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Malmström, Hans

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PO Box 117  
221 00 Lund  
+46 46-222 00 00



ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE MAKING OF KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS  
A STUDY OF ACADEMIC DISCOURSE



ACCOUNTABILITY AND  
THE MAKING OF KNOWLEDGE  
STATEMENTS

*A STUDY OF ACADEMIC DISCOURSE*

*Hans Malmström*



LUNDS  
UNIVERSITET

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Vik, December 2007

To You – like I promised



# Introduction

In this chapter, I briefly introduce the area and focus of research, motivate and state my research questions, discuss the method used in the study and provide an outline of the structure of the thesis.

## 1.1 The area of research – knowledge statements, accountability and knowledge stating verbs

This is a corpus-based study of how ACCOUNTABILITY is manifested in academic discourse through KNOWLEDGE STATEMENTS containing KNOWLEDGE STATING VERBS. Knowledge statements are assertions (Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Vanderveken 1991; the term ‘knowledge statement’ is my own) that make reference to the epistemic (Palmer 2001) or evidential grounding (Chafe 1986) of the information in the utterance. They always involve direct or indirect reference to the speaker’s<sup>1</sup> knowledge reserve, as in (1) and (2), or the knowledge reserve of someone other than the speaker, as in (3), and some reference to how the information was arrived at (e.g. through self-reflection, as in (1), through inference, as in (2), or through a report, as in (3)). The following examples illustrate the type of utterance at the heart of this study:

- (1) We **argue** that there is a Swedish middle construction.
- (2) These results **suggest** that there is a Swedish middle construction.

---

<sup>1</sup> Henceforth, the term ‘speaker’ is used to denote academic speakers as well as writers. Similarly, the term ‘addressee’ is used to denote the intended audience for the speaker’s utterance, which, in this case, comprises the wider reading audience (the research community as a whole) as well as a more limited group of scholars who are doing more or less the same thing (the research community in a narrow sense) (Myers 1989).

- (3) Smith (2000) **maintains** that there is a Swedish middle construction.

One of the main discourse functions of knowledge statements is their contribution towards the social interaction between speakers and addressees. In that capacity, knowledge statements are also associated with, for example, aspects of politeness, self promotion, allegiance, or persuasion. At this pragmatic crossroads, knowledge statements also embrace the discursive manifestation of speaker accountability. ‘Accountability’, as the term is used in this thesis, refers to the speaker’s being accountable for the information in the utterance by virtue of being the origin or mediator of that information. Consequently, accountability should not in the first place be associated with an epistemic or otherwise evaluative qualification of information contained in the utterance and it does not refer to the utterance as a report. To illustrate; with respect to utterance (1), the current speaker is accountable for the information of that utterance because the information comes from that speaker. Similarly, in (3), the current speaker is less accountable and *Smith* is more accountable because the information comes from Smith and not from the speaker of the utterance. Hunston (2000: 179) has a good example which could illustrate the limits of accountability in knowledge statements. In an utterance such as *George I regarded Gibraltar as an expensive symbol*, the accountability for the information, i.e. *Gibraltar is an expensive symbol*, rests with the original source, i.e. George I; this is what is central to the knowledge statement as such. However, one could also discuss the accountability for the utterance as a whole, *the utterance as a summary* of what George I once said *and* that which now constitutes the information. The indirect speech mode employed (Short 1996) requires that responsibility for the summary/report remains with the current speaker rather than with George I. The way I use accountability thus only refers to accountability for the origin of the information, or ‘knowledge content’ as I will refer to information in connection with knowledge statements.

In academic communication, the notion of accountability is central, in part because academic discourse involves the communication of new knowledge or the building on and developing of what is thought to be known – knowledge for which someone must assume accountability. Tucker (2003) claims that it is one of the primary functions of research articles to make “knowledge claims” and Crompton says that “generally speaking, the main speech act performed [in academic writing] is that of stating a proposition” (1997: 273) Also, Charles (2006: 31) says for some “academic productions” that they typically “must create new knowledge”;



see also Myers (1989: 5) who argues that “every scientific report states a claim: in other words, it makes a statement that is to be taken as the articles’ contribution to knowledge”. However, I am not denying that through their utterances, speakers are also essentially involved in a piece of social interaction with their audience, that “academic writing is a social practice” (Charles 2006: 28). Because of this, academic discourse, in which such knowledge is frequently advanced or developed in the form of knowledge statements of the kind in (1)–(3), is well suited for an investigation into the manifestation of accountability.

Knowledge statements are identified by their main parts (see Table 1.1): (i) a knowledge stating clause containing a knowledge stating element (verbal, nominal, adjectival or adverbial) which signposts the utterance as a knowledge statement and (ii) the knowledge content.<sup>2</sup> Consider the utterance in (1) above as an example in this respect:

Table 1.1 The knowledge statement and its component parts

<i>We argue that</i>	<i>there is a Swedish middle construction</i>
KNOWLEDGE STATING CLAUSE	KNOWLEDGE CONTENT
KNOWLEDGE STATEMENT	

Many previous studies have devoted attention to speakers’ epistemic modal assessment and their linguistic communication of such epistemic concerns in academic contexts (Salager-Meyer 1994, Crompton 1997, Hyland 1998a, Thue-Vold 2005, 2006a, 2006b), often under the guise of hedging; less attention has been paid to the notion of accountability, its manifestation and its role in academic discourse. By adopting a slightly different focus, this study remedies this lack of concern for accountability and looks in particular at knowledge statements.

In this thesis, I study one subset of knowledge statements – utterances containing knowledge stating verbs such as *argue*, *maintain* or *suggest*, i.e. verbs that feature as central knowledge stating elements in knowledge statements. Knowledge statements need not, however, always contain a knowledge stating verb as the knowledge stating element. Nouns (*argument*, *suggestion* or *proposal*) or adverbs (*arguably*) also count as knowledge stating elements. However, they will not be considered here. I selected as the focus of study the knowledge stating verbs *argue*, *claim*, *suggest*, *propose*,

<sup>2</sup> I will use the term ‘knowledge content’ to denote the information contained in or expressed by the knowledge statement, that for which someone is accountable. I refrain from using the term ‘proposition’ although one could argue that ‘knowledge content’ as I use it and ‘proposition’ denote the same thing.

*maintain*, *assume* and *believe*. These verbs were selected on the basis of two primary criteria: (i) the ability to feature as central elements in knowledge statements in academic discourse and (ii) the frequency in my corpus (see also 1.3.3). The utterances in (4) through (10) contain these verbs.<sup>3</sup>

- (4) The authors **argued** that the theory could predict CA by random lateralization in a small subset of the population in whom the right shift gene was absent [...] (LING)
- (5) We **claim** that Katu 3rd person forms do have distinct geometries for animate and inanimate in the singular, but that there is no pronoun in the inventory to realize the distinct 3rd person singular animate geometry, which is hence realized by the elsewhere form [...] (LING)
- (6) The available information **suggests** that it is entirely feasible. (LIT)
- (7) He further **proposes** her example as an analogy to the theater's [sic] and especially Shakespeare's acquiescence to Tudor power. (LIT)
- (8) Though this issue cannot be resolved here, I **maintain** that the two apparently opposing sources of evidence are not incompatible. (LING)
- (9) It was generally **assumed** that to write history one had to have a connection to public life, in other words, to be a man. (LIT)
- (10) Nevertheless, we confidently **believe** that a consideration of the developmental cycle argued for here may provide a useful new way of thinking about these old problems and may also lead to rather different and potentially interesting answers. (LING)

Through their reference to knowledge and source and mode of knowing (Chafe 1986), knowledge statements highlight an important (and controversial) intersection of different areas of linguistic interest (Dendale & Tasmowski 2001) – epistemic modality and evidentiality. This is evident also with respect to the knowledge stating verbs which feature as central elements in such statements.

The dictionary entries (*Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary*) for the knowledge stating verbs selected indicate a common but very general functional potential – that of being involved in the making of assertions about truth, falsehood, or fact. Despite this common core, however, the verbs vary considerably in the degree of strength with which the associated assertion is made. For *argue*, there is reference to the speaker's "opinion" and the associated assertion may be either "true or incorrect".<sup>4</sup> *Claim* is supposed to say that something is "true" or "a fact" although "other people might not believe" it. With *suggest*, speakers "put forward an idea for [others] to think about" or it is used to "say something which [...] puts an idea"

<sup>3</sup> Unless otherwise stated, all examples annotated by the inclusion of the tag LING or LIT are from the corpus compiled for the present study, the HAT-corpus (academic texts from research journals; see 1.3.2 for a description of the corpus). The annotations signify that the example comes from the linguistic or literary data, respectively.

<sup>4</sup> All of the quotations about knowledge stating verbs are from *Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary*.

into the minds of others, or used to imply something or make “you think it is the case”; to indicate something. When speakers *propose* something they “suggest [...] something for people to think about”. With *maintain*, speakers “state [their] opinion or belief [about something] very strongly”. When speakers *assume* that something is the case, they “accept it as true although [...] [they] have no real proof of it”. Finally, *believe* is used by speakers to signal that they are of the “opinion that [something] is true, even when it cannot be proved”, but also “to indicate that [they] are not completely sure that what [they] are saying is true or accurate”; interestingly, sometimes it is also used “to make a statement sound factual”. The semantic and pragmatic potential of knowledge stating verbs is described in more detail in Chapter 2.

The fact that knowledge statements communicate new or established knowledge makes them interesting also because their use may be considered one means for speakers to enter into a dialogue about knowledge content with their addressees. Communicating new knowledge is the potential starting point of an academic discussion. Similarly, references to established knowledge can be seen as further contributions to such a discussion. However, the idea that knowledge statements in academic discourse are the primary means for communicating new knowledge is not entirely uncontroversial. As a matter of fact, suggestions have been made in philosophical literature that there is no such thing as “new” knowledge. Instead, all knowledge should be seen as the speaker’s response to things said or questions asked in the past or things that will be said or asked about in the future. As Bakhtin (1986: 131) states, “the topic of the speaker’s speech, regardless of what this topic may be, does not become the object of speech for the first time in any given utterance; a given speaker is not the first to speak about it. The object, as it were, has already been articulated, disputed, elucidated and evaluated in various ways”. On this view, the speaker’s issuing of a knowledge statement could be seen as a “dialogic” contribution to a never-ending intertextual web of past and future discourses. This, however, does not make knowledge statements less interesting from the point of view of accountability. On the contrary, in a dialogic approach, where things said in the past are intermingled with things being communicated now and some unuttered knowledge content of a future discourse, the conveying of accountability is central.

## 1.2 Research objectives

Four research questions are at the heart of this thesis.

1. What is it in an utterance containing knowledge stating verbs that affects the manifestation of accountability?
2. Do the different knowledge stating verbs feature in utterances that convey different degrees of accountability, i.e. do they feature in different accountability contexts?
3. Do any differences in the typical accountability contexts of the knowledge stating verbs hold across two different academic disciplines?
4. Is accountability a metadiscourse phenomenon?

This thesis thus sets out to establish what it is in an utterance that affects the manifestation of accountability and how the degree of accountability manifestation is affected.<sup>5</sup> To illustrate, I investigate why the speaker of (11) is considered more accountable for the knowledge content of that utterance than the speaker of the utterance in (12).

- (11) I **suggest** that the same type of iconicity pertains to the other expressive items discussed in this article. (LING)
- (12) Luhrmann's title alone **suggests** a certain degree of unfinished cultural business in the plus sign it features. (LIT)

I argue that speaker accountability is intimately connected to the concept of DISCOURSE VOICE.<sup>6</sup> I also assume a direct mapping between discourse voice and the notion of speaker accountability. Discourse voice is taken to be a scalar concept, and I assume that the scalar nature of discourse voice serves as a direct input to a scalar concept of speaker accountability. Thus, for example, if a speaker is foregrounded in an utterance and the speaker's voice is "heard clearly", as in (13), I consider the speaker accountable for the knowledge content of that utterance to a high degree.

- (13) We **believe** that ultimately the only responsible solution is for the linguistic and legal communities to work together toward developing techniques from which reliable inferences about authorship can be drawn. (LING)

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<sup>5</sup> This study limits its attention to the single utterance, beginning with a capital letter and ending in a full stop. Accountability may, however, also be affected by "global" aspects of the discourse outside the immediate local environment.

<sup>6</sup> The term 'discourse voice' will be defined in Chapter 2. Provisionally, we could take it to refer to the speaker's 'vocal presence' in a discourse or a point in discourse.

Similarly, if a speaker is backgrounded in an utterance, because someone other than the speaker is foregrounded, the speaker's voice is "subdued", as in (14), and there is a corresponding decrease in the degree of accountability for the knowledge content.

- (14) Noyer (1992), citing Lipkind (1945) and Ken Hale (p.c.), claims that the Winnebago (Siouan) singular pronoun *nee* has exactly this range of interpretations. (LING)

The next issue to be considered in this thesis, reflecting research question 2, is thus if there are any differences between the knowledge stating verbs with respect to their occurrence in typical accountability contexts (i.e. discourse contexts in which a speaker is accountable to a high, moderate, or low degree). For example, does *suggest* feature in utterances where accountability is ascribed to the speakers themselves whereas some other knowledge stating verb, say *argue*, features very prominently in utterances where the speakers' accountability for the information is lower, e.g. where knowledge content is attributed? A mapping out of the accountability contexts associated with knowledge stating verbs will tell us more about the central knowledge stating element.

If it can be established that there are differences between the knowledge stating verbs with respect to the accountability contexts in which they typically feature, research question 3 aims to capture the issue of whether these differences hold across different kinds of academic disciplines. For example, if *suggest* features in high accountability contexts in one discipline, does it feature in similar contexts in other disciplines? Many previous studies of academic discourse (often from the point of view of the metadiscourse<sup>7</sup> of the utterance) have focused on a distinction between "hard" and "soft" disciplines (Hyland 1999c, 2005a) and have highlighted a number of communicative differences between texts from different disciplines (Thue-Vold 2006a, Fløttum et al. 2006). I explore two kinds of academic disciplines: one end of the spectrum is represented by linguistic texts (showing some of the characteristics of "hard" science) and the other by texts emanating from research into English literature (corresponding to a "soft" science). It has been suggested that the usage aspects of communication to which I seek to assign the expression of accountability (the metadiscourse of the utterance) should "reflect broad areas of intellectual inquiry, knowledge structures and their associated forms of discourse" (Hyland

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<sup>7</sup> The term 'metadiscourse' will be defined in Chapter 2. Provisionally, we could take it to refer to aspects of the utterance through which the speaker refers to the utterance or discourse itself.

1998b: 448) and that the structures underlying the communication in different disciplines would be sanctioned by the rhetorical constraints set up by rhetorical or social communities. Thus, since linguistics and literary studies can be placed in a Science and Arts or Humanities context, respectively, differences in terms of accountability contexts across disciplines should be expected.

This thesis will also address what accountability *is* and this is in the scope of research question 4. A number of the aspects I argue are important for the manifestation of accountability have previously been associated with the metadiscourse of a discourse. One example of this would be the fact that the knowledge stating verbs themselves are frequently analysed as metadiscourse elements because of their epistemic (modal) and/or evidential nature.<sup>8</sup> I will, however, discuss the possibility of treating accountability itself as a METADISOURSE PHENOMENON, not least because this could have interesting implications for how we view metadiscourse. Another reason for linking accountability to metadiscourse is that it provides the notion of accountability with more of a stable and independent theoretical grounding.

## 1.3 Method and framework, corpus material and the selection of knowledge stating verbs

In this section, I introduce the general framework adopted for this thesis as well as the empirical basis of the study, the HAT corpus. I also explain my choice of knowledge stating verbs, some limitations to the study and provide an outline for the rest of the thesis.

### 1.3.1 General method and framework

The work in this thesis relies mainly on a corpus-based approach in the sense that a corpus is used as an empirical basis for finding answers to the research questions.<sup>9</sup> I use the corpus for exploratory purposes to design a simple model that describes the manifestation of accountability in connec-

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<sup>8</sup> There is agreement in the literature on metadiscourse that hedging and evidentiality (evidentials) are central concepts in a theory of metadiscourse (see Sections 2.4 and 3.2).

<sup>9</sup> For good descriptions of corpus linguistics and its benefits (and shortcomings), see Biber et al. (1998), Kennedy (1998) or McEnery & Wilson (1996).

tion to knowledge statements (Chapter 3). I also use the corpus to elicit data on which to apply the proposed model and to investigate and describe in a systematic manner knowledge statements, and particularly knowledge stating verbs, and the kinds of accountability contexts in which they feature (Chapter 4). In addressing the last of the research questions in Chapter 5, I partly abandon the corpus approach for a more independent theoretical discussion about speaker accountability. However, I still rely on examples of knowledge statements from the corpus.

As the theoretical foundation for my study I use a general metadiscursive approach primarily inspired by ideas from a recent account of metadiscourse (Hyland 2005a). A slightly different way of characterising my approach would be to say that I am concerned with metapragmatics, “the systematic study of the metalevel [of language], where indicators of reflexive awareness are to be found in the actual choice-making that constitutes language use” (Verschueren 1999: 188). Verschueren defines reflexive awareness as those aspects of communication through which speakers’ choice-making “openly reflects upon itself” (1999: 187). In addition, a certain theoretical debt to dialogic frameworks should be acknowledged (e.g. Todorov 1984, Bakhtin 1986, Martin 2001, Martin & White 2005, White 2006, and Appraisal Website <http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/>: accessed on September 15, 2007). Terms such as ‘metadiscourse’ and ‘dialogic’ will be elaborated upon where necessary, but at this point I should briefly qualify the adoption of these concepts.

This study focuses on those aspects of communication through which speakers refer to things said or done in the discourse about the discourse itself, i.e. meta-comments about something in the discourse or highlighting a metadiscourse.<sup>10</sup> For example, in (15), the speaker’s comment that the state of affairs referred to by the knowledge content was “*persuasively*” argued for is a comment about the communication (in this case something argued by others in the past), rather than knowledge content itself. Similarly, in (16), when the speaker says that “*extrapolation from these figures suggests*” something and that the conclusion is “*most likely*”, the qualifica-

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<sup>10</sup> In my opinion, there is no “framework” or “model” of metadiscourse *per se*. When I refer to a general theory of metadiscourse, I refer more to a way of relating to aspects of language and communication such that I (and other people working with the notion of metadiscourse) acknowledge that there is a thing such as metadiscourse, helpful for explaining things or phenomena in communication. In connection to research question 4, this means considering how accountability fits into such a concept and what implications it has for our views of metadiscourse. Although not entirely parallel, this approach mirrors what Verschueren (1999: 2) says about pragmatics: “Pragmatics does not constitute a component of a theory of language, but it offers a different *perspective*”. A theory of metadiscourse can be seen as constituting such a perspective from which communication and discourse analysis can be approached.

tion is a comment about the knowledge content rather than knowledge content as such.

- (15) As a number of Renaissance textual scholars **argued persuasively** in the 1980s, notably in *The Division of the Kingdoms*, the Quarto and Folio versions of *King Lear* are distinct texts often producing different literary and theatrical effects (LIT)
- (16) Extrapolation from these figures **suggests** that linguists **most likely** played a part in approximately one hundred cases in just one year. (LING)

Just like attitudinal comments on something in the discourse, as in (15), are metadiscursive in nature, I will argue that the manifestation of speaker accountability is metadiscursive. When speakers convey how accountable they are for the knowledge content of their utterances, that is also a meta-comment about something in the discourse. I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 5.

By adopting a partly Hylandian approach to metadiscourse (Hyland 2005a), I also acknowledge that “communication is more than just the exchange of information, goods or services, but also involves the personalities, attitudes and assumptions of those who are communicating” (2005a: 3) and that metadiscourse is dialogic in its very nature (Hyland 2005a: 13).

When I say that I draw on ideas of dialogism, I acknowledge a theoretical debt to Bakhtinian ideas about communication and some of its developments in related frameworks (see White 2006 or any other publications within Appraisal Theory). Bakhtin assumed that “there is no utterance without relation to other utterances” (Todorov 1984: 60). Everything we do in communication and everything we say is in some way a response to things said previously or things that will be said in the future in the same or some other discourse. I will assume that the metadiscourse of communication serves two primary functions: (i) highlighting interpersonal aspects of communication – we meta-comment on things said or done in the discourse to entertain and to promote interpersonal relationships; and (ii) highlighting the dialogic nature of communication – we meta-comment on things said or done in the discourse as part of our responsive-discursive behaviour in relation to something communicated previously or something that will be communicated later on. Closely associated with the concept of dialogue is Bakhtin’s term “heteroglossia”. When I refer to heteroglossia or to communication as being heteroglossic, I will take that communication to serve as an acknowledgement “that the utterance operates [to] present the speaker as recognising or engaged with other voices and other viewpoints” (White 2006: 192). In other words, heteroglossia embraces the multivoicedness of any piece of communication.



The discussion in this thesis will show that knowledge statements exemplify the metadiscursive and the dialogic nature of communication.

### 1.3.2 Design of the corpus

In identifying some general research goals usually associated with corpus linguistics, Biber et al. (1998) claim that they are of two kinds: “(1) assessing the extent to which a pattern is found, and (2) analyzing the contextual factors that influence variability” (1998: 3). The present study incorporates both of these research goals. With respect to (2), I seek to establish what it is in the (academic) context of knowledge statements that influences the scalar manifestation of accountability. With the help of a corpus, I am able to consider a large sample of such contexts and consider more closely any contextual patterns that may emerge. With respect to (1), I seek to generalise on the basis of the identified patterns and claim that frequently occurring contextual patterns may lead to our assignation of certain knowledge stating verbs to typical contexts and consequently to certain accountability contexts.

The corpus used in this study, the HAT-corpus (Hans’ Academic Text corpus), contains research articles from four journals in two disciplines.<sup>11</sup> I use the term ‘discipline’ to denote a fairly well established area of scientific interest, the texts of which display a certain socio-cultural “sameness” or similarity with respect to discourse practices and epistemological and linguistic routines (see also Becher & Trowler 2001).

The data come from two linguistic journals, *Brain and Language* (Elsevier) and *Language* (Linguistic Society of America), and two journals of literary studies, *Shakespeare Quarterly* (Folger) and *English Literary Renaissance* (Blackwell).<sup>12</sup> I refer to the two sub-corpora as the LING(uistic) and the LIT(erary) sample, respectively<sup>13</sup>.

*Brain and Language* is an interdisciplinary journal focusing on clinical, theoretical and experimental research in linguistics, neuroanatomy, neurology, neurophysiology, philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, speech pathology and computer science. The editorial statement claims that “contri-

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<sup>11</sup> The design of the corpus in terms of contents and size is partly a response to previous literature on reporting discourse: that research suggests the need for studies that both use larger corpora and consider new academic disciplines and possible differences between them (see e.g. Charles 2006).

<sup>12</sup> The discipline-contrastive perspective chosen in this study follows the tradition of many previous analyses of data in connection with the concept of metadiscourse (for references, see 4.4.2).

<sup>13</sup> Whenever I refer to “HAT”, I refer to the combined sample, i.e. the two sub-corpora taken together.

butions are relevant to human language or communication in relation to any aspect of the brain or brain function”.

*Language* is a publication of the Linguistic Society of America and is probably the most wide-scoping of the journals included in terms of its contents. Although focusing on language and linguistics, contributions cover all areas of this field of research.<sup>14</sup>

As the title suggests, *Shakespeare Quarterly* is primarily concerned with research on the playwright William Shakespeare and his work. The contributions represent a wide variety of different perspectives of this general area.

*English Literary Renaissance* claims in its editorial statement that it is “devoted to current criticism and scholarship of Tudor and early Stuart English literature”. Content-wise, therefore, the two literary journals cut across each other’s main areas of research.

The journals used as a basis for the corpus contain a mix of research articles/theoretical papers, state of the art contributions, reviews (historical as well as book or theatre reviews) and clinical reports (mostly in *Brain and Language* and to some extent in *Language*). All of the journals are refereed and publish at least four editions a year.

I have reviewed the “Guidelines for authors”, “Style sheet” or the equivalent for all four journals. The editors or publishing companies do not provide any specific guidelines as to the use of knowledge stating verbs or other aspects that could be important for this investigation (such as a preference for passive voice over first person pronouns).

The texts in the actual corpus were selected randomly from the online editions of the journals. All of the articles are from the years 2001-2004 and range in length between 5700 and 28600 words, with an average length of 12485 words per article. The articles from *Language* are slightly longer than the articles from the other three journals; both literary journals have a higher average length than the other linguistic journal, *Brain and Language*.

The corpus contains a total of 100 articles and the number of articles included from each journal reflects the average length of the articles: for example, the total number of articles included from *Language* is slightly lower (21) than the number of articles from either of the two literary journals (25 articles from *Shakespeare Quarterly* and 25 articles from *English Literary*

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<sup>14</sup> Admittedly, the wide-scoping profile of the two linguistic journals could potentially influence the results of the investigation and we should be careful about making generalisations that are too far-reaching. For example, during a later stage of the study, it was pointed out to me that it is perhaps unfair to say that scholars from fields as far apart as neuropsychology and formal semantics both belong to a “uniform” tradition of *linguistics*.

*Renaissance*) or the other linguistic journal (*Brain and Language* – 29 articles). This is so because I wanted to include approximately the same number of words from each journal, but also include at least 20 articles from each journal.

All the texts selected are full-length articles and are 15 pages or more in length. All footnotes have been included as these sometimes make up a substantial part of the article and contain quite a few knowledge stating verbs. No review articles are included. Firstly, their inclusion might skew the result because of the higher density of knowledge stating verbs in such articles. Secondly, I did not want to mix text types beyond what was necessary because of the different foci of the data sources. Of course, the review component is not lacking in the articles included since most research articles contain, either as a separate section or combined with the text, some review of previous work as authors situate their topics within a broader framework. Finally, all acknowledgement sections and bibliographies have been excluded where they have appeared in separate sections and no appendices have been included.

No occurrences of knowledge stating verbs found inside citations/direct quotations in the texts excerpts have been included in the corpus material (e.g. *Smith demonstrates this in a convincing way: “There is plenty of data to suggest that there is a Swedish middle construction” (Smith 2000:15)*). I have also not included in the analyses any “mention” occurrences (e.g. *It is difficult to say what the verb “argue” actually stands for in this context*) or occurrences where the knowledge stating verbs feature as part of examples.

All occurrences of the verbs in the data have been checked so that their meaning reflects their “knowledge stating capacity” – utterances involving other senses of the verbs have been excluded from the analysis. For example, all instances of *argue* in its “fight/quarrel” sense and all instances of *maintain* in its “preserve/continue-to-have” sense have been excluded.

The corpus includes a total of 1.248.500 words, roughly 300.000 words from each journal.

Table 1.2 Corpus contents

Name of journal	No. of articles	Total no. of words	Average no. of words/article
<i>Language</i>	21	336.826	16.039
<i>Brain and Language</i>	29	301.130	10.383
<i>Shakespeare Quarterly</i>	25	306.225	12.249
<i>English Literary Renaissance</i>	25	304.319	12.172
<b>Total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1.248.500</b>	<b>12.485</b>

A more detailed description of the method of analysis is given in Chapter 4.

### 1.3.3 Selecting knowledge stating verbs and limiting the study

In this sub-section, I briefly illustrate the process of selecting the verbs studied in this thesis and explain some limitations which were made with respect to other aspects of knowledge statements.

The selection of the verbs was based on two primary criteria: (i) the ability to feature as central elements in knowledge statements in academic texts, and (ii) the frequency in my corpus. The candidate verbs had to have the ability to feature in knowledge statements as defined in Section 1.1. They had to be pragmatically versatile enough to potentially incorporate both a hedging and an evidential dimension, i.e. to have the ability to feature in the expression of *both* epistemic modality and evidentiality. In other words, to be selected, a verb had to be able to index both the current speaker (in which case the knowledge stating verb also functions as an epistemic element) or some other speaker as the source of the knowledge content (in which case the verb takes on an evidential potential). The reason for this requirement was to guarantee a verb's potential featuring anywhere along a scale of accountability.

My aim was to select knowledge stating verbs such that I could make generalisations about accountability in connection with the knowledge stating verbs chosen; I would then rely on fairly large individual samples of occurrences. To start with, I could have selected any potential knowledge stating verbs found in the HAT corpus (*think, note, indicate, know, regard, show* etc.). Indeed, Thomas & Hawes (1994) list 129 reporting verbs in the analysis of their corpus. Hyland (1999a) found as many as 400 in his study of 80 research articles; many could qualify as knowledge stating verbs. In his study of introduction chapters to PhD theses, Shaw (1992) found that as much as 20% of verbs were reporting in some way. Needless to say, in these studies, many "reporting verbs" occurred at a very low frequency. However, for the present study I decided that the crucial lower cut-off point should be a frequency of 20 occurrences in the HAT corpus. Thus, many of the verbs originally found in the corpus had to be excluded from the analysis (e.g. *insist* with 19 occurrences, *comment* with 10 occurrences or *note* with 13 occurrences).

All the verbs selected also had to be non-factive. The non-factivity requirement was a result of my desire to eliminate from the discussion an

evaluative component claimed to be associated with factive verbs when they are used reportingly (Thompson & Ye 1991). Since my focus is accountability, I wanted to avoid a theoretical clash between describing the manifestation of accountability and any associated evaluation. Although it is interesting how the two aspects of knowledge stating interact, this would not be relevant to the argument of this thesis. This requirement disqualified, e.g. both the verbs *know* and *show* which both were quite frequent.

Towards the end of the selection process, eight verbs met the criteria. Among the members of that group was the verb *think*. It received a high frequency (58) but because it has been studied previously on its own (see e.g. Aijmer 1997, Simon-Vandenberg 1998, 2000), I decided to exclude it. This limitation process left me with seven knowledge stating verbs, namely *argue*, *claim*, *suggest*, *propose*, *maintain*, *assume* and *believe*.

Two other important limitations of the present study should also be mentioned at this stage. First, the present study is concerned with positive knowledge statements only, i.e. it considers only non-negated knowledge statements. It is debatable whether negated knowledge statements should be treated in the same way, i.e. whether a knowledge statement like “*We would not argue that there is a Swedish middle construction*” and “*Smith does not maintain that there is a Swedish middle construction*” should be treated on a par with non-negated knowledge statements when it comes to the manifestation of accountability. Negative knowledge statements in which speakers foreground themselves, for example, as in “*We would not argue...*” are less of an issue in discussions of accountability than utterances where the knowledge statement is negated, and speakers make overt reference to someone else, for example, as in “*Smith does not maintain...*”. Regardless of whether we think they should be treated in the same way or not, it is clear that negation adds an interesting twist to a discussion which I will not be concerned with here. However, it is interesting to note that in the data analysed in the present thesis, only 13 examples (out of 1703) involve negation of the knowledge stating clause. The low frequency of negated examples is another reason why I decided against getting involved in a complex discussion of this aspect of knowledge statements and accountability.

Second, I restrict the scope of analysis in this thesis to knowledge statements in which the knowledge content appears as the syntactic complement of a knowledge stating verb (i.e. no other word classes were considered) and where the knowledge content has the form of either a *that*-clause or another finite clause. The *that*-clause is by far the most common type of complement for the knowledge stating verbs investigated (92%). In addition, a minority of the knowledge statement complements included in the

study have the form of a prepositional phrase (e.g. *I argue for a Swedish middle construction*), a noun phrase (*Smith (2000) has suggested a Swedish middle construction*) or a non-finite clause (*A Swedish middle construction has been argued to explain this (Smith 2000)*).

## 1.4 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided into six chapters (including this introductory chapter) and a summary chapter (Chapter 6). In Chapter 2, I discuss the assumptions guiding my work and review previous work on some aspects important for my study, such as metadiscourse and discourse voice.

In Chapter 3, I address the first of the research questions and discuss what it is in the utterance that affects the manifestation of accountability. Since I operate under the assumption that discourse voice is the main factor underlying the manifestation of accountability, the discussion is based on discourse voices – the voices of Self and Other – and the degree to which such voices are manifested in the discourse. My argument is that three aspects of the utterance affect discourse voice (in terms of its degree of manifestation) and accountability: (i) what explicit *aspects of metadiscourse* are made manifest in the utterance, (ii) the *citation strategies* used by the speaker, and (iii) the *staging* of the utterance in terms of the relative foregrounding and backgrounding of participants (Self or Other) or other contents in the utterance. My conclusions about what affects accountability are the foundation for the proposal of a set of *discourse voice interpretation principles*; and these principles lead to the proposal of a model that serves as a theoretical basis for the investigation and classification of utterances involving knowledge stating verbs in terms of different accountability contexts. Chapter 3 also paves the way for the corpus analysis of knowledge stating verbs in Chapter 4 in the sense that I use the model proposed as the basis for an analysis of accountability from the point of view of the accountability contexts in which we find knowledge stating verbs.

In Chapter 4, I study the knowledge stating verbs in terms of their occurrence in different types of accountability contexts in academic texts. Thus, Chapter 4 addresses research questions 2 and 3. I first present the results of the corpus findings and then discuss those results and their implications for my idea of individual differences between knowledge stating verbs as well as possible differences across disciplines.

In Chapter 5, I use my reasoning from previous chapters and turn to the last of the research questions and try to establish what accountability is; i.e. what its status is in a theory of communication. I propose that accountability may be a phenomenon of metadiscourse. I compare the manifestation of accountability with more widely acknowledged aspects of metadiscourse (such as hedging or textual organisation) and with some of the defining characteristics proposed for metadiscourse. I also introduce the notion of “social knowledge” (Sperber 1996) and argue that accountability is a good example of such knowledge. My reasoning about accountability as a potential metadiscourse phenomenon also leads me to propose a layered model of metadiscourse, incorporating both lower-level and higher-level kinds of metadiscourse. I base my argumentation on conclusions from my discussion of accountability.

In Chapter 6, I summarise and synthesise my findings and point out the implications of the present study both for research on metadiscourse aspects of communication and for any future research on knowledge statements and accountability.





# Background and key concepts

This chapter provides the backdrop for the rest of the thesis. The important notions of knowledge statement and knowledge stating verbs were introduced in Chapter 1. In Section 2.1, I demonstrate how the knowledge stating verbs *argue*, *claim*, *suggest*, *propose*, *maintain*, *assume* and *believe* have been analysed in previous work – as hedges, evidentials or speech act verbs – and this also tells us more about knowledge stating verbs in general. This characterisation is also important for understanding them as knowledge stating elements. Since this thesis is concerned with knowledge statements in academic discourse, subsection 2.2 briefly examines the issue of how we could characterise academic discourse, something that is important for a better understanding of knowledge statements in contexts where we frequently encounter them. The last two sections of the chapter are devoted to introducing two of the key concepts I use – DISCOURSE VOICE (2.3) and METADISCOURSE (2.4).

## 2.1 Knowledge statements and knowledge stating verbs

This section characterises the knowledge stating verbs investigated from three interrelated perspectives (i) as speech act verbs, (ii) as elements featuring in the expression of evidentiality and (iii) as elements involved in the hedging of an utterance. It also tries to explain these other pragmatic

functions associated with the verbs in relation to that of making a knowledge statement.

### 2.1.1 Knowledge stating verbs as speech act verbs

In Chapter 1, I claimed that with a knowledge statement the speaker is performing a communicative act of *making* a knowledge statement. Interestingly, of the few available proper semantic/pragmatic characterisations of knowledge stating verbs, most are inspired (sometimes peripherally) by or profess to a theory of Speech Acts (Hayakawa 1968, Searle 1969, Ballmer & Brennenstuhl 1981, Searle & Vanderveken 1985, Wierzbicka 1987, Vanderveken 1991, Levin 1993, Francis et al. 1996, Shinzato 2004). As speech act verbs, knowledge stating verbs feature as a sub-group of a more general group of verbs highlighting an *assertive speech act*. The reason for this may be that “*knowledge making*” can be seen as a kind of *asserting* or *stating*. We can take the term ‘speech act verb’ to refer to a verb that is a central element in a speech act and “names” the speech act it performs.<sup>15</sup>

*Argue, claim, suggest, propose* and *maintain* are all considered members of a more general group of “say”-verbs by Francis et al. (1996: 98). “Saying” in that sense should be interpreted rather widely as pertaining to many different aspects of *communication*. What is particularly noticeable about this group of verbs is that they are said to have the more general function of (i) “putting forward a suggestion or theory” and (ii) “saying something in a way that shows your attitude” (1996: 98). The knowledge stating verbs are also found in the “report”-group. Francis et al. (1996) claim that the meaning of the verbs in this group invokes what can be “announced, reported, disclosed, rumoured, alleged, argued”, or “denied” (1996: 526).

*Assume* and *believe*, are not part of the “say”- or “report”-group; instead, they are members of a more general “think”-group. The members of this group should be “concerned with thinking” and “having a belief” (Francis et al. 1996: 526) and sometimes include what may be “known or suspect-

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<sup>15</sup> An alternative approach to the semantic and pragmatic import of utterances involving knowledge stating verbs is the so-called “double speech act hypothesis” or “double speech act analysis”. This approach suggests that utterances involving verbs of this kind, often called parenthetical verbs or speech act verbs, involve not a single speech act but two closely related ones where the primary function of one speech act is to feature as *a kind of comment on the other* (for detailed accounts of this approach, see Mittwoch 1977, 1979 and 1985; Fabb 1990; Haegeman 1984 and 1991; Espinal 1991; Burton-Roberts 1999; and Ifantidou 2001). Notice also the connection to metadiscourse, see 2.4.

ed” (1996: 527). Interestingly, there is no mention of speaker attitude in connection to the “think”-group.<sup>16</sup>

In an attempt to map out the illocutionary forces of illocutionary verbs, Searle & Vanderveken (1985) and Vanderveken (1991) discuss *argue*, *claim* and *suggest* with the class of *assertives* in English. They say that *claim* has the same illocutionary force and felicity conditional make-up as *assert*. For *argue*, they say that “when one argues that P one asserts that P and gives reasons which support the proposition that P, normally with the perlocutionary intention of convincing the hearer that P” (1985: 184). *Suggest*, however, is different although it is grouped with the assertive verbs. The authors claim that its different illocutionary force is due to a difference in “strength”. One can only assume that what they are alluding to must be either the strength of the factuality of the proposition (although I would claim that none of the verbs are factive) or the strength of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the proposition. Note also that there is no contradiction between this assumption and Searle’s original classification under which *suggest* is listed as an assertive: he claims that assertives, i.e. all of the verbs discussed so far, commit the speaker “in varying degrees” to the factuality of the proposition (1979: 12).

In summary, regardless of whether the verbs be labelled as “say-” “report”- or “think”-verbs or given any other distinct categorisation, it seems that we can agree on the direct or sometimes more indirect reference to knowledge, what I call a knowledge statement.<sup>17</sup>

### 2.1.2 Knowledge stating verbs as evidentials

Knowledge stating verbs have also been claimed to feature as central elements in the expression of evidentiality.<sup>18</sup> Evidentiality is concerned with the way speakers express, either explicitly or implicitly, what kind of source of information they have for what they say (Chafe & Nichols 1986), how knowledge was arrived at.

Scholars of evidentiality tend to make a general distinction between knowledge that has been obtained directly, indirectly, or through inference. A distinction is also made between sensory evidence, different kinds

<sup>16</sup> Compare this to the dictionary definitions of the verbs provided in Chapter 1.

<sup>17</sup> For other (sub)categorisations of knowledge stating verbs, see Thompson & Ye (1991) and Thomas & Hawes (1994) or Fløttum et al. (2006).

<sup>18</sup> For good overviews of evidentiality, see Chafe & Nichols (1986), De Haan (1999 and 2001), Johansson & Utas (2000), Rooryck (2001a and b) and Aikhenvald (2004). See also Givón (1982).

of reported evidence, and evidence obtained through an inference process (see Willett 1988).

In the literature on evidentiality, two main views are usually distinguished, a *wide* and a *narrow* approach, a more inclusive and a more restrictive grammatical view, respectively. In the broad sense, evidentiality has been claimed to involve epistemic attitudes – such as commitment, confidence and reliability – in relation to knowledge about a state of affairs and information about how this knowledge is obtained. More narrowly defined, evidentiality is limited to the latter, i.e. the mere expression of an evidential source, devoid of any evaluative dimension (c.f. Chafe 1986: 262). It is not easy to properly delimit the category of evidentiality from epistemic modality since we have to account for instances where linguistic expressions display a polysemous character, i.e. where evidentiality is one of two potential meanings encoded by an expression (for a good overview of the controversial relationship between evidentiality and modality, see de Haan 1999 or Dendale & Tasmowski 2001; see Aijmer 1996 for an interesting perspective on (modal) discourse particles from a corpus-based contrastive perspective (translations between Swedish and English)). Knowledge stating verbs are a case in point. In English, evidentiality may be expressed by modality items (such as the modal verbs *may* and *must*), adverbs (*evidently*, *apparently* or *obviously*) or periphrastic or lexical constructions; in other languages, these same things may be coded morphologically (see Aikhenvald 2004).

Because it is easy to see a fundamental, and conceptual, difference between expressing commitment towards knowledge content, on the one hand, and indicating how the information constituting that content was arrived at, on the other (Dendale & Tasmowski 2001), I distinguish between evidentiality and hedging (and also between evidentiality, hedging and accountability). My view of evidentiality is rather narrow though not so strict as to limit evidentiality to what is grammatically expressed in all instances. But any expression of evidentiality must be taken to always have source of information as part of its central meaning (Aikhenvald 2004). Not just any utterance can be taken to involve a dimension of evidentiality, at least not out of context. Consider the following example:

(17) Hand-preference and hand-skill are associated with cerebral function.

This utterance is a straightforward assertion: there is no indication that it emanates from someone other than the speaker and that is what an addressee is entitled to assume. There is no reason for the addressee to suspect

that this utterance serves any other purpose than that of asserting the state of affairs. Now consider an utterance from my corpus:

- (18) Annett has **argued** that hand-preference and hand-skill are associated with cerebral function. (LING)

This utterance could be called an assertion, but it has the form of a knowledge statement; it is an assertion for which the speaker no longer has to accept complete accountability. Note that it is not the introduction of the knowledge stating verb, *argue*, that tells the addressee this; rather, it is the knowledge statement clause as a whole (*Annett has argued that*). The knowledge stating verb only contributes to the signposting of the presence of another source and this has probably led to its inclusion in general categories of evidentials (e.g. Chafe 1986). Ascribing the knowledge content to that other source removes a substantial part of the speaker's accountability for the knowledge content. However, this can be done to different degrees, depending on how the speaker chooses to realise or evoke such an evidential dimension through the usage of a knowledge stating verb. This issue is addressed in detail in Chapter 3 for knowledge statements and knowledge stating verbs.

### 2.1.3 Knowledge stating verbs as hedges (or epistemic elements)

Knowledge stating verbs have also been labelled hedges or lexical hedges (Salager-Meyer 1994, Hyland 1998a), epistemics (Holmes 1988, Thue-Vold 2006a/b), epistemic reporting (main) verbs (Varttala 1999) or shields (Salager-Meyer 1994). There is something about the meaning potential of knowledge stating verbs that relates directly or indirectly to epistemic modality. But the functional potential of knowledge stating verbs as hedges goes far beyond that of expressing epistemic commitment. Myers (1989) would classify many of the uses of knowledge stating verbs as having a primarily mitigating/face saving function crucial for the expression of politeness.<sup>19</sup>

Epistemic modality as expressed in language is a reflection of our cognitive need to construe the world from the point of view of what is actually happening in any situation relative to what might conceivably happen or might conceivably have happened in another situation. Epistemic modal-

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<sup>19</sup> Myers (1989) also considers a number of other strategies for politeness in academic discourse.

ity is defined by Palmer as being “concerned with the speaker’s attitude to the truth value [...] of the proposition” (2001: 8).

Shopen (1985: 242-244) discusses epistemicity in terms of event realisation in actual vs. possible or alternative worlds (see also Perkins 1983): “at any point in time, there is an actual world, and there are also a number of alternative worlds that could exist at that time [...] [t]he epistemic mode characterizes the event with respect to the actual world and its possible alternatives” (1985: 242). Nuyts (2001) takes a similar stance, saying that epistemic modality is “the linguistic expression of an evaluation of the chances that a certain *hypothetical* state of affairs under consideration, or some aspect of it, will occur, is occurring, or has occurred in a *possible world* which serves as the universe of interpretation for the evaluation process, and which in the default case, is the real world (or rather the interpreter’s evaluation of it)” (2001: 21; see also Nuyts 2005).

Epistemic modality has also received a lot of attention from a more discourse-based or functionally-oriented perspective, usually under the heading of *hedging*. When Lakoff (1972: 194) first used the term *hedging*, he was referring to “words whose job is to make things fuzzy or less fuzzy”. The functional polarity implied by that definition captures the vagueness with which the concept of hedging has subsequently been associated. Hyland (1996a: 433-434) says that “hedging is the expression of tentativeness and possibility [and it is] a discursive resource for expressing uncertainty, scepticism, and open-mindedness about one’s proposition”. Several studies have pointed out that hedging is a very common feature in academic texts (e.g. Hyland 1996a and 2005a). Hyland (1996b) found that one out of every 50 words in his corpus of research articles was a hedge. Adams Smith (1984), Hanania & Akhtar (1985) and Skelton (1988) all report similar findings. Hyland (1996a) points to the fact that many sub-disciplines of linguistics, such as conversation analysis, sociolinguistics or discourse analysis, have devoted a lot of attention to hedges and the effect of hedges in various (con)texts. He also says, however, that from the point of view of hedging, scientific research writing is understudied: “we still know little about how it functions or is typically realized in specific academic domains. In particular, greater attention needs to be paid to the fact that hedging represents a writer’s *attitude* within a particular context” (1996: 434). Salager-Meyer (1994), drawing on Fand (1989), talks about hedges as “understatements used to convey (purposive) vagueness and tentativeness, and to make sentences more acceptable to the hearer/reader, thus increasing the chance of ratification and reducing the risk of negation” (1994: 150).

It is worth stressing that Salager-Meyer (1994) and others have mentioned that we view hedges not only as elements whose main function is to express uncertainty for the sake of uncertainty or because speakers are actually uncertain: “it should be kept in mind that the definition of hedges [...] goes beyond their mere association with speculation” (1994: 153). Speakers may employ hedges to (i) be communicatively polite,<sup>20</sup> or (ii) designate actual values or findings which may be inexact or otherwise not well defined – i.e. to reflect “necessary imprecision” (Salager-Meyer 1994: 150). Channell (1990) also lists some potential communicative goals for speakers in academic texts using “vague expressions” (her account confirms what was said earlier). Within Appraisal Theory (<http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/>; accessed on September 15, 2007) it is claimed that the main functionality of hedges or “probabilising formulations” is associated with the dialogicity of the discourses in which they are found. For example, expressions like *it seems that* or *perhaps* could serve to acknowledge the existence of viewpoints alternative to the one being contained in the information in the proposition. On this view, such expressions are inherently dialogic – they invite responses or reactions from dialogic respondents or acknowledge previously held viewpoints that may be different from the one being advanced in the current discourse. It is exactly at these communicative crossroads that I want to situate accountability. Later on, I argue that accountability can be seen as being indirectly expressed, frequently by

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<sup>20</sup> Communicative politeness has been described from different perspectives in the literature. Much of the work on politeness takes its theoretical point of departure from a maxim-based approach to language (such as the model proposed by Leech (1983) or in the framework that highlights a conception of face (Brown & Levinson 1987, adapted from Goffman 1967)). Leech (1983: 40) views politeness, and the crucially important notion of “tact”, as being primarily concerned with “why people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean”. Brown & Levinson’s framework (1987) of politeness theory is concerned with the notion of a speaker attending to a designated abstract area of emotional investment in any conversation, the so-called notion of *face* (1987: 61). The authors claim that there are two different but closely connected variants of face:

- a) negative face: the want of every competent adult member that his actions be unimpeded by others, and
- b) positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at least some others. (1987: 62)

Both Leech (1983) and Brown & Levinson (1987) acknowledge the workings of Grice’s (1989) Co-operative principle and both *explain* why speakers do not adhere to the Co-operative principle and violate the sub-maxims. Several other studies have been concerned with communicative politeness in academic discourse: Myers (1985, 1989 and 1991); Wood & Kroger (1994), a discussion of politeness strategies in correspondence between two scholars and a university appeals committee; Flowerdew & Dudley-Evans (2002), a more recent account in a related field (communications between an editor and accepted and refused writers of scholarly papers); Spencer-Oatey & Jiang (2003) offer a theory in pursuit of sociopragmatic principles able to account for cultural differences; or Jary (1998) who offers some interesting alternative perspectives to the notion of politeness from the point of view of Relevance Theory.

hedges whose primary function may well be to express something other than accountability (or indeed epistemic commitment).

How do the claims about epistemic modality and hedging relate to knowledge stating verbs *per se*? Some studies have included some knowledge stating verbs as members of a more general category of epistemic markers (see e.g. Varttala 1999). Thue-Vold (2006a) claims that epistemic modality markers are elements that (i) “explicitly qualify the truth value of a certain propositional content”; the expression in question must also (ii) “be a lexical or grammatical unit (thus I am not talking about entire phrases or paragraphs that are used to tone down the findings)” (2006a: 65).<sup>21</sup> Using these criteria, she classifies most uses of *suggest* and *assume* as expressing epistemic modality. The other knowledge stating verbs are not included by Thue-Vold as epistemic elements in her corpus investigation. I understand her position to be that other knowledge stating verbs may have a hint of epistemic modality to them, but this does not make them markers of epistemic modality; “there might be an implicit qualification of the truth value of the propositional contents as questionable, but their main function is that of a reporting verb, introducing the propositional content without really qualifying its truth value” (2006a: 65). Thue-Vold’s approach (2006a/b) is thus to identify epistemic markers on a case by case basis: depending on the context, there is a set of elements in language with the potential to “qualify the truth value of a certain propositional content”; in this case, they are epistemic markers.<sup>22</sup> Recall also the semantic characterisation of the knowledge stating verbs from Chapter 1. There it was clear that, at least out of context, epistemicity is frequently and intimately associated with the verbs investigated.

I argue that in many cases knowledge stating verbs serve precisely an epistemic function. In light of the discussion of “discourse voice” that follows, I claim that on most occasions when a knowledge stating verb is used in a Self-oriented utterance, it qualifies as a hedge and sometimes expresses varying degrees of tentativeness towards the knowledge content (depending on which verb it is). However, we must bear in mind that hedges do not function only as *epistemic* markers: they may do other things in communication or feature as an integral part of a more extensive expression of

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<sup>21</sup> Aijmer & Simon-Vandenberg (2003) talk about elements that “do not contribute to the propositional content of the utterance which they modify” as discourse particles. If some discourse particle is conducive to the modal qualification of propositional content, it can be classified as a modal particle. On the face of it, some of the uses of knowledge stating verbs could qualify as modal “particles” or satellite elements on such an approach.

<sup>22</sup> She does, however, offer groups or categories of elements that *a priori* or inherently appear to be epistemic markers, too.



epistemic modality (note that under (ii) in Thue-Vold's definition, this would disqualify them in her categorisation). Although the use of knowledge stating verbs has usually been discussed in terms of hedging, i.e. as a decrease in commitment or detachment from the knowledge content, the verbs are likely to feature also as potential elements of reinforcement, "endorsers" of knowledge content. Assertions that could otherwise be perceived as rather weak become, subject to the inclusion of a knowledge stating verb, somewhat stronger or at least more emphasised (e.g. *I argue that there is a Swedish middle construction.*).

Usually, hedging takes as its norm the factive statement; anything less than a factive statement could therefore be called hedged. Even if a statement is non-factive, a speaker can express a high or very high degree of commitment towards its knowledge content. *Argue*, for example, would in many contexts be taken to express a higher degree of commitment than *believe*.

Without going into more detail about the degree of epistemic commitment associated with the knowledge stating verbs in this study<sup>23</sup>, it should be clear that on intuitive grounds, and based on how they have been described in the literature, knowledge stating verbs could be claimed to express different degrees of epistemic commitment, or to otherwise hedge to different degrees. See, for example, the earlier description of differences in assertive force (Searle 1979: 12) associated with the knowledge stating verbs as speech act verbs. Although I will not discuss this aspect of knowledge stating verbs, wherever it is appropriate, I will refer to this aspect of their semantic and pragmatic potential as a difference in epistemic "strength". From what has been said, and based on intuition, it is probably the case that a knowledge stating verb like *argue* is "stronger" than *believe* in terms of the commitment expressed: if *I argue* something, I am more committed than if *I believe* something. This only highlights one dimension of the epistemic scalar character of knowledge stating verbs as epistemic elements. I will return to the issue of scalarity when I argue for the scalar nature of accountability (in Sections 3.2, 3.6 and 4.4.1)

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<sup>23</sup> It should be emphasised that this is not the objective of this study.

## 2.2 Characterising academic discourse

In this sub-section, I provide a general characterisation of academic discourse. I point to the diversity of academic discourse but focus on denominators common to most or all kinds of academic discourse since some of these denominators are important in connection with knowledge statements and a discussion about accountability.

### 2.2.1 Is there *one* academic discourse?

The study of aspects of academic discourse is an interdisciplinary branch of linguistics that has attracted a great deal of attention over the last two or three decades: Crompton (1997) studies hedges in academic discourse, Holmes (1988) addresses tentativity and affirmation in academic text books, Hyland (1996a; 1996b; 1998a; 1999a; 1999b; 2005a) deals with metadiscourse in academic writing, Myers (1985; 1989; 1991) investigates communicative politeness in different kinds of academic productions, Recski (2005) studies how speakers are interpersonal in the defences of theses, Skelton (1997a; 1997b) examines hedges in academic writing and Swales (1990; 2004) is concerned more generally with academic discourse.

Academic discourse cannot be seen as a single and easily identified type of discourse; it is difficult to say exactly what academic discourse is like. Several scholars have pointed to the diversity of style that characterises academic production, be it written or oral. For instance, Elbow (1991: 138-139) exemplifies a number of different cultural and social traditions and Flower (1989: 8) says: “there is no Platonic entity called academic discourse”.

Let us look at some of the things various scholars have said about academic discourse. Barras (1984: 101) describes what makes academic discourse special:

Scholarly writing should be free from bias. Speculation, if necessary, should be clearly indicated by such words as *may*, *possibly*, and *perhaps*. And things first mentioned as possibilities should not later be stated as if they were facts. [...] Scholars, seeking the truth, should avoid emotive language and present evidence for and evidence against [and] where appropriate they should present a variety of opinions, to show that they are aware of different interpretations even if they conclude by supporting one point of view.

Although he admits that it is essentially a non-feasible task to identify a “deep structure”, i.e. a kind of atomic core of academic discourse, Elbow (1991: 140; 141-142) proposes the following description:

What would seem natural to such a conception of academic discourse is the giving of reasons and evidence rather than just opinions, feelings, experiences: being clear about claims and assertions rather than just implying or insinuating [and] what is essential: clear positions, arguments, and evidence [...].

Good academic discourse doesn't pretend to pure objectivity, yet it also avoids mere subjectivity. It presents clear claims, reasons, and evidence, but not in a pretence of pure, timeless, Platonic dialectic but in the context of arguments that have been or might be made in reply.

Like Elbow, I think it is essential for any researcher interested in academic discourse to disregard the detailed prescriptive and hands-on information found on this topic in the average college handbook on writing and focus instead on “the big picture”. That is, if we move beyond the linguistic level and try to find a common meta-descriptive denominator, it appears that many of the sources considered identify a set of more or less common characteristics: tentativity, polite but clear argumentation, logical reasoning and evidential justification and always, in one way or another, an element of persuasion.

Regardless of whether you advance a hypothesis, criticise something or somebody, or defend a thesis of your own, your presentation is likely to have these meta-descriptive trademarks. However, studies in the last decade have indicated that academic communication is far from the self-obliterating and overly humble business we may think it is. Hyland (2001a; 2002) stresses both the affirmation of the speaking Self and the substantial degree of interaction speakers seek through communication as important trademarks of academic communication. Speakers' concerns with these trademarks or the underlying motives are likely to influence and boost the speakers' use of metadiscourse to achieve their communicative goals (metadiscourse and its importance are discussed in Section 2.4).

Two more brief notes: first, I find the dialogic perspective mentioned by Elbow particularly interesting. All production of academic texts could in some sense be considered a reply to a spoken or unspoken question posed either by the speakers themselves or by someone else in their academic community. By providing solid argumentation and evidence for the issue at hand, the speakers feel confident enough to position themselves relative to whatever topic is being addressed and prepared to commit themselves

accordingly. In describing the negotiation scholars have to go through between a claim made by them and the ratification of that claim by the discourse community, Hyland also mentions this dialogic discourse dimension: “While lexical and syntactic forms *determine text meanings*, *interpretation is unconstrained* and subject to knowledge effects which depend on higher-level reasoning skills and world knowledge which are beyond the writer’s control [...] this is why mitigation is central to academic writing, as hedging signals the writer’s *anticipation* of the *opposition* to a proposition” (1996a: 436, emphasis added). In other words, the speaker anticipates potential critique of the claim and makes every effort to allow the claim to take on the character of a reply to an unspoken question. This is not enough, however; further mitigation is called for and hedges are introduced to attenuate the proposition/knowledge content or to achieve other communicative objectives, such as a genre specific dialogic-rhetorical requirements. The latter point is something I return to when discussing accountability.

Second, if you see language as a social enterprise, as essentially involving communication between people, it is tempting to consider the super-genre of academic discourse as socially determinative in relation to the overall discipline rather than a dependent component in the relationship between discourse and the knowledge basis framed by that type of discourse. Drawing on Latour (1987), Harvey (1992: 117) says that on such a view science may not only be “expressed by language, but also shaped by it”. Thus, she admits the possibility of relating academic text (and discourse as a whole) “to social organizations and to the productions of scientific knowledge”, pointing out that academic texts should not necessarily be “analysed as vehicles for information, but as structures for thinking and social interaction, and ultimately as means of exercising influence in a culture where scientific knowledge has great authority”. To me, the adoption of such a view presupposes a certain sensitivity and awareness on the part of the discourse participants with regard to the functions the utterances embedded in this social enterprise may and must have to be acceptable. Therefore, any claim that academic discourse is socially contingent will also fit into the model assumed in this thesis. In Chapter 3, I lay the foundation for the model of accountability that I propose is applicable to knowledge statements based on my first investigation of the corpus. In Chapter 5, this model is complemented by the introduction of reasoning that reflects very closely the speaker’s awareness of the social functions of communication in academic discourse (Harvey 1992).

Since this thesis focuses on a particular kind of academic discourse, the research article, a few words need to be said about it. Academic discourse encompasses numerous sub-genres, many of which have received a fair amount of attention in the literature of the last few decades: lectures or classroom discussions, PhD defences, PhD and other dissertations, wholes or parts of different types of research publications.

Not even the kind of discourse that this thesis is concerned with, the research article/paper, can be considered a homogeneous sub-category of academic discourse. Research articles can be further genre-categorised at least according to whether their outset is theoretical or experimental and even finer distinctions can be made (review papers, squibs, responses, etc). The average research paper can be dissected into several sub-texts, all of which have attracted the attention of researchers in general linguistics, sociolinguistics, discourse analysis and related fields. Swales (1990: 131-132) offers an overview of the sections that have been the foci of study: the research article as a whole, introductions, methods and results sections, discussions and conclusions. Swales (1990) is a good source for anyone interested in a more profound study (from a number of different perspectives) of different sections in research articles. Given the attention devoted to research articles, it should come as no surprise that it is a nearly impossible task to characterise *The Research Article*. Instead, we shall have to assume that many of the underlying motives that shape academic discourse also govern the work of the writer of the research article. The main reason I chose the research article as the object of study is that it is without doubt one of the premier means for scholars to advance their ideas to the research community without seeking monograph publication. Consequently, the research article is a good source of knowledge statements, which abound in this genre since writers are looking to establish themselves and their ideas whilst maintaining a close relationship with their research community by drawing on previous ideas and previous knowledge. While this balancing between advancement of new ideas and the dependence on ideas and the approval of the research community is unlikely to feature as a prominent characteristic in some other academic genres (such as the textbook), it is a crucial characteristic of the research article. This is likely to lead to interesting findings about the distribution and assignment of accountability between the scholar and the research community.

### 2.2.2 Discourse vs. text – what are they?

The concepts of discourse and text have had an enormous impact in many academic disciplines. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish these concepts, at least in terms of how they have been treated. Without engaging in a profound philosophical discussion of the problematic and closely related concepts of DISCOURSE and TEXT, I will say a few words about what I mean when I use the two terms in this thesis. I should stress that what I will offer is a very simple distinction.

When you read what I have written on this page you are looking at a piece of text, but the notion of text goes beyond this simplistic definition. To me, the text is not confined to the written medium of communication but is better characterised as concrete instantiations of language situations. This wider notion would include a piece of conversation, a television programme or traffic sign – all situations where there is some instantiation of semiotic system. The text may thus be described as the *ground* between whoever communicates something – the communicator may be only indirectly involved in the situation and what is communicated may be implicit or explicit – and whoever receives that message. We could imagine the ground being extrapolated from the communicative situation and subject to scrutiny. Everything that the participants in the situation bring along and use in any given situation should remain untouched by this extrapolation; only the ground can be analysed in a textual analysis. Basically, what I am saying is that any kind of interpretation as such is not a textual phenomenon; interpretation is rather a characteristic of the discourse dimension, but we will return to that later. Instead, I wish to subscribe to a view where the text is always defined as the object of study. To put it crudely, the text represents a concrete dimension whereas the discourse is a more abstract phenomenon.

In its widest sense, discourse is sometimes described as a certain way of speaking about and understanding the world through experiences we have in verbal communication and social interaction. In one sense, it is thus possible to view discourse as an autonomous domain governed by practices or rules without any actual discernable or independent agent/subject – a kind of meta-practice constituting the collected experiences of being and any earlier knowledge stored. It is something that forms our concepts about our environment in a direct and relatively straightforward way, delivering to us glimpses of how we may have acted and how we should act in and in relation to our present environment. Thus, it gives us a more profound understanding of the concepts that appear most central to us in the

situations we find ourselves in: “Discourse is *language use relative to social, political and cultural formations* – it is language reflecting social order but also language shaping social order, and shaping individuals’ interaction with society” (Jaworski & Coupland 1999: 3; emphasis added). It has been suggested that the notion of discourse must be (relatively) directly related to the notion of truth and that discourse therefore constitutes an essential link between subjects and epistemology (Jaworski & Coupland 1999: 3). This is important in discussions of modality and evidentiality.

An inherent feature of discourse seems to be to hierarchically grade or characterise our perceptions, thus enabling us to understand when we can speak of common knowledge, personal experiences or other consequences of perceptual stimuli. In all of this, the autonomy of discourse appears to hold centre stage. In one sense, this is correct; however, we should still ascribe a certain amount of activity and potential for variation to the subjects in the discourse (i.e. the speaker and the addressees). Considering the central position awarded to language in the formation of discourse, an overly deterministic view of the concept of discourse would be unfortunate. Even if discourse might decide certain “given” facts of the discourse situation and thus determine/govern speakers and addressees, language as a medium is not deterministic in nature. In various branches of linguistics, researchers have claimed for quite some time that it is not just discourse that constrains speakers but that speakers also have the ability to change discourse by strategically positioning themselves relative to the discourse in language use. In addition to construing the world of the subject/agent, most people today would extend the construal character of discourse to encompass other subjects (or perhaps it is easier if we call them objects/patients/themes) in any given discourse situation. Even if the agent (or the primary, external, argument) in a situation or a clause is the participant best suited to affect the discourse, it is unlikely that the affecting character of the discourse is limited to this participant; discourse is more likely to be insensitive to any kind of syntactic or semantic constraints that language as such may impose on the situation. Thus, it is likely that secondary participants also should be able to affect the discourse, given that all linguistic communication is the result of an act of balance between speaker and addressee. In that case, you could never completely disregard what an addressee does to language, i.e. we need to value the interpretative situation of the addressee on a par with the discourse governing situation of the speaker. If we permit for such a dynamic notion of discourse, we assign a certain amount of importance to all the participants in a situation, allowing them to drive and construe the discourse along new paths.

Discourse in its widest sense goes far beyond language as a closed system (c.f. Jaworski & Coupland 1999). I subscribe to a view of discourse dating back to Benveniste (1971: 110) who claims that “with the sentence we leave the domain of language as a system of signs [recall my earlier discussion of the text] and enter into another universe, that of language as an instrument of communication, whose expression is *discourse*” (emphasis added). It is in this universe of communication that discourse is generated, negotiated and modulated. There is no dividing line between language and discourse: discourse shapes language and language offers the necessary concrete instantiation of discourse. They are mutually dependent.

Given this view of discourse, one might ask how I propose to study it. Fasold (1990: 65) suggests that “the study of discourse is the study of *any* aspect of language use”. Since a direct study of discourse seems relatively futile given its abstract character, we have to resort to a study of discourse phenomena reflected in language use. That is exactly what I propose to do in this thesis by investigating knowledge statements and the implication the use of knowledge statements has for the (discourse?) dimension of accountability. One could say that I focus my attention on an aspect of what Verschueren (1999) has referred to as the “entextualisation” of discourse. This is the process whereby certain devices, in my case metadiscourse elements or other aspects of the utterance or in Verschueren’s terminology indicators of metapragmatic awareness, provide discourse (which must then be interpreted in the abstract sense) with “a textual status, an interpretive frame of reference, by means of metapragmatic contextualisation” (1999: 195).

## 2.3 Discourse voice – voices in the discourse and speaker presence

In this section, I introduce discourse voice. I begin by discussing it in general terms and I then consider the two voices important for the discussion in this thesis. I also introduce the idea that discourse voice is scalar in nature and end the section by indicating how discourse voice is relevant to knowledge statements.

Any stretch of discourse is likely to include or manifest different “voices”, to be “heteroglossic” (Holquist 1990) or “multivoiced” (Fløttum et al. 2006). Many models of discourse voice (e.g. Fløttum et al. 2006) consider



it in terms of “traces” of the speaker or other speakers in the text. To make the notion of voice clear, I will offer a few examples. In (19) and (21), the knowledge content of the knowledge statement clearly originates with someone other than the current speaker; the speaker is the one behind the evaluation (*convincingly*) in (21) as well as the source for the knowledge contents in (20):

- (19) Hay and Baayen (2002b) **argue** that parsing rates causally influence the productivity of affixes. (LING)
- (20) I **argue** that cultural identity should become part of the regular litany of nonlinguistic factors assessed in the study of language variation. (LING)
- (21) Barton convincingly **argues** that the presence of a politicized populace in Coriolanus is indebted to Philemon Holland’s translation of Livy’s History (1600). (LIT)

In what follows, I will maintain that any such orientation towards the speaker or towards someone other than the speaker can be described as instantiations of discourse voice.

In this thesis, discourse voice is considered an aspect of discourse pertaining to how vocally “visible” or “present” (or, conversely, “invisible” or “absent”) a speaker (not necessarily the speaker in the utterance situation but any potential speaker) is at any given point in a discourse<sup>24</sup> (Fløttum et al. 2006 talk about “person manifestation” in their characterisation of “academic voices”). I thus define discourse voice by referring to a speaker’s relative vocal presence or absence in a piece of discourse, where the presence-absence dimension is indexed by discourse traces of some speaker. In “identifying” a discourse voice in a piece of discourse, we should ask questions such as “With and through this piece of discourse, who is talking to us; whose voice do we hear?”

With respect to knowledge statements, I take discourse voice to be directly related to whose “knowledge” is referred to, whom the idea or information forming the basis of the knowledge content can be ascribed to. If it is the current speakers’ own knowledge, their idea, or information “coming” from them, the discourse voice is that of *Self*, as in (20). If it is knowledge emanating from someone other than the current speakers (we need not identify that individual more precisely), the discourse voice is that of

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<sup>24</sup> It is worth comparing this definition with the definition of metadiscourse offered by Crismore & Farnsworth (1990). They define metadiscourse as “an author’s overt or non-overt presence in the discourse in order to direct rather than to inform readers” (1990: 119). Discourse voice clearly has something to do with the speaker’s relative presence in the discourse, but it also has something to do with metadiscourse (see 2.4).

*Other*, as in (19) and (21)<sup>25</sup> (the terms ‘self’ and ‘other’ are used by Fløttum et al. 2006 as well).<sup>26</sup> Admittedly, this provides a relatively narrow concept of voice, but it is one that serves the present purposes and is justified given the focus of this study.

I assume that speakers’ manifestations of discourse voice are largely motivated by interpersonal concerns.<sup>27</sup> Speakers want to be accepted as members of the research community and make sure that their ideas are not refuted or discarded by that community. Therefore, they strive to adapt both the content and the form of their communication, both *what* they say and *how* they say it, to the norms, standards and expectations of the addressees in the community. One concern facing speakers is finding a balance between references to previous research and using that research to frame their argumentation and taking a stance with their own argumentation, a balance between “the voice of deference and that of authority” (Charles 2006: 32).<sup>28</sup>

There is a lot of research on discourse voice phenomena and academic language, though not necessarily under the heading of discourse voice. Most frequently, discourse voice has been treated as an aspect of reporting language. One of the first things to be noted when considering research on reporting or knowledge stating phenomena and academic language is that there is a great deal of variation between sub-genres or disciplines. It is impossible to say what the pattern for the making of knowledge statements and the manifestation of voice is in one genre or discipline as opposed to another (Fløttum 2005b). The differences have been the focus of numerous publications over the last 15 years (see e.g. Hyland 1996a, 1998a, 1998b, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 2004, 2005a, 2005b; Duszak 1997). Many of Hyland’s publications also focus indirectly on Self- and Other-reporting through his concerns with hedges, boosters and evidentials (e.g. 1996a,

<sup>25</sup> The fact that (21) also contains an element of Self, namely the attitude marker *convincingly*, does not change its interpretation as making manifest the voice of the Other. When different aspects of an utterance give rise to multi-voicedness (cf. Fløttum 2003, Fløttum et al. 2006), creating what we could call “vocal” ambiguity, it is hardly ever any problem deciding which voice is more foregrounded, if not backgrounded, so at least relatively less saliently manifested voice in connection with the knowledge stating verb. I will return to this issue in 3.6.

<sup>26</sup> Henceforth, any use of the words *Self* and *Other* (with capital letters) denotes the two dimensions of discourse voice.

<sup>27</sup> This assumption about social contingency is qualified in detail in Chapter 5. By ‘interpersonal’, I mean an addressee-oriented aspect of or motive for the communication. Any use of the term involves, however, a theoretical debt to Hallidayan approaches to language.

<sup>28</sup> In addition, Myers (1989: 5) notes that “the making of claims always involves a tension: the writer must stay within a certain consensus to have anything to say to members of his or her discipline, but must also have a new claim to make to justify publication”. See also Vassileva (2001) for a discussion of how such balance is maintained through the use of hedges and boosters (i.e. expressions pertaining to the commitment and/or detachment in communication).

1998a, 2005a and 2005b). Although Hyland remains one of the most influential scholars in this area, many other publications bear witness of a vast interest in these perspectives on academic language.

Even if variation is not the main issue in Thompson & Ye (1991) and Shaw (1992), both offer interesting analyses of citations and reporting verbs and the interactions of tense, voice and discourse functions. Both study academic discourse and focus on what I would call voice-related phenomena. Carter (1990) and Swales (1990) also discuss aspects of reporting. A more recent edited volume on aspects of evaluation and academic discourse (Del Lungo Camiciotti & Tognini Bonelli (2004)) contains papers such as Silver & Bondi (2004) who deal with reporting and what I call the making of knowledge statements. The most recent and ambitious account of discourse voice is offered by Fløttum et al. (2006). Finally, in the area of English for Specific Purposes (and also some branches of Applied Linguistics), academic language has always been at the centre of attention. For example, Silver (2003) is concerned with the notion of evaluation and expression of speaker stance.

Before I turn to the two voices central to my discussion in this thesis, I have to make a few additional comments on terminology. Tadros (1993), who owes many of her ideas to Sinclair (1985, 1986), talks about the notion of “textual voice” in terms of author *averral* (Self) and *attribution* (Other). She links these “basic notions for the organization of interaction in written texts” to aspects of social dynamicity in the interplay between author and addressee and to discourse dimensions such as evaluation of propositions. Tadros’ perspective is interesting also because it allows a comprehensive link between the notion of voice and speaker presence. Bondi & Silver (2004) offer a clear distinction between *averral* and *attribution*:

Averral is the default condition of a text, where the reader can assume that the responsibility for each proposition lies with the speaker or writer. Attribution, on the other hand, is the case where a proposition is indicated as deriving from a source. (2004: 115)<sup>29</sup>

The utterance in (22) is an example of *averral* whereas (23) is an example of *attribution*.

- (22) I would **argue**, however, that it is not the Shakespearean original which is at stake here but rather the recursive [...]. (LIT)

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<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting that Bondi & Silver (2004) make explicit reference to “responsibility” in connection to their distinction between *averral* and *attribution*. In Chapter 3, I will show how such responsibility must be taken to be subject to gradable qualification and I will offer a slightly more nuanced picture of this distinction grounded in the notion of discourse voice as a scalar concept.

- (23) Samuel Hynes **argues** that even as it was being fought the war was perceived as a force of radical change in society and in consciousness [...]. (LIT)

The distinction between averral and attribution is based on an assumption that text averral is the norm and any instances of attribution appear as marked. When there is no attribution to another source, any knowledge content appearing in an utterance is considered to emanate from the speaker.

Tadros (1993) appears to be in agreement with Sinclair on one of the central functions of attributions in texts, that of “transferring responsibility for what is beings said” (1993: 104). Since this statement has implications for my discussion of discourse voice and speaker accountability, I will return to it in Section 3.2. Tadros’ (1993) account incorporates another major concern for researchers studying reporting in academic language – the issue of different styles of citation, i.e. by what *textual* means a speaker can refer to voices in the text and the implications different strategies have for our interpretations. I defer the discussion of citation styles to Section 3.4.

Finally, it should come as no surprise that different voices may appear simultaneously in a piece of discourse. Fløttum (2003) and Fløttum et al. (2006) refer to this as the “multivoicedness” of discourses and Harvey refers to it as “referential fuzziness” (1992: 116). The label is irrelevant, however; what is relevant is Harvey’s suggestion that the speaker’s choice of voice may affect the addressee’s perception of the relation between the speaker and the knowledge content of the utterance, or at least of how the speaker wishes to portray that relationship in the utterance situation (See also Holquist 1990 on Bakhtinian ideas of dialogism and heteroglossia in this respect).

Different voices may become blended in a text: the speaker’s choice of voice manifestation may give rise to some degree of uncertainty on the part of the addressee as to who the actual source of the knowledge content is. This uncertainty may well be exploited by the speaker for different reasons (Harvey 1992). For example, the current speaker may have presentational or other reasons to hide the source, such as a wish to create referential ambiguity in cases of potentially modally committing utterances and thus allowing for exemption from accountability with respect to some knowledge contents. In academic settings, any such strategic choices are bound to have implications for how the speaker’s utterances are understood, accepted, or refuted under the interpretive social constraints of the speech com-

munity. Now, let us turn to the two dominant discourse voices, Self and Other.<sup>30</sup>

### 2.3.1 Self and Other

I assume that both Self-manifestation (averral) and Other-manifestation (attribution) are governed by interpersonal or social concerns for the addressee. In Other-manifestation, a speaker's presence in the utterance is backgrounded in favour of a more foregrounded Other-source: it is not the speaker's voice the addressee "hears" as the source of the knowledge content, but an echo of someone else. Through reference to Other(s), i.e. by manifesting the voice of the Other, academic speakers display knowledge of the field and are able to situate their own research within "a larger narrative". This serves as a reminder of the intertextual<sup>31</sup> context in which the speaker's text is produced in an academic setting and how it should be shaped and formulated: "explicit reference to prior literature is a substantial indication of a text's dependence on contextual knowledge and thus a vital piece in the collaborative construction of new knowledge between writers and readers" (Hyland 1999a: 342-343). Consider (24), an utterance making manifest the voice of Other: the voice we "hear" as the source of the knowledge content is clearly that of someone other than the speaker.

- (24) Marcus and colleagues (1992) have **argued** that the frequency difference between 1,010 and 1,001 occurrences of a word is unlikely to be as relevant in any given corpus as the difference between 10 and 1 occurrences. (LING)

Amsterdamska & Leydesdorff (1989: 451) say that references to Other "are the most explicit manner in which the arguments presented in an article are portrayed as linked to other texts [and, therefore, "intertextual" – see footnote 32], and thus also to a particular body of knowledge". Hyland (1999a) stresses the importance of manifestations of the Other: "one of the most important realizations of the research writer's concern for audience is

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<sup>30</sup> The notion of discourse voice is not limited to Self and Other although that is the focus of this thesis. For example, Fløttum et al. (2006) say that "person manifestation" may include 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> persons. With a slightly wider scope, Tadros (1993) and Thompson (1996) offer yet other categories of voice.

<sup>31</sup> 'Intertextual' refers to that aspect of the text or discourse through which it is in a constant relationship with other texts and other discourses.

the reporting, or reference to prior research” (1999a: 342).<sup>32</sup> For the moment, it suffices to say that the most conspicuous way in which Other can be referred to is by means of a citation. Since I deal with citations in Chapter 3, any discussion of citation management is deferred until then.<sup>33</sup> Now, let us consider the speaker’s own voice, Self.<sup>34</sup>

Academic language is traditionally considered to lack strong expressions or manifestations of the speaker. The assumption that academic language is governed by objectivity, neutrality and a minimising of the speaker has, however, by and large been abandoned by recent research. In several publications, Hyland points out that communicating within academic settings is far from a “self-effacing” business where the speaker is only “a humble servant of the discipline” (2001a: 209). The academic speaker must after all make some individual contribution to the body of research within the community, displaying originality of ideas and an “authoritative professional persona” (2001a: 209). The speaker can fulfil this discourse requirement by manifesting the voice of Self.

Unless there is evidence to the contrary, an addressee is entitled to assume that whatever constitutes information in a text emanates from the current speaker.<sup>35</sup> The utterance in (25) is an example of speaker averral, an utterance where Self is manifested:

- (25) I can only **suggest** that the religious history explored is deeply embedded in a patriarchal logic. (LIT)

<sup>32</sup> Hunston (1995) lists a number of potential metadiscursive functions of attributions to Other: “attribution can be used to hedge a statement, to introduce information which corroborates the writer’s own view, to indicate a gap in research, or to set up a point of view against which the writer wishes to argue” (1995: 134). My chief concern is the accountability effects associated with attributed statements, but I do not deny that other functions may be simultaneously performed and my discussion in Chapter 5 is a clear sign of this.

<sup>33</sup> Other-orientation does not always have to be explicitly signalled by the inclusion of a bibliographical citation. Thompson (1996: 502) notes that many reports are “expressed by means of structures other than quotes or reported clauses”. The polyphonic framework chosen by Fløttum et al. (2006) also appears to be able to handle other, not so overt aspects of language reports. In the rest of this thesis, however, I limit my investigation of Other-orientation to utterances with bibliographical citations, utterance where the Other-orientation is signalled indirectly by reference to an Other-oriented indirect or impersonal construction, or utterances where Other-orientation is contextually inferred.

<sup>34</sup> I have adopted a simplistic notion of the speaker in this thesis and talk about speakers only in their capacity as makers or issuers of knowledge statements. I have deliberately avoided the complex roles speakers can have in their capacity as researchers, writers, arguers, etc. For a detailed description of the speaker/writer in this way, see Fløttum et al. (2006) and for some early comments Myers (1989). As a consequence, the voice of “Self” refers to this simpler conception of speaker.

<sup>35</sup> There is ample support for this view in the literature. See for example Hunston (1995: 133): “All statements in a written text are attributable to the writer of the text unless attributed by the writer to another source”.

When speakers manifest their presence<sup>36</sup> in a text, or rather at a particular point in a text or discourse, there may be different reasons for their doing so and they may do it in different ways. They might want to take an authoritative standpoint on a debated issue, emphasise collegiality or community affiliation, mitigate a strong claim, or distance themselves from a line of argument detrimental to communicative or interpersonal goals. The speakers might realise their presence overtly by “stepping” into the text or discourse through references to themselves via a first person pronoun. They also may be slightly more subtle and do it by means of a hedging qualification or by an indication of opinion or attitude. In some cases, they may be difficult to detect at all unless there is more context available. Presumably, speakers can also indicate their presence by controlling the topic of discussion. There is general consensus that if the primary means for the Other to be present in the discourse is through citations, the most conspicuous way Self can be manifested is through first person pronouns (c.f. Fløttum et al. 2006: 67).

Regardless of why or how speakers manifest their presence in the discourse, their motives are likely to be both social and communicative. For example, speakers who argue strongly for something are likely to want to get their point across in order to persuade the audience. However, they must make sure to frame the argument in a manner acceptable to the audience, perhaps through mitigation or by overtly indicating that the point emanates from them only and is not yet accepted in the research community as established knowledge. That way, the community will appreciate the speakers’ point without being disturbed by other things such as their possible lack of modesty.

Recently, a number of studies have analysed Self-manifestation. Hyland (2001a, 2002 and 2003) is concerned with this matter mostly through investigations of disciplinary differences in how Self is manifested. Fløttum (2005a and 2005b) addresses the issue from a slightly different perspective through her framework of polyphony;<sup>37</sup> her main concern are the differences in Self-manifestation between different languages. Many of Fløttum’s colleagues in Bergen (often within the KIAP-project; *Cultural Identities in Academic Prose*) are concerned with similar approaches although not always from the point of view of polyphony (Gjesdal 2005 and Kinn

<sup>36</sup> By ‘presence’, I mean the extent to which some source (Self or Other) can be traced within its utterance. For a related definition of presence, see Tang & John (1999).

<sup>37</sup> Polyphony is described by Fløttum (2003: 111) as “the manifestation of several voices or points of view (pv) in one and the same utterance. [...] With a polyphonic conception of meaning, it is essential to demonstrate how the presence of several voices or points of view are signalled in the discourse”. For an illustration of a basic polyphonic analysis, see Fløttum (2003: 111-112).

2005; see also Fløttum 2005b). Finally, Vassileva (1998, 2002) also takes a language contrastive perspective in analysing Self-manifestation and authorial presence in English and Bulgarian, among other languages. The most ambitious study to date, however, is Fløttum et al. (2006).

Hyland (2002) also addresses the issue of Self introduction and discusses the importance of first person pronouns in thematic positions<sup>38</sup> in utterances. He claims that “the way the writer begins a clause not only foregrounds important information, firmly identifying the writer as the source of the associated statement, but also helps the writer control the social interaction in the text [...]; the use of first person pronouns allows writers to emphasize, and to seek agreement for their own contributions” (2002: 1093); it “assists authors to make a personal standing in their texts and to demarcate their own work from that of others” (2003: 257).

Discussing speaker stance, Hyland (2004) depicts speaker involvement in terms of binary opposing forces. He says that speakers’ expressions of stance in a proposition are one way to “intrude into the discourse to stamp their personal authority onto their arguments or step back from their discourse and disguise their involvement” (2004: 15). This is important for our purposes: although still by far the most frequent way of Self introduction, first person pronouns are not the only way speakers choose to Self-orient in the data investigated in this thesis (see Chapter 3). Charles (2006: 494) notes that “reporting clauses which comment on the writer’s own research offer an important opportunity for writers to position themselves within their disciplinary community by presenting their research in a way which will make it most likely to be accepted”.<sup>39</sup>

It should be clear that speakers are discursively compelled to find a balance between Self- and Other-orientation in their communication. Any skewing or imbalance towards one or the other pole results in possible non-acceptance by the audience and the speakers’ failing to achieve their communicative goals.

### 2.3.2 Scalar voices and knowledge statements

I contend that discourse voice should be considered a scale. Speakers can be present in the discourse, or rather make their presence known in the dis-

<sup>38</sup> See Section 3.5.1 for the term “thematic” (as in constituting the “theme” of the utterance).

<sup>39</sup> It is perhaps also worth mentioning the interesting finding of Crismore & Vande Kopple (1988; 1997). Students who were subjected to texts containing clearly Self-oriented structures such as *It seems to me that...* compared to an impersonal construction such as *It seems that...* to a large extent found the Self-oriented variants more helpful for their overall understanding of the text.



course, to higher or lower degrees, depending on their communicative objectives. Similarly, speakers can make the presence of the Other known to the addressee to varying degrees. The terminology used in this thesis is that speakers can “orient” or “make manifest” discourse voices to different degrees.

I sometimes prefer to use the term ‘orientation’ for one important reason. When I discuss the import of individual aspects of the utterance on discourse voice, such terminology signals that on its own that aspect (for example, a speaker’s Self-introduction into the utterance via a first person pronoun) indicates a certain discourse voice; however, this should not always be considered sufficient or conclusive evidence for the expression of a particular discourse voice. Sometimes we have to consider a whole array of aspects of the utterance, all of which may orient the utterance to one or another discourse voice. When all potential aspects of an utterance have been considered, I refer to this as a speaker’s *making manifest* a discourse voice.

If speakers seek to affirm themselves by introducing a unique idea or some novel line of reasoning, they are likely to orient an utterance to Self to a higher degree:

- (26) Ultimately, I **argue** that this pattern complicates the notion of redemptive recurrence [...] (LIT)

Conversely, if speakers are looking to background themselves in favour of a foregrounded Other, perhaps because the knowledge content emanates with the Other, speakers will make the discourse voice of the Other-manifest in an utterance:

- (27) Teeven **maintains** that it “had been a common way of raising capital in the sixteenth century” (p. 101-102). (LIT)

In some utterances where the voice of Self is manifest, it is much more “subdued” than in (26), frequently involving a discursive backgrounding of the speaker:

- (28) This way of looking at things **suggests** a link to the analysis of factives more broadly. (LING)

Therefore, we should envisage discourse voice manifestation in terms of degree rather than as pertaining to either Self or Other as discrete and in complementary distribution. Sometimes Self is made manifest to a high

degree, sometimes Other is, and sometimes we have to imagine intermediate degrees of manifestation (this claim is qualified in the next chapter).

In the next chapter, I argue that this scalar discourse manifestation of Self and Other maps directly onto speaker accountability: at a point where the discourse is highly Self-oriented, the speaker is also highly accountable for any information communicated. When the speaker makes manifest the voice of the Other to a high degree, the speaker's own accountability is minimised and the Other assumes accountability for the information communicated. At this point, I only want to introduce the idea of discourse voice as a scalar concept; an in-depth discussion is deferred to Chapter 3.

## 2.4 Metadiscourse – unnecessary umbrella term or useful communicative concept?

In this section, I introduce the term metadiscourse. The section is divided into two sub-sections. In the first one, I address what metadiscourse is by providing examples from my corpus and by looking at how previous studies have used the term. In the next sub-section, I provide a definition of metadiscourse as it is used in this thesis and I indicate how I think metadiscourse is important for a discussion of knowledge statements and accountability.

### 2.4.1 Metadiscourse – what is it and what use is it to us?

To illustrate what counts as metadiscourse, or more appropriately, as the linguistic manifestation of metadiscourse, consider the utterances in (29)-(31), all of which contain the knowledge stating verb *suggest*. Potential metadiscourse elements have been underlined.

- (29) Furthermore, given that it is the subject pronoun which is undergoing grammaticalization and eventual reanalysis as an agreement affix in such situations, it is fairly natural to suggest that the pronoun member of the pronoun/NP pair is essentially the older element in the concord situation. (LIT)
- (30) In other words, the intact LH should be sufficient to resolve ambiguity, though the present findings would suggest otherwise. (LING)
- (31) It is obvious enough why Shakespeare might have thought of Abraham and Isaac while writing this scene of King John, but it is the close comparison with The

Troublesome Raigne which strongly suggests a familiarity with the cycle plays' treatment of the story. (LIT)

All three utterances contain several elements whose main purpose is not to inform the addressee about any situation in a real or imagined world, but to function as indicators of how the utterance or what is said through the utterance fits in with previous utterances (*furthermore, in other words, though, but*); the speaker's attitude towards what is being said (*naturally, essentially, obvious*); or how sure the speaker is of things said (*fairly, should, would, might, strongly*).<sup>40</sup> One of the main functions of metadiscourse is to act as an interpersonal element in communication by facilitating the addressees' proper interpretation of what is being communicated and acknowledging a relationship between speakers and addressees.

I do not believe that metadiscourse should be viewed only as a piece of commentary and language without metadiscourse would be perceived of as impoverished and difficult to make any sense of. Luckily, we are rarely forced into a communicative situation that completely lacks a cooperative co-communicator with whose help we can negotiate our way through communication. Cooperative co-communicators accommodate our conversational needs by telling us how a particular piece of text connects to another part of this or another text and tells us their views on the topic at hand, e.g. whether the information is credible, bad, interesting or surprising, so that we can evaluate it properly. In short, they are someone we can interact with effectively and build a discourse relationship with. Needless

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<sup>40</sup> On my view, metadiscourse is primarily an abstract concept that denotes both a speaker-internal or mental dimension *and* a meta-dimension of the communication taking place between the speaker and his audience (for a related discussion of "metalanguage" as object and "metalanguage" as a *dimension* of language, see Verschueren 2000). However, there are also metadiscourse *elements* in language and these are the linguistic signposts of metadiscourse (as a mental but real concept). These metadiscourse elements *are* not metadiscourse, they are only overt evidence of its existence. To draw a parallel to another framework many will be familiar with, metadiscourse elements are similar to illocutionary force indicators. Illocutionary force indicators do not *constitute* the illocution, but signal its presence. The illocution as such, however, is internal to the speaker (and eventually perhaps also to the hearer), and so is metadiscourse. This is not to say that interlocutors could not share metadiscourse concepts with each other – this is an issue I return to in Chapter 5. Metadiscourse is also sometimes used to refer to what could be called "metatext", i.e. more narrowly limited to the organisation of the text (e.g. Mauranen 1993, Bunton 1999). For a good overview of the different uses of the terms metadiscourse and metatext and a discussion of the associated broader and more narrow characterisations of metadiscourse (e.g. metadiscourse as discourse, self-reflexive as well as interpersonal or metadiscourse more strictly concerned with textual reflexive aspects of a meta(textual)dimension), see Ädel (2006).

to say, for communication in an academic setting, metadiscourse is crucial, especially given the special characteristics of academic discourse.<sup>41</sup>

Many previous accounts of metadiscourse are less than precise in defining the concept, a concept often perceived as fuzzy and allowing for open-ended categorisations. Swales says that “although the concept of metadiscourse is easy enough to accept in principle, it is much more difficult to establish its boundaries” (1990: 188).

The term “metadiscourse” was coined in the late 1950s, but more recent and focused attention was devoted to this area during the early 1980s. Williams (1981: 211-212) talks about metadiscourse as: “[...] writing about writing, whatever does not refer to the subject matter being addressed”. The definition suggested by Crismore (1983: 2) also needs a bit more explanation: “the author’s intrusion into the discourse, either explicitly or non-explicitly, to direct rather than inform”. In another of the early influential writings on the topic, Vande Kopple writes that metadiscourse is “discourse about discourse or communication about communication” (1985: 83) (compare Verschueren’s idea of “metalanguage as an identifiable object” 2000: 440). Drawing on earlier work by Lautamatti (1978) and Williams (1981), Vande Kopple (1985) lists seven kinds of metadiscourse (*text connectives, code glosses, illocution markers, validity markers, narrators, epistemology markers and commentary*), but perhaps it is more appropriate to talk about these types in terms of their functional characterisation (and in his 2002 work a more economic taxonomy is offered). The taxonomies offered by Vande Kopple (1985, 2002) have remained the cornerstones of nearly all later taxonomies of metadiscourse (compare, for example, Vande

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<sup>41</sup> There have been few controlled experimental studies on the effects or non-effects of metadiscourse, i.e. what metadiscourse contributes to a text or a piece of discourse. Ifantidou (2005) is an exception (Crismore & Vande Kopple 1988; 1997 also look into the relationship between aspects of metadiscourse and effects on learners). The very last part of Ifantidou (2005) contains an experiment where informants were subjected to two different short pieces of academic text, one text lacking any additional, superfluous material, as in (i), and the other with such material, as in (ii) (the example in (ii) comes from the HAT corpus).

(i) The crossmodal binding in the human brain is achieved by the synchronized processing.

(ii) It is possible to plausibly argue that the crossmodal binding in the human brain may be achieved by the synchronized processing. (LING)

Informants were asked which text they found most readable and comprehensible. The questionnaire contained questions like “Which text is more effective in communicating its message?” The “superfluous material” the study aimed at investigating consisted of various metadiscourse elements. Informants opted in most cases for the text that contained metadiscourse elements and it was clear that their presence led to easier comprehension of the intended message in the text. However, as noted by Mauranen (1993), this has not stopped people from discouraging the use of metadiscourse elements as part of, for example, university academic writing classes.

Kopple's categorisation with Hyland & Tse 2004 or Hyland 2005a).<sup>42</sup> The taxonomy employed by Hyland is introduced in 3.3.

Importantly, Vande Kopple points to the multifunctionality involved, both at a descriptive and at an actual discourse functional level, and emphasises that context boundedness has to be taken into account in an interpretation of expressions to which we assign a metadiscourse label (1985: 83-85, 2002: 102-103).

Finally, it should be noted that metadiscourse has not escaped the scrutiny of Speech Act theorists. Beauvais (1989: 15) talks about metadiscourse as "illocutionary force indicators that identify expositive illocutionary acts". Beauvais is not the first scholar to suggest that Speech Act Theory is potentially suitable as a model for explaining metadiscourse phenomena. Vande Kopple (1982: 51) says that the notion of metadiscourse "calls attention to the speech act itself, often marking stages in the development of the primary discourse, displaying the author's position on the primary discourse, or molding the reader's attitude about the primary discourse". Crismore (1985: 11) also talks about metadiscourse as calling "attention to the communicative speech act itself [seeking ] to engage the reader as an active human being, and [signalling] the presence of the author". Beauvais claims that most scholars of metadiscourse acknowledge, at least indirectly, the theoretical debt that an overall theory of metadiscourse owes to aspects of Speech Act Theory or at least that certain connections exist at a structural or formal level.

Beauvais (1989: 14) notes that there is agreement on what a theory of metadiscourse must include: "categories that identify the roles that a writer and a reader play in using a text as a communicative medium. These categories must account for specific references in the text to the writer and reader, and the categories must also identify the communicative functions that passages of metadiscourse serve". Obviously, substantial aspects of this common ground have already been the focus of much discussion in previous studies and I have already hinted at the fact that functional categorisation or taxonomies features as central components in most models of metadiscourse (see e.g. Hyland & Tse 2004).

It would be tempting to group under the label of metadiscourse an abundance of linguistic concepts which, some might say, we would be better off investigating on their own: modality, evidentiality, social or textual

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<sup>42</sup> Hyland (2005a) offers a very good general overview of previous research in the field of metadiscourse. The multi-faceted character of the concept is emphasised by the multitude of approaches attempted, some of which were touched upon earlier. See also Hyland & Tse (2004: 158) for a very succinct presentation of the areas of research in which metadiscourse has proven a useful concept.

deixis, mood, etc. Much of the criticism of the notion of metadiscourse has focused on the fact that it is too broad of an umbrella term and fails to provide us with any deeper understanding of the concepts and notions it encompasses.

If 'metadiscourse' is used only as a convenient taxonomic label, I agree with this view. It seems pointless to redefine various areas traditionally treated under other headings in linguistic fields were it only for the discovery that a number of linguistic items share a certain potential in terms of the role they play in the discourse. As Ifantidou (2005: 1330) puts it, "unless one provides a proper pragmatic framework for such claims, they merely represent a collection of more or less interesting views on the pragmatics of metadiscourse, while failing to provide a coherent overall account of its essential contribution to the interpretation process". However, we could extend the scope of inquiry beyond a categorisation of linguistic items and devote attention to what is in the discourse, what it is that these features of metadiscourse share in terms of functional potential and why this is so. In that case, a detailed study may offer us far more in terms of systematicity of treatment of these functions and may allow us to (re-)discover links and interrelations among the linguistic phenomena the notion of metadiscourse brings out. Such a broad perspective has presumably also been the main rationale behind some of the more ambitious studies of metadiscourse. For example, Hyland's (2005a) strong emphasis on the social aspects of metadiscourse has contributed greatly to a more credible and intuitively appealing notion of metadiscourse as a concept worthy of study.

#### **2.4.2 Defining metadiscourse for present purposes**

Throughout this thesis, numerous references will be made to the model of metadiscourse offered by Hyland (2005a), which is the most ambitious and comprehensive account of metadiscourse to date. Parts of the model will be introduced throughout, but a brief discussion of the basic assumptions of Hyland (2005a) will help provide the necessary background. Hyland defines metadiscourse in the following way:

Metadiscourse is the cover term for the self-reflective expressions used to negotiate interactional meanings in a text, assisting the writer (or speaker) to express a viewpoint and engage with readers as members of a particular community. (37)

He also says that

metadiscourse thus offers a framework for understanding communication as social engagement. It illuminates some aspects of how we project ourselves into our discourses by signalling our attitude towards both the content and the audience of the text (2005a: 4)

In the introduction to his seminal work on metadiscourse, Hyland (2005a) says that the term refers to “an interesting [...] approach to conceptualizing interactions between text producers and their texts and between text producers and users”.

While I endorse the definition provided by Hyland (2005a), I will refer to metadiscourse as that aspect of the utterance through which speakers themselves highlight or refer not to a situation in a real or imagined world – not knowledge content – but to things said or done in the discourse about other things said or done in the discourse.

I take metadiscourse to operate simultaneously to “ordinary” discourse. I also take it to be conducive for a complete and proper understanding of the text as part of the discourse as a whole. Metadiscourse thus refers to a speakers’ interaction with their discourse through comments and statements about it, but it also highlights an interpersonal dimension of communication. It highlights speakers’ desire to facilitate an addressee’s interpretation of a discourse or serves as an indirect acknowledgement of the addressee as a partner in communication.

This view can be compared to ideas proposed in favour of a double speech act analysis (touched upon in 2.1.1). Regarding the relationship between what I call the knowledge content (corresponding to the “proposition”) and the knowledge statement clause (the reporting clause), Mittwoch says that it “is not one of super-ordination versus subordination, with the rest of the sentence embedded under the performative clause, but one of juxtaposition or parenthesis” (1977: 177). What he says would apply equally well to main clause uses of a knowledge stating verb as in genuine parentheticals. Consider also Haegeman’s statement that on many occasions a parenthetical clause (in my case the knowledge stating clause) “does not modify the propositional content of the adjacent clause [...]”. Rather the sentence is [...] “metalinguistic”. The speaker qualifies the speech act [as such]” (1991: 106). Both of these claims, although aimed at capturing genuine parentheticals, offer additional support for the view of metadiscourse advocated in this thesis – that metadiscourse operates both over and above the information communicated by the knowledge contents, but that it is also intimately intertwined with the overall meaning of the utterance as part of the discourse. It is the task of metadiscourse to facilitate the retrieval of the speaker’s intended message; through metadis-

course the speaker secures, or at least attempts to increase the chances for, successful understanding and interaction in communication.

Having introduced metadiscourse in general terms (and somewhat provisionally), it is clear that it is important for all kinds of language, and certainly in connection to knowledge statements and knowledge stating verbs (which themselves are considered metadiscourse elements). In the next chapter, we will see that metadiscourse is also a crucial parameter for the manifestation of discourse voice and the consequent assignment of accountability. First, however, I would like to briefly discuss Appraisal Theory, a framework whose interest in the metafunctions of language intersect with that of a theory of metadiscourse.

### 2.4.3 Metadiscourse and Appraisal Theory

Objectives and concerns resembling those underlying any theory of metadiscourse can be found also in Appraisal Theory (see e.g. Martin 2001, Martin & Rose 2003, Martin & White 2005, and Appraisal Website: <http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/>: accessed on September 20, 2007). Appraisal Theory has been described as “[...] a particular approach to exploring, describing and explaining the way language is used to evaluate, to adopt stances, to construct textual personas and to manage interpersonal positionings and relationships” (Appraisal Website, see also Martin 2001: 145-148). “Appraisal” has been used “as a cover-all term to encompass all evaluative uses of language, including those by which speakers/writers adopt particular value positions or stances and by which they negotiate stances with either actual or potential respondents” (Appraisal Website). Appraisal Theory shows significant dependence on ideas of dialogism (Bakhtin 1986). Advocates of Appraisal Theory hold that “all utterances to some degree take into account or respond to prior utterances, and, to some degree, anticipate or acknowledge likely responses, reactions and objections from actual or potential dialogic partners” (Appraisal Website). In White’s (2006) terms: “to speak or write is always to reveal the influence of, refer to, or to take up in some way, what has been said/written before, and simultaneously to anticipate the responses of actual, potential or imagined readers/listeners” (190). The dialogicity of communication is overall more emphasised in Appraisal Theory than in any of the studies of metadiscourse I have come into contact with. This makes Appraisal Theory interesting also for anyone wishing to introduce and establish dialogism as an important component in the description of metadiscourse phenom-



ena. The dialogic aspect of metadiscourse will be particularly important in connection with the discussion of accountability as a metadiscourse phenomenon in Chapter 5.

On several occasions in this thesis, I draw on ideas developed simultaneously in both theories of metadiscourse and Appraisal Theory. There are other theoretical similarities between a theory of metadiscourse and Appraisal Theory. For one thing, Appraisal Theory and metadiscourse theory are in agreement on the overarching interactional or interpersonal character of communication. This allows for cross-fertilisation of ideas. Although I subscribe to a general theory of metadiscourse, this should not be interpreted so narrowly as to exclude a theoretical debt to findings and suggestions emanating from Appraisal Theory. I hope the present study will be useful to scholars from both approaches.



# Speaker accountability and discourse voice

## 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I address the first research question posed in Chapter 1:

1. What is it in an utterance containing knowledge stating verbs that affects the manifestation of accountability?

I work under the assumption that the manifestation of speaker accountability is affected by the degree to which a speaker or someone else is “present” in the discourse at any point, i.e. the degree of discourse voice manifestation (as described in Section 2.3). By this I mean that depending on the dominant discourse voice in the utterance (Self or Other) and the way that discourse voice is manifested, the speaker conveys a certain degree of accountability for the information communicated in the utterance (i.e. the knowledge content). I thus approach the concept of speaker accountability from the point of view of discourse voice.

I begin by discussing the connection between discourse voice and speaker accountability from a general point of view and suggest that both should be thought of as being scalar concepts and that the dominant discourse voice maps directly onto speaker accountability. I then turn to what it is in the discourse that determines which discourse voice becomes dominantly manifest, the main issue in this chapter. The approach adopted is that discourse voice is manifested primarily through three aspects of the utterance: (i) additional metadiscourse (in addition to the knowledge stating verb itself), (ii) citation management and (iii) the staging of the utterance (foregrounding and backgrounding of the speaker, Other, or something else).

Metadiscourse features, citations practices and the staging of the utterance are discussed in 3.3-3.5. In Section 3.6, I return to the mapping between discourse voice and speaker accountability and propose a model for describing how a discourse voice is made manifest to a certain degree and how it affects the degree of speaker accountability associated with that utterance. The proposed model is used as the theoretical basis for the corpus investigation in Chapter 4. The chapter ends with a summary in 3.7.

## 3.2 Linking discourse voice and speaker accountability – the preliminary argument

In this section, I claim that speaker accountability is affected by the degree of discourse voice manifestation, i.e. directly related to discourse voice. I introduce the idea that three aspects of an utterance are crucial in the manifestation of discourse voice and in determining the degree to which a dominant discourse voice is made manifest. I start out by introducing the assumption that the discourse voices of Self and Other can be conceived of in terms of degree.

### 3.2.1 Degree of discourse voice and degree of speaker accountability

The discourse voice of Self is not made manifest to the same degree in all discourse contexts (see (32) and (33)); the same appears to be true for utterances in which Other is made manifest (see (34) and (35)).

- (32) I **believe** this marriage symbolizes the reunion of Puritan and Catholic which was one of James I's major policy goals. (LIT) → Self-manifestation
- (33) Thus while it is reasonable to **assume** that the instances of *ne* deletion found in the children's speech were largely developmental, it is possible that such instances could, to some extent, reflect the speech that the children were (presumably) most consistently exposed to. (LING) → Self-manifestation

In (32) the speaker appears to be present in the discourse to a greater extent than in (33) by virtue of the Self-introduction through the first person pronoun (*I*). There should be no doubt in the addressee's mind about who is making the knowledge statement, whose voice is "heard" in relation to the knowledge content. While it should be clear from the context that the

speaker is doing the assuming in (33), the speaker is visibly present only through the qualifying expressions in the utterance (*reasonable* or *presumably*) and possibly also indirectly through the impersonal strategy adopted (*...it is reasonable to assume...*). While both (32) and (33) make Self manifest, (32) does it to a higher degree because of the Self-introduced speaker. Consider (34) and (35) for examples of Other-manifestation.

- (34) Keen **argues** that such conservative faith in the king amounts to the “greatest deception of the agrarian public” (1995 p. 23). (LIT) → Other-manifestation
- (35) It was subsequently **proposed** that LH regions that subserve speech perception may be fundamentally specialized for the processing of rapidly changing acoustic information (Tallal, Miller, & Fitch, 1993). (LING) → Other-manifestation

In (34), Other features as the grammatical subject of the utterance and the utterance also contains an element of direct quotation, i.e. even the words of Other are transposed to the speaker’s utterance and the current speaker is clearly marginalised. This is not the case in (35). Here the knowledge content is ascribed to someone Other than the speaker, the “proposers” in the parenthesis at the end of the utterance, but these sources of the knowledge content are backgrounded because of the impersonal construction. Because they are not awarded an overt grammatical role, it is more difficult to decide who is actually making the knowledge statement. In cases like (35), the line between Self and Other is blurred and the discourse voice is more difficult to specify for the addressee.

Fløttum et al. (2006: 81) say that “behind every utterance in a text, there is a responsible locutor, corresponding to the author(s) of the text [...]”.<sup>43</sup> The argument I want to pursue about the link between discourse voice and speaker accountability takes its point of departure from previous research on reporting language. For example, Hunston (1995) notes that “[...] the responsibility for the veracity of a statement is transferred when the statement is attributed” (1995: 134). Tadros (1993), drawing on Sinclair (1988), appears to adhere to the same line of thinking: attribution to

<sup>43</sup> Note that this statement is qualified later on in their work in a discussion on verb variation patterns in connection to references to Other-sources (i.e. bibliographical citations): there the claim is that depending on the factive/non-factive nature of the reporting (knowledge stating) verb, the speaker can be claimed to enter into a relationship of responsibility or “non-responsibility” (2006: 234) with the knowledge content of the utterance. With factive verbs, when used “reportingly”, as in *Smith (2000) realised that...*, the author indicates that the proposition reported is one he or she is clearly taking into account; “the author is adopting the other’s observation [...] and this non-responsibility seems weakened” (2006: 234). Conversely, for non-factive verbs used reportingly, e.g. *Smith argued that...*, they claim “that there is a clear non-responsibility between author (self) and represented researcher (other)” (2006: 234) and one must presume that this non-responsibility includes also the knowledge content. These claims receive support in Perrin (2003, 2004a, 2004b and 2005, referenced by Fløttum et al. 2006).

another source implies transfer of responsibility.<sup>44</sup> Thompson & Ye (1991) is partly in agreement with these claims, arguing that responsibility is usually ascribed to the original source in cases of reporting of previous research.<sup>45</sup> In addition, although this claim is later qualified and nuanced so it agrees with my view allowing for degrees of transfer, Groom (2000: 18) claims for some instances of reporting that references to other sources have the effect of “transferring the responsibility for the attributed proposition completely onto the antecedent author”. Finally, recall the claim made by Bondi & Silver as regards the distinction between averral and attribution: “Averral is the default condition of a text, where the reader can assume that the responsibility for each proposition lies with the speaker or writer” (2004: 117). Here too, there is a clear implication that responsibility for knowledge contents is an either/or thing.<sup>46</sup> There have been suggestions in the literature to the effect that speakers sometimes accept partial responsibility either for averred or attributed information (see e.g. Hunston 2000 who offers a slightly different way of thinking about responsibility than Hunston 1995 and, as mentioned Groom 2000 who allows for a “sharing” of “propositional responsibility”).

All of these claims have clear implications for the relationship between discourse voice and speaker accountability – as soon as reference is made to another source, regardless, it seems, of the way such attribution is made, that source has to assume responsibility for the knowledge content and the onus of accountability is no longer on the speaker.

I have two objections to such assumptions. First, reference to other sources does not always imply complete transfer of accountability. Second, the reverse assumption, that reference to Self should always imply complete accountability, is unfortunate. Just as with discourse voice, it seems natural to assume that speakers can be held accountable for utterances to

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<sup>44</sup> See also Charles (2006) for a similar discussion, but note her allusion to an alternative to the either/or notion of responsibility in discussing reporting clauses with non-human subjects: “the use of a [non-human subject] does allow the writer to retain *some* responsibility” (2006: 501, emphasis added)

<sup>45</sup> However, their distinction between “author acts” and “writer acts” should be noted. For writer acts, the speaker of the utterance retains responsibility: “responsibility is ascribed, as it were, covertly to the reporting writer” (1991: 370). For author acts, the responsibility is “ascribed to the author, perhaps indirectly via his text or his research” (1991: 370). This, I believe, is uncontroversial. The point I want to make is that, when it comes to the assignment of responsibility between the speaker and the original source, the line is not clear. This applies to both straightforward instances of reporting “back to” the original source and to instances that are clearly more Self-oriented.

<sup>46</sup> Since all of the knowledge stating verbs I consider are non-factive, the proposal made by Fløttum et al. (2006) and referred to in a previous footnote must be taken to be in agreement with Tadros (1993), Hunston (1995), Groom (2000), and Bondi & Silver (2004): by virtue of being non-factive and when used reportingly (with reference to Other), the verbs signal non-responsibility on the part of the speaker. I will now take issue with this either/or approach to accountability and propose a more nuanced view.

different degrees, depending on how the utterance (and its content) is presented by the speaker.<sup>47</sup> What I am claiming is thus that for discourse voice, it is not the case that an utterance necessarily *either* manifests Self *or* manifests Other; in the case of speaker accountability, it is not the case that a speaker is necessarily *either* accountable *or* not accountable. Rather, in any given utterance, the voice of Self or Other can be promoted to different degrees and speakers can be held accountable to different degrees, depending on the discourse voice expressed and the degree to which it is made manifest. Speakers can exploit this scalarity and the notion of speaker accountability for strategic communicative purposes by varying the degree of transfer of accountability through discourse voice modulations.

This view is hardly controversial. After all, it seems natural that if it is the speaker's voice the addressee "hears" in relation to the knowledge content, and if the speaker is highly vocally present in the utterance, the speaker must assume accountability for the knowledge content by virtue of being the only available source for that knowledge content. It should be equally natural to say that if it is not the speaker's voice the addressee "hears", or if it is clear that the speaker's voice is in some sense subdued or the speaker is more absent, the accountability requirement is set lower.

Figure 3.1 illustrates provisionally how I portray the relationship between discourse voice(s) and accountability. When the degree of Self-manifestation is high, the speaker (the current speaker) is also accountable to a high degree. When Self is made manifest to a lower degree, the referent of Self is also accountable to a lower degree. On the other end of the scale, we see that when the voice of someone other than the speaker (Other) is made manifest to a high degree, the speaker must be taken to be minimally accountable; in those instances, the speaker is almost completely absent from the discourse in the knowledge statement, i.e. the voice of the speaker is not heard or it is heard only very marginally. Finally, when the voice of the Other is made manifest to a lower degree, but it is clear that the utterance makes manifest the voice of Other, the degree of speaker accountability could be taken to be intermediate but on the lower end of the scale. I return to the mapping between discourse voice and speaker accountability in detail in section 3.6.

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<sup>47</sup> A similar view is evident in Charles (2006).




Figure 3.1 The scalar nature of discourse voice manifestation mapped onto a scale of speaker accountability

As mentioned earlier, some scholars have offered a more nuanced view of accountability assignment than the either/or approach. Hunston (2000) offers an interesting model, drawing partly on Sinclair's 1986 "planes of discourse", where speakers themselves must assume accountability when they act as the source but *to different degrees* depending on whether we are dealing with straightforward cases of averral or whether the source (still the speaker) is "emphasized" or "hidden". In cases of attribution to Other, Hunston claims that responsibility can be "delegated" as "in prototypical cases of attribution" (2000: 191) or "reclaimed", which I take to involve cases of non-prototypical attribution, i.e. when the link to the Other is textually or contextually obscured in some way.

The problem with Hunston's (2000) model is that it is unnecessarily complex if you are only interested in accountability. Hunston makes claims for evaluation as a much broader concept and takes evaluation to be at the heart of reporting phenomena (though involving accountability/responsibility). Nevertheless, I think that we are trying to show the same thing – that issues of accountability distribution are highly complex and not as straightforward as some scholars have assumed.

Another alternative solution to the contested either/or concept of accountability distribution is offered by advocates of Appraisal Theory (see



Martin 2001, Martin & Rose 2003, Martin & White 2005 and Appraisal Website <http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/>: accessed on September 29, 2007). Using the concepts of intra-vocalisation (“the internal voice of the speaker or writer” vocalised in the text) and extra-vocalisation (“the inclusion in the text of some explicitly external voice”), responsibility is described so that under intra-vocalisation, the “responsibility for arguability is text internal – it remains with the internal authorial voice”; under extra-vocalisation “responsibility for the arguability of the proposition is assigned to some external voice, typically some attributed voice” (<http://www.grammatics.com/appraisal/>: accessed on September 29, 2007). This view is similar to the either/or notion illustrated earlier, but Appraisal Theory constitutes an important exception to this general view in that it also acknowledges that the distinction between intra- and extra-vocalisation is “not always so clear-cut”. Utterances may contain elements of both intra- and extra-vocalisation and this is said to give rise to multiple dialogicity, yielding utterances the responsibility for which “is ascribed to both the inner and the outer voice”. It is worth noting that what Appraisal Theory calls “hearsay” causes some problems in terms of explaining exactly how accountability distribution is managed; the only explanation we get is that “the situation remains unclear as to whether responsibility for the utterance lies with the inner or the outer voice”. I claim that this ambiguity can be resolved by drawing on the notion of discourse voice and that we can assign responsibility based on the degree to which a certain discourse voice is made manifest.

An important caveat in connection to this is that it has been repeatedly suggested in the literature (e.g. Thompson & Ye 1991, Fløttum et al. 2006: 83-87; see also Vassileva 1998) that attribution to another source always includes an element of epistemic evaluation on the part of the speaker (recall also the dictionary entries for the knowledge stating verbs introduced in Chapter 1). On this view, for example, an utterance such as *Smith (2000) suggests that there is a Swedish middle construction* would involve an epistemic qualification by the *current speaker* of the knowledge content because of the choice of knowledge stating verb. This means that the speaker’s choice of a knowledge stating verb merely has the effect of putting “forward an idea for [others] to think about” (see Chapter 1) rather than serving as a strong affirmation of the knowledge contents. Although I acknowledge that an *element* of qualification or evaluation may always be potentially involved (especially in cases of Self-manifestation), my own reasoning is more in line with Crompton (1997) who is reluctant to ascribe this quali-

fication to the speaker.<sup>48</sup> Prince et al. (1982: 89) says for reporting that “the speaker’s own degree of commitment is only indirectly inferable”. Crompton (1997) claims that the use of a knowledge stating verb in cases of attribution to Other is not hedging. He refers to such a verb simply as “reporting”: “The use of any kind of reporting verb only counts as a hedge if authors have elected to use them to report their own proposition; thus, for example, ‘I suggest that pigs fly’ would be regarded as a hedged version of ‘Pigs fly’, whereas ‘Smith suggests that pigs fly’ would not” (1997: 283). Translated into discourse voice terminology, this means that when the utterance involves Self-manifestation, hedging may be involved, but when we are dealing with Other-manifestation, it is not. This has important implications for the issue of accountability. I am arguing that a higher degree of accountability is ascribed to the speaker primarily in cases of Self-manifestation. This means that when utterances are hedged, the speaker assumes accountability for the origin of the knowledge content. Conversely, when utterances make manifest Other, i.e. when they are non-hedged, accountability is ascribed to Other. It is also worth mentioning that Thompson & Ye (1991: 372) say that when a *non*-factive verb is used as a reporting verb, “the writer gives no clear signal as to her attitude towards the author’s [the Other’s] information/opinion”. Since all of the knowledge stating verbs investigated are non-factive, evaluation is, if not cancelled, at least minimized.

We have to be careful not to equate speaker commitment and speaker accountability. Speakers can be accountable for the origin of the knowledge content they are asserting without being fully committed to it. Similarly, speakers can be fully committed to knowledge content attributed to Other without being very accountable.<sup>49</sup> For example, a speaker may issue the knowledge statement *We will tentatively suggest that there is a Swedish middle construction*; by virtue of being the source of the knowledge content and overtly signalling this through speaker presence in the utterance via the first person pronoun, the speaker is accountable for the knowledge content. However, the hedging of the knowledge content through the use of the future tense, the adverb *tentatively* and the knowledge stating verb *suggest*, which serves a double hedging function in this utterance, makes the

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<sup>48</sup> Although Crompton (1997) is primarily concerned with hedging, his reasoning is applicable here as well.

<sup>49</sup> This view is supported by the characterisation of hedging provided in Chapter 2. There I claimed, drawing on a number of sources, that it is not always the primary function of hedges or expressions of epistemic modality to signal lack of commitment. Therefore, criticism along the line that “If a speaker is not committed to the knowledge content of the utterance and this is overtly signalled through hedging, he cannot be held accountable” is unfounded.

speaker less committed than when simply stating that *There is a Swedish middle construction*. Having said that, and without venturing into a detailed theoretical discussion about knowledge stating verbs and issues of speaker commitment, speakers arguably attach a certain default “strength” of commitment to knowledge stating verbs. This was briefly discussed in Chapter 2.

A few comments by Crismore & Vande Kopple (1997) may further illustrate the complexity of the relationship between commitment and accountability. The authors say that hedging expressions like *I think that* or *perhaps* “signal a tentative or cautious assessment of the truth of propositions. In so doing, they reduce the [...] responsibility that they [speakers] might face in expressing the proposition” (1997: 84). Later on, Crismore & Vande Kopple says that “hedges can keep prose responsible” (1997: 86). I have been unable to track the original source of this statement, but it may well be interpreted so that the speakers’ presence in the discourse through hedging also has the effect of re-confirming *their* onus of accountability. This contradicts their earlier claim and supports the argument I am making in this thesis.

It is important to remember that the addressee is always entitled to ascribe accountability to *some* source of knowledge. However, it is not always clear who is accountable at any point in an utterance; in a more extensive stretch of discourse, if accountability is not clearly signalled, it can usually be contextually inferred from default assumption that anything not ascribed to anyone else is speaker averred – this does not, however, mean that the averring speaker is committed.

### **3.2.2 A first look at aspects affecting discourse voice orientation – the metadiscourse of the utterance, citation practices and the staging of the utterance**

Let us now consider a more extensive example which should illustrate how a speaker’s voice can go from being “heard” to almost not being heard and, conversely, how the voice of the Other can be completely absent or severely marginalised compared to a point where it has almost completely taken over the communicative situation. Under the assumption outlined earlier, the speaker becomes less accountable for the veracity of the knowledge content when the speaker’s “connection” as the maker of the knowledge statement and the knowledge content becomes less and less obvious through voice subduing and the gradual “making absent” of the speaker.

## Speaker accountability

High accountability

- (a) I argue that this is a lower-level phenomenon.
- (b) I would like to argue that this is a lower-level phenomenon.
- (c) It is possible to claim that this is a lower-level phenomenon.
- (d) One could argue that this is a lower-level phenomenon.
- (e) These findings suggest that this may be a lower-level phenomenon.
- (f) It is commonly proposed that this is a lower-level phenomenon.
- (g) It is believed that this is a lower-level phenomenon (Smith 2006).
- (h) Smith (2006) believes that this is a lower-level phenomenon.
- (i) Smith believes that “this is a lower-level phenomenon” (2006: 20).

Low accountability



This list of examples shows that several aspects of an utterance must be considered in order to explain what leads to the possible interpretation of that utterance as making manifest either Self or Other and the degree to which this manifestation is taken to hold. Let us consider some authentic examples from the HAT corpus in order to analyse which aspects of an utterance could contribute to discourse voice manifestation.<sup>50</sup> Keeping in mind the characterisation of discourse voice from Chapter 2, we should try to identify potential discourse traces of either the current speaker (Self) or someone else (Other); their relative presence or absence in the discourse at the relevant point.

- (36) Nevertheless, we confidently believe that a consideration of the developmental cycle argued for here may provide a useful new way of thinking about these old problems and may also lead to rather different and potentially interesting answers. (LING)

The most conspicuous trace of the speaker in (36) is probably the Self-introduction via the first person pronoun *we* in a clausally foregrounded position. It is not possible for a speaker to Self-orient an utterance in a more explicit way than by appearing in person in the utterance itself as the explicit maker of the knowledge statement. The initiating transition marker, *nevertheless*, signals a contrasting statement and is also clearly a stepping

<sup>50</sup> Utterances (a)-(i) are not discussed any further here. It should be noted, however, that I am not assuming that any distinctions in terms of discourse voice manifestation in (a)-(i) are always reflected as strict boundaries between different degrees of speaker accountability.

into the discourse by the speaker, though this time not in person but as an implicit guide who points out to the addressee that what follows stands in contrast to what has just been said. The attitude markers *confidently*, *useful*, *new* and *interesting* as well as the modal auxiliary *may* all constitute qualifications of information in the utterance on the part of the speaker; this is again the speaker intruding in the discourse.

- (37) It is possible to plausibly argue that the crossmodal binding in the human brain may be achieved by the synchronized processing of sensory inputs between the unimodal cortical areas (see reviews, Phillips & Singer, 1997; Salinas & Sejnowski, 2001), rather than in so-called convergence regions of the cortex. (LING)

In terms of qualification, this utterance (37) is among the extreme examples in the HAT corpus; consider both *possible* and *plausibly*, and in such proximity of each other, followed by modal *may*. In this utterance, there is no overt in-person trace of the speaker; rather, the construction signals some distancing from the knowledge content. Taken together with the overall hedged character of the utterance, this impersonalisation leads to a clear expression of tentativeness. Moreover, the overt introduction of Other-sources in the ensuing parenthesis also diminishes the degree of Self-orientation and introduces a marginal degree of Other-orientation. The fact that the two bibliographical citations are followed by a transition in the form of *rather* has the effect of re-introducing and re-affirming the speaker (Self) in the utterance. However, all of this taken together reveals a somewhat lower degree of Self-orientation and, as mentioned, an increase in the degree of Other-orientation.

- (38) In contrast, Bakan (Bakan, 1971, 1987; Bakan, Dibb, & Reed, 1973) **proposes** that all left-handedness is pathological. (LING)

The utterance in (38) starts out with an element that must be judged as Self-oriented, the transitory element *in contrast*, signalling that what is to come stands in contrast to what has been said previously. However, after that, there are no more overt traces of Self in this utterance. The Other has assumed the role of grammatical subject/“proposer” and the knowledge content is ascribed to Other (albeit in the form of indirect speech). I would say that this utterance makes manifest the voice of Other.

### 3.2.3 Summary

This section has criticised earlier claims that attribution to another source always equals a complete transfer of accountability and that speakers should always be completely accountable for utterances that are averred. I argue that there is a connection between the degree to which speakers are “present” in an utterance and the degree of accountability they must assume and emphasise that this must be thought of as a scalar rather than as an either/or phenomenon.

Speakers can orient the discourse towards the voice of Self or Other through strategic choices based on textual as well as pragmatic considerations, often in combination; these choices lead to scalar interpretations of discourse voice and speaker accountability. At least three major aspects of the utterance will be assumed to be important for the manifestation of discourse voice:<sup>51</sup> (i) the metadiscourse of the utterance in question, (ii) citation practices, and (iii) the staging of the utterance in terms of foregrounding or backgrounding of the speaker, the Other(s), or information in the utterance. Figure 3.2 is as a development of Figure 3.1 and shows how the speaker’s concerns with these three aspects of the utterance are crucial for the degree of discourse voice manifestation. In Section 3.6, I return to the issue of how these different aspects of the utterance affect the degree of discourse voice and to the mapping relationship between discourse voice and speaker accountability.




Figure 3.2 The relationship between aspects of the utterance, discourse voice manifestation and accountability

<sup>51</sup> Thus, there may well be other aspects of the utterance that are also important, but they will not be considered here.

The next three sections will focus on the metadiscourse of the knowledge statement, the citation practices adopted by the speaker and the staging of the utterance.

### 3.3 Metadiscourse and metadiscourse elements affecting discourse voice

In this section, I claim that one of the primary mechanisms underlying the notion of discourse voice (see Section 2.3) is the metadiscourse of an utterance. The concept of metadiscourse was introduced in Section 2.4 and will not be dealt with any further here. The aim of this section is to show how the metadiscourse of an utterance directly relates to discourse voice orientation.

I have adopted the basic categorisation of metadiscourse proposed by Hyland (2005a). This is not to say that other aspects of the utterance, aspects that have not been considered as such by Hyland, could not count as metadiscourse. I adopt Hyland's taxonomy because it is, in my opinion, the most updated and comprehensive one available (for another very recent account, see Ädel 2006).

In Chapter 2, I mentioned that Hyland's concept (2005a) of metadiscourse emphasises the interpersonal functions metadiscourse serves in communication. Based on the definition provided by Hyland (2005a: 4, 37 – see Section 2.4), it should be clear that *all* metadiscourse is interpersonal; it refers directly to the discourse relationship between speakers and their addressees or, as Hyland puts it, “offers a framework for understanding communication as social engagement” (2005a: 4). I will briefly discuss the taxonomic classification proposed by Hyland for the two types of metadiscourse central to his model: the interactive and the interactional dimensions.

Table 3.1 An interpersonal model of metadiscourse (adapted from Hyland (2005a: 49))

Category	Function	Examples
<b>Interactive</b>	<b>Help to guide the reader through the text</b>	<b>Resources</b>
Transitions	Express relations between main clauses	<i>In addition, but, and, thus</i>
Frame markers	Refer to discourse acts, sequences or stages	<i>Finally, to conclude, my purpose is</i>
Endophoric markers	Refer to information in other parts of the text	<i>Noted above, see figure 2, in section X</i>
Evidentials	Refer to information from other texts	<i>According to X; Z states</i>
Code glosses	Elaborate propositional meanings	<i>Namely; for example, such as, in other words</i>
<b>Interactional</b>	<b>Involve the reader in the text</b>	<b>Resources</b>
Hedges	Withhold commitment and open dialogue	<i>Might, perhaps, possible</i>
Boosters	Emphasise certainty or close dialogue	<i>In fact, definitely, obviously</i>
Attitude markers	Express writer's attitude to proposition	<i>Unfortunately, I agree, surprisingly</i>
Self mentions	Explicit reference to author(s)	<i>I, we, my, our</i>
Engagement markers	Explicitly build relationship with reader	<i>Consider, note, you, your</i>

Hyland (2005a) makes a principled distinction between interactive and interactional metadiscourse elements. The former refers to efforts on the part of the speaker to employ language that facilitates the addressee's structural and logical perception, understanding and subsequent interpretation of an utterance and the way that utterance figures in a more extensive piece of text or discourse. All of this is done for the purpose of contributing to the overall cohesion and coherence of the larger piece of discourse. The interpersonal perspective is most saliently realised as an indirect concern for the addressee's processing of the utterance in terms of logical connections: a speaker wishes to make the addressee aware and uses such aspects of the communication as inter-clausal connections (transitions), beginnings and endings (frame markers), what has been said and what will be said (endophoric markers), linguistic signs of intertextuality (evidentials) and explanatory elaborations (code glosses).

The interactional dimension, on the other hand, is characterised by a concern for the speaker's mapping and projection of communicative self onto and into the text and discourse situation. In this case, the interpersonal perspective is most prominently brought to bear on the utterance either through an inherently dialogic perspective adopted by the speaker (through hedges) or by simultaneous alignment with the addressee either as an equal member of the discourse community (in which case a somewhat tentative stance is adopted through hedges) or by adopting a more authoritative position from which the speaker can express an attitude or stance (through attitude markers or boosters). By making their presence in



the utterance flagrantly known to the addressee (for example, through self-mentions) or by involving the addressee directly (through engagement markers), speakers interact directly with their addressees; this directness contributes to the overall establishment of a discourse relationship. If we regard these two dimensions as abstract specifications of two general kinds of metadiscourse, a particular metadiscourse element must be specified under either dimension. Of course, as has been pointed out, there is overlap.

The connection between metadiscourse and degree of discourse voice (presence in the discourse) is not arbitrary but is based on previous research. For example, in her contrastive study of the use of metadiscourse (or metatext which is the term used in that study) in English and Finnish economics papers, Mauranen (1993) noted that the lower frequency of metadiscourse in Finnish papers resulted in the Finnish writers not making “their presence explicitly felt” (1993: 16).

Let us consider the categories of metadiscourse elements Hyland (2005a) uses and see exactly how each of them brings out the speaker’s voice or promotes the voice of the Other.<sup>52</sup>

### 3.3.1 Transitions

TRANSITIONS link main clauses in the discourse. Examples include *in addition, but, thus, furthermore, equally, anyway, admittedly* and so on. Hyland says that “they signal additive, causative and contrastive relations in the writer’s thinking, expressing relationships between stretches of discourse” (2005a: 50). Transition markers are prime examples of how speakers introduce their view-point into the discourse without being present through overt references to themselves.

- (39) Nonetheless, the small number of studies limits generalizability and **suggests** that these findings should be viewed as preliminary until more studies are conducted. (LING)
- (40) The critical and theatrical fortunes of Hotspur **suggest, conversely**, that 1 Henry I’s equivocal treatment of heroism continued to exercise and even to threaten readers into the twenty-first century. (LIT)

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<sup>52</sup> I include Hyland’s taxonomy (2005a) simply to present more detailed examples of the notion of metadiscourse brought up in Chapter 2. Henceforth I am going to assume a rather simplistic distinction between metadiscourse features and will adopt a rather uncritical stance towards Hyland’s categorisation although the distinction between some of his categories of metadiscourse markers warrants more discussion (see e.g. footnote 53).

In both (39) and (40), the transition markers combine with other expressions that are likely to add to the addressee's feeling that these utterances make manifest Self: the modal *should* in (39) and the expression of qualification inherent in *equivocal* in (40).

### 3.3.2 Frame markers

FRAME MARKERS such as *finally*, *subsequently*, *first*, *next*, etc. are schematic metadiscourse elements since they explicitly refer to text or discourse structure, or indeed to the internal structure of sub-discourses such as the speaker's argument. Hyland also includes in this category elements that indicate shifts in topic (*right*, *OK*, *now*) or the speaker's discourse goals (*It is my intention to...*). He notes that in order for elements of this kind to count as elements of metadiscourse, they must refer to the discourse or the text rather than to anything grounded outside such domains: "features which order arguments in the text rather than event in [real] time" (2005a: 51). Thus, overt textual schematic references are another aspect of discourse that brings out the speaker's voice by showing who is in control of the unfolding text and overtly indicating this for the benefit of the addressee.

- (41) In conclusion, results of this meta-analytic investigation **suggest** that there appear to be no significant differences between the cerebral hemispheres on semantic interference as measured by lateralized Stroop tasks. (LING)
- (42) I will then review the publication history of Shakespeare's plays, which **suggests** that the Lord Chamberlain's Men had a coherent strategy to try to get their playwright's plays into print. (LIT)

In (41), the frame marker features as a textual guidance marker to lead the addressee onto the right track and say how things in the text fit together. The same is true of (42).

### 3.3.3 Endophoric markers

ENDOPHORIC MARKERS specifically "refer to other parts of the text" and help readers "through the discussion" (Hyland 2005a: 51). Their main function is to assist the addressee in recovering ideas or propositions expressed previously or point to ideas that will be expressed later on. If frame markers help the addressee navigate in the text, endophoric markers help the addressee navigate in the ideational stratum of the discourse, to use

Halliday's (1994) terminology. Endophoric markers include *in table 2 I noted that...*, *if you refer to the next section in the paper...*, *as noted above/below*. As a natural pendant to textual schematic references in a discourse (c.f. frame markers), it is possible to think of endophoric markers as signalling ideational schematic references and another way in which a speaker's voice is heard in the discourse.<sup>53</sup>

- (43) In the remainder of this article I **assume** that expressive items are semantically complex, and present themselves as any of these three semantic types. (LING)
- (44) But, as **suggested in the introduction**, *has she* in 5b, for example, could be the remnant of something like VP fronting. (LING)

### 3.3.4 Evidentials

It has already been pointed out (Section 2.1.2.) that, under certain circumstances, knowledge stating verbs themselves are prime examples of EVIDENTIALS in the discourse. However, knowledge stating verbs are not the only ways speakers signal the source of information for what they say (Chafe & Nichols 1986). Hyland says for evidential metadiscourse that it refers "to information from other texts" (2005a: 49) and takes as examples expressions like *according to*. Other than indirectly, evidential metadiscourse should not be thought of as being Self-oriented but rather Other-oriented: it is a way bring out to the Other and its influence on the current utterance situation.<sup>54</sup>

- (45) This transcript was taken from the years 1605 to 1611 and according to the authors this **suggests** that *ne* deletion was already prevalent in seventeenth-century spoken French. (LIT)

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<sup>53</sup> The distinction between frame markers and endophoric markers is somewhat unclear. Since it makes little difference for the present discussion, I will adhere to Hyland's (2005) taxonomy, but I would prefer to think about endophoric markers and frame markers in terms of one and the same category of *schematic markers*. Depending on the context, their ideational or textual character could be thought of as more or less foregrounded or backgrounded. Indeed, it is sometimes very difficult to say, in context, whether some expression should be classed as a frame marker or as an endophoric marker; the distinction between ideational and textual schematicity is sometimes blurred.

<sup>54</sup> Apart from evidential markers, this taxonomy of metadiscourse elements is obviously skewed towards Self-orientation.

### 3.3.5 Code glosses

Sometimes speakers wish to make implicit reference to an addressee's background assumptions which the addressee is understood to have brought into the discourse. The speaker can then make use of CODE GLOSSES as 'introducers' of stretches of discourse that "supply additional information, by rephrasing, explaining or elaborating what has been said" (Hyland 2005a: 52) (*in other words, i.e., that is, for example*). All of this is done for the purpose of making sure that the addressee and the speaker are on the same wave length so that the addressee can successfully understand what the speaker wants to say. Code glosses are metadiscourse elements that indirectly (i.e. not overtly) signal the vocal presence of the speaker (Self). The use of a code gloss indirectly refers to a speaker who is able to entertain some assumption together with the addressee.

- (46) In other words, researchers tend to **assume** that the better preserved skill must be at least in part subserved by the intact left hemisphere. (LING)
- (47) In a later discussion of enargeia, for example, Quintilian **suggests** introducing fictional elements to amplify the trope [...]. (LIT)

### 3.3.6 Boosters

BOOSTERS such as *clearly, naturally, obviously, of course* (in some uses) indicate the speaker's relatively strong commitment towards what is expressed in an utterance. As with hedges, the speaker is frequently not making a factive statement in connection to boosters, i.e. the speaker is not saying that it is a matter of fact that a state of affairs pertains. Unlike what happens with most hedging expressions, the speaker states that his willingness to compromise about the factuality of the state of affairs is at a minimum, i.e. the speaker is committed to the veracity of the knowledge content to a high degree. I take boosters to convey a rather prominent degree of Self-orientation, mostly because by using them, speakers expose themselves and their epistemic attitude towards some knowledge content.<sup>55</sup>

- (48) In fact, we would **suggest** that failure to detect effects that might be revealed in other tests (Type II errors) is more likely with this methodology. (LING)

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<sup>55</sup> By 'epistemic attitude' I mean propositional conviction or commitment. I use the term because later I will group boosters and hedges together with other "attitudinal" expressions such as attitude markers (*to my surprise* etc).

- (49) This distance strongly suggests that any commission by W.S. to Ford, who was very likely in London, was probably not from distant Devonshire but from someone in London or within a day or so's ride. (LIT)

### 3.3.7 Hedges

HEDGES are claimed to signal “plausible reasoning rather than certain knowledge” and “degree of confidence” (Hyland 2005a: 52) and could therefore also be claimed to home in on epistemic attitudes.<sup>56</sup> However, it is one of Hyland's other claims that attracts my immediate attention in the search for arguments that hedges too function as metadiscourse elements that orient a discourse towards Self or Other. He claims that “hedges are devices such as *possible*, *might* and *perhaps*, which indicate the writer's decision to recognize alternative voices and viewpoints” (2005a: 52). These statements seem to imply a dual character for hedges; first, any epistemic qualification of the utterance is an indication of the speaker's own voice. Second, by implication only, the fact that the speaker qualifies the utterance could be seen as an invitation to the Other to enter the discourse, and more often than not, this is exactly what happens.

- (50) This suggests that the similar correlation observed for the real words in Table 17 is probably significant as well as another effect of the productive strategy Dutch speakers employ to interpret structurally marked forms as having some marked meaning. (LING)
- (51) We would therefore like to assume that the VP in sentences with *ne* is indeed raised and defocused, as in 31, and that the interpretation of focused progressive aspect results from the combination of two projections in an instance of aspectual concord very similar to the cases of definiteness agreement and negative concord already considered. (LING)

I think, however, that hedges drive discourse voice in another way as well. It is certainly not uncommon for boosters and hedges to appear in the same utterance (see (48); “*In fact, we would suggest that...*”); it is also not unusual for other (metadiscursive) traces of Self and Other to appear in the same utterance. A possible reason for the co-occurrence of boosters and hedges and the “competition” or multivoicedness/heteroglossia of a more limited stretch of discourse is that it is an overall metadiscursive function of hedges not only to attenuate propositional information, but to create a “vocally” balanced discourse, i.e. a discourse in which discourse voices do

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<sup>56</sup> The concept of hedging was discussed in general terms and in relation to knowledge stating verbs in Section 2.1.3 and will not be dealt with any further here.

not clash and where they are balanced so as to meet any discursive requirements. We saw in Chapter 2 that speakers need to maintain a balance between the voices of Self and Other in any academic discourse. Sometimes, however, speakers may come across as a bit undecided with regard to exactly how far they dare to orient a single utterance or a more elaborate stretch of discourse in terms of Self orientation. I claim that one function of hedges in these contexts may be to allow speakers to promote themselves in the discourse but to minimise any negative consequences of such promotion by balancing any utterance that may be perceived as carrying too much Self orientation.

- (52) *Nevertheless, we confidently believe* that a consideration of the developmental cycle argued for here may provide a useful new way of thinking about these old problems and may also lead to rather different and potentially interesting answers. (LING)

The speaker of (52) is making a strong assertion after the initial transition (which is of course Self-oriented) and both appear in person through Self-projection (*we*) combined with a boosting element (*confidently*). The norms and standards of the research community are likely to force the speaker to attenuate this extremely high degree of Self-orientation in order not to come across too strongly in the argumentation. The introduction of the hedging modal auxiliary (*may*) may have the effect of doing just that while also contributing to the overall Self-oriented nature of the utterance. Both boosters and hedges are clearly Self-oriented and may be used to balance one another.

### 3.3.8 Attitude markers

Hyland notes that speakers' affective or emotional attitude towards a certain state of affairs should not be confused with their epistemic positions. In what follows, however, I take both emotional or affective attitude and epistemic attitude to be instances of qualification of the utterance or some part of it. Hedges and boosters are conducive to expressing epistemic attitude, but ATTITUDE MARKERS are metadiscourse elements of another kind. With attitude markers, speakers can express their dismay, surprise, agreement and non-agreement or any other such feelings they may have towards the information contained in the utterance. Examples of such lexical markers of the speaker's attitude towards the knowledge content (a language may have other means of conveying the same thing) include expressions such as *honestly, I agree, to my surprise, appropriate, foolish, and wrong*.

Clearly, attitude markers could also be claimed to orient the discourse towards Self by virtue of exposing the speaker's emotional or affective attitude.<sup>57</sup>

- (53) The available information **suggests** that it is entirely feasible. (LIT)  
 (54) Paradoxically, this new interpretation of the play puts the Duke in a more positive light than much recent criticism has **suggested**. (LIT)

### 3.3.9 Self mention markers

Speakers can, of course, choose the extent to which they wish to make their presence in the discourse overt. With nearly all the metadiscourse elements discussed so far, there is only indirect reference to Self although, as we have seen, sometimes such indirect reference borders on the overt: the voice of Self stands out from the text on all occasions where it is signalled metadiscursively, be it indirectly or more overtly. Probably the most conspicuous way a speaker can enter a discourse – the most overt and obvious way in which the voice of Self can be heard in its most uninhibited form – is when speakers Self-introduce or Self-project into the utterance by overtly referring to themselves in the discourse by using so-called SELF MENTIONS (*I, me, mine, we, our* etc.), i.e. forms of first person pronouns (c.f. Tang & John 1999).

- (55) However, we would further **argue** that the presence of neglect does not necessarily predict the lateralization pattern of visuospatial or visuocstructional skills. (LING)  
 (56) Since I wish to **argue** that Shakespeare was strongly influenced by a theatrical version of the Abraham and Isaac story, it is necessary to consider where else he could have seen Corpus Christi performances. (LIT)

### 3.3.10 Engagement markers

Finally, a speaker may try to overtly involve the addressee in the discourse by explicitly mentioning the addressee (though this is rather rare in academic texts with the exception of inclusive *we* and phrases such as *Let us*) or by directing the addressee to do or think something about some piece of information contained in the utterance. ENGAGEMENT MARKERS such

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<sup>57</sup> In cases where we are uncertain about the origin of attitudinal qualification, i.e. where it could potentially emanate from someone Other, we are unlikely to resolve the matter unless we have access to the original source.

as second person pronouns (including inclusive *we*), interjections, or formal imperatives can be effectively used for such purposes. No one other than the speaker is in a position to instruct (Dahl 2003) or tell the addressee to do anything; any trace of the source of the imperative thus inevitably leads to the speaker and the voice uttering the imperative must be that of Self. The reasons for a speaker to include in such an overt way the addressee in the discourse may be many. Hyland mentions a few in saying that it may be important in order to secure “social and rhetorical objectives” (2005a: 54).

- (57) Consider now the following excerpt from Plag (1996), in which he **argues** that general semantic factors may rule out a large number of affix combinations in English. (LING)
- (58) Let us **assume** the playwrights were not inept, that they were writing for known conditions, and that they anticipated no difficulties in the actor’s being heard. (LIT)

It should be fairly obvious that all of the metadiscourse features operate together to ensure successful communication between speaker and addressee and it is common to find in a short excerpt of text a number of features working together towards such an overarching communicative goal. This phenomenon has been addressed in association with “multivoicedness” in previous literature on discourse voice. I return to this issue in Section 3.6.

### 3.3.11 Summary

In this section, I have claimed that the metadiscourse of an utterance directly affects the discourse voice orientation and the degree to which a certain discourse voice is promoted. In the next section, I consider another aspect important for discourse voice orientation and which is intimately related to the metadiscourse features of the utterance. Some would probably say that it is a metadiscourse feature: the management of citation.

## 3.4 Discourse voice and citation management

In this section, I look at another way a speaker can orient an utterance towards a certain discourse voice – namely through the management of citation. The reason that citation practices are not treated in the previous section is perhaps surprising, given that citations are prime examples of the



metadiscourse category of evidentials (see Hyland 2005a). However, since bibliographical citations form such an important part of academic writing and are one of the primary ways in which Other (or indeed Self (as Other)) is overtly referred to, I think they deserve separate treatment. Consider some utterances from the HAT corpus containing bibliographical citations.

- (59) Wilson does **assume** that at times the yeoman Robin can be taken to refer to peasants (p. 4). (LIT)
- (60) Several papers **suggest** that symptoms of developmental dyslexia are associated with morphological abnormalities in the temporal cortex and in the frontal cortex bilaterally and that a covariance exists between dyslexia, attention deficit disorders and left handedness (Hynd et al., 1995). (LING)
- (61) There are important gender differences in regard to the phonological domain (Shaywitz et al., 1995; Shaywitz, 1998) and these differences have been **suggested** to partly explain the difference in higher prevalence of dyslexia in men. (LING)

When a speaker makes use of a citation to ascribe an utterance to another speaker in another discourse or another point in discourse, the utterance is typically taken to be *less* Self-oriented and *more* Other-oriented than when it is ascribed to the speaker himself/herself. Before we consider citation in cases like (59)-(61), I should say something briefly about so-called self-citation.

It is common to treat under the heading of citation also those instances where speakers refer to themselves at another point in discourse or in a completely different text or discourse – “Self *as* Other”. In (62), Gibbons is also the speaker of the current utterance.

- (62) This has been **argued** in an earlier paper (Gibbons 1997). (LING)

Such self-citation (Hyland 2003) is admittedly one means for speakers to intrude into the discourse or text, and certainly one reporting strategy through which they can both establish themselves as independent researchers and entertain a strengthened and clear interpersonal relationship, by helping the audience situate the import of the current utterance relative to the assumptions of the larger research community. However, I think that self-citation has more in common with regular instances of attribution to Other than we might think. It is also important to remember that self-citations cannot be summarily disregarded in the analysis of manifestations of Self and Other as an oddity to which only inexperienced speakers surrender before they learn to master other reporting or knowledge making strategies. Several studies have shown that self-citations are extremely com-

mon. Hyland (2003) found that they account for between 10% and 20% of all citations, “depending on field and the stage of development of the area” (2003: 252).<sup>58</sup> If I understand Hyland correctly, he thinks that one reason for this high degree of self-citations in academic research is the fact that speakers are sometimes still reluctant to refer to themselves via more overt self-mention strategies such as the use of first person pronouns; self-citations therefore could thus be one means for speakers to advance Self in their writing.<sup>59</sup> “Regular” (attribution-to-Other) citation practices or citation management, as in (59)–(61), can be described in a more nuanced way by drawing on the much researched notion of integration or non-integration of the ascribed source.

### 3.4.1 The Other and citation practises

As Fløttum et al. (2006) point out, there has been no shortage of research in the field of bibliographical citations,<sup>60</sup> and the discourse function of bibliographical citations cannot be underestimated, particularly in an academic context.<sup>61</sup> In their study, Fløttum et al. (2006) distinguish four categories of bibliographical citations and their classification follows that of earlier influential sources (e.g. Swales 1990)<sup>62</sup> although their proposal is clearly a development of the basic integral/non-integral divide suggested by Swales (1990).

An integral citation is one in which the name of the researcher occurs in the actual citing sentence as some sentence element; in a non-integral citation, the researcher occurs in parenthesis or is referred to elsewhere by superscript number or via some other device (Swales 1990: 148)

Groom (2000) proposes that it is possible to make a rough distinction between so-called integrated and non-integrated means of attribution or reference to Other. Although much of the focus in citation research is on the

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<sup>58</sup> In the HAT-corpus, I identified 12 examples of Self-citation (0.7%), much lower than the figures reported by Hyland (2003).

<sup>59</sup> There may be many other reasons. For example, a speaker might want to show that he has had other publications before.

<sup>60</sup> However, to the best of my knowledge, no such study has devoted more than superficial attention to the issue of manifestation of accountability (other than indirectly, of course).

<sup>61</sup> Hyland & Tse (2004: 171) say that “Citation is central to the social context of persuasion, as it helps provide justification for arguments and demonstrates the novelty of the writer’s position [whilst allowing writers to] display an allegiance to a particular community and establish a credible writer identity”.

<sup>62</sup> For an alternative approach, see Vassileva (2002) who is more concerned with purely functional aspects of citations that the issue of integration and non-integration.

integrated kind, Groom (2000: 18) points out that non-integrated citations are also important in identifying balances of voice between Self and Other. Non-integrated citations are often claimed to focus on information rather than author. Integrated citations are what Weissberg & Buker (1990) call “author prominent”, something I interpret to mean that the intertextual element evoked by the citation should somehow be perceived as particularly salient, a matter of foregrounding.<sup>63</sup> Let us briefly consider the reasoning of Groom (2000) who offers an interesting discussion on subordination and domination by and of discourse voices, something I take to be an alternative approach from other claims that accountability is an either/or issue and thus something which supports my argument.

All other things being equal, it must be assumed that speakers uphold the most dominant position in any reporting piece of text; after all, the speaker is the person doing the reporting. However, by adopting an integrated citation strategy, and removing their own ground for making a clear evaluation of the information, speakers are almost put in a subordinate position relative to any Other. Needless to say, speakers can use this for strategic purposes, assuming a dominant or subordinate roll in the text. The essence of Groom’s discussion lies in the way speakers can use a non-integrated citation to obtain a balance in the attribution of information. By redirecting the addressee’s attention to information (in the case of non-integrated citation) rather than source (integrated citation), speakers intervene in the text and resume a semi-dominant position while allowing the attributed Other to take up the satellite roll of offering support or “warrant” (Toulmin et al. 1984) for what they are saying. A similar approach is offered by Thompson & Ye (1991) who contrast “writer acts” with “author acts”. In writer acts, “responsibility is ascribed, as it were, covertly to the reporting writer” (1991: 370) and they are an example involving a non-integrated citation. In author acts, the responsibility is “ascribed to the author, perhaps indirectly via his text or his research” (1991: 370). The conclusion to be drawn from both Groom’s (2000) and Thompson & Ye’s (1991) discussion is that by exploiting different presentational strategies, speakers can shift their position along the dominant-subordinate dimension, sometimes allowing the Other more conversational ground and sometimes claiming that ground for themselves.<sup>64</sup> Unfortunately, this idea is not pursued at any considerable length in Groom (2000). That is, he

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<sup>63</sup> See also Hyland (1999a: 344)

<sup>64</sup> I return to the idea of dominance later on in this chapter when we consider utterances where the citations practices adopted are perhaps not so clear as in (59)-(61) and where citation practices clash with other means of orienting towards a discourse voice.

stops at the point when he has suggested that accountability (or responsibility as he calls it) can be assigned to the current writer, some reported source, or, crucially, that it can be shared between writer and reported source depending on how the writer or reported source is positioned in the text and who could be taken to uphold a dominant position. Thus far, Groom (2000) and the present study are in complete agreement. I am not sure Groom would subscribe to my approach to accountability, i.e. as being explained by reference to discourse voice, but, clearly, the early dominance-model advocated by Groom (2000) and the model I propose in this chapter have common denominators.

Now let us look in more detail at a common way of classifying citations. The following are examples that Fløttum et al. (2006) use to highlight the differences between categories of citations:

- R1 Non-integral reference: *Little Lake is polluted* [1].  
 R2 Partly integral reference: *Little Lake is polluted* (Clark 1999).  
 R3 Semi-integral reference: *Clark (1999) has observed that Little Lake is polluted.*  
 R4 Fully integral reference: *Clark (1999) claims: "Little Lake is polluted" / Clark (1999) claims that "Little Lake is polluted".*

In R1, there is reference to a source appearing in some list of references; in R2, the reference is integrated in that it appears in the utterance but outside the clausal structure; in R3, the source is a grammatical element in the clausal structure; finally, in R4 the source is a clausal participant, but the utterance also contains direct quotation. Most sources in the literature follow the basic distinction suggested by Swales (1990) between integral and non-integral citations. For the benefit of comparison, I include a table where minor terminological as well as descriptive distinctions can be seen between some models of reporting strategies involving citation.

Table 3.2 Examples of citation practices and the terminology involved

Example citation	Swales (1990)	Tadros (1993)	Fløttum et al. (2006)
1. <i>This is handled at a discourse level</i> (Smith 2000)	Non-integral	Non-integral without direct quotation	Partly integral reference
2. <i>Smith argues that phenomena of this kind are discourse related.</i>	Integral	Integral citations without direct quotation	Semi-integral reference
3. <i>Smith (2000) argues that 'this is a discourse level phenomenon'.</i>	Integral	Integral citations with direct quotation	Fully integral reference

Based on my exploratory investigation of the HAT corpus and largely following Swales's definition, I define as *integrated* any source that is a *grammatical element* either in the main clause (as in R3 and R4) or in a subordinate clause – a comment clause where the clause in which the source is a grammatical element is actually structurally disjunctive in relation to the “informational part” of the utterance.<sup>65</sup>

- (63) As Linda Charnes would **argue**, these comments about Luhrmann's film bespeak an unwitting complicity in the ideology of the legendary: [...]. (LIT)
- (64) Toleration was in the air when Shakespeare was writing *Measure for Measure*: if Shakespeare was a tolerant Anglican, as Schoenbaum **suggests**, there was plenty of support for such an idea of toleration among his circle of relatives, friends, and patrons.

By being integrated into the utterance, the source enters into a relationship of potential affectedness or control with the knowledge content. The speaker is, however, at liberty to choose the words that constitute the information conveyed in the utterance. This, however, does not change the fact that the knowledge content is associated with the Other. When a bibliographical citation appears in the discourse but is not a grammatical element, the source is *non-integrated*:

- (65) Alternatively, it has been **suggested** that the language system may consist of different specialized components that are active as called upon in each situation (Demonet, Price, Wise, & Frackowiak, 1994a). (LING)

Another relatively common form of citation is to refer to an external source without ascribing the state of affairs constituting the knowledge content to that source; rather, the external source said something quite contrary to that state of affairs (e.g. *This is a lower-level phenomenon (cf. Smith 1997)* and where Smith said that it is a higher-level phenomenon). The knowledge content would then be ascribed to the current speaker despite the overt (integrated or non-integrated) reference to Other and the possible lack of reference to Self. Jacoby (1986) calls such references *contrastive* and, according to Swales (1990), they appear to be used to different extents by scholars from different disciplines. In my classification, such citations more often than not count as integrated sources; I adopt a strictly formal distinction between integrated and non-integrated citations.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>65</sup> To Swales (1990) and Tadros (1985) such citations are “adjuncts of reporting”.

<sup>66</sup> I have not separated “contrastive” references from regular reports in my classification, but it would have been extremely time-consuming to consider all references in terms of their potential “contrastiveness”.

Fløttum (2003) does acknowledge that further sub-classification of the citational categories (R1-R4) is possible. She claims that “there is much room for category improvement” (2003: 109). For example, with respect to R2, she claims that a partly integral reference can appear (i) at the end of the utterance, e.g. *The moon is blue (Smith 1995)*; (ii) as in (i), but preceded by an inanimate placeholder, e.g. *A recent study has observed that the moon is blue (Smith 1995)*; (iii) utterance internally and as a cluster, e.g. *Some recent studies have observed that the moon is blue (Smith 1995, Blair 1998, Clay 1999) between 3a.m. and 5a.m., when the temperature is low*; and (iv) distributed throughout the utterance, i.e. in internal position as well as in final position but multiply separate, e.g. *Some recent studies have observed that the moon is blue (Clay 1999) between 3a.m. and 5a.m. (Smith 1995), when the temperature is low (Blair 1998) and when it disappears behind clouds (Clay 1999)*. Needless to say, many combinations are possible.

Let us briefly turn to the reasons for and consequences of a speaker’s opting for an integrated or a non-integrated citation. In Chapter 2, it was established that the balance the academic speaker needs to find between Self- and Other-manifested production is essential. I propose that the issue of integration pertains precisely to that aspect of communication; this is because I see integration and non-integration as essentially highlighting the scalar feature of Self- and Other-orientation. Speakers who feel obliged to decrease their presence in a discourse may still want to maintain their presence rather than making the utterance Other-oriented to too high a degree. They may opt for a non-integrated citation whereby the knowledge content may be ascribed to someone Other than themselves, but where that Other is not allowed too much discourse space inside the utterance boundaries; by default, that discourse space is still occupied by an (albeit subdued) speaking Self.

Non-integrated sources are assumed to function primarily as evidential signposts; since so much of the utterance is still under the control of the speaker, the non-integrated source is only marginally present. Thus, the orientation towards Other is higher than in straightforward Self-orientation (for example, through self mention markers), but lower than with integrated sources.

### 3.4.2 Summary

Bibliographical citation is one way an utterance can be oriented towards Other in a very overt manner, either by being integrated or through non-

integrated strategies. Different citation strategies are one means for speakers to exploit the balance between Self- and Other-manifestation in a text.

The next section focuses on the staging of the utterance, i.e. how the speaker chooses to set up the communicational scene in terms of information packaging, foregrounding and backgrounding. This is another way a speaker can orient an utterance towards a certain discourse voice.

### 3.5 Discourse voice and the staging of the utterance

So far we have seen that speakers can orient their utterances towards Self or Other through different aspects of the metadiscourse of an utterance, such as self-mention markers, evidentials, or citation practices. In this section, I turn my attention to the way the utterance is staged or set up by the speakers in terms of the relative foregrounding or backgrounding of themselves, someone Other than themselves, or some relevant piece of information in order to orient the utterance towards Self or Other. Shaw (1992) suggested that shifts in tense and verb form of reporting verbs, such as present vs. perfect or active vs. passive, lead to “different functions at the discourse level”. I assume that one of these discourse consequences could be that voice orientation is affected.<sup>67</sup>

I thus operate with two basic assumptions in this section. First, staging as it was characterised earlier has a direct influence on the extent to which Self or Other is foregrounded or backgrounded. Second, the degree to which a speaker or Other is promoted has direct bearing on how dominant the speaker’s or Other’s discourse voice is, i.e. how strong the voice-orientation is. Speakers who are highly foregrounded in utterances will be taken to be in a position to manifest their own discourse voice to a high degree; utterances in which speakers are backgrounded will be taken to express a more subdued discourse voice of Self (and sometimes a more foregrounded and stronger Other).

By way of a simple illustration, consider the following three examples which are the staging “mirror image” of the discourse voice phenomena involved in citation management.

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<sup>67</sup> This thesis will not, however, be concerned with issues of tense or aspect *per se*, but I see no reason why Shaw’s (1992) thinking could not have a wider application.

- (66) We also **believe** that the law concerning the use of experts in both voice identification and author identification is in serious need of improvement. (LING)
- (67) Louis Montrose **argues** that the process of symbolic mediation in fact would make them think of courtiers and not shepherds at all. (LIT)
- (68) While Shuy is probably the most active American linguist in terms of legal consulting, these figures **suggest** that published opinions tell only part of the story. (LING)

In (66), the self projecting speaker (we) features as the grammatical subject in an informationally highly prominent position at the beginning of the utterance; in (67), this prominent and topical position is occupied by some source other than the speaker and there is no immediate trace of the speaker (with the possible exception of what might be the Self-orienting booster *in fact* or the hedge *would*). In (66), the speaker is the maker of the knowledge statement and in (67) the voice of the Other is brought out more prominently. In (68), the topic position<sup>68</sup> is occupied not by the maker of a knowledge statement but by *these figures*. *Figures* cannot by themselves suggest anything. They cannot be the maker of knowledge statements, but someone interpreting those figures can, and the interpreter or “inferer” of those figures is the actual maker of the knowledge statement. What is clear from the utterance in (68) is that some aspect of the research process is topicalised in favour of a “hidden” or less foregrounded researcher-*cum*-speaker/“inferer”. Other changes to the information packaging in an utterance can also affect discourse voice:

- (69) In the present paper it is **argued** that fluency in word reading and word recognition accuracy are both crucially linked to the speed at which relevant information is processed. (LING)
- (70) One could **argue**, for example, that testimony on a legal text’s range of possible interpretations is more descriptive than theoretical, and that therefore the Daubert approach should not apply. (LING)

For both of these utterances, the fact that they are impersonal is likely to affect the discourse voice heard, or as I will claim, how strongly that voice is heard. There is no overtly present source to which the information in these utterances can be ascribed. Consequently, the only way an addressee can identify the discourse voice is through contextual clues in (69). In (70), it is clear that the speaker is hiding behind the impersonal pronoun *one*, which is likely to signal a subdued voice on the part of the speaker. Impersonal constructions may also perfectly well be oriented not towards Self but towards Other:

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<sup>68</sup> See below for this term.



- (71) As for local cases, it has been **argued** that these often evolve from nouns, verbs, or adverbs; see Blake 1994. (LING)

Here, it is clear that the “arguer” behind the knowledge content is not the speaker but somebody else, *Blake 1994*, and although the voice is backgrounded, it is clearly that of the Other.

In this section, I discuss three different but related aspects of the staging of an utterance and show how such staging affects discourse voice. I start my discussion from the point of view of basic information packaging and spend some time on the active-passive alteration as it relates to foregrounding and backgrounding. I then address the issue of inanimate subjects. Finally, I talk about the effects of impersonalisation strategies.

### 3.5.1 Information packaging and foregrounding (and backgrounding) of the speaker

In this subsection, I address the question of how shifts in information packaging can affect the dominant discourse voice heard. It should be relatively uncontroversial to claim that voice alterations can be strategically exploited by the speaker for foregrounding and backgrounding purposes. What I am suggesting is that such foregrounding and backgrounding has important effects for the Self- and Other-orientation in the utterance. If speakers want to foreground themselves or someone else in an utterance, they make overt reference either to themselves or that other individual in a thematically prominent position such as grammatical subject, as in (66) and (67). Such foregrounding will result in an increase in the contribution towards the manifestation of the voice of Self or Other because the role of grammatical subject coincides with the role of the maker of knowledge statement. Alternatively, speakers might want to play down either their own role, in which case the utterance contributes relatively less or not at all towards the foregrounding of Self, or the role of someone else, in which case the source in question is thematically demoted. In either case, speakers would refer to Self or Other more indirectly or by placing any overt references in thematically less prominent positions in the utterance.

One of the most obvious ways to achieve a shift in foregrounding is through alterations between active and passive utterances. It is usually claimed that the passive voice involves a realignment of the participants (who can be characterised semantically and awarded a semantic “role”) in relation to the syntactic function of subject and direct object (Huddleston

& Pullum 2002). When I refer to passive utterances, I simply mean an utterance with passive morphology.<sup>69</sup>

A number of related information packaging notions are also important when addressing the issue of active-passive alteration from the point of view of discourse voice and I have already alluded to some of the terms without properly introducing them. Most frameworks of information packaging argue that what starts the utterance carries a special status and this is usually referred to as *topic*. I do not intend to go into a detailed discussion of the many theories that account for this notion. I will simply assume that the topic is the element in the utterance that comes first, i.e. in the leftmost position in the utterance, and “states what the clause is primarily about” (Siewierska 1984: 19), thus roughly adopting the nomenclature of Huddleston and Pullum (2002: 1371).

I will also sometime use the term *theme* to refer to this leftmost element of the utterance. The leftmost position in the utterance is a prominent position, not only because it is occupied by the grammatical subject in unmarked utterances but also because it is the position from which the utterance takes its point of departure (Halliday 1967: 212); it informs the addressee what the utterance is about, i.e. the speaker’s reason for speaking at all. Grimes (1975: 323) says that “every clause, sentence, paragraph, episode, and discourse is organised around a particular element that is taken as its point of departure. It is as though the speaker presents what he wants to say from a particular perspective”. This kind of perspectivisation mirrors, I argue, the kind of relative foregrounding and backgrounding of discursive voices I want to suggest is a consequence of (grammatical) voice alterations.

Although there is a long tradition in the teaching of academic writing that writers should refrain from using first person subjects and strive to express themselves using passive voice, there is now a great deal of evidence that this is not a true picture of the standard within academic writing. For example, Tarone et al. (1981) found that active sentences by far outnumber passive ones in a small corpus of research articles (two articles from two journals of astrophysics); the same thing is found in Shaw (1992), Master (2006) and also in the present study.<sup>70</sup> Since active-passive alteration af-

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<sup>69</sup> There are of course many different views on what active-passive alteration involves. For example, for Dik (1997) it would not be an issue of realignment but rather a matter of perspectivisation. I will not discuss these aspects of active-passive any further here.

<sup>70</sup> A very interesting finding indeed by Tarone et al. (1981) is that academic speakers are more prone to use the active voice when reporting their own work; the passive was more prevalent in the reporting of the research of others. On the assumption advanced here, such a finding indicates that academic speakers are prone to background Other when they report what Other has said.

facts elements in the utterance that are central to the interpretation of an utterance and certainly central to a discussion of Self- and Other-orientation (because the voices of Self and Other are usually associated with those positions in the clause), it is perhaps worth considering to what extent active and passive alteration is an issue in the making of knowledge statements containing knowledge stating verbs.

The ratio of active to passive utterances involving knowledge stating verbs in the HAT corpus is 84% to 16%.<sup>71</sup> This could be compared to the findings from a study by Master (2006) on research articles<sup>72</sup> where the ratio of active to passive was 52% to 48%. The findings from my study are similar to the results from Tarone et al., (1981): in two articles from journals of astrophysics active voice was used in 81% and 89% of the utterances. The difference between the two disciplines in HAT is notable: in the LING sample, the ratio was 78% active vs. 22% passive and in the LIT sample it was 93% active vs. 7% passive.

*Table 3.3* Ratio of active and passive utterances in the HAT-corpus (1.25 million words) (only knowledge stating verbs considered) relative to Master (2006) and Tarone et al. (1981) (all kinds of verbs considered)

	HAT	Master (2006)	Tarone et al. (1981)
Active	84%	52%	81% (89%)
Passive	16%	48%	19% (11%)
Total	100%	100%	100%

*Table 3.4* Ratio of active and passive utterances in the HAT-corpus and the two discipline sub-corpora, LING and LIT

	HAT	LING	LIT
Active	84%	78%	93%
Passive	16%	22%	7%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Since passivisation always implies backgrounding of the source of the knowledge statement, be it the speaker or someone other than the speaker,

<sup>71</sup> It should be borne in mind, however, that the high percentage of active constructions is probably boosted by the inclusion of formally active constructions featuring inanimate subjects such as (i):

(i) These figures **suggest** that constructional praxis lateralizes with language skills. (LING)

This kind of utterance has been addressed in passing and will be discussed in detail later.

<sup>72</sup> Eleven research articles from cell biology, chemistry, clinical psychology, computer science and geology.

the ratio between active and passive sentences indicates that backgrounding of Self or Other by means of passivisation is rather limited in the data considered here. Such backgrounding is, however, slightly more prominent in linguistic than in literary texts (at least relatively speaking): even though active constructions are favoured by speakers in linguistic texts using knowledge stating verbs, the active ratio is lower than in the LIT sample. Utterances involving knowledge stating verbs clearly appear to be in the active form in literary texts.

However, it should be borne in mind that for my discussion of discourse voice, the usefulness of these figures is limited: they only indicate that it is more likely for Self or Other to be foregrounded in some utterance than backgrounded (though, see footnote 71), not whether it is Self or Other that is foregrounded. Nevertheless, under the assumption that several aspects of the discourse integrate to yield a more wholly discursively grounded discourse voice manifestation, and since staging is one such aspect, this finding is interesting.

Now, consider the fact that passivisation combines with the notion of integration to yield discourse voices that are more or less promoted/demoted. The grammatical subject in (72), *Verbs that appear in different syntactic frames (active, passive, intransitive, etc.)*, is the direct object (or one of the direct objects) of the corresponding active clause (a rough active paraphrase can be found in (73)):

- (72) Verbs that appear in different syntactic frames (active, passive, intransitive, etc.) are **proposed** to have those frames specified in their lexical representations as different lemmas (Levelt, 1989). (LING)
- (73) Levelt proposes *that verbs appear in different syntactic frames (active, passive, intransitive, etc.)* and that they have those frames specified in their lexical representations as different lemmas.

However, by expressing (73) in a passive construction like (72), the complement clause of a knowledge stating verb in active form is put in the thematically more prominent topic position and thus awarded a completely different informational status. As a consequence, the element that would qualify as the grammatical subject (and topic and theme) in the active version of (72), i.e. as in (73), is put in a very different position far removed from the topic. Because it is placed outside the utterance itself, the Other-source is not as prominently foregrounded as it could have been. It should be noted that the source need not be the grammatical subject in order to be at least relatively more foregrounded. Compare (72) with (74), where the knowledge stating verb features in an equally canonically passive con-

struction but the source is substantially more foregrounded by virtue of being awarded a semantic role (agent) in the utterance, rather than appearing in a non-integrated citation:

- (74) The verbal complex is also **proposed** by Rizzi 1982 for Italian restructuring verbs, and by Bratt 1990 and Guasti 1993 for causatives. (LING)

Although the voice of the Other is heard also in (72) (after all it is right there through the non-integrated citation), I argue that the difference between (72) and (74) comes down to the *degree* to which the voice of the Other is foregrounded, i.e. the degree of Other-orientation. By awarding the source, the Other, a semantic role, albeit not as prominent as if the source had been the grammatical subject, the utterance in (74) is relatively more Other-oriented than the utterance in (72), i.e. the degree of Other-orientation is higher. This kind of distinction receives support in Shaw (1992) where utterances with overt and integrated sources, like (74), are classed as “IR-passive”, i.e. passive utterances with Integrated Referent, and utterances with referents that are not integrated, i.e. where the referent does not receive a grammatical or semantic role, like (72), are classed “NR-passives”.

Next let us turn to inanimate subjects which are another means for speakers to “hide” or marginally background either themselves or someone other than themselves.

### 3.5.2 Inanimate subjects

I have proposed that the speakers’ employment of either the active or the passive construction (as well as other, passive-like, constructions) is a direct consequence of their desire to foreground or background either themselves (Self) or someone other than themselves (Other). It was established that the HAT data contain a substantial number of active utterances that merit further consideration, utterances that look active but behave like passive in terms of foregrounding and backgrounding. Look at the passive-like utterance in (75):

- (75) Alternatively, the Folio lines may **suggest** that its natural Fool does not always have the proverbial sense to come in out of the rain and depends on Lear for care, as was typical of the natural fool. (LIT)

It stands to reason that an inanimate (grammatical) subject like *the Folio lines* cannot suggest anything the way people can suggest things because inanimate entities normally do not do that. Therefore, the actual “suggester” must be either the speaker or someone other than the speaker. There is no evidence in the utterance to suggest that the knowledge content, *its natural Fool does not always have the proverbial sense to come in out of the rain and depends on Lear for care, as was typical of the natural fool*, emanates from someone other than the speaker; an investigation of the more extensive context also shows no such indications. Thus, it is appropriate to assume that, unless there is evidence to the contrary, the sources of utterances like (75) are the current speakers and that the speakers have chosen to give to the addressee only a hint of their presence (let us for the moment disregard the obvious Self-oriented construal resulting from the modal auxiliary *may* in (75)). The speaker of (75) does this by pointing towards an inferential process, one of the premises of which is the expression now occupying the grammatical subject position, taking on the role of topic, *the Folio lines*. It is natural to ask why the speaker chooses to present the utterance in this manner. By only pointing towards speaker presence in the utterance as an (absent) “inferer” of premises, the speaker (Self) is backgrounded in favour of a thematically prominent piece of information; however, “although not directly visible, the [speaker’s] presence may be inferred by the [addressee]” (Charles 2006: 501). We are thus looking at an utterance that is presented as making manifest Self, but the degree of Self-manifestation is lower (though still detectable, especially given the modal qualification provided by *may*) than if the speaker had decided to make his/her presence more overt by presenting the knowledge content embedded under the knowledge stating verb *suggest* in a canonically active construction (a rough active paraphrase of (75) can be found in (76)):

- (76) Alternatively I **suggest** that it may be the case *that its natural Fool does not always have the proverbial sense to come in out of the rain and depends on Lear for care, as was typical of the natural fool*.

Here, the speaker projects him/herself right into the discourse by overt self-reference through the self-mention marker *I*. If we apply to (75) and (76) the same thinking we applied to some of the passive utterances earlier, I want to suggest that the speaker presents the utterance in (76) as making manifest Self to a substantially higher degree than in (75).

It should be noted, however, that not all utterances with an inanimate subject are necessarily oriented towards Self. In (77) and (78), the orientation is arguably that of Other:

- (77) Several papers **suggest** that symptoms of developmental dyslexia are associated with morphological abnormalities in the temporal cortex and in the frontal cortex bilaterally and that a covariance exists between dyslexia, attention deficit disorders and left handedness (Hynd et al., 1995). (LING)
- (78) Jensen's case report **suggests** that sentence formulation may not be exclusively driven by successful lexical retrieval. (LING)

In (77), there is reference to an external source but the source is placed in a backgrounded position outside the actual utterance in a non-integrated citation. Otherwise, this utterance is formally fairly similar to the one in (75) in that it is headed by an inanimate grammatical subject; the important distinction is the reference provided by the source in the citation. From the context, the addressee is informed not only that *several papers suggest that...*, but also that one of those papers is *Hynd et al. (1995)*; this arguably makes the utterance more Other-oriented than Self-oriented. We are no longer looking at an utterance where the grammatical subject, i.e. the inanimate subject, corresponds to one of the premises in some inferential process; indeed, there is actually no overt trace of an inferential process in (77) and (78). All the addressee is told is that some papers suggest something, but the suggestion as such very much rests with the cited (Other-) source implicitly referred to, rather than the speaker (for support of this view, see also reference to Warren 2006 in footnote 75). Now, compare (77) and (78). In (78), the source, a scholar named Jensen, features as a grammatical element in the utterance, that of possessor. This too makes the inanimate subject a kind of "Other-prop" rather than an element that refers to an inferential process having taken place. The inanimate subject could be claimed to be a metonymical trace of the Other-source referenced elsewhere (either integrated, non-integrated, or identified from a wider context).

Based on this, it should be clear that the use of an inanimate subject affects the staging of the utterance and the orientation of discourse voice. Whenever an inanimate subject appears, the speaker or the external source is backgrounded.<sup>73</sup> Before I turn to the last of the staging phenomena I consider important in discourse voice orientation, a brief aside is in order for one of the knowledge stating verbs selected in this study since it stands out from the other verbs – *suggest*.

As will be evident in Chapter 4, *suggest* is special compared to the other knowledge stating verbs. In the semantic characterisation of *suggest* provided in Chapter 1, it was evident that two readings of *suggest* are particularly

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<sup>73</sup> For the use of inanimate subjects as a strategy of politeness, see Myers (1989).

interesting from an academic discourse point of view: (i) to “put forward an idea for [others] to think about” or to “say something which [...] puts an idea” into the minds of others, and (ii) to imply something or make “you think it is the case”, to indicate something.

However, what makes *suggest* interesting in this section is that it readily lends itself to knowledge statements involving inanimate subjects and it does so in a way that may be described as conventionalised, especially in academic discourse.<sup>74</sup> The two readings of *suggest* pattern in different ways. Under reading (i), *suggest* can take both animate and inanimate subjects, as in (79) and (81). Under reading (ii), *suggest* appears to take only inanimate subjects, as in (80). The utterance in (81) appears to be of the same formal kind as (80) because *suggest* patterns with an inanimate subject; however, this is a pattern corresponding only to reading (i), not to reading (ii).

- (79) Laplanche **suggests** that this fact, the priority of the primal trauma, actually offers hope for healing [...] (LIT)
- (80) However, the only statistically significant result in this review **suggested** that more males than females had a history of familial sinistrality. (LING)
- (81) And since Rizzi’s approach **suggests** that exclamatives and interrogatives are differentiated by the content of ForceP. (LING)

The pattern in (79) is quite straightforward. It corresponds to one of the basic readings of *suggest* as we normally conceive of it on a par with the other knowledge stating verbs: it puts forward an idea and is overtly associated with either the Other-source, as in (79), or the speaker of the utterance (in the case of first person pronouns). In (79), the referent of the inanimate grammatical subject, *the only statistically significant result in this review*, is taken by the speaker of the utterance to indicate something (cf. reading (ii)), or to link inferential evidence (Johns 2006) reflected in the knowledge content. It is questionable whether patterns corresponding to reading (ii) give rise to cases of metonymy proper (Paradis 2004). As mentioned earlier, the pattern in (81) is similar to (79) in that it serves to put forward an idea or assertion, but the inanimate subject in (81), *Rizzi’s approach*, serves as a shortcut with reference to the original source and founder of

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<sup>74</sup> Warren (2006: 36) says that the metonymic pattern TEXT+VERB OF COMMUNICATION (e.g. “The article addresses problems...”) is an instance of the WORK OF WRITER → WRITER metonym and that “the pattern is so well-established that its metonymic character goes unnoticed”. It is also worth noting that Warren is explicit about one of the effects of using such metonymies in texts: “This pattern allows the speaker to focus on the contents of some text. The author of the text is *almost completely backgrounded* but is still *part of the interpretation*” (2006: 37, emphasis added).



that approach, Rizzi.<sup>75</sup> In (81), who the metonym refers to is obvious; in other cases, as in (77), it is not always so overt.

When it comes to patterns corresponding to reading (ii), i.e. the “indicate”-reading, Master (1991: 18) claims that verbs that allow this kind of reading “represent an inherent aspect or function of” the inanimate subject. That is, for *suggest* in (80), one could say that it is an inherent function of *the only statistically significant result in this review* to suggest something.

The only other knowledge stating verb selected that seem to allow this kind of diverse patterning is *argue*, which allows for both readings but to a much lesser extent (see Chapter 4 for details). In the HAT data, I have not found that any of the other knowledge stating verbs allow for the “indicate-pattern”, reading (ii). I now turn to another means through which the speaker can background Self or Other – impersonalisation.

### 3.5.3 Impersonalisation<sup>76</sup>

In this section, I will argue that passivisation and inanimate subjects are not the only ways a speaker can background Self or Other. Although not as frequently employed in the HAT corpus as active sentences with inanimate subjects, impersonal constructions or impersonal subjects have the effect of backgrounding Self and Other and they are still, overall, quite frequently used in academic writing.

While stressing the fact that speakers in academic settings are becoming far less impersonal than many think, Hyland (2001a) states that impersonal strategies of expression still have an important role in some contexts, although their role and extent of usage should not be overestimated. Impersonal strategies represent one means through which speakers can maximise their credibility and work “to elicit credence from the reader” (2001a: 208) and underline “the common share of knowledge with the community” (2001a: 208, with reference to Lachowicz 1981: 111). However, much research argues that the same credibility and acceptance can be achieved, perhaps more effectively, through other expressions of the voice of Self.

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<sup>75</sup> Warren (2006) talks about cases similar to the ones in (77), (78) and (81) in terms of referential metonymy on the pattern WORK OF WRITER → WRITER. I think we can extend this basic pattern to include not only “works” of writers but most associative patterns where the association between some work, idea or standpoint (and possibly other such associations between individuals and inanimate entities) metonymically relate one member of an associative schema pair to another, often, implicit, member.

<sup>76</sup> I am well aware of the fact that this term may be used to refer to much more than is covered in this section.

Examine the following three examples and consider the discourse voice brought out by each:

- (82) Since people label practices as “popular” for strategic reasons, it seems foolhardy to **assume** in advance its definition (as authentic, indigenous, politically resistant, or conservative). (LIT)
- (83) One might **argue** that in the pastoral plays of green worlds the vision is momentary in the mind and meant to evaporate. (LIT)
- (84) It is **argued** that an antifaithfulness truncation constraint, which must be morphological, interacts with both faithfulness and markedness constraints. (LING)

The utterances in (82)-(84) are representative of the HAT corpus as a whole in that each contains some kind of qualifying element, such as a modal verb (a hedge) or an attitude marker. This seems to indicate that many utterances involving impersonal constructions are clearly Self-oriented. But how strong is the speaker orientation in these utterances? Fløttum et al. (2006) discuss indefinite pronouns (such as *one* in (83)) and more generally impersonal features of an utterance and their discourse effects for Self-orientation: “since the reference of these pronouns typically has to be determined by the co(n)text, they represent a very specific means for hiding as well as bringing forth different voices. On the one hand, we can say that the pronoun is very useful to authors who want to hide; on the other, it is useful to authors who want to bring in the voice of a larger community, without having to be specific about the extension of this community” (2001: 111). Similarly, Charles (2006: 508) notes that “*one* is a hidden averral with general attribution, a source type which disguises the fact that the [speaker] is responsible for the proposition given” (see also Hunston 2000). Other scholars have also treated impersonal constructions as something of a problematic category in terms of the associated rhetorical effects and the effects on discourse voice orientation.

In the discussion on active-passive alteration (3.5.1), it was mentioned that many style guides and research communities over the years have looked down upon the use of overt strategies of self-reference (*I argue that...*). When passive utterances have been favoured by speakers in the academic setting, impersonal constructions have been one means through which a speaker can make at least a marginal personal imprint on the text, although the rhetorical effects of impersonalisation and passivisation appear to go hand-in-hand. Hyland (2005a: 160) says that “removing the agent helps remove the implication of human intervention and the possible subjectivity and distortions this might introduce [...]”. Just like inanimate subjects, where the logical maker of the knowledge statement is re-

moved or demoted, impersonal constructions serve to demote the maker of the knowledge statement, perhaps in favour of the knowledge content or because speakers need to tone down their voice at that particular point in the discourse.

Hewings & Hewings (2001: 202) list *hedging* among the functions of *it*-impersonal clauses. Quirk et al. (1985) also emphasise the hedging character of impersonal constructions: “they express the speaker’s tentativeness over the truth value of the matrix clauses” (1985: 1114). Although this is not discussed, the indirect reference to Self involved, through hedging, should perhaps be noted (for criticism of this view, see e.g. Crompton 1997).

Hewings & Hewings (2001; see also Thompson 2004) add that *it*-clauses can also *distance* the speaker “from the content expressed in the following *that*-clause and the choice of reporting verb allows great freedom in accepting, rejecting or remaining neutral about the proposition expressed” (2001: 201). Charles (2006: 499) says that *it*-subjects have the effect of hiding “the fact that the writer is the source of a proposition”; or in the words of Hewings & Hewings (2002: 368), “they [*it*-clauses] are a feature of academic writing which functions to both express opinions and to comment on and evaluate propositions in a way that allows the writer to remain in the background. Moreover, Hewings & Hewings (2001) mention specifically the fact that a speaker’s choice of an impersonal strategy results in a depersonalisation of opinions, making any such expressions of opinion more objectively grounded and “less open to negotiation” (2001: 201). It is probably worth mentioning the claim of Thompson & Ye (1991: 375) about modal (epistemic) qualification of impersonal utterances. Both in agentless passives and in other impersonal constructions, “the presence of a modal verb is normally a signal that the writer is the understood agent”. In the terminology of this thesis, this means that such impersonal utterances, on many occasions, orient the utterance towards the discourse voice of Self. I would not want to limit this reasoning to modal verbs, however. In many impersonal constructions, especially those where there is no (other) overt sign of either Self- or Other-manifestation (such as a foregrounded speaker or Other or a bibliographical citation), the presence of a number of different metadiscourse elements makes the utterance Self-oriented (this was touched upon in 3.3 and will be discussed again in 3.6).

In general terms, it is thus worth asking how impersonalisation can result both in backgrounding by hiding the speaker behind such construction and in an orientation towards the speaker from what appears to be hedging of the utterance. I think this apparent contradiction captures an

essential aspect of impersonalisation. It seems that impersonal constructions constitute something of a schizophrenic category when it comes to whether they contribute towards the orientation towards Self/Other or tone down the presence of Self/Other in favour of a more objectively oriented grounding, perhaps choosing to put focus on information in the utterance.

I solve this problem by resorting to a cline of discourse voice manifestation, ranging from highly Self-manifested to minimally Self-manifested (and, minimally Other-manifested to maximally Other-manifested) utterances. Along this cline, impersonal utterances can occupy different places, sometimes more speaker- or Self-manifested and sometimes more Other-manifested. The determination of orientation is based on the view that any utterance could be seen as an expression of an integrated dominant discourse voice which is a combination of a number of relevant metadiscourse and other features (see section 3.6). I argue therefore that we cannot simply say that impersonal constructions contribute towards one type of discourse voice; rather, the rhetorical effects brought out by them must be interpreted in the light of other contextual clues to discourse voice. What is clear, however, is that impersonal constructions have interesting implications for discourse voice phenomena.

Finally, the somewhat complex and controversial relationship between speaker commitment and accountability was mentioned in section 3.2. It is worth returning briefly to this issue here as impersonalisation, for example *it*-passive clauses, obviously highlights this intersection between commitment and accountability. Lachowicz makes the point that it is a function of the passive to “reduce the author’s commitment in the truth value of the statements” and, interestingly, “to assume responsibility toward research conducted (and not to avoid it as the popular belief has it)” (1981: 105). This means that there is no contradiction at all in arguing that hedging of knowledge content and accountable speakers are mutually exclusive. However, as will be evident in the next section, I argue that the degree of speaker accountability involved in connection with passive knowledge statements is rather low.

### 3.5.4 Summary

This section has dealt with linguistic strategies for foregrounding and backgrounding of Self and Other; active-passive alteration, inanimate subjects and impersonal constructions were all considered ways for speakers to

either foreground or background themselves or someone other than themselves.

Together with strategies for citation management and other metadiscourse aspects of an utterance, the staging or set up of the communicational scene is assumed to contribute directly towards the manifestation of a certain discourse voice. In the next section, I argue for an integrated view of discourse voice manifestation and return to the connection between discourse voice and the notion of speaker accountability discussed at the outset of this chapter.

### 3.6 Discourse voice and speaker accountability as scalar concepts – the argument revisited

This section is divided into two parts and leads to the proposal of a model of how different degrees of Self and Other-manifestation directly affect the degree of speaker accountability associated with an utterance.

In the previous three sections, we saw how (i) the metadiscourse of the utterance, (ii) the citation practices and (iii) the staging of the utterance directly affect Self- or Other orientation. However, so far, I have only alluded to discourse voice manifestation being gradable without actually qualifying discourse voice as scalar in any considerable detail (but turn to 3.2 for a preliminary discussion). In what follows, I first illustrate in more detail how the two dominant discourse voices can be made manifest to different degrees by drawing on examples from the HAT corpus and by using my assumption that (i)-(iii) above are important for our interpretation of discourse voice. I also address the issue of utterances displaying what we could call “vocal ambiguity” and “vocal competition”, (i.e. ambiguity between Self- and Other-manifestation and different degrees of Self- or Other-manifestation). I then propose that the degree of discourse voice manifestation is decided according to a set of *discourse voice interpretation principles* sensitive to *what it is* in the discourse, with respect to (i)-(iii), that communicators appear to judge as more or less important in determining how present speakers are in their discourse, i.e. the degree of discourse voice manifestation. I subsequently propose a model for mapping degree of discourse voice to speaker accountability.

### 3.6.1 Illustrating degree of discourse voice orientation

For the purposes of exemplifying different degrees of Self- and Other-manifestation, let us look at some examples. I start out with an utterance where we could argue that the speaker is presenting the utterance as highly Self-manifested.

- (85) I instead **suggest** that the domestic defines the way that fantasies of the court are shaped. (LIT)

I assume that the reason for this interpretation is that the speaker Self-introduces into the utterance via the first person pronoun *I* in the topical position. Thus, the utterance is staged with the speaker in a foregrounded position, which yields a high degree of Self-orientation. The presence of the metadiscourse element *instead* (a transition) also helps to make this utterance Self-manifested, but I do not think that the presence of this particular metadiscourse element contributes to an equally high degree of Self-orientation. After all, transitions frequently appear in utterances that are clearly Other-oriented (e.g. *Instead, Smith (2000) suggests that there is a Swedish middle construction*). Let us look at another utterance I consider Self-manifested, even though to a lesser degree:

- (86) These figures **suggest** that constructional praxis lateralizes with language skills. (LING)

In this utterance, there is no overt mention of the speaker. The topical position is occupied by an inanimate subject, which corresponds to one of the premises in a chain of inference. However, the only way we can interpret this utterance is that the speaker is doing the inferencing. Thus, although the speaker is more backgrounded in (86) than in (85), the utterance still manifests the voice of Self, but to a lower degree since the speaker is taken to be present to a lower degree.

- (87) In other instances, they **suggest** that it may be time for the legal system to re-examine some of its long-standing tenets about the nature of language. (LING)

In (87), the grammatical subject of the knowledge statement is again inanimate (*they* refers back to *observations* in a previous utterance). However, (87) also contains an additional hedge, *may*, and this, I have said, must be taken to be a trace of the speaker – the speaker is epistemically qualifying the utterance. In addition, the initial *in other instances*, serves to highlight shared background assumptions and elaborate on something said previ-

ously. This use of a code gloss also signals speaker presence. The question is, however, whether all of this makes (87) “more” Self-manifested than (86). Does the quantity of Self-orientation have any bearing on the voice manifestation of the knowledge statement as a whole? I claim that it does not.

- (88) As Edit Doron **suggested** to me, the derivational *t* can be viewed as a stem segment, since it appears throughout the tense paradigm of this Binyan (hitlabe+amitlabe+→titlabe). (LING)

In (88), there is an overt reference to the speaker of the utterance through the personal pronoun *me*, but, unlike in (85), the speaker does not Self-project into the topical position of grammatical subject. As a matter of fact, the self mention marker *me* is the only overt sign of the speaker. This utterance illustrates that a mention of the speaker is not, by itself, enough to contribute to a high degree of Self-manifestation, as was the case in (85). Clearly the difference between (88) and (85) must lie in the way the utterance is staged, i.e. where Self features in the utterance. The utterance in (88) appears more Other-oriented by virtue of the topicalisation of the Other-source and the knowledge content clearly emanates from that Other-source (although it is possibly endorsed by the speaker). Let us turn to some additional Other-manifested utterances where what seems to be true for Self-manifestation in terms of degrees of voice manifestation is also applicable to Other-manifestation.

- (89) Bean **claims** that the play is a game, one that revises the farcical fabliau elements of earlier shrew-taming stories [...]. (LIT)

In (89), just like in (88), the Other-source is integrated into the utterance and appears in a maximally foregrounded topical position. Arguably, since there is no evidence of the speaker being present (with the possible exception of the attitudinal qualification *farcical fabliau*), (89) is an example of an utterance with a very high degree of Other-manifestation.

In (90), we can see an Other-source that is non-integrated, i.e. it is not a grammatical element in the utterance. However, since there is no overt indication of the presence of the speaker’s Self (apart from the comment *and related work*), the origin of the knowledge content must be assumed to rest with the Other(s). I think the Other-orientation in (90) is less prominent, i.e. lower, than in (89), mainly by virtue of the non-integration and consequent backgrounding and de-personalisation of the source in favour

of an inanimate grammatical and topicalised subject that serves as an “Other-prop”.

- (90) Optimality theory (Prince & Smolensky 1993, McCarthy & Prince 1993a,b, 1995, and related work) **assumes** that there are constraints on the possible characteristics of word forms in a language. (LING)

Consider (91), where the Other-source is non-integrated and the utterance has the form of an impersonal construction. I would like to argue that this utterance too, like (90), manifests Other, but to a fairly low degree, mainly because of the non-integration of the citation, which effectively places the Other-source outside of the knowledge statement as such.

- (91) It was subsequently **proposed** that LH regions that subserve speech perception may be fundamentally specialized for the processing of rapidly changing acoustic information (Tallal, Miller & Fitch, 1993). (LING)

I have now shown that at least three aspects of the utterance – the metadiscourse features of the utterance, the citation practices adopted and the staging of the utterance – are important if we want to characterise discourse voice orientation in terms of degree. However, more is needed to specify the actual import of these aspects of the utterance and a few issues still need to be resolved. For example, we need some way of resolving instances of “vocal ambiguity”, utterances that seem to make manifest both the voice of Self and the voice of Other.<sup>77</sup> Consider utterances (88) and (91); in (88) there is an overt reference to both the speaker (*me*) and the Other-source in an integrated citation. What makes me want to classify this utterance as Other-manifested rather than Self-manifested; and who has actually proposed something in (91)? Clearly we need some way of making the interpretation of discourse voice more clear.

I will propose that the interpretation of the degree of discourse voice manifestation can be accomplished by *a set of discourse voice interpretation principles*.<sup>78</sup> These principles are sensitive to what addressees appear to judge as important when determining how present a speaker is in a discourse, i.e. the degree of discourse voice manifestation. The principles could then lead to the establishment of a model relating to the interaction between discourse voice and speaker accountability.

<sup>77</sup> Bondi & Silver (2004) talk about this in terms of “voice-directionality” – “the ways in which the plurality of voices involved in a text are convergent or conflicting” (2004: 118).

<sup>78</sup> The principles have been partly methodologically inspired by Hopper & Thompson’s (1980) account of transitivity.



### 3.6.2 Discourse voice interpretation principles

In this sub-section, I propose a set of principles that may be taken to reflect our scalar interpretation of discourse voice. Based on my own findings in the HAT corpus during the exploratory stages of the study, and with the help of an informal questionnaire administered to six interview subjects, I set out to identify what it is in the utterance that makes the presence of Self or Other salient to a higher or lower degree. I already knew that three aspects of the utterance appeared to be important: the metadiscourse of the utterance, citation management and the staging of the utterance. By modulating these aspects of the utterance, I wanted to see how the degree of discourse voice manifestation was affected and whether some aspect was more important than another.<sup>79</sup>

The *staging* of the utterance in terms of the relative foregrounding or backgrounding of the speaker (Self), any Other-source, or information appears to be most important when deciding how present or absent a speaker is. That is, if the speaker or someone other than the speaker appears in a foregrounded or backgrounded position in the utterance, this affects the judgement with respect to presence. Citation management, for example, whether a citation is integrated or non-integrated, is also important, but

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<sup>79</sup> Findings in previous literature confirming intuitions about discourse voice were also considered (e.g. Hyland 2005a, Fløttum et al. 2006). The six informants, six of my colleagues in the department, were asked by way of an informal questionnaire to rank utterances from the HAT corpus and indicate the degree to which they felt that the speaker in the utterance “could be claimed to be “present” in his own utterance”. The informants were also asked to indicate what in the utterance made them draw the conclusions about speaker presence. The term “speaker presence” (Fløttum et al. 2006 also talk about voice phenomena in terms of “presence” and Hyland & Tse 2004: 158 refer to one aspect of metadiscourse as embracing “those ways which allow the author to intrude into the evolving text”) was used for want of a better term to describe the speaker’s discourse voice of Self, considered the default. A comparison was then made between the ranking of the respondents and my own rankings of the utterances. Our intuitions matched despite minor differences. I used the follow-up comments from my interview subjects and my own intuitions to decide which aspects of the utterance (metadiscourse, citations, or staging) seemed most or least important. For example, according to the informants, it was clear that the staging of the utterance was most important when deciding on the relative degree of presence or absence of the speaker in the utterance:

“Inanimate subjects and impersonal constructions signal distancing”

“What comes first [...] and last seems to be important for presence, I think”

“First person pronoun indicates very clearly that the speaker is present”

I take the matching of our intuitions as a tentative point of departure for proposing a set of discourse voice interpretation principles, principles that help decide what makes the utterance express a high or low degree of Self-manifestation or Other-manifestation. It was my intention to test these principles in a psycholinguistic experiment but this was beyond the scope of the present study (see also Section 6.6).

apparently less important than staging. The metadiscourse aspects of the utterance, such as hedging, boosting, evidential marking (other than citations), code glossing, etc., are least important.

However, if we decide that staging is more important than citation practices, which, in turn, are more important than metadiscourse, there also appear to be more fine-grained facets of these general principles that must be taken into account; they affect the decision, particularly with respect to the degree of discourse voice manifestation. With regard to the staging of the utterance, the voices of Self or Other come across as more salient, i.e. oriented towards to a higher degree, when the speaker or the Other-source features as the grammatical subject of the utterance in a topical or thematically prominent position (see (85) and (89)) than when the utterance involves an inanimate subject in such a topical position (see (86) and (90)), when the knowledge statement is an impersonal construction, or when the discourse voice needs to be identified in the broader discourse context (see (91)). In these latter instances pertaining to staging, the discourse voice orientation must be considered lower. If an Other-source is integrated into the utterance by way of an integrated citation, as in (89), it is taken to be highly Other oriented. If, however, a source is non-integrated, as in (90) and (91), it is taken to impart a lower degree of Other orientation. Finally, metadiscourse features such as self-mentions (other than in subject position – cf. *me* in (88)), hedges, boosters, attitude markers, engagement markers, are considered to promote a high degree of Self orientation. On the other hand, elements such as transition markers, frame markers, endophoric markers and code glosses appear to yield a relatively lower degree of Self orientation.

The discourse voice interpretation principles can be illustrated in two tables, one representing the interpretation principles for different degrees of Self orientation and the other representing the interpretation principles for different degrees of Other orientation.

Table 3.5 Self-manifestation as dependent on discourse parameters

Parameter	Discourse voice orientation ( <b>Self</b> )	
	HIGH	LOW
A. Staging	Source as grammatical subject <sup>a</sup>	Impersonal constructions, constructions with inanimate subjects, or when voice referent is contextually determined
B. Citation management	Not applicable in Self orientation	Not applicable in Self orientation
C. Metadiscourse elements	self mentions, hedges, boosters, attitude markers, engagement markers	transition markers, frame markers, endophoric markers, code glosses

a. With reference to Self in a topicalised grammatical subject position, there are two options available to the speaker: first person singular *I* and first person plural *we*. It is a possible shortcoming of the present investigation that I have not differentiated between them in reporting my findings; as Charles (2006: 507) notes, the use of the plural may potentially signal indeterminacy “to imply that there could be others who share propositional responsibility” and this would therefore potentially affect the degree of discourse voice.

Table 3.6 Other-manifestation as dependent on discourse parameters

Parameter	Discourse voice orientation ( <b>Other</b> )	
	HIGH	LOW
A. Staging	Source as grammatical subject	Impersonal constructions and constructions with inanimate subjects or when voice referent is contextually determined
B. Citation management	Integrated citations	Non-integrated citations
C. Metadiscourse elements	Not applicable in Other orientation	Not applicable in Other orientation

Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show that I operate with two simple minimal scales of discourse voice. Both the scale of Self and the scale of Other map only two points, represented by the discourse voice values of High and Low, respectively. This means that a speaker can make manifest the discourse voice of Self to a High or to a Low degree; the voice of the Other can also be made manifest to a High or a Low degree. Whenever several parameters (A, B or C) are called upon in a single utterance, for the purpose of determining the actual degree of discourse voice manifestation it should be borne in mind (see discussion above) that A always takes precedence over B and C, and B over C. Similarly, a high degree of orientation always takes precedence over a low degree of orientation.

To show the applicability of the proposed principles, consider the following examples (repeated from earlier but re-numbered for ease of reference).

- (92) I instead **suggest** that the domestic defines the way that fantasies of the court are shaped. (LIT) → High degree of Self-manifestation

Staging is regarded as the most important aspect of all, and precisely because of the staging, utterance (92), which foregrounds the speaker (the source of the knowledge content) in the thematically prominent position of grammatical subject, is taken to signal a *high degree of Self-manifestation* (refer to Table 3.5 to confirm this interpretation).

- (93) These figures **suggest** that constructional praxis lateralizes with language skills. (LING) → Low degree of Self-manifestation

In (93), staging is again the only aspect we need to consider; the utterance does not contain any metadiscourse elements (apart from the knowledge stating verb itself) or citations. Because of the staging, utterance (93) involves a backgrounding of the speaker (the only available source for the knowledge contents) and is taken to signal a *low degree of Self-manifestation* (refer to Table 3.5 to confirm this interpretation).

- (94) Bean **claims** that the play is a game, one that revises the farcical fabliau elements of earlier shrew-taming stories [...]. (LIT) → High degree of Other-manifestation

In (94), we have two aspects of the utterance to consider: the staging of the utterance and the citation indexing the Other-source. Because the staging of utterance (94) involves foregrounding of the Other (the source for the knowledge content), and because the citation referring to this Other-source is integrated, this utterance is taken to signal a *high degree of Other-manifestation* (refer to Table 3.6 to confirm this interpretation).

- (95) Optimality theory (Prince & Smolensky 1993, McCarthy & Prince 1993a, b, 1995, and related work) **assumes** that there are constraints on the possible characteristics of word forms in a language. (LING) → Low degree of Other-manifestation

In (95), we again have two aspects of the utterance to consider: the staging of the utterance and the citation practices. Because the staging of utterance (95) involves a backgrounding of the Other (the source for the knowledge content) by virtue of the placing of the inanimate subject in the topical position, and because the citation referring to this Other-source is non-inte-

grated, this utterance is taken to signal a *low degree* of *Other-manifestation* (refer to Table 3.6 to confirm this interpretation).

In 3.6.2, a number of utterances involving vocal ambiguity also raised issues for the interpretation of which discourse voice is made manifest and the degree of that manifestation. To show the applicability of the discourse voice interpretation principles on these problematic utterances, consider the following examples (repeated here but renumbered for ease of reference).

- (96) As Edit Doron **suggested** to me, the derivational *t* can be viewed as a stem segment, since it appears throughout the tense paradigm of this binyan (hitlabe+mitlabe+titlabe+). (LING) → High degree of Other-manifestation

The issue raised in connection to (96) was how to resolve the possible vocal competition between the foregrounded Other-source and the overt reference to Self highlighted by the inclusion of the self mention marker *me*. Our discourse voice interpretation principles indicate that staging is more important than metadiscourse elements. In (96), we have an Other-source that is highly foregrounded in terms of how the utterance is staged. This is considered to be more important for our decision of discourse voice than the (high degree of) Self-orientation highlighted by the metadiscursive self mention marker *me*. Because the staging of utterance (96) involves a foregrounding of the Other (the source for the knowledge contents), and because the citation referring to this Other-source is integrated, this utterance is taken to signal a *high degree* of *Other-manifestation* (refer to Table 3.6 to confirm this interpretation)

- (97) It was subsequently **proposed** that LH regions that subserve speech perception may be fundamentally specialized for the processing of rapidly changing acoustic information (Tallal, Miller & Fitch, 1993). (LING) → Low degree of Other-manifestation

The utterance in (97) was potentially ambiguous because of the impersonal construction which could leave the addressee in some doubt as to whose discourse voice was actually heard. We have three aspects of the utterance to consider: the impersonal construction (an aspect of staging), the citation practice (as highlighted by the Other-sources in parenthesis at the end of the utterance), and metadiscourse (as indicated by the inclusion of the hedge *may*). Our discourse voice interpretation principles tell us that the impersonal construction results in a backgrounding of the relevant voice; consequently, a low degree of voice orientation in relation to the parameter

of staging. The only possible voice is that of Other as indexed by the non-integrated sources at the end of the utterance.<sup>80</sup> Again, our principles tell us that non-integration is an indication that the degree of orientation is low. Regardless of whether we think that the metadiscourse element, the hedge *may*, should be attributed to Self or Other, its presence in this utterance does not change the fact that the utterance makes manifest *Other* to a *low degree* (refer to Tables 3.5 and 3.6 to confirm this interpretation).

I have now shown that the discourse voice interpretation principles proposed in this section are applicable when deciding the degree to which a certain discourse voice is made manifest. They reflect the impact of three different parameters and the way we appear to judge different aspects of these parameters is important when deciding the degree of discourse voice manifestation. I now turn to the interaction I suggest characterises the relationship between discourse voice and speaker accountability.

### 3.6.3 Mapping discourse voice to speaker accountability

In this sub-section, I want to map the two minimal scales of discourse voice, Self (High) → Self (Low) and Other (High) → Other (Low), onto a scale of speaker accountability. As we shall see, the principles outlined earlier lend themselves well to a characterisation of speaker accountability, drawing on both Self- and Other-manifestation and degrees thereof.

Recall the widespread proviso discussed earlier in the light of comments from previous research: attribution always implies complete transfer of responsibility and averral always implies complete accountability on the part of the speaker. Using the scalar conception of discourse voice as my point of departure, I instead propose that the speaker can be held accountable to different degrees for the information in a knowledge statement, both when the information is attributed and when it is averred. Based on the interpretation principles for discourse voice outlined above, it should be clear that a speaker can be present in the utterance to different degrees. In section 3.2, I suggested that a source is only accountable to the extent that it can be identified and “heard” (i.e. when the discourse voice is heard). Thus, two things are required for deciding to what extent a speaker is accountable. First, we must identify the discourse voice in the utterance (Self or Other). Second, the degree to which that voice is made manifest must be established. When the degree of Self-manifestation is high, the speaker is

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<sup>80</sup> I have confirmed this in the original data source.

accountable to a high degree – High accountability. When Self is made manifest to a lower degree, Self is also accountable to a lower degree; let us call this range on the scale Medium-to-High accountability. When the degree of Other-manifestation is high, speakers are accountable to a low degree because they are (almost) absent from the utterance – Low accountability. Finally, when the voice of the Other is made manifest to a low degree, speakers are accountable to a fairly low, but not to the lowest, degree; let us call this range of the scale Medium-to-Low accountability.

I shall thus assume that accountability can be conceived of in terms of a scale comprising four non-distinct ranges and without any absolute endpoints. Figure 3.3 could be used to illustrate both discourse voice and speaker accountability as essentially scalar concepts.




Figure 3.3 Scales of discourse voice manifestation (Self and Other) collapsed into a single scale of speaker accountability

Figure 3.3 shows how the two scales of discourse voice collapse into a single scale of speaker accountability. The figure should be interpreted in the following way: in an utterance that makes manifest Self to a high degree, such as (98), Figure 3.3 indicates that Self (High) results in High speaker accountability.

- (98) I instead **suggest** that the domestic defines the way that fantasies of the court are shaped. (LIT) → High (Self) → High accountability

In an utterance that makes manifest Self to a low degree, such as (99), Figure 3.3 indicates that Self (Low) results in Medium-to-High speaker accountability.

- (99) These figures **suggest** that constructional praxis lateralizes with language skills. (LING) → Low (Self) → Medium-to-High accountability

Because the speaker is relatively more backgrounded in (99) than in (98), by virtue of hiding behind an inanimate subject, the addressee's focus is re-directed to another entity within the utterance and the speaker can "escape" with a somewhat lower degree of accountability load.

In (100), Figure 3.3 indicates that Other (Low) results in Medium-to-Low speaker accountability.

- (100) Optimality theory (Prince & Smolensky 1993, McCarthy & Prince 1993a,b, 1995, and related work) **assumes** that there are constraints on the possible characteristics of word forms in a language. (LING) → Other (Low) → Medium-to-Low accountability

In (100), since the utterance makes manifest the voice of the Other, albeit to a low degree, the speaker is expected to be accountable to an even lower degree than in (99) and (98).

In (101), Figure 3.3 indicates that Other (High) results in Low speaker accountability.

- (101) Bean **claims** that the play is a game, one that revises the farcical fabliau elements of earlier shrew-taming stories [...]. (LIT) → Other (High) → Low accountability

Because the Other is so prominently present in the utterance, the speaker association with the knowledge content is weakened and he is taken to be accountable to a very low degree.

I have shown how we could conceive of speaker accountability in terms of degree rather than in either/or terms. The deciding factor for accountability "distribution" or "ascription" (i.e. the assigning of the onus of ac-



countability) between speaker and someone other than the speaker thus rests with the notion of discourse voice.

### 3.7 Summary

There is probably no way to specify a definite discourse voice or speaker accountability value for an utterance. It is more likely that all utterances (not only knowledge statements) should be seen as clusters of discourse voice(s) which, when holistically understood, are represented by a combination of several aspects of the utterance: the staging in terms of foregrounding and backgrounding, the citation practices adopted and the metadiscourse of the utterance. The discourse voice manifestation of a certain utterance must be determined uniquely in each discourse situation.

However, in Section 3.6 I proposed a set of discourse voice interpretation principles that could account for how we may model the degree to which a certain discourse voice is made manifest. These principles, coupled with the assumption from Section 3.2 that speakers are accountable for the information in their utterances only to the extent to which they are “present” in their utterances, lead me to propose a model based on interaction between discourse voice and speaker accountability.

I now turn to a corpus investigation and focus on knowledge stating verbs as central elements in knowledge statements. In the corpus chapter, I will apply the discourse voice – accountability reasoning and the model in Figure 3.3 on knowledge statements from different academic texts and investigate research questions 2 and 3 as stated in Chapter 1.



# The corpus study – knowledge stating verbs in context

## 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I report on a corpus-based investigation of the knowledge stating verbs *argue*, *claim*, *suggest*, *propose*, *maintain*, *assume* and *believe* as central elements in knowledge statements in academic texts in an attempt to answer research questions 2 and 3 as stated in Chapter 1:

2. Do knowledge stating verbs feature in utterances that convey different degrees of accountability, i.e. do they feature in different accountability contexts?
3. Do any differences in the typical accountability contexts of knowledge stating verbs hold across two different academic disciplines?

As outlined in Chapter 1, my main focus in this thesis is the manifestation of accountability in knowledge statements containing knowledge stating verbs. In Chapter 3, I proposed a model of the interaction between discourse voice and speaker accountability. Depending on the degree to which a certain discourse voice is manifested, speakers are assumed accountable for their utterances to different degrees. Chapter 3 focused on knowledge statements containing knowledge stating verbs and for apparent reasons it is the knowledge statement as whole which has been at the centre of attention. In this chapter, I turn my focus to the knowledge stat-

ing element in such knowledge statements; here the focus is on the knowledge stating verbs themselves.

The purpose of the corpus investigation in this chapter is two-fold. First, I want to evaluate the idea that discourse voice and accountability are scalar and test the validity of the assumptions underlying the model proposed in Chapter 3. Second, using the proposed model, I intend to map out the accountability contexts in which a set of knowledge stating verbs typically feature. I do this both from a general, academic discourse perspective, and from the point of view of two different academic disciplines.

The chapter is organised in the following way. First, in 4.2, I briefly introduce the method of analysis based on the model of discourse voice and speaker accountability proposed in Chapter 3. I present the results of the investigation in 4.3 and discuss them in more detail in 4.4. The chapter ends with a summary in 4.5.

## 4.2 Method of analysis

In this sub-section, I briefly describe the method of analysing knowledge statements containing knowledge stating verbs in the HAT corpus in relation to discourse voice and speaker accountability. I take the model proposed in 3.6 as my theoretical point of departure. The basic design of the corpus and the compilation process has already been described in Chapter 1.

All of the knowledge stating verbs: *argue*, *claim*, *suggest*, *propose*, *maintain*, *assume* and *believe* occur in knowledge statements found in articles in research journals. After being randomly selected, the articles were converted to text files and put into a database, File Maker Pro. In File Maker Pro, searches could be carried out on a number of relevant parameters either in the corpus as a whole (HAT) or in one of the sub-corpora (LING and LIT). All statistical analyses have been carried out in SPSS. Figure 4.1 shows the interface in File Maker Pro.




Figure 4.1 Interface of the HAT corpus in File Maker Pro

Based on the model of the interaction between discourse voice and speaker accountability proposed in Section 3.6, the analysis in the corpus was carried out in three steps. For each utterance in the corpus corresponding to a knowledge statement involving any of the selected verbs, I examined the metadiscourse elements (Section 3.3), the citation practices (Section 3.4) and the staging in terms of foregrounding and backgrounding (Section 3.5) of that utterance. Each knowledge statement in the corpus was then analysed manually: it was labelled with respect to the dominant discourse voice (Self or Other) and the value (High or Low) associated with that discourse voice. Consider example (102).

(102) We would like to **suggest** that two assumptions might now allow one to see the development of subject agreement as potentially very similar to the general pattern of development [...]. (LING) → **Self-manifestation (High)**

Subsequently, and under the mapping assumption proposed in the previous chapter and following the model outlined in Section 3.6.3, each knowledge statement was also awarded an appropriate speaker accountability value (High, Medium-to-High, Medium-to-Low, or Low). See the example in (103).

- (103) We would like to **suggest** that two assumptions might now allow one to see the development of subject agreement as potentially very similar to the general pattern of development [...]. (LING) → **High accountability**

Since each utterance was awarded a speaker accountability value, it is possible to calculate how frequently a certain knowledge stating verb features in utterances with a value of High or Low accountability. Thus, it is possible to characterise each knowledge stating verb as a High-accountability verb, a Low-accountability verb and so on based on its frequency of occurrence in certain accountability contexts. This first step relates primarily to research question 2.

The HAT corpus contains texts from two different academic disciplines and I have tagged each utterance as emanating from either a LING(uistic) or LIT(erary) source. This makes it possible for me to say something about potential disciplinary differences between the verbs and their proneness to feature in different accountability contexts (see research question 3). For example, if *suggest* is almost exclusively a High-accountability verb in LIT texts whereas its distribution is more varied in LING texts, this is an interesting finding. It is possible also to say something more generally about knowledge statements involving knowledge stating verbs in the two disciplines, for example, how frequently a speaker is taken to be expressing High accountability in LING texts as compared to LIT texts. The first issue to be addressed in this chapter, however, is whether there are differences between the knowledge stating verbs with regard to typical accountability contexts. I now turn to the results of the investigation.

### 4.3 Results – knowledge stating verbs in the HAT corpus

As Table 4.1 shows, there are a total of 1703 knowledge statements in the HAT corpus that feature the knowledge stating verbs *argue*, *claim*, *suggest*, *propose*, *maintain*, *assume* and *believe*.

Table 4.1 Distribution of the knowledge stating verbs in the HAT corpus

Knowledge stating verb	Count (N)	% of total N
Suggest	644	38%
Argue	461	27%
Assume	212	12%
Propose	175	10%
Claim	107	6%
Believe	79	5%
Maintain	25	2%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1703</b>	<b>100%</b>

The knowledge stating verb that occurs most frequently is *suggest* (644 occurrences). The other six knowledge stating verbs are distributed as follows in descending order of frequency: *argue* (461 occurrences), *assume* (212 occurrences), *propose* (175 occurrences), *claim* (107 occurrences), *believe* (79 occurrences) and *maintain* (25 occurrences).

Table 4.1 shows that *suggest* and *argue* make up 65% of the total occurrences for all verbs; taken together, *claim*, *believe* and *maintain* only add up to 15% of the total number of occurrences. Although a seemingly homogenous group in terms of general discourse function— to feature as central elements in knowledge statements – some knowledge stating verbs are clearly favoured by speakers. If this investigation shows that there are indeed significant differences between the verbs in terms of typical accountability contexts, the general frequency distribution is of interest. The implication would be that if speakers favour some knowledge stating verbs in knowledge statements, then, perhaps, we could also say that speakers appear to favour certain ranges on the scale of accountability and that this is reflected in their choice of knowledge stating verb. Let us turn to the results of the investigation before drawing any conclusions.

### 4.3.1 Knowledge stating verbs and accountability contexts

The next step in the corpus investigation was to investigate any differences between the knowledge stating verbs in typical accountability contexts, thus addressing research question 2. In this section, I am only concerned with academic discourse in general, i.e. the entire HAT corpus. Disciplinary differences are discussed in 4.3.2. I start out by showing the overall distribution of the knowledge stating verbs relative to different kinds of accountability contexts. I then present the result of a median analysis which

reflects the distribution of the verbs but allows for generalisations to be made; on the basis of this analysis the knowledge stating verbs can be labelled as High-accountability verbs, Low-accountability verbs etc. Subsequently, I compare the findings for the different knowledge stating verbs and map out any differences, first quite generally and then in some detail for each verb.

Recall that for each utterance in the corpus I first used the discourse voice interpretation principles set up in Section 3.6.2 to decide which discourse voice it manifests and to what degree. Then, each utterance was awarded an accountability value based on the mapping between discourse voice and speaker accountability. Table 4.2 represents the distribution of the knowledge stating verbs compared to different accountability contexts.

*Table 4.2* Distribution of the knowledge stating verbs in accountability contexts. The chi-square value for table 4.3 is 554.228 (df=18) where  $p < 0.05$

	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
Suggest	95	366	50	133	644
%	14.8%	56.8%	7.8%	20.7%	100%
Std. Res. <sup>a</sup>	-4.5	10.8	-2.9	-5.3	
Argue	107	70	31	253	461
%	23.2%	15.2%	6.7%	54.9%	100%
Std. Res.	.0	-6.5	-3.1	8.4	
Assume	57	89	34	32	212
%	26.9%	42.0%	16.0%	15.1%	100%
Std. Res.	1.1	2.4	1.9	-4.5	
Propose	60	14	55	46	175
%	34.3%	8.0%	31.4%	26.3%	100%
Std. Res.	3.0	-5.7	7.7	-1.5	
Claim	26	5	15	61	107
%	24.3%	4.7%	14.0%	57.0%	100%
Std. Res.	.2	-5.0	.7	4.4	
Believe	47	6	4	22	79
%	59.5%	7.6%	5.1%	27.8%	100%
Std. Res.	6.7	-3.9	-1.7	-.7	
Maintain	5	3	9	8	25
%	20.0%	12.0%	36.0%	32.0%	100%
Std. Res.	-.3	-1.8	3.6	-.1	
<b>Total</b>	<b>397</b>	<b>553</b>	<b>198</b>	<b>555</b>	<b>1703</b>
%	<b>23.3%</b>	<b>32.5%</b>	<b>11.6%</b>	<b>32.6%</b>	<b>100%</b>

a. The Standardised Residual value is a value indicating the difference between actual and expected frequencies. The greater the Std. Res., value the more significant any difference, provided it is significant to begin with. The crucial Std. Res. value is (-) 1.96. If the Std. Res. value is higher than +1.96 or lower than -1.96, the difference is considered significant. To facilitate the task of the reader, expected frequencies have not been included in the table.



To make the interpretation of Table 4.2 more transparent, let us look in detail at one example, the knowledge stating verb *suggest*. *Suggest* occurs 95 times in High accountability contexts, 366 times in Medium-to-High, 50 times in Medium-to-Low and 133 times in Low accountability contexts. Included in the table is also the percentage distribution with respect to the different accountability contexts. For example, in almost 57% of the knowledge statements where *suggest* occurs, it features in Medium-to-High accountability contexts. I want to compare the frequency with which *suggest* is found in the different accountability contexts with how frequently any of the other knowledge stating verbs feature in those contexts. First, however, we shall consider the findings for each verb individually.

Overall, the knowledge stating verbs occur slightly more often in Medium-to-High and Low accountability contexts (32.5% and 32.6% of the total occurrences, respectively). In almost one quarter of the total occurrences (or 23.3%), the knowledge stating verbs are found in High-accountability contexts and in 11.6% of the cases they feature in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts. Table 4.2 shows that in knowledge statements with knowledge stating verbs, speakers seem to make manifest their degree of accountability at the upper end of the scale rather than at the lower end (56% vs. 44%). Thus, in the making of knowledge statements with knowledge stating verbs, speakers are frequently fairly highly accountable.

Based on Table 4.2, a median value (with respect to accountability) was calculated for each knowledge stating verb and its preferred accountability contexts. A non-parametric analysis of variance for independent groups was then carried out.<sup>81</sup> The knowledge stating verbs distribute in the following way according to their *median value of accountability*.

Table 4.3 Median value of accountability for the knowledge stating verbs. The result of the Kruskal-Wallis test: chi-square value 112.941 (df=6) where  $p < 0.05$


Verb	Median	Count (N)
<i>Believe</i>	(High)	79
<i>Assume</i>	(Med-to-High)	212
<i>Suggest</i>	(Med-to-High)	644
<i>Propose</i>	(Med-to-Low)	175
<i>Maintain</i>	(Med-to-Low)	25
<i>Argue</i>	(Low)	461
<i>Claim</i>	(Low)	107
<b>Total</b>		<b>1703</b>

<sup>81</sup> A Kruskal-Wallis test; see Bordens & Abbott (2005) for further comments. A non-parametric test is appropriate given the fact that the data forming the basis of the test are ordinal (each accountability value was awarded a corresponding numerical value to facilitate statistical calculations).

It is notable that the verbs fall quite neatly into four statistically significant groups, corresponding to the four ranges of accountability (High to Low). This means that at least one, and usually two, knowledge stating verb represents each range on the scale of accountability. It is also worth noting that *believe* represents an extreme point on the scale of accountability (High accountability contexts) and that *believe* has the second lowest overall frequency. I return to this in 4.4.1. Let us look at some examples of the knowledge stating verbs in their typical accountability contexts.


Table 4.3 shows that *believe* features most prominently as a High accountability verb, as in (104).

- (104) I **believe** this marriage symbolizes the reunion of Puritan and Catholic which was one of James I's major policy goals. (LIT)



*Suggest* and *assume* occur most prominently as Medium-to-High-accountability verbs. Consider (105) and (106) as examples: the speaker enters the discourse as “inferer” of the premises presented and, consequently, as the actual source of the knowledge content.


- (105) These figures **suggest** that constructional praxis lateralizes with language skills. (LING)
- (106) Consequently, **assuming** the determiner to be in D0, such structures raise the same problem as in Chinese concerning where it might be assumed that the demonstrative is base generated. (LING)



*Maintain* and *propose* feature most prominently as Medium-to-Low accountability verbs. Typical examples of such contexts can be found in (107) and (108) where it is clear, not least because of the overt ascription to the non-integrated Other-source, that the knowledge content originates with someone other than the speaker:

(107) The “slowed activation-hypothesis” **maintains** that a slowed rise time of lexical activation delays the activation of ambiguous word meanings (Prather et al., 1994; Swinney et al., 1989). (LING)


(108) OP has been **proposed** for topic drop in child English and French (Wexler 1992). (LING)



Finally, *claim* and *argue* feature most prominently as Low-accountability verbs, typically associated with a speaker who is responsible for the knowledge content of the utterances to a very low degree. Typical examples would include utterances like (109) and (110).<sup>82</sup>

<sup>82</sup> It is important to remember that the examples included for this Low-accountability range and for all other ranges are only *typical* examples. There is nothing to say that, for example, *claim* could not feature also in High accountability contexts, only that it does so more infrequently, relatively speaking.

- (109) Bean **claims** that the play is a game, one that revises the farcical fabliau elements of earlier shrew-taming stories with a humanizing program of matrimonial reform [...] (LIT)
- (110) Keen **argues** that such conservative faith in the king amounts to the greatest deception of the agrarian public. (LIT)



All potential differences in typical accountability contexts between the knowledge stating verbs were tested for significance with a Chi-square analysis and a post-hoc comparison using a Kruskal-Wallis test. When discussing the significance patterns between pairs of knowledge stating verbs, I point to the most interesting differences between the typical accountability contexts.

Post-hoc comparison of the figures in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 suggests the subdivision of the seven knowledge stating verbs in Figure 4.2; following Kruskal-Wallis (dashed lines indicate significant difference).

- believe
- .....
- assume
- .....
- suggest
- ...propose....
- maintain
- .....
- argue
- claim

Figure 4.2 Post-hoc comparison between the knowledge stating verbs

Figure 4.2 should be interpreted in the following way: any differences between *believe* and *assume* are significant and the same is true for differences between *assume* and *suggest*. Since there are significant differences between *suggest* and *assume*, there are also significant differences between *suggest* and *believe*. Differences between *suggest* and *propose* are not significant but differences between *suggest* and *maintain* are. Differences between *propose* and *maintain* are not significant. Differences between *maintain*, on the one hand, and *claim* and *argue*, on the other, are significant. Finally, any differences between *claim* and *argue* in terms of typical accountability contexts are not significant. All of this can be translated into a table illustrated in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4 Significant (indicated by ✓) and non-significant (indicated by NS) differences between the knowledge stating verbs with respect to typical accountability contexts.

Knowledge stating verbs	<i>Believe</i>	<i>Assume</i>	<i>Suggest</i>	<i>Propose</i>	<i>Maintain</i>	<i>Argue</i>	<i>Claim</i>
<i>Believe</i>	-----	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Assume</i>	✓	-----	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
<i>Suggest</i>	✓	✓	-----	NS	✓	✓	✓
<i>Propose</i>	✓	✓	NS	-----	NS	✓	✓
<i>Maintain</i>	✓	✓	✓	NS	-----	✓	✓
<i>Argue</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	-----	NS
<i>Claim</i>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	NS	-----

I will now present a cross-section of some of the more interesting differences between the knowledge stating verb in terms of accountability contexts in more detail. Any discussion, however, is deferred to Section 4.4.1.

As mentioned, the differences between *claim* and *argue* are not significant. This means that any differences in distribution for typical accountability contexts between *argue* and *claim* could simply be due to chance (henceforth, I will not discuss non-significant differences).

However, the differences between *maintain* and *claim* and between *maintain* and *argue* are significant at the level of  $p < 0.05$ . The most notable differences with respect to these verbs and their typical accountability contexts can be summarised thus: whereas *maintain* occurs in Medium-to-High accountability contexts in 12% of its occurrences, *claim* occurs in that type of context in little less than 5% of its occurrences. *Maintain* occurs in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts in 36% of its occurrences whereas *argue* and *claim* appear in those contexts in less than 7% and 14%

of their occurrences respectively. On the other hand, both *claim* and *argue* feature in Low accountability contexts more frequently (57% and 55%) than *maintain* (32%).

Next, any differences between *propose* and *claim* and *propose* and *argue* are significant. *Propose* occurs in High accountability contexts at a frequency corresponding to 34% whereas the figures for *claim* and *argue* are 24% and 23% respectively. Similarly, *propose* features in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts in 31% of its occurrences compared to 7% and 14% for *argue* and *claim* respectively. The converse is true for Low accountability contexts where *argue* and *claim* occur at a frequency corresponding to 55% and 57% compared to *propose*, 26%.

Differences between *suggest* and *maintain*, *suggest* and *argue*, and *suggest* and *claim* are significant. The table shows that *suggest* occurs more often in Medium-to-High accountability contexts (57%) than any of the three other verbs (*claim* (5%), *argue* (15%) and *maintain* (12%). Another notable difference between *suggest* and *maintain* is that whereas *suggest* occurs in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts in 8% of its occurrences, the figure for *maintain* is 36%, thus, much higher. With respect to Low accountability contexts, *suggest* has a fairly low frequency, corresponding to 21% whereas the figures for *claim*, *argue* and *maintain* are all much higher; *claim* (57%), *argue* (55%) and *maintain*, (32%).

Turning to *assume* all differences in relation to the other knowledge stating verbs are significant. The most important differences can be summarised in the following way. *Assume* occurs in High accountability contexts at a frequency corresponding to 27%. This can be compared to *suggest* (15%). *Assume* features in Medium-to-High accountability contexts in 42% of the cases. This is a figure comparable only to that for *suggest* (57%). In relation to other knowledge stating verbs it is very high indeed: *propose* (8%), *maintain* (12%), *argue* (15%) and *claim* (5%). Turning to the lower end of the scale of accountability, the reverse seems to be true; *assume* occurs in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts in 16% of the cases compared to 31% for *propose* and 36% for *maintain*. However, it is in Low accountability contexts where we find the most conspicuous differences; *assume* (15%), *propose* (26%), *maintain* (32%), *argue* (55%) and *claim* (57%). Finally, let us consider *believe*.

All differences between *believe* and the other verbs are also always significant. Starting with High accountability contexts; here *believe* occurs at a frequency corresponding to 60%. Compare this to: *assume* (27%), *suggest*, (15%), *propose* (34%), *maintain* (20%), *argue* (23%) and *claim* (24%). We are not very likely to find *believe* in Medium-to-High accountability con-

texts where it features at a frequency corresponding to a mere 8%. For this kind of context, the most notable differences are in relation to *assume* (42%) and *suggest* (57%). *Believe* is even more infrequent in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts (5%). This can be compared to *assume* (16%) and *maintain* (36%). Finally, the most important differences in accountability context between believe and other knowledge stating verbs in Low accountability contexts (where the figure for *believe* is 28%) can be found in relation to *assume* which features in such contexts in 15% of the cases, in relation to *argue* (55%) and *claim* (57%).

On the basis of the results illustrated above, it is clear that the knowledge stating verbs do occur in different kinds of accountability contexts. I now turn my attention to possible disciplinary differences.

### 4.3.2 Knowledge stating verbs, accountability contexts and discipline

We are trying to find out how the knowledge stating verbs distribute with respect to accountability contexts in the two different disciplines (LING and LIT) in order to see if there are any *differences between the disciplines* with regard to typical accountability contexts (research question 3). First, however, let us look at the overall distribution (the raw frequency of occurrence) of the knowledge stating verbs in the two disciplines.

Table 4.5 Differences in overall frequency of occurrence between linguistic texts and literary texts

Knowledge stating verb	% LING	% LIT	Count (N) (HAT)
<i>Believe</i>	48.1%	51.9%	79 (100.0%)
<i>Assume</i>	77.4%	22.6%	212 (100.0%)
<i>Suggest</i>	48.3%	51.7%	644 (100.0%)
<i>Propose</i>	92.6%	7.4%	175 (100.0%)
<i>Maintain</i>	80.0%	20.0%	25 (100.0%)
<i>Argue</i>	53.1%	46.9%	461 (100.0%)
<i>Claim</i>	59.8%	40.2%	107 (100.0%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1004 (59.0%)</b>	<b>699 (41.0%)</b>	<b>1703 (100.0%)</b>

A few general comments about Table 4.5 are in order. First of all, the knowledge stating verbs investigated appear to be overall more common in knowledge statements in linguistic texts than in literary texts (59% vs. 41% of the total number of occurrences, respectively). The distributional

differences between LING and LIT with respect to *believe* are marginal. With *assume*, more than 75% of its occurrences are accounted for in linguistic texts; a similar tendency is visible with *propose*, i.e. the frequencies for these verbs in literary texts are low or very low. *Suggest* is marginally more common in literary texts than in linguistic texts, but the reverse is true for *argue*. *Maintain* shows high frequency in linguistic texts and low figures in literary texts. *Claim* is found in linguistic texts more often than in literary texts (59.8% vs. 40.2%).

Let us now explore in more detail possible disciplinary differences between linguistic and literary texts with respect to typical accountability contexts for knowledge stating verbs. I present the results of the investigation for each verb individually. I start with *believe*, thus reflecting the earlier order of treatment going from High accountability verbs to Low accountability verbs.

### *Believe*

Table 4.6 Differences in typical accountability contexts for *believe* between LING and LIT.  
Chi-square value 2.725 (p<0.05)

<i>Believe</i> in:	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
<b>LING</b>					
Count	26	2	2	8	38
%	68.4%	5.3%	5.3%	21.1%	100.0%
Std. Res.	.7	-.5	.1	-.8	
<b>LIT</b>					
Count	21	4	2	14	41
%	51.2%	9.8%	4.9%	34.1%	100.0%
Std. Res.	-.7	.5	-.1	.8	

For *believe*, there are no significant differences between LING and LIT with respect to typical accountability contexts.



*Assume*Table 4.7 Differences in typical accountability contexts for *assume* between LING and LIT. Chi-square value 34.203 ( $p < 0.05$ ).

<i>Assume</i> in:	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
<b>LING</b>					
Count	48	75	29	12	164
%	29.3%	45.7%	17.7%	7.3%	100.0%
Std. Res.	.6	.7	.5	-2.6	
<b>LIT</b>					
Count	9	14	5	20	48
%	18.8%	29.2%	10.4%	41.7%	100.0%
Std. Res.	-1.1	-1.4	-1.0	4.7	

For *assume*, there are significant differences between LING and LIT in Low accountability contexts. The only statistically supported conclusion that can be drawn is that *assume* is more common in Low accountability contexts, like (111), in literary texts than in linguistic texts.

(111) Both Lacy and Garrick **assume** that female agency, in any form, is threatening to male power. → *assume* in Low accountability context in LIT

*Suggest*Table 4.8 Differences in typical accountability contexts for *suggest* between LING and LIT. Chi-square value 29.586 ( $p < 0.05$ ).

<i>Suggest</i> in:	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
<b>LING</b>					
Count	53	175	38	45	311
%	17.0%	56.3%	12.2%	14.5%	100.0%
Std. Res.	1.1	-.1	2.8	-2.4	
<b>LIT</b>					
Count	42	191	12	88	333
%	12.6%	57.4%	3.6%	26.4%	100.0%
Std. Res.	-1.0	.1	-2.7	2.3	

For *suggest*, there are significant differences between LING and LIT in Medium-to-Low and Low accountability contexts. This means that we can conclude, first, that there is a difference between how often *suggest* features in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts in linguistic journals as compared to literary journals; in this context, *suggest* is more common in linguistic texts. Second, *suggest* is more common in Low accountability con-

texts in literary texts than in linguistic texts. To exemplify, utterances like (112) are typical in linguistic texts and utterances like (113) in literary texts.

- (112) But in addition it is **suggested** that a flat stratum also corresponds to a flat constituent structure (see Aissen & Perlmutter 1976/83). → *suggest* in Medium-to-Low accountability context in LING
- (113) Thurston Dart **suggests** that Morley's consort music was performed in the public theater [...]. → *suggest* in Low accountability context LIT

As for Medium-to-High and High accountability contexts, no significant differences between LING and LIT were found.

### *Propose*

Table 4.9 Differences in typical accountability contexts for *propose* between LING and LIT. Chi-square value 6.008 ( $p < 0.05$ ).<sup>83</sup>

<i>Propose</i> in:	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
<b>LING</b>					
Count	57	14	52	39	162
%	35.2%	8.6%	32.1%	24.1%	100.0%
Std. Res.	.2	.3	.2	-.5	
<b>LIT</b>					
Count	3	0	3	7	13
%	23.1%	.0%	23.1%	53.8%	100.0%
Std. Res.	-.7	-1.0	-.5	1.9	

For *propose*, there are no significant differences between LING and LIT with respect to typical accountability contexts. However, given the Std. residual value for Low accountability contexts in literary texts, there is some very weak support for saying that *propose* is more common in Low accountability contexts in literary texts than in linguistic texts.

- (114) Margaret Jones-Davies has **proposed** a rearrangement of this eleven-line dialogue over the chessboard into eight lines of blank verse. → *propose* in Low accountability context in LIT

<sup>83</sup> The reason that the chi-square value indicates that there are significant differences is probably because the Std. Res. value for *propose* in LIT Low accountability is quite close to the cut-off point (+-)(1.96).

*Maintain*Table 4.10 Differences in preferred accountability contexts for *maintain* between LING and LIT. Chi-square value 2.031 ( $p < 0.05$ )

<i>Maintain</i> in:	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
<b>LING</b>					
Count	4	3	6	7	20
%	20.0%	15.0%	30.0%	35.0%	100.0%
Std. Res.	.0	.4	-.4	.2	
<b>LIT</b>					
Count	1	0	3	1	5
%	20.0%	.0%	60.0%	20.0%	100.0%
Std. Res.	.0	-.8	.9	-.5	

For *maintain* there are no significant differences between LING and LIT with respect to typical accountability contexts.

*Argue*Table 4.11 Differences in preferred accountability contexts for *argue* between LING and LIT. Chi-square value 54.710 ( $p < 0.05$ ).

<i>Argue</i> in:	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
<b>LING</b>					
Count	69	59	19	98	245
%	28.2%	24.1%	7.8%	40.0%	100.0%
Std. Res.	1.6	3.6	.6	-3.1	
<b>LIT</b>					
Count	38	11	12	155	216
%	17.6%	5.1%	5.6%	71.8%	100.0%
Std. Res.	-1.7	-3.8	-.7	3.3	

For *argue*, there are significant differences between LING and LIT in Medium-to-High and Low accountability contexts. *Argue* is used more frequently in Medium-to-High accountability contexts in linguistic than in literary texts. However, the reverse is true for Low accountability contexts: *argue* is more frequently encountered in such contexts in literary texts than in linguistic texts.

- (115) However, one could also **argue** that there is a possibility of a different intra-hemispheric language organization. → *argue* in Medium-to-High accountability context in LING
- (116) Foster has also forcefully **argued** that Shakespeare himself was behind the publication of his sonnets in 1609 [...]. → *argue* Low accountability context in LIT

There is weak support for differences in High accountability contexts: the difference is almost significant: Std. residual values of 1.6 and -1.7. This means that *argue* is more common in High accountability contexts in linguistic texts than in literary texts.

(117) Nevertheless I **argue** that imperative truncation in colloquial Hebrew is a case of true truncation. → *argue* in High accountability context in LING

As for Medium-to-Low accountability contexts, no significant differences between LING and LIT could be found.

### *Claim*

Table 4.12 Differences in preferred accountability contexts for *claim* between LING and LIT. Chi-square value 14.278 ( $p < 0.05$ ).<sup>84</sup>

<i>Claim</i> in:	High	Medium-to-High	Medium-to-Low	Low	Total
<b>LING</b>					
Count	21	4	12	27	64
%	32.8%	6.3%	18.8%	42.2%	100.0%
Std. Res.	1.4	.6	1.0	-1.6	
<b>LIT</b>					
Count	5	1	3	34	43
%	11.6%	2.3%	7.0%	79.1%	100.0%
Std. Res.	-1.7	-.7	-1.2	1.9	

There are no significant differences between LING and LIT with respect to typical accountability contexts for *claim*. However, the difference between LING and LIT in the case of High accountability contexts is almost significant (Std. residual values of 1.4 vs. -1.7); the same is true for *claim* in Low accountability contexts (Std. residual values of -1.6 and 1.9). This means that there is weak statistical support to say that *claim* is found more often in High accountability contexts in linguistic texts than in literary texts. Conversely, *claim* appears to be more common in Low accountability contexts in literary texts than in linguistic texts.

(118) We **claim** that Katu 3rd person forms do have distinct geometries for animate and inanimate in the singular, but that there is no pronoun in the inventory to realize the distinct 3rd person singular animate geometry, which is hence realized by the elsewhere form [...]. → *claim* in High accountability context in LING

<sup>84</sup> The reason that the chi-square value indicates that there are significant differences is probably because the Std. Res. value for *claim* in LIT Low accountability is quite close to the cut-off point (+-)(1.96).

- (119) Thomas Betterton was also a member of this company, and Charles Gildon **claimed** that Betterton was also Rhodes's apprentice, with Kynaston as his under-apprentice.  
 → *claim* in Low accountability context in LIT

On the basis of the above investigation, it is clear that there are few significant differences between linguistic and literary texts in terms of the distribution of knowledge stating verbs relative to different kinds of accountability contexts. Some differences have nevertheless been found. For example, it is interesting to note that *argue* is a lot more common in Low accountability contexts in literary texts than in linguistic texts. Despite differences like these, the result of the investigation does not allow for generalisations to be made as regards disciplinary differences.

## 4.4 Implications of the results

In this section, I further develop some of the discussion from section 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 and point to some possible conclusions to be drawn on the basis of the results reported in those sections.

### 4.4.1 Knowledge stating verbs and different typical accountability contexts

With respect to the second research question, there appear to be differences, sometimes substantial ones, in how the knowledge stating verbs distribute in typical accountability contexts in the HAT corpus. Not all of these differences hold up to testing for statistical significance, but most do. We can conclude that *believe* is typically a High accountability verb, that *suggest* and *assume* are both to be treated as typical Medium-to-High accountability verbs, that *propose* and *maintain* are typical Medium-to-Low accountability verbs and that *argue* and *claim* are typical Low accountability verbs. See Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3 Knowledge stating verbs on scale of speaker accountability

It is noteworthy that one 'extreme' on this scale of accountability, namely *believe* (High accountability contexts), occurs with a very low overall frequency in comparison to the other knowledge stating verbs (refer to Table 4.1). An immediate conclusion from this could be that speakers in some way favour knowledge stating verbs that typically occur in other accountability contexts and that they should disfavour High accountability verbs. However, such a conclusion suffers somewhat from the fact that the next 'almost extreme', *suggest*, is the most common knowledge stating verbs in terms of overall frequency of occurrence. Nevertheless, it would be an interesting tendency that speakers prefer the middle or lower range of the scale of accountability, leaving as much as possible to the interpretation of the addressee as regards the speaker's extent of accountability for the knowledge content or otherwise

<sup>85</sup> Note that these are typical contexts. Nothing prevents *believe* from featuring in Low accountability contexts.

preferring to take a step back from accountability with utterances involving these verbs.<sup>86</sup>

Although it seems appropriate to label the knowledge stating verbs selected for this study as High-accountability, Low-accountability verbs etc., it is important to remember that it is not the verbs themselves that *express* the relevant degree of accountability. Rather, there is evidence that knowledge stating verbs typically *occur* in different accountability contexts. The verbs are just one (albeit important) part of the equation for accountability manifestation in knowledge statements.

Scales such as the one for accountability in Figure 4.3, which could be claimed to be important for a semantic or pragmatic characterisation of verbs, have been proposed or implied by previous work on verbal semantics and pragmatics (see Section 2.1). However, as far as I know, these scales have not pertained to accountability but to other aspects of the verbs' contextualised uses such as their evaluative force (Thompson & Ye 1991) or the degree of epistemic strength (Thompson 1994, Hunston 1995, Thue-Vold 2006a/b). It is therefore natural that I also regard the verbs as potentially scalar in their contributions to the manifestation of accountability. Before I discuss the scalarity of accountability in connection with the result of this investigation, let us consider some of these other scalar aspects of the semantic/pragmatic import of the knowledge stating verbs.

Descriptions of the knowledge stating verb which draw on ideas from Speech Act-oriented frameworks have addressed the scalar nature of aspects of the meaning (or illocutionary force potential) of the verbs. For example, in her classification of knowledge stating verbs as speech act verbs, Wierzbicka (1987) frequently seems to draw on the notion of a scale, for example saying for *claim* that it appears to put something “forward confidently” (1987: 324). For *maintain*, on the other hand, she says that it implies that the speaker has less than convincing evidence in support of the proposition; “the attitude is not ‘I want to say what I think is right’; rather, it is ‘I want to say what I know I have good reasons to say’”. (1987: 326).

Additional support for the scalarity associated with the knowledge stating verbs is found in Thomas & Hawes' (1994) categorisation of the verbs where, for example, *suggest* and *propose* are labelled “tentativity verbs” as opposed to other “certainty verbs” and “argument verbs” (in a super cate-

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<sup>86</sup> However, in view of some of the ideas advanced in Chapter 5, there have to be some strong communicative objective underlying such a strategic choice by the speaker to obscure, leave more open or step away from accountability.

gory of discourse verbs).<sup>87</sup> Francis et al. (1996: 526) say that the verbs in their “say-group” (including several knowledge stating verbs) are used in “putting forward a suggestion or theory” and for the ones in their “think-group” (including several knowledge stating verbs) that they indicate a speaker’s “having a belief” and sometimes including what may be “known or suspected” (1996: 527). Similarly, in their account of the “inherent” evaluative potential of reporting verbs, Thompson & Ye (1991) operate with a scalar concept of the evaluative force of the verb (in and relative to an appropriate context of utterance).<sup>88</sup> See also Searle & Vanderveken (1985).

Although this thesis does not directly address the epistemic-modal strength of the individual knowledge stating verbs as hedges (or indeed boosters), the scale illustrated by Figure 4.3 and the associated mapping of the knowledge stating verbs onto that scale is interesting from the point of view of strength of speaker commitment and a brief aside is in order to point to some possible implications. Recall the tentative remarks in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 to the effect that it is possible to associate knowledge stating verbs with different degrees of assertive force or epistemic strength (and see the comments by Wierzbicka 1987 and others just above). A pattern that seems to emerge when analysing the results of the present corpus investigation is that strong knowledge stating verbs, i.e. verbs that could be taken to express a strong assertive force or high commitment, mostly feature in Low accountability contexts or the lower ranges on the scale of accountability (*argue, claim, propose* and *maintain* are cases in point). This means that speakers are more likely to foreground Others and background themselves with strong-commitment verbs. Conversely, what could be considered weaker knowledge stating verbs appear to feature more frequently in High accountability contexts or at least in the upper range on the scale of accountability (*believe, suggest* and *assume* are examples). This means that speakers are more likely to foreground themselves with weak-commitment verbs. It should be noted also that all these differences are supported statistically, as indicated by the grouping in Figure 4.3. Since it is not the task of this thesis to address the relationship between speaker commitment and speaker accountability, I will not go into this any further. However, this might be an interesting topic for future research.

Although I have now given examples of how knowledge stating verbs feature in the scalar expression of epistemic modality, this is not what I am

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<sup>87</sup> See also Hyland (1998a) for a discussion of degrees of epistemic import associated with lexical hedges such as the knowledge stating verbs and modal auxiliaries.

<sup>88</sup> See also Charles’s (2006) discussion of the findings of Thompson & Ye (1991).



primarily interested in. Instead, I want to point to an obvious parallel to be drawn between the scalar expression of epistemic modality and the scalar expression of accountability. I argue that the knowledge stating verbs are at the heart of both of these dimensions and there is no apparent contradiction in that. Just like knowledge stating verbs have other discourse functions of a scalar nature (expressing commitment or other evaluation), it seems likely that this scalarity applies also to the dimension of accountability.

The claim I want to make is that knowledge stating verbs feature as central elements in the scalar expression of accountability and I take the results of the present investigation to support such a view. I argued in Chapter 3 that, when manifesting accountability, speakers do not convey that they are either accountable or non-accountable. Rather, accountability should be interpreted in terms of degree; speakers can be more or less accountable for the knowledge content of the knowledge statements and this is what they are conveying through those statements by modulating the degree of voice manifestation. By modelling accountability as scalar in Chapter 3, I showed how it is possible to conceive of communication as associated with different degrees of accountability by positing that different knowledge statements involve different kinds of accountability contexts. In this chapter, I have showed that knowledge stating verbs appear to feature in different accountability contexts. On the assumption that the positing of different kinds of accountability contexts is valid, the results of the investigation of knowledge stating verbs are positive. Knowledge stating verbs do differ in the way they feature in different kinds of accountability contexts and we can label them as High-, Medium-to-High, Medium-to-Low or Low accountability verbs.

Other studies have successfully shown that the choice of verb (reporting, mental state, or knowledge stating) is important for how we understand and evaluate the utterance and its knowledge content. Although this thesis has not been concerned with evaluation, the present investigation adds to those findings by pointing to where, i.e. in what accountability contexts, certain such verbs are typically found. This is likely to be important for a better overall understanding of the area of reporting discourse or the making of knowledge statements as well as for our understanding of the communicative potential of knowledge stating verbs (regardless of whether you think that they contribute to or feature in evaluation).

Findings like those in the present chapter, i.e. findings to the effect that what appears to be a pragmatically homogenous group of lexical expressions (such as reporting verbs) actually displays some significant differences

in their usage pattern, have previously lead to the establishment of prescriptive advice in, for example, English-as-a-second-language-classes or academic writing classes (to some extent Salager-Meyer 1994 and Skelton 1988 are examples of this; in addition many of the findings from Hyland's numerous publications have been claimed to be of pedagogical use).

Although one could argue that the present results indicate, for example, that *believe* should be used primarily in High accountability contexts and not in Low accountability contexts, such prescriptive advice must be handled carefully. First of all, the size of this investigation (in terms of the number of texts reviewed and the limitation of disciplines to two) stops us from drawing conclusions that are too far-reaching. Second, it is important to remember that the results do not reflect the practices of native speakers of English only; they could potentially have been different if only native speakers had been involved.<sup>89</sup> It is nevertheless interesting to speculate whether inexperienced or novel speakers could use knowledge stating verbs to signal the "wrong" degree of accountability or if the present results could be used to say that certain knowledge stating verbs *should be* used to signal a certain degree of accountability. I do not think so. Just like Shaw (1992) is reluctant to draw strong conclusions from his findings on the correlation between tense and discourse functions in reporting verbs, I would be hesitant to say that the results presented here could be used to issue strong prescriptive advice about the use of knowledge stating verbs. However, if one were to take the conclusions from this study, and if future studies on accountability show similar tendencies for knowledge stating verbs, we could at least build descriptive illustrations of how academic speakers seem to use knowledge stating verbs in knowledge statements. Such descriptions may prove helpful for people seeking to master academic writing conventions or strategies.

#### 4.4.2 Knowledge stating verbs, accountability and discipline

Numerous studies in metadiscourse have shown that different disciplines or different genres display substantial metadiscursive differences in the *kinds* of metadiscourse elements employed by speakers in different contexts or the *frequency* with which such elements are used. Researchers have suggested that such differences in surface linguistic manifestation reflect a deeper difference at the level of disciplinary epistemology (c.f. Becher

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<sup>89</sup> This is likely a minor issue given that most or all articles in reviewed journals are proof read by native speakers.

1987). This raises questions whether differences in terms of the manifestation of speaker accountability between different disciplines should be viewed in the same way. Before we consider research question 3 in the light of the result of the corpus investigation, let us look at how previous studies have approached differences in terms of metadiscourse between disciplines or genres.

Many of the publications by Hyland take a disciplinary contrastive approach. Hyland (1998b) studies potential differences in terms of a number of metadiscourse elements in articles on marketing, applied linguistics, astrophysics and microbiology. Hyland (1999a) focuses on different citation practises in sociology, marketing, philosophy, biology, applied linguistics, electronic engineering, mechanical engineering and physics. Hyland (1999c) and (2001a and 2001b) use the same disciplinary basis on a more extensive corpus to investigate differences in the stance and persuasive character of academic texts, self-mention strategies and addressee features, respectively.<sup>90</sup> A general conclusion to be drawn from Hyland's studies is that more often than not different disciplines reflect different metadiscursive strategies.

Differences between academic disciplines or texts written in different languages within a single discipline (French, English and Norwegian) are at the heart of work emanating from the KIAP research group in Bergen (see the reference list of KIAP publications in Fløttum et al. (2006)). To highlight some of their findings: there appear to be only marginal frequency differences between writers in medicine and linguistics in the use of epistemic markers of uncertainty, but more important differences in the kinds of markers used (Thue-Vold 2006a). Similarly, Fløttum et al. (2006) found that linguistic texts contain significantly more bibliographical citations than economics ones.

When it comes to different genres, much of the research over the last decade or so owes a great debt to Swales (particularly Swales 1990 and Swales 2004) for the focus and interest in different sections (introductions, methods, discussion etc.) of various academic publications (theses, research papers etc.). Hyland & Tse (2004) consider different metadiscourse elements and compare Master's and PhD dissertations. They note, for example, that writers of doctoral theses use evidential elements to a much greater extent than writers of Master's theses.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Many additional studies of a similar kind are also referred to and discussed in Hyland (2005a). See also Charles (2006) for an overview of some studies focusing on disciplinary differences.

<sup>91</sup> Hyland & Tse (2004) also includes a disciplinary comparison (six different academic disciplines) based on their proposed taxonomy of metadiscourse elements.

Based on the findings from studies such as those referred to above, it seems fair to assume that there could also be notable differences in how accountability is manifested in different academic disciplines, especially if we were to consider accountability a metadiscourse phenomenon. In other words, we should be open to consider accountability as reflecting one dimension of “rhetorical variation [in] disciplinary communication” (Hyland 1998b: 437).

The present study is particularly important for two reasons; first, because it considers an aspect of communication in academic discourse for which possible disciplinary differences have not been explored so far. Second, in considering those differences, it compares linguistic and literary texts, two disciplines that have not been compared in this respect before.

The linguistic texts could be claimed to qualify as examples of hard discipline texts (Hyland 1999c).<sup>92</sup> Many of the features of text in the hard disciplines seem to be present in the academic writing up of research in linguistic, and particularly psycholinguistic, contexts. Just like scientists in the natural sciences, researchers in linguistics often resort to testing or laboratory-like experiments. This, and the many other ways in which linguistics is sometimes claimed to resemble natural science, is likely to have significant rhetorical effects on the communication in such contexts (not least with respect to accountability). Hyland identifies the notion of hard science in the following way:

The hard knowledge disciplines can be seen as predominantly analytical structuralist, concerned with quantitative model building and the analysis of observable experience to establish empirical uniformities. Explanations thus drive from precise measurement and systematic scrutiny of relationships between a limited number of controlled variables. Knowledge is characterised by relatively steady cumulative growth, problems emerge from prior problems and there are fairly clear-cut criteria of what constitutes new contribution and how it builds on what has come before (1999c: 80-81).

The texts emanating from a research tradition in literary history and literary theory, conversely, are far removed from the hard disciplines and epitomise research from *soft* disciplines (Hyland 1999c). Soft disciplines are quite different in character, according to Hyland.

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<sup>92</sup> Some scholars may object to this assignment of linguistics to the “hard” disciplines. However, just as Stotesbury (2003) notes, I believe that the distinction between hard and soft fields is rather “fluid” but that “some disciplines traditionally regarded as humanistic subscribe to the reporting patterns of experimental research, for example various branches of linguistics” (2003: 328).

Soft knowledge disciplines [...] concern the influence of human actions on events. Variables are therefore more varied and causal connections more tenuous. These fields tend to employ synthetic rather than analytic inquiry strategies and exhibit a more reiterative pattern of development with less scope for reproducibility (1999c: 81).

This means that the corpus used here includes texts from two types of disciplines which, according to a somewhat stereotypical picture, have the potential of displaying distinct characters.

Intuitively, it is perhaps not strange to imagine that the issue of accountability is dealt with differently by speakers in linguistic and literary contexts, even though both disciplines are likely to adhere to some general academic norm (see Section 2.2 for a characterisation of communication in academic discourse). This brings me back to research question 3:

3. Do any differences in the typical accountability contexts of knowledge stating verbs hold across two different academic disciplines?

With the help of the HAT corpus and the two sub-corpora, I investigated whether there are any differences between the two disciplines in terms of the accountability contexts in which knowledge stating verbs typically feature. It turns out that very *few differences* between linguistic texts and literary texts can be found. Speakers in a linguistic context do not appear to differ to any considerable extent from speakers in literary texts when using knowledge stating verbs to manifest accountability (although, as indicated in Section 4.3.2, there are *some* differences).

This is interesting in view of what has just been said about other rhetorical (or indeed epistemological) differences between academic disciplines. Even if differences between academic disciplines have been found in other respects – for example, hedges are employed to a greater extent in marketing articles than in articles in astrophysics (Hyland 2005a: 144) – the way such differences carry over to the manifestation of accountability appears to be very limited. This is somewhat surprising given the characterisation of linguistic texts as hard discipline texts, and literary texts as soft discipline texts. It is surprising because the features of hard and soft discipline texts could have a lot to do with issues such as the manifestation of accountability. We would expect the fact that hard disciplines rely on knowledge (expressed in knowledge statements) based on “measurement and systematic scrutiny of relationships between a limited number of controlled variables” (Hyland 1999c: 80), to be reflected in the verb internal distribution across accountability contexts. Knowledge stating verbs in linguistic texts should

perhaps display less preference for High accountability contexts (remember the link between High accountability and High degree of Self-manifestation) than they actually do.

What is more, since we have characterised knowledge stating verbs according to their typical accountability contexts (for example, *believe* was labelled as a High accountability verb, *claim* as a Low-accountability verb and so on), we would expect to find lower frequencies of High or Medium-to-High accountability verbs in linguistic texts than we do. For example, it turns out that *suggest* (which I have classed as a Medium-to-High accountability verb) is very frequent in linguistic texts. Furthermore, the third most frequently occurring knowledge stating verb, *assume* (also a Medium-to-High accountability verb), is also very frequent in linguistic texts.

Similarly, the characterisation of soft disciplines as relying more on “synthetic rather than analytic” knowledge (Hyland 1999c: 81) would perhaps lead us to expect both denser High accountability distribution (for a specific verb) and higher frequencies of High accountability verbs in literary texts, not least because of the higher proportion of personal involvement associated with these verbs. This is not the case. Instead, the investigation shows that a Medium-to-High accountability verb like *assume* is encountered most frequently in Low accountability contexts in the literary sources. Although it is found frequently in High accountability contexts in literary texts, a High accountability verb like *believe* is overall very infrequent in such texts, contrary to what may be expected.

Nevertheless, some differences between linguistic and literary texts have been reported, but mostly at a level that does not allow far-reaching generalisations such as: *suggest* is a low-accountability verb in linguistics but a high-accountability verb in literary texts. Instead, we noted that *suggest* is slightly more common in Medium-to-Low accountability contexts in linguistic texts than in literary texts whereas the reverse is true for Low accountability contexts: *suggest* appears more often in such contexts in literary texts than in linguistic texts.

Thus, with regard to research question 3, any differences between linguistic and literary texts would have to be considered on a verb-by-verb basis and at considerable level of detail rather than as generalisations.

## 4.5 Summary

In this chapter, I have reported on a corpus investigation the purpose of which was to answer research questions 2 and 3 as stated in Chapter 1. On research question 2, some (and sometimes substantial) differences were found with regard to the accountability contexts in which knowledge stating verbs occur. In other words, the answer to research question 2 is: the verbs appear to display differences in terms of typical accountability contexts.

This also means that the scalar concept of accountability introduced in Chapter 3 appears to be able to accommodate the difference in accountability contexts for the verbs. The model proposed in the previous chapter thus offers a possibility for analysing accountability.

With respect to research question 3, there first appear to be some differences between linguistic texts and literary texts with regard to the typical accountability contexts of knowledge stating verbs. However, when the figures are tested for significance, it turns out that only a fraction of the differences can be considered significant. We should, however, not dismiss the results pertaining to research question 3. Previous work has shown that there are often substantial differences between disciplines as regards the use of different kinds of metadiscourse such as hedges, boosters, or evidentials, between disciplines. The manifestation of accountability shares similarities with metadiscourse, such as the expression of epistemic modality: both accountability and epistemic modality are scalar in nature and there is a notable element of “code-sharing” involved in that elements expressing epistemic modality, such as hedges or boosters, are also important in the manifestation of accountability. This was an important reason for my assumption in Chapter 1 that differences between disciplines should be expected with respect to accountability. Even though the results do not support that conclusion, they are interesting. The outcome of this second part of the corpus investigation could be explained with the fact that the linguistic and literary texts are not different enough to begin with. However, I find that explanation unlikely. I am more inclined to interpret the result at face value: the differences between academic speakers in different academic disciplines are perhaps not always as striking as we might have thought, at least not with regard to the manifestation accountability.

So far in this thesis, there have been numerous references to metadiscourse or aspects of metadiscourse in its broadest sense and I have made no secret of my intention to investigate the potential for considering accountability a metadiscourse phenomenon (research question 4). The results of

the current corpus investigation neither prove nor disprove this assumption. Indeed, the “negative” result with respect to disciplinary differences for knowledge stating verbs and accountability contexts could perhaps be partly explained by allowing accountability to be associated with one dimension of metadiscourse (see Section 5.4).

Explaining accountability by drawing on a theory of metadiscourse requires further development of the concept of metadiscourse, a development I consider an improvement: it will allow us to think of metadiscourse in potentially new ways and it will confirm and re-establish its usefulness as a linguistic concept.



# Speaker accountability – a metadiscourse phenomenon?

## 5.1 Introduction

So far, I have said that the metadiscourse of an utterance, including different citation practices and the staging of the utterance, is important for the manifestation of discourse voice (Self (+High/+Low) or Other (+High/+Low)). I have also assumed that it is possible to equate the degree to which a certain discourse voice is manifested with the degree to which a speaker could be considered accountable for the utterance (High, Medium-to-High, Medium-to-Low, or Low accountability; see Section 3.6). I have also shown that it is possible to describe the use of a set of lexical items crucial for the making of a knowledge statement, knowledge stating verbs, in terms of their featuring in typical High, Medium-to-High, Medium-to-Low or Low accountability contexts.

In other words, we have seen, first, what affects the manifestation of accountability and, second, how accountability can be mapped out to different extent in different contexts. In this chapter, I address the question of what accountability *is*; how it can be explained in a theory of communication. I do this by exploring whether accountability could be considered a phenomenon of metadiscourse. I test accountability against some defining criteria for metadiscourse (Hyland 2005a). This involves, among other things, considering how the notion of accountability relates to knowledge

content and to what extent the manifestation of accountability highlights the social dimension in communication.<sup>93</sup>

I begin by showing that accountability should not be equated with the knowledge content of the utterance. I then show that the degree of speaker accountability is motivated by social concerns and propose that accountability is best explained with reference to the concept of ‘social knowledge’. I furthermore claim that accountability is made intentionally-socially manifest between speakers, though not communicated in the traditional sense of the word. Finally, I suggest that there may be grounds for treating metadiscourse as a layered concept. I use the notion of accountability as social knowledge to illustrate this layering of metadiscourse and draw parallels to other kinds of social knowledge and propose a higher-level metadiscourse. This chapter thus addresses research question 4.

#### 4. Is accountability a metadiscourse phenomenon?

To the best of my knowledge, establishing a connection between accountability and metadiscourse has not been attempted so far. One important consequence of our interest in accountability as a potential phenomenon of metadiscourse is the implications it has for a theory of metadiscourse as a whole. As we will see, the association of accountability with metadiscourse invites a possible extension and development of our concept of metadiscourse.

The contribution of this chapter is three-fold and the conclusions of the discussion can be summarised thus:

- (i) There are grounds for treating accountability as a phenomenon associated with metadiscourse;
- (ii) Accountability can be considered as one dimension social knowledge;
- (iii) Accountability can be used to argue for a layered or two-dimensional metadiscourse where accountability is explained with reference to higher-level metadiscourse.

The chapter is organised in the following way. In Section 5.2, I test the notion of accountability against some qualifying criteria for metadiscourse proposed in previous accounts. In 5.2.1, I consider the extent to which accountability should be thought of as distinct from knowledge content and,

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<sup>93</sup> Other defining criteria have been proposed; for another recent discussion, see Ädel (2003). Although some differences are primarily terminological or presentational in nature, Ädel provides a viable alternative approach to and characterisation of metadiscourse (drawing on Jakobson 1998).

in 5.2.2, I turn to the issue of whether accountability highlights an interpersonal dimension in communication. In section 5.3, I introduce the idea of social knowledge and draw on proposals on similar discourse phenomena. I illustrate how this social communicative conception can help us understand the metadiscursive character of accountability and how social knowledge has even broader applicability in a general theory of metadiscourse. In section 5.4, I propose that accountability (and other kinds of social knowledge) is evidence for a division of metadiscourse into lower- and higher-level metadiscourse. Finally, in 5.5, I provide a short summary of the chapter.

## 5.2 Accountability – metadiscourse or not?

In this section, I compare the concept of accountability to two central criteria that have been suggested to qualitatively identify and characterise metadiscourse (see also Section 2.4). This means considering, first, whether speaker accountability could be seen as distinct from the propositional content of communication, and, second, whether it could be claimed to refer to aspects of the discourse that embody an interpersonal component of communication.

The concept of proposition has been a source of controversy for many years. Hyland (2005a: 38) acknowledges that “the idea of ‘proposition’ is undertheorized and rarely elaborated”. Lyons defines proposition as that which “is expressed by a declarative sentence when the sentence is uttered to make a statement” (1977: 141) and Hurford & Heasley say it is “that part of the meaning of a sentence that describes a state of affairs” (1983: 19). In formal approaches to semantics, the term is often equated with the part of the utterance that may be true or false (see e.g. Cann 1993). Halliday (1994) uses the term propositional material to denote “something that can be affirmed or denied, and also doubted, contradicted, insisted on, accepted with reservation qualified tempered, regretted and so on” (1994: 70). Like Hyland & Tse (2004), I am reluctant to include as much as Halliday seems to want to include in the term ‘propositional’. Much of what Halliday includes would arguably count as aspects of metadiscourse (Hyland & Tse 2004: 160). It is interesting though that accountability actually does not fit the description of any of the things Halliday mentions as propositional; we can affirm, deny, or contradict a proposition, but it seems odd to affirm, deny, or contradict accountability unless we do so very explicitly

(*I am not accountable for saying that...*), and this must be considered very rare in most kinds of discourse contexts.

By ‘interpersonal’, I mean an addressee-oriented aspect of or motive for communication. Any use of the term involves, however, a theoretical debt to Hallidayan approaches to language. In his Systemic Functional Grammar framework, Halliday claims that any text or discourse displays a tri-dimensional character conceptualised by an ideational (language as representation), an interpersonal (language as exchange) and a textual (language as message) perspective. For Halliday, interpersonal involves the establishment and maintenance of social relations, the expression of social roles (c.f. 1970: 143) (Halliday 1978, 1994). Finally, we should acknowledge the emphasis with which Halliday states that an interpersonal dimension of language is in no way inferior or secondary to the ideational dimension. This is support for the view that metadiscourse (if we regard it to represent primarily an interpersonal dimension) is also not to be considered secondary to propositional information.

### 5.2.1 Speaker accountability as distinct from knowledge contents

Hyland (2005a) establishes a vague defining line between propositions and metadiscourse, or in his own words “things in the world and things *in the discourse*” (2005a: 38 emphasis added).<sup>94</sup> He claims that metadiscourse should be regarded as a central part of what is *being meant* by the utterance in which it features: “[it] is itself a crucial element of its meaning – that which helps relate a text to its context [of utterance], taking readers’ needs, understandings, existing knowledge, intertextual experiences and relative status into account” (2005a: 41). Also, “[it] does not simply support propositional content: it is the means by which propositional content is made coherent, intelligible and persuasive to a particular audience” (2005a: 39). Yet, he also says that metadiscourse is non-propositional: “there are, then, good reasons for distinguishing metadiscourse from the propositional content of a text[...].” (2005a: 48). I agree with this view, and most approaches to metadiscourse appear to acknowledge that metadiscourse is different from propositional aspects of communication.<sup>95</sup> Let me illustrate this with

<sup>94</sup> Hyland & Tse even say that it is “unwise to push this distinction [between metadiscourse and propositional material] too far” (2004: 160); doing so may lead us to think that metadiscourse constitutes a separate level of meaning.

<sup>95</sup> See also e.g. Crismore et al. (1993: 40) who claim that metadiscourse refers to: “linguistic material [...] which does not add anything to the propositional content [...]”.

an example from the HAT corpus where we may consider the metadiscursive import of the utterance. In (120), the speakers signal overtly both their presence in the utterance (*we*) and the tentative stance (*may* and *suggest*) towards the content of the proposition.

- (120) We have demonstrated some minor differences between the groups where we **suggest** that they may reflect differences regarding automaticity of certain language sub-functions. (LING)

This utterance clearly manifests the discourse voice of Self and, according to the principles established in Chapter 3, it does so to a high degree because of the way the utterance is staged with the foregrounding of the speakers. Under the mapping assumption from Chapter 3, the speakers of (120) would also be considered accountable to a high degree for the content of the utterance by virtue of their high degree of presence. The import of the metadiscourse elements (*we*, *we*, *suggest* and *may*) should be evident in the light of the discussion in Chapter 3; with the self mention marker, the speakers step right into the discourse by self projecting and with the hedges the speakers' tentative epistemic attitude and perhaps also "the [speakers'] decision to recognize alternative voices and viewpoints" (Hyland 2005a: 52) is brought out.

It is easy enough to think of such metadiscursive aspects of an utterance as something separate yet intimately connected to the knowledge content communicated, comments *on* the utterance information, information pertaining only to other pieces of information in the utterance or the text and not to something in a real or possible world. Metadiscourse is usually not thought of in terms of information *communicated* between speakers on a par with propositional information. In this chapter, I propose an alternative and somewhat modified approach to communicability and metadiscourse, but in principle, I agree with the view that metadiscourse (when considered in traditional terms) is not communicated and this will be my point of departure.

Is it then possible to consider accountability non-propositional, akin to self mention markers or hedges? I argue that accountability is not something communicated on a par with the knowledge content in an utterance like (120). In terms of information communicated, speaker accountability should not be equated with the *meaning* of the knowledge content. When the speakers utter (120), they could be claimed to have communicated the information that *they reflect differences regarding automaticity of certain language sub-functions*, but no one is likely to say that the information "We are accountable to X degree" is communicated in the same way. Nevertheless,

since I would say that it is important for a complete understanding of the utterance, at some level the speakers may be taken to *convey* this degree of accountability to the addressee. This makes me want to address the notion of accountability from the point of view of information *about* something in the discourse – in this case, how accountable a speaker is – rather than information that constitutes knowledge content. Such a view corresponds quite well to the concept of metadiscourse introduced earlier. I want to make the same claim for accountability that Vande Kopple (2002: 102–103) makes for metadiscourse and its relationship to truth value: accountability does not “in the first instance appear to move [addressees] to subject them to the same processes of consideration and verification that ideational statements do”. If one continues to draw on Hallidayan terminology, metadiscourse, and accountability, are a lot more likely to evoke other dimensions of meaning associated with the utterance, primarily dimensions pertaining to interpersonal relationships (c.f. Vande Kopple 2002: 103).

The text could be taken to point towards a dimension of accountability, but the two are different ‘substances’, primarily because they have different functions at different levels of abstraction. It is the function of knowledge content (text) to communicate information about situations in a real or possible world; it is the function of metadiscourse dimensions to *convey* things *about* whatever is being expressed at the level of the text: for example, the speaker’s epistemic or other attitude or how what is being said fits in or contrasts with other, previous or coming, utterances. Thus, we can consider accountability as essentially having the same function – that of indirectly conveying something about how accountable speakers are for what they are saying with their utterance.

What exactly is the element of indirectionality involved? I argue that we use aspects of the text, very often metadiscourse elements, to highlight assumptions about a certain expected social behaviour such as politeness or accountability. In other words, we use metadiscourse to evoke such assumptions. For example, in (121), there is no “element of accountability” visible in the utterance itself; rather, the foregrounding of the Other-source (*Latham*) makes the utterance highly Other-oriented with the help of the knowledge stating verb *argue* in its evidential function. The speaker is taken to be accountable to a very low degree.

- (121) Latham **argues** that in English literature there were few references to fairies before mid-sixteenth century but abundant allusions in Scottish literature. (LIT)

Accountability can be seen as a function of our using certain linguistic expressions in appropriate discourse environments. On this view, metadiscourse and its implications for discourse voice can be seen as an indirect impetus to accountability.<sup>96</sup>

To sum up, conveying something about the degree of accountability is not the same as communicating information pertaining to knowledge content. Therefore, accountability is to be treated as distinct from knowledge content. I return to this point in Section 5.3 when I have introduced the notion of social knowledge.

### **5.2.2 Speaker accountability as referring to aspects of the discourse that embody speaker-addressee interaction**

Another crucial criterion for metadiscourse, particularly if one adopts a Hylandian approach (as I partly do), is that the linguistic element or aspect of discourse must evoke an interpersonal or addressee-oriented dimension at the level of metadiscourse. This means that any metadiscursive act by speakers reveals social concerns on their part. In the next sub-section, I am going to argue that more than accountability is “governed” by interpersonal concerns at the level of metadiscourse (this is important for Hyland (2005a) too; see Section 2.4 and the ensuing discussion in 5.3). I will also suggest that social expectations and anticipations are entertained and conveyed by the speaker and the addressees.

For Hyland, a piece of text or discourse always constitutes a potential meeting ground for speakers and their addressees, involving all or most of the social aspects of any regular encounter. When two people meet in the street and start chatting, it is quite uncontroversial to claim that what goes on between them is not only a purely linguistic interchange and exchange of information; that communication is a social enterprise in which speakers attend to the face wants (c.f. Brown & Levinson 1987) of an addressee or acknowledge an addressee in other ways and that there is a constant negotiation of conversational floor between speaker and addressee are just a few of the obviously social aspects of communication. I will assume that

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<sup>96</sup> This was established in Chapter 3. However, with the introduction of a concept of social knowledge (see below) to explain accountability (mental representations about social behaviour), it is easier to see not only that metadiscourse and other linguistic or communicative aspects of the utterance (citation management and foregrounding/backgrounding) are mechanisms of accountability but also that accountability is an independent social-communicative and real concept.

many of these social aspects or social objectives or concerns are neatly handled as metadiscursive<sup>97</sup> (see Section 5.3).

The strong interpersonal emphasis in Hyland's model is stressed already by his definition of metadiscourse:

Metadiscourse is the cover term for the self-reflective expressions used to negotiate interactional meanings in a text, assisting the writer (or speaker) to express a viewpoint and *engage with readers as members of a particular community* (2005a: 37 emphasis added).

The view that all metadiscourse, both interactive and interactional, can be considered interpersonal could be illustrated by any example utterance containing an element of metadiscourse. For the sake of comparison, let us use the example in (120), repeated here as (122).

(122) We have demonstrated some minor differences between the groups where we **suggest** that they may reflect differences regarding automaticity of certain language sub-functions. (LING)

An interpersonal dimension is brought out in its clearest form by the hedging introduced by the modal auxiliary *may* (and by the knowledge stating verb). By hedging the utterance, the speaker is not only expressing a tentative viewpoint but leaves the communicative space open for dissenting opinions from the audience. This should be interpreted as an acknowledgement of the addressees' right to opinions and their right to speak. Similarly, the fact that the speaker Self-projects (*we*) is a signal to the addressee about "the perspective from which statements should be interpreted, distinguishing [the speaker's] own work from that of others" (Hyland 2005a: 148). This clearly helps the addressee's overall interpretation of the utterance and acknowledges the addressee in the sense that the speaker seeks to facilitate this interpretation and avoid misunderstandings. Any other example involving metadiscourse would show exactly the same element of concern for the audience; all metadiscourse is thus socially contingent.

By expressing a certain degree of accountability, could a speaker be said to interact socially or interpersonally with his addressee(s) in the same way? Does it constitute social interaction to convey in some way who and to what extent someone is accountable for the utterance and the knowledge content? I will not offer an explanation for why accountability is essentially a social thing in this section, but will do so in the next section by relying

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<sup>97</sup> In Section 5.4, I am, however, going to argue that perhaps not all kinds of metadiscourse should be conceptualised as "belonging" at the same level of metadiscourse.



on the concept of social knowledge. However, for the sake of completeness, and by way of introducing the next section, I will provisionally make the claim that accountability is interpersonal for two reasons.

Firstly, an addressee is entitled to ascertain what kind of support for the knowledge content the speaker has and who is accountable for the information and to what extent. If the addressee is uncertain about the origin of the information and the extent to which that source can be held accountable for it, how could the addressee evaluate the information independently and decide what to think about it? On this view, when speakers express their degree of accountability, they are taking the addressees into account by indicating all the addressees may need to know about accountability distribution. Consequently, the conveying of information about accountability could be seen as an interpersonal act in itself in that it facilitates the addressee's proper interpretation of the utterance (this is in line with what Hyland and others have proposed for other kinds of metadiscourse; see Sections 2.4 and 3.3).

So, if I am reading linguistic articles, I expect the authors to signal clearly which ideas belong to them (by means of manifesting their own discourse voice or the discourse voice of Other) and also the extent to which they are accountable for the information. The speakers need to do this because the addressee may be of another opinion and wants to argue the opposite; the addressee needs to know whether the speaker or someone other than the speaker is accountable for the knowledge content. By indicating who is accountable and the degree of accountability, speakers acknowledge the addressee and the addressee's attempts at understanding what is being said.

Secondly, and more importantly, accountability is interpersonal also because its manifestation acknowledges the existence of a mental representation shared by the speakers and the addressee. This representation pertains to what is socially expected or acceptable at any given point in discourse; this acknowledgement also amounts to an acknowledgement of the addressee as a participant in communication by virtue of the addressee's sharing in the representation (Dahl 2004: 1811 says explicitly than all metadiscourse "may be broadly described as overtly expressing the writer's acknowledgement of the reader"). I will now turn to the social aspects of the conveying of accountability in more detail.

## 5.3 Speaker accountability as socially contingent – extending the argument and explaining accountability as social knowledge

### 5.3.1 Introduction

In this section, I will suggest that accountability qualifies as one dimension of what Sperber (1996) calls social knowledge. Furthermore, I will point to connections between the notion of social knowledge, a set of adequacy and acceptability conditions framing communicative expectations, and the dialogic nature of communication. All of this is considered an indication of the overall interpersonal act involved in the conveying of accountability. In 5.4, I show that the idea of social knowledge is one essential component of the explanation of accountability as a metadiscourse phenomenon. Section 5.4 also addresses some important implications resulting from this line of reasoning.

Let us start off with an example. In (123), it should be quite clear what knowledge content is communicated by the utterance: *the religious history explored is deeply embedded in a patriarchal logic*.

(123) I can only **suggest** that the religious history explored is deeply embedded in a patriarchal logic. (LIT)

It could also be claimed that by issuing this utterance the speaker expresses or does other things; most of this was addressed already in 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. For example, the hedging of the utterance through the knowledge stating verb and the limiting expression *only*, which almost takes on a focusing character, signal that the speaker only tentatively thinks that *the religious history explored is deeply embedded in a patriarchal logic*. Also, it could be claimed that by phrasing the utterance in this way, the speaker is being communicatively polite (Brown & Levinson 1987) to the audience: the speaker's tentative attitude almost invites dissenting opinions. Is there anything else this utterance does, anything the speaker is doing through the utterance in addition to communicating the knowledge content and being communicatively polite? I believe that the utterance also involves *some indication* of who is accountable for the knowledge content and to what degree. Two crucial questions can be asked in connection to this claim:

(i) Exactly what is the nature of such an indication of accountability?

- (ii) Could this kind of indication of accountability be claimed to be socially contingent (just as politeness is obviously interpersonal)?

To answer the first question, I claim that any indication of accountability is contained in the overall message communicated as a *mental representation* reflecting the speaker's and the addressee's shared social knowledge. To answer the second question, I claim that the speaker's concern for accountability ascription is socially contingent for two reasons; first, because the speaker's attention to anything that counts as social knowledge is a response to the addressee's need to be guided towards a complete and proper interpretation of the information communicated; and second, because such attention constitutes an indirect situational acknowledgement of the addressee as a partner in communication. In what follows, I will assume that the answer to both of these questions can be found by drawing on the concept of social convention or social knowledge.

### 5.3.2 Accountability and social knowledge

Following Sperber's (1996) proviso of social (as opposed to individual) knowledge, it seems reasonable to imagine that accountability could be a

widely distributed, lasting *representation* [which] gets communicated repeatedly and ends up being distributed throughout [a] group [yielding] a mental version in most of its members (1996: 33, emphasis added).

Ideas about social knowledge have their origin in social psychology and social cognition, and more precisely, within a theory of social representations (notably in works such as Moscovici 1981, 1988). Social representations theory “has as its imperative to reintroduce a social focus to the study of social psychology by reinstating the primacy of collective concepts”; it is assumed that any individual acting in a social context has its “own existence and identity rooted in a collectivity” (Augoustinos & Walker 1995: 134). Moscovici (1981: 181) defines social representations as “a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual communications”. Augoustinos & Walker (1995: 160-161) say that “social representations refer to the ideas, thoughts, images and knowledge structures which members of a society or collectivity share”. What I am arguing is that accountability is conceptualised and thus collectively shared as a common inter-individual or community-internal representation of a particular social behaviour.

When I argue that an aspect of communication, such as accountability, is a representation, I mean that it is something that can be entertained as an assumption inside the speaker, but also outside the speaker (and this is crucial if we want it to qualify as social knowledge) – communally entertained within a specific group of communicators. Sperber’s (1996: 33) example is any social group that also counts as a social community with a “common environment” or, I would argue, a common, frequently communicated, or otherwise entertained common discourse. Such a community is “inhabited by [a] population of representations” which then gets communicated or otherwise entertained between the speakers of that community. Sperber does not provide any concrete example of social knowledge; all he says is that there is no agreement on what it could amount to or how we should approach or explain it with a common terminology. There is thus no common ground, neither within anthropology nor within linguistics, but it leaves us with many potentially interesting avenues of research into social knowledge.<sup>98</sup> In this chapter, I will explore the idea that accountability is one aspect of social knowledge. I will begin by pointing to a parallel between accountability as social knowledge and other aspects of communication that could also constitute social knowledge.

### 5.3.3 Mentally representing social behaviour

For something to have the potential of being communicated between speakers, we assume it must be possible to mentally represent it, i.e. to entertain some assumptions about the thing being represented. Presumably, such assumptions are themselves representations in some open-ended mental space. Can we envisage a mental representation of accountability?<sup>99</sup> As a starting point, let me draw a parallel.

If I am a consumer or potential client of some company and see an advertisement, the knowledge I have of the relationship between manufacturers or producers and clients will make available in my cognitive environment a number of assumptions. One of these assumptions is likely to be that communication from manufacturers and producers is likely to include an element of persuasion because they want to sell me some idea or

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<sup>98</sup> Work within social cognition also acknowledges that there are few studies using the concept of social representations as a research construct in its own right; most studies on social representations seem to include it as part of a focus “linked to research in more mainstream approaches to social psychology” (Augoustinos & Walker 1995: 155).

<sup>99</sup> I use this term in a non-technical sense to mean a representation inside the speaker or someone else, inside a subject capable of entertaining a memory, intention or belief (c.f. Sperber 1996: 32).

product. Thus, when I entertain a mental representation reflecting the knowledge content brought to bear on the situation in the advertisement, I simultaneously entertain another, related, mental representation of the manufacturer/producer – consumer/client relationship. Part of this representation, or a sub-representation of it, highlights an element of persuasion. In this example, the social community would be manufacturers and clients and our common environment would be the relationship, the discourse, which usually pertains between manufacturers and clients. Persuasion involves a speaker's taking into account an abundance of aspects, including the addressee, in assessing the communication: for example, the addressee's background assumptions on what is being communicated, the addressee's feelings or attitudes towards the subject matter and the likelihood of the addressee's acceptance of what is being proposed.

People usually do not have a problem seeing communicative situations like these as being largely governed by some set of *social expectations* of a particular communicative behaviour.

Upon entering into a given conversation each party brings an understanding of some initial sets or rights and obligations that will determine, at least for the preliminary stages, what the participants can expect from the other(s).  
(Fraser 1990: 232)

It should be immediately obvious that this kind of reasoning extends to other aspects of communicative behaviour, such as communicative politeness.

Within Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995), it has been proposed that politeness too could be explained by drawing on the notion of social knowledge. The work within Relevance Theory can be compared to Meier (1995), who recasts the notion of politeness (he uses the term as proposed by Brown & Levinson 1987) in terms of what is “socially acceptable” (1995: 387) or determined in the light of the conditions or constraints of appropriateness. Meier's view is not very different from Fraser's (1990) who advocates a theory of politeness along the lines of what may be anticipated from a speaker on a certain occasion – a speaker's adherence to a social conversational contract. When speakers engage in communication, regardless of the communicative situation, they bring along a set of assumptions that specify what the addressees can expect from the communication. In some aspects, this expected behaviour is non-negotiable; for example, the speaker must use a language that both speaker and addressee can understand. In other instances, the expected behaviour is negotiable to a certain extent, depending on the context (Fraser 1990).

The point I want to make with respect to accountability is similar to the argument Jary (1998) and Escandell-Vidal (1998) make for politeness within Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1995). Escandell-Vidal takes the following example (1998: 48):

...for instance, if I hold an apple in my hand and drop it, I expect that it will fall; similarly, if I do you a favour, I would probably expect that you express gratitude. The first expectation has a natural basis and belongs to naïve physics; the second one depends on convention and has to do with politeness.

For accountability, speakers and addressees may be taken to share assumptions amounting to mental representations in the form of ideas about what communication in that situation requires in terms of accountability distribution. For example, if I write an article and it is published in a scholarly journal, since I am likely to be making a number of assertions in that article, the reading audience is perfectly entitled to expect (as part of my writing social behaviour) that I be specific about accountability assignment. They can also expect that I will signal to what extent I or somebody other than me is accountable for the knowledge content of the assertions.<sup>100</sup>

Thus, when speakers advance ideas of their own in an academic context and express a certain degree of commitment towards those ideas, they are likely to be held accountable by virtue of being the source from which such ideas emanate. This is something both the speaker and the addressees know and can mentally represent as part of their social knowledge about accountability distribution in academic discourse.

Similarly, speakers and addressees are likely to share assumptions about cases where speakers report the ideas of other scholars: those Other-sources can be held accountable to varying degrees and depending on how the speaker interferes with the utterance and remains, at least peripherally, present.

Further support for the existence of social knowledge (as represented mentally) and its importance to communication can be found in the fact that at some level of thinking, speakers must be assumed to entertain assumptions about the possible misuse or “non-execution” of certain linguistic expressions or strategies. For example, speakers are likely to think about inappropriate uses of language which would be detrimental to their communication or which would at least not serve their communicative goals

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<sup>100</sup> All knowledge content has a source and that source can only be the speaker himself or someone other than the speaker. Even if no *particular* individual is made accountable for the knowledge content, as in utterances where the discourse voice is that of the community (*It is generally believed that...*), the condition of accountability ascription is in some sense met and the utterance is acceptable.

and they are likely to notice such deviances in the communication from others. Any such “weighting” of language must be assumed to have its basis in speakers’ assumptions about what is conventional, expected, or otherwise appropriate for the communication. The speakers’ social knowledge likely helps them in making such decisions.

It should be stressed that accountability thus ascribed to either the speaker or someone other than the speaker<sup>101</sup> is likely to be scalar: at the abstract level of a speaker’s mentally representing accountability as social knowledge in academic discourse, there is some indication as to the degree to which accountability is ascribed. If speakers indicate that they are accountable for some utterance, they also indicate the degree to which they can be held accountable (High, Medium-to High, Medium-to Low, or Low). Similarly, for any utterance for which someone other than the speaker is accountable, that Other can be accountable to a very high or a very low degree. There is no reason this scalar schematic information cannot be part of the mental representation shared by the speaker and the addressee and entertained at the level of social knowledge.

### 5.3.4 Social knowledge and metadiscourse – accountability as a matter of acceptability?

As mentioned above, ideas resembling those advanced by Sperber (1996) in social epidemiology<sup>102</sup> have also been proposed in connection to metadiscourse. However, as far as I know, they have not been developed to any considerable extent; even more interestingly, scholars seem to have overlooked some of the theoretical implications of such reasoning.

*Adequacy* and *acceptability conditions* (Hyland 1998a, 2005a) have been claimed to underlie and govern metadiscourse and to be one of the main motivating factors for it. To Hyland (1998a, 2005a), adequacy and acceptability conditions involve speakers’ attending to a set of abstract conditions

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<sup>101</sup> Accountability ascription need not, however, be crucial for the communication between a speaker and the audience, and different discourses make different “social knowledge demands” on their speakers. For example, if a man is telling his wife about something he read in a spam e-mail he received at work, she is unlikely to pay much attention to the distinction between the information emanating from the sender of the e-mail and the conclusions drawn by her husband. In an academic panel discussion on L2 vocabulary storage, however, the academic audience and the panel members are likely to react if the line between information based on empirical evidence and a scholar’s conclusions is blurred. In the latter context, who is accountable for what is important; in the former, it is not.

<sup>102</sup> The term ‘social epidemiology’ stems from a metaphor suitable to explain Sperber’s (1996) position that ideas or mental representations are in a way epidemiological in that they spread around inside and across social communities.

in their communication. For example, this could involve making sure that any communicative contributions in an academic context:

- respond to an existing and finite set of exigencies recognised by the community
- maintain or expand the community's understanding of natural phenomena
- represent empirical adequacy and accuracy in terms of prescribed methods
- correspond to existing assumptions, theories and bodies of knowledge believed to accurately depict nature
- adopt the most certain and general position readers are likely to accept
- demonstrate scientific ethos which involves:
  - recognising previous work and acknowledging priority
  - concealing a rhetorical identity behind a pose of objectivity
  - presenting a modest and collegial persona, demonstrating deference to, and willingness to negotiate with, one's peers

Hyland (1998a: 252-253)

In a somewhat simplified fashion, we could take adequacy conditions to pertain primarily to the *content* of the communication: speakers need to make sure that their communicative contribution adheres to the expectations of the community; therefore, they consider such aspects of the communicative situation as the background assumptions of the community involving acknowledged empirical truths and disputable points of interests. Acceptability conditions, on the other hand, have more to do with *how* the topic is treated and how assumptions are negotiated between the speaker and the addressees. Hyland (1998a, 2005a) views metadiscourse and metadiscourse elements as one means for a speaker to meet both the adequacy and the acceptability conditions of the discourse community. Let us consider (124).

- (124) I **believe**, however, that it is rather unlikely that extraparadigmatic forms may have a blocking effect, that is, that nouns can block the formation of homophonous imperatives. (LING)

In (124), the speaker has decided to hedge the knowledge statement. One reason could be to guarantee a successful acceptance by the addressees; had the speaker opted for a bold assertion instead, he or she would have run the risk of attracting the research community's displeasure for not having



used the appropriate level of deference. These concerns could be claimed to highlight the acceptability conditions of the discourse. Since adequacy conditions are more subjectively oriented and concerned with the actual knowledge content of the utterance, they will only be considered in passing here; however, the reasoning is the same.

The list provided by Hyland (1998a; referred to above) could be revised to cover only the essentials of adequacy and acceptability conditions. What is more, the list as adapted applies only to communication in an academic environment; a revised minimal principle of adequacy and acceptability conditions (c.f. Grice's co-operative principle, Grice 1989: 22-41) would offer a more general set of conditions applicable to any discourse regardless of type, discipline, or genre.

Your communicative contribution should be such that it corresponds to the audiences expectations in terms of:

- (i) what the utterance is about (in terms of knowledge contents), and
- (ii) how the utterance is performed in its current discourse context.

In the utterance in (124), the speaker must be assumed to have adhered to both parts of the principle. We do not know to what extent the speaker meets the addressee's expectations with respect to knowledge content. With regard to the performance of the knowledge statement (*how* the speaker does it), the speaker's making of the assertion, we could imagine the speaker having adapted the communication according to some set of norms or standards by epistemically couching the knowledge content rather than making a bold assertion; alternately, the speaker could have foregrounded himself or herself in connection to the tentative assertion to underline the fact that the tentative assertion stems from himself or herself only and has thus not yet reached the stage where it is established communal knowledge, something which all members of the community agree upon.

What is interesting for our discussion is that the speaker's performance of the utterance in relation to how it is done in the "current discourse contexts" relates also to aspects of social knowledge. In (124), the speaker is highly accountable (by virtue of the foregrounding as well as the degree of presence introduced by the hedges and the attitude marker). The speaker's conveying of this fact to the addressee should also be considered in keeping with the second part of the principle and meet the addressee's expectations in terms of *how* the utterance is performed, i.e. a requirement that accountability is ascribed appropriately. We have also concluded that the speaker

seems to have met any requirements pertaining to communicative politeness (also through the hedging involved).

The idea that expectations govern the speaker's communication is not new. Bakhtin (1986: 132) said that "both the composition and, particularly, the style of the utterance depend on those to whom the utterance is addressed, how the speaker (or writer) senses and imagines his addressees". This process of imagining the addressee could, I argue, be explained with the notion of social knowledge which "feeds" into the establishment of certain conditions of communication.

One minor shortcoming of Hyland's (1998a) account of adequacy and acceptability conditions is that although he claims that such conditions exist, he does not say more specifically *what* they are (their ontological status) or *wherein* they have their basis. In the following, I shall claim that adequacy and acceptability conditions are motivated by social knowledge; social knowledge serves as input to such conditions in communication. The minimal principle of adequacy and acceptability conditions would then be motivated by social knowledge in its broadest sense (i.e. social knowledge taking into its scope not only accountability but also other relevant concepts such as politeness, persuasion, personal promotion, etc.). I return to this issue in section 5.4, when I discuss higher-level metadiscourse and its relationship to social knowledge.

By way of a partial summary and a response to the first question posed in Section 5.3.1, accountability should be seen as a mental representation of the social knowledge shared by speaker and the addressee.

### **5.3.5 Accountability as interpersonal – conveying social knowledge**

As a starting point for addressing the issue of how such a mental representation could be claimed to be interpersonal, question (ii) in 5.3.1, I want to raise the important question of whether the motives that underlie acceptability conditions (i.e. social knowledge of any kind) are communicated between the members of the community as (propositional) meanings or made manifest in any other way. Basically, what I am asking is whether social knowledge such as accountability is something *communicated* in the traditional sense of the word.

Let us consider this issue of communicability of metadiscourse and accountability further (communicability and/or non-communicability was discussed briefly above in 5.2.1; I now return to this issue having intro-

duced the notion of social knowledge). In line with earlier reasoning about metadiscourse, it has already been established that metadiscourse is non-propositional and I have proposed that we treat accountability in the same way; accountability is also not part of propositional information/knowledge content. However, I do wish to say that accountability is somehow entertained between the speaker and the audience and that it is thus indirectly conveyed.

Let us consider a crucial point for communication – intentionality.<sup>103</sup> Hyland says for *interactive metadiscourse* that “writers have to ensure that their claims display a plausible relationship with reality using the epistemic conventions and argument forms of their disciplines. [...] It [i.e. metadiscourse] therefore represents the writer’s assessment of the reader and his or her assumptions about their processing needs, rhetorical expectations and background understandings” (2005a: 90). Similarly, he claims that *interactional metadiscourse* (see 3.3 for a discussion of interactive and interactional metadiscourse) is used to address “acceptability conditions, incorporating an awareness of interactional factors. [...] This is principally accomplished through weighting tentativeness and assertion, and the expression of a suitable relationship to one’s data, arguments and audience” (2005a: 91). In other words, Hyland says that interactive and interactional metadiscourse address adequacy and acceptability conditions, respectively. In the next section, I propose a slight modification of Hyland’s claim although I think that in principle he is correct. Unfortunately, Hyland (1998a and 2005a) seems to stop short of exploring whether the attention paid to adequacy and acceptability conditions is something that the speaker is aware of or whether it gets combined with the overall metadiscourse concerns (i.e. to *be* interpersonal) and what the possible implications of these different views would be.

If metadiscourse helps speakers meet adequacy and acceptability conditions, presumably the speakers’ employment of metadiscourse elements such as hedges rests with their overall conscious attention of the addressee – that the addressee should be guided towards a proper interpretation of the utterance in the best possible way or else in correspondence with the speakers’ communicative objectives. But are speakers *consciously* attending also to the adequacy and acceptability conditions of the discourse situation? And if so, are these conditions (and the speakers’ adherence to them)

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<sup>103</sup> In keeping with one very influential framework of communication, Relevance Theory (c.f. Sperber & Wilson 1995; Carston 2002), I assume that for communication to have taken place, the speaker must have had the intention to communicate and that this intention must be obvious to the addressee. Thus, the issue of *communicative intention* is crucial.

something speakers *communicate* to the addressee? I am inclined to say that the speaker is consciously aware of these conditions. I will also argue that at one level of metadiscourse the speaker is indirectly *conveying* this conscious attention of adequacy and acceptability conditions to the addressee as part of the social knowledge, even if this attention is *not communicated per se*.<sup>104</sup>

Hyland also seems to think that one of the rationales for a speaker's use of metadiscourse, and the speaker's consequent concern for adequacy and acceptability conditions, is the inherent potential falsification of claims in an academic setting (e.g. 1998a: 92, 94; 2005a: 90-91). In other words, speakers hedge (or use other metadiscursive strategies) to signal potential negatability of assertions either because what is asserted may not correspond to what is "believed to be true in the world" (1998a: 92) (adequacy conditions) or because what is asserted may not correspond to what is expected in terms of the speaker's *way* of asserting the knowledge content (acceptability conditions). I believe this is true, but I do not think it is the whole truth or the whole rationale.

Instead, I suggest that when speakers are consciously attending to adequacy and acceptability conditions (by framing their communication metadiscursively), they are doing it in order to *convey* something *in addition* to their communication of knowledge content. They are conveying their *social knowledge* about the communicative situation or the relationship with the addressee, for example, how accountable they are for the utterance.

Speakers' objectives for conveying this kind of social knowledge is likely to be interpersonally grounded. By conveying social knowledge, speakers guide and facilitate the addressee's complete and proper reception of the communicated information (remember that accountability assignment is *needed* for proper interpretation in some contexts). The speakers' sharing of social knowledge involves an acknowledgement of the other interactant(s): "I know what is required of me in this situation and you know this too – we are both members of the same social community". This kind of acknowledgement is perhaps more evident with politeness than with accountability, but I think that both accountability and politeness are related to the speakers' interpersonal attention with and through their utterance.

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<sup>104</sup> It is, of course, impossible to have anything but a hypothesis about a speaker's conscious or non-conscious attention to the social assumptions of the discourse situation. For the sake of the discussion of social knowledge or social assumptions, it is interesting to reason along these lines. We should perhaps also bear in mind that when it comes to academic writing, this must be seen as a very conscious way of crafting communication.

Moreover, speakers' objective in conveying social knowledge may also be dialogically motivated (though, note that there is no contradiction at all in saying that their objective is interpersonal as well as dialogic). When speakers convey some social knowledge relevant to the communication (regardless of the degree of indirectness), this could be a dialogic re-acknowledgement of past discourses the speaker has shared with the addressee inside the social community.

A final remark about the process of conveying. The distinction I want to make between communicating something and conveying something is essentially one of *intentional communicative manifestness* and *intentional-social manifestness*. In this I follow in some marginal respects Escandell-Vidal's proposal (1998) (see also Fraser 1990). Speakers can make something intentionally-socially manifest between themselves and an audience without having the intention to *communicate* it directly: it is only entertained, i.e. made available, as a shared assumption. Propositional information or knowledge content is communicated because it is intended to be communicatively manifest. Social knowledge is not communicated but may be made socially manifest and thus have a bearing on communication.

It is unlikely that speakers always overtly or directly *inform* the addressee who is accountable and to what degree, or that speakers are being polite as part of the utterance on a par with knowledge content (unless this *is* also part of the knowledge content, of course). Myers (1985) talks about something similar in connection to persuasion. In the writing of grant proposals, the applicant must craft the message so it will persuade the audience without being too obvious: "one must persuade without seeming to persuade" (1985: 220). I argue that persuasion, accountability and politeness all involve social knowledge. It is not unlikely that speakers are concerned with what the social expectations demand of them in a given situation and thus acknowledge that they and the addressee(s) share a mental representation of what attention to such expectations involves (for example, persuasion, accountability or politeness) and that this is conveyed between the interactants.

### 5.3.6 Summary

By way of a more complete answer to the first and second questions posed in the introduction to this section (5.3.1), I suggest, first, that accountability should be seen as a mental representation of the social knowledge shared by speaker and addressee and that the making manifest of such a

mental representation counts as a speaker's *conveying* of social knowledge. What is more, such attention to a mental representation and such conveying of social knowledge are interpersonal: they guide and facilitate the addressee's interpretation and acknowledge that the speaker and the addressee are members of the same community of speakers.<sup>105</sup>

In other words, and in response to research question 4, there are grounds for associating the manifestation of accountability with metadiscourse. Accountability is distinct from knowledge content and its manifestation brings an interpersonal dimension to the communication through its connection to social knowledge. The last section of this chapter is concerned with some implications of our thinking about accountability in connection with metadiscourse. We will see that the reasoning from this chapter invites us to extend and develop our concept of metadiscourse.

## 5.4 Social knowledge and prospects for a *higher-level metadiscourse*

In the previous section, it was established that accountability is a phenomenon of metadiscourse. In this section, I develop this idea and propose that accountability should be associated with a different kind of metadiscourse than metadiscourse in "traditional" terms. I suggest that accountability is addressed by an aspect of a '*higher-level metadiscourse*' and introduce this new term into our reasoning about metadiscourse.<sup>106</sup>

As a starting point, recall the definition of metadiscourse that I operate with in this thesis:

That aspect of the utterance through which speakers themselves highlight or refer not to a situation in a real or imagined world – that is, not to something which counts as knowledge content – but to things said or done in the discourse about other things said or done in the discourse

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<sup>105</sup> Additional support for the fact that accountability is metadiscursive in this way can be found in the claim made by Fløttum et al. (2006: 160) with reference to what metadiscourse is: "[...] overt expressions of the writer's acknowledgement of the reader". Although the acknowledgement is hardly overt in the concrete sense of the word, when it comes to the mutual entertainment of accountability as a social knowledge mental representation, I take my view to support Fløttum et al.'s position.

<sup>106</sup> "Higher-level metadiscourse" should not be confused with "higher level metatext" as the term is used by Bunton (1999). Higher level metatext (in Bunton's terminology) refers to strictly meta-*textual* links allowing for metadiscursive references to be made over more extensive pieces of discourse.

Throughout this thesis, a number of aspects of an utterance have been accounted for by recourse to the notion of metadiscourse. The (functional) taxonomies proposed in previous literature bear witness to the multitude of dimensions potentially involved (refer to Hyland 2005a: 49 for examples of different kinds of interactive and interactional metadiscourse).

For example, a hedge can be used to signal speakers' commitment to knowledge content.

- (125) I am **assuming** that the play could have been performed at both these locations.  
(LIT)

With such a metadiscourse element, it is easy to see that at the level of metadiscourse the hedge highlights or refers not to a situation in some world, but to the speaker's comment or qualification of knowledge content, i.e. something said in the discourse (c.f. the definition of *metadiscourse* above).

When speakers make intentionally-socially manifest (possible lack of) accountability for some information which is communicated, this also does not involve highlighting or reference to a situation in a real or imagined world. Thus, speakers' intention to make something socially manifest should not be considered on a par with their intention to make manifest propositional information. However, conveying something about accountability crucially involves speakers making reference to the dimension of accountability itself (i.e. to social knowledge). The dimension of accountability exists purely as social knowledge and cannot be found within the utterance. It is something shared by the speaker and the addressee as a mental representation outside or above the utterance but still associated with the utterance through a relationship of embedding.

Hedging, for example, takes within its scope primarily the knowledge content of the utterance – it is a meta-comment *about* knowledge content (*I tentatively assert that P*). Similarly, a transition marker such as *however* is a comment by speakers that what follows in the utterance stands in contrast to something communicated previously – a meta-comment about something in the utterance. When conveying something about accountability, however, speakers are not primarily concerned with the knowledge content but with the presence of a representation shared by them and the addressee(s), highlighting and taking within its scope social knowledge. Through the utterance, speakers indirectly refer to this social knowledge.

Remember that I have claimed that accountability is not “part of” the utterance, it is distinct from knowledge content (c.f. 5.2.1 above). Ac-

countability, unlike other kinds of metadiscourse, also has no *direct* linguistic manifestation in communication. Whereas a speaker's metadiscourse comment that some knowledge content may or may not be true is represented by an overt linguistic expression through a metadiscourse element, a hedging expression such as a modal auxiliary, accountability has no such direct linguistic reflection. Instead, it rides piggy-back on other metadiscourse expressions and other aspects of the utterance (for example, information structure)<sup>107</sup> and receives more of an indirect *linguistic* manifestation. I claim that this lack of an overt linguistic expression is a characteristic of all aspects of what I call 'higher-level metadiscourse phenomena'. A similar thing is noted by Thompson & Ye (1991) in their discussion of evaluation – evaluation is not discretely linguistically encoded. Rather, they say, it makes use of “*features* of linguistic elements [and, I would argue, linguistic structure] already present” (1991: 367, italics added). The fact that aspects of communication referred to as metadiscourse can have different degrees of linguistic salience is noted also by Verschueren in his reasoning about reflexive awareness (which I have taken to correspond fairly well to what I describe as metadiscourse): “not all reflexive awareness is equally salient and accessible (to the point where one may wonder [...] whether the concept still applies” (1999: 188). So, even if we do not ‘see’ accountability in the text, it may still be part of discourse.

Thompson & Ye comment that evaluation is “best seen as working at the discourse level” and that it is “cumulative rather than clearly signalled [...] depend crucially on context [and that] it can be seen as a separate layer of meaning potential” (1991: 367). This is more or less what I am claiming for accountability, though I should stress that “meaning potential” should not be interpreted as “separate” in the sense that it has nothing to do with the rest of the utterance. On the contrary, it is an essential piece of the interpretation of the utterance as a whole. Bergler (1990) also talks about reporting in terms of “*primary information*” (the knowledge content) and “*meta-information*, which embeds the primary information within a perspective, a belief context, or a modality, which we call *circumstantial information*” (1990: 216). Although I think the term ‘circumstantial’ is unfortunate, she makes an interesting point. Her claim seems valid for metadiscourse in its broadest sense, i.e. as incorporating both lower-level metadiscourse and higher-level metadiscourse (which embeds that lower-level metadiscourse).

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<sup>107</sup> I owe this metaphor to Levinson (2000), although he uses it in a different context.



Higher-level metadiscourse could thus be considered a cumulative concept. It involves a bringing together of several aspects of the utterance (e.g. the dominant discourse voice) addressed at the level of lower-level metadiscourse to achieve a higher-level meta objective corresponding to the social knowledge assumptions entertained. This presupposes some degree of metadiscursive awareness on the part of the speaker. To be metadiscursively aware means that a speaker has a certain awareness of the kind of metadiscursive impact a certain utterance has, i.e. what the utterance is ‘doing’ at the level of lower-level as well as higher-level metadiscourse (c.f. “metapragmatic awareness” as it is used by Verschueren 1999 to designate the process of linguistic choice making by speakers to employ language to “openly reflect” upon discourse itself).

The differences in metadiscourse scope alluded to earlier and the fact that there appears to be a difference also in terms of the directness of the linguistic manifestation of the two kinds of metadiscourse leads me to propose that metadiscourse is two-dimensional. At the level of lower-level metadiscourse, speakers refer to or address something said or done *in the utterance*, a meta-comment on or about knowledge content (sometimes referring to knowledge content itself and sometimes more concerned with the organisation of the text or how the utterance and its knowledge content relate to other utterances and the knowledge content in them, schematic reference in its widest sense). At the level of higher-level metadiscourse, speakers do not primarily refer to something said or done in the utterance, but address aspects of the communicative situation, something in the discourse embedding the utterance and what the utterance itself does, e.g. conveying accountability, politeness or other aspects of social knowledge. Let us consider the example in (126) to make this clear.

- (126) **Assuming** that this is correct, it is plausible to **suggest** that the factivity of exclamationatives is syntactically encoded by the presence of the extra CP layer [...].  
(LING)

This utterance communicates the information that *the factivity of exclamationatives is syntactically encoded by the presence of the extra CP layer*. At the level of lower-level metadiscourse, the speaker cautiously meta-comments that what is contained in the knowledge content of the utterance is possibly true (notice the hedging expression *plausible* and the fact that both knowledge stating verbs, *assuming* and *suggest*, are Self-oriented and evoke a hedging dimension). The speaker’s meta-comment is, as it were, a comment *on* the knowledge content, i.e. internal to the utterance.

The utterance in (126) would also be taken by many to involve a high degree of communicative politeness: through hedging, the speaker minimises the impact of a potentially face threatening act (Brown & Levinson 1987). At the level of higher-level metadiscourse, the utterance highlights social knowledge shared by the speaker and the addressee pertaining to the situation which they are in. This social knowledge involves social assumptions about politeness, what it means to be communicatively polite, and “situated” social knowledge, such as the extent to which politeness is important in the current communicative situation (i.e. in this particular piece of academic discourse). The utterance in (126) could also be taken to convey a relatively high degree of speaker accountability. The utterance also potentially conveys other things, such as that the speaker is promoting himself/herself and his/her scholarly persona to a moderate degree or that the speaker is trying to persuade the addressee about the correctness of the line of argument. All of this must be taken to be the result of the speaker’s reference to an aspect of the utterance that refers to something the utterance does. As in the case of politeness, I assume that this reference involves the entertaining of social knowledge about accountability, Self-promotion and persuasion and situated social knowledge about accountability, Self-promotion and persuasion in academic discourse. Thus, this aspect of the utterance is attended to at a level of higher-level metadiscourse.<sup>108</sup> There is nothing to stop an utterance from evoking more than a single dimension of social knowledge simultaneously.

It is worth noting that my reasoning with respect to a layered or two-dimensional metadiscourse is also in keeping with the minimal principle of adequacy and acceptability conditions introduced earlier. Lower-level as well as higher-level metadiscourse must be taken to be crucial for the fulfilment of the conditions under the principle (especially the second part; *your communicative contribution should be such that it corresponds to the audience’s expectations in terms of how the utterance is performed*). However, it is likely that lower-level and higher-level metadiscourse are doing different things under the principle and for adequacy and acceptability conditions. Lower-level metadiscourse is the speakers’ way of adhering to what the principle requires in the communicative situation (see discussion on this and Hyland’s (2005a) claim along these lines in Section 5.3). Higher-level metadiscourse, on the other hand, addresses social knowledge, and social knowledge (and situated social knowledge) is the input to the minimal

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<sup>108</sup> The concept of self-promotion has been addressed in various forms throughout this thesis. For discussions on the notion of persuasion, see e.g. Kitcher (1991), Crismore et al. (1993), Hyland (1998b); Halmari & Virtanen (2005) (and some of the papers in there, such as Östman 2005).

principle of adequacy and acceptability conditions – that which tells speakers what they have to do at the lower-level of metadiscourse. Through higher-level metadiscourse speakers could be claimed to address the meta-objectives (the *why*) of their own lower-level metadiscourse expression.

It is important not to underestimate the vast number of social knowledge assumptions possibly brought to bear on any communicative occasion. For example, social knowledge involves knowing that the use of a hedging (epistemic) element signals how committed speakers are to the information communicated. It should be borne in mind, however, that speakers also have assumptions about the *full* functional potential of hedges, what functions lower-level metadiscourse can perform to satisfy acceptability conditions which have their basis in social knowledge. Moreover, speakers also entertain knowledge about things such as the dangers of misusing (overusing or not using) hedges (c.f. Varttala 1999) in a particular social context. This is also part of speakers' social knowledge and a potential piece of evidence for the existence of a higher-level metadiscourse.

Before summing things up in this section, it is worth noting that if we work with the assumption of a higher-level metadiscourse, some of the existing definitions of metadiscourse appear problematic. For example, while I acknowledge that Hyland's is a good model of metadiscourse, one of his earlier definitions does not seem able to accommodate a higher-level metadiscourse. He says, for example, that "Metadiscourse is defined here as those aspects of the text which explicitly refer to the organisation of the discourse or the writer's stance towards either its content or the reader" (1998b: 438). There is nothing in this definition to allow for an extension to a higher-level metadiscourse as discussed in this section. Accountability need not, as has been argued, have anything to do with stance. The definition proposed in this section covers the crucial reference to a higher-level metadiscourse too in its reference to "things said or done in the discourse about other things said or done in the discourse". However, an obvious drawback of the definition I have proposed is its lack of an overtly referred to interpersonal element. Since much of the essence of higher-level metadiscourse embraces precisely social or interpersonal aspects of communication, the definition I provide needs to be supplemented to overtly refer to the fact that metadiscourse, lower- as well as higher-level, also involves an interpersonal element. Consequently, I propose the following, reformulated, definition of metadiscourse:

That aspect of the utterance through which speakers themselves highlight or refer not to a situation in a real or imagined world – that is, not to something

that counts as knowledge content – but to things said or done in the discourse about other things said or done in the discourse and where this reference involves an acknowledgement of the addressee.

The interpersonal acknowledgement referred to in the definition includes not only the kind of acknowledgement involved in the higher-level metadiscursive reference to social knowledge shared by the speaker and the audience, but also such lower-level metadiscourse elements as engagement markers, a specific acknowledgement of the addressee.

To summarise, at the level of lower-level metadiscourse speakers refer to things said or done in the utterance *about something in the utterance* or *in other utterances* and there are individual metadiscourse elements in the utterance to signal the presence of lower-level metadiscourse. At the level of higher-level metadiscourse, speakers refer to social knowledge *outside the utterance* (i.e. to something existing independently of the utterance but still situationally associated with the utterance) and the utterance as a whole addresses social knowledge at the level of higher-level metadiscourse. It should be emphasised that my reasoning about a lower-level and a higher-level metadiscourse aims to connect the two levels, i.e. they are not complementary but rather complement each other. What speakers are doing at the level of lower-level metadiscourse is a response to something addressed at the level of higher-level metadiscourse. When speakers express evidentiality through the use of a knowledge stating verb and by foregrounding an Other-source, this is a lower-level meta comment on the knowledge content. Simultaneously, however, those speakers address the social knowledge of a given situation by conveying a certain degree of speaker accountability – this is a higher-level metadiscourse aspect of the utterance.<sup>109</sup>

I should be clear about what I mean when I say that accountability is a ‘phenomenon of metadiscourse’. I am not saying that accountability *is* metadiscourse, but that it is addressed *at a level* of metadiscourse (*an aspect of the utterance which refers to things said or done in the discourse*) and therefore qualifies as a metadiscourse phenomenon. Accountability *is* social knowledge and as a dimension of social knowledge it is addressed by high-

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<sup>109</sup> In the same way, I would argue that discourse voice is essentially a lower level phenomenon (but perhaps not lower-level *metadiscourse*). Higher-level metadiscourse addresses aspects of the discourse outside the utterance, i.e. in the discourse. The manifestation of discourse voices is a bringing together of several lower-level phenomena, an accumulation of lower-level aspects which directly interacts with something which takes place at a higher-level of communication. It is therefore reasonable to treat discourse voice itself as a lower-level phenomenon. However, it is important to remember that discourse voice is likely to interact in this way with other aspects of discourse addressed at a higher-level of communication as well. Although I do not explore this any further in this thesis, I see no reason why the manifestation of discourse voice should not also be interacting with other dimensions of social knowledge.

er-level metadiscourse. We can compare this to any instance of lower-level metadiscourse. Although a hedge or a self mention marker may be referred to as metadiscourse elements they never *are* metadiscourse. Those aspects of the meaning of an utterance underlying the use of a hedge or a self mention marker can be addressed by the lower-level metadiscourse of the utterance and any linguistic expression serves as a signpost to that dimension of communication (as opposed to propositional aspects of communication). In Chapter 2, I drew the parallel to illocutionary force and illocutionary force indicators; the illocution could be seen to be indexed or linguistically addressed by the illocutionary force indicators but the latter certainly do not constitute the illocution which purely exists as a mental dimension of communication. The terminology adopted in this chapter with respect to accountability, social knowledge and higher-level metadiscourse mirrors that used in relation to illocutions; the only difference is that accountability as a dimension of social knowledge does not have any single “indicator” to make it linguistically overt, rather the utterance as a whole, and, in the case of accountability, the dominant discourse voice made manifest is crucial. Thus, the important point I am making is that accountability, and other dimensions of social knowledge, and the way these aspects of communication are addressed at the level of higher-level metadiscourse are a clear indication that we need to expand our notion of metadiscourse to allow it to encompass, or ‘address’ as I use the term, not only aspects of the utterance or other utterances in relation to the current utterance, but a wider discourse context, for example anything referred to as social knowledge – to achieve this, we need a higher-level metadiscourse.

The basic idea underlying the concept of social knowledge is not new (see Fraser 1990, Hyland 1998a, 1998b, and these sources have referred to it in other ways) but rather offers an alternative theoretically grounded perspective in connecting accountability to social knowledge. However, the idea of explaining accountability, and other aspects of communication qualifying as potential social knowledge phenomena, with reference to a higher-level metadiscourse is a new take on metadiscourse.

Finally, a few additional brief remarks on social knowledge and higher-level metadiscourse are in order. Social knowledge as portrayed here could also be compatible with, and perhaps even partly explained by, a dialogic view of communication. Todorov (1984) says that “not only have words always already been used and carry within themselves the traces of preceding usage, but ‘things’ themselves have been touched, at least in their previous states, by other discourses that one cannot fail to encounter” (1984: 63). Just like words or thoughts carry traces of prior use, discourses highlight

preceding discourses, aspects of discourse, or discourse patterns. There is no reason such discourse traces should be limited to propositional information/knowledge content. Instead, discourse traces, i.e. intertextuality, could highlight other commonalities of discursive behaviour such as social patterns. It is in this respect that I want to point to the dialogic nature of social knowledge, discursively referenced by higher-level metadiscourse.

If social knowledge equals mental representations of a particular social behaviour and these representations are shared or frequently entertained within a social community, the recurrent entertainment of those social assumptions could be considered dialogic: whenever speakers entertain a social mental representation, it has been entertained, is entertained and will be entertained by other speakers and addressees at other points in the discourse or in other discourse situations. So, like propositional information/knowledge content, which clearly is dialogic in Bakhtinian terms, social knowledge is dialogic as well:

The topic of the speaker's speech, regardless of what this topic may be, does not become the object of speech for the first time in any given utterance; a given speaker is not the first to speak about it. The object, as it were, has already been articulated, disputed, elucidated and evaluated in various ways. [...] The utterance is addressed not only to its own object, but also to others' speech about it. (Bakhtin 1986: 131)

Instead of addressing a propositional or knowledge content “object”, speakers could be addressing their own as well as others' assumptions about expected social behaviour patterns – a pattern established by frequent recurrence in communicative situations governed by conventionalised discursive behaviour. For accountability, then, as well as for other kinds of social knowledge, the entertainment and addressing of these higher-level metadiscursive aspects of the utterance can be seen as a dialogic response to expectations resting in social knowledge.

As a very last point, with reference to the conclusions from Chapter 4, it is also worth recalling the fact that although many metadiscourse differences between academic disciplines have been noted, this does not seem to apply to the manifestation of speaker accountability. In Chapter 4, it was established that there are few differences between linguistic and literary texts in the typical accountability contexts in which knowledge stating verbs feature. On the assumption that accountability is a higher-level metadiscourse phenomenon, it is interesting to ask if this is common for all, most or some of the aspects of metadiscourse we could label higher-level. As mentioned, numerous differences between academic disciplines have

been noted in regard to (lower-level) metadiscourse. It may be worth asking if these disciplinary differences simply do not carry over to aspects of communication addressed by higher-level metadiscourse.

## 5.5 Summary

This chapter addressed research question 4. It was established that accountability can be explained as a phenomenon of metadiscourse. It is conveyed between speaker and addressee but distinct from the knowledge content of the utterance. Its manifestation and impact on communication highlight the social aspects of communication and it can be thought of as one instance of social knowledge. The connection to social knowledge leads me to propose that there may actually be two levels of metadiscourse, a lower and a higher one; only the latter addresses social knowledge aspects of communication.





# Summary and future research

This short chapter summarises the thesis and points out some avenues for future research.

## 6.1 Introduction

In this thesis, my main concern has been the manifestation of *accountability* in *knowledge statements* containing *knowledge stating verbs* in academic discourse. It was the aim of the thesis to provide answers to the following four research questions:

1. What is it in an utterance containing knowledge stating verbs that affects the manifestation of accountability?
2. Do knowledge stating verbs feature in utterances that convey different degrees of accountability, i.e. do they feature in different accountability contexts?
3. Do any differences in the typical accountability contexts of knowledge stating verbs hold across two different academic disciplines?
4. Is accountability a metadiscourse phenomenon?

In this chapter, I first provide a short summary of the contributions of the study. I then describe in more detail the conclusions from Chapters 3-5, the chapters addressing research questions 1-4.

## 6.2 The contributions of the study

The main contributions of the present study can be summarised in the following way.

- I proposed a strong connection between discourse voice and accountability and modelled the relationship between discourse voice and accountability as one of interaction.
- My line of argumentation can also be seen as a confirmation of the link previously proposed between discourse voice and metadiscourse, something that has repeatedly been discussed in the literature, but often without considering the issue of accountability.
- I showed that different knowledge stating verbs feature in different typical accountability contexts in academic discourse.
- I showed that there were few differences in how knowledge stating verbs feature in different accountability contexts in the two academic disciplines.
- I claimed that accountability is social knowledge, i.e. a mental representation of something reflecting a convention-based social behaviour.
- I proposed that accountability be considered a phenomenon of metadiscourse.
- Finally, taking my discussion about accountability as social knowledge as the point of departure, I claimed that there are grounds for treating the notion of metadiscourse as two-dimensional or layered, constituting a lower-level as well as a higher-level metadiscourse.

## 6.3 The (discourse) motivation for the manifestation of accountability (Chapter 3)

Much research has claimed that when speakers aver an utterance they have to assume complete responsibility for the knowledge content of the utterance and, conversely, when speakers attribute the knowledge content of the utterance to somebody else, responsibility is transferred completely onto that other source.

At the outset of Chapter 3, I objected to this either/or concept of accountability and proposed that we view accountability as a scalar concept: speakers can be more or less accountable and they modulate this by way of linguistic means in their utterances.

The focus of Chapter 3 was to identify what in a knowledge statement affects the manifestation of different degrees of accountability. Several conclusions can be drawn from that discussion. First of all, accountability is intimately connected to discourse voice, i.e. the extent to which speakers are present or absent in their discourses. Second, discourse voice is also scalar and the degree of accountability speakers express is directly connected to the degree to which a certain discourse voice is made manifest in an utterance. When the speaker's discourse voice is "heard" clearly, the speaker is accountable to a high degree; when the speaker's voice is subdued in favour of the voice of some other source, the speaker is less accountable.

On the basis of the HAT corpus investigation, I proposed that there are three primary aspects of the utterance affecting the scalar manifestation of discourse voices: (i) the metadiscourse of the utterance; (ii) the citation practices adopted by the speaker; and (iii) the staging of the utterance in terms of foregrounding or backgrounding of the speaker or other sources. How speakers use metadiscourse elements, how they use citations and how they present the utterance in terms of information packaging all affect which discourse voice is being heard and to what degree.

I subsequently established a set of discourse voice interpretation principles to systematise discourse voice as a scalar concept. These principles were a direct input for a model that illustrates the mapping between discourse voice and speaker accountability. Using examples from the HAT corpus, I showed that the model can explain how discourse voice, made manifest to different degrees, directly motivates corresponding degrees of accountability.

## **6.4 Knowledge statements and knowledge stating verbs in context – investigating accountability contexts in and across disciplines (Chapter 4)**

It was assumed at the outset of the thesis that accountability was important for knowledge statements, especially in academic texts, because of the important role knowledge statements play in advancing new knowledge and re-addressing previously established knowledge in different research communities. Chapter 4 focused on a particularly important element of the knowledge statement, knowledge stating verbs, and the way such verbs feature as central elements in the expression of different degrees of accountability. More precisely, the objective behind the corpus investigation in

Chapter 4 was to determine whether different knowledge stating verbs feature in different accountability contexts.

The conclusion was that the knowledge stating verbs investigated, *argue*, *claim*, *suggest*, *propose*, *maintain*, *assume* and *believe*, indeed differ as to the kinds of accountability contexts in which they feature. There was statistically supported evidence to the effect that (i) *believe* featured most prominently in High accountability contexts; (ii) *assume* and *suggest* were more likely to be found in Medium-to-High accountability contexts; (iii) *propose* and *maintain* were typical Medium-to-Low accountability verbs; (iv) *claim* and *argue* typically featured in Low accountability contexts. Moreover, most of the differences *between* the verbs were also statistically significant. The answer to research question 2 is: there are differences between the verbs with regard to featuring in typical accountability contexts. Figure 4.3 (repeated here as 6.2) illustrates the differences.




Figure 6.2 Knowledge stating verbs relative to scale of accountability with examples of typical contexts

<sup>110</sup> Again, it should be noted that these are 'typical' contexts. There is absolutely nothing to stop *believe* from featuring in Low accountability contexts.

What is more, the investigation showed that the model proposed in Chapter 3 can be used in the analysis of accountability. The outcome of the investigation also shows the scalar concept of accountability introduced in Chapter 3 appears to be able to accommodate the difference in accountability contexts for the verbs.

The corpus investigation also considered whether the differences between the knowledge stating verbs in their favoured accountability contexts would hold across academic disciplines. In other words, the purpose was to see if knowledge stating verbs feature in a particular accountability context in one discipline but in different contexts in another discipline. Two disciplines were investigated: linguistics and literature. There appear to be substantial surface differences between the two disciplines with respect to the extent to which knowledge stating verbs are employed (i.e. their raw frequency of occurrence). For example, knowledge stating verbs (as a group) were about 20% more common in linguistic texts. There were also interesting differences in terms of which particular knowledge stating verbs seemed to feature to a higher extent in linguistic or literary texts.

However, the investigation showed that any differences in typical or preferred accountability contexts for knowledge stating verbs do not appear to hold across disciplines. The answer to research question 3, therefore, was that very few differences between academic disciplines are considered significant. However, it is important to bear in mind that the 'negative' result is interesting in and of itself. Research has shown that when it comes to other aspects of the utterance, such as the expression of epistemic modality and the means and the extent for expressing epistemic modality, considerable disciplinary differences exist. Now that we have seen that this disciplinary contrast does not appear to hold true for accountability; this tells us that accountability may, in some sense, be different from other aspects of the utterance previously considered under the heading metadiscourse.

## 6.5 Accountability and (levels of) metadiscourse (Chapter 5)

Chapter 5 addressed research question 4: it investigated the potential for explaining accountability as a metadiscourse phenomenon. I first compared the manifestation of accountability to some criteria considered char-

acteristic of other kinds of metadiscourse. This meant considering to what extent the expression of accountability could be considered distinct from knowledge content, i.e. whether accountability is propositional or non-propositional in nature. It also meant reviewing the extent to which the manifestation of accountability could be claimed to embody interpersonal aspects of the relationship between speaker and addressee.

The conclusion drawn from the discussion in the first part of Chapter 5 was that on the basis of the criteria proposed, there are grounds for treating accountability as metadiscourse. The manifestation of accountability, like other kinds of metadiscourse, is indeed distinct from the overt and intentional communication of knowledge content. With respect to the social contingency of accountability, it was proposed that it is best explained by drawing on a notion proposed within social epidemiology, namely social knowledge, and that accountability counts as such social knowledge.

Chapter 5 also established, however, that accountability is a different kind of metadiscourse phenomenon in two important respects. First, unlike traditional aspects of metadiscourse, it does not receive direct linguistic encoding; it seems to ‘piggy-back’ with other kinds of metadiscourse. Second, whereas traditional aspects of metadiscourse can be seen as referring to an aspect of the utterance and can count as a comment on knowledge content in the utterance or textual-schematic references, accountability refers to an aspect of the communication addressing something outside the utterance – social knowledge. Accountability is manifested through indirect “code-sharing” with other lower-level metadiscursive aspects of the utterance. It is still possible to say that the speaker refers not to knowledge content but to something said or done in and through the utterance, dialogically addressing social knowledge. Therefore, the term ‘higher-level metadiscourse’ was coined. It was also indicated that this may be something which holds true for all or most kinds of social knowledge phenomena. On the basis of this, I proposed that we differentiate between lower-level metadiscourse (such as hedging, evidentiality, or boosting), concerned with aspects of the utterance, and higher-level metadiscourse (such as accountability, politeness, persuasion, etc.) which primarily addresses aspects of the communication outside the utterance, taking within its scope social knowledge.

## 6.6 Avenues for future research

### 6.6.1 Implications for research into metadiscourse

To the best of my knowledge, no previous study has used the notion of a higher-level metadiscourse. The proposal of a higher-level metadiscourse means that we might have to re-evaluate our reasoning about metadiscourse. It should be noted, however, that the proposals I have put forward in this thesis in no way contradict previous research and well-established ideas about metadiscourse. On the contrary, I acknowledge the usefulness of metadiscourse as a theoretical concept and show that it occurs as a central aspect in the orientation towards discourse voices. I furthermore concur with previous research in acknowledging the all-important association of metadiscourse with the social interaction between speakers and addressees. I suggest that metadiscourse may not be limited only to the traditional categories we associate with metadiscourse elements. I also argue that some 'meanings' of the communication not necessarily communicated in the traditional sense of the word may nevertheless be part of the overall meaning conveyed, using accountability as my example. With the introduction of a higher-level metadiscourse, I also extend the application of the term metadiscourse not only to things immediately visible in the text, but also to aspects of communication that do not necessarily receive overt linguistic coding. When I say that higher-level metadiscourse takes within its scope the realm of communication associated with social knowledge, in a sense I have opened up the concept, which is not necessarily a positive thing. Future research might want to criticise this approach and delimit the application of a higher-level metadiscourse, but I am also hopeful that higher-level metadiscourse will be established as a useful addition to our thinking about metadiscourse in general.

Although the present study addresses accountability, social knowledge and higher-level metadiscourse from the point of view of knowledge statements and knowledge stating verbs, the possible ramifications of the conclusions go beyond the study. For example, the present study could be seen as an attempt at addressing metapragmatics from more general perspectives, i.e. perspectives other than those offered by the study of metadiscourse elements as indicators of metapragmatic awareness; a point Verschueren (1999) makes in his appeal for more research into metapragmatics.

### 6.6.2 Teaching metadiscourse – and issues of plagiarism

As was mentioned in Chapter 4, pedagogical advice has often been dispensed based on the findings of previous studies on (lower-level) metadiscourse phenomena. For example, Salager-Meyer (1994) offers practical advice about teaching the importance of hedges; Varttala (1999) remarks on the importance of hedging and the teaching of the implications of hedging in specialist-to-specialist discourse; and Thue-Vold (2006a) offers advice on the analysis of epistemic elements. Clearly, the conclusions from empirical studies could be used to develop training materials or have other pedagogical implications. This could apply to the teaching of strategies for conveying speaker accountability or signalling accountability distribution as well. Thomas & Hawes (1994: 131) argue that “EAP learners commonly have serious difficulties with the range of choices involved in Reporting: choices of syntactic form, tense, voice, reporting verbs, and so on”. It is possible that such learners experience difficulties also in mastering accountability distribution and the textual manifestation of accountability.

As pointed out in Chapter 4, I am, however, reluctant to offer any prescriptive advice based on a limited study such as this one. Nevertheless, studies like this one are important for increasing our understanding of the balancing of discourse voices and the textual marking of distribution of accountability. A haphazard blurring of discourse voices between an accountable speaker and an accountable Other may, in some contexts, lead to uncertainty about who knowledge content emanates from and could be seen as a sophisticated kind of plagiarism. By increasing students’ and research writers’ awareness of the balancing of discourse voices and the implications of strategic linguistic choices, studies like this one are a small step towards improved scholarly writing. They might be especially helpful for non-native speakers, who may experience some difficulties in their linguistic choices.

### 6.6.3 Metadiscourse and gender

Some studies have devoted considerable attention to the differences in the writing or speaking of men and women, a perspective that has not been considered in any detail in this thesis. For example, Lakoff (1975) suggested that women are more prone to use tag-questions and hedging devices to indicate a possible lack of confidence in their statements or to guarantee communicative politeness. Preissler (1986) also shows a higher proportion



of hedges in female language. Brown (1998: 82) says that we talk about a certain female ‘register’ because women create and follow certain speech strategies “intending to do certain kinds of things, such as create rapport with the addressee, or flatter the addressee that her/his opinion is worth soliciting, or assure the addressee that no imposition is intended”. Thus, women appear to be more concerned than men with face-saving strategies (Brown & Levinson 1987).

Considering that some of the features women appear to pay more attention to are central in the cumulative manifestation of speaker accountability, it would be interesting to see if there are any differences between male and female speakers in degrees of speaker accountability in academic texts. To the best of my knowledge, the only study concerned with metadiscourse that takes a clear gender contrastive perspective is Crismore et al. (1993). Certainly, more studies are wanted to shed light on possible gender issues in connection to the notion of metadiscourse.

#### 6.6.4 Extending the scope (I) – nouns and adverbs?

In future work it would be interesting to extend the scope of inquiry with respect to accountability and knowledge statements to include other types of elements and see if knowledge statements such as (127) and (128), with nouns or adverbs, yield similar results.

(127) These competing hypotheses make fundamentally different **claims** about brain processing of auditory signals in linguistic and non-linguistic contexts. (LING)

(128) The same **claim** might be made for “it was a lover and his lass” which is **arguably** more correct in the First Folio than in The First Book of Ayres [...] (LIT)

The model developed in Chapter 3 could be used as a starting point for a more extensive model able to account for knowledge statements incorporating different knowledge stating elements. The very same questions that were asked in this study could be asked in a more extensive one. For example, it would be interesting to know whether nominalisations occur to the same extent and convey the same degree of speaker accountability in different kinds of academic disciplines.

### **6.6.5 Extending the scope (II) – other kinds of disciplines?**

In connection to the outcome of the contrastive investigation of linguistic and literary texts, I said that it was possible that the result would have been different if I had investigated two other disciplines. However, I also consider it more likely that any differences in degree of speaker accountability, which is a higher-level metadiscourse phenomenon, did not carry across academic disciplines in the way differences in lower-level metadiscourse have been claimed to do. Either way, further investigations involving other academic disciplines could confirm or disconfirm the findings and conclusions of this study.

### **6.6.6 Comparing and re-categorising**

Several other investigations have devoted attention to the knowledge stating verbs selected for the present study, but never as members of a single group and not as knowledge stating verbs. For example, in Fløttum et al. (2006) the verbs feature as both “research verbs” and “position verbs”. Similarly, in Thomas & Hawes (1994) the knowledge stating verbs are classified as “cognition verbs”, “discourse verbs”, “tentativity verbs” and “(pre-) experiment verbs” (depending on their contextual use). Thompson & Ye (1991) list them according to the kind of function they perform in “author acts” or “writer acts”. It would be interesting to take some of these other categorisations of knowledge stating verbs and apply the model from the present study to investigate if, for example, speakers convey that they are more accountable with research verbs than with position verbs or perhaps less accountable in “author acts” than in “writer acts”.

### **6.6.7 Extending the application of the model – testing the model**

In Chapter 3, I alluded to the fact that the model for the interaction between discourse voice and speaker accountability and the principles underlying that model could, and should, be tested in an experiment. It would be interesting to design a psycholinguistic experiment to ascertain in a more controlled environment the actual import of different aspects of the utterance, such as the metadiscourse, the citation strategies adopted by the speaker, the staging of the utterance in terms of the foregrounding and

backgrounding of the speaker and the Other and the knowledge stating verbs themselves. As mentioned earlier, any inclusion of other kinds of knowledge stating elements, such as nouns and adverbs, would force a development of the model too, something that could also be interesting if the validity of the model were first to be tested in an experiment.

### **6.6.8 The relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality – could the study of accountability help us to solve the controversy?**

As a final note, I would like to return to something alluded to in the introduction to this thesis – that the study of knowledge statements and accountability is interesting also because it means that we study one area of communication where evidentiality and epistemic modality intersect. Nuyts comments that mental state verbs (among which some of the knowledge stating verbs would definitely qualify) involve “a combination of evidential and epistemic meaning [which ] is one of the most central characteristics of this expression type in general” (2001: 111).

I will not go into a detailed discussion of the relationship between the ‘domains’ of evidentiality and epistemic modality, but this relationship has caused a lot of controversy among scholars. Dendale & Tasmowski (2001: 341-342) offer a good overview. They distinguish three kinds of relationships: i) a relationship of *disjunction*, where the explicit link between evidentiality and modality is denied; ii) a relationship of *inclusion*, where one of the two concepts falls within the scope of the other; and iii) a relationship of *overlap* between the two notions. This last relationship is easily confused with inclusion: in an overlapping relationship the two categories remain distinct, apart from one or several aspects in which they intersect (for a good description of this relationship see van der Auwera & Plungian (1998: 84-86)).

Scholars have considered it appropriate to distinguish between an epistemic system – a modality system where speakers express judgements about some knowledge content or proposition and commit themselves to a greater or lesser degree to that proposition – and an evidential system, a system more concerned with the factual evidence the speaker may have for the proposition (see e.g. Palmer 2001: 8; 24-25; 29).<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> For other discussions of this relationship, see e.g. Willet (1988), de Haan (1999 and 2001) and Boye (2001).

I would have liked to study more in-depth how discourse voice, the heteroglossic tension (Holquist 1990), and the balancing of discourse voices and accountability could be helpful for our understanding of evidentiality and epistemic modality. For example, Self-manifestation is often central to epistemic modality (*I suggest that...*) and Other-manifestation would often be associated with evidentiality (*Smith suggests that...*). However, depending on how you delimit evidentiality, instances of lower degree of Self-manifestation, such as *These results suggest that...*, involve a substantial element of evidentiality if evidentiality is concerned with what kind of sources speakers have for what they say. It seems that accountability and the conveying of accountability, which are motivated by the manifestation of discourse voice, feature in this area of tension between evidentiality and epistemic modality. Future studies of accountability and knowledge statements should investigate more closely the implications a model combining discourse voice and speaker accountability has for the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality.

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