well. I trust they will get through
their work before rain and sickness set in.”

A majority of the British officers were aristocrats, the offspring of families with
the money and tradition to purchase military titles for sons with little aptitude for
other pursuits. Strikingly many were Scottish—including both Lord Elgin and James Hope Grant, but there were Scotchmen in many other leading positions as well. The empire, to the Scottish, and to Scottish elites in particular, provided a means of social advancement when other, more English, routes were barred. As a result, the Scottish officers were often fiercely loyal to the crown and notoriously ferocious on the battle-field. As for the regular soldiers, they were predominantly drawn from the teeming crowds that recently had been uprooted and displaced by the forces of industrial capitalism. Irishmen, running away from hunger at home, were prominent among them. The contempt that the officers felt for these men was rivaled only by the contempt they felt for the Chinese, and the soldiers’ rough manners, love of drink, and Irish accents were often lampooned. Soldiers were commonly flogged, a public form of punishment that served above all as a warning to others. And yet, the soldiers were not generally mistreated. By the 1830s, with increasing demand for labor back home and rising wages, the army had had to start competing for the manpower it needed. Various institutions sprung up catering to the soldiers’ welfare—garrison hospitals, regimental libraries, schools for the soldiers’ children, recreational facilities, army chapels, and so on.

As for the French army it was smaller, reflecting the smaller French stake in China, and the fact that all French troops had to be transported all the way from Europe or North Africa. The ethos of the French army was more egalitarian, or so it seemed to the British who often complained that the French had no corporal punishment and hence constantly faced the problem of how to keep its soldiers in line. There were many other things the French lacked: they had no proper cavalry, no naval gunships, and their artillery had lighter cannons than the British. Yet their irregular troops, brought from North Africa—the spahis and the chasseur d’Afrique—were a well-trained force with extensive experience of colonial warfare. The British had brought “native” soldiers too, which formed two irregular cavalries—known as Fane’s and Probyn’s Horse. In fact, about a third of the British army consisted of Indian soldiers, predominantly Sikhs, who had proven themselves loyal during the uprising of 1857. “They are a fine, wild-looking set, dark, with well-marked, prominent features, which are admirably set off by an ample red turban.”

In addition to the foreign soldiers, there were some 3,000 Chinese coolies, who carried much of the equipment and the supplies. The coolies were recruited in Guangzhou and the Europeans both admired and loathed them. On the one hand, they worked “most cheerfully and well,” “carrying heavy loads, and yet laughing and chaffing each other all the while.” On the other hand, they were “mostly thieves or pirates hardened to deeds of blood,” who were known to break out of camp at night and “prowled about into the neighbouring villages, plundering and frequently ill-using women.” Their lack of national loyalties fascinated the Europeans. In Europe, after the French Revolution and the nationalist revolutions of 1848, it was obvious that conationals should feel a sense of loyalty to each other, but such allegiances the Chinese completely seemed to lack. The coolies did not hesitate to make war on their fellow countrymen as long as they were being adequately paid. In addition to the coolies, the Allied armies were followed by a ragtag band of beggars, prostitutes,
and thieves who all were looking for some way to make a living.\(^50\) All in all it was a motley crew: “half-castes, Gentoos, Mahrattas, Arabs, Negroes, Japanese, Seedes, Bengalese, Cingalese—diverse in religion, and customs, language, but all united in worshiping the lucre.”\(^51\)

As for the health of the soldiers, lessons had been learned from the medical scandals that had prompted Florence Nightingale to dispatch her contingent of nurses to the war in the Crimea.\(^52\) In China the troops were far better looked after and better fed; health inspectors made regular checks on their conditions and there were hospital ships anchored off the North China coast ready to receive any casualties. These ships, *The Times* reported, contained everything a wounded soldier might require, including fresh fruit, British newspapers, and even bottles of claret. And yet since the soldiers rarely took baths and often slept in their uniforms for days on end, it is clear that the sanitary conditions of the army left some room for improvement. There seems to be a national odor about us, Wolseley admitted, “easily discernible by the Chinese.”\(^53\) As for the personal equipment they carried with them, each private was given a pair of khaki trousers, two flannel shirts, two pairs of socks, and one pair of underwear, in addition to an overcoat, a blanket, cooking utensils, and a haversack.\(^54\) Since nothing much was known about the resources available on the plains of northern China, everything the army needed had been bought in Hong Kong or brought from India, including hay for the horses.\(^55\) All in all, the army kept some 4,000 animals. Ponies for the soldiers were procured in Japan and Manila, and there were mules from Bombay and bullocks from Madras, used for transportation and as food. As for the French soldiers, they had three days of rations consisting of biscuits, rice, and coffee.\(^56\) The use of coffee had started in Algeria; it was a good drink during long marches, and together with crushed biscuits it constituted breakfast in the French camp.\(^57\) As it turned out, however, it was easy to provision for the troops in northern China. On their way to Beijing, the soldiers marched through a fertile country where fields and orchards were ready to be harvested, and in the end the troops were better provided for than in Europe.\(^58\)

In addition to the soldiers, various groups of European civilians accompanied the armies. There were diplomats first of all who were to negotiate with the Chinese authorities and sign their names to any treaty, and in addition there were the secretaries to the diplomatic missions, liaison officers, and translators. Prominently among the latter group were Harry Parkes and Thomas Wade, who not only were linguists and China experts, but also, in practice, negotiators in their own right. There were also those who were paid to report on the events: journalists writing for the leading European newspapers of the day, *The Times* and *Le Moniteur*, the official French paper, but there were also reporters for newspapers published in Hong Kong and Shanghai, including *The North China Herald* and the *China Mail*. There were also artists who worked for the army and for the *Illustrated London News*, and photographers, like the adventurer Felice Beato, who was attached to the British army in an unofficial capacity and was responsible for taking the very first photographs of China and the Chinese.\(^59\) There was even a French *mission scientifique*—modeled on the famous scientific mission that accompanied Napoleon’s armies to Egypt—although it in this case consisted of no more than a single member.\(^60\)
A nuisance constantly complained of by the Allied soldiers was the mud that covered the plains of the Bohai Gulf where they landed and the dust that enveloped every subsequent Chinese city they visited, including the imperial capital itself. The dust clogged the pens of the letter writers and “found its way into our very food, rendering one’s camp fare disagreeable from the highly earthy flavour imparted to it.” Before they arrived, the weather in northern China had been another cause of concern. The British knew the summers in Hong Kong to be humid and hot, but to their great satisfaction they discovered the fall in the vicinity of Beijing to be pleasant like an “English summer day.” The impending change of season nevertheless imparted a sense of urgency to the campaign. As they all were aware, winter was approaching. In the course of October, during the last weeks of the campaign, night frosts became more frequent and, since they were not equipped for winter warfare, the French had set November 1 as the deadline by which they wanted to turn back.

As for the enemy, the Europeans had a rather hazy notion of who that was. They were usually referred to as “Tartars,” or sometimes as “Mongols,” but rarely as “Chinese” or “Manchu.” The Tartar label was clearly the most useful one for propaganda purposes. For one thing, it made a not too tacit connection to the “Tartar hordes,” which throughout history periodically had threatened to overrun Europe. “Tartars,” all Europeans knew, were ferocious and barbarian. Moreover, the label conveniently separated the Manchu armies from the Chinese people and identified the former as foreign intruders with dubious claims on the imperial throne. In addition, calling the enemy “Tartars” made it possible to argue that the emperor was their real enemy and that Europeans had no quibbles with ordinary Chinese. They could even hint that the Europeans and the Chinese had a common interest in opposing the Manchus.

The commander of the imperial army, Sengge Rinchen, was a Mongol nobleman who had earned his reputation for military genius after defeating the Europeans at the Dagu Forts in June, 1859. The European soldiers were intimidated by his reputation—like so many Chinese officials he was portrayed as a blood-thirsty madman who personally beheaded captives who refused to kneel before him. And yet, in the Allied camp his name was most commonly rendered as “Sam Collinson,” a far less intimidating opponent. This combination of the sublime and the ridiculous characterized European descriptions of the imperial enemy as a whole. In breathless accounts, no doubt intended for readers back home, the “Tartar hordes” posed immense challenges, and even in the army itself rumors periodically circulated regarding the hundreds of thousands of archers and horsemen who were waiting to attack them. Most of the time, however, the enemy’s military capability was a source of mirth. The Chinese suffered from a “national ignorance respecting the science and practice of war,” and as a result the European commanders expected no proper resistance. The soldiers were badly trained, lacked discipline, and the officers were completely ignorant of modern warfare. In the end, the bows, arrows, and occasional matchlocks of the imperial army provided no defense against Europe’s rifled ordinance. At every encounter, the Chinese were easily outgunned and outmaneuvered. Some of the Allied officers even felt ashamed to have come so far to fight such a wretched enemy.
The North China Campaign of 1860

Men of Culture and Sophistication

Looking at the leading diplomats and generals in some more detail, we discover men of considerable cultural and intellectual sophistication. Next to all of them came from well-established families, they had gone to the best schools, and were in several cases highly artistically and musically gifted. Some were keen gardeners, others collected antiquities, played instruments, read poetry, or organized theatrical performances. Accordingly, the accounts they left of the North China Campaign are often filled with keen observations of Chinese life that, although limited in range and depth, give evidence of a fluent literacy as well as considerable respect for the locals and their ways of life. Whatever else the Allied commanders were, barbarians they were not.

Even among these cultured and sophisticated men, John Bowring stood out from the rest. Born in 1792, Bowring began his career as a linguist and translator of poetry. He learned French, German, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese at an early age and published a series of anthologies of Russian, Polish, Serbian, Czech, and Hungarian verse. Getting to know Jeremy Bentham in 1820, he joined the liberal Westminster Review as an editor in 1824, and wrote not only on literature but also very extensively on matters of political economy. Bowring soon became Bentham’s confidante, and after Bentham died—in “his arms”—in 1834, Bowring became his literary executor and the, sometimes unreliable, editor of his Collected Works in eleven volumes. Bowring was a fervent advocate of free trade and of related liberal causes. In the 1820s, he was elected international secretary of the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace, and in 1838 he was, together with Richard Cobden and John Bright, a founding member of the Anti-Corn Law League.

In 1835, after several unsuccessful attempts, Bowring became a member of the House of Commons, and from 1841 he occupied a safe seat as the MP for Bolton. However, financial difficulties forced him to look for a more lucrative position. In 1849, Lord Palmerston made him consul in Guangzhou and in 1854 governor of Hong Kong and British plenipotentiary in East Asia. In 1855, he went to Siam and in a mere two weeks he concluded a treaty that guaranteed European merchants free access to Siamese markets. Back in China again, he was outraged when the Chinese authorities in October, 1856, boarded a British-registered ship, The Arrow, and hauled down its flag. In retaliation he ordered the Royal Navy to start bombarding Guangzhou, and this was how the new war—the Second Opium War—got under way. When members of parliament back in London heard of Bowring’s conduct, many were outraged, and although Bowring was given strong backing by Lord Palmerston, he was forced to resign. Bowring was too controversial a figure, too much of a missionary on behalf of his liberal creed, and too aggressive.

The person who replaced him as British plenipotentiary was Lord Elgin, James Bruce, the 8th Earl of Elgin and 12th Earl of Kincardine. Born in 1811, Elgin attended Eton and Christ Church College, Oxford, where he befriended the Marquess of Dalhousie and Earl Canning, two future governor generals of India, and William Gladstone, the future prime minister. At Oxford, according to Elgin’s brother, “his intellect was attracted to high and abstract speculation,” and he mastered both
the Classics and contemporary philosophy. After graduating, Elgin returned to Broomhall, the family estate in Scotland, and he ran, unsuccessfully, for parliament. Elgin was a Tory, albeit of a liberal bent, and he firmly believed in the benevolent potential of the policies pursued by a patriarchal state. “I am a Conservative,” he declared when he finally was elected to parliament in 1841,

because I believe that our admirable Constitution…proclaims between men of all classes and degrees in the body politic a sacred bond of brotherhood in the recognition of a common welfare here, and a common hope hereafter.

Elgin worried about the ravages brought by capitalism, and although he in principle supported the idea of free trade, he was concerned about the impact that a reduction in customs duties would have on “the rights of the labouring classes.” We must remember, he said, that “the only capital of the labourer is his skill in his own particular walk, and it is a mockery to tell him that he can find a satisfactory compensation elsewhere.”

Elgin was made governor of Jamaica in 1842 and governor general of Canada in 1846, and in the spring of 1857 he was dispatched to China to sort out the diplomatic tangle created by the new war that John Bowring had started. Elgin was of an entirely different disposition than Bowring. Like other conservatives, he was skeptical of the money grubbing of British merchants, he objected to the beligerent British policy, and he was morally uncomfortable with the opium trade. Elgin, in short, was a sensitive soul. He was fond of quoting romantic poetry and the memories evoked by a book his wife sent him were “too touching for me, and I have been obliged to lay it aside.”

When visiting Egypt, en route to China in 1860, Elgin made a night-time excursion to the pyramids—a classical setting for sublime experiences. And as we would expect, he was duly overwhelmed. The sight of the sphinx left a particularly strong impression on him:

The mystical light and deep shadows cast by the moon, gave to it an intensity which I cannot attempt to describe. To me it seemed a look, earnest, searching, but unsatisfied. For a long time I remained transfixed, endeavouring to read the meaning conveyed by this wonderful eye.

Compare John Bowring, who visited the same pyramids in 1837. His only comment regarding the site concerned how he was robbed “in one of the dark chambers” by one of the natives.

Given such romantic sensibilities, it is not surprising that many a China-hand doubted Elgin’s willingness to subdue the Chinese. When overseeing the renewed bombardment of Guanzhou on December 28, 1857, Elgin was also perfectly nauseated. “I hate the whole thing so much that I cannot trust myself to write about it,” he told his wife. Looking at the British warships anchored in the harbor, “I never felt so ashamed of myself in my life… I feel that I am earning for myself a place in the Litany, immediately after ‘plague, pestilence, and famine.’” And once the new treaty finally was signed, at Tianjin in June 1858, Elgin was happy to return home to his wife and to a new job as post-master general and a member of Palmerston’s
government. According to his critics, Elgin had been far too trusting of the Chinese, and they felt vindicated after the defeat at the battle at the Dagu Forts in June 1859.\textsuperscript{96} When Elgin returned to China the following year his attitude was more cynical and he was more ready to see the anti-Chinese logic of the arguments long advocated by British merchants in Hong Kong.

Elgin’s French counterpart was Baron Jean-Baptiste Louis Gros.\textsuperscript{97} Born in 1793, 18 years Elgin’s senior, Gros was the son of a painter, Antoine-Jean Gros, who had been a personal friend of Napoleon’s wife Josephine and who together with Jacques-Louis David was responsible for producing some of the most iconic pictures of the Emperor of the French. The family was ennobled after the Salon de peinture et de sculpture in 1808 where Gros père had displayed his Battle of Eylau, showing a dashing Napoleon leading his troops into battle.\textsuperscript{98} The son, Jean-Baptiste, was a painter in his own right and noted, in particular, for his remarkably realistic pictures of Latin American landscapes.\textsuperscript{99} Gros fils was also one of the first daguerrotypists—he captured Acropolis on his plates—and a photographer who took photos of the Great Exhibition in London in 1851.\textsuperscript{100} Above all, however, Baron Gros was a diplomat, posted as chargé d’affaires in Lisbon, Mexico, Bogota, Athens, and after the return of the Napoleons to power, he was made a senator and rewarded with the ambassadorship to London. It was in this latter capacity that he became involved with the wars in China. When they first met in 1858, Lord Elgin called Baron Gros “civil, cautious, diplomatic,” but the two clearly warmed to each other, and when they met again in 1860, traveling from Europe to China on the same ship, Elgin referred to him as “wise,” “amiable,” and “my friend.”\textsuperscript{101}

A curious parallel connects the fathers of the two chief diplomats. James Bruce was the son of Thomas Bruce, the Seventh Earl of Elgin, British ambassador to the Sublime Porte and a notorious collector of Greek antiquities. Starting in 1810, the Seventh Earl removed a large portion of the friezes that surrounded the Parthenon in Athens, originally created by Phidias and his pupils in the fifth century BCE.\textsuperscript{102} Yet since the British Museum refused to pay the price he asked for, Thomas Bruce went bankrupt and to avoid his creditors he took temporary refuge in Paris. It was only in 1816 that a deal finally was struck and the family was able to return home to Scotland. Compare Baron Gros’s father, the famous painter. In 1797, Antoine-Jean Gros was commissioned by Napoleon, whose troops occupied Italy at the time, to make an inventory of all major art collections in the country, to pick out the works of highest artistic merit, and to ship them back to the Louvre in Paris.\textsuperscript{103} Once proudly displayed in the respective capitals, the two thefts soon became symbols of the cultural sophistication of their new owners. From this point of view, Elgin junior and Gros fils simply followed in their fathers’ footsteps.

Turning to the military commanders next, we discover men who too came from good families and displayed a surprising level of cultural sophistication. Officers in the nineteenth century frequently wrote diaries—they were often required to do so as part of their official duties—and a large number of them published their personal accounts of the North China Campaign.\textsuperscript{104} One such diary-writer was the commander of the British army, General James Hope Grant.\textsuperscript{105} Born in 1808, the fifth and youngest son of a landed Scottish family, he was the brother of the painter Francis Grant, president of the Royal Academy. Hope Grant enlisted at 18, became
a lieutenant at 20, and captain at 27, but it was when he was made Brigade Major during the First Opium War that his career took off. Yet, as he himself suggested, his military qualities were only partially what recommended him for the job. Hope Grant was also “a great musician, and plays beautifully on the violoncello and on the piano,” and one of his chief tasks was to entertain his fellow officers during the long passage from Europe to the East. In addition, Hope Grant liked to put on theatrical performances featuring his soldiers, and visitors knew that they always could expect a good evening’s entertainment in his camp.

During the 1840s and 1850s, James Hope Grant took part in various Indian campaigns—the First Anglo-Sikh War of 1845-1846, the Punjab campaign of 1848–1849, and so on—and during the uprising of 1857 he took a leading role in the capture of the besieged cities of Kanpur and Lucknow. Once the British retook Delhi, Hope Grant was one of the officers responsible for meting out a harsh punishment on the rebels. In appreciation of his services in this respect, he was knighted and promoted to major general and it was as such that he arrived in China in 1860. Despite, or perhaps because of, these unsavory experiences, General Hope Grant had a deep Christian faith—he banned foul language among his troops, and every morning after breakfast, “as regularly as clockwork,” he held prayers and read a chapter from the Bible. Hope Grant was loyal to his troops and his superiors, a team player, but often overshadowed by Lord Elgin who in practice came to direct many of the military operations. Some of the soldiers admired him greatly but he was also the object of derision—some detractors claiming, for example, that he did not wash as often as he should. “Hope Grant is tall and skinny and looks like an old woman and this is what his men call him.”

Hope Grant’s French counterpart was general Charles Cousin-Montauban. He too had been a military man all of his life. Born in Paris in 1796, he joined the army at the age of 18 and once France’s colonization of North Africa began in 1830 he was transferred here. Active in a number of engagements, he was decorated six times and once shot in the chest. In Algeria, he made a name for himself in 1847 when he helped to capture Abd al-Qadir himself, the leader of the independent Algerian state. Montauban continued to chase guerrilla fighters in the Khabyl mountains and in 1855 he was made commander of the Algerian province of Constantine. Yet the same year, Montauban was dispatched to the Crimea and in 1859 he was made commander of the French forces in China. Returning from the campaign in 1862, he was knighted by Louis-Napoleon and took the title of “Count of Palikao,” after Baliqiao, the bridge outside of Beijing where he had routed the Chinese troops.

A man of a particular importance to the outcome of the North China Campaign is Harry Parkes, the translator, China expert, and negotiator. Born in 1828, Parkes was only 32 years old in 1860, and yet he had experiences far beyond his years. Orphaned at the age of five, he went to live with his uncle but was promptly dispatched to his sister in the newly acquired colony of Hong Kong. Parkes’s sister was married to Karl Gützlaff, a German missionary and adventurer, known for smuggling both Bibles and opium into China. In Hong Kong, Parkes learned Chinese and began working for the British authorities as a translator in the various ports which the Nanjing Treaty had opened up to trade. In 1854, Parkes was appointed governor in Xiamen; he went to Siam with John Bowring in 1855, and was the same
The North China Campaign of 1860

year made acting consul in Guangzhou. It was Parkes who first alerted Bowring to the case of *The Arrow* and to the shameful way in which its crew had been treated at the hands of the Chinese authorities.

Just like his friend Bowring, Parkes had many critics at home. Despite his knowledge of China, or perhaps because of it, he was a Sinophile. “I often catch myself thinking that I have had enough of this climate,” he wrote to his wife in November 1857. If I find another position, I will be “free at least of Chinese, language and people, of both of which I am heartily sick.”113 In the eyes of the political establishment in London, Parkes’s greatest fault was perhaps that he hailed from the wrong social class. He was an autodidact and an adventurer, and he had not “gone through the gradations of civil employment calculated to give him that moderation, prudence, and discretion which he may one day possess.”114 Like the merchants in Hong Kong, with whose views he strongly sympathized, Parkes cared more about results than about principles. Karl Marx, in an article in *New York Tribune*, called him “a person of a quick and irritable disposition.”115 When Lord Elgin first arrived in China in 1857 he shared these sentiments, and Parkes, on his part, suspected that Elgin would be too soft on the Chinese. Yet when Elgin returned in 1860, he quickly came to appreciate Parkes both as a professional and as a person. “Parkes,” said Elgin, “is one of the most remarkable men I ever met; for energy, courage, and ability combined, I do not know where I could find his match; and this, joined to a facility of speaking Chinese… makes him at present the man of the situation.”116

The March on Beijing

On August 21, the Allies once again found themselves in front of the Dagu Forts, and just in June 1859, the Chinese had blocked off the Baihe river with “rows of booms, hawsers, piles, and sharp-pointed stakes of iron, each several tons in weight.”117 Better prepared this time, however, and weary of falling into the same trap as the previous year, general Hope Grant launched an attack by land on the northern-most of the forts.118 Artillery fire began at daybreak; the British employed their Armstrong guns and howitzers and the French used their rifled cannons. The Chinese forces defended themselves ferociously, and for a while they successfully kept the Europeans at bay, then suddenly there was “a loud, bursting, booming sound,” and a tall black pillar of smoke rose up from one of the forts.119 A large ammunition dump had been hit by Allied fire, clearly with devastating effect, yet it took another hour before the Chinese cannons fell completely silent.120 The Europeans rushed forth with scaling ropes and ladders, but the fort was still difficult to enter. Two ditches surrounded the outer perimeter, there were palisades of sharpened bamboo stakes surrounding it, and the remaining Chinese defenders showered the assailants with pots of lime and other improvised missiles.121 The French and British soldiers raced each other to the top of the ramparts. “Our flag was the first hoisted,” Harry Parkes reported, “but a Frenchman had waved a minute or two previously a French flag as he got on the wall, but was shot down.”122

Excited by this victory, the Allies turned their fire on the remaining forts. One of them hoisted a white flag, as if to surrender, but when the Europeans approached them they were unable to come to terms. Then another ammunition dump went
up in a large explosion. At two in the afternoon, the Allies finally captured one of the southern forts together with some 2,000 Chinese soldiers and the remaining forts surrendered later in the evening. The defending army had taken serious losses. Inside the forts, the Europeans found perhaps a thousand dead and wounded soldiers, many with spectacular lacerations caused by the Armstrong guns. “The horrors of the scene,” wrote Parkes, “defy description.” The Allies had suffered considerable losses too—some 200 men killed or wounded per army. All in all, however, it was a very satisfying revenge. Through the victory at Dagu, they “redeemed their country’s glory, which had been dimmed, but only for a while, by last year’s unhappy disaster.”

Once the Dagu Forts were in their hands, the Allies moved on to the city of Tianjin, which they took without a fight. The victory, everyone assumed, meant that the war now was over. “I do not now expect to hear another gun fired,” Parkes wrote to his wife. “With proper management on our part, Diplomacy, which will now come into play, will, we should hope, be as successful as the sword.” Several of the officers auctioned off their heavy luggage and gear for the horses; some troops were returned to Shanghai, and others made preparations to go back to Britain. Peace negotiations with the Chinese authorities were initiated at Tianjin on September 2. By now the Allies had added new demands to the original 1858 Treaty—above all that the city of Tianjin should be included in the list of cities open to foreign commerce and that the Chinese should compensate the Europeans for the expenses incurred during the current war. The exact size of the indemnity was an issue to be discussed but, as the Chinese negotiators made clear, they were not going to quibble over a few taels. “Today,” said General Montauban, “the negotiations are very advanced and Baron Gros considers them as concluded.” A guard of honor, comprising a few hundred men, were preparing to accompany the European ambassadors to Beijing for the ratification of the treaty.

Then, on September 6, “like a clap of thunder,” came news that the talks had broken down. Harry Parkes and Thomas Wade met with Chinese officials to arrange for the signing of the convention. However, when their Chinese counterparts were asked to show their credentials, the British negotiators decided that they were unsatisfactory. Despite having brought along the guanfang, or “great seal,” and insisting that they had the authority to discuss all outstanding issues, Parkes and Wade suspected that the Chinese negotiators lacked the power to bind the emperor to an agreement. The Chinese, they concluded, had not negotiated in good faith. In addition, the Chinese continued to make assorted ridiculous demands regarding the size of the escort that was to accompany the ambassadors to Beijing and the protocol they had to follow once they arrived. These punctilios, Parkes and Wade decided, were a “patent a pretext for delay.” By dragging out the negotiations, the Chinese hoped to gain sufficient time to reassemble their army, to give the emperor time to flee, to set some trap for Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, or, if nothing else, to postpone further military engagements until the weather had turned too cold for the lightly clad Europeans to continue their advance.

The two China experts reported their conclusions to Lord Elgin who immediately asked general Hope Grant to march on Tongzhou, a town only 12 miles southeast of Beijing. The discussions so far, Baron Gros informed general Montauban,
have been “nothing but a comedy.” We were now freed from all commitments we had made to the imperial Commissioners.” We laughed “all the more heartily,” Wolseley remembered, “when we learnt that negotiations were broken off.” Increasingly desperate, the Chinese authorities appointed two new negotiators on September 11—Zaiyuan, the Prince of Yi, a relative of the emperor, and Mu Yin, the president of the Board of War—whose credentials surely would be impossible for the Europeans to doubt. In repeated communications they urged the Allies to stop their advance on Beijing and return to Tianjin where talks would be easier to carry out. Elgin, however, refused to turn back.

After the breakdown of the talks on September 6, the status of the Allies was rather ambiguous, and the commanders seemed to be in two minds about whether to continue to Beijing as the invited guests of the emperor or as the head of a conquering army. “Are we a peaceful escort to the Queen’s representative,” John Hart Dunne, a young officer in the British army, asked himself in his diary, “or an advanced column of a belligerent force? No one can tell positively.” On September 13 the Allies reached Hexiwu, and on September 16 negotiations were once again held in a reasonably amicable session where the new Chinese negotiators repeated that they were prepared to agree to all demands. Further talks were planned to take place in Tongzhou, and several groups of Europeans went there to discuss the arrangements and to scout out the terrain for the arriving troops. However, on their way back to the Allied camp, they were seized by the Chinese and taken prisoner. Among the altogether 39 men—26 British and 13 French—were Harry Parkes; Henry Loch, Lord Elgin’s secretary; Thomas Bowlby, correspondent for The Times; and Stanislas d’Escayrac de Lauture, the one member of the French scientific mission. When the Allied commanders insisted that the captured men be returned, the Chinese officials said, somewhat contradictorily, that they were not responsible for their capture and that they would be handed over only once the Europeans were on their way back home. “Great fears are felt on their behalf,” wrote a British officer, “for they are doubtless at the mercy of an infuriated soldiery.” Lord Elgin insisted that they were not to be regarded as prisoners of war but rather as civilians treacherously seized while going about their peaceful business.

On the morning of September 18, the Europeans clashed with some 30,000 Chinese troops at the town of Zhangjiawan. “The firing of our Armstrong guns was admirable,” Wolseley reported, “each shot telling upon the large bodies of Tartar cavalry, which kept moving round towards our left flank and rear.” The town was captured and “given over to loot.” Two women in a house next to the British camp committed suicide, and “much to my annoyance,” wrote Dunne, “were in the morning found at the bottom of the well, which I principally depended on for water for my men.” On September 21, another battle was fought, this time at Baliqiao, a bridge located only eight li, or five miles, from the capital. Here too the Allies, this time led by the French, defeated a far larger Chinese army causing heavy losses. “The victory was decisive,” and as a result, “Pekin lay open to us.”

After the defeat at Baliqiao, Emperor Xianfeng met with his advisors to discuss the situation. Some argued that the emperor should remain in the capital, others that he should take personal command of the army and bravely march towards the enemy, but in the end he decided to escape and on September 22 he left for
Chengde, the summer retreat beyond the Great Wall. The emperor also dismissed the previous negotiators and appointed instead Yixin, the First Prince Gong, his own half-brother and the son of Emperor Daoguang. Of a pragmatic bent, and later the leader of what the Europeans identified as the “peace party” within the Chinese government, Prince Gong understood the dangers that the Allied army posed to the future of the dynasty and he was prepared to make concessions to them. In next to daily dispatches, he too urged the Allies to stay away from the capital or at least to proceed only in a small, unarmed, contingent—a demand that the Europeans regarded as laughable. While the Chinese insisted that the Allies stop their advance or they could not be held responsible for what happened to the prisoners, the Allies insisted that the prisoners be returned or they could not be held responsible for what happened to Beijing. The treaty, wrote Antoine Fauchery, a journalist working for official French newspaper *Le Moniteur*, is like an ivory ball in a fairy tale that keeps on rolling away from a child.

Diplomacy had clearly failed and on September 24 negotiations were once again broken off. After waiting a few days for military supplies and additional troops to arrive, the Europeans began the final march on Beijing on October 3. Two days later they arrived at an enormous brick-kiln where they decided to set up camp for the night. From the top of the kiln, the soldiers were for the first time able to see the city walls of Beijing. Before them lay an immense panorama magnificently illuminated by the evening sun. “It resembled engravings of the luxurious decors of the theater productions of the most fantastic views of Nineveh or Babylon,” wrote a French soldier.
The following day, October 6, the Allied commanders received reports that General Sengge Rinchen together with 10,000 of his men had retreated to the imperial palace at Yuanmingyuan, northwest of Beijing, and the decision was taken to pursue them there. Yet the terrain was difficult to navigate and it was particularly cumbersome for the British artillery, which insisted on hauling its heavy Armstrong guns through the thick forest. Before long the two armies became separated from each other and the British lost their way. The main part of the British army set up camp in the forest for the night, while the French and the British cavalry marched on to Yuanmingyuan, which they reached late in the afternoon. Since his troops were tired and it was getting late, General Montauban decided not to explore the premises that evening.

Before they could go to sleep, however, they needed to make sure that the imperial army did not lie in wait for them. One of General Montauban’s aids knocked on the main gate of the compound and when no answer was given he scaled the outer wall. The aid and a few soldiers who had followed him came under attack, but it was soon clear that the palace was defended by no more than a handful of men equipped with the most pathetic of weapons. One eunuch they captured—a “withered old man, dressed in the garb of an official menial”—told them that the emperor had left the premises already two weeks earlier, accompanied by his women and a large retinue of courtiers and soldiers. Only Prince Gong had remained behind, but he had left the previous evening. Despite the long day’s march, the soldiers found it difficult to go to sleep. In the middle of the night shots rang out twice and on both occasions the men were impossible to control, running around and refusing to listen to their officers. Yet there was nothing in the end, just shadows and premonitions.

At 8 o’clock the following morning—Sunday, October 7—General Montauban, accompanied by his commanders, and escorted by a contingent of infantry soldiers, made their way into Yuanmingyuan without firing a single shot. The buildings were completely deserted both by the court and by the imperial soldiers and everything
was left much as if the emperor himself still had been present. On a table in the Audience Hall was a half-finished letter in the emperor's own hand; on his bed in the private apartments was his hat and on the empress' table a basket of sweetmeats. Walking around the galleries and the halls, the Allies were filled with reverential awe. Much as in a museum, they were afraid to touch any of the objects, lest they break, or they inspected them gingerly by lifting them up and putting them down with the utmost care.

As Montauban explained in his correspondence back to Paris, he had taken a number of precautions to make sure the buildings and their contents were secure. Already before they entered the premises, he had stressed to his men the importance of not interfering with the collections and he had appealed to the officers to control their men, and to their sense of honor in controlling themselves. Once the first set of buildings had been inspected, Montauban placed armed guards at the various gates and he required all visitors to present a laissez-passer before they could enter. To indulge his officers, however, and to thank them for their hard work, he allowed each one to pick a small souvenir from the imperial collection. This, it seems, is what broke the spell. Once the first jewelry cases and the first gold watches had disappeared into the pockets of the first soldiers, the cupidity of all was aroused and they began helping themselves to the contents of the rooms. After about ten minutes, Montauban wanted to stop for breakfast and he insisted that they all follow him out and kept repeating that looting was strictly prohibited. Already at this point, however, the French camp was full of silks and bijouterie: one officer had a string of pearls the size of marbles; another a pencil case set with diamonds; and others watches and vases inlaid with pearls. When Montauban and his retinue returned to the palace around noon, the imperial collections already presented quite a different aspect. The number of guards was insufficient, and the temptations were too strong; indeed the guards themselves had turned into looters.

Although this was the official start of the destruction, security at Yuanmingyuan had begun deteriorating already before the Europeans arrived. According to a servant working in the gardens, news of the Allied victories at Zhangjiawan and Baliqiao had struck everyone with fear and suddenly it was possible for people of all kinds to come and go much as they pleased at all hours without the officials in charge preventing them. Clearly some objects disappeared already at this early stage. In addition, it seems at least some Allied soldiers, unable to sleep, had made it into the park in the evening of October 6. One of them was Jean-Louis de Negroni, a Corsican adventurer, who recounts running into a group of the emperor's women whom he proceeded to escort to safety away from the Allied armies. In return, he tells us, he was given not just a kiss but also a box of jewelry.

On October 7, when Lord Elgin and General Hope Grant finally arrived around 2 o'clock in the afternoon they were taken aback by the destruction that already had taken place. Yet General Montauban welcomed them and, perversely, assured them that nothing had been touched. “I would like a great many things that the palace contains,” Elgin remarked sardonically, “but I am not a thief.” Together the commanders set up a prize commission in charge of gathering the most precious objects and collecting whatever cash they might come across. As a result of the work of the commission each soldier in the army received about 80 francs.
also found two  *bitons de commandement* in pure gold inlaid with jade, which they decided to send as personal gifts to Queen Victoria and Napoleon III. Much as General Montauban in the morning, general Hope Grant gave his officers special permission to pick out a small memento from what remained of the collections. Of this privilege everyone happily and instantaneously availed themselves.

Later that first afternoon discipline broke down completely. The emperor’s warehouses on the Nine Islets were pried open and rolls of silk and embroidered gowns were thrown out in armfuls or used to tie up the army’s horses. The soldiers, “decked out in the most ridiculous-looking costumes they could find,” ran from room to room looking for loot. The hands of soldiers of every rank and position were brushing together in the same jewelry boxes, searching and grasping.

The man who “loots” well must have a good knowledge of minerals and metals, a quick eye, a cool head, and, above all, a determined fixedness of purpose. “He who hesitates is lost,” and half the fellows got little or nothing by first picking up one thing and then throwing it down for something else, or rushing about to inquire whether it was valuable or not.

The soldiers broke into the Wenyuanko library, tore up scrolls, and used old manuscripts as torches or to light their pipes. Some soldiers played pitch and toss against the large mirrors, others took cock-shots at the chandeliers. Soon the floors were covered with fur robes, jade ornaments, porcelain, sweetmeats, and wood carvings. They were “wild for plunder”; an insanity, a “furious thirst,” an “*ivresse du moment*,” had overcome them; it was an “orgiastic rampage of looting”; “un rêve d’un mangeur de haschich.”

Fancy having the run of Buckingham Palace and being allowed to take away anything and everything you liked, and armed moreover with a thick stick and a deep-rooted feeling of animosity to the owner, being able to indulge in the pleasure of smashing looking-glasses and porcelain, and knocking holes through pictures.

With no security measures in place, Chinese looters increasingly found their way into the gardens. Some were the inhabitants of the neighboring village of Haidian who saw an opportunity to join in the action; others were members of the band of hangers-on who accompanied the European armies. There were hundreds of them, one soldier reported, and they were going back and forth carrying bundles. Yet the Chinese were often out of luck. If an French officer who struggled with a heavy load came across a Chinese looter who struggled with his, the native would be required to open his pack and the officer would add the choicest pieces to his own collection. The Chinese would then be required to carry both bundles back to the French camp. It was only the lack of decent means of transportation that set a limit to these activities. “If you and Julia could have been present,” wrote Frederick Stephenson, a British officer, in a letter to his mother, “and had two large Exeter wagons at hand, you might have passed a most delightful morning, and enriched yourselves with all those beautiful things.” Futile attempts were made to restore discipline. The buglers summoned the men for a row-call, but next to no one responded. In
order to demonstrate how looters were treated, Montauban personally caned an elderly Chinese man who had been caught stealing a pair of shoes. But no one paid much attention. In the end, Montauban walked around among the soldiers telling them: “my children, please drop your things; you can’t take it all with you anyway; we still need to make war. We are going to Pekin, there will be enough there for everyone.”

That first night the French camp was transformed into an Oriental bazaar. Many of the soldiers had found food and alcohol and they were all dressed up in the silken gowns and peacock-feathered hats of high-ranking imperial officials. Each soldier had a music box or a mechanical bird and, easily amused, they sang along to the tinny accompaniment. All talk was of plunder and of the remaining, unexplored, corners of the gardens and of the unimaginable riches that were still waiting for them there. Yet the soldiers’ exuberance never completely overcame their fears and this night too the sentries suddenly sounded the alarm for no obvious reason. In the resulting panic, some guns went off and a sergeant was seriously wounded.

At day break on October 8, the plunder continued much as it had the previous day. A large incense burner of massive gold, with a large sparkling diamond on the top, had been placed in front of Montauban’s tent. It was intended as yet another gift for Napoleon III, and yet, although it was carefully guarded by two men, the diamond soon went missing. When news got around that a collection of coins had been discovered in the empress’ quarters, an excited crowd ran over to the spot. However, the prize agents got there first and saved the discovery for their own coffers. They also took the opportunity to add the empress’ collection of jades, ambers, and corals to the common fund. Yet since the money discovered only amounted to the equivalent of some 400,000 francs, they decided that the bullion concerned had to be the emperor’s box of petty cash. There must be even more money somewhere, they reasoned, and the soldiers began searching the bottom of the lakes for safe boxes that the courtiers might have hidden. Nothing was discovered.

Once the portable objects had been pilfered, and the not so portable objects lugged away, there remained a large number of objects that were valuable but too large to move. These the soldiers proceeded to destroy. Fires were started in various parts of the compound, and the imperial library, with its vast collection of rare books, was one of the first victims. Wielding clubs or the butts of their guns the soldiers macadamized jades and emeralds and reduced porcelains and lacquers to smithereens; they played boule with Ming vases and broke large mirrors for no other reason than that the red, frenzied, faces that suddenly appeared in them looked so unfamiliar. “During two days,” wrote a soldier to his father, “I have walked on more than thirty million francs worth of silks, jewelry, porcelain, bronzes, sculptures, and treasure.”

On October 9, the French army finally left Yuanmingyuan. Supplies were running low and it was time to make a move on Beijing itself. No rations were distributed that morning but the soldiers did not complain, feeling light under the weight of their stolen goods. The troops, as they made their way back to the capital, resembled an ambulating magasin de bric-à-brac. There were more than 300 vehicles transporting the loot, and the soldiers wore red, yellow, blue, and green turbans to correspond to the colors of their respective regiments. A few lucky men had
enlisted the help of coolies who carried the extra burdens on their backs. To keep track of their belongings, the pigtails of the coolies were attached to the buttons or the suspenders of their masters.  

During the three days when Yuanmingyuan was looted, the main part of the British army remained camped north of the Beijing city wall—a considerable distance away. Only the British cavalry, which had been with the French from the start, and the limited number of officers and soldiers who were granted special permission, had the opportunity to make it to Yuanmingyuan. Inevitably, some of these soldiers too had enriched themselves handsomely, whereas the majority of their compatriots had had no such opportunity. This caused resentment and grumblings within the British ranks, and the solution was to organize an auction. The commanders required all goods that had been looted by individuals to be handed in, and to this treasure was added the money and assorted other objects gathered by the prize commission, including a roof encountered in the garden, which was believed to be made entirely of gold. When the value of everything was tallied up, each soldier received a sum of money that he could use in bidding for the items on sale. Generously, the commanders, following Hope Grant’s example, refused their rewards, but as a token of respect Hope Grant was given a claret jug in solid gold, one of the handsomest pieces in the emperor’s collection.  

Starting on October 11 and lasting two days, the auction took place in front of the large joss-house of the Llama temple next to the British camp. It was a fine collection they had assembled and soldiers of all ranks were bidding against each other and many objects—not always the most valuable—reached ridiculously high prices. By all accounts, there was much merry-making and consumption of liquid refreshments. One officer with very deep pockets was reputed to be acting on a commission from Baron Rothschild in London. Since the winter soon was upon them, fur coats were in high demand. Charles Gordon, who years later died a hero’s death in Khartoum, bought the emperor’s throne, which he donated to the headquarters of his military corps in Chatham. “Had the Emperor been present,” Robert Swinhoe, translator to the British troops, wryly remarked, “he would doubtless have felt flattered at the value set by the foreigners on any objects solely because it had belonged to him.”  

Why Yuanmingyuan was Looted  

The question of the responsibility for the looting of Yuanmingyuan should be easy enough to settle. Some Chinese people were clearly involved. Security in the gardens had deteriorated after the emperor left, and some objects may have disappeared already at this stage. Individual Allied soldiers also seem to have made it into the park already on the evening of October 6. Yet in both cases this was a matter of pilfering rather than pillaging, and they were private initiatives, not a collective effort. Instead wholesale looting began on the morning of October 7, when French soldiers started helping themselves to the contents of the palaces, and when the French commanders, while insisting on protecting the collections, did little to stop them. The security measures put in place—the guards, access only by means of a laissez-passer, the public punishment of looters—were all hopelessly inadequate. A few British
soldiers too were present, especially members of the cavalry, and a number of new Chinese looters joined the action, yet all in all it was French soldiers who looted the palace and French commanders who allowed it to happen. As Prince Gong put it in a letter to Baron Gros on October 12: "France is a civilized country and the soldiers are under orders; how can they, on their own authority, burn down the palace of the emperor?\footnote{366}

The case is clear, yet the French commanders always denied culpability. Baron Gros, in his official correspondence, never mentioned the destruction, and while General Montauban mentioned it, he played it down insisting that he was innocent of any wrongdoing.\footnote{47} In 1874, in a deposition before a French court that was investigating the rightful ownership of the objects brought back from China, Montauban continued to maintain that he had done everything that was required of him, and that, for that reason, "there could be no pillage."\footnote{48} Instead it was the Chinese, he said, who should be held responsible. Using their superior local knowledge, they had scaled the walls and entered parts of the compound that the French had not yet discovered. It was only when the Chinese finally were caught by Montauban’s troops that their booty ended up in French hands. In addition, he said, there were many undisciplined members of the Allied army—he was clearly thinking of the Sikh contingent of the British cavalry—who seized on the opportunity to enrich themselves.

In 1866 Maurice d’Hérisson, an interpreter with the French army, developed the most complete version of what by now had become the official French account.\footnote{49} The Chinese looters, Hérisson claimed in his reminiscences of the campaign, had brought thatch and matches with them and once inside the compound they had proceeded to set fire to the buildings. This provided them with the opportunity they needed: as the French soldiers were busy putting out the fires, the Chinese had made off with the treasure. The fires also explains why the French too began removing objects—they wanted to protect them—and this was why such a lot of loot ended up in their camp. In the general confusion that ensued, everyone just started helping themselves. In addition to Montauban and Hérisson, a few other French soldiers remembered the events in much the same way, blaming the Chinese for the fires and the looting and portraying the French as innocent bystanders.\footnote{50} Others even blamed the British, especially the cavalry officers and the Sikhs.\footnote{51} Hérisson ends by painting a very exotic picture—among the looters he saw peoples of all colors, tongues, and creeds.\footnote{52} The French, he implies, played only a minor role in this multinational mix of marauders.

Yet there were also Frenchmen who told quite a different story, especially ordinary soldiers when writing letters to family and friends back home.\footnote{53} "How could we have been there," Armand Lucy asked, "without taking some small souvenir?"\footnote{55} The love of art is contagious, he explained, and besides all the treasure was just lying there on the floor and it would have been a crime not to pick it up. Lucy took bottles of the emperor’s vermilion ink—in which he wrote the letters home—a watch and a piece of ivory with an inscription by a famous Chinese poet. His only regret was that he did not find out earlier that there was free access to the palace already on October 7.\footnote{56} Writing in a similar vein, Antoine Fauchery, the correspondent for \textit{Le Moniteur}, makes a curious confession.\footnote{57} While continuing to
deny that French soldiers took part in the loot, he adds that everything that hap-
pened during the North China Campaign, including the events that took place
at Yuanmingyuan, had been perfectly unbelievable. Or to be precise, they had all
been part of an Oriental dream. It was in this dream that Fauchery saw the most
unlikely of events: French soldiers dressed in the emperor’s furs, eating the emper-
or’s pastries, and falling asleep to the tunes of the emperor’s music boxes.  58

A separate question concerns the cause of the loot; the question, that is, of why
it was undertaken. According to most participants, the answer was perfectly obvi-
ous: looting is a matter of human nature; to loot is what soldiers always do if given
half an opportunity.  59 Soldiers need constant discipline if they are to be kept in
line, and when discipline temporarily breaks down they quickly revert to a state
of pure freedom. Surely cupidity played a role too—many looked forward to the
profits they would make from selling the goods at home—and all of them wanted
mementos to present to family and friends. Yet, given the fury with which the loot
was carried out, such rational motives come across as post hoc rationalizations,
and in any case they cannot explain the soldiers’ well-documented desire to simply
destroy.  60

Some authors add an Orientalizing twist. It was the geographical transition, they
explain, which prepared the way for the moral transgression. To the soldiers, none
of the rules that applied in China applied to them, and as soon as military discipline
was relaxed they went on a moral holiday. Morality like the temperature, Fauchery
explained, “varies with the difference in longitude and latitude.”  61 The license that
the Orient provided them also explains the carnivalesque atmosphere of the loot.
Just as in the carnivals back home in Europe, the loot became an occasion when
ordinary status hierarchies were inverted. For a few hours French farm-boys and
apprentices from the faubourgs found themselves prancing around in the robes of
state of the Son of Heaven. This sudden transfiguration of paupers into kings made
them giddy and their giddiness was addictive. Hence the many references to intoxi-
cation. After the intoxication had worn off, however, the soldiers were often quite
unable to explain what it was they had done and why.

It is easy to see why the Allied officers and members of the establishment back
in Europe were partial to these explanations. References to “human nature” made
it possible for them to avoid culpability while explaining to their own satisfaction
what had transpired. The culprits were assorted foreigners and members of their
own lower classes. Since both kinds of people had little by means of cultural sophis-
tication, they had few means of covering up their human natures, and this was why
they were unable to control themselves. Thus the Sikhs were famous for their love of
gaudy silks, the North Africans were notoriously lecherous, and the coolies “could
smell a pillage the way a dog can smell a deer.”  62 The only reason the British soldiers
behaved marginally better, their commanders agreed, was that they had a natural
defense to their betters and they were scared of the whip. This was also why the
French army, with its more populist ethos and its lack of corporal punishment, had
more problems with discipline.  63

What was impossible to explain, however, and truly worrying, was why discipline
had broken down among the officers too. They were not supposed to be governed
by their innate natures and, as Elgin pointed out, they were not thieves.  64 If nothing
else, their education should have taught them to respect cultural artifacts and artistic values. As one way to deal with this troubling anomaly, the officers invented various alternative appellations for their activities. “We don’t,” Dunne explained, “hurt each other’s feelings by calling things by ugly names.” The most popular such term was “loot” itself. It is a Hindi word, Elgin explained, recently imported into our language, “which gives, unfortunately, a venial character to what would, in common English, be styled robbery.” Dunne and his fellows preferred the verb “to annex.” “When you meet a friend riding a fine mule, or with a sackful of silk or silver bangles, you merely inquire when and where he ‘annexed’ this property.” In French the preferred circumlocutions included *déménagement*, “removal,” *arrachement*, “uprooting,” and *bibelotage*, the “collection of knickknacks.” Armand Lucy’s favorite terms was “rathauser,” which, he says, is the *mot du jour* in the French army, “replacing other words of a more dubious reputation.”

Yet references to human nature come to have a slightly different meaning once we remember that the looting of Yuanmingyuan was far from an isolated incident. As a complete account of the North China Campaign makes clear, the European soldiers looted, pillaged, sacked, and raped from the first day they set foot in China to the very day they left. The only thing that made Yuanmingyuan different was the value of the collections and the thoroughness of the destruction. Combining and paraphrasing the main eyewitness accounts, we arrive at this far from comprehensive list of atrocities:

- **Beitang, August 1-3:** Evidence of extensive destruction despite the obvious poverty of the inhabitants; Frenchmen and coolies rushed around, big sticks in hand, ransacking right and left; what they could not carry with them they destroyed; every house without exception was broken open and the contents gutted and strewn about in every direction; the French dressed up in Chinese clothes and pretended to be Chinese women; before the Allies left, almost all the original inhabitants had fled.

- **Xinhu, August 12:** The French looted the town frightfully; the Allies took foods stuffs and fodder and broke the wooden furniture, doors, and window frames of the houses to use as fuel.

- **Hexiwu, September 16:** The Allies discovered a large pawn shop filled with gold and silver jewelry, fur coats, silk dressed, and a room full of cash; guards were posted at the gates, but apart from the British officer in charge, the soldiers looted the place to a man. Afterward the soldiers got drunk on *samshoo* and put on a fancy-dress party; they attacked domestic animals, spearing dogs in a clumsy fashion, breaking their legs, backs, or heads, and leaving them to die. The soldiers were cursed with a mania for destruction which targeted men, women, pigs, dogs, cats, and property of every description. The order against looting was more honored in the breach than in the observance; it is useless to tell the locals we will protect them when we do not.

- **Zhangjiawan, September 18:** The town was captured and given over to loot, although the Allies as always were held back by their lack of vehicles to transport the goods. After a few days, the inhabitants themselves joined in the looting of pawn shops.
Beijing, October 18: The British discovered a large number of religious artifacts in the Llama Temple where they were quartered. Every portable god and goddess was removed. The army now has a thirst for plunder, which will be difficult to cure.  

Clearly the commanders, both the British and the French, were complicit in these acts of destruction. They did not do enough to stop the soldiers, and on at least one occasions—Zhangjiawan on September 18—the loot was officially sanctioned by general Hope Grant himself. It is easy to understand why. Plunder was a cheap way to reward the troops for their efforts; it was a bit of fun, the costs of which were borne by the enemy. Besides, by terrorizing the local population, a good loot instilled an appropriate sense of awe in the Chinese. In this respect, the destruction carried out in China fits perfectly with the way wars already had been fought in colonial settings such as Algeria, Afghanistan, and India. European armies—often, in fact, the very same men who committed atrocities in China—had already been instructed to make wars in barbarian ways. When they arrived in China, they knew exactly what to expect and they knew what they could get away with. There was thus nothing unusual about the looting of Yuanmingyuan. The destruction wrought in October 1860 was on a different scale, but not of a different nature than the destruction of Algerian villages by the French or the sacking of Delhi by the British. To loot was simply what European troops did when making war outside of Europe.

Yet, as the European commanders were only too aware, loots were bad for discipline and for that reason necessarily troubling. The Dionysian exuberance of the loot was simply impossible to combine with the Apollonian ethos of a European army. The soldiers enjoyed themselves, but they enjoyed themselves too much. To loot was empowering—it made kings out of paupers—but when it was over order was often impossible to restore. The social hierarchy, inverted for the purposes of intimidating the enemy, was not reversed back and the soldiers stopped obeying their own officers. To the commanders, this presented an image of social upheaval, of the lower classes rising up and overthrowing their masters, and that prospect was perfectly frightening. “What becomes of a soldier,” Baron Gros asked rhetorically in a letter to the French government, “when he has ten, twenty, fifty and up to a hundred francs in his bag?”

The effects on their own troops, and not on the local population, was also why the commanders on several occasions preferred not to enter a city—Tianjin, for example, and Beijing itself. In order to deprive their own soldiers of an opportunity to sack, the Chinese capital was not actually occupied. Instead the Allies took symbolic possession of one of the gates in the city wall and restricted access to those who had a laissez-passer and a good reason to enter. Fear of anarchy also explains why the British kept the bulk of their troops away from Yuanmingyuan and why they set up the auction. An auction, after all, is a very orderly way of distributing goods. Thanks to the magic of the market, the emperor’s treasures were speedily moved from the persons who first found them—or from the persons strong enough to wrestle them away from the persons who first found them—to the persons who had enough money to pay for them. In this way, no social hierarchies needed to be reversed and discipline could easily be maintained.
The Final Incineration

If the French were responsible for looting Yuanmingyuan, the British were responsible for its final destruction. On October 18 and 19, the whole compound, including all the buildings and what remained of their content, was burned to the ground on Lord Elgin’s direct orders. To burn down Yuanmingyuan was a decision that Elgin had reached after what he himself described as a “protracted process of rational deliberation: “I examined the question in all its bearings to the best of my judgment,” he said, and “came to the conclusions that the destructions of Yuanming-yuan was the least objectionable of the several courses open to me.”

What the British sought was revenge for the way the prisoners taken by the Chinese had been treated. On September 18, we said, several groups of Europeans—altogether 39 men, 26 British and 13 French—had been taken hostage by the Chinese while on reconnaissance missions behind enemy lines. The Allied commanders regarded this as a treacherous action on the part of the Chinese since, following the capture of the Dagu forts, peace negotiations were under way, and a settlement of the conflicts was in sight. The men had peaceful intent and the groups included several civilians. The Allied commanders had demanded their immediate release, but it was only on October 9, once Yuanmingyuan had been pillaged, that the first prisoners were surrendered, and during the next couple of days a trickle of others followed. The returning men told horrific tales of torture and maltreatment at the hands of their captors. They had been kicked and punched, not fed for days, and exposed to the scorching sun, but above all they had had their hands tied behind their backs and water had been poured on the ropes to tighten the knots. The wrists on several of the men had swelled up, turned black and started rotting; maggots had appeared in the wounds and a few of the men, including Thomas Bowlby, reporter for The Times, had died in a most gruesome manner. In the end only 18 out of the 39 men came back alive.

This treatment, the Allies agreed, constituted a crime against the laws of war, against humanity, and an insult both against Britain and France. The Chinese had to be punished, the question was only how. The commanders considered a number of alternatives. They could, for example, have asked the Chinese to pay an indemnity or demanded that they turn over the men responsible for the treatment of the prisoners. However, Elgin did not think it right to accept money in return for human lives and besides, he argued, the sums would have been difficult to collect. And if they had asked the Chinese to hand over the perpetrators, the imperial authorities would surely have given them some miserable underling who the Allies would have found it difficult to punish, and if they had asked for Sengge Rinchen himself, the Chinese would have refused and the Allies would have had no means of forcing them. A Russian diplomat, Count Nikolay Pavlovich Ignatyev, who was stationed in Beijing in 1860, and in intermittent contact with the Allies, came up with what looked like a good idea: why not, he suggested, raze the prison where the prisoners had been kept and build a monument on the site that in Chinese, Mongol, Manchu, Tibetan, French, and English explained how they had been treated. If the monument was put under the shared jurisdiction of all foreign diplomats, it would forever bear testimony to the treacherous conduct of the Chinese. Elgin was
clearly attracted by this suggestion and for a while he seriously entertained the idea of building a similar monument in Tianjin where there was more of a European presence than in Beijing itself. Baron Gros, however, regarded the idea as impractical. It would never be possible, he argued, to ask the Chinese authorities to humiliate themselves in this way.

Having ruled out the alternatives, Lord Elgin argued, only the destruction of Yuanmingyuan remained. It was an “act of retribution and punishment sufficiently severe to produce the required effect”—it would avenge the lives that had been lost, but it would also terrorize the Chinese, forcing them to agree to European terms and reminding them for ever more just who the Europeans were and of what they were capable. The effect, moreover, would be instantaneous, making it possible for the Allies to turn southward before the weather had turned too cold. Although other targets could be imagined, Yuanmingyuan was particularly well suited to achieve these effects. This was first of all the case since the compound was where the Europeans believed the 39 prisoners had been held captive. Through a complete incineration, the site of their humiliation would be obliterated. Destroying the palace was also a way to strike at the Chinese emperor personally rather than at the Chinese people with whom, Elgin insisted, Britain had no quarrel. Yuanmingyuan “was the Emperor’s favourite residence, and its destruction would not fail to be a blow to his pride as well as to his feelings.” The action would no doubt “produce a greater effect in China and on the Emperor, than persons who look on from a distance may suppose.”

The French, however, were not convinced by these arguments. Baron Gros objected in the strongest possible terms against the action Elgin contemplated and he categorically refused to lend French support to a complete incineration. “It takes a courageous resignation not to let oneself be swept away by the desire for vengeance which has taken hold of all hearts.” Yet Gros left it open to General Montauban, as the military commander, to make the final decision. Happily, Montauban reached the same conclusion as Gros, and this despite strong pressure exerted on him by the British commanders. I too have considered the question very carefully, Montauban insisted in his reply to Elgin, and I have come to the conclusion that “this vengeance is worthy of a people more barbarian than the Chinese themselves.” Moreover, if we burn the palaces and gardens Prince Gong might take flight and thereby we might end up overthrowing the entire Qing dynasty. Such an outcome would not be in the best interests of the French government. We want a China open to trade and to Christian missionaries, but we do not want a China in chaos. Yet none of these arguments had a effect on Lord Elgin. The British made fun of the 11th hour piety of the French, pointing out that they only would complete the work that the French themselves had begun.

Early in the morning of October 18, a division of British troops marched off to Yuanmingyuan. The accounts left by the people present on that fateful day all mention the immense beauty of the gardens even in its post-looted state. “We marched through scenery of the most enchanting beauty,” wrote reverend M’Ghee, and as he explained, the beauty demanded some kind of tribute, “a tribute so due that you must performe pay it.” Other eyewitnesses must have felt the same. Beauty, they too argued, cannot simply perish without us, its beholders, taking some kind of action;
at the very least we must describe it all one last time. Robert Swinhoe, the translator, who also was a keen naturalist, inserts a long lyrical passage into his account where he surveyed the layout of the park, its trees and plants and the animals that already had made their way back to their old habitats. He noticed “the flights of stone steps leading from palace to palace,” the “shady bowers,” the “delightful terraces,” and the “herds of deer” that halted and “gazed with a fixed and curious stare at the intruders.” However, it was Garnet Wolseley who engaged in the most prolonged réverie. “Whilst the work of demolition was going on,” he happily noted, “we had ample opportunity of inspecting the country around the palaces.” From the top of a pagoda, “the eye wanders over as fair and lovely a scene as can well be imagined.” He saw “oddly-shaped spires and minarets of a summer-house [that] peer above the variegated foliage”; neglected temples that “from their half-ruinous condition add much the scenic effect”; “some fine joss-houses or temples lay scattered about”; “tremulous, wavy reflections along the glass-like lakes”; and “a long bridge with seventeen arches of beautiful proportions, richly decorated with stone carvings and balustradings.”

Yet the spell was soon broken. M’Ghee’s company turned a corner and saw a mass of smoke and a blazing fire—it was a temple compound set ablaze, together with much of the surrounding trees. And Swinhoe, when his group approached their assigned location, immediately noticed the crackling sound and the sickly hue cast upon plants and trees by the sun shining through the fumes. Since most of the buildings were made of cedar wood, they burned easily and soon a tall and dense column of smoke rose high up in the sky. After a few minutes, similar columns emerged from all around the gardens—“out burst a hundred flames, the smoke obscures the sun, and temple, palace, buildings and all . . . are swept to destruction, with all their contents, monuments of imperial taste and luxury.” The smoke formed a large cloud which drifted in over Beijing, “having the semblance of a fearful thunderstorm impending.” The soldiers who had been working here were already sweaty and the red flames that gleamed on their faces “made them appear like demons glorying in the destruction of what they could not replace.” It was sad, heart-wrenching, work. “A pang of sorrow seizes upon you, you cannot help it, no eye will ever again gaze upon those buildings . . . of which the world contains not the like.” “You can scarcely imagine the beauty and magnificence of the places we burnt. It made one’s heart sore.” Yuanmingyuan was the most beautiful thing the soldiers had seen and now they were destroying it. Each soldier struggled with this contradiction in his own way. M’Ghee conjured up images of his dead compatriots who had been tortured at the hands of the Chinese. He remember how they only the other day had turned up at the British camp: “the dashing charger led, not ridden; the empty saddle and the empty boot in the stirrup” and “the limb that filled it forms now a part of the skeleton that lies in the coffin on that gun-carrriage.” Superimposing that Gothic image on top of the image of the wondrous beauty that surrounded him, M’Ghee was able to go on with his work, and he ended up thanking God that there was a way to make the Chinese suffer. Swinhoe justified his action to himself with the help of an intellectual argument. Although it is too late to save Yuanmingyuan, he reasoned, “there is time yet for China to regenerate herself, and by cultivating friendly relations with foreign empires, learn
from them how . . . she may maintain order among her people, and keep pace with the march of progress." The destruction would help advance these goals. In the ruins of Yuanmingyuan, a new China would rise up—a China open to the world, to European ideas, and to British-made goods. The job of the soldiers was to first clear away the rubble. Right before sunset on October 19, after two days of hard labor, the mission was finally accomplished; the destruction was complete. “From an artistic point of view it was an act of vandalism; from that of sound policy it was statesmanlike.”

“The Sleep and the Awakening” While the smoke from Yuanmingyuan still enveloped the Chinese capital, a negotiated settlement to the conflict was finally reached. The Treaty of Beijing was signed by Britain and China on October 24 and by France and China on the following day. Lord Elgin showed up in the Forbidden City in full gala uniform, accompanied by as much pomp and circumstance the British could muster. Prince Gong, by contrast, who signed the treaty on behalf of the emperor, looked tired and glum. The Chinese had suggested that they sit down for dinner together once the documents were signed, but Elgin declined the invitation, not wanting to appear too cordial and perhaps fearing a Chinese ruse. The first divisions of the Allied armies left Beijing on November 7. The new ambassadors to China from Britain and France, Fredric Bruce and Alphonse de Bourbon, were introduced to Prince Gong in a short meeting held on November 8. They made attempts at small talk and Prince Gong expressed the hope that a man as young as Fredric Bruce would be able to learn to speak Chinese fluently. After some deliberations, the Allies decided on Tianjin as a more suitable location for their embassies than Beijing itself. The winter finally caught up with them before they left: there was snow on the distant hills, hard frost every night, and ice on the lakes in the morning when the Allies departed.

When news of the outcome of the North China Campaign arrived in Europe at the end of December, the British government was delighted. “I am heartily glad that Elgin and Grant determined to burn down the Summer Palace,” wrote Lord Palmerston to Sidney Herbert, the minister of war, on December 20. “It was absolutely necessary to stamp by some such permanent record our indignation at the treachery and brutality of these Tartars . . . I should have been equally well pleased if the Pekin palace had shared the same fate.” The prime minister was equally enthusiastic when giving his official thanks to the troops in parliament on February 14, 1861. Both the army and the navy had performed brilliantly and “not a single mistake was made in the whole course of the expedition.”

These semi-barbarous Governments appear to deal with each other with treachery and cruelty, and they are apt to think that they may act in the same manner against civilized Governments. It was, therefore, necessary to prove to them by some signal retribution that such deeds are not to be committed with impunity.

Sidney Herbert, for his part, called it a “short but brilliant and decisive campaign” carried out by “an admirable force beautifully handled and universally successful; there has not been a single reverse or drawback.” Queen Victoria, who was celebrating Christmas at Windsor together with Albert and the children when news arrived
regarding the outcome of the campaign, wrote to Napoleon III to congratulate them both on their shared success. The peace will be fruitful, she hoped, “and beneficial for our two countries, as well as for the strange people which we have forced to enter into relations with the rest of the world.”119 Before long the royal family was joined by a new member—an adorable lion-dog, a Pekingese taken from Yuanmingyuan and presented to them by a member the returning army. Affectionately they called the dog “Loothy.”120

This positive verdict was not universal, however, and there were voices of dissent, expressed above all in the House of Lords. I understand the reasons that Lord Elgin has given for his actions, said Lord Derby, a conservative former prime minister and leader of the opposition, when parliament met to thank the troops, yet “I do feel some regret at what I consider the unnecessary demolition of the magnificent place of the Emperor of China.”121 It was neither a necessary nor a politic act, and a mistake of both judgment and policy, which is “likely to produce a painful and prejudicial impression against us as to the mode in which we carry on our military operations.” Other lords agreed. Earl Grey, whose father was a famous tea drinker, called the China war “unjust,” and lamented the fact that it had been undertaken without parliament’s approval.122 The destruction of Yuanmingyuan, said the Marquess of Bath, was “an act of vandalism,” which “ranked with such deeds as the burning of the library of Alexandria or the sacking of Rome by the Constable de Bourbon.”123 Vincent Scully, a liberal Irishman in the House of Commons, agreed and compared Elgin’s action to the destruction of Persepolis by Alexander the Great.124 How would we like it, he asked, if the Chinese made their way to London and burned down the palace of our queen?

Returning to France in December 1860, General Montauban was awarded the great cross of the Legion d’Honneur, was made a senator, and ennobled under the title of “Palikao,” after Baliqiao, the battle where he had defeated the Chinese. The following year he received further decorations by the British government and by Pope Pius IX, in recognition of his services to the Christian faith.125 In France too there were protests—Victor Hugo’s letter to captain Butler labeled the destruction of Yuanmingyuan a crime—but the actions were found to be legal under article 119 of the Ordonnance sur le service des armées en campagne of May 3, 1832, which allowed armies in enemy territory to appropriate the property they came across.126 Before long the gifts presented to Empress Eugénie—all 15 crates of it—came to form the core of a Musée chinois established at Fontainebleau in 1863.127 In 1874, after the fall of Napoleon III, a French court decided that the objects belonged not to the empress personally but to the French people and the French state.128

A very large number of items remained in private hands. Jean-Louis de Negroni, the Corsican adventurer, showed up in Europe with a large collection of treasure, which he began showing to wealthy audiences in Paris, Baden-Baden, and other fashionable resorts.129 In his Souvenirs de campagne en Chine, 1864, which served as a catalog to the exhibition, he retold the story of how he rescued the emperor’s women, and how they, gratefully, gave him their affection together with various precious objects.130 After failing to sell the things for the sum he expected, however, Negroni took up a loan with the collection as security. When his creditors began suspecting that they would not be repaid, they took him to court for misrepresenting
its value. In court, Negroni argued that the objects were impossible to put a price
on since no similar items were offered for sale anywhere in Europe. Negroni, his
lawyer insisted, “had bona fide worked himself into a belief that he had all Aladdin’s
 Treasures.”  

As for the reactions among Chinese officials, there was terror and complete befud-
dlement, mixed with immense sadness. The emperor’s brother, Prince Gong, when
observing the smoke rising in the sky northwest of Beijing on October 18, was over-
whelmed and broke down in tears. “This seemed, indeed,” The Times reported, “to
have produced a greater impression on him than any other event that had occurred
during the war.” When news of the destruction reached Chengde, Emperor
Xianfeng is reported to have coughed blood. Shocked and torn apart by shame, he
increasingly left matters of state in the hands of his advisers and turned to opium
and to his women for consolation. The emperor never returned to Yuanmingyuan
or to Beijing but died in Chengde on August 22, 1861, only 31 years old. On his
deathbed Xianfeng handed over the official seal of one of the main buildings in
Yuanmingyuan to his widows and son.  

Few buildings in the garden had escaped the blaze. An official investigation in
the 1870s counted 13 reasonably intact structures, most of them at the northern-
most end of the park, and one set of pavilions on an island in the Fuhai lake was
entirely intact. In 1873, Ernest Ohlmer, a German working for the Chinese cus-
toms office, visited the grounds and took photos of the European-style buildings.
Since they were made of stone, they had not burned, but the roofs had caved in
and some of the walls had toppled. Cixi, the empress dowager, tried to rebuild
the garden on several occasions, most determinedly in 1873 and 1874, but on both
occasions she ran out of money. Instead she refurbished the buildings in Yiheyuan,
the “Purple Ripple Garden,” an outlaying garden complex not counted as a regular
part of Yuanmingyuan. During the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, European armies
attacked this park too and they even had another go at the ruins of the European
palaces in Yuanmingyuan itself. The walls that still were standing in Ohlmert’s
photos from 1873, were now razed. In 1903, Katherine Carl, an American painter,
spent nine months in Yiheyuan working on a portrait of Cixi’s to be displayed at
the World Fair in St. Louis the following year. Yet she and the empress dowager
visited Yuanmingyuan only once. The ruins “have become picturesque with time,”
Carl reported, “and give the one note of somberness to this smiling demesne that
is needed to accentuate its charm.” There are some unhappy associations con-
 nected with this beautiful spot, and Her Majesty did not seem to care to visit it.”
Over forty years after its destruction, even “the promenade in the direction of the
old Palace also seemed to sadden her.”  

After the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, the Sino-centric international system
quickly disintegrated, and after 1860 the rituals once presided over by the emperor
no longer constituted a viable alternative to the European way of organizing rela-
tions between states. Instead China tried its best to join the Euro-centric system on
Euro-centric terms. It was Prince Gong above others who oversaw the transforma-
tion of China’s foreign policy. Under his leadership, a ministry of foreign affairs,
Zhongliyamen, was established in 1861, where students were instructed in foreign
languages and in the practices and rituals of European diplomacy. European works
on international law were also translated into Chinese, beginning with the publication of a translation of Henry Wheaton’s *Elements of International Law* in 1865. The first Chinese diplomat dispatched on an official mission abroad was Anson Burlingame, an American working for the Chinese government, who visited New York in 1868, but in the following decade, permanent Chinese embassies were established in one country after another. Chinese diplomats also began participating in international conferences such as the ones held in The Hague in 1899 and 1907.

The fate of the *koutou* illustrates this transformation. After the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, the imperial authorities knew they no longer could insist that the ritual be followed. Conveniently, however, since the new emperor was a minor, the issue could be postponed until 1873 when Tongzhi reached maturity. After four months of complicated negotiations, an audience was finally held on June 29 of that year, which resembled the old protocol in some respects, yet with all the Sino-centric logic taken out. Very early on the appointed day, diplomats from Britain, France, Russia, and Holland gathered in a reception room in the Forbidden City where they were kept waiting, and given tea, sweetmeats, cakes, and fruits. Then they were led to the Audience Hall where the emperor was to appear. Once he arrived, however, the visitors merely bowed, approached the throne, and bowed again. Then the *doyen* of the group, the Russian ambassador, read an address and the diplomats placed their letters of accreditation on a yellow table by the emperor’s side and bowed once more. With this the audience ended, and the ambassadors, walking backward, made three bows in the same manner as when they first entered. It was all very dignified, but it was not the traditional protocol. When Tongzhi’s successor, Guangxu, reached maturity in 1888, a decree from the court declared that the protocol used during the audience of 1873 should be followed also on this occasion.

Writing about these developments in *The Asiatic Quarterly Review* in 1887, Zeng Jize, a brilliant member of the new generation of Chinese diplomats, admitted that the Nanjing Treaty of 1842 had helped “to rouse China from the Saturnian dreams in which she had been so long indulging.” However, this was not enough “to make her wide awake.” It was instead the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, which was the real wake-up call:

> By the light of the burning palace which had been the pride and the delight of her Emperors, she commenced to see that she had been, asleep whilst all the world was up and doing; that she had been sleeping in the vacuous vortex of the storm of forces wildly whirling around her.

Ambassador Zeng stoically insisted the Chinese were grateful for the opportunity to finally end their slumber. “The summer palace, with all its wealth of art, was a high price to pay for the lesson we there received, but not too high if it has taught us how to repair and triple fortify our battered armour.”

In subsequent decades, the grounds of Yuanmingyuan were increasingly neglected and most of the remaining signs of the imperial palaces were carted away by peasants from the surrounding villages who used their foundation stones as building material. Farmers and factories moved into the grounds after 1949 and during the hunger that followed the Great Leap Forward, locals planted rice in the former
gardens. During the Cultural Revolution, university professors were sent here to level
the hills and to fill in the lakes with stones. In 1988, the grounds were opened as a
public park. It is now the “Old Summer Palace” in the guide books, to be contrasted
with the “New Summer Palace,” which is the garden Empress Dowager Cixi created
for herself. Today the remnants of the European-style palaces are what the tourists
mainly take photos of, not surprisingly perhaps since they constitute the most dis-
tinctive features in the park. Those marble slabs tell the story of what the Europeans
once did in this place, just as they were in the process of taking control of the world.
The ruins remind us of how that victory was won, but they also tell the story of the
gardens that the Chinese emperors once constructed, in which the European contri-
bution was nothing but an amusing feature off to the side in a corner.
PART III

PRACTICES AND
PERFORMANCES
Chapter 6

An International Society of Civilized States

The Europeans who destroyed Yuanmingyuan, we said, were men of culture and learning engaged in an attempt to civilize the Chinese. Indeed, the middle of the nineteenth century was a time when Europeans suddenly became far more civilized than they were previously. For example, they began making war in more civilized ways, drawing a clear distinction between soldiers and civilians and between military and nonmilitary targets. While soldiers could be attacked, civilians could not, and combatants who failed to respect the difference were punished by their own military authorities. In addition, international law for the first time explicitly outlawed the wanton destruction of works of art and cultural treasures, of libraries, and places of religious worship. If we juxtapose these developments with what we know regarding the atrocities committed during the North China Campaign of 1860, we arrive at a puzzle. Why would the very acts which the Europeans committed in China at exactly the same time be outlawed in Europe itself? This question is the topic of this chapter, and the answer will become obvious once we know what the Europeans meant by “civilization” and how a European society of civilized states came to constitute itself.

Consider first how China was regarded by the Europeans. As all liberal writers agreed, China was an “uncivilized,” a “barbarian,” or at best as a “semibarbican” country. To have such labels attached to themselves was naturally surprising to the Chinese who for thousands of years had been convinced that they represented the pinnacle of human civilization and that foreigners were far inferior in next to all respects. Indeed, these labels were surprising to many Europeans too who had become accustomed to thinking of China as a rich, powerful, and sophisticated country. Well into the eighteenth century leading European thinkers—French Physiocrats like François Quesnay and Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, for example—still insisted that China constituted a model that Europeans would do well to copy.1 The verdicts on China of a majority of Europeans changed only late, in other words, above all in the second half of the eighteenth century, and the reason was more than
anything that Europeans by this time saw their own societies change at an increasingly rapid pace. To liberals—in a common, if slightly simple-minded syllogism—to change meant to make progress and to make progress meant to be modern and to be modern meant to be civilized.  A country that did not change, or did not change as quickly, was left behind; that is, it was not in the process of becoming civilized. The prime example was China: “The Chinese, then, had lost the power of change; for them to improve was impossible.”

There is, we will argue, a constitutive relationship between the civilized norms that developed in Europe in the middle of the nineteenth century and the distinctly noncivilized ways the Europeans behaved elsewhere. It was because they acted in barbarian fashion in non-European locations that they were able to become increasingly civilized at home, and because they were increasingly civilized at home that they could commit barbarian acts elsewhere.

**The Standard of Civilization**

There is some considerable intellectual confusion regarding how the idea of “civilization” best should be defined. The term is often used in the sense of Hochkultur—a sophisticated society widely admired, much like the “ancient civilizations” of the Baylonians, the Incas, or the Egyptians. Using the term this way, however, makes it impossible to compare societies with each other. “The term civilization was by him,” James Mill complained, referring to the work of the British Orientalist William Jones, “attached to no fixed and definite assemblage of ideas.” As a result, “[w]ith the exception of some of the lowest states of society in which human beings have been found, it was applied to nations in all the stages of social advancement.” In order to deal with this problem, Mill looked for a standard of some kind by which the level of civilization of each society could be reliably measured. Yet what such a standard might be remained obscure. “It is to be lamented,” he concluded, “that philosophers have not as yet laid down any very distinct canons for ascertaining the principal stages of civilization.” In practice, they

fix on one or two of the principal nations of Europe as at the highest point of civilization; wherever, in any country, a few of the first appearances strike them as bearing a resemblance to some of the most obvious appearances in these standards of comparison, such countries are at once held to be civilized.

To philosophers of history, or international lawyers, this state of affairs was particularly vexing. Philosophers needed a standard by which they could classify various societies and to charter the path of progress from one stage of development to the next. Similarly, nineteenth century international lawyers needed a standard by which they could determine which kind of societies that were in a position to enjoy the rights and obligations that properly belonged only to civilized states. Unable to come up with a conclusive definition, they settled instead for a make-shift solution. As Adam Ferguson explained in 1767, there is a relationship between a society’s economic system and the degree to which the society in question can be called civilized. A certain level of economic development is a precondition for civilization to
emerge, regardless of how the concept itself is defined. There are “rude” societies, but there are also “polished” societies, and the difference between them has much to do with the division of labor. As societies develop, people increasingly come to specialize in various trades—they can, for example, leave the land and move to cities where they engage in professions which require the use of their minds rather than their bodies. This surely represents an increase in civilization, Ferguson concluded, and this is how he arrived at a way to classifying societies into stages. The rudest societies are the ones with least division of labor—hunters and gatherers, for example, or pastoralists—then come agricultural societies, and last, and highest up on the ladder of development, commercial societies of the kind in which Ferguson himself lived. Commercial societies are most polished since human beings here predominantly are ruled by social rather than by physiological needs.

As Ferguson made clear, this process of development can only get under way provided that the right political institutions are in place. The market, we might say, must be protected by the state. This was a point emphasized also by John Stuart Mill in his essay on “Civilization” from 1836. Consider, said Mill, what life is like in societies where there is no state. Such societies “consists of a handful of individuals, wandering or thinly scattered over a vast tract of country”; they have “no commerce, no manufactures, no agriculture”; “we seldom see any joint operations carried on by the union of many; nor do savages, in general, find much pleasure in each other’s society.” It is these dire conditions that the state can help improve. By enforcing laws that guarantee peace and security, the state makes common undertakings possible, and “the community becomes and continues progressive in all the elements which we have just enumerated.” In the nineteenth century, stateless societies of the kind Mill had described were commonly known as “savage”—examples included most peoples in Africa, the Americas, and Australia.

The classificatory challenge was more demanding in relation to the ancient monarchies of Asia—the Ottoman empire, Persia, India, China, Siam, and Japan. Here there were states to be sure, and in many respects Asian states were at least as impressive as any that could be found in Europe. Asian kingdoms too had a fixed territory and a fixed population over which they had far-reaching administrative control, and they were quite able to defend themselves militarily. Yet the Europeans were nevertheless not prepared to call them civilized, and the reason was that their governments were of entirely the wrong kind. Asian kingdoms were all “despotic,” meaning that they were ruled as the private possessions of their rulers. In Asia, Europeans believed, the monarchs had all the power, owned all the land, and their subjects were slaves; the passions and whims of the kings were restrained by no laws, and ordinary people were entirely excluded from politics. The ancient monarchies of Asia had gone through none of the changes that from the end of the eighteenth century had transformed European states into nation-states: there was no sense of a civil society, no political participation, and no accountability. As a result—and this was a particular concern of international lawyers—despotic states could not be involved in reciprocal arrangements of any kind. They did not recognize the rights and obligations of other states, and never mirrored the behavior of others. The Asian kingdoms were worlds onto themselves and the rulers did not recognize other rulers as their equals. States of this kind, the Europeans decided, were “barbarian.”
In this way, a tripartite schema was arrived at. "As a political phenomenon," said the Scottish international lawyer, James Lorimer, "humanity, in its present condition, divides itself into three concentric zones or spheres: that of civilised humanity, that of barbarous humanity, and that of savage humanity." And although the definitions and the nomenclature differed slightly depending on the author, the classification fit well with the "stages of history" which Adam Ferguson and others had identified. Hunters, gatherers and pastoralists were consequently savages since their societies had next to no division of labor; agricultural societies were barbarian since labor was more specialized, although most social positions still remained fixed. Only commercial societies were fully civilized since division of labor here was the most advanced.

Such categorizations were not universally embraced, not even in Europe. Conservatives, in particular, were skeptical of all talk of "civilization." The problem, they explained, is that the concept has universal pretensions, insisting that it can be applied to everyone everywhere and in the same manner. Civilization, thus understood, has no roots and reflects no actual person's lived experience. Civilization has no home, as it were. Yet everything that makes life valuable is local and native and time-honored, and consequently not the kind of thing that lends itself to "spreading." To protect ourselves against the onslaught of civilization, conservative critics decided, we must stand up in defense of our culture. A culture, in contrast to a civilization, has no universal pretensions but belongs instead to a particular society, a people, and their shared way of life. Stubbornly, many European conservatives failed to look down on the Chinese, the Indians, and the Persians, and insisted that the long history and many achievements of these societies made them eminently worthy of respect.

To liberals such conclusions were not only unacceptable but also positively threatening. Blurring the lines between their categories, loose talk of "culture" made a comparative study of social development impossible and undermined the whole idea of progress. To refute these conservative claims was thus a task of paramount importance. One liberal writer who rose to the challenge was James Mill in his *History of British India*, 1817. The fact that Mill had not visited India, and that he knew no Asian languages, made his scholarship unreliable to say the least, and it is easy to ridicule his self-confident assertion that countries like India are best observed "philosophically" and at a distance. Yet what concerned Mill were not the facts as much as the viability of the standard of civilization. The India he described was not the country as it actually existed, but instead as it had to be in order for the liberal view of the world to be correct. Luckily for Mill, India’s claims to civilizational status were easily refuted. For example, it turned out that most of India’s population had been sedentary and that the various kings never had ruled more than small portions of the country. Indian people had always been poor, and this, indeed, was why they were so easily impressed with the gaudy displays of their rulers. The country had made next to no progress over the past centuries and to talk to a contemporary Indian was for that reason much like talking to an Indian of a thousand years ago.

However, there was still the case of China, a country whose reputation was even better established in Europe. To undermine China’s pretensions to civilizational status was for that reason even more urgent. While writing on India, Mill addressed
this task in a review of a book by Chrétien-Louis-Joseph de Guignes, a French scholar who had visited Beijing together with a Dutch delegation in 1795. “In the small catalogue of rational books which we possess on the subject of China,” Mill began the review, “this deserves to occupy a respectable station.” Relying on de de Guignes’ work, it was easy for Mill to show that China too was very far from civilized. The country was, for example, not at all as old as Europeans previously had thought.—China had only been stable and united for some 500 years. Besides, to have a long history is not actually a sign of stability but proves only that no group powerful enough to overthrow the government has managed to emerge. This is a consequence of China’s despotism, not a sign of its level of sophistication. Moreover, China’s population is nothing like as large as Europeans have been led to believe, and for much of the country’s history the Chinese have led nomadic lives. Chinese women are routinely mistreated, and this too is a sign of backwardness. Even the country’s sciences and arts are in a lamentable state, and the only reason the Chinese can make good china is that the country is lucky enough to have exactly the right kind of clay for the task. “The information we now have concerning China,” Mill concluded, is “abundantly sufficient to prove, that they are in the very infancy, or very little advanced beyond the infancy, of fixed, or agricultural society.”

The Possibility of International Law

The standard of civilization added another aspect to the self-definition of the Europeans. In the Renaissance, we said, an independent international system came to be formed in Europe, based on states that regarded each other as sovereign and equal. These states formed a society as they engaged in practices and rituals of various kinds, including the practices and rituals of diplomacy and war-making. Added to this well-established description was now an understanding of international society as a society of civilized states. Relations between civilized states were not necessarily more peaceful than relations between the states of the previous era, but they interacted with each other in new ways. Consider, for example, the mid-nineteenth century developments in international law.

The old international law, ius gentium, the law of peoples, had long been in decline, mainly since the authorities on whom it relied—Nature, God, Providence—spoke in hopelessly hushed voices, which were next to impossible to conclusively interpret. Natural law, as Jeremy Bentham concluded, is not only nonsense but “nonsense upon stilts.” According to the legal philosopher John Austin, this was a reason to reject the very possibility of international law. In a series of lectures he gave at the newly established University of London in the 1820s, Austin argued that law properly so-called must have its origin in the pronouncements of a sovereign power and it must be backed up by coercive force. In relations between states, there was no one sovereign, only sovereigns, and although there was plenty of force, none of it was used in defense of a common legal framework. What was known as international law, Austin suggested, should properly be called “international morality” since it concerned not what is but what ought to be.

This too was a challenge to the liberal outlook since Austin, much as the conservative critics of the concept of civilization, regarded each state as a unit self-sufficient
onto itself, and since different societies as a result were impossible to compare by the same standard. Austin’s lectures questioned not only to the possibility of international law but potentially the entire liberal project as it applied to relations between states. Before long this challenge was taken on by a new generation of international legal scholars who contributed to journals such as *Revue de droit international et de législation comparée*, the leading international law journal of the age. 33 To survive in this modern era, these liberal reformers argued, international law had to be treated scientifically, that is, it had to be treated as a matter of empirical investigation rather than philosophical reflection. To understand the law, all you need to do is to observe how states act, which agreements they enter into, and which conventions they follow. 34 Compiling this collection of practices and pronouncements, a body of law can be distilled which is “positive,” that is, explicitly manmade. 35 Yet international law could never simply be equated with the sum total of this rather untidy collection of cases. Rather, cases had to be selected and organized and only the most progressive, most civilized, examples qualified for inclusion. The aim of international law, after all, was to reform and improve relations between states. This aspiration, in the end, made even positive international law into more of an art than a science. The tension between the empirical and the normative could only be resolved by a mind that was both knowledgeable about the facts and motivated by a liberal spirit. By people, that is, similar to the new generation of international legal scholars themselves. 36 But the brunt of Austin’s challenge still bore down on them. As Austin had argued, if the state is sovereign, it is its own source of law and as such it cannot be bound by other sources. And yet, as the new generation of legal scholars insisted, the kind of law that Austin had described—law emanating from sovereign command—is not the only kind of law there is. Not all law is declared into existence by political fiat but much of it is instead created through the gradual development of various customs and conventions. International law is surely law of this kind. 37 That is, international law consists of the norms that describe the accepted practices in which actual states actually engage. If this sounds unimpressive, it is worth remembering that case law of a similar kind forms the basis of the legal systems of both England and the United States without anyone complaining that this law somehow is inferior.

Ironically, given the importance that these scholars attached to the actions of the state, this redefinition gave international law much the same status as the kind of law that might exist in a stateless society. 38 What matters both in stateless societies and in an international system such as the European is not sovereign will since there is none, but instead the conventions that society, such as it is, has come to embrace. It is society as a whole that enunciates customary law, keeps it up-to-date, and makes sure that breeches are reported and publicly judged. Once international law came to be identified as customary law, that is, the real source of law was no longer the state but instead the society of states. Law and society are indivisible, as John Westlake pointed out, *ubi societas ibi ius est*, “where there is a society there is law.” “When we assert that there is such a thing as international law, we assert that there is a society of states: when we recognise that there is a society of states, we recognise that there is international law.” 39

As a result, international law could only be as coherent and as unified as the society of states that guaranteed its existence. 40 To make this society more coherent and
more unified was consequently the best way to strengthen the force and increase the reach of the law. The more unified and homogeneous international society became, the more viable the law, and the more viable the law, the more unified and homogeneous international society. This was why international society only could comprise states that were reasonably similar to each other and engaged in reasonably similar kinds of practices. If there was too much diversity, customary law could neither be compiled nor enforced. Membership in the international society of civilized states was consequently limited to European states; only European states were considered as full subjects of international law, and only Europeans enjoyed the full rights and obligations that followed from this status. As long as the line to the non-European was sufficiently sharply drawn, international law would always be viable.

The civilized, the savages, and the barbarians had consequently entirely different standing in the eyes of the new positive international law. Civilized states enjoyed the full rights and obligations of sovereignty—above all the inviolability of borders and the right to self-determination. A civilized state could conduct both domestic and foreign policy without interference from others, and if it was attacked it had an unquestionable right to self-defense. Savages, by contrast, had no standing in international law; they enjoyed no sovereign rights and could rely only on the kind of benevolence that all human beings owe each other by virtue of our shared humanity. As a consequence, there was, for example, nothing stopping the Europeans from simply appropriating the land of the savages for themselves. As for barbarians, they occupied an intermediary position. They had an international status and standing, but nothing like full membership in international society and they were international subjects only in certain respects. Barbarian states were formally independent but not fully sovereign and they periodically saw their territories invaded and parts of their political systems taken over by foreigners. Their actions were often constrained by unequal treaties and by military intimidation.

China provides an example. In response to a request in 1875 from the editors of Revue de droit international et de législation comparée for information regarding the nature of the legal systems of the Orient, the German consul in Shanghai, Dr. A. Krauel, submitted an extensive report. His conclusions were not encouraging. Despite the changes that had taken place since 1860, China's legal system was arbitrary and cruel and in its external relations the Chinese could still not relate to others as an equal. The Chinese did not reciprocate. Although China had begun to engage in diplomatic activities abroad, they had still little knowledge of the practices and rituals associated with European-style diplomacy. They did not fully understand the meaning of sovereignty and China was not a partner to military alliances or a member of international organizations. “In short,” Krauel concluded, “China is not yet advanced enough to understand the ideas which in our century have inspired the conference in Brussels or the Geneva Convention.”

This is not to say that a country such as China could not one day join the Europe-run society of civilized states. All it took to gain membership after all was to be recognized by the already existing members as one of their kind. For this to happen, however, the aspiring candidate had first to adopt a fully European understanding of international relations and embark on a series of far-reaching domestic reforms. It had to become the kind of state that was responsive to the demands of the members
of its own society and responsive also to the demands of the rest of the world. It was a state of this kind that the Ottoman Empire had promised to become when they, through the Treaty of Paris of March 1856, had been admitted to full membership in the Euro-centric system. This was also Japan’s commitment when the leading powers in August 1899 decided that “Japan’s position as a fully independent sovereign power is assured.” Sovereignty, once gained, would allow the new members to do whatever they wanted to do, but sovereignty could only be granted to states that lived up to the European norm. Only by first forcing the non-Europeans to become like them, would the Europeans later allow the non-Europeans to be whatever they wanted to be.

**Jealousies of Trade**

To insist on the relevance of legal standards is not to imply that relations between states necessarily were harmonious and peaceful. Membership in the international society of civilized states provided Europeans with a way to define themselves in relation to barbarians and savages, but it did not stop them from challenging and threatening one another, and periodically resorting to wars. This put the state in the paradoxical position of being at the same time a guardian of, and a threat to, civilization. First, the state made civilization possible by creating and upholding the kinds of institutions that allow human beings to cooperate with one another. And then, once established as an international subject in its own right, the state set itself in opposition to other states, causing wars and other conflicts, which produced results that were nothing short of uncivilized. The radical solution would have been to replace the individual states with some all-European form of political institution, and there were indeed peace proposals—such as those of Bentham and Abbé Saint-Pierre—which suggested just that. Yet to most Europeans such suggestions were not only unrealistic, but also perfectly dangerous since any weakening of state sovereignty surely would risk inviting Europe-wide chaos. Better, most argued, to find ways in which the individual states could be controlled and their aggressive tendencies reigned in.

International trade illustrates these aspirations. Since the time of the great expansion of trade in the seventeenth century, European societies had become increasingly closely connected through commercial ties. With Holland and then England taking the lead, new markets were discovered and new products—Atlantic herring, Baltic wheat, West-Indian sugar, and so on—developed and promoted. These new markets were to a large extent organized and policed by the merchants themselves. They had their own ways of transporting, storing, and paying for the goods; providing credit to buyers and investors; to protect themselves against pirates and insure themselves against storms; they even policed themselves through their own *lex mercatorum* and their own courts. Before long, however, individual states became more heavily involved in these enterprises, and the spoils of commerce became a source of conflict. Nothing is more common among states, David Hume noted in 1742, “than to look on the progress of their neighbours with a suspicious eye, to consider all trading states as their rivals, and to suppose that it is impossible for any of them to flourish, but at their expence.”
It was actually very easy for the state to manipulate the market and to divert some of the profits that it generated into its own coffers. The state could put up customs offices and impose tariffs; it could sell monopolies and patents; it could ban certain goods outright and declare certain activities as smuggling; it could manipulate exchange and interest rates; and it could provide direct subsidies to certain industries and help merchants dump goods in foreign markets. Given the right to sovereignty, there was not a lot outsiders could do to stop a state which engaged in such beggar-thy-neighbor practices. As the international lawyers too were forced to concede, each state was free to organize its economic policy in whichever way it wanted. The only practical solution was reciprocity: each country had to restrain itself in the name of its own enlightened, long-term, self-interest. Yet such restraint required international coordination, and coordination in turn required trust. That is, it required the kinds of norms that the international society of civilized states instilled in its members.

The situation was quite different in relation to other parts of the world—when it came to trade with savages and barbarians. Trading with savages was easy. Since they had no state, there were no border controls to worry about, no protective tariffs, no prohibitions on smuggling, and so on. Indeed, the lack of a state made it impossible for African societies to even protect its own members, and human beings too were soon turned into goods that were sold and exported for profit. Trading with savages, in other words, was purely an economic matter and no politics, and no morality, intervened. The Europeans would show up at different points along the coast with their pewter and copper utensils, their glass trinkets, hats, fake crystal, gunpowder, pistols, and spirits, hoping to find someone ready to barter with them. The only difficulty here was the fact that other European states wanted access to the same markets. To Europeans every savage terra nullius presented an irresistible temptation. “The inflow of the white race,” Westlake noted, “cannot be stopped where there is land to cultivate, ore to be mined, commerce to be developed, sport to enjoy, curiosity to be satisfied.” These temptations were an obvious source of conflict, and since the savages had no states that could keep the foreigners out, the competition always risked ending up as an unseemly scramble.

The civilized solution was for all Europeans to get together and work out their differences through negotiations and voluntary agreements, and it was with this aim in mind that the representatives of all colonial powers met in Berlin in November 1884. Today the Berlin Conference is universally regarded as a particularly striking example of the arrogance of European imperialism, yet at the time it was instead seen as an admirable example of how civilized states could settle their differences without resorting to war. In Berlin, national interests were replaced by common interests and warfare by negotiations. “In the present stage of civilization and in view of the progress which has been made in International intercourse,” wrote Jan Helenus Ferguson, a Dutch diplomat and legal scholar, “all narrow minded colonial jealousy is utterly out of season.”

No Power following a wise and liberal colonial policy (the only one which can exist now-a-days) ought to have any reason to fear the neighbourhood of any other friendly Power in a colonial settlement. On the contrary, every well-minded and able
colonization scheme should be welcome as a new fellow-worker in the great field of civilization, for the formation of millions of new centres, productive of trade and consuming the products of industry.  

As for the savages themselves, they had nothing to complain about. As a result of the Berlin Conference, they were finally given a state, albeit a European-run one. Just as in Europe itself, the state would soon help set them on the road to progress.  

In relation to barbarians, quite different challenges presented themselves. In the ancient monarchies of Asia, the problem was not the weakness of the state, but instead its relative strength. Several barbarian states could quite effectively engage in many of the same discriminatory practices as the Europeans—they could confine international trade to particular locations or time periods, impose tariffs, ban certain goods, and so on. Since the barbarians were not members of the international society of civilized states, there was no way to involve them in mutually self-restraining arrangements. In countries where “the natives are artful, crafty, and designing,” as an apologist for the British East India Company argued, European merchants are exposed to particular dangers. There is no notion that pacta sunt servanda, there is no lex mercatorum, no protection from fraud or from the “armed and fierce multitude.” Under such conditions, European traders had to be prepared to defend themselves. This meant that the trading companies, such as the various East India companies, often had to call on their respective governments to intervene in their defense. Conveniently, the fact that barbarian states were not full subjects of the international law meant that they did not have the rights that followed from full sovereignty. Ignoring the policies set by Asian governments, the Europeans looked for clandestine ways to penetrate the local markets; they sold banned products—such as opium—and they used their military power to force one country after another to “open up”—Japan in 1853, Siam in 1855, China in 1842, 1858, and again in 1860. The problem was only that wars undertaken for commercial reasons, no matter how justified, would risk undermining the Asian states and turn them, much as the savage societies of Africa, into battlegrounds for European rivalry. In Asia too a distinctly uncivilized scramble might ensue. A civilized solution was needed, yet since Asian societies already had states with quite well-defined borders, a solution like the one reached at Berlin in 1885 was out of the question. The answer was instead to make sure that the actions of the Europeans were tightly coordinated. This explains the decision of Britain and France to coordinate their engagements both with Turkey and with China in the 1850s, and it explains why all treaties that successfully were negotiated by one European country quickly were signed by all the rest. The need for concerted action also explains the so-called “open door policy,” according to which “China should remain free and open to trade for the nationals of all countries without distinction,” and it explains the decision by no fewer than eight foreign countries to invade China at the time of the Boxer Rebellion in the year 1900. In Chinese historiography, this collective invasion has always been portrayed as evidence of the evil ambitions of foreign imperialists. At the time, however, it was rather understood as a particularly successful example of how the individual interests of each state could be subsumed under the common good. The invasion was yet more evidence of Europe’s civilized understanding of international politics.
Instead of a scramble, there was coordination. The fact that China needed to be subdued was taken as given.

Civilized Forms of Warfare

The question still remained of what to do about war itself. Although no major pan-continental wars were fought in Europe between 1815 and 1914, there were enough smaller wars and near-war experiences to remind Europeans that state-sponsored violence constituted a threat to their civilizational values. This was a problem that the new generation of international legal scholars sought to address. As they explained in their treaties, abolishing the state was neither feasible nor advisable, yet there were ways in which war-making itself could be rendered less destructive. Assembling cases that they regarded as particularly “humane” or “enlightened,” abstracting the principles behind these cases, and adding progressive opinions of their own, the legal scholars came up with a new set of laws pertaining to war as fought between civilized countries.

In civilized wars, they explained, soldiers fight only other soldiers, never civilians, and the foundations of civilian life are not legitimate targets of military attacks. It is not permissible to destroy civil institutions or the bases of people's livelihoods—infrastructure such as roads, water-mains, or sewage plants, industrial machinery, crops, orchards, or livestock. Equally it is against the laws of civilized warfare to assassinate individual soldiers, to take them hostage or to torture them, or to put prize money on their heads. And once a soldier reverts back to his civilian status, or is held as prisoner of war, he should be given the same respect as all other civilians. A substantial subsection of the new rules concerned the treatment of enemy property. As the legal scholars agreed, an occupying army may provision for itself in enemy territory, set up camp, and requisition horses and vehicles, but when they do so they must pay a fair price for what they take. Under no circumstances is looting or wanton destruction of private property allowed. While the property of the enemy state automatically becomes the property of the occupier, limitations apply here as well. State archives cannot be seized since that disproportionately inconveniences individuals. Similarly it is not permissible to carry off entire libraries or museums, or destroy buildings of national or historical importance, universities, and scientific academies. The only exceptions to these rules concern cases of “military necessity”—but any military benefit must be immediate, overwhelming, and easily demonstrated.

Hopelessly idealistic though these requirements may sound, they were in the latter part of the nineteenth century increasingly reflected in international agreements. In 1856, all major European states met in Paris to sign a convention dealing with privateering in war; in 1864, they met in Geneva to improve the treatment of wounded soldiers, and in 1868 in St. Petersburg to outlaw certain particularly cruel weapons. In 1899, a first Hague Conference agreed on “laws and customs of war on land” and the “pacific settlement of disputes,” and in 1907 a second Hague Conference was convened, which expanded on these conventions. There were further meetings in Geneva in 1929 and 1949 at which agreements were concluded—the famous “Geneva Conventions”—on the treatment
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of prisoners of war, the protection of civilians, and of wounded soldiers. These agreements were quoted in battle-field manuals too and the conduct of individual soldiers was judged—and if need be punished—in their terms. The “Lieber Code” of 1863, which provided rules of engagement for the soldiers of the Northern states in the American Civil War, is an early celebrated example, but the British, German, and French armies soon adopted similar legally inspired regulations.

Yet these stipulations all concerned wars conducted between civilized states, and they did not answer the question of how wars should be fought against non-Europeans. In the nineteenth century, this was known as the problem of “small wars,” the guerrilla, fought against irregular troops and in an irregular manner. Such wars were not unknown in Europe itself—as conducted, for example, by “partisans” during the popular resistance against Napoleon’s invasion of Spain in 1808. Partisans were members of citizen armies who had taken up arms on their own initiative, often badly trained and equipped, often not wearing any formal uniforms, or answering to any formal command structures. From the point of view of international law, the warriors that the Europeans encountered in savage societies resembled these guerrilleros. Savage soldiers too were irregulars, without uniforms, discipline, and commanders, and as such their actions were not subject to the laws of war and were in effect impossible to distinguish from simple crimes. Although savages were unorganized and had no modern weapons, they often fought in unspeakably cruel ways. They made no distinctions between soldiers and civilians and between military and nonmilitary targets. Although they rarely had the organizational skills to fight a proper battle, they made raids on European settlements—perhaps at night—killing the men, raping the women, and carrying off the children to their camps. This is the way red-skins fight wars in cowboy movies, and it was the stock in trade of penny-dreadfuls describing the perils of life in various colonial outposts.

As for barbarians, they were far better prepared than savages to put up resistance against the Europeans. They had their own states after all, they could field armies—often very large ones indeed—and they had the institutional wherewithal to sustain long and complicated military campaigns. The military units of barbarian armies had some considerable measure of discipline and barbarian soldiers, the Europeans discovered to their surprise, were occasionally both tenacious and brave. During the first centuries of sustained contact, the Asian monarchies were powerful enough to stop the Europeans, yet the balance of power shifted decisively in the course of the nineteenth century. Barbarian commanders knew little of the tactics of modern warfare and their military hardware was hopelessly outdated. Instead they too fought in various underhanded ways. Much like savages, barbarian enemies made no difference between military and nonmilitary targets, and they treated soldiers and nonsoldiers alike. Barbarians too took civilians captive and tortured and killed prisoners of war, and they often had little respect for cease-fires and treaties.

The question for the Europeans was how to respond to enemies of this kind. The most laudable option, and the one they first attempted, was to fight according to the same rules of engagement that by now had come to govern warfare in Europe itself. And yet, since the requirements of the new positive international law effectively served as constraints on an army, they were, militarily speaking, a liability. The rules of warfare, military strategists pointed out, must be reciprocal, but savages...
and barbarians were not able to reciprocate. “Against uncivilized people who do not know international law and do not observe it, and would take advantage of one who did, there must be…a clear understanding that this is a different kind of war.”

This left the Europeans with no choice, and in the end they easily adapted themselves to the new conditions. “Gentlemen,” as the notorious general Thomas Robert Bugeaud put it in the French parliament when he was questioned about the methods of warfare he had implemented in Algeria, “war is not made philanthropically; he who wills the end wills the means.”

Adapting themselves to what they took to be the methods employed by savages and barbarians, the Europeans came to fight colonial wars with extraordinary brutality. In Algeria in the 1840s, the système Bugeaud featured raids on crops, orchards, cattle, and fields, and civilians were systematically starved, raped, and terrorized by the French troops. During the war in Afghanistan in the fall of 1842, the British exacted an equally terrible revenge for the loss of their army earlier the same year. Here too, much as in Algeria, civilians were made into explicit targets. “Their forts and houses were destroyed,” wrote an eyewitness. “Their walls were blown up. Their beautiful trees were ringed and left to perish. The retribution was complete.” In India, after the suppression of the uprising in the fall of 1857, the British ordered entire villages to be burned and their inhabitants to be killed, and after the fall of Delhi, in September, the city was thoroughly sacked and looted. And Americans, fighting their own wars at roughly the same time, behaved no better. First, the native population of the great North American plains was attacked and driven off their land, and then, once the colonizers had run out of continent to expand on, the wars continued across the Pacific. The American soldiers fighting the native insurrection in the Philippines, 1899-1902, were known for their cruelty toward civilians, as well as for their use of concentration camps and “the water cure,” a notorious form of torture, practiced on captured prisoners of war.

This was also how wars were fought in China. During the First Opium War, Lord Palmerston had taken great pride in the civilized means by which the British troops had conducted themselves. It was, he insisted, “the humanity and forbearance of our troops towards the people of China which essentially contributed to the success of our military operations.” The Chinese had been accustomed to give no quarter to their captives, but to practice the utmost barbarity upon all whom they vanquished; they were surprised that the English should take so much pains, expose themselves to danger and death, and expend so much treasure, for the purpose of inflicting wounds upon the Chinese, which afterward they took so much trouble to cure. That is an illustration both of the character of the Chinese and of the contrast afforded by the conduct of our troops.

Palmerston called his soldiers “bayoneted philosophers,” who “taught their enemy a lasting lesson of mercy to captives, and of humanity towards the conquered.” Yet these elevated pedagogical standards were not long maintained. The armies who participated in the North China Campaign of 1860 started by paying the local population for the produce they requisitioned—apart from the morality of this policy, it was an easier means of acquiring the food stuffs needed to feed close to 20,000
soldiers. And yet, when the locals failed to come forward with the required produce, General Hope Grant was accused of being soft-hearted. “He has tried fair means and failed. He should now try the heavy hand and take what we cannot buy.” The French, his British critics pointed out, were already doing it. They called it réquisitions forçés mais payés—at first they had paid three dollars per head of sheep, but before long the French got them for nothing.

The atrocities which took place during the North China Campaign of 1860 fit perfectly into this far broader pattern. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was only another item in a long list of abominations committed by Europeans in non-European settings. The proper question to ask is thus not why Yuanmingyuan was destroyed, but instead why the Europeans repeatedly behaved in such an atrocious manner. The military answer is that it was considered to be a liability to fight these kinds of enemies in more civilized ways. The legal answer is that savages and barbarians were not members of the international society of civilized states and were not subjects of international law. Thus, the actions of the French soldiers who looted Yuanmingyuan were readily excused by reference to the Ordonnance de l’armée, a military manual from 1832, and to its article 119 that referred to the actions undertaken by “irregular troops.” It was the Chinese setting that made the regular French troops “irregular,” and that legitimated their actions. Since savages and barbarians did not understand civilized language, the Europeans were forced to talk to them in the only language they knew. “Is it not obvious,” as Antoine Fauchery concluded in Le Moniteur, that “the more we attempt to use chivalric acts to show them the splendors of civilization, the more they treat us as barbarians?” The only solution is to “give the Chinese, a Chinese and a half.”

The categories of “savage” and “barbarian” were invented by Europeans for purely European reasons. Their existence was due to a distinction—first imaginary, then amply confirmed—which drew as sharp a line as possible between the Europeans and everyone else. This distinction did not name a previously existing difference; instead it constituted a difference that later became the basis of Europe’s colonial actions. It was the invention of barbarians and savages that made civilization possible, but once they were invented, savages and barbarians immediately identified themselves as threats. Fighting these threats, the Europeans only invoked their self-evident right to self-defense.
Chapter 7

The Failure of the Liberal Project

The Europeans in China were not only barbarians, they were Liberal barbarians. The next question is consequently what this liberal label might add to our knowledge of the people who destroyed Yuanmingyuan. One way to answer this question is to return to the simple-minded syllogism that we briefly discussed above: to change is to make progress, to make progress is to be modern, and to be modern is to be civilized. Putting liberalism at the head of this chain of deductions, we could say that the liberal project provided a suggestion for how change originally came to take place. In the middle of the nineteenth century, liberalism stood above all for freedom of exchange, that is, for a belief that the unimpeded global circulation of goods, people, and ideas would not only raise living standards, bring people closer together, but also spread assorted progressive values, tastes, habits, and lifestyles. Once everything was circulating freely, change was inevitable. The aim was not to study the world as much as to change it.

As Marx and Engels understood earlier and better than others, the idea of free exchange has far-reaching and perfectly revolutionary consequences. The bourgeoisie, in its search for new markets and higher profits, has “pitilessly torn asunder motley feudal ties,” and “left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest.” This quest has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, and of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It has resolved personal worth into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom—free trade. Yet as we have seen, there were limits to what free exchange could achieve. Marx and Engels were wrong about China, but so were all merchants, missionaries, and liberally minded by-standers who hoped the country would simply “open up.” In the end, free trade had to be forced, and the Chinese walls were dismantled by military means. The liberal project—understood purely as the principle of free exchange—failed, and instead liberalism had to ally itself with the practices of statecraft as traditionally pursued by European countries. It was the British state, through its navy, its army, and its diplomats, that eventually
broke down China’s resistance. Yet on the basis of what we know of the North China Campaign of 1860, this conclusion too must be modified—or this, at least, is the argument to be developed in this chapter. In the Chinese context, the traditional practices of European statecraft did not work very well either. Making war half a world away was difficult even for the British empire, and the British diplomats were not having much luck with the treaties they negotiated. Even a China that had lost a war and signed a humiliating treaty still stubbornly refused to undertake radical changes. It was in the context of these failures that the decision was made to destroy Yuanmingyuan.

The Liberal Project

At the core of the liberal project stands the idea of free exchange. We are probably most accustomed to thinking about free exchange as a matter of free trade in goods and services, and this was certainly a main part of what the liberals wanted to achieve. As early modern advocates of commerce with East Asia explained—and as Adam Smith later famously argued—it is foolish to try to produce everything we need by ourselves. Much better to specialize in whichever products we are best at producing while letting others specialize in whatever they do best. Then we trade. The larger the market, the more we can specialize; the more we specialize, the more we need to trade, and the more we trade, the larger the mutual gains. This is how nations become wealthy. After William Harvey’s discovery, in 1628, of the circulation of the blood, it became common to compare the circuits of exchange to the vessels through which blood is pumped through the body. “Trade,” as John Dryden explained in his *Annus Mirabilis*, 1667, “like blood, should circularly flow/ Stopp’d in their channels, found its freedom lost.” Societies that are integral parts of the great circulatory system of mankind are constantly nourished and given new oxygen. This makes each country grow and improve, while countries that are not part of, or only partially included in, the system become stunted and contorted. England provides an example. As any reader of Caesar’s *Commentaries* will notice, Joseph Addison pointed out, England was originally but “a barren uncomfortable spot of earth,” where nothing grew but “hips and haws, acorns and pignuts.” It was only because of their relations with other countries that the English learned to grow more tastier fruits. And not only the vegetable world was improved in this manner, but also “the whole face of nature among us.”

Our ships are laden with the harvest of every climate; our tables are stored with spices, and oils, and wines; our rooms are filled with pyramids of China, and adorned with the workmanship of Japan. Our morning’s draught comes to us from the remotest corners of the earth. We repair our bodies by the drugs of America, and repose ourselves under Indian canopies.

In this way, Addison concluded, the vineyards of France have become our vineyards, the Spice islands our hotbeds, and the Chinese have come to work as our potters. While our palates feast on the fruits of the tropics, we can comfortably remain in our own green and pleasant land, “free from those extremities of weather which give
them birth.”8 “Our English merchant converts the tin of his own country into gold, and exchanges his wool for rubies.”9 Contrast the countries that refuse to participate in international trade, such as the Ottomans.10 Since their government is despotic, they can take what they want from the poor, and since their country is enormous, there are many ways for the government to enrich itself, yet since the Ottomans “are enemies to trade” and “discourage industry and improvement,” the Turkish people as a whole are miserably, distressingly, poor, “idle, indolent and starving.”11

Freedom of trade was ultimately but an aspect of the free circulation of everything else that could be moved, transported, and spread around—ideas, lifestyles, institutions, fashions, tastes, dreams, desires, and ambitions. By allowing free circulation in one aspect, all the other aspects would soon become freed too. This is not only how prices are kept low, but also how civilization is disseminated. The more we interact with the rest of the world, the more we get to know about it; the more we know about it, the wiser we will be and the more imagination we will have as to our own ambitions; the more imagination we have as to our own ambitions, the better we will become at executing our preferred designs.12 Free exchange, as Lord Palmerston explained during the debate on the Corn Laws in 1842, leads not only to an extension and diffusion of knowledge, to mutual benefits and kindly feelings, but it also makes mankind “happier, wise, better.”13 “This,” he concluded, “is the dispensation of Providence—this is the decree of that power which created and disposes the universe.” This is what we could refer to as the “liberal project.” The attempt, that is, to radically transform society by replacing all other forms of human interaction with the principle of free exchange. “Exchange...is society itself, for it is impossible to conceive of society without exchange, or exchange without society.”14

Property rights are often said to require enclosures. It is only once a fence has been erected that a certain piece of property properly can be said to belong to us, and it is only now that it makes sense to invest resources in cultivating, and improving, what we own. Capitalism is premised on exclusion. And yet liberals, once property rights had been secured in this fashion, were adamantly opposed to walls. A wall creates a “this side” and a “that side”; it breaks up the world into a multitude of separate, noncommunicating, compartments. If a wall is in the way, and if it is high enough, you cannot move ahead, you cannot exchange anything with the people on the other side, or even see who they are or what they are doing. In this way, walls make both you and the people on the other side more ignorant than you otherwise would be. Walls, moreover, block light and they block enlightenment. What you cannot see, you cannot inspect, scrutinize, or verify, and for that reason walls allow people to hide themselves, to keep secrets, and to scheme. Not surprisingly, walls are much relied on by people and institutions who prefer to remain unaccountable. Since a political power hidden behind a wall is impossible to engage in conversation, it never has to explain itself nor provide reasons for its actions. In this way, walls contribute not only to the sublime mystique of power but also, more prosaically, to political and economic corruption. By restricting and shaping the exchange, walls force people to interact on certain terms rather than others, thus determining the way politics is conducted. By building a wall, the powerful can privatize public space; by razing a wall, the powerless can reclaim it for themselves.
Liberals used these kinds of antiwall arguments in defense of many of their favorite causes. One example was prison reform. In the latter part of the eighteenth century, when the public forms of punishment common in the Middle Ages increasingly came to be replaced by prison sentences, there were suddenly not enough prisons available and the conditions for the inmates were often deplorable. The prisons were dark and dank and full of vice, and provided no means by which the prisoners could be turned into better human beings. To improve the conditions of prisons became a popular cause, which took liberals like Alexis de Tocqueville to America to investigate the most recent, most enlightened, practices.\(^\text{15}\) In Britain, the same topic preoccupied Jeremy Bentham whose solution, the Panopticon, relied on a way to discipline prisoners by removing the prison walls. Instead of hiding the inmates, the Panopticon made them perfectly visible.\(^\text{16}\) By placing himself in the “inspector’s lodge” at the center of Bentham’s contraption, a single person could easily survey the whole establishment, and since the inspector himself remained hidden, the prisoners would never know if they were under scrutiny or not. The “central inspection principle,” Bentham argued, made prisons cheaper, but by disciplining prisoners in a more effective way, it also provided a way for them to be reformed.

Liberals opposed quarantines with the same antiwall arguments. The first quarantines had been put in place in Venice during the bubonic plague in the fourteenth century, and the first permanent *cordon sanitaire* was established between Austria and the Ottoman Empire in the middle of the eighteenth century.\(^\text{17}\) At this border, products were inspected, disinfected, heated, and washed, and travelers were held in custody for up to 48 days. To liberals such policies were an abomination. The rationale for their existence, they argued, was not found in medical science but instead in the kind of trial-and-error practices in which all absolutist regimes specialized. In Britain, liberal members of parliament insisted that there was no scientific evidence for contagion and that quarantines themselves, by confining people to small rooms with little change of air, were likely to spread disease.\(^\text{18}\) What concerned liberals the most, however, was the impact on trade and on the freedom of movement. Although the success of the Austrian policy has been credited with finally stopping plagues from Asia from entering Europe, Austrian trade with Eastern Europe had suffered as a result.\(^\text{19}\) Thus, when the French government convened an international conference in 1851 with the aim of standardizing medical regulations across Europe, Lord Palmerston dispatched his delegates with instructions to make the quarantines as short and ineffective as possible.\(^\text{20}\)

Above we briefly discussed the conservative critique of the idea of civilization. Civilization is a rootless and homeless notion, conservatives argued, and instead they insisted on the importance of culture—on the way a particular group of people make sense of their lives. This argument is easily reformulated as a defense of walls.\(^\text{21}\) For a society to constitute itself as such it must necessarily end somewhere. There must be a wall, a fence, or some kind of a border, through which society is delimited. By setting a limit, a wall sets a stage, and only as limited and staged can society appear as a meaningful construct. Walls make a home possible not only since they protect you, keep enemies and burglars out, but also since they give you a chance to be by yourself and to limit contact with the outside world. A sense of home is required even by economic markets. After all, economic life cannot only
The Failure of the Liberal Project

Consist of exchange but must also consist of production—new products, ideas, or ways of doing things must all have a place of origin; they must come from someone and somewhere.

Compare what happens when walls are destroyed. The new visibility that is the result does not necessarily empower everyone in the same manner. After all, what you can see depends not only on the absence of objects blocking your sight, but also on where you are positioned and on the direction you are facing. Some observers, as Bentham explained in case of his Panopticon, are centrally located and can see everything and everyone, while others have a peripheral position or are able to look only in one direction.\textsuperscript{22} Perfect visibility is what authoritarian regimes insist on; they must see everything in order to control everything. To be able to hide oneself behind a wall is thus arguably a precondition not only for privacy but also for self-governance and freedom.\textsuperscript{23}

There is a tension here between the liberal project and the requirements of civilization. On the one hand, nineteenth century liberals defended the state as the only institution that could make it possible for human beings to cooperate with one another, thus assuring that civilization would flourish. On the other hand, the insistence that all walls be removed was an antistate argument. In a world where free exchange is the basic value from which all other values follow, states will necessarily appear as an encumbrance. After all, much of what the state does is to set up obstacles to free exchange—passports, border controls, visas, and customs duties, or the state-sponsored walls created by separate languages, cultures, and ways of life. For exchange to flow freely, these walls too will have to come down, but as a result interstate relations will before long be replaced with interpersonal relations.\textsuperscript{24}

The Failure of Free Trade

When the East India Company’s monopoly on the China trade finally was removed in 1833, the new merchants who entered the market were full of hopes. China constituted an enormous market, untapped by foreign commerce, and the size of the potential profits to be made here boggled their minds.\textsuperscript{25} Much the same excitement was felt after the conclusions of the Nanjing Treaty, 1842, and the Tianjin Treaty, 1858. Now, British merchants believed, on all three occasions, they were going to get access to a market made up of some 350 million people—an unimaginable “third of mankind”—who all eagerly awaited their products.\textsuperscript{26} Lord Palmerston, foreign minister in 1842, urged caution, but there is no mistaking his excitement:

\begin{quote}
when we consider the magnitude of the population with which we are about to open an intercourse, the vast resources and wealth of the empire with which we are about to have an extended commerce, how many wants they have which it is in our power to supply, and how many things they possess which we should be glad to take in return, it is impossible not to see that great and important advantages must result from the successful termination of this war.\textsuperscript{27}
\end{quote}

The British cotton industry would be the first to benefit. Cotton manufacturing was a highly lucrative business, but periodically subject to recessions due to
overproduction, yet such difficulties were now a thing of the past. As Henry Pottinger, the first governor of Hong Kong, explained in 1842, China constituted a market so vast that “all the mills in Lancashire could not make stocking-stuff sufficient for one of its provinces.”  

Our woolens are far superior to the woolens of the Chinese, the merchants argued; the Chinese have no glass manufacturing that deserves the name, and although they work diligently for little money, they cannot undersell our steam engines:

there is scarcely an article, food excepted, that can administer to the wants or tastes of man, that the manufacturers of England may not supply to them of a quality and at a price that will ensure an almost unlimited demand. 

European missionary societies were equally excited. To the 350 million consumers, corresponded 350 million unsaved, Chinese, souls. Although the use of opium certainly was an evil, and the methods employed by British merchants were unnecessarily aggressive, the British empire was nevertheless the instrument that God had chosen to carry out His work. “China is open! Open from one end to the other for the introduction of the Gospel,” an ecstatic John Angell James, a Nonconformist clergyman, declared in 1859, and he proceeded to tell his congregation how previous generations of missionaries now celebrated the victory in heaven, “while the heavenly hosts in millions of echoes, reverberate the sound, crying: ‘Hallelujah, China is open.’”

Yet the dramatic breakthroughs never happened. The end of the East India Company’s monopoly led to an increase in trade, but the only product that was a true success was India-grown opium. Similarly, during the first ten years after the Nanjing Treaty, the sale of British-made goods barely increased at all, the numbers improved only slowly after that, and again it was only with the help of opium that Britain balanced its books. The missionary societies were failing in much the same way—working hard to be sure, but making surprisingly few converts. There were two possible explanations for these disappointing results. The first was that the British hopes always had been hopelessly exaggerated. We should have remembered, said W. H. Mitchell in a skeptical report to parliament in 1859, “that we were about to start in competition with the greatest manufacturing people in the world, with a people who manufactured cloth for themselves when the nations of the West wore sheep-skins.” As long as there are Chinese people, and the “spirit of untiring industry and domestic thriftiness” lives in them, “the same obstacles which now operate as a bar to any extensive diffusion of our manufactures in this quarter of the world, will equally operate a hundred years hence.” From this perspective, the dream of the Chinese market resembled nothing as much as one of those other get-rich-quick schemes that flourished in the middle of the nineteenth century: the mania for railway shares in the 1840s, or the gold rushes that took people to California and Australia in the early 1850s.

The alternative explanation—the one that the most powerful strand of liberal public opinion embraced—was that British merchants had failed since they never had been given a proper chance to succeed. Once the monopoly of the East India Company was removed in 1833, the monopoly of the gonghang guild had continued,
and foreign merchants had been confined to the city of Guangzhou, far away from the main Chinese markets. Likewise, the Treaty of Nanjing was never properly implemented. Most glaringly, European merchants had never been given full access to the city of Guangzhou, but had instead been forced to trade outside of the city itself. And as for the Tianjin Treaty, the Chinese refusal to ratify it was surely proof of their attitude toward it. What the disappointing trade figures showed, in other words, was not that there was something wrong with British-made products—or, for that matter, with the Christian god—but instead that Chinese markets had to become even more open. The remarkable opportunities were still there if only the Europeans were given a chance to exploit them. If only “there were a good revision of those treaties,” as Lord Palmerston put it in 1857, “by which a larger access to the people of China were afforded to Europeans, I am sure there would be an immense augmentation of European commerce with China—an extension which would be equally advantageous both to the European producer and the Chinese consumer.”

This was an analysis fully shared by John Bowring when he arrived in China in 1849, first as consul in Guangzhou, and after 1854 as governor of Hong Kong. Bowring, we said, was an arch-liberal, or rather an arch-Benthamite, and a political activist with a love of hyperbole. He wrote on topics related to free trade in the Westminster Review in the 1820s, and in the 1830s he traveled around Europe compiling reports for the British government concerning the state of trade with various European countries. In 1838, Bowring had been one of the original founders of the Anti-Corn Law League. “England has the highest and most noble of missions,” he declared at a meeting of the League on April 13, 1843, which is “to teach the world that commerce should be free—that all humble beings are made to love and help one another.” While the Bible teaches us the imperative of neighborly love, most people take little interest in their fellows. It is only if the help we give others can benefit also ourselves that we care. It is such mutual advantages that free exchange provides.

Freedom of commerce, I dare say it, is Christianity in action. It is the manifestation of this spirit of kindness, benevolence and love which everywhere seeks to distance itself from evil, and tries in all places to strengthen the good.

Bowring, it is not surprising to learn, hated walls—walls around countries, around cities, and around prisons. In 1821—ten years before de Tocqueville went to America—he toured Spain and Portugal to inspect the state of their carceral institutions. In Spain, there are still mazmorras, Moorish dungeons, he noted with a shudder, where the inquisition used to torture its enemies; and the vermin-infested prisons constructed by the Bourbon autocracy were hardly any better. The solution was obvious: the inmates had to be taken out of their subterranean confinement and placed in prison akin to a Benthamite Panopticon—a prison built according to a “central-inspection plan”—where “the prisoners be always within sight; that no light and air be wanting.” Bowring opposed quarantines for much the same reason. Quarantines, he explained, were “founded on the most erroneous notions as to the best means of preserving the public health,” but “confining patients to
lazzarets” would only increase the “contagious power” of any illness. Epidemic diseases are propagated by atmospheric influences, not by contagion, and the solution is to improve the quality of the air—“by the introduction, for example, of better sewerage, ventilation, and greater comfort to the community generally.” It was only through such fundamental reforms—only through the progress of civilization—that epidemic disease finally would be eradicated.

When Bowring arrived in China, he was outraged. There were walls everywhere: there was not only the Great Wall to the north, but also walls surrounding the country in every other direction; every Chinese city had a city wall, and inside the cities there were walls separating, for example, the Manchu from the Chinese sections, or government officials from ordinary people. Chinese houses were separated from each other by walls, and inside the houses walls divided not only rooms but also classes of people; inside the rooms themselves there were screens made of wood and paper which blocked one’s sight. These walls stopped European merchants from trading freely and they made it impossible for outsiders to understand what the Chinese were up to. At the same time, the walls blocked China’s access not only to new and cheaper products, but also to new ideas, values, tastes, lifestyles, dreams, desires, and ambitions, and to the word of the Christian God. No wonder the Chinese were so secretive, so unfathomable, so ignorant, superstitious, and corrupt. From the time he first arrived in China, Bowring looked for a way to explain their predicament to the Chinese, and when the British-registered smuggler, The Arrow, was seized by Chinese authorities on October 8, 1856, he believed he had found the appropriate vehicle for his message. The fact that The Arrow incident largely was a fabrication made no difference to the justice of Bowring’s cause. Without waiting for instructions from London, the Royal Navy began operations on the Canton River at the end of October.

When news of the war that Bowring had started eventually reached Britain, many were outraged at his conduct and between February 24 and March 3, 1857, parliament met to discuss Chinese affairs in no fewer than six separate sessions. Bowring was criticized both from the left and from the right. Lord Derby, a former Tory prime minister, who led the conservative attack, declared himself shocked at Bowring’s presumption and his aggressive posture. Bowring seemed prepared to do just about anything to get access to the city of Guangzhou, yet such access made little difference, Derby argued, since British merchants were able to trade freely outside of the city. Derby made fun of Bowring’s incessant references to Guangzhou’s city wall. Bowring had a “monomaniacal obsessions” with these walls: “I believe he dreams of the entrance into Canton, I believe he thinks of it first thing in the morning, the last thing at night, and in the middle of the night if he happen to awake.”

I do not believe he would consider any sacrifice too great, any interruption to commerce to be deplored, any bloodshed almost to be regretted, when put in the scale with the immense advantage to be derived from the fact that Sir John Bowring had obtained an official reception in the yamun [town-hall] in Canton.

Bowring was criticized from the left too. The most extended critique came from Richard Cobden, Bowring’s old friend and a fellow founder of the Anti-Corn Law
Cobden was in every respect as much of a believer in the liberal project as Bowring himself. He too had a boundless faith in free exchange whose virtues he too had extolled with great conviction during the free-trade debates of the 1840s. He too wanted the walls of China to come down, British merchants to trade freely, and civilization to spread. In all these respects, Cobden was a liberal, yet he was a liberal of a different kind. Cobden began by questioning the official rationale for the war. China was not, he argued, a closed market. “I only wish that we had, not five ports, but one port in France, Austria, or Russia, where we should have the same low tariff as we now have in China.”

There is not a country on the face of the earth where trade is carried on with greater facility than in China. There is no place where if you send a ship you can get her unloaded and loaded with greater despatch, where the port charges and other expenses are so moderate, or where you are more certain to find a cargo of the produce of the country.

The basic issue at stake, Cobden concluded, is not access as such but instead China’s defense of its sovereignty. We should treat the Chinese the same way we treat other states with which we do business—like the United States or France. It is completely out of the question to use the Royal Navy to force the Chinese to give in to our demands. This is no way to treat fellow human beings and it is demeaning to Britain to pursue such a policy. The only way to engage with the Chinese is to offer them products that they actually might need—and opium does emphatically not qualify. It is only through the example set by our own success, Cobden concluded, that we can demonstrate the advantages of open borders.

Bowring’s conduct was, not surprisingly, strongly supported by Lord Palmerston and by the government. There are people here, Palmerston began his speech in the House of Commons, who give far more credit to the Chinese than they deserve, but we cannot treat them the same way we treat others. The Chinese are not like us. “In all our treaties with nations less civilized than those in Europe” we need to make special arrangements to protect the interests of British subjects. This is how we deal with Turkey and Persia, and in the case of China—with their “ferocious system of administration”—such stipulations are even more necessary. Ancient Rome defended its citizens against arbitrary treatment, and Britain insist on the right to do the same. The phrase Palmerston used here—Civis Romanus sum, “I am a Roman citizen”—invoked his celebrated “Don Pacifico speech” from 1850 where he had used that exact formulation to great effect. Yet this was not, Palmerston insisted, another colonial enterprise, and the independence of China was not at stake. All we want is to establish “free commercial intercourse” with the Chinese. Free trade benefits us, but it benefits the Chinese too.

Something happened to John Bowring once he arrived in East Asia. In a startling transformation, the international secretary of the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace became the initiator of an unprovoked war on false pretenses against a third of mankind. Yet for Bowring himself, the contradiction never seemed as sharp. To him, what really mattered was that China finally would become properly attached to the worldwide body made up of the rest of mankind.
If a quick war could speed up this process of attachment, it was a small price to pay. “England has the highest and most noble of missions,” as he had argued before the Anti-Corn Law League in 1843, “to teach the world that commerce should be free—that all human beings are made to love and help one another.” Free exchange, he believed, was “Christianity in action.” This is where Bowring and Cobden parted ways. Cobden too was a liberal, but he regarded the tough love that Bowring prescribed as a betrayal of truly liberal principles. Free trade, Cobden insisted, cannot be forced and civilization cannot be spread by barbarian means. When parliament finally voted on the issue after six days of debate, the government won in the House of Lord but lost, by 16 votes, in the House of Commons. Bowring’s conduct had been officially censored. Palmerston dissolved parliament on March 5, 1857, and called for an election.

The war John Bowring started illustrates the limitations of the principle of free exchange. Liberals are no doubt correct to conclude that free exchange results in mutual advantages, more efficient allocation of resources, and that it spreads good ideas and best practices. Yet not all participants in the market are placed in the same position; there are privileged, centrally located, participants, and other participants who are far weaker and more peripheral. The market, that is, is not a web made up of nodes where all are of the same size and connected to each other in the same manner. Instead some nodes are larger and more central, and the position you occupy in the market determines the power you have. A market where power is extremely unevenly distributed looks like Bentham’s Panopticon. A market of this kind is what Bowring’s war created—a Britain at the center of the wheel of international commerce, from whence British merchants and investors were able to see, inspect and control, everything that happened in the world. Free exchange to China, as a powerless and marginal country, could never mean the same thing. Much like a prisoner coming out of a dark dungeon in a medieval prison, China could be reformed only if it was exposed to sunlight and fresh air—and to the disciplining gaze of the central inspector.

The Failure of War

Looking at a map from around the turn of the twentieth century, with nearly the whole world painted in the colors of various European countries, it is easy to exaggerate the power of imperialism. What the world map does not tell us is how hard it was to achieve many of the military victories, how thin the European presence was on the ground, and how difficult the respective colonies were to control and manage. There were problems of distance and logistics. Soldiers, weapons, and supplies were cumbersome and expensive to transport to these far-away locations, and as a result the armies were always smaller than in Europe and less well equipped. Moreover, tax payers were not happy to pay for wars that, before the end of the nineteenth century, were considered not as national concerns but instead as the pet project of special interest groups. And wars in Asia were impossible for European governments to direct. Before the arrival of the telegraph in the 1850s, it was difficult to even communicate with many outposts, and in 1860 it still took over two months before a message from London arrived in Hong Kong. It was because of
problems such as these that Algeria took two decades for France to conquer and why Afghanistan was subdued only after three, hard-fought, wars. The British empire was not acquired in “a fit of absence of mind.” Rather, while absent-mindedness brought the British into various colonial conflicts, it was only by paying perfect attention to what they were doing that Britain eventually prevailed.

There were equally daunting problems ruling the lands they eventually conquered. Because of the lack of resources and the distances involved, there were few European soldiers and administrators on the ground, and large sections of each territory were controlled more by cunning and intimidation than by military might. The predominance of the British was negotiated through a series of ad hoc arrangements—deals with local pashas, sultans, and kings; divide et imperia tactics that played one ethnic group off against another; payments to slave traders and thugs, bribes to petty officials. And everywhere the Europeans went they had to rely on the services of native soldiers. Much of the time these arrangements worked well enough, but occasionally they broke down. The British armies took Kabul easily in 1839, but were pushed out in the most humiliating way in 1842; in 1857, they came close to being thrown out of India itself. Perhaps, many suspected, Britain was simply too small to be running an empire of such globe-spanning ambitions. In 1820, a fifth of the world’s population, some 200 million people, lived in the British empire—in India above all—yet there were only 12 million people in Britain itself. The British empire was an oak tree planted in a flowerpot. The country did not have the manpower, the armies, the economic resources, or the tax base to administer and police a political entity of this size. European imperial power was daunting to be sure, yet also surprisingly brittle.

Being more aware of these shortcomings than later students of British imperialism, colonial conquests made contemporary Britons feel anxious rather than self-confident. Yet this is a paradoxical conclusion. The middle of the nineteenth century was the time when Britain was supposed to exercise a next to hegemonic power. It was the workshop of the world, the center of global finance, and a leader in science and technology; the country was rich and steadily getting richer. The British lion roared, Britannia ruled the waves, and the sun never set on an empire that covered nearly a fourth of the world’s surface. Yet, in the opinion of many contemporaries, such success only meant that there were all the more things to worry about. British public opinion had a perpetual fear of reversals, of social upheavals, or even of retributions from on high. Russia, leading British politicians convinced themselves with a paranoia dressed up as geopolitical vision, was playing a “great game,” which soon would see the czar’s troops overrunning the Middle East and even India. Every diplomatic dispatch seemed to confirm these fears and every military setbacks gave preachers back home an additional reason to ask their congregations to atone for their sins. Now the swarthy multitudes were finally on the move; the hubris of Britain’s global ambitions was about to be punished.

One expression of this anxiety, as the wars in China attest, was a hypersensitivity to anything that could be construed as an insult. For the British in China next to everything the Chinese did was a reason to feel put upon and a justification for some form of retribution. The Chinese government, said Henry Pottinger, has always encouraged its people to treat us as “human beings of a lower grade.” In 1857,
the British government even published a 232-page report, *Correspondence Respecting Insults in China*, cataloging these various offenses. The grievances concerned the destruction of British property by Chinese mobs, attacks on British subjects and their employees, fraudulent business practices, arbitrary treatment of British subjects in Chinese courts, and so on. Most of the items were misdemeanors, not crimes, and in any case, it was not clear why they were matters for parliament to discuss under the label of “insults.” The publication date of the correspondence, in the spring of 1857, coincided with the resumption of hostilities in Guangzhou and the government’s presumption was clearly that the alleged inequities would resonate with the British public and help make the case for war. Overreacting to these imaginary insults, the British were, said general Montauban, “full of pride and without any restraint.” Samuel Wells Williams, an American missionary and diplomat working in China in 1858, also saw the British up close. “I shall not soon lose my disgust for the overbearing conduct of Lord Elgin and his entire set,” he concluded. “Lord Elgin, who has many good traits, should have been restrained by rather stricter instructions and not backed by thirty men-of-war to add a terrible force to his petulance.”

I find I have need of more grace of God to like Englishmen than people of any other name, and must keep the beams of the lamp of love shining pretty bright upon them to render them tolerable.

Making war on the Chinese was both easy and exasperating. It was easy since Europe’s military superiority was such that they always would win every man-to-man, gun-to-gun, battle. It was exasperating since such level-playing-field engagements were quite rare. Often the Chinese forces simply retreated, and occasionally—such as at the Dagu Forts in June 1859—the Europeans were outsmarted. Yet it was exasperating above all since the Europeans, even when they won the wars, seemed to lose the peace. In both 1842 and 1858, military action had brought the Chinese to the negotiating table, and in both cases an agreement was eventually reached, yet soon afterward the Chinese began back-tracking and prevaricating. The Chinese authorities did not feel bound by the treaties they had entered into, and they failed to implement a number of their key provisions. “Some of the concessions made to us at Tien-tsin in 1858,” as Elgin himself reported back to London, “had been granted by the Emperor in order to get rid of us, and were not intended by him to be permanently binding upon him.” And most frustratingly of all, military action alone was not going to shake the Chinese in their confidence in the viability of their own international system. The European armies constituted only a few thousand men after all, and they were in no position to change the outlook on the world of the Son of Heaven and his 350 million subjects. Sooner or later, the Chinese reasoned—sooner, in fact, given the rapidly approaching winter—the Allied armies would have to go home, and until that moment the Chinese forces avoided direct confrontations and simply absorbed the blows they were dealt. “I am afraid that the moment we all leave the Gulf of Pecheli, the greater part of this dearly-purchased document, will prove a dead letter.” The Chinese “would like to buy us off but we can’t afford to have a war every other year and must make a settlement this time which will really last.”
The Failure of the Liberal Project

The only alternative would have been to topple the Qing dynasty and to replace it with some other, more Europe-friendly, ruler. This was clearly a possible outcome of the North China Campaign of 1860, yet this was not what any European country desired. The lucrative China trade required peace and stability to flourish, and if the imperial regime fell, the consequences were likely to be disastrous. Thus, ironically, at the same time as the Europeans were making war on the emperor in northern China, they supported him militarily in putting down rebellions in the south. Besides, an occupation of the whole country was in any case completely unfeasible. The 20,000 soldiers brought along in 1860 might win all their battles, but they were not in a position to control and administer the country. If not before, this had been made perfectly clear during the two months in the winter of 1857 when Britain temporarily had occupied Guangzhou. Being short on staff and translators, and constantly harassed by irregular Chinese forces, they were first forced to ask the Chinese administrators to return to help them govern the city, and eventually the city itself was simply abandoned. The same difficulties existed in Beijing in October 1860, but in addition the Allies were short on ammunition and they did not even have proper winter coats.

The Failure of Diplomacy

By looking more closely at the failure of the negotiations initiated after the capture of the Dagu forts, we will understand why peace was so difficult to achieve. In the weeks after August 21, the Allies met repeatedly with the Chinese negotiators, and on several occasions a settlement seemed to be tantalizingly close, yet each time the talks broke down. They finally agreed that a new convention would be signed on September 7, yet at the very last moment Parkes and Wade, the translators and China experts, decided that they wanted to see the letters of accreditation that empowered their Chinese counterparts to conclude a deal on behalf of the emperor. Yet “the Chinese dignitary endeavoured to avoid this straightforward request, feigning indisposition, shilly-shallying and beating round about the bush, and trying to gain time in the manner usual with diplomatists of his nation.” The British negotiators—“far too accustomed to such manoeuvres not to observe it at once”—decided that something was wrong. “They left, saying that it was useless to talk any more upon the subject of the convention with one improvided with the necessary powers from the Emperor to act in his name.”

To call the talks held in the fall of 1860, “negotiations” is perhaps not entirely appropriate. After all, the matter at hand—the Tianjin Treaty from 1858—had already been signed and all that remained was the question of the terms under which the ratifications were to be exchanged. There were a few additional issues—above all the Allied insistence that they be paid an indemnity—but as the Chinese authorities repeatedly made clear, they were perfectly ready to agree to all requests. The talks, in short, should have been easy enough to conclude. The ratification was a simple matter of protocol, yet an agreement proved impossible to reach since the simple matter of protocol concerned nothing less than the fundamentally different ways in which international politics was conceptualized by the Europeans and by the Chinese. Since the practices that constituted the two international systems were
impossible to combine, and since neither party was prepared to yield, the talks had to break down.

To the British, it was essential that their diplomats should be permanently stationed in Beijing, or at least that they would have permanent access to the Chinese capital. Having a permanent embassy “lies at the whole root of the Chinese question,” and Elgin was prepared to get to Beijing even “if he walked there.” The exchange of permanent resident ambassadors was after all one of the core practices that constituted the Euro-centric international system. Through the exchange of ambassadors, the formal equality of the respective heads of states were affirmed and manifested. Yet no such practice existed in the Sino-centric international system, and instead foreign envoys were treated as tribute-bearers who were forced to submit themselves to the protocol of the imperial court. Foreign missions should enter China at the prescribed location, not exceed one hundred unarmed men, travel in the emperor’s carts, lodge at the official residence, and so on—and then followed the elaborate details concerning the audience with the emperor. What the Chinese authorities tried to do in the fall of 1860 was to convince the Allies to follow at least some of these requirements. They urged them to approach the capital unarmed, in a small contingent, and so on, and once in Beijing they were asked to present themselves before the emperor according to all the time-honored rules. This is not to say that the court’s rules were rigid. In the past, the imperial authorities had on several occasions shown great flexibility when accommodating foreign guests, and in 1860 they once again gave evidence of their willingness to compromise. Thinking on their feet, the Chinese negotiators first suggested that the ratification should take place somewhere else than in Beijing—in Tianjin, for example—but in the end the emperor was simply removed from the capital, for his personal safety to be sure, but also in order to facilitate the negotiations. After all, if no emperor was present, no audience was required. Given their own flexibility, the Chinese never understood why the Europeans were so intransigent. They continued their march on Beijing even though peace talks were under way, and even though the imperial authorities were prepared to agree to all their demands.

What the British sought was not a material as much as an ontological concession. It was, said Lord Elgin, “the obstinate refusal of the Court of Pekin to place itself on a footing of equality with other Powers [which] lies at the root of our difficulties with that country.” Changing the Chinese outlook on the world, and on themselves, was thus Britain’s most fundamental concern. A precondition was that Britain should be treated as an equal. A stipulation to this effect featured prominently in the Tianjin Treaty itself. According to Article 3, the British ambassador was to be spared “any ceremony derogatory to him as representing the Sovereign of an independent nation on a footing of equality with that of China.” The forms of diplomacy should be those that “are employed by the Ambassadors, Ministers, or Diplomatic Agents of Her Majesty towards the Sovereigns of independent and equal European nations.” In general, the British ambassador in China “shall enjoy the same privileges as are accorded to officers of the same rank by the usage and consent of Western nations.” According to an explicit provision, the Chinese character 奸, yi, which the Europeans
usually translated as “barbarian,” “shall not be applied to the Government or subjects of Her Britannic Majesty, in any Chinese official document issued by the Chinese authorities either in the capital or in the provinces.” 99

Ironically considering these stipulations, the Nanjing and Tianjin treaties are usually labeled “unequal,” referring to the fact that the Chinese on both occasions were forced to agree to a number of humiliating concessions—extraterritoriality for foreigners, for example, and the loss of Hong Kong. In domestic law, treaties agreed to at gunpoint are normally considered invalid, yet in international law this is not the case—after all, peace treaties are generally signed under duress. Yet what in a more fundamental sense made these treaties unequal were not the forced concessions but instead, paradoxically, the language of equality itself. Reciprocity, we said, presupposes mutual recognition—a mirroring of rights and obligations—but in the Sino-centric international system such mirroring had no place. 100 The Sino-centric system was hierarchical and what was recognized were differences not similarities. 101 To insist on the language of equality constituted for that reason alone a rejection of the imperial assumptions. The Chinese authorities had agreed to the terms of the treaties, but since they could not properly conceptualize them, they had done so only in bad faith. As the Europeans suspected—and they were right—the Chinese authorities lacked the proper commitment.

The Allies never really understood the nature of this disagreement and they never understood why the Chinese stubbornly refused to see sense. 102 In the talks held in the fall of 1860, they repeatedly insisted on their right to station diplomats in Beijing, on the right not to kou tou, and that the ratifications should be exchanged in a ceremony that presented them and the imperial authorities as equal parties. 103 The Allies were not tribute bearers, they emphatically declared, but instead the representatives of sovereign rulers. Already in their initial ultimatum to the emperor—the letter whose “cheeky” reply constituted the ostensible reason for the 1860 war—they had demanded that this display of equality take place in Beijing. China’s pretensions were simultaneously both preposterous and ridiculous, yet nothing that the British said or did could change their minds. China’s was a “jealous, arrogant, and unapproachable government”; the Chinese were “idiotical,” “stubborn,” “overbearing,” “lying,” and “treacherous.” 104

The problem of incommensurability is vividly illustrated by the diplomatic paraphernalia that the Allies brought with them to China. They insisted, for example, that treaties should be drawn up and ratified and that relations between Europe and China should be defined in legal terms. Indeed, it was the ratification of a treaty that provided the official rationale for the military campaign in the first place. In the nineteenth century such legalisms constituted the modus operandi of European colonialism, not only in China but elsewhere in the world too. 105 Wherever the Europeans went, they looked for some local dignitary—a “chief” or a “king”—who could be forced or bribed into signing a paper which handed over a designated piece of land to them, preferably “in perpetuity.” In Africa and North America, hundreds of treaties were concluded in this manner, legalizing and legitimizing European possession and making sure that any resistance on the part of the natives could be identified as a breach of contract. 106 To respectable international lawyers, treaties such as these were a joke. 107 Since savages had no standing in international law, they
could not enter into treaties with Europeans. The papers were not legal documents as much as rituals through which European possession was publicly announced and made official.\footnote{108}

As for the Chinese, they were not unfamiliar with this legalistic terminology. However, in their diplomatic tradition, treaties played a role only in relation to tribes on the Central Asian steppes to the north and the west of the country, including Russia with whom agreements were concluded at Nerchinsk in 1689, Kyakhta in 1727, and Kuldja in 1851.\footnote{109} The issues at stake here were the establishment and pacification of a common border, and the regulation of trade, and for these purposes there was indeed a presumption of equality of sorts between the parties. This was emphatically not the case, however, in relation to the foreigners who arrived in China by boat. These were delegations from kingdoms who were subordinate to the emperor, and with such rulers there could be no legal relations and no deals. The treaties concluded at Nanjing and Tianjin were formally modeled on the Russian treaties, but since the Europeans who concluded them had no permanent presence in relation to China, there was no reason for the imperial authorities to take them seriously. The Nanjing and Tianjin treaties were either ignored by the Chinese or incorporated as temporary aberrations of the practices that governed the Sino-centric international system.

Barbarian states, the new positive international law had concluded, have a partial standing in international law and for that reason they can enter into some agreements with civilized states.\footnote{110} Yet agreements made by barbarians can by definition never be equal. In domestic society, parties concluding a contract renounce their right to exercise power over each other and trust instead the state to do it for them. In an analogous manner, in civilized international society, each state renounces the use of power and trusts that the norm regarding reciprocity will help enforce any agreement. In relations between civilized and barbarian states, however, there is no reciprocity and instead power has to be exercised directly by each negotiator. This is why the diplomats seeking ratification of the Tianjin Treaty were accompanied by an army. The Europeans relied on the legal language above all since it provided them with fancy-sounding pretexts for doing what they would have done anyway.

Consider the issue over which the talks were abandoned on September 6. When they met to finalize the proceedings for the following day, Harry Parkes and Thomas Wade suddenly decided that their Chinese counterparts lacked the authority to conclude a deal. Yet there is no doubt that they exaggerated the importance of this issue.\footnote{111} Naturally negotiators need to know that their counterparts have the right credentials, yet it is unlikely that any Chinese negotiator would have been in a position to bind the hands of the emperor. A negotiator representing the emperor of China could never have the same status as a negotiator representing a European ruler. In this case, however, this hardly mattered since a deal already had been concluded—the Treaty of Tianjin, after all, was signed already two years previously. The points that had been added since then were minor ones and the imperial authorities had already agreed to them. And in any case, whatever the credentials of the negotiators, their word would soon enough be superseded by the official ratification itself. What the talks concerned were the circumstances under which the ratification was to take place and talks on that topic could have been carried out by clerks without any particular credentials.\footnote{112}
It is difficult to avoid the impression that at least some of the Allied commanders wanted the war to continue. The fact that Harry Parkes was the person who broke off the negotiations is significant. Parkes, after all, had a well-documented disdain for negotiated settlements and a deep hatred of the Chinese authorities. However, Elgin himself was clearly thinking along the same lines. “My idiotical Chinamen,” as he put it in a letter to his wife, just as the negotiations broke down,

have taken to playing tricks, which give me an excellent excuse for carrying the army on to Pekin... The blockheads have gone on negotiating with me just long enough to enable Grant to bring all his army up to this point... these stupid people give me a snub, which obliges me to break with them.

This is why it proved impossible to reach an agreement even though the Chinese insisted that they willingly agreed to all Allied demands. On September 11, the Chinese came up with a new negotiating team: Zaiyuan, prince Yi, a member of the imperial family, and Muyin, the minister of war. And yet, since the Chinese insisted that the Europeans follow the official protocol, no agreement could be reached. “Parkes and Wade have just been in my tent,” wrote Elgin, “with a letter from two new plenipotentiaries, really some of the highest personages in the empire, stating that they are under orders to come to Tientsin to settle everything, and deprecating a forward movement.” Yet Elgin remained firm: “I shall of course stick by my programme, and decline to have anything to say to them till I reach Tung-chow.” Yet once he reached Tongzhou, Elgin still had no interest in finding a negotiated solution. To accept their proposals, as he explained in a letter to the British government, “would have been, in my judgment, to compromise the most important objects for which this costly expedition was undertaken.” What the British wanted was not an agreement, not a peace treaty, but to force the Chinese to change their very outlook on the world.
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The reason Lord Elgin decided to burn down Yuanmingyuan, wrote general Montauban in his diary, is that he is afraid of public opinion, “and in particular of the newspapers, since among the 26 English victims is Monsieur Bowlby, correspondent for The Times.”¹ In 1874, in a deposition before a French court, he repeated the allegation. It was when the bloody remains of Thomas Bowlby’s body were discovered, Montauban explained, “that the English resolved to burn the Palace in revenge for the murder of their countryman.”²

I perfectly remember that I then made some observations to Lord Elgin, who replied in a form of discreet confidence, “What would The Times say of me if I did not avenge its Correspondent?”

According to Henry Knollys, the editor of General Hope Grant’s recollections from the war, this is not a convincing explanation. It is difficult to believe, Knollys concluded, “that our high-minded diplomatist was prompted to so severe an act of retribution, merely through an apprehension that otherwise he might lack the support of one of the organs, however influential, of public opinion.”³ The aim of this chapter is to investigate this question. Montauban was right, we will conclude, and Knollys was wrong. Consideration regarding British public opinion was not the only reason why Yuanmingyuan was destroyed, but it was an important reason.

To make sense of Lord Elgin’s concerns, we need to return to the notion of a performance. An action that is performed, we said above, is an action that is staged and carried out in front of an audience. By representing something before others, we seek to demonstrate, explain, or teach something, to convey sensations, emotions, and experiences. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was a performance of this kind, and British public opinion was one of the audience before whom it was staged. Lord Elgin’s aim was to avenge the torture and killing of the 39 prisoners taken by the Chinese on September 18. Britain had been humiliated, the country’s ability to
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protect its own people had been questioned, and Elgin had to demonstrate to the British public that he could set the situation right. Or so, at least, he imagined. For this purpose, the traditional practices of statecraft were hopelessly inadequate. Wars and diplomatic negotiations had been tried and found wanting. It was instead only through a spectacular performance that British newspaper readers could be reassured. “The English nation will not be satisfied unless more lasting marks of our sense of the barbarous manner in which they have violated the laws of nations be inflicted on the Chinese Government.”

The question remains why General Montauban was not equally afraid of Le Moniteur, the French newspaper who also published long articles about the war. In fact, under pressure from public opinion, the French commanders reacted in the opposite manner: they insisted that the incineration of Yuanmingyuan constituted a crime that would be roundly condemned at home. The French commanders too, that is, adjusted their behavior in relation to the anticipated verdict of an imagined public opinion, yet this public opinion was a different one, speaking with a different voice. What these publics are and how their voices are related is a story of the development of newspapers and the printing press, of new technologies such as the telegraph, and new professions such as that of the war correspondent. However, it is also a story of politics: the role of-parliaments, freedom of the press, and the scope and depth of public deliberation. Britain and France differed in several of these respects and as a result the public opinions whose verdicts the respective commanders feared were quite different.

Newspapers and Public Opinion

In the course of the 1850s, vastly more newspapers than previously were printed and sold, especially in Great Britain. With increasing literacy rates, more people were able to read, and with higher living standards, they had more time to devote to reading; thanks to improvements such as the invention of the kerosene lamp, 1846, it was possible to extend the reading hours into the evenings. In addition, the newspaper itself underwent a technological revolution. At the start of the century, papers were still printed by hand, one sheet at the time, but once steam-driven printing presses were introduced, adopted by The Times in 1814, the speed increased dramatically. In the 1830s, the rotary press was invented in the United States, and that invention too was soon adopted by The Times. With the help of the new technology, something between 18,000 and 20,000 copies could be printed per hour.

Meanwhile, the invention of the telegraph in the 1830s made sure that the news really was brand new. In 1850, the first telegraph cables was laid across the English Channel, before long similar cables criss-crossed Europe, continuing onto Egypt, and in 1860 it was possible to communicate between London and India in as little as five days. The first operational trans-Atlantic telegraph cable was put in place in 1866 and direct telegraphic communication with China was established in 1871, although British diplomats in far-flung locations were encouraged to use ordinary mail due to the high cost—more than two dollars per word across the Atlantic. Newspapers were, despite the exorbitant rates, heavy users of the telegraph, and Julius Reuter’s news agency, founded in London in 1851, helped make
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news more affordable. Relying on the telegraph, and on an extensive network of correspondents, Reuter’s put more, and better quality, information into the pages also of regional newspapers. As all editors soon enough came to realize, if one paper subscribed to Mr. Reuter’s services, the other papers catering to the same readers had to do so too.¹²

In Britain, the most important changes may well have concerned the tax code.¹³ Before the 1850s, an advertising tax, a stamp duty, and a tax on paper had contributed to making newspapers too expensive for ordinary people to buy.¹⁴ “So long as the penny lasts,” as Richard Cobden put it in 1850, referring to the stamp duty, “there can be no daily press for the middle or working class.”¹⁵ According to its conservative defenders, these taxes discouraged “the dissemination of seditious and blasphemous opinions,” which might “demoralise the community.”¹⁶ However, according its liberal critics, it was “a tax on truth, a tax on public opinion, a tax on good order and good government, a tax on society, a tax on the progress of human affairs, and on the working of human institutions.”¹⁷ In 1853, the advertisement tax was finally abolished and in 1855 the stamp duty too.¹⁸ The results were dramatic: in the middle of the 1860s, five times more newspapers were sold than 30 years earlier.¹⁹ The cheap weekly papers intended for an urban mass market were the greatest winners, but the provincial press also flourished, including The Manchester Guardian, The Scotsman, and many other regional papers. Despite the increased competition, sales of The Times increased fivefold too—from around 10,000 copies in 1834 to 51,648 in 1854. By the middle of the 1850s, The Times was still selling twice as many copies as all other morning dailies combined.²⁰

Several of these developments had a similar impact in France.²¹ Here too by mid-century there was a dramatic increase in the number of newspapers sold. “Not the literary man only,” wrote Walter Bagehot in a report from Paris in 1852, “but the ouvrier and the bourgeois live on the same food; this day’s Siècle is discussed not only in gorgeous drawing-rooms, but in humble reading-rooms and still humbler workshops.”²² Yet the overall numbers of newspapers sold were always considerably lower in France than in Britain, not least since France retained the stamp duty. The most important difference between the two countries, however, was political. After Napoleon III’s coup in December 1851, stringent press controls were imposed on all French editors and articles dealing with political and economic matters were subject to prepublication censorship.²³ Decisions made by the government or by parliament could be reported, but they could not be discussed in editorials or opinion pieces, and all articles had to be signed so that “the courts might lay hands at once on an offending writer.”²⁴ Toward the end of Napoleon III’s reign, after 1867, these rules were considerably relaxed, but in 1860 they were still in place and still largely respected.²⁵

The restricted nature of discussions in France was a source of great embarrassment to Frenchmen of liberal persuasions, such as Victor Hugo, and conversely, the vibrant British press was a source of great pride to all British writers on the subject.²⁶ A free press operates much like a court of law they decided: newspapers allow us to publicize issues, to debate them, and eventually to reach a shared judgment on them. “The newspaper,” as John Stuart Mill put it in 1836, “carries home the voice of the many to every individual among them; by the newspaper each learns that others
are feeling as he feels, and that if he is ready, he will find them also prepared to act upon what they feel.”  

The example that Mill had in mind here was the Reform Act of 1832. “Hundreds of newspapers speaking in the same voice at once, and the rapidity of communication afforded by improved means of locomotion, were what enabled the whole country to combine in that simultaneous energetic demonstration of determined will….” Conversely, a society that lacks a free press will make less well-considered decisions and it will be more difficult for people to act together to achieve common goals.

At the same time, liberals were often afraid of public opinion understood as a simple aggregation of the actual views of a majority of the people. Huddled together in the enormous new cities created by the industrial revolution, a majority of the people were undereducated, underpaid, and overworked, and whatever they did and thought and said they did and thought and said only as a member of a crowd. 

Crowds, leading liberals decided, are easily manipulated by orators and prone to violence. The opinions of ordinary people are now ruling the world, Mill complained, but “[t]hier thinking is done for them by men much like themselves, addressing them or speaking in their name, on the spur of the moment, through the newspapers.” What was at stake here were the conditions under which politics is carried out in a democracy. Today it is not good enough to merely do things, Mill concluded, you have to be seen to be doing things; that is, your actions have to be covered by the press. It was only by grabbing and holding the attention of journalists and their readers that politicians could influence public opinion. Politicians started “playing to the gallery,” referring, originally, to the way members of parliament pandered to the journalists who were admitted to the gallery of the House of Commons after 1774.

As newspaper editors soon discovered, nothing grabbed their readers’ attention like a sensational story. The word “sensation,” understood as an event which causes a “state of shock or surprise,” is first recorded in English in 1779. It denoted an emotional experience closely related to the wondrous and awe-inspiring, but sensations were more than anything wonders that could be sold at a price. As publishers discovered, members of the general public had a next to insatiable demand for sensational stories, as conveyed, for example, by the large number of books that appeared in the 1860s and 1870s dealing with adultery, theft, insanity, bigamy, murder, and other equally shocking subjects. Newspaper editors soon tapped into the same market. The sensational aroused the curiosity of the reader, “extra, extra!” cried the newspaper boys, and the sensations they promised made passers-by want to “read all about it.” For the editors, this presented a temptation to exaggerate—to “sensationalize”—what was taking place, or even to make up events in order to sell copy. The funeral of the Duke of Wellington may, for example, have been long anticipated, but when it eventually occurred in November, 1852, the press turned it into a grand occasion for national mourning. Likewise, when Prince Albert unexpectedly died in December 1861, it was a tragedy for the royal family in which the whole nation, thanks to the newspapers, were able to share. Both occasions allowed The Times to double its regular sales.

The new taste for the sensational presented opportunities for individuals and groups who could provide newspaper editors with the required material. The killing
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of a political leader, as John Wilkes Booth found out in 1865, was certain to be a headline-grabbing event, and the latter half of the nineteenth century saw a number of political assassinations and other spectacular violent acts undertaken in order to publicize various political causes. There were no fewer than eight attempts on Queen Victoria’s life through the course of her reign. The first, in 1840, was carried out by a man who attacked the royal carriage on a London street. Since, when interrogated, the assailant gave no other reason for the assault than the attention he would get from the press, he was declared insane and transported to Australia. In 1872, a 17-year-old Irishman ran up to the queen waving a pistol and demanding the release of imprisoned Irish nationalists. These attempts were all badly planned and badly executed, but the attack that the Italian nationalist Felice Orsini and his accomplices executed against Napoleon III and his wife on January 14, 1858, was deadly. The gang threw three bombs that missed their intended targets but killed eight innocent bystanders. The attack, Orsini explained in court, was a way of encouraging Italians to stand up against foreign oppression and to call on all Frenchmen to liberate themselves from Napoleon’s tyrannical rule.

From Our Own Correspondent

Wars had been reported on before—already the atrocities of the Thirty Years War were discussed in the news-sheets of the seventeenth century—but it was only in the 1850s that correspondents were dispatched to the front with the express purpose of staying with the troops and reporting from the battlefield. These “our own,” or “our special,” correspondents were the coddled stars of the new era of commodified sensations. In contrast to regular hacks, they were usually educated men and often well connected both socially and politically, and as money-makers for the papers they were provided with generous expense accounts. Constantly exposed to perils in far-away locations, “they lead the most exciting lives a man can lead.”

The person who more than others personified the new profession was William Howard Russell, dispatched by The Times to the Crimean War in 1854. Writing long dispatches in a lively prose, Russell reported the facts but he also gave his personal judgment on what he witnessed. Most famously he exposed the incompetence of the generals and he reported on the abysmal state of the medical facilities in the field, prompting Florence Nightingale and her contingent of nurses to set off for the Russian front. Russell’s reports were regularly discussed in the British parliament with some members insisting that The Times abstain from publishing anything that could be “considered calculated to furnish valuable information to the enemy.” Russell, however, defended himself and he was strongly backed by John Thadeus Delane, the legendary editor of The Times, not least since every report from the front increased newspaper sales. Russell’s writings were a voice of moral authority, feared by the incompetent and the corrupt, and his pen could bring down governments. Russell was in his time “the best known and most admired literary man, with perhaps the solitary exception of Mr. Charles Dickens, in the world.”

This was the glamorous role taken on by the small group of reporters who covered the Second Opium War—two correspondents for The Times, George Wingrove Cooke and Thomas Bowlby, most prominently among them. Cooke was an Oxford
graduate and a man of letters who had written several books on historical subjects as well as editorials for *The Times*.\(^{47}\) He arrived in Hong Kong in May 1857, and stayed in China for one year, during which time he covered the on-going war in long, 4,000 words, essays that appeared *verbatim* in the pages of the paper.\(^{48}\) Cooke was generally dismissive of the Chinese, which he found dirty and ridiculous looking, but he was also critical of the British. Perhaps Cooke even suffered from something of a Russell complex: some of his complaints were identical to those that contemporaries remembered reading in Russell’s dispatches.\(^{49}\) Yet his greatest ire was reserved for those “twenty-years-in-the-country-and-speak-the-language” experts who all were of a defeatist frame of mind and ready to give in to every Chinese demand.\(^{50}\) We should be honest with the Chinese and “say to them that the nations of the civilized world regard them as barbarous; or, at least, as a semi-civilized people.”\(^{51}\) Although Cooke clearly did not have anything like Russell’s status or impact, he too was influential.

Elgin and Cooke did not get along. The bombardment of Guangzhou, in December 1857, Elgin complained, became “a romance” in the hands of “Our Own,” although he clearly had not even witnessed many of the events he described.\(^{53}\) Cooke exaggerated, caricatured, and played to the prejudices of the British public. “I saw very well, from his case, what the great evils are of this way of informing the public mind.”

It was always necessary for him to write a telling letter. Everything was exaggerated for effect. The fighting was a work of the fancy, and the poor Chinese were of use only as *matériel* for caricatures and epigrams. He never entered into or ever approached the heart of Chinese life. He looked at them entirely from without, with the eyes of a man whose whole stock of ideas has been laid in at Temple Bar, and who had not room for any importation from any other quarter.\(^{54}\)

Cooke defended himself against such accusations, insisting that “upon arriving in the country I anxiously discarded all Europe-bred opinions, and applied myself earnestly to the collection of facts before I indulged in any new beliefs.”\(^{55}\) And perhaps, in the end, the main problem was that Cooke did not give a sufficiently positive image of the British war effort and of Elgin himself. Cooke’s decision to leave for India in May 1858 must have come as a relief for the British plenipotentiary.

As for Lord Elgin, he was clearly something of a news junkie. Returning home from an assignment, the first thing he would do was to read the papers that had accumulated in his absence and when the mail from London reached him he spent several hours catching up on the latest events.\(^{56}\) He read the English language Hong Kong and Shanghai press, European newspapers like the *Indépendance belge*, and the London dailies, *The Times* foremost among them.\(^{57}\) In letters to his wife, he would occasionally refrain from describing a certain event since he knew a full account subsequently would appear in *The Times*.\(^{58}\) Elgin was aware of what the papers were writing about him, that questions would be asked in parliament based on those articles, and that the eventual verdict on his mission would depend on how it was reported in the press.\(^{59}\) “The last *Times,*” he pointed out to his wife, “has reprinted my telegram from Tianjin, as well as a report of a few words from Disraeli, showing
that they think there has been a want of promptitude”; “I see that in the very flattering article of *The Times* of September 7th, which you quote, it is implied that when I signed the Treaty, I had done my work…” Queen Victoria herself would read what *The Times* was reporting from China, and be “most interested in it.”

When he returned to China in 1860, Elgin spent considerable efforts befriending *The Times*’ new correspondent, Thomas Bowlby. Bowlby was a lawyer with a practice in the Temple, but a love of writing had brought him to journalism. *The Times* sent him to Continental Europe in 1848 to cover the various nationalist revolutions and in 1860 they sent him to China. On the way there he traveled on the same ship as Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, and the three clearly enjoyed each other’s company. “Our own Correspondent,’ Mr. Bowlby,” Elgin told his wife, “is a remarkably agreeable person, and has become very much one of our party.” Like Russell and Cooke, Bowlby wrote in a personal style, mixing reporting with praise and blame as he saw fit. For example, when their ship was wrecked in the harbor of Galle, Ceylon, on the way to China, he lashed out at the officials of the shipping company who refused to reimburse them for their losses. As for China and the Chinese, Bowlby indulged in fewer stereotypes than Cooke, and as a member of Elgin’s party, his interpretations were far closer to the official British version of events. In an explicit reference to Russell’s highly critical reporting from the Crimea, Bowlby made a visit to a British hospital ship anchored off the Chinese coast, but the conditions on-board left nothing to be desired. The British government had clearly learned their lesson. In consideration of the power of Bowlby’s pen, he was given both respect and privileged access, and he repeatedly held “long conversations” with Elgin himself. He was very much “in the secrets of the cabinet,” as David Rennie put it, and Elgin thought of him as “the means of diffusing sound information on many points on which it is most important for the national interests that the British public should be correctly informed.” Delane, the editor of *The Times*, was delighted to have placed his correspondent so close to the British ambassador, but he also warned him that access could be corrupting—“your difficulty will only be to escape fascination.”

The French too had their own correspondent in China, Antoine Fauchery, reporting for *Le Moniteur*, the official newspaper of the French government. Fauchery was an adventurer and a photographer who had spent time in Australia documenting the gold rush in the 1850s, but when war broke out in China he was recruited as the paper’s correspondent. He filed 13 long dispatches in all, and just as Bowlby’s reports they were personal in style, mixing accounts of the events of the battle fields with more mundane observations. Yet Fauchery always stayed close to the official French line, in particular when it came to denying, or simply not mentioning, French atrocities. There were frequent reports in other French papers too—in *Le Figaro*, *Le Siècle* and *Journal des débats*—but these articles were copied from *Le Moniteur* and *The Times*, or they were copies of official correspondence. Back in France there was consequently no debate about the China war in the press and no concerned letters to the editors. There was furthermore no risk of criticism being raised in the French parliament. During Napoleon III, France had two parliamentary assemblies, the Corps législatif and the Senate, but both were controlled by the government and their powers were limited. The French commanders, as a result, knew they ran no risk of being publicly censored/criticized for their conduct.
The Chinese Election of 1857

When the House of Commons in March 1857 censored John Bowring for the war he had started in China, and Palmerston’s government was forced to resign, the editor of *The Times* had difficulties making sense of the connection. Has the government really forfeited the confidence of the people, the paper asked, due to an act committed on the other side of the world, by people they did not appoint and not instruct? And yet, there it was. Newspaper reports from China had stirred parliament into action and the debate that ensued had forced the government to resign. Unlikely as it sounds, in the election campaign that followed—the “Chinese Election of 1857”—the war in China was one of the main topics discussed.

Just as during the war itself, newspapers played an important role throughout the election campaign—creating, formulating, and directing what came to constitute British public opinion. Initially both the government and the opposition were perfectly confident regarding their chances. “I am sure there is no safer battle-ground than the Chinese business,” Richard Cobden concluded. “Our opponents will try to escape the issue, but we must rub their noses in it.” Yet it was Lord Palmerston who seized the initiative, aided and abetted by the most influential papers—the *Morning Chronicle*, which specialized in assorted jingoistic appeals, and *The Times*. Just as Palmerston had done in the House of Commons, the papers poured abuse on the Chinese and on the Chinese authorities. The choice is simple, *The Times* explained, Palmerston and Bowring had stood up for Britain, whereas Cobden and the opposition had prostrated themselves before the emperor, embarrassing the country and putting its officials at risk. They made fun of the ragtag band of brothers that constituted the opposition—Lord Derby, the former prime minister, was a protectionist, and Cobden a famous champion of free trade and a universal franchise. “The Government has been defeated, it is true,” the editor of *The Economist* concluded, “but it has been defeated by a combination of forces which could not combine to replace it; it has succumbed to a causal junction of antagonists, each section of which is weaker than itself.” The choice that confronted the voters was not between Palmerston and the men who opposed him, but between a Palmerston government and no government at all.

Once the election campaign got under way, it quickly became clear that the opposition faced serious difficulties. A first sign of things to come was that several of the government’s critics had problems convincing their own parties that they should be allowed to stand for reelection. Some of them were forced to look for new constituencies elsewhere and others were simply dropped from the ballots. Even Richard Cobden had to move from Manchester to the humble constituency of Huddersfield, and John Russell, another government critic, was unceremoniously deselected by his party, despite the fact that he was a former prime minister and closely associated with the popular reforms of the past several decades. “There is terrible rottenness and apathy,” wrote Cobden ten days into the campaign, “and desertions almost by streets.” Facing angry questions and hecklers in their audiences, the opposition talked less and less about China and more and more about other issues. Meanwhile, Palmerston was feeling increasingly confident. He had proof, he said, “that the heart of the country is sound, and that it will reverse the censure which was passed upon
us the other day by the House of Commons.” The government’s case was straightforward and easily explained; the position of the opposition was obscure and weak, but more than anything it was anti-British. The opposition “expected to succeed to power by making the humiliation and degradation of their country a stepping-stone to office”; they had forgotten “the tie that ought to bind every Englishman to the interests, the honour, and the glory of his country”; they “would have had us make an abject submission to the barbarians.” It was only Palmerston who had stood firm throughout, defending his country and its officials. The British people, when they now were asked to pass their verdict on the China war, would surely not forget his resolute defense the country. “The decision may be left very confidently in the hands of a nation jealous of its honour,” The Times concluded, “and resolved to preserve the lives and property of its citizens in all quarters of the globe.”

The arguments concerning national honor seem to have had a particular appeal in less well-to-do constituencies. Despite his decidedly patrician outlook, Palmerston had always been popular with workers and craftsmen, among whom he enjoyed a reputation as approachable and ready to listen to their grievances. During the election campaign in 1857 “Palmerston For Ever” rallies were organized up and down the country where the prime minister was presented as a friend of the poor and as a great social reformer. In one working-class constituency, the local member of parliament defended the government, insisting that it was “an insult to John Bull to pull his nose,” and that “a proper course had been taken to prevent a repetition of the insult to the British flag.” In another working-class constituency, its prospective member of parliament declared himself to be both a “zealous reformer” and “friendly to the foreign policy of Lord Palmerston.” According to Palmerston’s critics, such conclusions were perfectly absurd. The prime minister, they pointed out, was an aristocrat with no interest whatsoever in reforms. He did not want a franchise that included the great unwashed masses; indeed, as Cobden reminded his audiences, Palmerston had been in government during the Peterloo Massacre in 1819 when the British army had charged into a crowd of some 70,000 working-class protesters.

After the ill-tempered election campaign, the election itself was held on March 27, 1857, and Palmerston’s government was returned in a landslide. The Liberals received 64.77% of the vote—up 7%—and the Tories got 34.45%—down 7.1%. More significant still was the composition of the two parties. While pro-Palmerston candidates overwhelmingly were returned, the leading anti-Palmerston candidates were all beaten, including Richard Cobden himself and men like John Bright, a fellow founder of the Anti-Corn Law League. In the new parliament, a quarter of the MPs were freshmen, all virtually unknown, and they replaced popular men with long years of distinguished service. The new parliament was a far more predictable place, with two distinct parties but with far fewer independent voices. To Palmerston’s friends among the newspaper editors, this was all for the good. It made the prime minister stronger and it made governing easier. Richard Cobden and his friends, The Times concluded, were seriously out of touch with the sentiments of the country. In the 1840s, Cobden had commanded millions in his movement to abolish the Corn Laws, but now he had been rejected by the voters in a second-class borough. The electorate who once attentively had listened to his free
trade message had no interest in his “extravagant peace doctrines.” The Economist noted, “If there is one thing loathsome to the British people,” it is a politician who seeks to make capital out of his country’s reverses, or who aims at power by trying to trip up those who are fighting his country’s battles.

Cobden, when he got news of the outcome of the election, put on a brave face but privately he blamed the press, and in particular the close connection between Palmerston and the leading newspapers. They pretend to speak on behalf of the people, but the prime minister had shamelessly relied on his friends among the editors in “creating an artificial public opinion.” Clearly, lessons had to be learned. The most important such lesson was that nothing could be gained by defending foreigners over British subject, no matter how justified their cause. People like the Chinese were too easy to vilify and British subjects were too easily presented as paragons of virtue. As a result of the outcome of the election, China had few supporters left in the House of Commons when the new war was declared in the spring of 1860, and even the most vocal critics, like Lord Derby in the House of Lords, preferred to keep mum. In fact, once the North China Campaign was launched some of Palmerston’s critics had joined the government side and were put in charge of executing the official foreign policy: Sidney Herbert, a defender of China in 1857, was made minister of war. There were lessons to be learned for the government too, and for the political establishment that ruled Britain. In 1857, the franchise was still severely restricted—limited to perhaps 5 percent of the adult population—but extensive discussions were taking place regarding if, and how, it could be expanded. Britain’s traditional elites, like elites elsewhere in Europe, were unwilling to let ordinary people have an influence over political decisions. Not only would democracy allow the many and the poor to take over the reins of power—and most likely enrich themselves in the process—but democracy would also result in exceedingly poor decisions being reached. Ordinary people, the elites believed, were badly educated, prejudiced, and easily manipulated. “The secret of governing a democracy is understood by men in power at present,” as Lord Elgin himself explained:

Never interfere to check an evil until it has attained such proportions that all the world see plainly the necessities of the case. You will then get any amount of moral and material support that you require; but if you interfere at an earlier period, you will get neither thanks nor assistance.

Yet, and as the Chinese Election of 1857 demonstrated, democracy did not necessarily equal mob rule. As the traditional elites came to realize, if ordinary people easily could be manipulated by demagogues, those demagogues might as well be the traditional elites themselves. Indeed, if they were in charge of forming and molding public opinion, they had a means of retaining power even as the franchise was expanded. Foreign wars could effectively be used as a means of diverting the attention of the working classes away from domestic grievances and concerns. To Cobden, a long-time advocate of a universal franchise, this was a most disheartening conclusion. “In the present general election,” he noted, “the most warlike returns have come from the most popular constituencies, the least warlike from the most aristocratic counties.” In the latter part of the nineteenth century democratization
went together with an increasingly aggressive imperialism and with a predilection for engaging in unprovoked foreign wars.

**Captivity Narratives**

This is the context in which to understand Lord Elgin’s decision to burn down Yuanmingyuan. Newspapers were a new political force in mid-nineteenth century Europe. In Britain in particular, papers became far cheaper and read by many more people. The newspaper readers wanted “sensations,” and one of the sensations they wanted concerned far-away wars, as supplied to them by the new profession of the war correspondent. As Russell’s writings from the Crimea had demonstrated, war correspondents had the power to make up the public’s mind on matters of foreign policy, and Elgin was aware of the power of the press in determining the public assessment of his campaign. When the 39 prisoners—26 of whom were British—were taken captive by the Chinese on September 18, public opinion in Britain required a response. The country had been humiliated and the its ability to protect its own people had been questioned, and Elgin had to demonstrate to the public that he could set the situation right. For this purpose, the traditional practices of statecraft were hopelessly inadequate. Wars and diplomatic negotiations had been tried and found wanting. It was instead only through a performance of some kind that the British public could be reassured. Only by staging some kind of event would it become clear to newspaper readers back home that the British government stood by its officials. It was a matter, said general Hope Grant, of “satisfying the English nation” by “inflicting a lasting mark on the Chinese government.”

When reporting his decision to burn down Yuanmingyuan to the British government, Elgin emphasized the extensive deliberations that had gone into the process, and as a result we get the impression that he acted entirely on his own. Yet hostage crises of this kind were not uncommon in European imperial history, and Elgin’s decision must for that reason be understood in the context of the way other British commanders had reacted on similar occasions. Merchants, settlers, soldiers, and colonial administrators had been taken captive at least since the seventeenth century when England first sought to establish a foothold for trade in the Mediterranean. For a country of Britain’s power and stature, it was profoundly embarrassing that its citizens could be taken prisoners in this way. Britain was a world power to be sure, but as we noted above, its soldiers and officials were often only thinly spread over vast territories, hampered by long distances and slow communications, and by the reluctance on the part of tax payers at home to pay for exotic wars. As a result, British subjects were often exposed to dangers and occasionally they fell into native hands. It happened again and again—in North America, in Africa, and all over Asia.

Although the British public as a rule took little interest in colonial affairs, the details of how British subjects had been captured and treated at the hands of ungrateful natives was an entirely different matter. News of such hostage crises fit perfectly with what editors defined as “sensations.” The stories sold copy, and fiction writers
too were quick to pick up on the theme and elaborate on it in ever more gruesome detail in serialized novels in the papers. Indeed the captives themselves—the ones who survived—often capitalized on their celebrity and published accounts of their ordeals. Such “captivity narratives” counted hundreds of titles, forming something of a separate literary genre. It was to this genre that the narratives left by the prisoners taken during the North China Campaign—accounts by Henry Loch, Harry Parkes, and Stanislas d’Escayrac de Lauture—made direct contributions.

The basic outline of these stories was always the same. First the reader would be introduced to the well-meaning administrators, the intrepid travelers, or—best of all—to the wives of white settlers and their innocent little children. Next the brown-skinned natives would rush onto the scene, capture the Europeans, and drag them off to their lair. Here they would be subject to unspeakable cruelties, starved and tortured in various innovative ways, and in the case of the women, inevitably raped. When news of their capture eventually reached the headquarter of the British colonial army, a brave young officer would set out to rescue them all. If the operation was successful, and the prisoners released, all was well and good. But even if they were not, the editors were equally pleased. To kill innocent prisoners was a crime, which had to be avenged, and the details of the avenging were bound to be sensational too. It was a classical tale of social order established, social order undermined, and social order restored.

Take, for example, the case of the captives seized in Afghanistan in January 1842. When the British army, and a large number of civilians, began their march from Kabul back to India, they were attacked by natives who managed to capture well over a hundred people, including the commander himself, Lord Elphinstone, some 20 children and a dozen white women. Several of the survivors wrote diaries during the captivity, and widely read accounts such as Kaye’s History of the War in Afghanistan turned some of the captives into celebrities in Britain. Or take the case of the prisoners taken during the Indian Uprising in 1857. The most widely publicized account here concerned the siege of Kanpur, a British settlement that contained some 900 Europeans, among them 300 women and children. After being besieged for close to three weeks, the settlers were promised their freedom if they only surrendered, yet the natives did not deliver on their promise. First the men were killed, and then, after two weeks of additional captivity, the women and the children were brutally hacked to pieces. Their body parts were thrown into a well—the notorious “well of Cawnpore”—which in Britain quickly became a symbol of the unspeakable savagery of Orientals.

In both cases, the fate of the captives stirred the indignation of the British public. The prisoners taken in Afghanistan “excited more interest in the mother country than all the other events of the war,” The Illustrated London News concluded, “the history of the world barely contains scenes of more terrific interest.” The gruesome details of the siege at Kanpur had the same effect. British newspapers wallowed in horrific details—some of the children, they decided, were thrown into the well while still alive and they died among the body parts of their family members. The horror that such reporting inspired provided the perfect justification for a terrible revenge, and in both cases the natives were taught a lesson which they were unlikely soon to forget. Yet in both cases, the revenge was exacted also with the
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British public in mind. It was a way to remind British newspapers readers that their government protected its own, and that evil doers would be punished. Reading these accounts, the British public became by turns first confident, then worried, and finally reassured.

The case of the 39 prisoners taken by the Chinese on September 18, 1860, was judged in the light of these earlier experiences. There was by 1860 a certain way of presenting captivity narratives, an accepted vocabulary of pathos, which made them easily identifiable to the British public and which was certain to arouse the required emotional response. As soon as British newspaper readers realized that European civilians had been captured by Asians, they expected them to be humiliated and taunted, left without food, tortured and exposed to the elements, and they expected white maggots to emerge from their pussy wounds. The Chinese were acting true to type, not only because the prisoners indeed were tortured but also because the type in question, by 1860, was a well-established newspaper cliché. What Lord Elgin reacted to was consequently never just the taking of the 39 prisoners. In fact, he did not confront a single event but an event in a series, and his reaction was determined by the series as a whole, the language in which it was described, and the reactions of previous British governments and colonial administrators.

"I have just finished reading Kaye's *History of the Afghanistan War,*" Elgin wrote to his wife on June 11, 1857, on his way to China. "It is very well written, and certainly, if faithful, discloses a series of follies and injustice perfectly appalling." Among the follies that Kaye disclosed was the ineptitude of Lord Elphinstone, the commander. Elphinstone showed, said Kaye, "a feebleness of will" and an "infirmity of purpose," which is "discreditable to the character of a statesman entrusted with the welfare and the honor of the of the greatest empires in the world." By contrast, the British commanders who exacted the eventual revenge on Kabul and the Afghans, "cheerfully took up the burden and placed it on their own shoulders." Thus, once a very similar incident occurred on his own watch, Elgin knew perfectly what his choices were. Showing no infirmity of purpose, he too cheerfully took up the burden of revenge. And the fact that Thomas Bowlby was among those tortured and killed left Elgin no choice. Bowlby was Elgin's personal friend, but above all he was the correspondent for *The Times.* If *The Times* unleashed its fury on him, it would determine the public’s verdict on the North China Campaign and do irreparable damage to Elgin’s own future prospects in politics and government. "I saw much of him both on our voyage out and since our arrival in China,” wrote Elgin to Delane, editor of *The Times,* when expressing his condolences after Bowlby’s death,

And I felt a real interest in and regard for him, not only because I had found him to be an accomplished and agreeable companion, but also because, from the conscientious and liberal spirit in which he took to his work, I believe that he would have done much to enlighten public opinion in England on Chinese affairs. I consider the loss of such a man at this conjunction to be a great calamity.

Compare Britain with France. Public opinion spoke with entirely different voices in the two countries, and it was in anticipation of these verdicts that the commanders made their respective decisions. The British commanders heard a voice that was
perfectly concrete and loudly expressed in editorials and letters to the editor of the leading newspapers. The British public used the pages of the press to further what it regarded as its national interest, and they used the right to vote to promote the same issue in parliament. The French commanders, by contrast, heard a disembodied voice of conscience that embraced all of mankind, or at least its civilized part, and it spoke rather faintly of moral principles and common interests. Not having to pander to popular sentiments to the same extent, the French commanders were free to act in a more civilized manner. The French laws were not liberal, but as a result the actions of the French commanders in China were less barbarian.
The Europeans who approached Beijing in early October, 1860, were, we said, at their wit’s end. The liberal practices of free trade were ineffectual in relation to a Chinese state which stubbornly failed to open its gates to the world market. The traditional practices of statecraft were not more successful. Wars in China were easily won, but the subsequent peace was just as easily lost, and the practices of European diplomacy meant little in terms valid within the Sino-centric international system. Trade, war, and diplomacy had all been tried, and they had all been found wanting. It was in this situation that Lord Elgin decided to burn down Yuanmingyuan.

The final destruction was a staged event, we said; it was a performance. A performance is a representation of something in front of an audience; a performance seeks to demonstrate, explain, or teach something; to convey sensations, emotions, and experiences. This particular performance had two main audiences. In relation to public opinion back home, the message had been that Britain still is strong and still able to protect its own; in relation to the Chinese emperor and the court, the message would be that Britain, not China, is the leading country in the world, and that international politics henceforth must be defined in European, not in Chinese, terms. The traditional practices of statecraft were unable to make these points, but a performance could do it—provided it struck the Chinese with sufficient awe, blew them away, startled, and terrified them. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was just such a performance.

The ability to instill a sense of awe, we said, had long been used by the Chinese court as a means of impressing foreign visitors. Foreign delegations arriving in Beijing were wined and dined and subject to a series spectacles of which the audience with the emperor was the centerpiece. Acknowledging their subservient position, the visitors were required to prostrate themselves before the imperial throne and to hand over their respective tributes. The Europeans, keen to gain commercial advantages, generally followed the prescribed ritual: the Portuguese and the Dutch always did; the Russians usually did; but the British constantly refused to.1 British delegations were never taken in by the wonders of China and they never prostrated themselves before the emperor’s throne. Such insolent behavior was inexplicable to
the Chinese authorities who never could understand why someone would travel so far and go through such expense only to make trouble once they arrived. The reason of course was that trade concessions only was one of Britain’s concerns. In addition, from the time of the first official contacts—from the time of George Macartney’s mission in 1793—its diplomats had also sought to establish Britain in the eyes of the Chinese as their equal and as a country worthy of respect. By refusing to be struck by the wonder, Macartney and subsequent British ambassadors made it impossible for the emperor to exercise power over them; by not koutou-ing, they insisted on their right to stand up for themselves.

Instead the British tried repeatedly to turn the tables on the Chinese. In 1793, and again in 1816 and 1860, representatives of the British government made their way to Beijing with the intention of staging a counter-wonder, a performance that would strike the Chinese with awe and make the emperor prostrate himself before them. Macartney’s attempt at such a counterstrike was an abysmal failure, however, and William Amherst’s attempt in 1816 was even more pathetic. It was only the performance staged by Lord Elgin in 1860 that finally forced the emperor and the court to pay attention to them. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was the counter-wonder that finally achieved its aim.

Refusing to Koutou

In contrast to other Europeans, British visitors to China were never particularly impressed with what they saw. When they arrived at Yuanmingyuan in August 1793, George Macartney and his delegation quickly decided that the descriptions they had read of the palaces and the gardens had been “fanciful.” 2 John Barrow, who spent five weeks here, saw “none of those extravagant beauties and picturesque embellishments,” which had made the palace famous throughout Europe. 3 The Jesuit fathers working in Yuanmingyuan, he concluded, had exaggerated its wonders in order to make themselves look important. Our task should be to “divest the court of the tinsel and the tawdry varnish with which, like the palaces of the Emperor, the missionaries have found it expedient to cover it in their writings.” 4 This stripping exercise soon uncovered a very different kind of place. The buildings, said Æneas Anderson, another member of the mission, are small, heavily decorated, and “not only destitute of elegance, but in a wretched state of repair,” giving “an appearance of neglect.” 5 The buildings were dirty, and this was true also of “those parts contiguous to the palace, which may be supposed the most carefully cultivated.” 6 “These assemblages of buildings,” Barrow concluded, “which they dignify with the name of palaces,” are “more remarkable for their number than for their splendour or magnificence.”

A great proportion of the buildings consists in mean cottages. The very dwelling of the Emperor and the grand hall in which he gives audience, when divested of the gilding and the gaudy colours with which they are daubed, are little superior, and much less solid, than the barns of a substantial English farmer. 7

Given this refusal to be struck by awe, it is not surprising that British diplomats refused to prostrate themselves before the imperial throne. In fact, however, on the
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Macartney’s instructions were actually quite flexible. He was to obtain an audience with the emperor, he was told, but not to “commit the honor of your Sovereign or lessen your own dignity.” On the other hand, he should not “let any trifling punctilio stand in the way of the important benefits which may be obtained by engaging the favorable disposition of the Emperor and his ministers.”

Looking for a way to balance these conflicting objectives, Macartney refused to fall to the ground when the court officials made him rehearse for the audience, but he promised he would do it on the day as long as a Chinese official of equal rank to himself did the same before a portrait of King George III—which Macartney helpfully had brought along with him. Any ritual was acceptable, in other words, as long as it was reciprocal and based on equality between the two countries. What actually happened during Macartney’s audience with Qianlong is contested. Chinese sources claim he koutou-ed, while British sources insist he did not. Yet considering the summary manner in which he was dispatched and his failure to gain any concessions whatsoever from the imperial authorities, Macartney may indeed—as the British sources claim—only have bowed down on one knee.

The story was repeated in 1816 when the next British diplomat, William Amherst, arrived in Beijing at the head of an embassy of some 54 people. Amherst employed the same obstructionist strategy as Macartney and he obtained the same abysmal results. Instead of reciprocal prostrations, the Chinese authorities insisted that he follow Macartney’s example who, according to their version of events, “performed all of the ceremonies and knelt and knocked according to the usages.” Yet Amherst, much like Macartney, clearly had the authority to make up his own mind on the issue, and on their way to Beijing the members of his mission discussed at length how to behave once they arrived. When Amherst finally found himself in Yuanmingyuan, he was still clearly confused about what to do. He excused himself by saying that he did not feel well and that he, besides, needed more time to prepare himself properly for the grand occasion. Attended to by the emperor’s own medicus, however, the court officials decided that he was feigning illness and he was promptly sent packing. Amherst did not prostrate himself, but neither did he achieve any of his mission’s aims.

From the point of view of the Chinese authorities, none of this made any sense. It was surely irrational to travel so far and to equip an embassy at such an expense only to jeopardize the outcome through childish and insolent behavior. Besides the British had already participated in a large portion of the ritual. They had arrived in Beijing in an imperial coach with a banner proclaiming them to be “bearing tributes from the British king” and they had already enjoyed the emperor’s hospitality. Moreover, the Europeans completely misunderstood the meaning of the koutou. By prostrating yourself on the ground you subjected yourself to the power of a superior to be sure, but the superior in question reciprocated by benevolently acknowledging the obligation to care for and protect you. The koutou established and manifested a social relationship and was in no way an act of worship or a way to humiliate an inferior. We officials are of equal rank, Macartney’s Chinese interlocutors explained, and so are our sovereigns, yet we kneel before our emperor and so must you or you will raise yourself above us. This logic made no sense to the Europeans. In the Euro-centric international system, diplomats were thought to personify the state that had sent them and the way diplomats were treated was consequently the way...
the state was treated. In the Sino-centric international system, by contrast, a diplomat was simply a servant of his ruler and he could safely be treated as such.

The problem for the British diplomats was that the dual goals set for their missions contradicted each other. A koutou might get them a concession on trade, but it compromised Britain's status, at least in the eyes of the British diplomats themselves. If they refused to koutou, on the other hand, their missions would end in failure. In the end, the British government left it up to the diplomats to decide what to do. Clearly, if they had decided to prostrate themselves, they would not have acted against their instructions. Yet, on the day, both Macartney and Amherst found themselves quite unable to go ahead with the hated motion. Headlong prostrations did not come easily to members of the British aristocracy famous for their skeptical outlook on life. According to the stoical norms that guided the conduct of a British gentleman, feelings of wonder—or indeed feelings of any kind—were for members of the lower classes, or perhaps for foreigners, to display. By rejecting the possibility of wonders, they defended themselves against the kind of unlimited political and religious authority that Hobbes had advocated. According to Hobbes, the state had to be “awful” in order to compel its subjects to follow its commands. Yet by never falling to the ground, members of the British aristocracy retained their reason and their claims to self-rule. There was no real difference between themselves and their king, they argued; the king was simply a primus inter pares—the leading citizen of the aristocratic republic—and before such a ruler it was completely inconceivable that a real aristocrat would prostrate himself.

During the negotiations conducted throughout September 1860, as we saw, the imperial authorities insisted that an audience with the emperor was required, yet as Lord Elgin made clear, he was not going to koutou, but neither was he going to place himself in a situation where he refused to koutou. Yet in contrast to Elgin himself, the prisoners captured by the Chinese on September 18, 1860, had no choice in the matter. Taken to Yuanmingyuan and brought before various Chinese generals, including Senge Rinchen himself, they were repeatedly asked to make a full prostration, and since their hands were tied behind their backs, they were forced to comply. The most widely publicized case of a koutou, however, concerns not the 39 prisoners, but instead one John Moyse, a private of the 44th Royal East Kent Regiment, popularly referred to as “the Buffs.” On August 12, 1860, Moyse’s company, together with a group of 16 coolies, had been busy transporting a cart of liquid refreshments to the troops. Unable to avoid the temptations presented by the content of the carts, they had fallen asleep by the roadside and this was where they were picked up by the Chinese cavalry. A sergeant in the company who managed to make his way back to the Allied camp reported that they had been tied up and abused by the Chinese. Moyse and his party had been brought before a high-ranking mandarin and ordered to koutou. Insisting that he “would not prostrate himself before any Chinaman alive,” Moyse was promptly “dispatched by a blow on the head, and left on a dunghill.”

Although the story of Private Moyse received some attention when it first was published, it was only in 1866 that he was immortalized in a poem, “Private of the Buffs,” written by F. H. C. Doyle, professor of Poetry at Oxford. John Moyse, the Oxford professor decided, was a low-born, hard-drinking, ruffian, and yet when he
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suddenly found himself “beneath the foeman’s frown,” he became the representa-
tive of the entire British nation. “And thus, with eyes that would not shrink/ With
knee to man unbent, Unfaltering on its dreadful brink/ To his red grave he went.”
It now behooves us all, Doyle concluded, to follow his example. Our famous fleet
and our mighty guns are as nothing unless we also have soldiers like John Moyse.
“A man of mean estate/ Who died, as firm as Sparta’s king/ Because his soul was
great.” Unfortunately, the story of the “Private of the Buffs” is pure fabrication. The
alleged witness was, said Garnet Wolseley, far from reliable; he was “unbal-
anced” and “talked utter nonsense”; John Moyse was either killed outright by his
captors or he died from some grogg-cart-related condition. The event took place
only in the minds of British newspaper readers and the consumers of second-rate
poetry, and it is significant not because of what it tells us about the British love of
liberty but for what it tells us about the British love of the idea of their love of liberty.

In the sentimental imagination of British middle-class readers, even a downtrodden
member of their own lumpen proletariat such as Moyse displayed an unquestioned
loyalty to the values of his superiors.

As for the 39 prisoners, it is unlikely that they ever were held at Yuanmingyuan,
and inconceivable that they were required to kou-tou. Yuanmingyuan was many
things, but it was not a gaol where prisoners were kept, and the kou-tou was not a
way of humiliating a prisoner. Not bothering to investigate the matter too closely,
Lord Elgin decided that the accounts of the prostrations were true. The fact that
he seems to have spent much time with Harry Parkes at the time when the decision
to burn down Yuanmingyuan was taken is itself significant. Parkes, as we know,
had a long-standing hatred of the Chinese authorities. It was he who helped John
Bowring start the Second Opium War in October 1856, and it was Parkes who
decided, on September 6, that the credentials of the Chinese negotiators were insuf-
ficient, thus prompting Lord Elgin to continue the march on Beijing. After being
taken prisoner on September 18, mistreated, but returned alive on October 9, Parkes
had an additional reason to seek revenge. It is easy to imagine what advice he gave
to Elgin. “[T]he army would go there not to pillage,” as Elgin put it in his report to
the government, “but to mark by a solemn act of retribution the horror and indigna-
tion with which we were inspired by the perpetration of a great crime.”

The Failed Counter-wonder of 1793

Refusing both to be struck by awe and to kou-tou, the constant aim of the British
diplomats who visited Beijing was to turn the tables on the emperor and the court:
to stage a counter-performance, a counter-wonder, which would strike the Chinese
with awe, and to do it in the very place where Europeans always had had to prostrate
themselves. This, the British government decided, was the quickest way to force
the emperor to respect them. Until now, as they argued when preparing for George
Macartney’s mission in 1793, the Chinese only knew about the British subjects who
traded in Guangzhou. Since these merchants admittedly were rather uncouth, it
was not surprising that the Chinese despise us. What we need to do is to send them
a proper diplomatic mission, from one sovereign to another, headed by a digni-
fied ambassador and made up of diplomats, soldiers, and even a set of musicians.
Moreover, we need to bring some presents that really will impress the Chinese. After some considerable discussions between the British government and the East India Company, it was decided that a part of the presents should be examples of British-made products—Wedgwood urns, Vulliamy’s clocks, Derbyshire porcelain, Argand lamps, and so on. The aim of which was “both to gratify the curiosity of the natives,” and “to spread a taste for British manufactures.” As a little booklet that introduced these objects helpfully explained, it was possible to place orders for all of these products directly with the manufacturers in Britain.

In addition, however, and constituting by far the larger part of the tribute, was a collection of scientific instruments. A planetarium, known as a Weltmaschine, a “world machine,” was the most eye-catching piece. It showed not only the movements of the planets and their moons, in geocentric and heliocentric representations, but also the Milky Way and more than 1,500 stars, in addition to “the month, the week, the day, the hour, and minute, at the time of inspection.” The clock was set to operate accurately for no less than a thousand years. Among the many other instruments were two globes—one terrestrial, the other celestial—custom-made for the emperor. Next an orrery most noteworthy for the fact that it included “Georgium Sidus,” the new planet Uranus, discovered in 1781 by Wilhelm Herschel in Bath. There was also a large lens that could be used to create extreme temperatures for melting metals and minerals, or for scientific experiments such as attempts to measure the heat emitted by the moon. Among the less costly but no less important instruments was an air-pump used for creating vacuums, “in order to make, in the vacant space, several curious and extraordinary experiments.” In addition, there were chronometers for determining longitude, and barometers that could predict changes in the weather; an “inflammable air machine,” that is, a hot-air balloon; a solar microscope, electrometers, two sets of magnets in mahogany boxes; a portable furnace, a foundry, a steam engine, a printing press, and so on.

The obvious alternative would have been to bring the emperor some kind of mechanical device. This after all was what Europeans were famous for in China, and what emperor Qianlong expected them to give him. Yet the emperor already had a large collection of automata and musical boxes and giving him something he already had, the British government decided, was not going to have the desired effect. British officials knew that the emperor was impressed with European sciences and with astronomy in particular. Astronomy in China was a political art, an arcana imperii, of obvious concern to the “Son of Heaven,” and although the emperor had many astronomical instruments too, including several of European manufacture, he had little knowledge of the latest astronomical discoveries and the newest technical equipment. Fortunately, in both respects, Britain was leading the world, and it was decided that Macartney and his entourage would tell him about it. “His Britannic Majesty,” the booklet that introduced the presents proudly proclaimed, has been “careful to select only such articles as may denote the progress of Science and of the Arts in Europe”; there are no “trifles of momentary curiosity but little use,” only such items as “may convey some kind of information to the exalted mind of His Imperial Majesty or such others as may be practically useful.”

Science is sometimes seen as antithetical to the wondrous. Scientists are supposed to carry out their research in a rational manner and not be taken in by the
awe-inspiring and the sublime. Yet a sense of awe is closely associated with scientific discoveries. Scientists often marvel at the operations of the laws of nature, and we may all marvel at the scientists themselves or at the ability of us human beings to unravel the secrets of the universe. Or, as the British government officials were hoping in 1793, the Chinese would marvel at the country that made these scientific discoveries possible. Their plan was to set up the scientific instruments at the imperial court in Beijing and to conduct experiments and give lectures with the emperor himself in attendance. This was why James Dinwiddie, a “Scotch philosopher and experimentalist,” accompanied the mission. Dinwiddie was a famous popularizer of science who already for some 15 years had toured England, Scotland, and Ireland, giving talks on everything from chemistry and mechanics to gunnery and fortifications, and he also conducted public experiments with diving bells, air-balloons, and an early version of the bicycle. Taking his scientific road-show to Beijing, Dinwiddie was going to show the Chinese what Britain could do.

The Macartney mission arrived in Beijing on August 21, 1793, and Dinwiddie and his assistants began to arrange the exhibition in the Audience Hall at Yuanmingyuan. It is a “spacious and lightsome hall,” Staunton noted, “well calculated to display the presents.” Yet there was trouble already from the start. The court officials did not understand why it took the Europeans so long to organize the instruments and they grew increasingly impatient with the lack of progress. “A number of impertinent eunuchs,” Dinwiddie complained, “made so much noise, and what they thought fun, that it was frequently impossible to attend to the business.” Besides it had obviously been a mistake to let the courtiers see the instruments while they were in the process of being assembled. “An ignorant people should be taken by surprise,” Dinwiddie pointed out:

When a grand machine is shown all at once, and the principles of motion concealed, it seldom fails in its effect; but when it is shown piecemeal, when the various detached parts are exhibited, and put together in their sight . . . the prejudices entertained by the Chinese, respecting the ingenuity and address of our workmen, will be confirmed.

In addition, only a few days before the audience itself Dinwiddie was asked to rearrange the instruments and to place them at the end of the hall “that his Imperial Majesty might be able to view them from the throne, without being at the trouble of turning his head.” Working day and night to remodel the exhibit to suit the emperor’s convenience, it became obvious that this was not going to be the kind of scientific seminar they had been hoping for.

On October 1, the emperor finally came to inspect the display. Staunton’s official account says he paid considerable attention to the instruments and watched a few of the scientific demonstrations, and yet “the interpreters found much difficulty in explaining many technical expressions, a circumstance which evidently abridged the number of his questions.” Dinwiddie considered the performance a complete failure. The emperor “looked at the apparatus not more than two minutes, and retired,” saying that “these things are good enough to amuse children.” Dinwiddie begun one experiment—an attempt to use the great lens to melt a Chinese coin—but the courtiers immediately made fun of him, asking impertinent questions, and lighting
their pipes on the heat which the lens produced. “Several of these presents,” Æneas Anderson, concluded:

when a trial of them was made before the mandarins, were found to fail in the operations and powers attributed to them; and others of them did not excite that surprise and admiration in the breasts of the Chinese philosophers, which Dr. Dinwiddie and Mr. Barrow expected, who immediately determined upon the ignorance that prevailed in China, and the gross obstinacy of the people.52

Clearly the emperor had misunderstood the purpose of the demonstration and he was not giving the members of the Macartney mission a chance to explain what it was about. Qianlong was convinced that they had brought him yet more mechanical gadgets, and these, he decided, were not even very good ones.53 Not even the most advanced scientific results, it was clear, were going to convince the Chinese regarding Britain’s true position in the world. Dinwiddie left in a huff, “resolving for my part not to visit the palace again, nor contend with the most prejudiced of men.”54 Soon afterward the visitors were informed that their presence in Beijing no longer was required, and they left on October 7, humiliated and angry, in considerable confusion, and without a deal on trade. When they packed up their things, they discovered that the glass lustres already “had been taken down and moved away,” the lens-house was in pieces, and “besides other of the instruments thrown aside in disorder as useless.”55

The Beauty and Terror of the Armstrong Guns

Returning to China in 1860, the British made a new attempt to strike the Chinese with awe—this time relying not on scientific equipment but instead on a piece of advanced British-made technology. The Armstrong gun was a battlefield cannon invented by William Armstrong in the middle of the 1850s.56 It was a ferocious weapon—the most impressive of its time—that could shoot projectiles far further than any other guns, with a devastating and terrifying effect on the enemy. And yet the choice to bring the Armstrong gun to China was not obvious.57 Newly invented, the technology had not previously been battle-tested and there were many who doubted its accuracy and its resilience on the battlefield. China, moreover, was half a world away and the muddy shores of the north China coast presented formidable problems for weapons of this size and weight. Above all, as everyone acknowledged, there was no military need for the Armstrongs. Their long range was not required for siege warfare—such as a renewed siege on the Dagu Forts—for which regular breechless guns were more appropriate. In fact, as Sidney Herbert, secretary of war, admitted, the discrepancy in military hardware was such that any cannons would have won the war for Britain.58

Instead the Armstrong guns were brought along as props for the performance the British were planning to stage. Science, we said, can inspire awe, and the same is true of technology. Yet the two kinds of awe are nevertheless quite distinct. The effects of science are mainly intellectual—science impresses our minds—and while technology may have this effect too, it often also leaves an impression on our bodies.
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The result can be terrifying, such as the effects of the railways that were built in the 1840s, or of electricity that from the 1890s was used to carry out capital punishments. Yet the terror that technology inspires is often also mixed with a sense of beauty. There is something beautiful about a train running through a landscape at 30 miles per hour, or an electrical current that kills a criminal at the flick of a switch. The awe we feel is sublime—the terror the technology inspires is thrilling as long as we know we ourselves are safe. Military technology can have the same effects. Designed to terrify the person it is pointing at while making the person who wields it feel secure, a gun is a perfect example of a sublime technology. Weapons that produce loud noise, that kill at a vast range, in great numbers, or that produce ghastly wounds are particularly useful in these respects. With the help of such weapons, it is easy to pretend that one is more powerful than really is the case—and the enemy might just believe it.

This was more than anything the reason why the British commanders insisted that the Armstrong guns be brought along to China. The aim was to “blow the Chinese away,” both literally and figuratively, but also, and simultaneously, to impress the French and to reassure the British newspaper-reading public. Before the 1840s, there had been little technological development as far as field-artillery was concerned. Cannons still had the same smooth-bored barrels as their medieval predecessors—basically they were just metal tubes into which gunpowder and projectiles were inserted. An obvious improvement was to apply the idea of the “rifle” also to these far larger weapons. A rifle has a grooved barrel that makes the bullet rotate as it passes through it, giving the projectile an exceptional speed, range, and accuracy. Already in the seventeenth century such guns had been produced and by the mid-nineteenth century it was by means of rifles that the American “West was won.” Yet the technology was slow to migrate to field-artillery. The first experiments with rifled field-cannons took place in Germany in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, they were continued in Piedmont and Sweden, and in the 1850s the French army decided to adopt the new invention, the canon rayé, for general use. Yet the French guns suffered from too much windage: the bullets fit only loosely in the barrels and as a result they went off in uncertain trajectories. The French artillery men were forced to lobby their shots, and whenever the precise distance to a target was unknown—and this included most battlefield situations—the accuracy was abysmal.

It was these problems that William Armstrong set out to solve. The Armstrong gun was built up by wrought-iron coils wrapped around an inner tube of cast steel, giving the weapon a distinctive, telescopic, look, and allowing for far more powerful explosions. The elongated projectiles were covered with a mantle of lead that gave them a diameter slightly larger than the bore of the barrel. Since the lead melted as the shot made its way through the grooves, windage was reduced to zero. Since the shots were larger than the barrels, the guns had to be breech loaded—loaded from the back—and Armstrong invented a new mechanism, a vent-piece, through which the breech could be tightly screwed together. In July 1855, he presented a 3-pounder gun to the War Office, and in November, 1858, a special committee recommended the “immediate introduction of guns fixed on Mr. Armstrong’ principle.” The range of the new guns was exceptional. The 3-pound projectile penetrated two feet...
of elm timber from 2,000 yards and the 40-pounder gun sent projectiles up to 8,500 yards, and within 2,000-3,000 yards targets were hit with reasonable accuracy.  

The problems of the Armstrong guns became apparent as soon as the Allied troops landed on the North China coast. The land was flat, the beaches shallow, and the large ships could not get close enough to the shore. The soldiers jumped into the water and waded, and the guns had to be dropped from the ships and then tugged, and even once they reached land it was difficult to find solid ground.  

"On leaving the road it became abundantly apparent that the mud was most difficult to cross," Thomas Bowlby reported in *The Times*. "The waggons were immovable, so the limbers, containing 30 rounds of gun, were detached and brought on, the remainder of the waggons being left in the marsh, and eventually taken back to Beitang." Yet the power of the guns also soon became apparent. Already at the first engagement with the enemy, at Xinhe on August 12, the Armstrong guns were brought to the front, "and made some pretty practice." After a few rounds, the enemy took to their heels. The Armstrong are "beautifully precise," said Wolseley, and the contrast with the pathetically ineffectual Chinese guns was striking.  

At Tanggu on August 14, they once again performed beautifully, knocking out fortifications and sweeping away enemy positions. "We speak to them in the only language they understand," wrote Antoine Fauchery, referring to the Chinese, "in the language of the cannon."  

When the Allies arrived at the Dagu Forts on August 21, the Armstrong guns were leading the assault, and again they performed splendidly. "The effects of the Armstrong shell," wrote *The Times* in an editorial, "exceed anything that had been predicted of its destructiveness." Pastor M’Ghee stood close to a battery unit when the guns began firing: "it was at once a beautiful and yet a fearful sight," he reported, "to see the precision of their fire as the shells struck the exact spot aimed at, and knocked the guns of the Tartars about their ears, amidst clouds of dust." "We became increasingly attracted by the performance," wrote Maurice Hérisson, "and after a while we forgot the danger. It was a very beautiful spectacle." "I felt thankful," M’Ghee concluded, without a tinge of irony, that since there were such weapons in existence they were in our hands—ours, who would use them more to preserve the peace of the world than ever to make an aggressive or unjust war.  

As soon as the Chinese had surrendered, the British entered the forts to inspect the damage. "A distressing scene of carnage disclosed itself," David Rennie, surgeon to the troops, remembered, "frightful mutilations and groups of dead and dying meeting the eye in every direction." "Poor heathens," the regular soldiers remarked, "they little know our strength"; "Egad!" the British officers exclaimed, "what fine soldiers they would make, if properly drilled and led by plucky spirits." And the military surgeon, stooping down, would thrust his finger into the wound and, extracting a piece of shell, observed, "Wonderful instrument that Armstrong!"  

The moment was perfectly captured by Felice Beato, the photographer. Although Beato took over 100 photos from the North China Campaign, including the first photos ever of Beijing, his most famous shots are from the Dagu Forts.
“I walked round the ramparts on the west side,” Rennie remembered. “They were thickly strewed with dead—in the north-west angle thirteen were lying in one group round a gun.”

Signer Beato was here in great excitement, characterising the group as “beautiful,” and begging that it might not be interfered with until perpetuated by his photographic apparatus, which was done a few minutes afterwards.  

Reading news of such engagements must have been reassuring to the British public. Only a year previously the Allies armies had been defeated here, but now, with William Armstrong’s wonderful invention on their side, they were able to take a satisfying revenge. Thomas Bowly, writing in The Times, was overjoyed. “From officers to men there was but one feeling,” he reported, “every one had pride in the gun and full confidence in its success.” The Chinese were terrified, and the French were duly impressed.

During the failed negotiations that took place in the wake of the capture of the Dagu Forts, the Chinese officials insisted that the British leave their Armstrong guns behind. A military escort could enter the capital, they explained, but it had to be lightly armed, and light arms the Armstrongs were not. The argument that the guns would “frighten the people of Beijing” was equally unconvincing to the British since frightening the people of Beijing was one of their intended aims; the argument that the weather was too hot to drag the guns along was dismissed as nonsense. Yet it seems the British authorities would have done well to take the Chinese objections into account. The large guns were indeed difficult to drag through the sorghum fields and thick forests in the vicinity of Beijing. In fact, the Armstrong guns were more than anything what slowed the British troops down and the reason why the French arrived before them at Yuanmingyuan on the evening of October 6.

Once in Beijing, and much as the British had envisioned, the guns proved eminently useful. The Allies had decided that the capital itself had to surrender, yet from a strictly military point of view it is not clear exactly why. For well over a month, the Chinese negotiators had insisted on their readiness to settle, and the guns were for that reason not needed to force a peace. Yet a settlement was not Britain’s only goal—in addition they wanted to demonstrate their superiority over the Chinese. To really show them what the Europeans were capable of, the capital had to surrender. Walls, we said, were a metaphor for everything that liberals despised about China, and to pry open the walls of Beijing would constitute a great symbolic victory. Yet the Allied commanders also worried about the consequences of letting their troops run amok in the city. They would no doubt pillage, destroy, and rape the way they had pillaged, destroyed, and raped whenever given the opportunity. This was bad for the Chinese, but it was bad for the Allied armies too. The solution was to demand that the Chinese surrender only one of the gates in the wall—they chose the Anting gate—of which they would proceed to take control. Meanwhile the bulk of the Allied army was to be quartered outside the walls and only allowed to enter the city in small groups and for particular purposes. It would be a symbolic rather than an actual occupation.

The Beijing city wall was a tall fortification in gray brick-work, designed to repel both bandits and hostile armies; it was a daunting, awe-inspiring, structure and as
such the best way to both greet and intimidate visitors to the capital. The walls, said General Hope Grant, are “indeed a wonderful sight,” and he described them as “upwards of 50 feet in breadth, very nearly the same in height, in excellent repair, and paved on the top, where, I am sure, five coaches-and-four could with a little management have been driven abreast.” Paul Varin, who measured them carefully, mentions two walls of 14.4 meters, with a 20.5 meter space in-between them filled up by mud, stones and concrete. All in all, he says, the wall is 42 kilometers in length, with loopholes and niches for cannons and massive towers at every 200 meters, some with gates where guards let people in and out at their discretion. However, the defensive arrangements were at the same time perfectly perfunctory: only a few soldiers could be seen behind the parapet, even fewer cannons—and some of them, the Europeans later discovered, were only painted decoys.

On October 10, the Chinese authorities were given an ultimatum: the Anting gate had to be opened before noon on October 13 or the Europeans would unleash their Armstrongs on the city. To prepare for the assault, the Allies set up their position in a temple dedicated to the Earth God and dug trenches as close as sixty meters in front of the Anting gate. Perhaps uniquely in the history of siege warfare, the military engineers were able to walk undisturbed all the way up to the walls, while curious Chinese soldiers were looking down on them. From this position, four 8-inch battering guns and two Armstrongs were going to attempt to make a breech, while two Armstrongs protected the position and two more were held in reserve. The question is of course whether the Allies could have done it—whether they could have broken through the wall and captured the city. Some French commentators were skeptical, pointing out that the guns were too few and too weak to deal with the massive fortifications. British commentators were universally optimistic, however, and it does appear likely that the guns were up to the task. Given a sufficient rate of fire over a sufficient amount of time all walls will eventually crumble, and after a few days of bombardment a breech would probably have been made that could have been reached with scaling hooks and ladders.

Yet the Allies were indeed bluffing, and the reason is that they suffered from a severe lack of ammunition. In fact, the siege of Beijing itself was significantly delayed as they waited for deliveries of more projectiles for their guns, and once the projectiles arrived it was discovered that the supply was unlikely to be sufficient. “Our ammunition,” says Varin, “would have been exhausted twenty times over before we could have made a breech.” Yet the Chinese did not know the Allies were bluffing, and on the night of October 12 they let the European commanders know that they were prepared to surrender. A few minutes to noon on October 13 the Anting gate swung open and the Allied army swarmed in. A ramp made it possible to bring the guns onto the gate itself, and soon “several Armstrong muzzles pointed threateningly over the city.” A few minutes later the Union Jack and the Tricolor were both floating from the walls of Beijing, “the far-famed celestial capital, the pride of China, and hitherto esteemed impregnable by every soul in that empire.”

When the British parliament met on February 14, 1861, to thank the troops for the successful campaign, many of the speakers were happy to conclude that China not only had been beaten, but humiliated—and the Armstrong guns had played a decisive role in the outcome. “I am happy to say,” said Sidney Herbert, “that the
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Armstrong guns have proved entirely successful; and I believe the English army may be congratulated on possessing at this moment the best gun in the world. 96 The Duke of Cambridge called it a “wonderful new description of ordnance” and quoted an officer returning from China who claimed he “could go all over the world with that gun, and whatever the circumstances—however difficult—I am confident the result would always be the same.” 97 It was the perfect weapon for a country with global ambitions. The Armstrong guns stood for the best of British-made technology, and the immense, world-transforming, power that this technology embodied; the self-confidence and hopes it provided to the British, and the sense of awe with which they struck everyone else. Yet the Armstrongs were a prop, a means of intimidating enemies rather than to actually defeat them militarily.

In the years after 1860, the very obvious drawbacks of the Armstrong guns became increasingly clear. They really were too heavy and too large to use on a rapidly moving battlefield, and although their range was indisputable, their accuracy was often abysmal. Even during the North China Campaign, critics claimed, their impact was nowhere near as impressive as its proponents, including Tomas Bowly, had led the British public to believe. Although it pains me to speak ill of a dead man, David Rennie, concluded when going through the evidence, “this style of ‘sensation’ writing cannot be too strongly condemned.” 98 And besides, the Armstrongs were expensive—expensive to produce and expensive to use. Thus, when William Palliser, a British engineer, developed a method by which old muzzle-loaded cannons could be converted into rifled cannon for a fraction of the cost, he was bound to find a hearing, not least with the Ordnance Select Committee of the House of Commons. 99 In 1863, production of the Armstrong guns was stopped, and from 1865 the British army no longer relied on the guns, although the navy continued to use them.

Striking the Chinese with Awe

More than all other events of the war, it was the final incineration of Yuanmingyuan that demonstrated to the Chinese what the Europeans could do. Yuanmingyuan was a world inside a garden, we said, the cosmological doll house of the Son of Heaven; it was a perfect world, an idealized world, where everything, including trees, mountains, and animals, obeyed the emperor’s command. As such it was both endlessly pleasing and infinitely reassuring. It was onto this stage that Elgin and his soldiers made their way, carrying torches, and the counter-performance they staged here did not destroy a garden as much as a model of the imperial vision of the world.

The imperial authorities were clearly deeply affected. When hearing news of the destruction at his retreat in Chengde, Emperor Xianfeng retired from politics and turned to his women and to opium. He never returned to Beijing, but died in exile within a year. On October 18, when the emperor’s brother, Prince Gong, first saw the smoke rising in the sky northwest of Beijing, he broke down in tears. “This seemed, indeed,” The Times reported, “to have produced a greater impression on him than any other event that had occurred during the war.” 100 “The destruction of the palaces appears to have struck the Pekin authorities with awe,” Garnet Wolseley concluded. “It was the stamp which gave an unmistakeable reality to our work of vengeance.” 101
This was a conclusive victory to be sure, yet it was achieved more through intimidation than through actual military superiority. It was a victory won above all on battlefields of the imagination, and the methods employed were not weapons of the powerful as much as weapons of the weak. That is, they were weapons of terrorism. Powerlessness is obvious in the case of the lonely bomb throwers and anarchist cells who commit atrocities in order to gain attention. With the help of mass media, they are able to leverage what little power they have and to multiply it many times over. Strange as it may seem, European colonial powers were often in a similar position. Regardless of the nominal titles to the lands they had conquered, they were hopelessly ignorant of local conditions, always outnumbered, worried that the natives would turn on them, or that the fragile alliances they had assembled would collapse. More aware of these weaknesses than later students of colonialism, an empire, to the imperialists themselves, was a source of anxiety as much as pride. This discrepancy between universal preponderance and local weakness presented a tactical problem to which state-sponsored acts of terrorism provided a convincing answer. Colonial warfare was often a matter of bluffing, that is, it was a matter of staging a performance. By striking the locals with awe the Europeans hoped to achieve the goals that regular, protracted, wars were incapable of achieving.

In Algeria it was the système Bugeaud that was used to this end. As general Thomas Robert Bugeaud had explained, extensive use of the razzia would destroy the lives and livelihoods of the enemies and thereby force them into submission. Adopting his methods, the French began burning down villages, crops, and orchards, slaughtering cattle, and rounding up and executing people suspected of hiding, or sympathizing with, native fighters. In Afghanistan, much the same tactics were used in order to get revenge for the humiliating way the British had been driven out of the country. In the fall of 1842, the British army returned, but in addition to fighting the enemy, they intimidated civilians by dynamiting their villages, cutting down orchards, and by completely razing the great bazaar of Kabul. In India in 1857, the British took revenge in much the same manner, allowing soldiers to loot with impunity, most notoriously so when Delhi was recaptured. A favorite method of execution was to tie the rebels to the mouths of cannons and to blow them to pieces. As Charles Dickens’s weekly, Household Words, assured its readers in a graphic account of the method, this way of punishing mutineers “is one of the institutions of Hindustan.” While it may seem barbarian to us, it is in fact “one of the easiest methods of passing into eternity.”

To men of keen sensibilities the few minutes preceding the execution must appear like cycles of torture; but to brutes—like the savages of Cawnpore and Delhi—they can have few terrors.

These were not presentations, but representations; they were performances designed to prove to the natives that they stood no chance and that further resistance was futile. Not surprisingly, the word “terror” recurs repeatedly regardless of the geographical context. The methods used in Algeria, French newspapers explained, were designed to inspire a “terreur salutaire” in the locals; “the times,” said Household Words, “demanded that a terrible example should be made.” "A severe example
was undoubtedly necessary,” a British looter in Delhi, 1857, insisted, “to instill terror into the minds of the wavering and those still bent on defying our authority.”

When viewed in this light, none of the atrocities committed by the Europeans were actually all that atrocious. The sooner the natives were subjugated, the more lives would be spared, and the better both for them and for us; “the inhuman act thus becomes actually humane, for it shortens the conflict and prevents the shedding of more excessive quantities of blood.” “It is better, politically and for the sake of humanity, to hit hard once than to hit often.”

Lord Elgin, we said, had read John William Kaye’s *History of the War in Afghanistan* on his way to China in 1857, and he found it a most enlightening read. In addition, he had been present in India during the repression of the uprising in the fall of 1857, and he had personally witnessed the methods the British military employed. Both the Afghan War and the Indian rebellion illustrated the perils of weak leadership and the importance of decisive action. Since the start of the North China Campaign, Elgin had been looking for an excuse to make a similar impression on the Chinese. His remit was to conclude a settlement which would “really last”; he was prepared to be “thorough,” meaning that he would find a way to “convince the Pekin Mandarins that we are too strong for them.” When the option of incinerating Yuanmingyuan suddenly presented itself, Elgin seized it. The problem with the other alternatives—an indemnity, a trial of the people responsible for the mistreatment of the prisoners, an expiatory monument of some kind—was that none of them had anything like the same performative power. None of them was going to strike the emperor and the court with awe. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan, as Elgin pointed out to his government, is “an act which was calculated to produce a greater effect in China and on the Emperor, than persons who look on from a distance may suppose.”

The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was thus another example of the kind of *terreur salutaire* that Europeans performed in order to frighten people in far-away countries into submission. China was even further away than Algeria, Afghanistan, and India, and the European force was far smaller in relation to the local population; in addition, winter was fast approaching, the Allies lacked the right equipment, and they had for that reason to act quickly. What the situation called for was an “unprecedented act of audacity,” “an energetic measure and a brutal intimidation,” “a great jolt,” “a vigorous demonstration,” a “coup de théâtre” or a “coup de foudre.” The Chinese will never change their minds, Elgin concluded, unless “we terrified them by some extraordinary act.”

The proper question to ask is thus not why the Europeans destroyed a cultural treasure as unique as Yuanmingyuan. Rather, it was because Yuanmingyuan was unique that it was destroyed. The palaces and the gardens were exceptional and to burn them down was an exceptional act, but an exceptional act was precisely what was called for. If the destruction had not been an act of barbarism, it would not have worked. “I trust that these incidents,” Palmerston concluded, “will teach them that in dealing with the Powers of Europe they must obey those laws of international right which prevail among the civilized nations of the world.”
PART IV

CONCLUSION
So, why was Yuanmingyuan destroyed? The most fundamental reason concerns the different assumptions made regarding the nature of international politics in the Euro-centric and the Sino-centric international systems. In Europe, states were regarded as sovereign and as formally equal and the system as a whole as anarchical and without central authority. In East Asia relations between states were explicitly inegalitarian and hierarchical, with the Chinese empire and the emperor firmly located at the center of the system. For centuries these differences had not mattered much since Europe and China were only in intermittent contact with each other and since the Europeans, when visiting China, generally behaved the way they were instructed. In the middle of the nineteenth century, however, such workarounds were no longer feasible. So, at least, the British argued. Since the assumptions of the two systems could not be combined, one or the other had to give, and in the end the Chinese gave.

Perhaps China could have been left alone if not for the temptation provided by the 350 million consumers—that fabled “third of mankind”—which British merchants were convinced were waiting for them on the other side of the walls that surrounded the country. Cheap prices, Marx and Engels argued, were the heavy artillery that would make these walls come down, and liberals insisted that the advantages of free exchange were such that everyone eventually would become members of the same worldwide system of circulation. In the case of China, however, it did not work that way. The imperial authorities rejected the European demands and insisted that the Chinese did not “need any more of your country’s manufactures.” This was when a certain brand of liberals, exemplified by John Bowring and Lord Palmerston, invoked the support of the traditional practices of statecraft and began battering down the walls of China with the heavy artillery of heavy artillery. Yet wars were difficult to wage in an East-Asian setting. The British were far from home, few in numbers, insufficiently equipped, and with impossibly long channels of communication back to London. Although the wars themselves were easily won, they never achieved their aims. The provisions of the Treaty of Nanjing, 1842, were never fully implemented and when the Europeans in 1859 sought a ratification of the Treaty of Tianjin they were beaten back by a Chinese army. Returning in 1860,
the Europeans were bent on revenge. When the diplomatic negotiations dragged on, and the Chinese kept on raising one obstacle after another, the Europeans had had enough.

Yuanmingyuan was looted on October 7-9, mainly by the French army with some incidental help from members of the British cavalry and local inhabitants. In looting the palaces and the gardens, the armies only did what they already had done in other colonial settings—Algeria, Afghanistan, and India—and what they had done since they first set foot in China. Apologists for the destruction refer to “human nature,” implying that loots are what uncouth soldiers always engage in unless they are stopped, yet at Yuanmingyuan the most cultivated among the officers too were taking part and much of the pillaging was organized by an official prize committee. A loot is a carnivalesque occasion and an easy way to reward the troops, but it was also, and for those precise reasons, a threat to the army’s discipline. The aim of the commanders was to indulge their men while at the same time making sure that the destruction was kept within bounds. In both Tianjin and Beijing, the commanders restricted access by quartering the troops well away from inhabited areas. In the case of Yuanmingyuan, General Montauban made perfunctory attempts to restrain the troops, but the soldiers were invited to help themselves to mementos from the imperial collection. After that there was no stopping them. The French army looted since they knew they could get away with it, and since the commanders let them.

Yuanmingyuan was burned down on October 18 and 19, at the direct order of Lord Elgin. It was, he explained, a carefully considered response to the way the Chinese had captured and tortured 39 Europeans, only 18 of whom were returned alive. In both Afghanistan and India, British citizens had recently been taken prisoners in a similar fashion, and Britain itself had been humiliated. In both cases the British army had exacted a terrible revenge. This, they argued, was the only way to teach the natives that such actions were unacceptable. Given that the correspondent for The Times was among the victims of the hostage-taking of 1860, Lord Elgin had to find a way to reassure British newspaper readers that Britain could protect its people. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan was a performance he staged to this end.

The destruction was a performance staged for the benefit of the Chinese too. The armies that marched toward Beijing in the fall of 1860 were not actually all that interested in a negotiated settlement. As the Chinese repeatedly made clear, they were ready to agree to all European demands. The Allied argument that the Chinese negotiators lacked sufficient credentials is not credible—certainly not once the emperor’s own brother was in charge of the Chinese delegation. Instead of an agreement, the British wanted to change Chinese minds. The aim was to put on a performance so terrifying, so intimidating, that the Chinese had no choice but to pay attention. As Lord Elgin realized, the destruction of Yuanmingyuan would deal a particularly hard blow to the emperor personally. In these gardens, he had created a perfect and endlessly reassuring world of which he was the undisputed ruler. Yuanmingyuan was a representation of the imperial conception of the world. When the British soldiers invaded this play-house universe and torched it, the emperor and the court were duly struck by awe. The reforms initiated by Prince Gong—the creation of a foreign ministry; education in European diplomatic practices; the translation of European works on international law—were all intended to assure China a
recognized place in the Euro-centric world. This was the end of the Sino-centric international system and the beginning of Europe’s global hegemony.

“A Palace in a Dream” A European who today visits the grounds of the “Old Summer Palace” in Beijing may easily feel a sense of shame—shame at the thought of the European responsibility for the destruction of a unique and irreplaceable part of the heritage of mankind. Often enough this sense of culpability is mixed with a nostalgia for what has been lost. In an increasingly wall-less, twenty-first century world, Europeans, and North Americans too, are nostalgic for differences, for culture, for the secret and the sacred. We want things to be exotic because only the exotic can deliver us from the predictable and the bland. Yet in today’s increasingly wall-less world even the exotic is becoming all-too familiar. All that remains today is to faithfully reproduce the universally applicable logic of the liberal economic and political system. With the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, Europe destroyed the last true alternative to itself. Such nostalgia is nothing new, but has accompanied the liberal project from the start. Although the palace of the emperor of China admittedly only occupies a small place in the collective imagination of Europeans, it nevertheless a significant place, and it is significant above all as a romantic alternative to the world that liberalism has created. Consider, for example, the dream dreamed by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in October 1797 after he had read a few pages from Purchas His Pilgrimage, had taken a few grains of laudanum, and promptly fallen asleep. What Coleridge saw was a vision of the palace of Kublai Khan that Marco Polo visited in 1275, in Shangdu in Inner Mongolia, the city famous in Europe as “Xanadu.” The palace, Coleridge explained, was a sublime apparition that inspired both longing and dread:

In Xanadu did Kubla Khan
stately pleasure-dome decree,
where Alph, the sacred river, ran
through caverns measureless to man
down to a sunless sea…
A savage place! As holy and enchanted
as a’er beneath a waning moon was haunted
by woman wailing for her demon lover.
And from this chasm, with ceaseless turmoil seething,
As if this earth in fast thick pants were breathing,
A mighty fountain momently was forced:…
And ’mid this tumult Kubla heard from far
Ancestral voices prophesying war!…
And all should cry, Beware! Beware!
His flashing eyes, his floating hair!
Weave a circle round him thrice,
And close your eyes with holy dread,
For he on honey-dew hath fed,
And drunk the milk of Paradise.

Given the inspiration provided by Purchas’s collection of medieval travelers’ tales, it is not surprising that Coleridge’s vision was thoroughly Gothic. The emperor he
describes is immensely powerful, equipped with miraculous powers, and he inspires fear and trembling in his visitors. With his “flashing eyes” and “floating hair” he is nothing like the real-life Chinese emperors with whom Coleridge’s contemporaries, such as George Macartney, were dealing. Kubla Khan is not someone you obtain trade concessions from, conclude peace treaties with, or bully into submission. Yet Coleridge’s poem is not Gothic as much as Neo-Gothic; that is, it describes a medieval world as imagined through a romantic, turn-of-the-nineteenth century, sensibility. The difference between the Gothic and the Neo-Gothic concerns more than anything the addition of a notion of the sublime. The palace of the emperor of China, in Coleridge’s version, provides an example. It is a violent and intoxicating location; a place of devastation and fear, where women “wail for demon lovers” and “close their eyes in holy dread.” It is a terrible world, but at the same time, and for that very reason, terribly seductive.

Compare the striking similarities between Coleridge’s poem and the Chinese gardens as described in William Chambers’s *On the Art of Laying out Gardens among the Chinese*, 1757, and *A Dissertation on Oriental Gardening*, 1772. The ferocity and animality of the two sets of images are the same and many of the phrases echo each other—Chambers’s “deep caverns in the rocks” have, for example, become Coleridge’s “caverns measureless to man.” Chambers’s description too emphasizes the sublime, and as we briefly discussed above, his first pamphlet on the subject of Chinese gardens appeared only weeks after Burke’s *Inquiry into the Sublime and the Beautiful*. This is why the “wolves, tigers and jackals,” which “howl in the forests,” have less to do with Yuanmingyuan than with Chambers’s own overheated Neo-Gothic imagination, and so too do the “half-famished animals” who “wander upon the plains,” the “gibbets, crosses, wheels, and the whole apparatus of torture”; and the “temples dedicated to the king of vengeance.”

It is difficult at first to imagine that Chambers who had such obvious love of the Neo-Gothic also was the architect behind the impeccably Neo-Classical Somerset House in the center of London. Yet there is no contradiction here. The rational ideals are not opposed to the romantic in the end, but instead they presuppose one another. Liberalism requires its other, and the Victorians did not only worship reasons but also, and at the same time, the sublime. Their minds were simultaneously occupied by the precepts of Benthamite, Millian, and Comptian theorizing and by entities such as Frankenstein’s Monster, Poe’s Raven, Freud’s Subconscious, and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. These fantastical beings are the manifestations of reason’s mad and embarrassing twin brother locked up in the attic of our collective consciousness. By submitting themselves to the power of the obscure, the transcendent, the unutterable, the shadowy, and the grotesque, nineteenth century liberals temporarily liberated themselves from the requirement to make sense. However, note that the rational and the irrational are given an entirely different status. The liberal, increasingly wall-less world, is the real world and the romantic, walled-in, world, is only a fantasy. The experience of the sublime is a vicarious pleasure, a pleasure you experience by imagining that you are someone else. It is the fantasy of yielding and falling that is exciting, not the actual experience of it.

A story missing from Purchas’s *Collection of Travelers’ Tales* is an account of Kublai Khan’s palace written by the Persian fourteenth century historian Rashid-al-Din
A Palace in a Dream

Hamadani. The emperor of China, Rashid-al-Din explained, had laid down to sleep and when he woke up the following morning he told his courtiers about the wondrous palace he had seen in his dream. He promptly instructed his architects to set to work and before long the palace at Shangdu was completed. When discussing Rashid-al-Din’s description in an anthology of medieval writings on China, the Scottish Orientalist Henry Yule noted a curious fact: the palace in Shangdu had first appeared to both Kublai Khan and to Samuel Taylor Coleridge in the form of a dream. What is particularly odd is that Rashid-al-Din’s account was not available in European languages at the time Coleridge wrote his poem and he could consequently not have known about Kublai Khan’s oneric vision. The juxtaposition of the two dreams was either a strange coincidence or, as Jorge Luis Borges surmised in an essay in which he discussed Coleridge poem, perhaps the two dreams both had the same object. The palace in the dream is eternal, Borges concluded; it is a place we all can visit in our sleep, and from time to time there will be rulers, or poets, who will try to recreate it here on earth. Yet these recreations are bound to be only temporary since royal palaces, like all other things human, eventually will crumble and be ground to dust. It is the palace in the dream that is real, and the palace built here on earth is only its ephemeral, sublunar, manifestation.

What is even more curious is Lord Elgin’s part in this story. Elgin, we said, was a sensitive soul, a lover of poetry, and at Oxford he was even something of a Coleridgean, the philosophy of whom, his brother explained, he had “thoroughly mastered.” Of course, Elgin knew Coleridge’s most famous poem, most likely by heart. Yet when Elgin himself came face to face with the palace of the emperor of China he did not “close his eyes in holy dread,” nor did he drink any paradisaical milk. Clearly Yuanmingyuan was nothing like the palace that Coleridge once had described to him, and Elgin was not dispatched to China in his capacity as a poetry lover but as a diplomat with an obligation to further the interests of his country. Reading romantic poetry in school was all very well, and so was indulging in various Orientalizing fantasies, but it had nothing to do with the realities of power politics. This is how Elgin unwittingly became the instrument through which the actually existing palace of the emperor of China once again was returned to the realm of dreams.

“I Love You, Oh Ruins”

The shame which Europeans may feel when contemplating the destruction of Yuanmingyuan was most eloquently expressed by Victor Hugo in the letter to Captain Butler of November 25, 1861. Hugo, as we saw, was scathing regarding the conduct of the Allied armies, calling them “bandits” and “thieves” and “barbarians,” and hoping that one day a rejuvenated, post-Napoleonic, France would return the looted items to China. Since its publication, Hugo’s letter has been quoted by Europeans eager to let the Chinese know that not all them are uncouth brutes. It has also been quoted by Chinese people willing to extend a hand of friendship to Europeans who give proof of respect for their country. The Chinese also like Hugo’s letter since it provides what might just be the most romanticized description of the Oriental wonder that was Yuanmingyuan. And this is precisely the problem: by
romanticizing and Orientalizing the palace, Hugo’s description has little to do with China and very much to do with Hugo himself and with his fellow Europeans.

Ruins were always popular among Europeans of Neo-Gothic sensibilities. Early romantics visited ruins, wrote poetry, and philosophical reflections about them, and ruins were one of the main motifs of eighteenth century paintings. Ruins are oniric objects, objects that help us dream, and the sublime frisson they provide explains their attraction. Ruins tell a story of a different world, a world that now has disappeared, and when we contemplate them, we are able to enter this world and to listen to the stories. We suddenly see the magnificence of an ancient court, opulent feasts arranged in spacious halls, knights gathering for a mission, and monks forming a procession in a crypt. Conjuring up all these details is pleasant, or it may fill us with an unrequited sense of longing, but it is also infinitely sad. They were all so confident, so sure that these solidly built structures would last forever, yet now it is all laid in ruins before us. All things must pass, and so—this is our next thought—must we. Placing ourselves in the ruins we are contemplating, we see how little we have lived and how little that remains of our lives. If these stones too have been ground to dust, then what are we worth? Time is a torrent that pulls entire nations, one after the other, into a common void, and soon enough we too will be swept away. Trying to shake off such gloomy thoughts, we turn away from the ruins and pay attention to the present again, and much to our relief everything is as normal and as solid as we remember. We are reassured, at least for now, yet it is all so amazing—the fact that we must die, and the fact that we now are alive.

Such ruminations continued to excite Europeans well into the nineteenth century, and Victor Hugo is a prime example. He was obsessed by ruins, uncommonly so even for a romantic writer. He went ruin watching as often as he had the opportunity; ruins featured prominently in his poetry, and some of his best water colors—Hugo was a first-rate artist—show castles and churches in various states of dilapidation and decay. He immediately fell into Neo-Gothic rêveries in places such as Montfort l’Amaury, close to Paris, with its castle destroyed by the English during the Hundred Years’ War, or the Mäuseturm, the Mouse Tower, on an island in the Rhine, with a ruined fortress from the tenth century. “I love you, oh ruins,” he wrote, “and never more than when the autumn extends its monotonous complaints among your echoes.” In a poem from 1877, he imagined a city that, much like Yuanmingyuan, one day simply vanished:

Houses, domes, pillars, arches, suddenly
With the whole city—people, army, all
Their king who sang and feasted in his hall,
And had not time to rise up from the board—
Sink, into nameless depth of darkness poured;

Much as in Coleridge’s vision of the palace of Kublai Khan, Hugo’s language mixes images of regal power with violence and not-too-subtle sexual allusions.

And whilst at once, heaped up from top to base,
Towers, palaces, are ‘gulled without a trace,
A hoarse, a savage murmuring arose,
And you behold like a vast mouth unclose
A hole, whence spouts a stream of foaming wrath—
Gulf where the town fall in, the sea comes forth.

If such exquisite anguish could be conjured up by regular European ruins, ruins found in Asia were even more striking since they, in addition to the standardized frissons, allowed the Europeans to indulge in Oriental fantasies. Oriental palaces were more magnificent than European, their opulence more opulent, and their decay for that reason all the more sublime. In addition, Asian ruins were set in wonderfully exotic locations—often overgrown with jungle and overrun by monkeys and parrots who took flight at the arrival of intrepid European travelers. In the middle of the nineteenth century, a large number of ruins of exactly this kind were discovered: in Anuradhapura in Sri Lanka, Bagan in Burma, Ayutthaya in Siam, and the Sun Temple in Konark, India. Angkor Wat was another exciting discovery, first visited by the French missionary Charles Émile Boulleuvaux in 1855 and famously described by Henri Mouhot, a French naturalist, in 1860. Mouhot found a temple, “a rival to that of Solomon, and erected by some ancient Michael Angelo,” which “might take an honourable place beside our most beautiful buildings.” Yet much of Ankor was now in ruins, Mouhot reported, and its splendors were no more. It was all immensely sad, yet absolutely wonderful too.

In Hugo’s mind, and in the mind of his contemporaries, the Neo-Gothic and the Oriental blended easily, and his obsession with ruins fits perfectly with a fascination for the countries of the East. In Les Orientales, 1829, Hugo reflected on the differences between Europe and Asia, between the real world and the world of dreams—ruminations continued in his letter to Captain Butler. Yuanmingyuan, Hugo explained, was an example of the “chimerical art” that characterizes the East, which he contrasted with the “ideal art,” the rational art, of the European tradition. Yuanmingyuan was a “lunar building,” “the thousand and one dreams of the thousand and one nights”; “a tremendous unknown masterpiece, glimpsed from the distance in a kind of twilight, like a silhouette of the civilization of Asia on the horizon of the civilization of Europe.”

By turning Yuanmingyuan into a chimera, however, he is considerably detracting from the force of his own apologia. Hugo’s regrets have next to nothing to do with the palace as it once existed, and instead everything to do with the palace as it continues to appear in his own imagination. While the actual Yuanmingyuan belonged to the emperor of China, the palace, once destroyed, belongs in a European fantasy of the East. The event for which Hugo apologizes is consequently the very same event that makes Yuanmingyuan significant to him—the fact that it all was destroyed. Fantasies of the Orient, of which Hugo’s Yuanmingyuan is a prime example, allowed Europeans to imagine an alternative to the world of which they now had become the undisputed masters, while at the same time continuing to reap all the benefits of world hegemony. They washed their hands of the crime, sighed deeply, and went on their daily business much as previously. The Europeans needed their fantasies in order to make the new world they had created in their image halfway bearable.
Like Europeans, contemporary Chinese people who visit the “Old Summer Palace” often experience a feeling of shame. Yet the Chinese are not ashamed of something they did here, but instead of something that they did not do. They are ashamed of not defending the gardens and their country, and of not standing up to the foreigners and their demands. According to this, the official version of modern Chinese history, China has suffered one humiliating defeat after another at the hands of foreigners. These bainian guochi, the “hundred years of humiliation,” started with the two Opium Wars and the unequal treaties and continued with the war against Japan in 1895, with the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, the degrading treatment at Versailles in 1919, and the Japanese invasion in the 1930s. The destruction of Yuanmingyuan is the pivotal event in this story. Before Yuanmingyuan was destroyed, the emperor and the court still had their self-confidence and their pretensions; after the destruction, these fictions could no longer be maintained.

To the story of a hundred years of humiliations corresponds a hundred years of revolutionary fervor. The revolutionaries called for reforms that would make China strong again and one day would force the Europeans to take them seriously. The revolutionaries, such as the young activists associated with the May 4th Movement, wanted to “catch up” by “modernizing” everything from China’s political institutions and legal system to its social customs and the way people talked and dressed. In this way the Chinese came to continue, and accelerate, the process of creative destruction that the Europeans had initiated. As a result, China has since 1860 been a country at war with itself. All aspects of Chinese society have been scrutinized and most have been found wanting; in the eyes of the revolutionaries, China was never good enough and its people were always “reactionary” and “feudal.” Everything had to be destroyed and created anew. The victory of the Communist Party in 1949 changed the form of this struggle, but not its nature. Although China now, as Chairman Mao famously declared in September 1949, had “stood up,” the country was still not universally respected, and as a result the revolutions had to continue. In fact, under the leadership of the Communist Party, the revolutions were intensified. Yet it was not until the 1980s, once the Party came to embrace capitalism, that actual progress was made. The irony of a Communist regime policing its cheap and nonunionized work force on behalf of international capitalism was completely lost on the Chinese leaders. Communism and capitalism are perfectly compatible, they argued, since they are subordinate to the real goal which is to make China strong and respected.

Although the revolutionary fervor has remained the same, Beijing’s abrupt shifts in policy have provided challenges to the officials in charge of propaganda. In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, when there still was a strong official commitment to Marxist ideals, the Chinese nation was made up of workers and peasants, but not of capitalists, landowners, or members of the “revisionist clique” that had escaped to Taiwan. The class struggle took priority over the struggle on behalf of the nation as a whole. Not surprisingly, Yuanmingyuan played no role in the official rhetoric during this period. Instead the grounds where the imperial palaces once stood were entirely neglected. The former gardens were taken over by squatters, farmers,
doufu-makers, and assorted cottage industries; pigs roamed freely over the Nine Islets and Qianlong’s 40 spots of natural beauty were used as garbage dumps. And then in the 1980s, when private businesses once again were permitted in China, an amusement park was constructed here together with a paint-ball gallery, a pigeon aviary, a go-cart track, and a “Primitive Totem Exhibition.”

It was only in the 1980s that Yuanmingyuan was rediscovered by the political authorities. The site was gradually cleared and cleaned up, and it was first opened to the public in 1988. At this time, only the outlying areas were accessible and only after more recent excavations has it been possible to visit the core of the original Yuanmingyuan, the part created by Kangxi and expanded by Yongzheng. Still, much of the original gardens remains inaccessible to this day, largely it seems since they have been destroyed beyond recognition. In fact, much of the area immediately surrounding the gardens is still occupied by cottage industries, squatters, assorted animals, and garbage. Work to get the imperial compound into a presentable state—construction work on the ruins—is ongoing. It would thus not be incorrect to say that the “Old Summer Palace,” as visitors see it today, is a recent creation, barely 30 years old.

The real story told by this place does not concern China’s humiliation, or even its past, as much as the attempts by the Chinese Communist Party to maintain legitimacy for its rule. All political regimes need legitimacy, and in the twenty-first century democratic elections provide by far the most common such legitimating device—a device unavailable to the Chinese leaders. As long as Communism was the guiding ideology, this hardly mattered. The scientific laws of history that Marx claimed to have discovered provided a powerful sense of legitimacy to anyone who acted in their name. Working on behalf of History was at least as good as working on behalf of God, and whatever true revolutionaries decided to do was legitimate by definition. After the rapid chain of events that occurred in 1989, this story completely fell apart. After the end of the Soviet Union, and after the demise of Marxism as a state ideology, legitimacy had to be found in other ways. And in China, after the events on Tiananmen Square in June, 1989, the crisis of legitimacy became acute.

It was only now that the modern history of China began to be told as the story of the nation, not of class struggle, and that the Chinese nation came to include all social classes, not just workers and peasants. It was now too that the national school curriculum was rewritten to emphasize the humiliation that China has suffered since the middle of the nineteenth century. According to the “Outline on Implementing Patriotic Education,” 1994:

The objectives of conducting patriotic education campaigns are to boost the nation’s spirit, enhance cohesion, foster national self-esteem and pride, consolidate and develop a patriotic united front to the broadest extent possible, and direct and rally the masses’ patriotic passions to the great cause of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.

It was also now, not before, that Yuanmingyuan became a symbol of China’s humiliation. Suddenly dioramas showing the imperial gardens being looted or in flames became common features of historical exhibitions and school teachers throughout
the country were required to stress the same themes in their classes. By making ordinary Chinese see how their country was brought low, the patriotic education would nurture resentment and stir a desire for revenge—emotions that could be channeled into support for the government. “We must never forget,” became the constantly repeated message, that is, in practice, “we must never forget that the Communist Party are the only viable leaders of our nation.” Only a strong government, which brooks no dissent and is loyally supported by the people as a whole, can make China strong again. Since 1949 the CCP has constituted such a government, and to question the party’s rule is for that reason not an expression of political disagreements as much as an act of treason.

In this way, the Chinese leaders have come to treat Yuanmingyuan much as romantically inclined Europeans treated it—as a fiction of their own making and as a means to achieve their own ends. In the process, long-forgotten historical facts have been remembered, new facts have been invented, and many facts have been ignored. That the events that transpired at Yuanmingyuan fit badly in the new official account becomes evident once we realize that feelings of national humiliation only arise to the extent that the history of the past 150 years indeed is claimed as the “history of the Chinese nation.” That is, feelings of national humiliation are only possible to the extent that the Chinese nation is taken as the subject of the story we tell about the past. Yet to take the nation as the subject of history is a relatively recent phenomenon. In Europe it happened only after the French Revolution, and it was only in the course of the nineteenth century that these “national histories” became prominent. This is the kind of history that students were taught once public schools were established in one European country after another. Indeed, the telling of the story of the nation was one of the main ways in which the nation came into being. It was by memorizing such national stories that European peasants were turned into “Frenchmen,” “Finns,” or “Bulgarians.”

These stories are easily deconstructed, and so is the Chinese version. After all, Qing dynasty China was an empire ruled by a Manchu elite, which was intensely proud of its Manchu heritage, language, and culture, and their country consisted of a multitude of peoples speaking different languages and embracing different cultures. In 1860, that is, there was no Chinese nation. Rather the national history of China is a product only of the last decades of Manchu rule, the events leading up to the revolution of 1911. Much like nationalists in Europe, the new generation of nationalist Chinese leaders began by seizing power, and only later did they create the nation in whose name they had acted. It was only once China was subjected to the superior might of the Europeans that the nation came into being as a political subject. The Chinese nation was born through struggle—through a ferocious struggle against Chinese culture, traditions, and ways of life, and through an equally ferocious struggle to catch up with the rest of the world and to get revenge. However, if China ever is to live at peace with itself and the world, these struggles must come to an end. A truly self-confident China must once again rewrite its history. It is only by reconstructing the past that we can become liberated from it—from the impulse to impose our will on others and the desire to avenge imaginary injustices.

This is not to say that we should forget Yuanmingyuan. After all, Yuanmingyuan is not only a palace in a dream but also an actual location, and at this location
ordinary Chinese people have started to show up in increasing numbers. Walking around the grounds on a sunny Sunday in the spring, you come across families having picnic, young couples holding hands, children flying kites with their grandfathers or laughing as they run across the rebuilt, and once again zig-zagging, bridges. The lakes are filled with lotuses, colorful fish, and mating black swans; it is a popular place for amateur photographers, and equipped with a good map it is still possible to make out where some of the bigger buildings must have been located. Besides, the hills and trees are still here and the waterways meander in much the same manner as when they first were laid out. Despite everything that has happened, Yuanmingyuan remains a delightful place, a happy place even. It is a place, as Emperor Qianlong once pointed out, "protected by Heaven and Blessed by Earth." As such, it is not best treated as a symbol of anything, it is not a means to an end, or a reason to unite behind the government or to sacrifice oneself for national glory. Ordinary Chinese people are taking over the grounds where the original palaces once stood, just as ordinary Chinese people, little by little, are reclaiming their country. When the eternal object once again enters the world, it will belong to them.

“*A Public Admission of Our National Superiority*”

Before leaving Beijing, the Europeans staged one last performance. On October 24, the British and the Chinese met to ratify the Tianjin Treaty and to sign the new Beijing Convention, and on the following day the French and the Chinese met to do with same thing. On both occasions, the signing took place at the Hall of Ceremonies, three miles past the Anting Gate into the heart of Beijing, and the Allies marched there in a long procession. The British troops looked splendid. Two military bands took the lead, playing “God Save the Queen,” then followed a squadron of the Queen’s Dragoons—“a magnificent troop, which carries itself remarkably”—then a contingent of Sikh cavalry, Indian infantry, and two regiments of regular infantry troops. Lord Elgin himself traveled in a sedan chair, painted red for the occasion “and hung about with long streaming tassels of many colours, after the most approved Chinese fashion,” and the 16 coolies who carried him were “decked out in gorgeous scarlet clothing.” Everywhere large crowds of spectators were lining the streets, curious to see the British diplomat, “who at that time was more powerful than even their own Emperor.” “The presence of a large body of troops marching with confidence through the capital, with colours flying, bands playing, and every outward sign of victory,” said Garnet Wolseley, “must have, indeed, impressed all with the reality of their own defeat.” “It was an undeniable assertion of our victory, and will be a warning to Imperial officials in their intercourse with our authorities.”

The role as conquerors and masters of the world suited the Europeans far better than the role they had given themselves, only a week earlier, as vengeful barbarians and destroyers of cultural treasures. The Chinese had always referred to them as “barbarians,” the Europeans believed, and the Chinese language did not seem to have another word for “foreigner.” In the Tianjin Treaty, the Europeans had even tried to outlaw this linguistic usage, and when the Chinese authorities insisted on it, the Europeans would simply break off communications. At the same time, the
Europeans were clearly fascinated by the barbarian label and they often appropriated it for themselves using indirect speech. "We wander about Pekin," a soldier might report in a letter home, "showing our barbarian faces in every street"; the curiosity dealers, wrote another, like us once they "tasted the sweets of the Barbarian dollar"; and everywhere women came out "to have a peep at the 'barbarian.'" Yet these references are made in jest, and the sentences sound funny since the label is so obviously misplaced. The Europeans were not barbarians; they were just calling themselves that for a laugh.

After the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, the same label took on an entirely different connotation. If a barbarian is someone who does barbarian things, barbarians were surely what the Europeans had become. This resulted in a contradiction that was too stark to ignore, even for the people responsible for the deeds themselves. We burned down Yuanmingyuan, said a British officer, “destroying in a Vandal-like manner” the most valuable property; when General Hope Grant wrote home to London, letting the government know about their plans, he somewhat anxiously hoped that he would be forgiven for “committing this, what may be called barbaric act.” Unable to simply ignore the contradiction between their actions and their self-image, they all resolved it in their own manner. While the burning was going on some of the soldiers conjured up images of their dead compatriots who had suffered so terribly at the hands of the Chinese, while others were hoping that their crimes would clear the way for a rejuvenation of China.

A more general solution was to point to the imperatives of all wars fought in non-European settings. There was a difference between who the Europeans were at a home, they explained, and who their presence on the Chinese stage had turned them into. In Europe, they were their real selves—civilized, humanitarian, peaceful—and the colonial wars were for that reason undertaken as if in disguise. “Barbarian” was only a role that they temporarily had been forced to assume. When taken at face value, the two identities are contradictory to be sure, but when we realize that one of the faces is a mask, the contradiction disappears. The ability to switch between real and performed selves was, the Europeans argued, one of the features that made them superior to the Chinese. The Chinese could never engage in the same kind of play-acting; they were stuck in their world, stuck in their barbarian selves. It was thus, paradoxically, by becoming like the Chinese that their difference from the Chinese was best illustrated. Europeans could move between selves; they could distinguish performance and reality, and it was through such acts of transgression that their superiority was made manifest. To play at being a barbarian was thus not to deny one’s civilization, but on the contrary to affirm it.

The coolies finally put down Lord Elgin’s sedan chair outside of the Hall of Ceremonies where Prince Gong approached him, looking stiff and nervous. Elgin was two and a half hours late for the appointment, no doubt by design. He gave the prince “a proud, contemptuous, look,” which “must have made the blood run cold” in the veins of the emperor’s half-brother. What happened next is contested. In the British accounts, they both moved toward the chairs that had been prepared for them, “each seeming to eye the other narrowly, lest by some sudden movement he might get the least in advance.” And when they finally arrived at their seats, “it was of great importance that both should sit down exactly at the same moment:
a feat which was most satisfactorily accomplished.” According to French accounts, however, Elgin showed a “haughty, tough and utterly shameless” attitude toward Prince Gong, pushing him in the back, and making sure that Britain took charge of the seating arrangements. Then the credentials of the respective parties were presented, carefully studied, and the documents were signed. In the middle of the ceremony, on Elgin’s orders, Felice Beato, the photographer, showed up, eager to take a photo of the “Signing of the Beijing Treaty.” He placed his camera at the entrance door of the hall and directed the large lens straight at Prince Gong. “It really looked like a sort of mortar, ready to disgorge its terrible contents into his devoted body.” When Lord Elgin in a loud voice ordered everyone to remain still for the photo, the Chinese courtiers, not understanding the meaning of his words, were struck “with such amazement, that not one stirred.” Prince Gong looked up in a state of terror, pale as death “expecting every moment to have his head blown off by the infernal machine.” The members of the British delegation laughed heartily at the Chinese and tried their best to reassure them.

While the performance staged at Yuanmingyuan was designed to destroy the Chinese conception of the world, the performance staged during the signing ceremony was a celebration of the new world order. Instead of terrifying the Chinese, the object was to make them come to terms with the new situation. Lord Elgin wanted to show them to their designated place in the Euro-centric international system—off in a corner, a bit to the side. “Thus was happily concluded an event which was the commencement of a new era, not only in the history of the Empire of China, but of the world, by the introduction of four hundred millions of the human race into the family of civilized nations.” In this international system, all states are equal, yet some states are more equal than others. The ceremony was, said Wolseley, “a public admission of our national superiority and a concession of all those demands which we had made before the war commenced.” As such it was “truly gratifying to all who took part in it, and a very just source of pride to every British subject.” Once the ceremony was over, the Chinese invited the British delegation to dinner, but Elgin declined. The British did not want to appear too cordial, perhaps they still suspected some Chinese ruse, and besides they had to pack their bags and turn southward before winter was upon them.
Biographies

**The Chinese**

**Cixi, Empress Dowager.** 慈禧太后. 1835–1908. The favorite concubine of Emperor Xianfeng and the mother of Emperor Tongzhi. After Xianfeng’s death in 1861, she effectively became the regent for the subsequent emperors, exercising a powerful influence on Chinese politics. She has commonly been regarded as a conservative obstacle to more far-reaching reforms, although much of the scholarship on her life in English has been based on flawed sources.

**Gong, Prince. Yixin.** 奕訢. 1833–1898. The sixth son of Emperor Daoguang and Emperor Xianfeng’s half-brother. By Europeans identified as a member of the “peace party” at the Chinese court and responsible for the final stage of the negotiations in 1860. He was the person who ratified the Tianjin Treaty and the Beijing Convention on part of the Chinese. After Xianfeng’s death, he was regent for the future Emperor Tongzhi, and responsible for creating a foreign ministry and implementing European diplomatic practices. He strongly objected to Cixi’s plans for a partial reconstruction of Yuanmingyuan in 1873, and was dismissed from power by Cixi in 1884.

**Kangxi Emperor.** 康熙帝. 1654–1722. The fourth emperor of the Qing dynasty, responsible for the construction of Yuanmingyuan in 1709. His long reign was a period of economic prosperity and cultural flourishing. Succeeded by Emperor Yongzheng.

**Lin Zexu.** 林则徐. 1785–1850. Chinese scholar and official, commissioner in Guangdong in 1838. Determined to back stamp out opium smuggling he came into conflict with European merchants. Wrote a memorial to Queen Victoria in 1839 urging her to halt the trade. A statue of him is erected in Chinatown, New York.

**Qianlong Emperor.** 乾隆帝. 1711–1799. The son of Emperor Yongzheng and the father of Emperor Daoguang; he was the sixth emperor of the Qing dynasty.

**Sengge Rinchen.** 僧格林沁. 1811–1865. Mongol nobleman and Qing dynasty general, who gained a reputation for successfully fighting the Taiping Rebellion and for
the victory against the Europeans at the Dagu Forts in June 1859. He was ambushed by Nian rebels in 1865, captured, and killed.

**Tongzhi Emperor**, 同治. 1856–1871. Son of emperor Xianfeng and Cixi, and the tenth emperor of the Qing dynasty. During his reign, a number of reforms were initiated. Died of smallpox or possibly a sexually transmitted disease.

**Xianfeng Emperor**, 咸豐帝. 1831–1861. Fourth son of Emperor Daoguang and the ninth emperor of the Qing dynasty. His reign saw the rise of the Taiping Rebellion and the outbreak of the Second Opium War. Fled to the summer retreat at Chengde on September 22, 1860, to escape the Allied armies who approached Beijing. Died in August the following year, reputedly addicted to opium. He was survived by his consort Cixi, the Empress Dowager.

**Ye Mingchen**, 叶名琛. 1807–1859. Chinese scholar and official, governor of Guangdong in 1848. Came into conflict with the British regarding access to the city of Guangzhou. Responsible for seizing the crew of *The Arrow*, providing the British with an excuse for war. Captured by the British in December, 1857, and brought to India where he subsequently died.

**Yongzheng Emperor**, 雍正帝. 1678–1735. The son of Emperor Kangxi and the father of Emperor Qianlong, he was the fifth emperor of the Qing dynasty. Moved his residence to Yuanmingyuan and expanded the gardens. Responsible for banning nonmedical opium use in 1829.

**Zaiyuan**, 載垣, Sixth Prince Yi, was the fifth generation descendant of the 13th son of Emperor Kangxi. Together with Muyi, minister of war, responsible for negotiations with the Europeans during part of September 1860. Designated as one of the regents of Emperor Tongzhi, but out-maneuvered by Cixi and forced to commit suicide.

**The British**

**Bolwby, Thomas.** 1818–1860. Trained as a solicitor but was attracted to journalism and covered the nationalist uprisings in Europe in 1848 for *The Times*. Dispatched by the paper to China in 1860 as a war correspondent. His reports were widely appreciated, not least by Lord Elgin. Captured by the Chinese on September 18, 1860, tortured and killed.

**Bowring, John.** 1792–1872. Polyglot man of letters, poet, liberal activist, member of the Houses of Parliament, and editor of the collected works of Jeremy Bentham. One of the founders of the Anti-Corn Law League in 1838 and the international secretary for the Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace. Consul in Guangzhou from 1849 and governor of Hong Kong from 1854. Responsible for starting military action against China in October 1856, which resulted in the Second Opium War. Censored by parliament, he was forced to retire in 1859.

**Bright, John.** 1811–1889. British Liberal politician, pacifist, and one of the founders of the Anti-Corn Law League in 1838. In 1857, together with Richard Cobden an opponent of Palmerston’s China policy.
Bruce, Frederick. 1814–1867. Brother of the Eighth Earl of Elgin. British diplomat, stationed in Hong Kong, Newfoundland, Bolivia, Uruguay, Egypt, and the United States. Leader of the failed mission to obtain a ratification of the Tianjin Treaty in 1859. In 1860, the first British ambassador to China.

Cobden, Richard. 1804–1865. Manchester businessman, liberal activist, and politician. One of the founders of the Anti-Corn Law League in 1838 and later its chief spokesman. Member of Parliament in 1841 and an active peace campaigner. In 1857, he strongly opposed Palmerston’s China policy and lost his parliamentary seat in the subsequent election. Returned to parliament in 1859, he refused to join Palmerston’s government but was responsible for negotiating a trade deal with France the same year.

Cooke, George Wingrove. 1814–1865. Trained as a solicitor but turned to scholarship and wrote several books on British political history. Special correspondent for The Times in China in 1857.


Elgin, Thomas Bruce. Seventh Earl of Elgin. 1766–1841. British diplomat stationed in Constantinople, most famous for removing half of a frieze by the sculptor Phidias, fifth century BC, from Parthenon in Athens. The work, “the Elgin Marbles,” was bought by the British Museum in 1816 where it remains to this day. Elgin attracted syphilis and lost his nose to the illness whereupon his wife left him. He remarried and moved to Paris in 1810 to avoid his creditors.


Hope Grant, James. 1808–1875. British general and the person in charge of the British troops during the North China Campaign of 1860. First made a name for himself during the suppression of the Uprising in India in 1857. A devout Christian, a cellist, and the brother of the artist Sir Francis Grant.

Parkes, Harry. 1828–1885. Orphaned at the age of five, he moved to Hong Kong to live with his sister who was married to the German missionary Karl Gütlaff. Translator and secretary to Henry Pottinger in 1841 and after 1842 stationed in various Chinese treaty ports. Consul at Xiamen in 1854 and in Guangzhou in 1855. Together with John Bowring responsible for starting the Second Opium War. Together with Thomas Wade the main translator for the British troops in 1860. Taken prisoner by the Chinese on September 18. Influential critic of the Chinese authorities. Consul general in Japan in 1865, and the first British diplomat to Korea in 1883. A statue erected in his honor in Shanghai was demolished by the Japanese in 1943.


Russell, William Howard. 1820–1907. Special correspondent for The Times during the Crimean War in 1854. His reports on the incompetence and the British officers and the sanitary conditions in the British camp led to investigations by parliament. Reported from the Uprising in India in 1858, from the American Civil War, and the Franco-Prussian War in 1871. Ran unsuccessfully for parliament as a conservative in 1868. Knighted in 1895.

Victoria, Queen. 1819–1901. Queen of the United Kingdom from 1838, and Empress of India from 1876. Married to Prince Albert. Had nine children, and survived eight assassination attempts.

THE FRENCH

Bourboulon, Alphonse de. The first French ambassador to China in 1860. Married to Catherine Fanny MacLeod, a Scottish beauty and adventurer. Returning to Europe from China by way of Siberia and Central Asia, the couple’s travels inspired Jules Vernes’ novel Michael Strogoff.

Chapdelaine, Auguste. 1814–1856. Christian missionary in Guangxi, China. He was taken prisoner and tortured to death by local officials. His death provided the official rationale for the French decision to join the military campaign in China in 1860.

Cousin-Montauban, Charles. Count of Palikao. 1796–1878. Military man with a career in Algeria where he distinguished himself by pursuing native guerrilla fighters
and by participating in the capture of Abd al-Qadir, the leader of the Algerian government. Military commander of the French troops during the North China Campaign of 1860. Made a senator and a count by Napoleon III after his return to France. Became a minister of war during the Franco-German War and, during the summer of 1870, a short-lived prime minister of France. After the French defeat he fled to Belgium.


Napoleon III, Charles Louis Napoleon. 1808–1873. The nephew and heir of Napoleon I. Elected president of France in 1848, he carried out a coup d’etat in 1851, which established him as emperor in the Second French Empire. A populist ruler who claimed a mandate directly from the French people; he also instituted censorship and restricted political freedoms. After the loss to Germany in the war of 1870, he took refuge in England. A notorious womanizer.

OTHERS

Gützlaff, Karl. 1803–1851. German missionary and adventurer in China, known to smuggle both bibles and opium to the Chinese. Liked to dress in Chinese clothing. Married the sister of Harry Parkes.

Ignatyev, Nikolay Pavlovich. 1832–1908. Participated in the diplomatic negotiations that concluded the Crimean War, and was in 1858 sent on mission to Central Asia and in 1860 to Beijing as Russian plenipotentiary. Through skillful negotiations, he obtained Outer Manchuria for Russia. Between 1864 and 1877, he was Russian ambassador in Constantinople. Mount Ignatiev in Antarctica is named after him.

Williams, Samuel Wells. 1812–1884. American linguist, missionary, and diplomat. In 1855, secretary of the United States Legation to China, and in 1859 attached to Ward’s mission to Beijing. Between 1860 and 1876 he was American charge d’affaires in Beijing. He translated the Book of Genesis and the Gospel of Matthew into Japanese, but both manuscripts were lost in a fire before they could be published.

CHRONOLOGY

1856

October 8. The crew of The Arrow is detained by Chinese authorities. The incident is turned into a casus belli by the British.

October 23. The Royal Navy begins military action on the Canton River.
1857

December 28. British bombardment of Guangzhou, 广州, the city is occupied.

1858


1859

June 25. The Allies stopped at the Dagu Forts, 大沽炮台, Dagu paotai, on their way to Beijing to obtain a ratification of the Treaty of Tainjin. In the ensuing battle, the Europeans lose a third of the army.

1860

April 28. Lord Elgin leaves for China from Marseilles on the Valetta, together with Baron Gros and Thomas Bowly, correspondent for The Times.
August 1. The Allied armies land in Beitang, 北塘, on the Bohai Gulf, 渤海.
August 12. The armies arrive at Xinhe, 新河, where they have their first encounter with the enemy.
August 14. Battle at the Tanggu forts, 塘沽炮台, Tanggu paotai.
August 18. The Allied army captures the Dagu Forts, 大沽炮台, Dagu paotai.
August 24. Tianjin, 天津, is taken by the Allies.
September 2. Negotiations begin with Chinese officials who immediately agree to all European demand, including the new demands to make Tianjin an open port and for an indemnity of eight million taels to be paid to each army.
September 6. The negotiations break down over the issue of the credentials of the Chinese negotiators. Elgin decides to march on Beijing.
September 8. The march on Beijing begins.
September 11. The Allies are approached by the president of the Imperial Court of Punishment and the president of the Council of War and asked to resume negotiations, once again insisting that all demands will be met. Elgin replies that he will not halt the troops before they reach Tongzhou, 通州, southeast of Beijing.
September 13. The Allies reach Hexi, 河西务.
September 16. The Chinese negotiators once again approach the European commanders, promising to agree to all terms as long as the armies halt their march.
September 18. The battle of Zhangjiawan, 张家湾, where the Europeans are confronted by some 30,000 imperial troops but win a decisive victory. The Chinese capture 39 European soldiers and civilians who subsequently are held prisoner and tortured.
September 21. Battle of Baling, 八里橋之戰. The Chinese armies are again defeated and Beijing is open to the Europeans.
September 22. Emperor Xianfeng leaves Yuanmingyuan and takes refuge in Chengde, beyond the Great Wall. The Allies receive a letter from Prince Gong, the emperor’s brother, who takes charge of the negotiations.
October 3. After waiting for supplies, the Allies begin the final march on Beijing.
Appendix

October 6. The French army and the British cavalry arrive at Yuanmingyuan late in the afternoon. The first court-yard is seized after a skirmish, the troops bivouac outside the gates. A few individual soldiers venture into the compound.

October 7. General Montauban inspects the first set of buildings, permits the soldiers to take mementos of the campaign, full-scale looting begins. The British cavalry and Chinese looters join from neighboring villages. Lord Elgin visits Yuanmingyuan and is horrified at the destruction. At night the French camp is turned into an Oriental bazaar.

October 8. Second day of looting. The first prisoners—Parkes, Loch, and l’Escayrac de Lauture—are returned to the Allied camps.

October 9. The French troops depart from Yuanmingyuan and take up quarters outside of the city walls of Beijing.

October 11. The British organize an auction of objects looted from Yuanmingyuan.

October 13. The Allies force open the Anting Gate, in the city wall of Beijing, and take formal possession of the capital.

October 17. Funeral for the 13 British prisoners killed by the Chinese in the Russian cemetery, Beijing.

October 18. Yuanmingyuan is burned to the ground by British troops.

October 19. Second day of burning.

October 24. Ratification of the Treaty of Tianjin and signing of the Beijing Convention by the British and the Chinese.


November 1. General Montauban leaves Beijing with his army.

November 7. Frederick Bruce, the British ambassador in waiting, reaches Beijing and is introduced to Prince Gong.

November 8. The last Allied troops leave Beijing.

1861

February 14. The British parliament meets to thank the troops for the campaign in China.

August 22. Emperor Xianfeng dies in Chengde, 30 years old.

November 25. Victor Hugo writes his letter to Captain Butler.

1863

November 20. Lord Elgin dies in Dharamsala, India, 52 years old.

1873

June 29. Audience in Beijing with Emperor Tongzhi who reached his maturity. The court protocol no longer required a koutou by the foreign visitors.

1874

March 10. According to reports in The Times, General Montauban, in a French court hearing, defended his actions at Yuanmingyuan and insisted no looting took place.
All primary sources are in print and they are available online either at the Internet Archive or at Gallica, the digital resources of the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris. Despite the fame of Yuanmingyuan in both Europe and China, it is described by relatively few sources. The most prominent Chinese description is by the two artists, Tang Dai and Shen Yuan, commissioned by Emperor Qianlong to paint each of the 40 scenic vistas in the gardens. The album is reprinted in its entirety in *Yuanmingyuan sishijing tuyong* (Beijing: Shijie tushu chubangongsi, 2005), or more accessibly in Che Bing Chiu, *Yuanming Yuan: le jardin de la clarté parfaite* (Paris: Editions de l’Imprimeur, 2000); it is also available online. The account of Yuanmingyuan that had most influence in Europe is by the Jesuit friar Jean Denis Attiret, written in 1743, first published in 1749, and reprinted in “Lettre du frère Attiret, de la Compagnie de Jésus, peintre au service du l’Empereur de la Chine, à M. d’Assaut,” *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, écrites des missions étrangères*, edited by Charles le Gobien (Paris: J. Vernarei, 1819), pp. 387–412. Attiret’s account was translated into most European languages and extensively reprinted. See, for example, Jean Denis Attiret, *A Particular Account of the Emperor of China’s Gardens Near Pekin* (London: M. Cooper, 1752) or Jean Denis Attiret, “A Description of the Emperor of China’s Gardens and Pleasure-Houses Near Pe-King,” in *Miscellaneous Pieces Relating to the Chinese*, edited by Thomas Percy (London: R. & J. Dodsley, 1762) pp. 149–201. Shorter accounts left by other Jesuits include “Extrait d’une lettre du père du Gad, missionnaire en Chine, au père de Brassaud, Macao, le 15 décembre 1757,” and “Lettre, du père Benoist, missionnaire, à M. Papillon d’Autriche, Pekin, le 16 novembre, 1767,” both in *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses, écrites des missions étrangères: mémoires de la Chine*, edited by Charles Le Gobien (Paris: J. Vernarei, 1819) vol. 13, pp. 89–90 and 176–184, respectively.

Briefer descriptions of Yuanmingyuan can be found in the accounts left by members of the Macartney and the Amherst missions. See, for example, John Barrow, *Travels in China, Containing Descriptions, Observations, and Comparisons, Made and Collected in the Course of a Short Residence at the Imperial Palace of Yuen-Min-Yuen, and on a Subsequent Journey Through the Country, from Peking to Canton* (London: T. Cadell & W. Davies, 1804); George Macartney, *Our First Ambassador to China: An Account of the Life of George, Earl of Macartney*, edited by Helen H. Robbins (London: John Murray, 1908); and George Staunton, *An Authentic Account of an Embassy from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China* (London: Bulmer, 1797), as well as the more idiosyncratic William Proudfoot, *Biographical Memoir of James Dinwiddie: Embracing Some Account of His Travels in China and Residence in India* (Liverpool: Edward Howell, 1868). Descriptions of Yuanmingyuan are also given by participants in the Dutch diplomatic mission in 1794/95; see, for example, Andreas Everardus van Braam, *Voyage de l’ambassade de la Compagnie des Indes Orientales hollandaises, vers l’empereur de la Chine, dans les années 1794 & 1795* (Philadelphia: M. L. E. Moreau De Saint-Mery, 1795). In addition, the gardens are described in considerable detail by several of the participants in the North China Campaign of 1860. They, after all, were the only visitors who ever had perfect access to the gardens. The most extensive, authoritative, and beautifully illustrated
Appendix


As far as the origins of the Second Opium War are concerned, a good place to start is Laurance Oliphant, *Narrative of the Earl of Elgin’s Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857, ’58, ’59, 2 vols.* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1860). See further the official diplomatic correspondence and letters to and from ministers and officials gathered in *Correspondence Regarding Insults in China* (London: Houses of Parliament, 1857); *Correspondence Relative to Earl of Elgin’s Special Missions to China and Japan, 1857–1859* (London: Houses of Parliament, 1859); and *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859–60* (London: Houses of Parliament, 1861). A similar collection of French documents is Henri Cordier, *L’Expédition de Chine de 1857-58: histoire diplomatique, notes et documents* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1905). By far, the best insight into the British mid-nineteenth-century conception of relations between Europe and the rest of the world is provided by the contributions to the “Great China Debate” held in six separate sessions on February 24, 26, 27 and March 2 and 3. They are reprinted in Hansard, in its entirely available online. In this debate, the contributions by Lord Derby, Richard Cobden, Benjamin Disraeli, and Lord Palmerston are particularly noteworthy. For comments on Richard Cobden’s speech and his reactions to the subsequent election defeat, see John A. Hobson, *Richard Cobden: The International Man* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1919). Sidney Herbert’s conversion from a critic of Palmerston in 1857 to minister of war in 1860 is covered in Arthur H. Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert, Lord Herbert of Lea: A Memoir* (London: Murray, 1906). This volume also reprints correspondence relevant to the 1860 campaign.

Appendix

There are well over 20 eyewitness accounts left by ordinary soldiers—not all of them cover all the events, however, and some are obviously derived from other originals. The most useful source is Garnet Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China in 1860; to Which Is Added the Account of a Short Residence with the Tai-Ping Rebels at Nanking and a Voyage from Thence to Hankow* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862). Wolseley was a perceptive observer, he writes in a lively prose, and because of the semiofficial status of this account it gives a good insight into the thinking of the Allied commanders. Wolseley’s description of the burning of Yuanmingyuan is particularly moving. See also Garnet Wolseley, *The Story of a Soldier’s Life* (Westminster: A. Constable, 1903).


The North China Campaign of 1860 was covered by two journalists working for European newspapers—Thomas Bowlby writing for *The Times* and Antoine Fauchery writing for *Le Moniteur*, the official newspaper of the French government. Fauchery’s articles appeared on October 13, 16, 17, November 7, December 16, 18, 28, 29, 1860, and on January 15, 27, 29, 31, 1861. Bowlby’s articles were published on June 27, July 10, August 7, 14, 28, September 14, October 1, 5, 17, and November 3, 14, 1860. The articles of both correspondents were widely reprinted in other newspapers in Britain and in France. In addition, Bowlby’s writings from China, together with his personal letters are reprinted in *An Account of the Last Mission and Death of Thomas William Bowlby*, edited by his son and privately printed in 1906. The reporting of *The Times’* previous China correspondent is reprinted in George Wingrove Cooke, *China: Being “The Times” Special Correspondence from China in the Years 1857-58* (London: G. Routledge, 1858). A helpful discussion from a French perspective is provided in Charles Lavollé, “Une historiographie de la presse anglaise dans la guerre de Chine.” *Revue des deux mondes* 3 (1859), pp. 145–178.

The translators working for the Allied commanders had unique opportunities to observe events. The accounts left by Maurice d’Hérisson, Montauban’s translator, articulate better than Montauban himself was able to do the official rationale.


Other noteworthy eyewitness accounts include Robert M’Ghee, *How We Got to Pekin: A Narrative of the Campaign in China of 1860* (London: Richard Bentley, 1862). M’Ghee was pastor to the troops and his colorful prose reflects both the official aims of the campaign and the prejudiced points of view on China current among ordinary soldiers. An account valuable for its explicitly nonofficial perspective is Armand Lucy, *Souvenirs de voyages: lettres intimes sur la campagne de Chine* (Marseille: Jules Barile, 1861). Nonofficial is also the point of view of Jean-Louis de Negroni, *Souvenirs de campagne en Chine* (Paris: Renou et Maulde, 1864). Negroni was a Corsican adventurer who passed himself off as a nobleman, and his book served as an introduction to the collection of imperial bric-à-brac, which he had managed to bring back to France. Charles Gordon and Frederick Stephenson are two British military commanders later famous above all for their exploits in Africa, but both learned the basics of colonial warfare in China. The letters of “Chinese Gordon” are published in Alfred E. Hake, *The Story of Chinese Gordon* (London: Remington, 1884), and Stephenson gives his own account in Frederick Charles Arthur Stephenson, *At Home and on the Battlefield: Letters from the Crimea, China*.
Appendix

1 Liberals and Barbarians

1. This is the Chengde bushu shanzhuang, the “Chengde Mountain Retreat.” Chengde is also known as Rehe or Jehol. For a history, see Philippe Forêt, Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2000).

2. Spence makes this claim, see Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999), 100, 182.


6. Ibid., 137.

7. Garnet Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China in 1860: To Which Is Added the Account of a Short Residence with the Tai-Ping Rebels at Nankin and a Voyage from Thence to Hankow (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862), 226–227.


9. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 280.


11. One seminal statement, written one year before the destruction of Yuanmingyuan, is by John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (London: John W. Parker & Son, 1859). In the concluding section “Of Individuality,” Mill develops his argument with China as its foil. The Chinese have “become stationary,” he declares, “and have remained so for thousands of years; if they are ever to be further improved, it must be by foreigners” (ibid., 129).

12. “It is curious to notice,” says the editor of the letters of Sidney Herbert, British secretary of war in 1860, “how little comment was made on the destruction of the Summer Palace.” Arthur H. Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, Lord Herbert of Lea: A Memoir (London: Murray, 1906), 349.

14. See, for example, Spence, *Search for Modern China*, 182.


17. “At the same time,” Elgin continued, “there is certainly not much to regret in the old civilisation which we are thus scattering to the winds.” James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, *Extracts from the Letters of James, Earl of Elgin to Mary Louisa, Countess of Elgin*, 1847–1862 (Edinburgh: Privately Printed, 1864), 101.


20. Ibid., 134.


38. Ibid, 269.


41. Hugo’s sentiments did not, for example, stop him from buying a large quantity of Chinese silk from a British officer who had taken them from Yuanmingyuan. Young-tsu Wong, *A Paradise Lost: The Imperial Garden Yuanming Yuan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), 154.


60. Ibid., 322.


62. “Garden of Eden.”


66. On the healing power of gardens, see Harrison, Gardens, 131–134.

67. In the end, Morse concludes, “the Chinese learned, and they accepted as their law, that, whereas formerly it was China which dictated the conditions under which international relations were to be maintained, now it was the Western nations which imposed their will on China.” Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Conflict, 1834–1860, vol. 1 (New York: Paragon, 1900), I:617.


69. This paragraph paraphrases ibid., 16–19.


77. Wong, Deadly Dreams, 333–364.


88. In 1937, the number of potential consumers had reached 400 million. See Carl Crow, Four Hundred Million Customers, ed. G. Sapojnikoff, originally published in 1937 (Hong Kong: Earnshaw Books, 2008).


94. According to article 2: “in accordance with the universal practice of great and friendly nations, Her Majesty the Queen, may, if She see fit, appoint Ambassadors, Ministers, or other Diplomatic Agents to the Court of Peking.” Mayers, “Treaty of Tianjin, 1858,” 11.


96. See, for example, “Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce,” Houses of Parliament, Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859–60 (London: Houses of Parliament, 1861), 1–2. On the conditions, see “Vote of Thanks,” Hansard 161, House of Commons (February 14, 1861): 367. The emperor’s reply, received on April 8, was, said Hope Grant, “cheeky in the extreme.” James Hope Grant, Incidents in the China War of 1860: Compiled from the Private Journals of General Sir Hope Grant, ed. Henry Knollys (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1875), 9. But clearly the answer itself was not important. Compare Elgin, while in transit to China: “If the ultimatum has been accepted, shall we be able to turn back at once? This is doubtful. I think that we must assure ourselves that it is not only accepted in terms but actually carried out in practice, before we can consider our mission closed.” James Bruce, Earl


2 **An Awesome Performance**

1. An international system is formed “when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole.” Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), 9–10.


8. On the rituals and practices of seventeenth century diplomacy, see François de Callières, *De la manière de négocier avec les souverains* (Amsterdam: La Compagnie, 1716). On the rituals and practices of nineteenth century diplomacy, see, for


13. This is also true of Britain where the national idea often was given an Anglican interpretation. H. S. Jones, “The Idea of the National in Victorian Political Thought,” *European Journal of Political Theory* 5, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 12–21.


15. Any kind of state can be a subject of international law, says Bluntschli, and yet he insists that states, “through the intermediary of their rulers or their assemblies, have a common will.” Johann Caspar Bluntschli, *Le droit international codifié* (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1874), 63.


17. Democracy is not suited to foreign policy, Tocqueville concluded, since democracies “cannot combine its measures with secrecy, and will not await their consequences with patience.” Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1:254.


19. Quoted in ibid., 134.


22. Feng Zhang, “Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 2
Notes


29. Ibid., 133; Fairbank and Teng, “The Ch’ing Tributary System,” 138–139.


34. This, as Crossley points out, was implied by the Buddhist notion of the “wheel-turning king,” and it applies to the Sino-centric international system. Pamela Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 223–280. As far as China itself was concerned, however, carefully delineated borders were important. See, for example, the Treaty of Nerchinsk, concluded in 1689. “Traité de paix entre la Chine et la Russie signé en 1689,” Archives diplomatiques 1, no. 1 (January 1861): 271–275.


36. The Dutch, after all, were representatives of the Dutch East India Company, V.O.C., more than the non-existant “king of Holland.” Duyvendak, “The Last Dutch Embassy To the Chinese Court (1794–1795),” 1–2.


38. Compare the etymological roots of “theater” in theo, “seeing,” related to theoria, meaning “contemplation, speculation, looking at, things looked at.” Compare the early modern idea of the theatrum, a display of something such in a book or a


44. Compare also the ballet put on by Rene Descartes for Queen Christina of Sweden. See Richard A. Watson, *Descartes’s Ballet: His Doctrine of Will and Political Philosophy* (South Bend: St. Augustine’s Press, 2004).


47. Hinds, *Calendar of State Papers*, 33.


49. In 1893, the U.S. Congress finally decided to send and receive diplomats of ambassador’s rank. See Foster, *Practice of Diplomacy*, 23.

50. Commenting on this quote, Trotsky added “I intentionally exaggerated my point of view, because I wanted to emphasize the fact that the centre of gravity was not in diplomacy at that time.” Leon Trotsky, *My Life: An Attempt at Autobiography* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1930), 268.

51. Ibid., 287.

52. Ibid., 293.


55. The different European reactions are discussed in William W. Rockhill, *Diplomatic Audiences at the Court of China* (London: Luzac, 1905).


Notes


58. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry, 41–72.

59. Ibid., 41–42.

60. On Addison, see Nicolson, Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory, 310–316, 320–323.


64. Compare, for example, Michael Halberstam, Totalitarianism and the Modern Conception of Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 182–203.


66. Ibid., 314.

67. The kouyou is sometimes also rendered as ketou in contemporary Chinese. For a comprehensive discussion, see Rockhill, Diplomatic Audiences.

68. Macartney, Our First Ambassador to China, 281.


3 An Imperial Theme Park


2. The area covered by the manmade structures corresponds to 160,000 square meters. Wong, Paradise Lost, 5.

3. The Yongzheng Emperor spent about 200 days here per year. Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 92, 94. Qianlong, who often left on travels and hunting expeditions, spent on average 126 days here (ibid., 101). His son, Jiaqing, 167 days (ibid., 102). And his son, Daoguang on average some 200 days per year, and in one year, 1849, he spent 350 days here (ibid., 103).


5. On the Qianlong Emperor’s daily schedule, see Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 32, 158, 160.
6. Qianlong’s harem had 41 official members. The emperor wrote some 42,550 poems in his life (ibid., 161–162, 164–166).
10. This is the traditional character. The simplified is 园.
11. Ibid., 64.
13. Quoted in ibid., 92.
14. On Qianlong’s extensions, see ibid., 101–102.
15. The Changchunyuan is first mentioned in 1745, and Qichunyuan in 1769, but work on both seem to have begun earlier (ibid., 69–76, 76–78).
29. “Between the bedchamber of an emperor and that of an ordinary person,” as Hérisson put it, “there is necessarily less difference than between a throne room and a living room.” Hérisson, *Journal d’un interprète*, 17.
30. Castano, *L’Expédition de Chine*, 159–161. Castano says the sheets were of cotton—and remarkably, the emperor did not seem to have a bathroom.
42. Quoted in Malone, *History of the Peking Summer Palace*, 63.
46. On the creation of the fountain, see Benoist, “Lettre, du père Benoist, missionnaire, à M. Papillon d’Autriche, Pekin, le 16 Novembre, 1767.” The heads of these figures have recently been the focus of discussions regarding the return of objects taken from Yuanmingyuan, see Hugh Eakin, “The Affair of the Chinese Bronze Heads,” *The New York Review of Books*, May 14, 2009. The fountain was taken apart after the death of Benoist since only he knew how to make it function properly. Chiu, *Yuanming Yuan*, 75, 86.
48. Castano, for one, was fooled. Yuanmingyuan is “as large as Paris,” he claimed, and “goes on until the mountains in Tartary.” Castano, *L’Expédition de Chine*, 158.
49. Malone, History of the Peking Summer Palace, 100; Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 41.
50. Malone, History of the Peking Summer Palace, 66.
51. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 233.
52. Ibid.
53. In 1754, a teenage Manchu boy was caught climbing the garden wall. He was sentenced to one hundred lashes and banishment to a place one thousand miles away. Wong, Paradise Lost, 109.
54. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 234.
55. There are two exceptions. One concerns the Ancestral Shrine which was a very large building. As Malone notes, however, its setting in the corner of the compound and the way it was surrounded by hills and trees made it into a less than imposing structure. Malone, History of the Peking Summer Palace, 67. The other exception was the Audience Hall at the entrance of the gardens, which, as we have seen, was intended for public functions and rituals.
56. Quoted in Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 140; Malone, History of the Peking Summer Palace, 64.
57. Attiret, A Particular Account, 8–9; Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 237.
59. Varin, Expédition de Chine, 235; M’Ghee, How We Got to Pekin, 216.
61. In fact from 1757 onward, in order to strengthen security, people working in the park were required to show their “branded waist plates,” not too dissimilar from passports, as they entered the park. Wong, Paradise Lost, 108.
62. Ibid., 109.
63. There were altogether some 1,623 people working in the imperial household (ibid., 101).
64. Ibid., 57–58.
68. Attiret, A Particular Account, 26–32.
69. During Qianlong’s reign there were some 500 eunuchs in the garden, and in 1805 there were 620. Wong, Paradise Lost, 104. On the eunuchs in China from a comparative perspective, see Richard Millant, Les eunuques à travers les âges (Paris: Vigot, 1908), 233–243. On the selection of soldiers, see Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 100.


77. Tuan, Domination and Affection, 165–166.


83. Forêt, Mapping Chengde, 103.

84. Elliott, Emperor Qianlong, 117, 124.

85. On copies of Mount Sumeru as axes through which cosmic energy might flow, see Forêt, Mapping Chengde, 69. On the Song dynasty emperor Huizong’s creation of a 225 feet mountain outside of his capital Kaifeng, see Tuan, Domination and Affection, 24.

86. The first emperor of Qin, according to Pauthier, built a palace in the style of each kingdom he had destroyed and placed it in his garden. Pauthier, “Une visite à Youen-Ming-Youen,” 98.

87. Malone, History of the Peking Summer Palace, 93.

88. Wong, Paradise Lost, 55.

89. Ibid., 19, 54.

90. On the bodhisattva identity, see Crossley, A Translucent Mirror, 235–236.

91. Malone, History of the Peking Summer Palace, 91; Attiret, A Particular Account, 32; Wong, Paradise Lost, 40–41.


93. Ibid., 28.

94. Wong, Paradise Lost, 63.

95. Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 74, 132.


103. Ibid., 54.
105. Ibid.
108. Ibid., 39.
110. On this curious parallelism, see Thomas, “Yuanming Yuan/Versailles,” esp. 115–125.
113. Ibid., 131–132.
117. Ibid., 37.


122. This is not to say that they were unaware of the connection. Compare Macartney: “Whether our style of gardening was really copied from the Chinese, or originated with ourselves, I leave for vanity to assert, and idleness to discuss.” Quoted in John Barrow, *Travels in China, Containing Descriptions, Observations, and Comparisons, Made and Collected in the Course of a Short Residence at the Imperial Palace of Yuen-Min-Yuen, and on a Subsequent Journey Through the Country, from Peking to Canton* (London: T. Cadell & W. Davies, 1804), 134.

123. Macartney quoted in ibid., 130.


### 4 The North China Campaign of 1860

1. Garnet Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China in 1860: To Which Is Added the Account of a Short Residence with the Tai-Ping Rebels at Nankin and a Voyage from Thence to Hankow* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862), 84.


4. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 89. Castano says the smell was due to a large number of women who had killed themselves and their children as the Europeans were approaching. F. Castano, *L’Expédition de Chine* (Paris: Victor Rozier, 1864), 124.


15. See, for example, James Hope Grant, *Incidents in the China War of 1860: Compiled from the Private Journals of General Sir Hope Grant*, ed. Henry Knollys (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1875), 140.


18. This is the battle in English referred to as “the battle of Plassey.” See James Mill, *The History of British India* (London: Baldwin, Cradock & Joy, 1817), vols. 3, chapter 3.


25. For a slightly more extensive list of reasons, see Marquis de Moges, *Recollections of Baron Gros’s Embassy to China and Japan in 1857–58* (London: Richard Griffin, 1860), 2–3. As Lord Elgin commented in his diary for November 17, 1857: “The fact is, that he has a much better case of quarrel than we. At least one that lends itself much better to rhetoric.” Elgin, *Extracts from Letters*, 59.


28. In 1850, Britain’s combined army was only a third of the French and smaller than Prussia’s, although the latter had no colonies. Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (London: Anchor, 2004), 310–312.


35. Allgood, *China War 1860*, 73. The numbers of soldiers differ depending on which stage in the campaign that is referred to. Some soldiers were held back and did not participate in all stages. A total number of 18,000 men, roughly 11,000 British soldiers and 7,000 French are often given. Hope Grant, *Incidents in the China War*, 49–50. Bowlby says, 11,000 British and 5,000 French troops at the start of the campaign. Bowlby, *Last Mission and Death of Thomas Bowlby*, 61. Napoleon III, according to Chiu, *Yuanming yuan*, 296, had initially envisioned 14,000 French troops, but the difficulties of transporting them all from Europe meant that only 10,511 were dispatched in the end. There were 68 French naval vessels; the British had 12,613 soldiers (ibid., 298).


37. In addition, of course, they could spot each other more easily. “We could see the red coats of our dragoons belonging to Colonel Walker’s party, which was moving about through the Chinese troops, whose grey uniforms made the scarlet of our men all the more plainly visible.” Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 175. The khaki dress was adopted by the army in 1902 but not universal until World War I.

38. Ibid., 262. It was “one of the most perfect little armies that England ever possessed.” Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, “Preface.”
40. Compare, for example, Pastor M’Ghee’s tale of “The Irishman and the Two Coolies,” M’Ghee, *How We Got to Pekin*, 336–337.
47. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 83–84, 97–98.
48. Ibid., 196, 197.
52. As the minister of war, Sidney Herbert, happily noted. See “Vote of Thanks,” 374. Several of the medical officers left their own accounts of the campaign. See, for example, Muir, “Medical History of the War in China”; Rennie, *British Arms in North China*; Castano, *L’Expédition de Chine*.
55. Ibid., 69; Division of the Chief of Staff, *Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India*, 420.
57. Allgood, *China War 1860*.
60. His name was Stanislas d’Escayrac de Lauture, and was later taken prisoner by the Chinese. For his account, see Stanislas d’ Escayrac de Lauture, *La Chine et les Chinois* (Paris: Delahays, 1877). Swinhoe, the translator and naturalist, visited him hoping to form a friendship among scientists. Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North China Campaign*, 191–194.
62. Ibid., 207.
65. See, for example, Lord Palmerston’s use of the term, quoted in Stanmore, Sidney Herbert, 350.
66. “We should conclude,” Joseph de Guignes argued, “that China and Tartary have been the cause of great upheavals in the world…. These Tartars, like the waves of the sea, continually overtake one another.” Joseph de Guignes, Histoire générale des Huns, des Turcs, des Mogols, et des autres Tartares occidentaux, &c. avant et depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu’à présent (Paris: Desaint & Saillant, 1756), 122–123.
67. As repeatedly argued by Elgin, see, for example, “The Peace with China,” The Morning Chronicle, December 29, 1860.
69. On koutou-ing before Sengge Rinchen, see Rennie, British Arms in North China, 106. On “Sam Collinson,” see Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 122–123; Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 186.
70. “They now talk of 200,000 men being collected in the neighbourhood of the Taku forts…” Stephenson, At Home and on the Battlefield, 254. Upton’s assessment from 1878 of the strength of the entire Chinese army set the size between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men, but adds that they were badly trained. Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe, 19.
71. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 149.
73. Stephenson, At Home and on the Battlefield, 261; Upton, Armies of Asia and Europe, 28–29.
74. Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 84.
76. Arthur Prudden Coleman, “John Bowring and the Poetry of the Slavs,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 84, no. 3 (May 31, 1941): 431–459. Not everyone was equally impressed with Bowring’s linguistic powers. He was, said Borrow, “slightly acquainted with four or five of the easier dialects of Europe, on the strength of which knowledge he would fain pass for a universal linguist.” Borrow, “The Old Radical,” 388. His attempts to learn Chinese seem to have been largely unsuccessful. Wong, Deadly Dreams, 86–87.
77. See, for example, Bowring, “Colonization in India.”
79. In 1827 his firm, Bowring & Co., exporting herring to France and Spain, went bankrupt leaving him without means of supporting his eight children. Stone, “John Bowring,” In the 1840s, his investments in the railroad industry failed.
80. For an overview of the “Arrow affair” and a refutation of Bowring’s version of the events, see Wong, Deadly Dreams, 87–95.
81. “In 1857,” as Harriet Martineau put it, “Lord Elgin was sent to China, to try what could be done to repair, or to turn to the best account, the mischief done by Sir John Bowring’s course, and by the patronage of it at home, in face of the moral reprobation of the people at large.” Harriet Martineau, “Memoir of the Earl of


84. Walrond, Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin, 3, 8.
85. Ibid., 9–10.
86. Ibid., 11.
87. On Elgin’s career in Canada, see John George Bourinot, Lord Elgin (Toronto: Morang, 1903).

88. According to Lane-Poole, Parkes’ editor, “Lord Elgin was disposed to treat the opinions of the residents and old officials somewhat cavalierly”; “his sympathies were apparently rather with the Chinese than with his fellow-countrymen.” Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 166–167. For Elgin’s views on the opium trade, see Elgin, Extracts from Letters, 13, 29, 137, 190.


91. Elgin, Extracts from Letters, 178.
93. Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, Sometime Her Majesty’s Minister to China & Japan, Volume 1: Consul in China (London: Macmillan, 1894), 310.
95. Ibid., 65–66.
96. See, for example, Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 186–187.
97. For biographical information, see Boilly, Le Baron Gros, 1838; Moges, Souvenirs d’une ambassade en Chine et au Japon en 1857 et 1858, (Paris: Librairie de L. Hachette et cie, 1860).
98. The picture is today in the Louvre. For a discussion, see Christopher Prendergast, Napoleon and History Painting: Antoine-Jean Gros’s La Bataille d’Eylau (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 145–185.
100. Elgin is very appreciative of his artistic talents. Elgin, Extracts from Letters, 55.
101. Ibid., 55, 174, 203.
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104. On the literary abilities of nineteenth-century military men, see Colley, Captives, 278–280.
106. Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 333.
107. For his own account of the Indian Uprising, see James Hope Grant, Incidents in the Sepoy War, 1857–58: Compiled from the Private Journals of James Hope Grant, ed. Henry Knollys (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1873).
108. Stephenson, At Home and on the Battlefield, 262.
111. The commanding officer for the operation was Christophe de Lamoricière. On Montauban’s role, see Nouvelle biographie universelle, “Abd-el Kader,” 579; Cousin-Montauban, La guerre de vingt-quatre jours, 189.
113. Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 181.
118. This decision was taken despite French resistance to the plan. Montauban wanted to attack the southern forts first. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 128.
119. Ibid., 130.
120. Ibid., 130–132.
121. Ibid., 134–135.
122. Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 222.
123. Rennie, British Arms in North China, 119–120; Hope Grant, Incidents in the China War, 92–93.
124. Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 223.
125. Allgood, China War 1860, 77. The figures on the number of dead and wounded in the two armies vary somewhat. Compare Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 277; Castano, L’Expédition de Chine, 127.
126. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 220–221.
127. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 155; Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 120–121; Allgood, China War 1860, 47.
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128. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 197.
129. Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 368.
130. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 196; Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 368–369; Béziat, “Campagne de Chine: 2,” 301–304; Bowlby, Last Mission and Death of Thomas Bowlby, 92.
132. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 161–162; Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 98; Castano mentions 1,000 British and 300 French troops. Castano, L'Expédition de Chine, 138.
133. Gros, Négociations entre la France et la Chine, 69; Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 196–198; Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 369.
134. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 161–163; Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 229.
135. Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 369; Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 229.
136. Lane-Poole, Parkes in China, 376; M’Ghee, How We Got to Pekin, 220; Mutrécy, Journal de la campagne, 2:11; Castano, L'Expédition de Chine, 128.
137. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 197–198; Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 165.
139. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 164.
140. Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 374–376; Loch, Personal Narrative, 129.
141. Elgin is criticized by Parkes’ editor, Stanley Lane-Poole, for his indecisiveness. Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 374–375.
142. Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 100.
143. Bowlby, Last Mission and Death of Thomas Bowlby, 97. The Chinese also expected a treaty to be concluded. On September 17, Harry Parkes came across a Chinese lieutenant-general who cordially congratulated him on “the conclusion of peace.” Lane-Poole, Life of Harry Parkes, 376.
145. Allgood, China War 1860, 54; Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 205–206.
146. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 179.
147. Division of the Chief of Staff, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 434.
148. Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 114.
149. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 191; Division of the Chief of Staff, Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India, 435.
150. Allgood, China War 1860, 81–82.
151. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 348; Varin, Expédition de Chine, 275.
152. Hope Grant, Incidents in the China War, 143–144; Varin, Expédition de Chine, 184, 221; Mutrécy, Journal de la campagne, vol. 2, vols. II:1, 2, 12.
154. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 193.
155. Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 126.
5 Enter the Barbarians


3. Varin talks about “our complete ignorance of where we were.” Paul Varin, Expédition de Chine (Paris: Michel Levy, 1862), 226.


6. Robert Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign of 1860: Containing Personal Experiences of Chinese Character, and of the Moral and Social Condition of the Country; Together with a Description of the Interior of Pekin (London: Smith, Elder, 1861), 293–294. It had been common for the emperors to visit Chengde every year, but Emperor Daoguang had not gone here after his father was killed by lightning in 1820. Philippe Forêt, Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000), 96–97.


18. For a complete list of the objects sent to Napoleon III and his wife, see Mutrécy, *Journal de la campagne*, vol. II:25. On Montauban's relations to Empress Eugénie, see Charles Cousin-Montauban, *Un ministère de la guerre de vingt-quatre jours, du 10 août au 4 septembre 1870* (Paris: E. Plon, 1874), 185–188.
19. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 227–228. On the particular interest, the Indian cavalry took in the silks, see John Hart Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin: Being Notes Taken from the Journal of an Officer Between Those Places* (London: Sampson Low, Son, 1861), 130. For Chinese sources confirming the destruction, see Chiu, *Yuanming Yuan*, 312.
35. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 225.
38. Montauban admits that “all our soldiers have belts of silk and our camp was covered with rolls of precious fabrics.” Cousin-Montauban, *L’Expédition de Chine*, 208.


41. As an “eye-witness” concluded in a letter to *The Times*, “the bulk of the English prize money was the proceeds of a sale by auction of the loot surrendered by individuals officers in obedience to a General Order.” An Eyewitness, “The Summer Palace of Pekin,” *The Times*, London, March 18, 1874.


43. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 241–242; Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North China Campaign*, 311; Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, 135–137.


47. For Baron Gros’s account, see ibid., 125, 133.


49. Hérisson, *Journal d’un interprète*, 330–331. This is contradicted by Hérisson’s own admission that although he did not personally take anything, his North African servant pillaged on his behalf (ibid., 347).


53. Even the official French version of events had changed by the end of the century when it was accepted that “the French and the British” both had contributed to the déménagement of the imperial palace. See Auzillion, *La propriété privée et la guerre continentale*, 45–46.


56. Ibid., 106.


58. The Chinese, said Fauchery, were busy looting and recklessly destroying. “That morning, not having anything more to break, they had applied fire since it still did justice to the shattered pieces.” Antoine Fauchery, “Lettre de Chine: Pékin, 20 octobre, 1860,” *Le Moniteur*, Paris, December 29, 1860.

“Our soldiers,” as Varin put it, “more squanderers than interested looters... did not pocket more than a tenth of the riches which they had at their disposition.” Varin, *Expédition de Chine*, 237.


On this last, often repeated point, see, for example, Hérisson, *Journal d’un interprète*, 329.


Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North China Campaign*, 300.

Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, 140–141.

Elgin, *Extracts from Letters*, 69.

Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, 140–141.

Lucy, *Lettres intimes*, 104–105. From the German Rathau, “town hall,” the verb is in all likelihood referring to actions taken by the French during the war in Italy in 1859. Compare “to run amok,” from the Malay *mengamuk* meaning “to make a furious and desperate charge.” Used, albeit in a different context, by Stanley Lane-Poole, *Sir Harry Parkes in China* (London: Methuen, 1901), 310, 352.


George Allgood, *China War 1860: Letters and Journals* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1901), 75; Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, 78.


Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, 114.

Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 182–183.

Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, 140–141.

The soldiers not present on these occasions regretted it since it put them at a disadvantage compare to their peers (ibid., 131).


As Montauban noted in connection with the occupation of Tianjin: “We agreed to occupy the outside, to prevent the disorders, however minor they may be, of an interior occupation.” Cousin-Montauban, *L’Expédition de Chine*, 165.

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1903, 413; Mutrécy, Journal de la campagne, vol. 2, vol. II:35; Gros, Négociations entre la France et la Chine, 125, 163–164; Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 142.

82. The state of the French army, and our own recollections from India, “were cogent reasons for avoiding such an arrangement.” Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 238.


84. On the “treacherousness” of the action, see Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 276; Henry Brougham Loch, Personal Narrative of Occurrences During Lord Elgin’s Second Embassy to China, 1860 (London: John Murray, 1869), 270; Hope Grant, Incidents in the China War, 108.


86. Of the 26 British prisoners seized on September 18, 13 were returned alive—including Harry Parkes, Henry Loch, one British soldier and 10 Sikhs; of the 13 French prisoners, 5 were returned, including d’Escayrac de Lauture and 4 soldiers. Hosea Ballou Morse, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire: The Period of Conflict, 1834–1860, vol. 1 (New York: Paragon, 1900), 608; M’Ghee, How We Got to Pekin, 252.


88. In the end an indemnity was indeed demanded, see Cousin-Montauban, L’Expédition de Chine, 265–266.

89. Ibid., 266.

90. Ibid., 265–266.


92. “The Peace with China.”


94. Ibid., 143–144.


96. “Letter from General Montauban to Baron Gros, Oct 17, 1860,” quoted in Hérisson, Journal d’un interprète, 385–386. Montauban, on October 18, started wondering if there was a secret instruction to Lord Elgin from his government to bring down the Manchu dynasty. Cousin-Montauban, L’Expédition de Chine, 221.

97. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 329–330; Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 279–280.

98. According to Allgood there were 3,500 men involved. Allgood, China War 1860, 58.


100. Swinhoe, Narrative of the North China Campaign, 335–336.

101. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 285–286.


103. Baron Gros watched the cloud of smoke from his residence in Beijing. Gros, Négociations entre la France et la Chine, 150; and so did Dunne, From Calcutta to Pekin, 141–142.

108. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 281.
109. As Parkes’ editor comments, see Lane-Poole, *Parkes in China*, 250.
111. He looked young, said Wolseley, but he displayed “a worn-out expression indicative of debauchery, so very common with Asiatic potentates.” Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 296. Prince Gong, said Dunne, who was not present, “looked, I hear, very sulky.” Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin*, 147.
113. Ibid., 301.
117. Ibid., 404–405.
119. Victoria, Queen of Great Britain, *The Letters of Queen Victoria: A Selection from Her Majesty’s Correspondence Between the Years 1837 and 1861* (London: J. Murray, 1907), 427.
126. Albert Garrel, Ordonnance sur le service des armée en campagne du 3 mai 1832 (Paris: Librairie Militaire de J. Dumaine, 1870), 113; Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 326.


128. Auzillio, La Propriété privée et la guerre continentale, 45–48; Cousin-Montauban, La guerre de vingt-quatre jours, 185–188.


130. Negroni, Souvenirs de campagne en Chine.


133. Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 41. This was the seal associated with Tongdaotang, “The Hall of Alignment with the Dao.” Young-tsu Wong, A Paradise Lost: The Imperial Garden Yuanming Yuan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), 153, 114–115.

134. Wong, Paradise Lost, 168. When Mme de Bourboulon, the wife of the French ambassador, visited the grounds in 1861, she noticed “a few pagodas, forgotten by the destroyers,” but the rest was “rubble of all kinds,” “burned beams,” and “calcined marble and alabaster.” Achille Poussielgue, Voyage en Chine et en Mongolie de M. de Bourboulon, ministre de France et de Madame De Bourboulon, 1860–1861 (Paris: L. Hachette, 1866), 135–136.


136. This garden, Qingyiyuan, was originally built in 1750 and completed in 1764. Chiu, Yuanming Yuan, 76, 78–80.

137. Ibid., 330–331.


139. Ibid.


144. William W. Rockhill, Diplomatic Audiences at the Court of China (London: Luzac, 1905), 41–54.


148. Ibid.

149. Ibid., 3–4.


### 6 An International Society of Civilized States


9. A government provided the way in which mankind “laid the basis of safety” (ibid., 316).


14. “In order to be entitled to recognition, a State must presumably possess: The will to reciprocate the recognition which it demands. The power to reciprocate the recognition which it demands.” Lorimer, *Institutes*, 2:109.

15. Ibid., 2:163.


20. “Although inferior to ourselves in civilization,” as Earl Grey explained in 1857 in reference to the Chinese, “they are a nation among whom good government and good order were established ages before the nations of Europe emerged from barbarism.” Earl Grey, “War with China,” *Hansard* 144, House of Lords, February 24, 1857, 1234. See also Edward Henry Stanley Derby, “War with China,” *Hansard* 144, House of Lords, February 24, 1857, 1155–1245.


24. Ibid., vol. III:469.


26. Ibid., 409, 411.

27. Ibid., 424–427.

28. Ibid., 413.


31. Austin, Province of Jurisprudence, 208.

32. Ibid., 316.


35. The term “positive international law” was introduced in Georg Friedrich Martens, Précis du droit des gens moderne de l’Europe (Paris: Guillaumin et cie, 1858). See Austin, Province of Jurisprudence, 280.

36. “Without wishing to exaggerate the importance of these writers,” as Wheaton put it, “it may be affirmed that they are generally impartial in their judgment.” Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (Boston: Little, Brown, 1855), 22. Compare Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 51–54.


44. Westlake, Principles of International Law, 136. “The right of undeveloped races, like the right of undeveloped individuals, is a right not to recognition as what they are not, but to guardianship that is, to guidance in becoming that of which they are capable, in realising their special ideals.” Lorimer, Institutes, 2:157.


47. Krauel, Applicabilité du droit des gens,” 398. The “Geneva Convention” to which Krauel refers concerned the “Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field” adopted in 1864; the “conference in Brussels” was the international conference, convened by the Russian Czar Alexander II in 1874, to reach an agreement on the laws and customs of war. “We know by experience,” Frederick Bruce noted, “that the Chinese do not confine the rights of a belligerent within the
limits established by European usage.” Quoted in “Mr. Bruceto Lord J. Russell, Shanghai, January 6, 1860.” Houses of Parliament, Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859–60 (London: Houses of Parliament, 1861), 13. In 1912, according to Oppenheim, China still belonged to a small group of countries where “neither their governments nor their populations are at present able to fully understand the Law of Nations and to take up an attitude which is in conformity with all the rules of this law.” Oppenheim, International Law, vol. I:155.

48. Hall, International Law, 34.


51. A point emphasized also by Ferguson, History of Civil Society, 315–316.


56. David Hume, “Of the Jealousy of Trade,” in Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary (Dublin: J. Williams, 1799), 347. This was particularly the case, Adam Smith argued in 1776, when the state has been captured by a mercantile elite who demanded protection for their monopolies and who involved the state in ruinous colonial adventures. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, originally published 1776 (London: A. Strahan and T. Cadell, 1793), vol. II:439–442. For a discussion, see István Hont, Jealousy of Trade: International Competition and the Nation-State in Historical Perspective (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2010), 185–266.

57. Compare, for example, August Wilhelm Heffter, Le droit international public de l’Europe (Paris: Cotillon, 1857), 67–68.


59. These are some of the items from a list in ibid., 438.

60. Westlake, Principles of International Law, 142.

61. Ibid., 139; Anglie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 90–100; Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer of Nations, 121–127.


63. Westlake, Principles of International Law, 140; Ferguson, Manual of International Law, vol. I:106. For a more skeptical view on the influence of trade on savages, see Lord Acton, “Colonies,” The Rambler, March 6, 1862, 396.


67. Thus, the Treaty of Nanjing, 1842, was followed by treaties with the United States and France (1844) and Sweden (1847); the Treaty of Tianjin, 1858, was followed by treaties with France, Russia, and the United States (1858), and Prussia and Germany (1861). The American treaty with Japan, 1858, was followed by treaties with Britain, Russia, the Netherlands, and France the same year. On China’s treaties, see Edward Hertslet, *Hertslet’s China Treaties* (London: H.M. Stationary Office, 1908). On the Japanese treaties, see Michael R. Auslin, *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006).

68. To quote the “Text of Anglo-German agreement, October 16, 1900,” reprinted as Appendix III, in Mingchien Joshua Bau, *The Open Door Doctrine in Relation to China* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), 199–200. The eight countries were Austria–Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.


71. Ibid., 366–369.


73. Bluntschi, *Droit international codifié*, 360.

74. Ibid., 325. Although it is not against international law to remove individuals works of art, “today’s public opinion disapproves of the sale or donation of such objects by a victor during a war” (ibid., 363). Compare Lieber, *Instructions for Government*, 11–12; Moore, *Digest*, 362–364.

75. As Lieber put it: “Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” Lieber, *Instructions for Government*, 4. Compare Bluntschi, *Droit international codifié*, 309; Moore, *Digest*, 178; Wheaton, *Elements of International Law*, 421.


“In the Hindu armies,” says Franchlin, ‘no idea of discipline ever existed.’ ‘The rudeness of the military art in Indostan,’ says Mr. Orme, ‘can scarce be imagined but by those who have seen it. The infantry consists of a multitude of people assembled together without regard to rank and file.’” Quoted in Mill, History of British India, 464–465.


Henri Ideville, Memoirs of Marshal Bugeaud, from His Private Correspondence and Original Documents, 1784–1849 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1884), 299–300.


An eyewitness account is Edward Vibart, The Sepoy Mutiny as Seen by a Subaltern: From Delhi to Lucknow (London: Smith, Elder, 1898).

92. Ibid.
94. Ibid., 101.

7 The Failure of the Liberal Project

3. In the preface to *De Mota Cordis*, 1628, announcing the discovery of blood circulation, William Harvey suggested that a prince should study the operations of the heart “as being a divine resemblance of his actions.” Christopher Hill, “William Harvey and the Idea of Monarchy,” *Past & Present* 27, no. 1 (April 1964): 54.
8. Ibid., 282.
9. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
Notes


20. Earl of Shaftesbury, “Sanitary Conference: Law of Quarantine,” Hansard 121, House of Lords, May 28, 1852, 1273–1275. Afraid to sound too contagionist, British military surgeons constantly discussed the quality of the air where troops were lodged. Rennie, however, disagreed: “in matters relating to military hygiene there is a tendency to over-estimate as causes of disease certain atmospheric impurities of local origin, as well as to attribute endemic disease to the external air that soldiers breathe.” David F. Rennie, The British Arms in North China and Japan: Peking 1860, Kagoshima (London: John Murray, 1864), 85.


29. Gordon, Address to the People, 6.
33. The church that Lord Elgin visited in Shanghai on Easter Sunday, 1858, claimed to have 80,000 parishioners, but most of them were “made by the missionaries ages ago,” and the Protestant missions “make hardly any converts.” James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, Extracts from the Letters of James, Earl of Elgin to Mary Louisa, Countess of Elgin, 1847–1862 (Edinburgh: Privately Printed, 1864), 93.
35. Ibid., 248.
38. Ibid., 1828.
40. The meeting was attended by the French liberal economist Frédéric Bastiat, as reported in Frédéric Bastiat, “Meeting à Londres, 13 avril 1843: Discours du D. Bowring,” in Oeuvres complètes de Frédéric Bastiat, vol. 3 (Paris: Guillaumin, 1862), 145–153, quote from ibid., 146. The text is here translated back into English from French.
42. Compare Bowring’s outrage when he in 1822 temporarily was detained by the French authorities. Sir John Bowring, Details of the Arrest, Imprisonment and Liberation of an Englishman by the Bourbon Government of France (London: Rowland Hunter, 1823).
44. Ibid., 295.


49. On Bowring’s defense of the opium trade, see An Old Resident in China, “Sir John Bowring and the Opium Question,” The Times, October 5, 1859, sec. Letters to the Editor.

50. Most obviously, The Arrow was no longer a British-registered ship when she was boarded by the Chinese authorities. J. Y. Wong, Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856–1860) in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 87–95. Compare Lord Elgin’s verdict: “that wretched question of the Arrow, which is a scandal to us, and is so considered, I have reason to know, by all except the few who are personally compromised.” James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, Extracts from the Letters of James, Earl of Elgin to Mary Louisa, Countess of Elgin, 1847–1862 (Edinburgh: Privately Printed, 1864), 62–63.


54. On how he became interested in the China issue, see Cobden’s comments in “Election Intelligence,” Daily News, March 20, 1857.

56. For Cobden’s elaboration on this point see Hobson, Richard Cobden, 198.
58. Ibid., 1827; See Third Viscount Palmerston, “Speech on Affairs in Greece,” Hansard 112, House of Commons (June 25, 1850): 380–444. In Bowring’s mind, he had already been subject to this kind of a treatment: “A license has now been given to all despotic powers,” as he put it when he was arrested in France in 1822, “to make Englishmen the victims of any tyrannical inflictions which their good pleasure may deem them to exercise.” Sir John Bowring, Details of the Arrest, Imprisonment and Liberation of an Englishman by the Bourbon Government of France (London: Rowland Hunter, 1823), x.
62. A privileged position that in the nineteenth century was strengthened through European control of the means of gathering and disseminating news. See Ariane Knüsel, “British Diplomacy and the Telegraph in Nineteenth-Century China,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 18, no. 3 (September 13, 2007): 519.
65. “No doubt at this distance,” as Elgin noted, “it is practically impossible for Government to give instructions, and all the responsibility must rest on the agent on the spot.” James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, Extracts from the Letters of James, Earl of Elgin to Mary Louisa, Countess of Elgin, 1847–1862 (Edinburgh: Privately Printed, 1864), 100. In 1860, it was above all communications east of India that were slow (ibid., 174). Compare Elgin’s instructions, “The Earl of Clarendon to the Earl of Elgin, Foreign Office, April 20,1857.” House of Commons, Correspondence Relative to Earl of Elgin’s Special Missions to China and Japan, 1857–1859 (London: Houses of Parliament, 1859), 2. For a discussion, see Knüsel, “British Diplomacy and the Telegraph,” 522–525.
66. “We seem, as it were, to have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.” J. R. Seeley, The Expansion of England: Two Courses of Lectures (London: Macmillan, 1883), 8.
68. Britain’s naval power, said Charles Pasley, “resembles an oak planted in a flower pot; which the more rapidly it increases in size, beauty, and apparent strength, is only hastening so much the sooner to the period of its final decay and dissolution.” Charles William Pasley, Essay on the Military Policy and Institutions of the British Empire (London: Edmund Lloyd, 1810), 54.


71. Items such as “a recent disturbance at Canton, during which considerable damage was done,” ibid., 1; “aggressive conduct of Chinese at Foo-chow” (ibid., 28); “stones thrown at English boat near Canton” (ibid., 65); “interference with native teachers, in the service of Mr. Walker” (ibid., 199); “incendiary placard against foreigners, published at Canton” (ibid., 212).

72. “I have read the blue-book through, and what is it?” Cobden asked in parliament, “It consists of garbled extracts from correspondence extending from the year 1842 to the year 1856. What do those extracts relate to? A few street riots, a few village rows. An Englishman straying out of bounds to shoot is hooted back by the peasants.” Richard Cobden, “The War in China,” *Hansard* 144, House of Commons, February 26, 1857, 1405. Elgin read the report on the way to China and was not impressed: “the more I read of the blue-books and papers with which I have been furnished, the more embarrassing the questions with which I have to deal appear.” James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, *Extracts from the Letters of James, Earl of Elgin to Mary Louisa, Countess of Elgin, 1847–1862* (Edinburgh: Privately Printed, 1864), 22. See further ibid., 82.


75. Frederick Wells Williams, *The Life and Letters of Samuel Wells Williams, LL.D., Missionary, Diplomatist, Sinologue* (New York: Putnam’s Sons, 1888), 280–281.

76. The war-party at the court, said Frederick Bruce, “will strain every nerve to render nugatory the stipulations destined to facilitate intercourse with this country.” Quoted in “Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell, Shanghai, February 6, 1860.” Houses of Parliament, *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859–60* (London: Houses of Parliament, 1861), 28. Compare Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Life of Sir Harry Parkes, Sometime Her Majesty’s Minister to China & Japan, Volume 1: Consul in China* (London: Macmillan, 1894), 310–311. The Chinese authorities, Thomas Wade reported, made a distinction between “the details of the Treaty which it will be proper to give effect to, and those respecting which compromise (or arrangement) is to be made.” Quoted in “Mr. Wade to Mr. Bruce,” Shanghai, April 16, 1860.” Houses of Parliament, *Correspondence, 1857–59*, 54.


78. “These curious, solid, imperturbable people seem determined simply to ignore our presence here, and to wait till we are pleased to go away.” Stanley Lane-Poole, *Sir Harry Parkes in China* (London: Methuen, 1901), 169.


80. According to John Thadeus Delane, editor of *The Times* and a confidante of Palmerston’s. Quoted in C. C. Bowlby, ed., *An Account of the Last Mission and Death*
Notes


90. As Elgin explained in conversations with Thomas Bowlby during the passage to China in June 1860, quoted in Bowlby, Last Mission and Death of Thomas Bowlby, 28.


98. Article 4, ibid., 12.

99. Article 5, ibid., 19.

100. “Hence,” as Elgin noted in a letter to the British government, “the latitude enjoyed by the Court of Pekin in promoting through subordinate agencies, the violation of its own Treaty obligations, without, as it fondly imagines, exposing itself to the penalty which justly attaches to such proceedings.” House of Commons, Correspondence, 1857–59, 21. Compare James Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1884), 109.

101. The treaties were instead a means by which they would “disabuse the Emperor of his preposterous claim to be the legitimate ruler of all the peoples of the world.” A. Krauel, “Applicabilité du droit des gens européen à la Chine,” Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 9 (1877): 390.

102. Thomas Wade, the “Chinese Secretary,” is an exception, see Houses of Parliament, Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859–60 (London: Houses of Parliament, 1861), 54.


106. Ibid., 52–55.

107. “Hence it follows that no document in which such natives are made to cede the sovereignty over any territory can be exhibited as an international title, although an arrangement with them, giving evidence that they have been treated with humanity and consideration, may be valuable as obviating possible objections to what would otherwise be a good international title to sovereignty.” John Westlake, *Chapters on the Principles of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1894), 144, see also 139–140.

108. It was not a coincidence that Stanley was a journalist and not a diplomat. Henry M. Stanley, *In Darkest Africa* (New York: C. Scriber’s Sons, 1890). For examples from the Americas, see Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492–1640* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).


111. “It is not very easy,” Elgin admitted, “to apprehend the precise import of the phraseology employed in Imperial Decrees on subject of this nature.” Quoted in “Earl of Elgin to Lord J. Russell, September 8, 1860.” *Houses of Parliament, Correspondence, 1857–59*, 155.

112. Lord Elgin lost his letter of accreditation in a ship-wreck in Galle harbor, Ceylon, on the way to China. See Our Special Correspondent, “The British Expedition to China,” *The Times*, July 10, 1860; But he received a new letter when negotiations with the Chinese began at the end of August. John Hart Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin: Being Notes Taken from the Journal of an Officer between Those Places* (London: Sampson Low, Son, 1861), 96.

113. “This is,” said Thomas Bowlby, “the best thing that could possibly have happened.” C. C. Bowlby, ed., *An Account of the Last Mission and Death of Thomas William Bowlby: Compiled from Records Collected by His Son* (London: Privately Printed, 1906), 95.


115. Ibid., 213.


8 Performing for European Public Opinion


3. Henry Knollys, “Remarks on the French March to Yuan-Min-Yuan, and on the Pillage and Destruction of the Palace. Results Attained by the War,” in *Incidents*
in the China War of 1860: Compiled from the Private Journals of General Sir Hope Grant, ed. Henry Knollys (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1875), 221–222.


7. Although literacy data are notoriously unreliable, it has been estimated that in the 1840s between two-third and third-fourth of the British working class was able to read. In France, the numbers were lower, if comparable. Robert K. Webb, “Working Class Readers in Early Victorian England,” The English Historical Review 65, no. 256 (July 1950): 349.


17. As Bourne points out, this was not The Times’ only view on the issue. Since they had benefited greatly from the existing system, they were at times wont to defend it (ibid., 211).


19. Bourne, English Newspapers, vols. 226–231. In 1831, some 38,648,314 newspapers were sold per year in the United Kingdom, but in 1864 the figure was more than five times higher, at 205,462,400 copies. Grant, The Newspaper Press, vols. II:320–321.


28. Ibid.


32. The sensational, according to the Archbishop of York, a critic, are tales “which aim at this effect simply—of exciting in the mind some deep feeling of overwrought interest by the means of some terrible passion or crime.” Quoted in Patrick Brantlinger, “What Is ‘Sensational’ About the ‘Sensation Novel’?,” Nineteenth-Century Fiction 37, no. 1 (June 1, 1982): 7.


40. Favre, Procès de Orsini, 89–103.

41. The two terms were usually used interchangeably. However, “special” correspondents were often felt to be a more prestigious title than “our own.” Grant, The Newspaper Press, II:247.

42. Ibid., II:256. See also Archibald Forbes, “War Correspondence as a Fine Art,” Century Magazine, January 1893; F. Lauriston Bullard, Famous War Correspondents (Boston: Little, Brown, 1914).


51. Cooke, China, 360.
53. James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, Extracts from the Letters of James, Earl of Elgin to Mary Louisa, Countess of Elgin, 1847–1862 (Edinburgh: Privately Printed, 1864), 109. Compare the discrepancy Elgin finds between Cooke’s account of Commissioner Yeh and the account given by the captain on the ship that takes him to Calcutta (Ibid., 110). Cooke’s article on Yeh is “Mr. Ex-Commissioner Yeh,” The Times, May 17, 1858.
54. Elgin, Extracts from Letters, 105.
55. Cooke, China, xxiii.
56. Elgin, Extracts from Letters, 160.
57. On Indépendance belge see ibid., 110.
58. Ibid., 70.
59. Compare the way the commander of the force in India, Lord Ellenborough, claimed to despise the judgment of the press while in practice fearing it. John William Kaye, History of the War in Afghanistan (London: Richard Bentley, 1851), 553.
60. Elgin, Extracts from Letters, 127, 130.
61. As Elgin told Bowlby, see Bowlby, Last Mission and Death of Thomas Bowlby, 89.
64. This article attracted widespread attention. “With what delight and satisfaction I read your most admirable description of the loss of the Malabar,” wrote Delane, editor of The Times. “Never did Russell or Cooke exceed the word painting of that most perfectly told story; it was read everywhere with the same breathless interest and I leave you to imagine the pride your friends took in your praises.” Our Own Correspondent, “China,” The Times, June 10, 1857, 393.
71. J. Y. Wong, *Deadly Dreams: Opium and the Arrow War (1856–1860) in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 216–257. Other issues discussed during the election campaign include the income tax, the British war in Persia, the church rates, the extension of the franchise, and the question of whether pubs should be opened on Sundays.
75. “Ministerial Banquet at the Mansion-House.”
80. “Ministerial Banquet at the Mansion-House.”
81. Ibid.
82. “Lord Palmerston’s Address to the Constituency . . .”
89. John Russell was indeed returned, but clearly due to his personal rapport with the voters of London rather than to his stance on the China issue. “The Results of the Election.”
90. Ibid.
94. Ibid., 202; See also ibid., 213–214.
95. "We have all had a lesson in this General Election," Sidney Herbert concluded. Quoted in "Everything Connected with the Hustings Is…;" *The Times*, London, April 3, 1857, sec. editorial.
100. “Instead of the political emancipation of the British people,” as Marx put it, “we have had the dictatorship of Palmerston. War was the powerful engine by which this result was brought about, and war was the only means of insuring it. War had therefore become the vital condition of Palmerston’s dictatorship.” Marx, “After Having Raged for Four Nighs, the Chinese Debates…;” Compare Stanmore, *Sidney Herbert*, 89.
102. Slightly paraphrasing Hope Grant, *Incidents in the China War*, 203.
103. Our Own Correspondent, “The Plunder of the Summer Palace at Pekin.”
106. For a short bibliography, see Colley, *Captives*, 380–385.
107. Ibid., 352.
108. The most celebrated may have been Arthur Conolly and Charles Stoddart, both executed by the Afghans in 1842. See Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan*, 502–528.
112. For a contemporary Chinese view, see Kaixi Wang, “False Excuse of British and French Captives Maltreated to Death in Yuanming Yuan,” *Journal of Beijing Normal University*, vol. 8, no. 4 (April 2010).
116. Referring to generals Pollock and Nott (ibid., 559).
117. “Poor old Bowlby,” he commented, “a highly-accomplished and well-informed gentleman” and “he wrote about the complicated moral, social, political and commercial condition of China in a liberal and conscientious manner.” Walrond, *Letters and Journals of Lord Elgin*, 364–365.
118. Lord Elgin to Delane, editor of *The Times*, October 25, 1860, quoted in Bowlby, *Last Mission and Death of Thomas Bowlby*, 404.
119. “There is not one voice in Europe,” said Baron Gros, referring to a French participation in the incineration of Yuanmingyuan, “who would forgive us if we went there.” Gros, *Négociations entre la France et la Chine*, 149, 150.

9 Performing for the Chinese

1. For an overview, see William W. Rockhill, *Diplomatic Audiences at the Court of China* (London: Luzac, 1905).
3. Ibid., 85–86.
9. Ibid., 184.
15. As Staunton makes clear, the British authorities were already in 1793 fully aware of what the Chinese court protocol required. Staunton, *An Authentic Account*, 130.
16. Ibid., 130–131.


20. Compare the instructions to Frederick Bruce, the British ambassador-in-waiting: “It is essential that you should correspond on terms of equality with the chief officers of the Empire, and that you should refuse to submit to any degrading ceremonial, either on the occasion of an audience of the Emperor, or on any other.” Quoted in “Lord J. Russell to Mr. Bruce, Foreign Office, October 29, 1859.” Houses of Parliament, *Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859–60* (London: Houses of Parliament, 1861), 2. For a discussion, see Tseng-Tsai Wang, “The Audience Question: Foreign Representatives and the Emperor of China, 1858–1873,” *The Historical Journal* 14, no. 3 (September 1971): 617–626.


23. Bowly, “Capture of the Taku Forts; Occupation of Tianjin,” 159.


26. Compare the stories that circulated regarding the captivity of Captains Stoddart and Arthur Conolly during the Afghan War in 1841. Stoddart was first beheaded, then Conolly was offered his life on conditions that he converted to Islam. Conolly, however, refused. “And then Arthur Conolly; full of faith in the merits of his Redeemer, stretched forth his neck, and died.” John William Kaye, *History of the War in Afghanistan* (London: Richard Bentley, 1851), 523.

27. Garnet Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China in 1860: To Which Is Added the Account of a Short Residence with the Tai-Ping Rebels at Nankin and a Voyage from Thence to Hankow* (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862), 112; David F. Rennie, *The British Arms in North China and Japan: Peking 1860, Kagosima* (London: John Murray, 1864), 82–83; Robert Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North


30. Baron Gros finds Parkes with Elgin on October 11. The French are made aware of the decision to destroy Yuanmingyuan on October 15, but it may have been taken earlier. Jean-Baptiste-Louis Gros, *Négociations entre la France et la Chine, en 1860: livre jaune du baron Gros* (Paris: J. Dumaine, 1864), 130.

31. Parkes was actually well treated compared with the other prisoners. Most likely, it seems, because of Prince Gong’s intervention. Stanley Lane-Poole, *Sir Harry Parkes in China* (London: Methuen, 1901), 234–235.


34. Staunton, *An Authentic Account*, 146.


36. Ibid., 163—164.


41. Henry Dundas, who organized the mission for the government, demanded “instruments and material necessary for making the most curious and striking experiments especially such as from their novelty are not likely to have been formerly exhibited by the Missionaries in China, or not at least on so extensive a scale.” Dundas to Macartney, 8 September, 1792, quoted in Simon Schaffer, "Instruments as Cargo in the China Trade," *History of Science* 44, no. 2 (2006): 234—235, note 65.

42. Abbott, *China and the English*, 162.


48. Ibid.

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50. Ibid., vols. II:163, 324.
52. Anderson, British Embassy to China, 177.
54. Proudfoot, Memoir of James Dinwiddle, 54.
55. Ibid., 40. As James Mill commented: “and in selecting the presents intended to display at once her grandeur and her friendship, sent such things as the people were too rude to value, and which they threw aside as little better than lumber.” James Mill, “Review of M. De Guignes, Voyages à Peking, Manille, et l’île de France, faits dans l’intervalle des années 1784 à 1801,” The Edinburgh Review 14 (July 1809): 412.
64. Ibid., 196–197; Bastable, “Breechloaders to Monster Guns,” 232–244.
67. Loch, Personal Narrative, 38–56; Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 102.
68. Bowlby, “Capture of the Taku Forts; Occupation of Tianjin,” 247.
69. John Hart Dunne, *From Calcutta to Pekin: Being Notes Taken from the Journal of an Officer between Those Places* (London: Sampson Low, Son, 1861), 76.
70. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 104–105.
77. Rennie, *British Arms in North China*, 112. As Dr. Muir, the chief medical officer, noted: “Every officer noticed that the wounds made by the [Armstrong guns] were positively frightful.” Dr. Muir, “Medical History of the War in China,” *The British Medical Journal* 2, no. 99 (November 22, 1862): 539–540.
78. This sentence paraphrases Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North China Campaign*, 92.
84. James Hope Grant, *Incidents in the China War of 1860: Compiled from the Private Journals of General Sir Hope Grant*, ed. Henry Knollys (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1875), 198–199. Robert Swinhoe describes the walls as “forty feet high, and sixty-four feet broad at the top, gradually narrowing upwards from the base.” Adding that it is “constructed internally of earth, with a casing of bricks.” Swinhoe, *Narrative of the North China Campaign*, 318. According to Davis, the wall is 30 feet high and 20 feet thick at the base, but in a bad state of repair, and “its perpendicular external face, would only serve to facilitate the operations of battering cannon.” John Francis Davis, *The Chinese: A General Description of the Empire of China and Its Inhabitants* (London: Charles Knight, 1836), vol. I:352—353.
86. Fauchery, “Golfe de Petcheli, à bord du Rhône, 23 novembre, 1860.”
90. Among the French, Mutrécy was equally confident. Mutrécy, *Journal de la campagne*, vol. II: 23.
95. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 274.
101. Wolseley, *Narrative of the War with China*, 279.
102. Compare, for example, "Recessional," the poem written by Kipling for Victoria’s Diamond Jubilee in 1897, which included lines such as “Far-called our navies melt away/ On dune and headland sinks the fire/ Lo, all our pomp of yesterday/ Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!” Rudyard Kipling, "Recessional," *The Times*, London, July 17, 1897.
106. Ibid.
110. “Le Moniteur Algérien du 15 juillet.”
112. Elgin arrived on August 5, 1857, and stayed until September 2 (Ibid., 41–46).
113. As he explained in conversations with Thomas Bowlby while on their way to China in June, 1860. C. C. Bowlby, ed., *An Account of the Last Mission and Death of Thomas William Bowlby: Compiled from Records Collected by His Son* (London: Privately Printed, 1906), 14, 16.


10 A Palace in a Dream

1. “In Xanadu did Kublai Can build a stately palace, encompassing sixteen miles of plain ground with a wall, wherein are fertile meadows, pleasant springs, delightful streams, and all sorts of beasts and chase and game, and in the middle thereof a sumptuous house of pleasure, which may be removed from place to place.” Samuel Purchas, *Purchas His Pilgrimage: Or Relations of the World and the Religious Observed in All Ages and Places Discovered* (London: Henrie Fetherstone, 1614), 415.


12. Ibid., 369–372.
21. On Hugo’s reflections on the Mäuseturm, see ibid., 225–226. Hugo, says Barbou, “has a loving veneration for the Middle Ages, which in a marvelous manner he has, as it were, recalled to life; he has an evident delight in the dilapidated fabrics, the crumbling ceilings, and the broken mullions, deprecating from his very soul all modern attempts to restore them” (ibid., 423).
24. On Asian ruins, see Macaulay, *Pleasure of Ruins*, 372–397. Compare Angkor Wat as discovered by Henri Mouhot: “These temples were situated in a district which was now completely embedded in a forest very difficult to access, and were so much in ruins that trees were growing upon the roofs, and many of the galleries were in a state of great decay,” Henri Mouhot, “Travels in Cambodia,” *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society of London* 6, no. 3 (1861): 81.
25. Charles Émile Bouillevaux, *Voyage dans l’Indo-Chine* 1848–1856 (Paris: Victor Palmé, 1858); Henri Mouhot, *Travels in the Central Parts of Indo-China (Siam), Cambodia, and Laos: During the Years 1858, 1859, and 1860* (London: John Murray, 1864). Mouhot’s descriptions were popularized in accounts such as Frank Vincent, “Rival to Solomon’s Temple,” in *In and Out of Central America, and Other Sketches and Studies of Travel* (New York: D. Appleton, 1890), 146–181.
27. Victor Hugo, *Les Orientales* (Paris: J. Hetzel, 1869), 8–9. There may even be a direct personal connection between Victor Hugo and Henri Mouhot since both lived in the Channel Islands in the 1850s.

28. As Hugo points out, the Seventh Earl of Elgin, who robbed Parthenon of its marbles, was responsible for destroying the archetype of ideal art, while the Eighth Earl, who burned down Yuanmingyuan, was responsible for destroying the archetype of chimerical art. Victor Hugo, “L’Expédition de Chine: au capitaine Butler,” in *Œuvres complètes de Victor Hugo: actes et paroles pendant l’exil*, 1852–70 (Paris: J. Hetzel, 1880), 269.

29. “The author of *Les Orientales* has been reproved for drawing an East that is entirely imaginary, having nothing real nor historical in its character.” Barbou, “Victor Hugo and His Times,” 189.

30. “You have to destroy a palace,” as Diderot put it, “in order to make it into an object of interest.” Diderot, *Salon de 1767*, IX:386.


40. Ibid., 784.

41. Quoted in ibid., 790.


44. Callahan, “National Insecurities,” 208.


Considering the great amount of autonomy granted to the various provinces, there were Europeans in 1860 who advocated treating China “as a congeries of separate States.” Quoted in “Mr. Bruce to Lord J. Russell, Shanghai, April 7, 1860.” Houses of Parliament, Correspondence Respecting Affairs in China, 1859–60 (London: Houses of Parliament, 1861), 38. On the power of the Manchu heritage, see, for example, Pamela Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 296–311.


The most extensive accounts can be found in Garnet Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China in 1860: To Which Is Added the Account of a Short Residence with the Tai-Ping Rebels at Nankin and a Voyage from Thence to Hankow (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1862), 291–297; Henry Brougham Loch, Personal Narrative of Occurrences During Lord Elgin’s Second Embassy to China, 1860 (London: John Murray, 1869), 282–289; James Hope Grant, Incidents in the China War of 1860: Compiled from the Private Journals of General Sir Hope Grant, ed. Henry Knollys (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1875), 207–210. Not all details correspond perfectly. The number of coolies carrying Elgin’s sedan-chair, for example, varies between each account as do the color of their clothes.


Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 292.

Loch, Personal Narrative, 284.

Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 293.

The French clearly had the same intention: “Since we wanted to give the Chinese an idea of our power,” wrote Castano, “we put on a great military display, organizing the army in a long column, which accompanied the ambassador to the signing ceremony.” F. Castano, L’expédition de Chine (Paris: Victor Rozier, 1864), 172–173.

“Fangui,” Downing reported in 1838, “literally signified barbarian wanderer,’ or ‘outlandish demon,’ but having been so long accustomed to the epithet, and hearing it so often pronounced, we are willing to hope that it is not generally used without intention to insult, and may be fairly translated ‘foreigner.’” C. Toogood Downing, The Fan-qui in China in 1836–7 (London: Henry Colburn, 1838), v. On the translation of yi, see Lydia H. Liu, The Clash of Empires: The Invention of China in Modern World Making (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 31–69.


George Allgood, China War 1860: Letters and Journals (New York: Longmans, Green, 1901), 60; Robert M’Ghee, How We Got to Pekin: A Narrative of the Campaign in China of 1860 (London: Richard Bentley, 1862), 338; Robert Swinhoe, Narrative...


64. Hope Grant, Incidents in the China War, 209.

65. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 295; Loch, Personal Narrative, 285–287.


68. Varin, Expédition de Chine, 272.

69. Loch, Personal Narrative, 189.

70. Wolseley, Narrative of the War with China, 292.