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Sahlin Lilja, Hanna

2021

*Document Version:*

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

*Citation for published version (APA):*

Sahlin Lilja, H. (2021). *The Emergence, Establishment och Expansion of Fear of Crime Research in Sweden*. [Doctoral Thesis (monograph), Sociology]. Lund University.

*Total number of authors:*

1

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# The Emergence, Establishment and Expansion of Fear of Crime Research in Sweden

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Department of Sociology  
Faculty of the Social Science  
Lund Dissertations in Sociology 125  
ISBN 978-91-8039-025-5  
ISSN 1102-4712



The Emergence, Establishment  
and Expansion of Fear  
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
DOCTORAL DISSERTATION  
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Lund University, Sweden. To be defended at Kulturen aula,  
on the 17th of December, 2021

*Faculty opponent*  
Anita Heber

Organization LUND UNIVERSITY		Document name Doctoral Dissertation
Faculty of Social Sciences Department of Sociology		Date of issue 2021-11-23
Author(s) Hanna Sahlin Lilja		Sponsoring organization
Title and subtitle The Emergence, Establishment and Expansion of Fear of Crime Research in Sweden		
Abstract:  <p>The purpose of this dissertation is to construct an historical account of the emergence, establishment, and expansion of fear of crime research in Sweden. This dissertation aims to answer questions about the function, spread, and high level of institutional engagement of fear of crime research by analyzing the literature and examining the methodological, theoretical, and epistemological origins of fear of crime research itself. What happened when fear of crime was translated as "otrygghet", a word with a previously established meaning in Swedish? The analysis on the emergence of fear of crime in Sweden is based on documents, a survey of Swedish municipalities, and key informant interviews. The question of conceptual change is addressed through comparing how "otrygghet" is used by Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna in motions and bills from the Swedish Riksdag across five time periods: 1978, 1988, 1998, 2008 and 2018. The dissertation is theoretically inspired by a Foucauldian interest in the intersection of power and knowledge and by an interest in historicizing the sociological and criminological development that this thesis depicts, using the work of Stuart Hall. The analysis of conceptual change is inspired by the conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck. The results show a rapid and striking expansion of fear of crime measurements during the 2000s. From 2003 to 2007, the number of national surveys containing fear of crime indicators grew from one to six, to include The Survey of Living Conditions that premiered in 1978, the Local Youth Politics Survey in 2003, The National Public Health survey in 2004, The Citizen Survey in 2005, The Swedish Crime Survey in 2006, and The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey in 2007. For the municipalities, the period with the most dramatic increase in fear of crime measurements happens in the 2010's. The percentage of municipalities that don't do fear of crime surveys decreases from 98 percent before 1995, to 94 percent in 1995–1999, 74 percent in 2000–2004, 51 percent in 2005–2009, 30 percent in 2010–2014 and only 16 percent during the last examined period, 2015–2018. The analysis also shows that the meaning of "otrygghet" has undergone significant changes. From being used as a descriptive term commonly signifying economic and materialist unpredictability, over time "otrygghet" has come to be used almost exclusively in a crime context. The concept is exclusively used to argue for increased measures of police control and judicial expansion during the last examined period of 2018. This dissertation argues that the development and expansion of fear of crime research can be understood by examining the function that fear of crime research fulfills in legitimizing an increased level of state control, which makes it a good fit for the penal politics of late modernity.</p>		
Key words		
Classification system and/or index terms (if any)		
Supplementary bibliographical information		Language
ISSN 1102-4712 Lund Dissertations in Sociology 125		ISBN 978-91-8039-025-5 (tryck) 978-91-8039-026-2 (pdf)
Recipient's notes	Number of pages 300	Price
	Security classification	

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# The Emergence, Establishment and Expansion of Fear of Crime Research in Sweden

Hanna Sahlin Lilja



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Faculty of Social Sciences  
Department of Sociology

ISBN 978-91-8039-025-5 (tryck)

978-91-8039-026-2 (pdf)

ISSN 1102-4712

Lund Dissertations in Sociology 125

Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University, Lund 2021



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# Thanks

First, to my supervisors, Malin Åkerström and Christopher Swader. Without Malin this dissertation would have been three times as long, and I would have been a lot more stressed out. Thank you for all the support, reassurance and for pulling the brakes occasionally.

To Chris, for being a lovely, kind and supportive person, whose competence and encouragement greatly improved this dissertation.

To all the people who have taken the time to read my work and provide feedback, with a special thanks to Henrik Tham, the commentator at my final seminar, whose comments provided important direction during the last year, and for his own very inspiring work.

Thanks also to David Wästerfors, Carl-Göran Heidegren, Sara Uhnöo, Sara Eldén and Henrik Jönsson for their time and valuable insights.

To Anita Heber for her comments during the defence, and for the inspiring dissertation on fear of crime she wrote in 2007.

To the department of Sociology at Lund University, for providing an inspiring academic work milieu. The department really provided me with ample opportunity to learn, teach and grow, thank you for that. I really missed you during the Covid pandemic!

To my lovely colleagues, the doctoral candidates at the Department of Sociology at Lund University, for all the interesting talks, seminars and fikas throughout the

years, especially to Colm, Anders, Uzma, Isabelle, Rasmus, Anna, Staffan and Oriana.

To Josephine and Lars, who knows what I am trying to say.

To the staff at Svenheimer och Cederleufs, for all the soup, support and coffee that helped me finish writing this dissertation.

To my parents, Gun and Per, for their unwavering support. Thanks for listening to me and for making me believe in the importance of my own ideas from an early age. Writing a dissertation requires that kind of confidence.

To my brilliant siblings, Henrik and Kajsa, and to our extended, loud and fun family.

To Johanna and Stephanie, for your love and support.

To the people who taught me the kind of lived knowledge that can never be gained from a book. You know who you are. This is for you, really.

To my daughter Selma, for being the light of my life, and for helping me keep my priorities in order.

To Anders, my other half. I cannot imagine this would have been fun without you.

# Table of Contents

THANKS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION	15
Expansion of fear of crime research in late modernity	17
The concept of "otrygghet"	19
Purpose	21
Research questions	22
Disposition	23
2. METHODOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY	24
Methods matrix and chapter disposition	24
What is the origin of fear of crime research?	26
How has fear of crime been researched in Sweden?	26
Interviews	27
How has fear of crime research expanded and spread?	28
Procedure and response rate of the municipal survey	28
How has the concept of otrygghet changed?	29
Selection of parties	29
Selection of periods	30
Analytic procedure	31

Analytic procedure concerning the police	31
Limits and exclusions	32
On etymology and translation of a concept	32
On the subject of research	33
3. BACKGROUND	35
Late modernity, postmodernity, or the neo-liberal era?	36
Crime, criminalization, and incarceration in late modernity	39
Criminalization and policy development	39
Incarceration and punishment	40
Crime and crime trends	41
Swedish crime in late modernity	42
The United States and the United Kingdom	48
Crime rates in late modernity: the factual, the contradictory, and the common sense	50
4. THEORY ON PRODUCTION OF FEAR OF CRIME KNOWLEDGE	52
<i>What</i> is a research discourse?	53
<i>How</i> to study the production of fear of crime knowledge	55
Commensuration	56
Classification and categorization	57
Reactivity and perlocution	58
The linguistic, the conceptual, the historical, the social?	59
The narrative of crime and fear of crime in late modernity	62
A common sense of crime	62
Roll-back transformation of the state	63
The hegemonic function of crime	64
Convergence and signification	65
Construction of a suitable enemy	66
The good guardian (thin blue line)	68
An immeasurable crime problem	68
5. REVIEW OF THE FEAR OF CRIME LITERATURE	70
Introduction	70
Motives behind the 1960s emergence	71
The origin of fear of crime	75

The 1970s	81
Establishing the analytic themes of the discourse	81
Emergence of large-scale survey research	82
Fear of crime, victimization and rationality	84
The conjunction of origins of fear of crime	87
Controversy and ambiguity surrounding the emergence of fear of crime	87
Race and fear of crime	90
Gender and fear of crime	91
Boundary work	92
Consequences of the emergence of large-scale crime surveys	93
The 1980s and onwards	94
A period of expansion	95
The jump over the pond: Fear of crime in Britain	96
...and, subsequently, to the rest of Europe and the world	102
Prominent themes in later fear of crime research	102
Vulnerability	102
Women and fear of crime	104
The feminist critique	106
Fear of crime and the media	109
Signs of disorder – the spatial turn	111
Can fear of crime be built away?	114
Crime, space and race	115
Methodological critique	118
Political persistence and methodological inertia	125
Discussion of the reviewed literature	127
6. THE EMERGENCE OF FEAR OF CRIME IN SWEDEN	128
The first fear of crime survey – The Stockholm Project	129
Between the governmental and academic	131
The Police	135
The Police Survey	136
The Police and the Swedish Crime Survey	138
The conjunction of import	140
Rise of the Victim of Crime	141
Organization of the Police	142

Swedish media	142
Criminology in Sweden	143
Political interest in the issue of crime	145
Conclusion	147
7. FEAR OF CRIME SURVEYS IN SWEDEN	148
The establishment of a research discourse	148
The Swedish Survey of Living Conditions	150
Local Youth Politics Survey	150
The National Public Health Survey	151
The Citizen Survey	151
The Swedish Crime Survey	152
The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey	153
Questionnaires and indicators	153
What is a survey?	153
What is a general fear of crime indicator?	154
On indicators	159
Results	160
The Citizen Survey	164
Commensurative practices	165
Participants	169
Response rate	169
On falling response rates	172
Swedish municipalities and fear of crime	174
From the national to the local	174
Development of local fear of crime measurements over time	175
Forms of local fear of crime research	178
Other local ways of measuring fear of crime	179
Summary and discussion	183
8. THE CONCEPT OF “OTRYGGHET”	186
The Crime Context	187
The state as a central actor in 1978	187
Vulnerable groups in 1988	187
Crime and criminological knowledge in 1998	189
Crime as growing, expanding and increasing in 2008	196

Crime dominates the discourse in 2018	202
”Otrygghet” in a context related to families and children	209
“Otrygghet”, children, and modernity in 1988	210
From concern to control in 1998	214
Crime, children, and “otrygghet” in 2008	216
“Otrygga” children because of crime in 2018	217
The economic context	218
“Otrygghet” related to employment, labor and welfare in 1978	218
“Otrygg” as an employee in 1988	221
A polemic push? Otrygghet as reliance on welfare in 1998	222
Return to a <i>materialistic</i> definition in the wake of the 2008 crisis	226
To feel “otrygg” in 2018	228
Conceptual change	229
Is the concept common?	232
Is meaning of the concept disputed?	233
In what contexts is the concept used?	233
What solutions are suggested to the problem of otrygghet?	235
What causes are attributed to “otrygghet”?	238
What is the valence of the concept “otrygghet” within the structure of political vocabulary?	241
With what terms does the concept overlap and converge?	243
9. DISCUSSION	245
Introduction	245
The fear of crime research discourse	246
Emergence and expansion	247
The establishment and salience of the concept	249
The function of fear of crime research	251
Constructing a uniquely useful concept	252
Fear of crime research constructs a threat from below	254
Fear of crime and feminism	257
Initiated by political interests	260



Knowledge production within governmental control	263
The unique opportunity of "otrygghet"	265
BIBLIOGRAPHY	267
APPENDIX	291
Appendix A	291
Additional fear of crime indicators	291
Appendix B	294
The municipal survey	294

# 1. Introduction

We haven't been this otrygga in ten years" declares the second largest party in Sweden, Moderaterna (Moderaterna, 2018a). Not to be outdone, Stefan Löfven argues for extensive interventions to make the Swedes feel more "trygga"; suggesting longer sentences for young offenders, increased surveillance and more resources for the police. Perhaps the police could co-operate with the military in order to fight gang crime, he suggests, as the leader of Socialdemokraterna (2018). The background to these statements is the ongoing election cycle of 2018, in which Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna are struggling for the chance to a government and rule Sweden. The election is characterized by statements concerning how "otrygga" the Swedish people are. "It is a crisis", according to Moderaterna (2018a). An identical phrase formed a central part of both parties election strategies; "ett tryggare Sverige". (Moderaterna, 2018b; Socialdemokraterna, 2021).

The word they are using, "trygghet", as well as its negation "otrygghet", has by that point in time reached a salience in Swedish political debate that is remarkable. There is no shortage of measurements of Swedish people's "o/trygghet",<sup>1</sup> at the time of the 2018 election. "O/trygghet" is measured using either quantitative surveys or structured interviews by at least five national governmental agencies, at both the regional and municipal levels of local government, and by private enterprises across different geographic contexts in Sweden. The Swedish Crime Survey, administered by the Swedish Crime Council (BRÅ), claims to be the largest in the world in terms of participants; it is sent to over 200 000 people (BRÅ, 2020a).

---

<sup>1</sup> "O/trygghet" is used in this dissertation to denote both "Trygghet" and its negation "Otrygghet".

In this dissertation, I lay out the argument that two candidates for Prime Minister of Sweden trying to outdo one another in concern for Swedish "o/trygghet" represents an intersection of several strands of historical development. One of these is the birth of the 'fear of crime' concept and the subsequent establishment of an expansive research discourse on it in the United States. This research discourse has been analyzed through tracing methodological and theoretical assumptions and conventions to their original studies and trying to understand the criminological, social, and political milieu, the American 1960s, in which it originated. By tracing this research discourse through periods of methodological development in the 1970's and of rapid expansion in the 1980's, I have attempted to pay attention to how the establishment of a fear of crime research discourse conjoins with other strands of social development.

The fear of crime discourse was brought to Sweden first through the addition of an indicator in the Survey of Living Conditions (Undersökningen om Levnadsförhållanden) in 1987, and then through more specialized research during the 1990's (Torstensson & Olander, 1999; Torstensson & Persson, 2000; Torstensson, Wikström, & Olander, 1998; Wikström, 1991; Wikström & Dolmén, 1997; Wikström & Torstensson, 1998; Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmén, 1997; Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmén, 1997). Fear of crime, the subject of the research, was translated into Swedish as "o/trygghet".

This dissertation investigates several types of empirical materials, in order to understand and explain the saliency and meaning of the concept of "o/trygghet" in contemporary Sweden. These include previous academic research, chronologically analysed in terms of methods and results, as well as reports and documents from fear of crime surveys by Swedish governmental agencies. A survey, along with emails and phone conversations are used to study how Swedish municipalities measure fear of crime. The conceptual usage and change over time of the Swedish word "trygghet" in policy-making and political debate are studied through political documents in the form of motions and prepositions from the Swedish Riksdag.


# Expansion of fear of crime research in late modernity

A key purpose of this dissertation includes the mapping out of the expansion of fear of crime research in Sweden. Some key results follow. **Figure 1** depicts the development of total frequency of survey participation in municipalities over time, based on the municipality survey that forms part of the empirical material of this analysis.<sup>2</sup> Ranging from 1995 to 2018, we can see an exponential increase, from almost zero survey measurements to almost 500 surveys in the Swedish municipalities during the last period. **Figure 2** depicts the average number of fear of crime measurements per municipality. This also increases drastically during the period 1995-2018. Together, these figures depict a development of fear of crime measurements during the 2000s that can only be described as rapid and striking.


**Figure 3** illustrates the establishment of national fear of crime surveys over time: The Survey of Living Conditions in 1978, Local Youth Politics Survey in 2003, The National Public Health Survey in 2004, The Citizen Survey in 2005, The Swedish Crime Survey in 2006 and The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey in 2007. Most of them do not have fear of crime as a main theme, but they all contain fear-of-crime indicators. From 2003 to 2007, the number of national surveys containing such indicators thus grows from one to six. For the municipalities, the period with the most dramatic increase in fear of crime measurements comes later, in the 2010's, even though the development is well underway in the 2000's. 89 percent of participating municipalities said they also do some form of additional non-quantitative measurement of fear of crime, such as fear of crime walks.

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
<sup>2</sup> The survey contains questions on if municipalities participate in a number of national elective surveys and if they are conducting local fear of crime surveys of different types. It also contains questions on when they started conducting each survey and if implementation has been continual. For a more detailed description, see chapter 2.




**Figure 1** total number of fear of crime measurements per time period time in Swedish municipalities



**Figure 2** Average number of fear of crime measurements per municipality and time period



**Figure 3** Number of national governmental Fear of Crime Surveys per year



**Figure 4** "Fear of Crime" according to Google Ngram

# The concept of "otrygghet"

What happened to the word "otrygghet" when it was designated as the Swedish translation of the American "fear of crime"? A parallel empirical study investigates this through an analysis of conceptual change, comparing how "otrygghet" is used by Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna in motions and bills from the Swedish Riksdag across five time periods: 1978, 1988, 1998, 2008, and 2018. This part of the dissertation is theoretically inspired by the German conceptual historian Reinhardt Koselleck, who claims that periods of historical change and upheaval are also periods of conceptual and semantic transformation (Koselleck, 2004).

Results indicate that the signification of "otrygghet" has undergone significant changes. It started as being used as a descriptive term in different contexts in earlier times, commonly signifying economic and materialistic unpredictability. The categorization of context is illustrated by **Figure 5**. The concept "otrygghet" in the earlier periods was used in a variety of contexts, most commonly denoting unpredictability in the economic sense. You were "otrygg" if your employment, housing, or availability of social resources and welfare was unsecure. The suggested solutions are also oriented towards stability and control.

The difference between the examples from 1978 and the last period of 2018 is stark. "Otrygghet" had during the most recent period of 2018 come to be used almost exclusively in a crime context. According to the empirical examples from 2018, the causes of otrygghet are violence, crime and drugs, shootings, the presence of drugs in school, fraud against the elderly, gang crime, organized crime, gang crime, robbery, shoplifting, burglary in small rural communities, thefts from the elderly in their homes, and the absence of police. The suggested solutions are singularly oriented towards increased policing and order maintenance.


Koselleck writes that concepts are joints that link language to the historical, social and political extralinguistic world; words with special ability to carry meaning. Words can be unambiguous in use, but concepts must always be interpreted, their baggage investigated (2004). I argue that the translation of fear of crime into the Swedish word "otrygghet" gave this word a new and particular baggage.

A research discourse is, in the way that I have used this term, made up of set ideas and practices of how knowledge on a subject should be produced and interpreted. It consists of theoretical assumptions and underpinnings, methods, indicators, instruments, and ways of presenting results that together make up an accepted practice. What was imported into a Swedish context, first with the addition of a fear of crime indicator into the survey of Swedish living conditions in 1978, and more comprehensively with the first specialized Swedish fear of

crime surveys in the 1990's, was a discourse on how fear of crime knowledge is to be constructed in a way that is considered empirically valid.

Late modernity should arguably be understood as a period of rapid structural and social change. In this era, stable (or even decreasing) levels of crime have paradoxically coincided with a rapid expansion of the judicial sphere. At the same time, global capitalism transformed into its current neo-liberal form (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b), and Sweden has experienced increased economic inequality and experimented with new forms of governance over its welfare sector (Therborn, 2020). These strands of historical change are a backdrop to the establishment of the central subject of this research, the fear of crime discourse in Sweden. The analysis in this dissertation is theoretically inspired by Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts (2013/1978) analysis of the British mugging panic in relation to the economic crisis of the 1970s, which depicts a shift from a consensual to a more coercive and controlling management style and penal politics. I argue, alongside Hall et al. (2013/1978); Wacquant (2009) for the need to put the judicial expansion front and center in our understanding of late modernity in Sweden.

If the purpose of fear of crime research is to reduce the fear of crime, the usefulness of the knowledge produced cannot explain the spread of the research discourse. The speed and intensity of the expansion of fear of crime research, and how it managed to penetrate and expand into many segments of Swedish governance, must be considered remarkable. There is a Swedish idiom "att falla i god jord", that would translate to "to end up in beneficial soil", that can describe this development. The strands of social and historical change analysed here are far too complex to discuss in simple causal terms. Fear of crime research, and its impressive proliferation cannot be attributed to any one factor. Neither do I make the argument that conceptual change of the word "otrygghet" was exclusively caused by the establishment of fear of crime surveys. In agreement with Koselleck, the relationship between the structural, social, and historical, on the one hand, and the linguistic, conceptual, and semantic, on the other hand, is better characterized as a mutual tension, and as potentially explosive rather than causal.



**Figure 5** The contexts of "otrygghet" 1978-2018

## Purpose

The dissertation's starting point was an epistemological interest in the intersection between the production of scientific and criminological knowledge, the dissemination of this knowledge into a common understanding of crime, and the historical and social context in which this knowledge was produced. Do how we research change in how we think and talk about crime? A purpose of the dissertation is to analyze how fear of crime measurements and the concept of "otrygghet" fit into the construction of a common sense of crime. What is the political function of this knowledge? What is used to argue for? As such, this work is theoretically oriented towards an interest in the intersection between power and knowledge and how it can be located in contemporary political debate. It is also an effort towards historicizing the sociological and criminological development that this thesis depicts as a matter of 'conjuncture' (Gilbert, 2019; Hall et al., 2013/1978). A key purpose is to construct a historical account of how the establishment of fear of crime research fits into the developing political narrative about crime. Mapping out this conjuncture for Stuart Hall was a matter of situating current developments historically (Gilbert, 2019; Hall et al., 2013/1978). There are several strands of criminological development that coincide with the establishment of fear of crime research in late modernity. They are neither caused by nor causes of this establishment, but they rather interlock and connect. They are conjunctive.

This dissertation aims to analyze both the historical and methodological origins of the fear of crime research discourse and how it functions in Sweden today. The



overall purpose is to study how fear of crime is ‘made’ and if and how the concept of "otrygghet" has changed in relation to this knowledge production. In this endeavour, a number of empirical materials will be examined. These include previous academic research, chronologically analyzed in terms of methods and results, as well as reports and documents based on fear of crime surveys organized by Swedish governmental agencies. A survey as well as emails and phone conversations are used to study how Swedish municipalities measure fear of crime. The conceptual usage and change over time of the Swedish word “otrygghet” in policy-making and political debate are studied through political documents in the form of motions and prepositions from the Swedish Riksdag.

## Research questions

Three overarching research themes have guided this project:

How has fear of crime been researched in Sweden?

How did the research discourse emerge and expand?

Which methods have been used?

Which institutions have directed the research?

Which indicators have been used to operationalize fear of crime?

Which results have these measurements produced?

How has use of the concept of “otrygghet” in political debate changed during the examined period of 1978-2018 in terms of:

How common the concept is?

What meaning the concept signifies?

Which contexts the concept is used in?

Which solutions are suggested to the problem of otrygghet?

Which causes are attributed to “otrygghet”?

What is the valence of the concept “otrygghet” within the structure of political vocabulary?

With which terms does the concept overlap and converge?

How can the expansion and prominence of the concept of “otrygghet” be understood in relation to contemporary Swedish politics and society?

## Disposition

The second chapter describes the dissertation's methodology. After this follows chapter 3 on the background of the analysis, and chapter 4 presenting the theoretical framework of the analysis. Chapter 5, a review of the fear of crime literature, can be considered the first empirical chapter. Three more empirical chapters follow, including chapter 6 on how the fear of crime research discourse emerged in Sweden, chapter 7 on Swedish governmental fear of crime research, and chapter 8 on how the concept of "otrygghet" has been used in Swedish political debate. The dissertation ends with chapter 9, a discussion of the results.

## 2. Methodology and epistemology

### Methods matrix and chapter disposition

The relationships between collected and analyzed materials and how they correspond to the research questions of this dissertation, will be discussed here. These relationships are depicted in **Table 1**, a methods matrix, and then discussed under headings corresponding to the main themes of the dissertation: the origin of fear of crime research, how it has been researched in Sweden, its expansion and spread, and conceptual change undergone by the word *otrygghet*. The chapter finishes with a discussion on epistemological positions, limitations, analytical procedure and etymology and translation of the concepts of fear of crime and *otrygghet*.

Table 1 Methods matrix				
(working) RESEARCH QUESTIONS	How do Swedish public administration measure "otrygghet/fear of crime? When did they start? What tools do they use to produce knowledge about fear of crime?	How has fear of crime been researched in Sweden in terms of: 1.1. What methods have been used? 1.2. What institutions have directed the research? 1.3. What indicators have been used to operationalize fear of crime? 1.4. What results have these measurements produced? 1.5. Who are the participants? 1.6. What theoretical assumptions are implicit?	How has the concept changed over time in terms of: 2.1. How common is the concept? 2.2. What does the concept signify? 2.3. What contexts is the concept used in? 2.4. What solutions are suggested to the problem of otrygghet? 2.5. What causes are attributed to "otrygghet"? 2.6. What is the valency of the concept "otrygghet" within the structure of political vocabulary? 2.7. With what terms does the concept overlap and converge?	What is the spread and scope of the research apparatus? Who are the central actors? How did fear of crime research begin in Sweden and how did it develop historically?
TYPE OF DATA	Quantitative survey data	Document analysis Secondary data analysis Phone conversations and emails with key informants	Documents: Motions and propositions from the Swedish Riksdag Election manifests from S and M	Documents Academic literature Interviews
COLLECTION METHOD	Survey of Swedish municipalities in spring 2018, with two email reminders and phone calls to those who did not respond.	Document collection via internet and email	Searches on "otrygghet" primarily via the Swedish parliament archive (Riksdagsarkivet)	Key informant interviews/expert interviews
COLLECTION PERIOD	Spring 2018	Fall 2017	Continually during 2016–2019	Fall 2017 to Spring 2018; Fall 2018 to Spring 2019
SELECTION AND RESPONSE RATE	194 municipalities answered the survey, of a total of 290, giving a response rate of 66.89%.		A total selection of documents where the word "otrygghet" is used in Swedish Riksdag, where S or M was the author, during 1978–2018	
ANALYTIC METHODS	Descriptive statistics	Text analysis and methodological analysis, theoretically inspired by sociology of quantification theory	Qualitative document analysis with discourse and concept analysis methods for text analysis	Content analysis Interview material analysis with document verifying mechanism

## What is the origin of fear of crime research?

This question is addressed by the literature review which traces fear of crime research to its American origins. As such, the literature review can be considered part of the empirical analysis. The literature review is extensive, yet many studies on fear of crime have been left out, as literally thousands exist today. The purpose of the literature review has guided the selection process. This was never to review the key results of the research discourse and, for example, show how fearful people really are. The true object of study is the research discourse itself. This means that the literature review includes the studies that have been the most influential in the continuing research: if a work has been widely cited in other fear of crime research, I have endeavored to include it. Similarly, work that contains innovative ideas or methods has been included mainly if these ideas or methods have been picked up by other researchers, and influenced the continual research. An exception to this general rule of prioritizing studies that shaped subsequent research relates to studies containing important methodological critique. Extra effort was expended in locating, reading, and referencing the very first fear of crime studies in order to be able to address questions on the origins. Studies were found through the bibliographies of other studies, through searches on Google Scholar, and through Lund University Library's search function. Literature was organized and archived using EndNote.

## How has fear of crime been researched in Sweden?

This question guided much of the collection of empirical materials, and turned out to be rather complicated. It is primarily addressed using documents, and those related to the fear of crime surveys of government agencies are a central part of the data. The documents were generally obtained through the websites of the government agencies and through email correspondence with the concerned agencies. These include reports, questionnaires, technical reports, and decision-making protocols. However, these materials turned out to be insufficient to answer the question in full, as the first version of any given survey generally doesn't contain information on its own conception. The origins of fear of crime surveys are a story of inherited instruments in the form of surveys, and murky institutional developments, where some institutional actors that used to be central, like the

research group of the police, for example, no longer exists. For this reason, I decided to do additional interviews with key informants.

## Interviews

The empirical material of the dissertation comprises five key informant interviews. The interviews were done in person, at the informant's place of work, and using a semi-structured interview guide. The interviewees were professionals in the field of crime research discourse, generally with long careers in key institutional positions. Some were employed by the police and some by universities. They were aged between 55 and 75 years and most, but not all, were men. The interviews took 1–2 hours each, and were recorded and transcribed. The selection mechanism for interviewees can best be described as “by recommendation,” such that people I was in contact with for data-gathering purposes, either at municipalities or governmental agencies, would say “have you talked to XX? S/he is the one who knows what really happened.” As such, they represent key informants on the subject of fear of crime. I have elected to not share further demographic characteristics, due to anonymity concerns.

Research questions addressed in interviews relate to the first of the empirical key themes; the emergence and expansion of fear of crime research in Sweden. The interview data was analyzed using statements and stories on how something happened, for example the implementation of a survey, and then using documents to validate the narrative. I also tried to validate in the other direction, by using interviews to probe partial explanations offered in documents. This approach is inspired by DeVault and McCoy (2001) “institutional ethnography” approach, in which informants' accounts are used not as windows on their inner experience but to reveal the “relations of ruling” in an institutional setting. This entails combining document and interview research to map out institutional processes; talking to people in order to learn “how things work” (DeVault & McCoy, 2001).

## How has fear of crime research expanded and spread?

This question involves elements of quantification, of aspiring to know how common something is, in this case fear of crime research. It became obvious early in the process that a large part of this research took place at the local level of government. I decided to try to find out how Swedish municipalities engaged with fear of crime research, and when they began to do so. This, in combination with tracing the launch and development of national surveys, enabled me to say something about the spread and historical development of fear of crime research. I decided to survey Swedish municipalities on their fear of crime work, as a method of quantification was needed. I obtained the e-mail addresses of Swedish municipalities through SKL<sup>3</sup> and sent a survey asking each of the municipalities about their fear of crime work, how they try to measure fear of crime and which fear of crime surveys they participate in. The survey questionnaire is added as an appendix to the dissertation.

### Procedure and response rate of the municipal survey

Of the 290 Swedish municipalities to whom I sent the survey (March 2018), 95 answered the survey before the first reminder, which went out by email two weeks after the survey was sent (in April 2018), with a link to the survey. Twenty-five more municipalities answered after the first reminder. A second reminder by email was sent about a month after the survey was first sent (end-April 2018). By May, 152 municipalities had filled in the survey. After this began the work of calling the remaining 138 municipalities, during May and June 2018. By the end of August 2018, 194 municipalities had answered the survey, 67% percent of municipalities. I consider this an acceptable respondent rate. Google Survey was used to administer the survey, and SPSS was used for the statistical analysis. The survey is placed in appendix B.

In hindsight, a representative sample of municipalities might have been a better idea, as the chosen method generated a lot quantity of data. But there are also advantages to doing a total selection. It means that the validity and reliability of claims of historical spread can be made with a higher degree of confidence. It would also have been hard to generate a truly representative sample, as differences

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<sup>3</sup> *Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting/Regioner*: Municipalities and Regions of Sweden.

between municipalities are large. Another aspect is the qualitative material that was generated during the course of administering the survey. I included open questions asking if I could contact the person answering for additional questions, and obtained mainly positive answers. This enabled me to send follow-up emails with requests for clarification or phone conversations about the municipalities' fear of crime work. All in all, it created material that was large and complex.

## How has the concept of otrygghet changed?

Another strand of empirical investigation runs parallel to the investigation of the origins of fear of crime research, and concerns the concept of otrygghet. What happened to this word when it was designated the Swedish translation of the American concept of fear of crime? This question deals with conceptual change and linguistic meaning over time. This part is theoretically and methodically inspired by the conceptual historian Koselleck (2004) whose method for analyzing conceptual change over time entails synchronous comparison and analysis of usage, followed by diachronous comparison over time. A great many materials could have been used to compare the usages of otrygghet. I selected bills and motions from the Swedish Riksdag as this corresponds best to the research questions on how otrygghet is used in political debate and policy-making. It is also a way of looking at what actually is done with the concept of otrygghet, meaning, what is it used to argue for or against?

### Selection of parties

The empirical material for the analysis of conceptual change consists of motions and bills from two Swedish political parties, Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna. Earlier reiterations of the analysis also included the other parties of the Swedish Riksdag. However, it soon became obvious that too much of the discrepancy could be attributed to differences in ideology and position in the Swedish political landscape when comparing material from different parties and years. While this would also be an interesting object of study, this dissertation does not aim to analyze party differences in how fear of crime and the concept of otrygghet is used but to locate *discursive* change. I argue that discursive change



can be understood as change in the generally accepted order of speech; change in what is considered appealing to the political middle.

In late modernity, two parties have led the Swedish government and aspired to be a *statsbärande parti*, literally translated, a party that can carry the state, a natural party of government. These are Socialdemokraterna (center-left) and Moderaterna (center-right). While there are definitely differences in their political discourse which can be attributed to their ideological positions, both try to appeal to the political middle and win undecided centrist voters. Change in what the parties think will appeal to undecided centrist voters is a reasonable operationalization of discursive change in political debate and policy-making.

## Selection of periods

The analysis of conceptual change contains material from points representing five periods during late modernity: 1978, 1988, 1998, 2008, and 2018. Change in text and speech over time is central to the questions addressed in this dissertation, and therefore a year per decade is included in the material. An earlier version of this study compared only 1978 and 2017 (Sahlin Lilja, 2018). All examples where *otrygghet* was used in motions or propositions by Moderaterna or Socialdemokraterna from 1978, 1988, 1998, 2008, and 2018 are included in the analysis. The material is an exhaustive selection, which minimizes the risk of results being skewed due to sampling error. However, some kind of limiting factor had to be included to generate empirical materials that were a reasonable size for meticulous analysis, and selecting one year per decade ensured this. Another way to achieve this would have been to use a systematic sample of examples from all years, for example every tenth motion or proposition.

Qualitative research always depends on interpretation and the construction of narratives to generate insight and knowledge from empirical materials, and thus is not, strictly speaking, dependent on representative sampling. However, ensuring that all possible examples are included in the material, and selection mechanisms have not influenced the interpretation of empirical results can be one way to strive towards the kind of thoroughness that Bryman (2011) argues is characteristic of valid qualitative research.

## Analytic procedure

The analysis on this dissertation is abductive and retroductive, and characterized by a cyclical motion between data and theory. Meyer and Lunnay (2013) write that abduction is fundamentally a means of forming associations that enable the researcher to discern relations and connections that are not otherwise obvious. Retroduction is defined as a means of knowing the conditions fundamental to the existence of a phenomenon (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). While most research projects are cyclical, the broad formulation of the purpose of this dissertation made abduction necessary. The vague ambition of wanting to find out *everything* about fear of crime in Sweden made theory crucial for discerning what is actually interesting in the wealth of possible materials. I used several data-gathering procedures during this project. The first two, the municipal survey and the literature review, functioned as pilot studies. Through surveying the municipalities, and through extensive familiarity with the academic field, my research questions could be further specified, and new avenues for data collection that fruitfully corresponded to the research questions could be identified. Critical criminology and theory on knowledge production and the relationship between scientific and public knowledge helped discern what constituted interesting data.

### Analytic procedure concerning the police

The police were obviously actors within the fear of crime apparatus that warranted some attention. From experience gained researching my master's thesis on internal police investigations, I knew researching the police is different from other government agencies. The police have a very low level of documentation of their work, and the documentation that actually exists is often hard to obtain. This is not because of any reluctance or ill will – a large majority of the personnel I was in contact with during my research were helpful and interested. Rather it is because of the lack of centralization (until 2015 the police were regionally organized), a lack of institutional memory, and no tradition of documentation and archiving. To be fair, many of the governmental agencies I was in contact with shared this problem to a certain degree. It was not easy to find documents from before the digitization process that many governmental agencies underwent during the 2000s. The documents I obtained from the police, and some from other sources, were unpublished, and were internal “working” documents. This could pose a problem of replication for this study.

Another related question I have had to ask myself during the research process is, how reliable are memories of institutional practices from 20–30 years ago? In some cases, I came across contradictions in the accounts I was given. As far as possible, I have tried to verify the content of the interviews with documents. This entails finding documentation that supports the narratives presented by informants and, in the case of contradicting narratives, presenting the one that is supported by documentation.

## Limits and exclusions

Some collected materials are not included in the dissertation, as some kind of compromise had to be reached concerning length and readability on one hand, and a wish to show complexity and refrain from simplifications on the other. I have not included an analysis of the dissemination of fear of crime research in the media, nor have I given examples of the usage of *otrygghet* in election manifestos and political speech outside of motions and bills from the Riksdag. I have only included some of the data generated from my communication with Swedish municipalities.

## On etymology and translation of a concept

This analysis is based on documents, a survey and conversations, all conducted in Swedish and from Swedish-language sources such as government agencies and municipalities. This dissertation is written in English on how a research discourse of American origin came to be implemented in Sweden. Necessarily, there is a lot of translation involved. When translating key concepts from one language into another, there is always risk that layers of meaning are lost. This section will briefly discuss the translation of a key concept for this analysis, the Swedish word *trygghet* and its negation, *otrygghet*. *Trygghet* can be translated into English as security or safety, but neither of these terms encompass the whole meaning of "trygghet" in Swedish.

The research discourse studied here is an American invention and it launched the concept of fear of crime historically rather late. As Lee (2013) has argued, the words "fear" and "crime" existed in the English language long before this research discourse originated in the 1960s, but were not joined together as a single concept with a defined meaning, as "fear of crime". That is in accordance with how

Koselleck (2004) defines a concept, as a word carrying a historically specific meaning. When these ideas and methods made their way to Sweden, the concept of fear of crime was translated as *otrygghet*, the negation of *trygghet*. Why is hard to say, and none of the empirical investigations have provided a definitive explanation. The closest explanation offered by informants is that it was a consequence of how the mission of the Swedish police has been formulated since 1992: “to decrease crime and increase *trygghet*” (see discussion in chapter 6).

A closer translation would have been the word-for-word translation of “fear of crime,” *rädsla för brott*. This term is sometimes used, but is much rarer than *trygghet/otrygghet*, which is found in all of the examined surveys. Indeed, surveys that ask about fear of crime are called *trygghetsundersökningar*.<sup>4</sup> When municipalities were contacted and asked what kind of *trygghetsundersökningar* they implemented, none expressed any confusion on what was referred to.

*Trygghet/otrygghet* is a word with very old etymological roots and, historically, a much broader meaning than fear of crime or *rädsla för brott*. It comes from the Proto-Germanic *trewwia* and shares a word stem with, for example the English words true, truth and truce, and the Swedish words *trogen* (faithful), *trohet* (true) and *truism* (truth) (Hellqvist, 1922). It is just as often used in adjectival form, as *trygg*, as it is as a noun, *trygghet*. *Trygghet* signifies being safe, cared for and protected; how a child thinks of its mother for example. In translations for this analysis, fear of crime and sometimes unsafety are used to translate the noun *otrygghet*, while the most common translation used for *o/trygg* is safe/unsafe. Giving the whole sentence a comparable meaning has been prioritized over a literal translation which may sound “off” in English. Many times, *trygghet* or *otrygghet* are used without translation because of the difficulties discussed here.

## On the subject of research

An attentive reader will have already noticed several epistemological positions I have taken in describing the subject of my research. First, it is historically and spatially defined. It takes place in a specific period of time, late modernity, and in specific geographical contexts: first in the United States, then spreading into the Anglo-American sphere, and then the rest of the world. Thus, I believe that this research subject is not necessarily something that can be studied efficiently through direct

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<sup>4</sup> *Undersökning* translates to “study” or “survey”.

observation. I argue, with Mills (1959), that we need to take into account historical and political factors that construct our contemporary time. Indeed, we are surrounded by complex entanglements of institutions, discourses, and structures of knowledge which order our world and make us think and behave the way we do. Another way to say this is that our subjectivity, the way we inhabit the world, is constituted by current and previously existing power structures. Even more simply put – the reasons why we behave the way we do cannot be found in the propensities of individual actors. Our ontology, what we believe about the world around us and ourselves as actors in it, is something trans-individual and historically situated. It is in these historical and political factors we must go digging to understand our current social world. This world is constituted by the historical. The many materials, and the different methods and theoretical tools used to analyze them, are a consequence of my view of the object of study in this thesis.

### 3. Background

The purpose of this thesis is to historicize a research discourse and to understand it in relation to the contemporary context in which it became established. This requires an understanding of the time periods in which it emerged, as well as the structural factors characterizing those periods, such as crime and victimization, and economic and structural change. This thesis is about Sweden and how research on fear of crime came to be established here, but neither crime nor structural economic change are phenomena that are limited by the borders of nation-states. Ideas, methods, practices, and scientific discourses, other central themes in this thesis, also move across boundaries. The fear of crime discourse examined here, for instance, originated in the United States. A short description of how similar structural background factors developed in the United States and the United Kingdom is therefore included. While other countries are not discussed, in this time of late modernity, trends in economic distribution, crime, security and punitivity are global, with similar trends discernable in other European and Scandinavian countries (Marcelo F. Aebi et al., 2017; Marcelo F Aebi & Linde, 2010; Kristoffersen, Hildebrant, Muiluvuori, Gudmundsdottir, & Lindsten, 2010; Lehti et al., 2019; Träskman, 2005).

## Late modernity, postmodernity, or the neo-liberal era?

Why do seemingly quite different countries, with unique social and historical traditions, exhibit similar trends in contemporary times? Why do European countries emulate American patterns of crime control? Garland writes that the explanation may lie in the fact that social, economic, and cultural developments in these countries increasingly expose them to the distinctive problems of social order that late modernity brings in its wake. Analyzing patterns of penal control in the United Kingdom and United States, Garland (2001) concludes that these changes must be explained by the historical forces that transformed social, economic, and cultural life during the late-twentieth century. These historical forces, for Garland, include economic and social changes, and the political realignments and policy changes that emerged in response to these changes: “a combination of free-market neo-liberalism and social conservatism” (p 75).

Garland’s (2001) book, which was influential and ahead of its time, is concerned with “the last twenty years”, a period roughly coinciding with the beginning of the 1980s and the election of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1979, and Ronald Reagan’s assumption of the presidency of the United States in 1981. This thesis is concerned with the last twenty years of the twentieth century, and the first twenty years of the new century. Following Garland’s example, I will designate this period as “late modernity”. The term “late modernity” is often credited to Bauman (2000)<sup>5</sup> and denotes a period characterized by global capitalist economies and increased privatization of services during the information technology revolution. The concept late modernity will be used in this dissertation to designate a specific period of time, a period beginning with the 1980s, and still persisting at the point of publication, in 2021. The onset roughly coincides with amendment of the Survey of Swedish Living Conditions that included a fear of crime question in 1978, which makes it a reasonable point of departure for this analysis.

Should this period be considered a break with, or a continuation of, modernity – and thus is it better designated post- or late modernity? Is it sufficiently characterized by neoliberal capitalism to be best described as late capitalism or as the neoliberal era? Post-Fordist or post-welfare are other terms that emphasize a break with previous forms of social organization. These matters have been the

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<sup>5</sup> Bauman actually names our contemporary period *liquid* modernity.

subject of vigorous academic debate (Beck, 1992a, 1992b; Butler, 1994; Giddens, 1991; Harvey, 1989; Mulinari & Sandell, 2009; Sennett, 2007). Sidestepping debates on the contingency between late modernity and the preceding period of Fordist, welfarist, postwar societies, proponents of different concepts might agree there has been sufficient systemic change, in similar directions, on a global scale that a specific concept may be applied to our contemporary time. My use of “late modernity” should not be read as a rejection of other, competing, concepts, but is rather for linguistic clarity, as Garland (2001) also motivates his choice. The strands of systemic change most central to understanding the establishment of the fear of crime research discourse in relation to its contemporary context are outlined below.

Late modernity is characterized by the changing organization of economics: of production, ownership of capital, and of working life. Scholars have described the current form of capitalism as fragmented (Sennett, 2007) or free (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005a). The ownership of capital is broken down and reassembled into complex configurations: conglomerates, hedge funds, and indexes. Production is characterized by outsourcing and subcontractors. Responsibility and decision-making are often removed from ownership and take place on a global stage. Production has moved from an idealized “Fordist” form, characterized by mass production, standardization, standardized labor and mass consumption, to a “post-Fordist” form, of specialization, flexible production, individualization, individualized consumption, and service sector labor. A key condition for these transformations of capital into a new “free” form was the 1971 repeal of the Bretton Woods agreement which had tied the value of the dollar to the value of gold (the gold standard). A crucial effect of this repeal was the financialization of the world economy and the adoption of market principles in new sectors. These changes are tied to emergence of New Public Management, an attempt to administer public affairs in accordance with market principles (Karlsson, 2017). In practice, this has resulted in a shrinking public sector, where many services are provided by private businesses and paid for by the state. Farrall (2006) has called this “rolling back the state”. Some have suggested that the effects of responsabilization of the citizenry have been so wide-reaching that they must be considered ontological (Oksala, 2013).

Economic inequality has increased during late modernity, both in terms of ownership, with capital becoming increasingly concentrated, and in terms of income inequality, which is increasing (Thebourn, 2018b, 2020). Sweden has an international reputation as an egalitarian country: as social democratic, welfarist, and equal. Indeed, in 1980, Sweden was ranked the least unequal country in the



world in terms of income (Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2018). From this high watermark, Sweden has experienced radically increasing economic disparity which, today, puts it on par with the United States in terms of economic inequality. In 2017, the richest 1 percent in Sweden owned 37 percent of all private wealth, and the richest 10 percent owned 75 percent, while in the United States, the richest 1 percent owned 35 percent and the richest 10 percent owned 76 percent (Therborn, 2020; Waldenström, Bastani, & Hansson, 2018). Therborn summarizes Sweden's growing economic disparity during late modernity thus:

Income development during the last three decades makes up a pattern which can be illustrated by as class staircase, the higher you are on the income scale, the more increase you get. Apart from the acute crisis years of the 1990s and immediately after 2007, the arrangement has not pushed down the incomes of the disadvantaged. Instead it has put them into a hierarchical order of growth, at an ever increasing distance from the top. (Therborn, 2020, p. 161)

Economic crisis has been a distinguishing feature of late modernity. The 1970s oil crisis, which was highly influential in American politics, had less of an effect in Sweden than the home-grown crisis of the 1990s, which in turn was a prelude to the international crisis and recession of 2007–2008 (Therborn, 2018a, 2020). The trend towards the financialization of the Swedish economy has been extremely strong, so much so that the economists who advocated for deregulation have had cause to question the development they themselves suggested (Jonung, 2015).

As Hagan (2010) and others have discussed, there is an unfortunate tendency in criminology to treat these structural changes and the increased instability of capitalism as something unrelated to the field. Perhaps related to this is what Garland (2001) names presentism; a tendency to locate explanation for contemporary events only in contemporary causes, forgetting that we are in fact caught up in long-term processes of historical change. This thesis will attempt to stress the conjuncture between the different strands of social change that form the background of the establishment of a fear of crime research discourse. While increasingly unequal and unstable configurations of economic change are defining features of late modernity, more central to the research questions of this analysis are matters of penal control, to which we will now turn. These too have undergone significant change during late modernity.

# Crime, criminalization, and incarceration in late modernity

## Criminalization and policy development

In Sweden the dominant trend has been of drastic development towards criminalization in general, and criminalization of drugs specifically. A recent analysis of the development of Swedish penal policy shows that, since 1976, the movement has almost exclusively been toward criminalization. The great majority of policy changes have increased the scope of the judicial sphere in terms of criminalization, sentencing, and discretionary powers of the police. The few exceptions are related to sanctioning, where non-imprisonment sanctions have been promoted, possibly because of the economic functionality of the penal system in relation to increased criminalization, as incarceration is expensive. The trend of judicial expansion has been similar under both liberal-conservative and social-democratic governments (Tham, 2018).

The matter of drugs is also a dominant theme in the Swedish penal politics of late modernity. Zero tolerance has been promoted as a national project, enforced by the police, taught in schools, and upheld as the solution to what is framed as our foremost social problem. Tham writes that the Swedish national drug policy is hard to understand as a rational project, as it represents a diversion from the ideals of pragmatism that Sweden prides itself on, with a rejection of empirically sound harm reduction methods and leading to comparatively high mortality among addicts (Tham, 2018). Träskman's analysis of Swedish drug policy states:

The penal control of narcotics in Sweden has been strongly characterized by certain ideological positions. Possibly the most important of these is the position of absolute zero tolerance for drugs, and the acceptance that the purpose of penal drug control policy is a society completely free from drugs. (Träskman, 2011, p. 59)<sup>6</sup>

This change is part of a hegemonic shift in how the causes of crime are understood. Sweden's one-time strong rehabilitative penal tradition has subsided in favor of a growing punitive ideal, and a strong focus on victims of crime and on fear of crime (Andersson & Nilsson, 2009).

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<sup>6</sup> My translation.

In the United States, also, drugs have had a special role in the penal politics of late modernity. A report from the National Research Council (2014) attributes the country's unprecedented incarceration rate during late modernity to increased prison admission rates and greater severity of sentencing. The rise in admission rates is attributed to increased incarceration for drug crime, while the longer time served is mainly explained by harsher sentencing for violent crime. Interestingly, crime trends are not associated with rising incarceration (2014). In short, the American mass incarceration phenomenon is a result of increased criminalization and policing.

## Incarceration and punishment

The War on Drugs and other law and order policies have implemented several mechanisms of increased social control and repression. These include stop-and-frisk tactics, increased surveillance, greater discretionary power of the police, and the involvement of other social institutions in policing (Garland, 2001; Hagan, 2010; Rios, 2011; Western, 2006; Western & Beckett, 2000).

The United States has thus experienced an unprecedented rise in mass incarceration during late modernity:

Current incarceration rates are historically and comparatively unprecedented. The United States has the highest incarceration rates in the world, reaching extraordinary absolute levels in the most recent two decades. (National Research Council, 2014)

The US prison population consists of some of the most disadvantaged people in American society: poorly educated, disproportionately belonging to minority communities, and mostly men under age forty. Young black men are incarcerated in unprecedented numbers; about one in five of those who have never been to college, and over half of all high-school dropouts have served time in state or federal prison at some point in their lives (National Research Council, 2014). The American prison system is increasingly monetized and functions as an economic institution. The debts prisoners incur in the system often increase over time, sometimes over several generations (Harris, Evans, & Beckett, 2010). The result is the formation of a new penal underclass which is poor, racialized, incarcerated, and indebted. The growing imprisonment of racial minorities cannot be explained by their overrepresentation in official crime statistics. This overrepresentation decreased during the 1990s–2000s, the period in which the number of

incarcerated black Americans increased most dramatically (National Research Council, 2014). The rate of incarceration in the United States, with nearly one out of every hundred adults in prison or jail, is five to ten times higher than the rates in Western Europe and other democracies.

Sweden has traditionally had low incarceration rates compared to the rest of Europe, and definitely compared to the United States. The postwar incarceration rate has hovered around 50–60 per 100,000 population, a fraction of the US incarceration rate (National Research Council, 2014; Pratt, 2008a, 2008b; Tham, 2018; von Hofer, 2011). However, penal culture in Sweden is increasingly influenced by the United States, leaving the so-called Scandinavian penal exceptionalism behind (Pratt, 2008a). Swedish prisoners are older, less well-educated, and in prison for longer than before. Drug crime and violent crime have surpassed theft as the most common causes for prison sentences (Tham, 2018). New Swedish prisons are being built for security reasons rather than to harmonize with ideals of equality and normalization (Pratt, 2008a). Incarceration rates have increased somewhat from the low levels of the mid-nineteenth century (Pratt, 2008b). Thus, we can conclude that the trend towards increased incarceration is heavily pronounced in the United States, and rather moderate in Sweden.

## Crime and crime trends

Estimating overall crime development in terms of aggregated levels of crime is fraught with methodological problems. The official statistics of reported crimes, prosecuted crimes, and sentencing are a product of several factors beyond actual crime, such as changes in law and policy, changes in police practice, and changing perceptions of what is criminal. Other sources are needed to improve validity of estimates, such as survey data and hospital data. These sources have other methodological problems<sup>7</sup> but can, through careful comparison and analysis, provide a more reliable description of crime development. This section will provide a brief overview of late-modernity crime trends in Sweden and, to a lesser extent, in the United States and United Kingdom.

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<sup>7</sup> See chapter 8 for a discussion of survey data problems.

## Swedish crime in late modernity

As **Figure 6** shows, aggregated levels of reported crime increased significantly during the postwar period in Sweden, most notably during the 1950s (Tham, 2018; von Hofer, 2011). The number of prosecuted people per 100,000 citizens reached an all-time high in 1977, and the trend since has been one of decrease (von Hofer, 2011). But counting aggregated levels of crime is often misleading, as all crimes are counted equally, and the number of convicted people is not the same as the number of reported crimes. The dramatic increase in aggregated crime in postwar Sweden is mainly explained by more traffic crime and public inebriation. As **Figure 7** shows, excluding these crimes makes the aggregated trend much less pronounced. The decriminalization of public inebriety in 1977 also had great effects on aggregated crime statistics. To really understand what is going on with crime trends, it is preferable to examine different types of crime separately and to compare different types of data, while remembering that all forms of data on something as complex as crime have potential sources of error.

Property crime far outnumbers violent crime, as shown by **Figure 8**. Criminologists suggest that property crime rises as people own more “loose property”, meaning personal and valuable belongings (Bäckman, Estrada, Nilsson, & Sivertsson, 2020; Estrada & Nilsson, 2001; von Hofer, 2011; von Hofer & Tham, 1989). It is easy to assume that violent crime has always been considered more serious, but analysis shows that concern about property crime used to dominate penal debate until 1986, when violent crime took over and has since overshadowed other types of crime (Estrada, 1997). Violent crime is the most relevant for this thesis, but is also more complex to study, as the data sources provide somewhat contradictory views.

The number of reported violent crimes per 100,000 citizens is increasing, and has done so for the whole period under study, as shown by **Figure 9**. When considering victimization surveys (see **Figure 11**) however, the depicted trend is much more stable, with only a slight increase. These two sources are compared in **Figure 10**, where we see that they differ significantly in the trends they depict. In the hospital data shown in **Figure 11**, however, the trend is instead one of decrease. There are two possible explanations for these apparent discrepancies: either Swedes are assaulted to a previously unknown degree and refrain from seeking health care, or violent crime is not increasing but people are increasingly *sensitized* to violence and report more violent incidents to the police. A data source supporting this hypothesis, that the development of violent crime is much more

even and constant than the statistics on reported crime suggest, is the statistics on deadly violence.

Deadly violence<sup>8</sup> is considered a reasonable proxy for violent crime, and has been relatively stable in Sweden during the twentieth century, with around one case per 100,000 people annually (von Hofer, 2011). **Figure 13** depicts the development of deadly violence in the Nordic countries, showing a modest increase during the 1960s and 1970s, stability during the 1980s, and a decreasing trend since (Lehti et al., 2019).<sup>9</sup> The report finds that the Nordic countries have “extremely low rates of homicide rates” in global comparisons, and that the trends are similar to those in most of the Western world:

The overall trend of the short and mid-term fluctuations in homicide rates in all the Nordic countries have followed a similar pattern in the post-Second War era observed in most European countries, North America, Australia and New Zealand. In these countries, there was an increasing trend starting between the early 1960s and mid-1970s, a stabilization of the rates for two decades, and a decreasing trend from the 1990s onwards. (Lehti et al., 2019, p. 16)

The total number of convictions in Sweden decrease over time (von Hofer, 2011), but there are also changes in the structure of crime, with decreasing property crime, relatively stable violent crime and increasing drug crime (driving up incarceration rates) (Bäckman et al., 2020; Kristoffersen et al., 2010; Träskman, 2005). Total deadly violence is not increasing, but a growing share of it is gun violence (Lehti et al., 2019). Most criminologists agree that more violent crime is reported today, and that the changing factor has been the tendency to report; not the actual amount of violence (Andersson & Nilsson, 2009; Kivivuori, 2014; A. Nilsson, Estrada, & Bäckman, 2017; Tham, 2018; Tham & von Hofer, 2014; Tonry, 2014a; von Hofer & Tham, 1989). It should also be noted that both crime and victimization are unevenly distributed. Women’s crime levels are approaching men’s, especially property crime, but men remains overrepresented. Fewer young men are convicted of crime, and immigrant men commit higher levels of crime than ethnically Swedish men, but this difference is decreasing, and was more pronounced during the 1990s and 2000s than in the 2010s. Crime has become more socioeconomically unequal, where low-income young men are ten times as

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<sup>8</sup> *Mord, dråp och vållande till annans död*: murder in the first and second degree, and manslaughter.

<sup>9</sup> Two exceptions are Finland, where deadly violence has been steadily decreasing, and Norway, where the terrorist attack on Utöya led to an outlier in 2011.

likely to be convicted of violent crime than young men from high income families (Bäckman et al., 2020; A. Nilsson et al., 2017). Bäckman et al. (2020) makes the following comment in their analysis of Swedish crime trends:


An important observation is that the socio-economic difference between individuals born in Sweden and those born abroad or have parents born abroad are large, and increases during 1990–2017. (Bäckman et al., 2020, p. 4)

Increased sensitization to violence may explain why reported violent crime (**Figure 9**) seems to be constantly increasing. For a violent crime to be included in the official statistics, someone had to experience or witness it, identify and classify what happened as criminal violence, and report it to the police, who had to agree with the assessment and register it as a violent crime. There are thus many subjectivities involved in the construction of official statistics.


An indication of changing attitudes to violence can be found in studies which show radical increases in reported violent crime in schools. The increase is dominated by minor cases reported to the police by schools (Estrada, 2010). Violence among children has likely existed in schoolyards for as long as there have been schoolyards, but changing attitudes and directives have led to much more of it being reported to the police and classified as crime. Another example is violence against minors,<sup>10</sup> which was criminalized in Sweden in 1979. Two years after criminalization, in 1981, minors were the victim of 4 percent of all counts of assault. In 2016, the corresponding number was 27 percent (Tham, 2018). Are more children beaten today than right after the criminalization of parental violence? It seems unlikely, and data from the patient registry supports the opposite conclusion, that fewer children are hurt due to violence than ever before (Socialstyrelsen, 2004). There is nothing to suggest that our understanding of violent crime should be constant over time. Violence used to be much more of a fact of life in society, and many forms of violence which we understand as criminal were historically not so considered, such as beating children, women, or servants. That the social definition of crime matters a great deal is an issue that has received increased attention recently (Kivivuori, 2014).

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
<sup>10</sup> *Barnaga*: disciplinary parental violence against children.




**Figure 6** Sweden: Number of reported crime per 100,000 population  
Sweden: Official statistics. Number of reported crime per 100,000 population. Based on official crime statistics. Source: Brottsförebyggande Rådet (bra.se)



**Figure 7** Sweden: Number of convicted people per 100,000 population  
Sweden: All offenses. Number of convicted person (black line) excluding inebriety and traffic crimes (dotted line) per 100,000 population, 1831–2010 (five-year average). Source: von Hofer (2011, p. 224)




**Figure 8** Sweden: Number of people convicted of assault or property crime (per 100,000 population)  
Sweden: Number of people convicted of assault (black line) or property crime (dotted line) per 100,000 population, 1836–2010 (five-year average). Source: von Hofer (2011, p. 54)




**Figure 9** Sweden: The number of reported assault crime 1975–2020  
Sweden: Number of reported assault crimes per 100,000 population, 1975–2020. Based on official crime statistics. Source: Brottsförebyggande Rådet (bra.se)






**Figure 10** Sweden: Model of development of assault based on official crime statistics  
 Sweden: Model of development of assault based on official crime statistics, 1950–2010, and of victimization survey 1978–2009. von Hofer (2011, p. 61)




**Figure 11** Sweden: Percentage of people victimized by violent crime or threat  
 Sweden: Percentage of people victimized by violent crime or threat during the previous year, 1978–2002. Comparison of men (dark) and women (light). Source SCB (2004)



**Figure 12** Sweden: Number of patients receiving care because of assault by another person per 100,000 population

Sweden: Number of patients receiving care because of assault by another person per 100,000 population, 2001-2019. Data from the Patient Registry, Socialstyrelsen (<https://sdb.socialstyrelsen.se/ifska/resultat.aspx>)



**Figure 13** Homicide mortality in the Nordic countries per 100,000 population


Homicide mortality in the Nordic countries per 100,000 population, 1946–2016. Based on official crime statistics; Denmark 2012–2016 data from police statistics; Iceland five-year moving average. Source: (Lehti et al., 2019, p. 14)

## The United States and the United Kingdom


Self-reporting surveys do not support the view of a radical increase in crime in the United States during the 1970s. This is apparent in **Figure 15**, which is based on a chart from the National Crime and Victimization survey (1992). According to official statistics, US crime rates rose considerably in the 1960s and 1970s, followed by a slight decrease and subsequent increase in 1980s. Peak crime, according to the official statistics, was in the early 1990s, and the trend since has been a rather dramatic decrease during the 2000s and 2010s (Beckett & Herbert, 2010; Beckett & Sasson, 2000b; Hagan, 2010; Western, 2006; Western & Beckett, 2000). This recent drop in crime is uncontested, and is also supported by statistics on American homicides:

Prior to 1965, the US homicide rate was consistently under 5 per 100,000 population. Around 1965, it began to steady rise, and from 1970 it oscillated for twenty years in the range of 8 to 10 per 100,000. A decline from 1980 to 1985 was followed by a dramatic growth in youth violence during the period from 1985 to 1991, with arrest rates for homicide more than doubling for each age group of males under age 20; the rise for black youth was even steeper. Then, beginning in 1992, aggregate rates declined steadily to less than 6 per 100,000 in 1999, a level not seen since the 1960s, with no clear indication of when the decline would level off or reverse itself. (Blumstein, Wallman, & Farrington, 2006, p. 3)

A comparison of reported crime and crime and victimization survey statistics in the United States (Levitt, 2004) and the United Kingdom (Jansson, 2007) depicts a similar tendency as in Sweden. Crime is generally decreasing, but with increased sensitivity towards violence, more of it is reported to the police. During the period from 1973 to 1991, American survey statistics depict stable levels of violent crime and aggravated assault, and decreasing rape, robbery, burglary, theft, and property crime, while official statistics show considerable increases. During 1991–2001, all categories of crime decreased according to both police reports and survey data, but the decline was more dramatic in the survey data, at around 50 percent for most categories (Levitt, 2004). A similar comparison between British police data and survey data from 1981 and 2006 depicts an analogous trend: a larger percentage of crime was reported to the police in 2006 than in 1981, and the effect was most noticeable for violent crime (Jansson, 2007).



**Figure 14** United Kingdom: Trends in British Crime Survey and police-recorded crimes  
 United Kingdom: Trends in British Crime Survey and police-recorded crimes, in thousands, 1981–2005/2006.  
 Source: Jansson (2007, p. 8)



**Figure 15** United States: Crime rate per 100,000 population  
 United States: Crime rate per 100,000 population, 1960–2012. Homicide and rape rates per 100,000 have been multiplied by 10. Rates for burglary have been divided by 10. Source: Tonry (2014a)

## Crime rates in late modernity: the factual, the contradictory, and the common sense

Tonry (2014b) writes that crime rates have moved in parallel in English-speaking countries and Western Europe since the 1960s. A chart from an unpublished article by the late von Hofer (**Figure 16**), comparing trends in homicide rates in the United States and Sweden,<sup>11</sup> further supports this claim. The trend in late modernity seems to be one of consistency across national contexts rather than local specificity. At the same time, the very existence of a crime drop is contested. Tonry (2014b, p. 2) writes:

Almost no one except a handful of academic specialists seems to have noticed that crime rates are falling throughout the Western world. That is curious. It should be seen everywhere as good news.

Tonry (2014b) argues that the crime drop has been obscured by increased reporting and over-estimations of crime increases in the 1970s and 1980s, and indeed, famous criminologists such as Wilson have described the postwar increase in crime as historically unprecedented and as continually increasing (Wilson, 1975). Certainly, the increasing trend of criminalization and incarceration in late modernity would be easier to explain with reference to a steadily increasing crime rate. Yet some criminologists have questioned the apparent increase in crime during the 1970s and 1980s:

Analysis of crime rates reveals, however, that despite the propaganda of law enforcement agencies and the impression perpetrated by the media, the crime rate in the United States has not changed significantly in the last 20 years. (Chambliss, 1994)


A reasonable conclusion is that Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States all experienced moderate increases in crime between 1970 and 1990, but the levels of crime in most categories have been stable or decreasing from the 1990 onwards. There appears to be a more pronounced sensitivity to crime, especially violent crime, in all three countries, and more crime is consequently reported to the police. During the same period, criminalization and incarceration has increased. For Sweden the trend of criminalization is very pronounced, while the

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<sup>11</sup> The level of deadly violence in Sweden was increased 6.67 times to make it comparable to US levels.

United States has experienced unprecedented levels of incarceration. The overall trend in late modernity is one of judicial expansion. Simultaneously, economic inequality has increased.

Stable or decreasing crime levels cannot adequately explain increased criminalization and incarceration. Nor can crime levels explain the prominent role of the concept of *otrygghet* in contemporary Sweden, nor the rapid expansion of fear of crime research. As we delve deeper into the contradictions and paradoxes that characterize penal control in late modernity, it becomes obvious that factual and sober accounts of crime trends cannot adequately explain the developing *common sense of crime*. We will now turn to theoretical tools that can help us understand it more thoroughly.



**Figure 16** Sweden and the United States. Comparison of homicides per 100,000 population Sweden (red) and the United States (black). Comparison of homicides per 100,000 population. Homicide rate for Sweden has been multiplied by 6.67 for purpose of comparison. Source: von Hofer (2013)

## 4. Theory on production of fear of crime knowledge

The previous chapter sought to describe how two seemingly paradoxical trends co-exist in the same period of time, late modernity: first, that crime rates are not rising in Sweden or in the United States; and second, that the judicial sphere is characterized by rapidly increasing criminalization, sentencing, and policing. Additionally, I have tried to define what late modernity is, and described the rapid structural economic and social changes that took place within it. It is against this contemporary background of structural change that the concept of "*otrygghet*" has risen to prominence. To help us understand this concept, and how and why it arose, this chapter will present the theoretic framework of this thesis, starting with the *what*, and moving on to the *how* and *why*.

This chapter starts with the section on the *what* and discusses what a research discourse is and why it should be the subject of critical analysis. The *how* is about which theoretical tools are needed to understand and analyze the empirical materials. The first empirical part of this thesis is about how fear of crime has been researched in Sweden. It deals with surveys, institutions, respondents, operationalizations and results and tries to answer how knowledge on fear of crime is produced. For this, sociological theory on the production of knowledge is necessary. Chapter 8 investigates how the Swedish concept of *otrygghet* has been used in political debate during late modernity. *Otrygghet*, during this period, became the generally accepted Swedish translation of the American concept of "fear of crime". This thesis seeks to find out if what the concept signifies has

changed during the period. It is a matter of linguistic change over time. For this, we need theoretical tools that enable analysis of linguistic conceptual change.

The *why* aims to position the empirical analysis against the background of structural change described in the previous chapter, and ask: *why* did this discourse on fear of crime become what it is during this period? This is a matter of *conjuncture*, to use a term favored by Stuart Hall (Gilbert, 2019; Hall et al., 2013/1978), here meaning to historicize the sociological and criminological development discussed in this thesis. For Stuart Hall, mapping out the conjuncture is a matter of situating current developments historically (Gilbert, 2019; Hall et al., 2013/1978). A key purpose in this thesis is to construct a historical account of how the establishment of fear of crime research fits into the developing political narrative of crime. Indeed, there are several strands of criminological development that coincide with the establishment of fear of crime research in late modernity. They are neither caused by, nor causes of, this establishment, but rather interlock and connect; they are *conjunctive*. Some of these penal and judicial developments, and their relation to the social and economic, are discussed towards the end of this chapter.

## *What* is a research discourse?

Histories are written of the congenitally blind, of wolf-children, and of hypnosis. But who will write the history of the practice of examination, a history more general, more indefinite, but more determinate as well... For in this simple technique there is involved a whole domain of knowledge, and a whole species of power. (Foucault, 1980, p. 51)

This thesis argues that there is a discourse of fear of crime: a common, accepted, and prescribed way to research this subject in terms of what questions to ask, which methods to use, and what language to use when talking about fear of crime. This discourse, this ordered speech on fear of crime, is a historically situated product specific to late modernity. It is entangled with institutions, knowledge practices, power, and materiality. It should be a matter of social research and thought, as it has implications for how we think and act.

The research questions of this thesis are concerned with the complicated and entangled relationship between scientific research, language, and the structural



and political. In his *L'archéologie du savoir* (1969) and *Les mots et les choses* (1966), Foucault develops the concept of the discourse, the scientific order of speech that makes it possible to state certain things as true, and which orders writing and thinking. He uncovers the entanglement of institutions, power, and knowledge during different epochs, and how they define and support each other. Power is knowledge, and knowledge is in turn power; knowledge is produced that naturalizes the current social organization and division of power, and power in turn materially enables the production of knowledge. They are thus dependent on each other and caught in a cycle of mutual support and legitimatization.

This dual notion of power, as something that is both repressive and productive – as something that orders the world – has influenced both criminology and the sociology of knowledge. It invites social scientists to consider the disciplinary and ordering function of the knowledge we produce. Foucault describes the purpose of his work as “the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently” (Foucault, 1985). In his later works, the concept of the apparatus (French: *dispositif*) is developed as a way to talk about what is required for knowledge production (Foucault, 1985). Foucault defines apparatus as:

a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions. (M Foucault, 1980)

The apparatus can be seen as way to widen the understanding of the scientific discourse to include the material. It is not only an order of speech that makes it possible to judge statements as true and scientific that is needed for the production of knowledge. There must also be institutions to administer the research and pay people to do it, buildings in which to do research, forums where it can be presented, and so forth. This entire system, collectively, is the scientific apparatus.

## *How to study the production of fear of crime knowledge*

The fear of crime research discourse is an endeavor to measure the amount of fear in a population and produces “facts” about fear of crime in the form of numbers. This makes statements such as “30 percent of the population of Malmö are fearful of crime” not only possible but scientific. One way to examine the processes involved in this quantification is by asking what is needed to produce such facts. What is being quantified, and by what means? What institutions are involved in creating scientific numbers? What instruments do the institutions use to generate these numbers? What entities and phenomena are commensurated to make up fear of crime statistics? What categorizations and classifications are involved in the process? What kind of reactivity does the knowledge production around fear of crime produce? In these research questions, there is an inherent interest in the process of quantification itself, and the scientific apparatus that produces it.

While quantification has a long and complex history within the social sciences,<sup>12</sup> there is a new and growing body of research that examines quantification as not only a tool for research, but as a subject of research. The sociology of quantification asks questions about the production of numbers: how are numbers produced, and what do people do with them? Espeland and Stevens (2008) map out five key areas for enquiry: the work quantification requires, its reactivity, its tendency to discipline human behavior, its polyvalent authority, and its aesthetics. The sociology of quantification is, to a certain degree, a meta-science, in the sense that it asks sociologists to analyze and examine scientific production itself. As such, it can be seen as related to science and technology studies and the sociology of knowledge, areas of research that have proliferated in the past decade. Inspired by influential works by, for example, Latour and Woolgar (2013), science and technology studies asks sociologists to go into lab and examine the social processes that produce scientific facts. Science and technology studies also includes examinations of the processes of quantification: of counting things and producing numbers. But processes of quantification take place in a great variety of social contexts also outside the lab. The study of quantification urges sociologists to open up the “black box” of number production and ask: when a number comes out, what goes in? What questions are being asked to generate a numerical answer? As such, this is a fruitful theoretical

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<sup>12</sup> See, for example, Lazarsfeld (1961).

perspective for investigating how knowledge production in a scientific discourse changes the *games of truth* (Owen, 2002), in other words how we talk and what is possible to say about a scientific subject. It involves examining the practice of knowledge production; all the choices and assumptions that are involved in producing knowledge, the accepted practices and methods, *the way things are done*. Key theoretical concepts emerge from the field of sociology of quantification as central for the study of knowledge production on fear of crime: commensuration, classification and categorization, and reactivity and perlocution.

## Commensuration

Commensuration is the transformation of different qualities into a common metric (Espeland & Stevens, 1998). The concept denotes the process of how things that are counted together *become* the same. Commensuration can render some aspects of a phenomenon invisible and irrelevant by not counting them, and at the same time make phenomena with different characteristics similar by including them in the same count. This is the social and subjective process of deciding what is to be included in the production of a measurement. Espeland and Stevens (1998) write that commensuration transforms qualities into quantities, difference into magnitude. Another way to say this is to state that commensuration transforms difference into quantity, by encompassing different unities under a shared cognitive system. Commensuration changes sense-making by reducing, simplifying, and integrating information, and by creating new, precise, and all-encompassing relationships between entities (Espeland & Sauder, 2007). The notion that the process of creating equivalence has relevance for social science analysis is not new. For Marx, labor is the great commensurator. It commensurates value, and in turn value is derived from labor. Value is expressed in terms of what all commodities have in common: the general experience of labor, what Marx (1986) calls abstract labor, which is measured as labor-time. Much fear of crime knowledge is presented as a dichotomy: how many are fearful of crime? What commensurative practices are in play to generate these quantitative and scientific facts? What has been measured “together” and made similar? What has been reduced, simplified, obscured?

## Classification and categorization

If counting different phenomena as one makes them appear as one, and transforms difference into quantity, a related concept of theoretical relevance is how to classify and categorize. These social processes are highly discursive, but the numbers they produce tend to conceal this. Espeland and Stevens (2008) write that classification precludes commensuration: “before objects can be made commensurate, they must be classified in ways that make them comparable”. Fourcade and Healy (2017) write that all quantifying implies sorting, and to sort is to pass through a categorical lens. Therefore, there can be no measurement without classification. Fourcade and Healy (2017) also argue that classification and categorization schemas are built upon other classifying practices. The more advanced the quantification mechanism, the more layers of categorization and classification are constructed upon each other. To unravel them is akin to peeling an onion, where each layer obstructs the implicit assumptions and social processes that construct the layers under it. We shall use these concepts to study the categorical lens of fear of crime research. What types of crimes are thought to generate fear and thus are included in fear of crime surveys, and what types are not? How are the categories constructed, and how does that influence the types of results produced?

Much of this is related to the criticism of *abstracted empiricism* put forth by Mills (1959), and further derived from the tradition of adherence to *methodological individualism* first proposed by Weber (1978/1922). J. Heath (2020) summarizes the methodological claim as follows:

Social phenomena must be explained by showing how they result from individual actions, which in turn must be explained through reference to the intentional states that motivate the individual actors.

Ironically, this tradition has developed in a way that is quite different from what Weber likely intended, as his motivation for the recommendation was that only individuals can provide explanations for their actions, and are thus the only source of insight available to social scientists into why something happened (J. Heath, 2020). Thus, Weber’s goal was not necessarily to privilege explanations on the individual level over collective, structural ones, but this has undoubtedly been a result of this methodological claim, as its history is entangled with the introduction of a certain kind of quantitative research as the dominant form of social science knowledge production. The idea that social phenomena must be explained by the rational choices of individuals is based on the assumption that people are rational,

and that the choices they make are motivated by internal intentional states. Under this assumption, surveys are seen as the most efficient way to obtain knowledge on individual motivations in a large enough sample to enable statistical analysis. For Mills (1959), this assumption is tied to a tendency to confuse whatever is to be studied with the methods suggested for its study. He writes:

Studies of the type I am examining, when analyzed from a logical standpoint, reveal that the “interesting concepts” used to interpret and explain “the data” almost always point to: (1) structural and historical “factors” above the level made available by the interview, (2) psychological “factors” below the depth open to the interviewer. But the important point is that conceptions neither of structure nor of psychological depth are typically among the terms with which the research has been formulated and “the data” collected. (Mills, 1959, p. 70)

Taking as our point of departure the criticism of abstracted empiricism and the methodological individualism that critics name “psychologism”, in this thesis we shall endeavor to pay attention to what is being researched in the fear of crime discourse as a result of the methods that are used.

## Reactivity and perlocution

Scientific methods do not only measure and describe the world, they also enact upon it. In the words of Law (2009), successful knowledge practices not only have to present convincing narratives, they have to imply realities fit for that knowledge. Measurement and quantification produce numbers, and people react to those numbers and do things with them. Numbers have reactivity; they cause people to think and act differently. Espeland and Stevens (2008) suggest that we consider choices of what to include in quantitative efforts, such as the selection of variables, as *perlocutionary* acts: acts of speech that enact upon the world. Numerical measurements are performative, and not only descriptive. Espeland and Sauder (2007) describe the reactivity of law school rankings as self-fulfilling prophecies which encourage law schools to become more like what the rankings measure: “reactions to social measures confirm the expectations or predictions that are embedded in the measures, or increase the validity of the measures by encouraging behavior that confirms it”. Hacking (1999) calls the process of how measurements reinforce the categorization of human beings as “making up people”: the categories change how we think about people.

What is the perlocutionary function of fear of crime surveys? This question is twofold. First, in what way does the production of fear of crime knowledge *define* what fear of crime is? And, second, what happens with that knowledge? What are its consequences in terms of politics and policy-making? While the first question is addressed in chapter 7, the second question is broader and harder to answer in full. Chapter 8, which analyzes how the concept of *otrygghet* changes by comparing texts from different periods of late modernity, addresses how the measurement of fear of crime defines what can be said about it. In this chapter, we can look for references to research on fear of crime, and ascertain the degree to which knowledge production, the scientific discourse on fear of crime, has affected what can and is said about fear of crime in political debate.

## The linguistic, the conceptual, the historical, the social?

The question addressed in chapter 8, on conceptual change, is first and foremost a matter of the *linguistic* and *conceptual* in relation to the *historical* and *social*. Social semantics as a field begins with Saussure (1916/1983) introduction of the concept of the linguistic sign, which comprises the *signifier* (such as a word), and the *signified* (what meaning it entails). The notion that this is a simple, dyadic relation is known as the structuralist position and has been criticized as much too simple to explain the complex role of language in social life. The post-structuralists have expanded upon this notion and are occupied with the complicated relationship between language, the structural, and the social.

Chapter 8 aims to analyze what happens to a word, a *concept*, when it is used to research something new. The importation of fear of crime surveys to Sweden (laid out in chapter 6), led to *fear of crime* being translated into Swedish as *otrygghet*. Did this have had linguistic effects on the word itself – on what it *signifies*? The writing of German conceptual historian (*Begriffsgeschichte*, to use his own term), Reinhart Koselleck, can aid in analyzing what happens to a concept, such as *otrygghet*, over time. It is through language we make sense of the world, argues Koselleck, and without concepts there can be no politics, no social life and no history – at least, none that we can understand and interpret:

There is no history without societal formations and the concepts by which they define and seek to meet their challenges, whether reflexively or self-reflexively; without them, it is impossible to experience and to interpret history, to represent it or to recount it. (Koselleck & Presner, 2002, p. 23)

Any event, large or small, involving people and their organizations of social life, depends on language in action. But the event is not only the retelling of it: what takes place is obviously more than the linguistic articulation that led to the event or that interprets it. There is a difference between history as it takes place and its linguistic facilitation. The relationship is not causal – one does not determine the other – but is reciprocal and entangled (Koselleck & Presner, 2002).

Koselleck (2004; 2002) calls concepts words with a special ability to convey meaning – they are words that can *carry* something. He writes that his interest lies not in mere linguistic history, but in the socio-political terminology relevant to the current conditions of social history. Words can change meaning over time, but concepts are more sophisticated structures, with greater *carrying capacity*; they are words with historical and social baggage. Every concept is associated with a word, but not every word is a social and political concept, Koselleck argues. Concepts are constituted by two elements, and it is this constitution that makes them a suitable object of social research. They carry the baggage of the past; they are constituted by the structural, political, and social that has already happened. Furthermore, they carry the intentions of the future: the use of a concept constitutes a polemic push in some direction (Koselleck, 2004; Koselleck & Presner, 2002). This brings us to the question: is *otrygghet* a concept, and if so, has it always been so? Koselleck argues that remodeling of a word into a concept can happen without noticeable disturbance, and it is the shared ambiguity that both words and concepts have that enables this. He writes:

In use a word can become unambiguous. By contrast, a concept must remain ambiguous in order to be a concept. The concept is connected to a word but is at the same time more than a word: a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word. (...) Concepts are the concentrate of several substantial meanings. (...) Signifier and signified coincide in the concept insofar as the diversity of historical reality and historical experience enter a word such that receive their meaning only in this word. (Koselleck, 2004, p. 85)

To find out if *otrygghet* is, and always has been a concept we must tease out what the signifier (*otrygghet*) signifies, and if its meaning has been constant over time. Does *otrygghet* refer to a specific sociopolitical context that makes sense only by referring to it by that word? If we can define it as a concept, what kind of historical baggage does the concept of *otrygghet* carry? What types of intentions towards the future does using it convey? How does the semantic content of the signifier *otrygghet* reach into the non-linguistic, the historical, political, and structural – Koselleck writes that a historical clarification of conceptual use must not refer only to the history of language, but also to sociohistorical data (Koselleck, 2004). For Koselleck, the relationship between the linguistic and the non-linguistic, between the conceptual and the structural, political and social, is never causal or deterministic in either direction, but complex and mutually entangled:

Social history (Sozialgeschichte oder Gesellschaftgeschichte) and conceptual history stand in reciprocal, historically necessitated tension that can never be cancelled out. (Koselleck & Presner, 2002, p. 23)

Conceptual history, *Begriffsgeschichte*, is an “in-text” method of analysis. It determines meanings and changes in a concept over time through synchronous analysis (comparing and teasing out meanings within a period of time), followed by diachronous analysis (comparing different periods to each other to determine change over time). The synchronic analysis must take account of the situation and conjuncture, the “outside” of the text, because while the conceptual and linguistic is not determined by the sociopolitical, it exists in a mutually engendered tension (Koselleck & Presner, 2002). In Koselleck’s view, conceptual and social history inform each other, both functioning to specify the other, to make it more precise. Koselleck writes that the sociohistorical relevance of a conceptual history is the result of a rigorous diachronous analysis of the persistence or change of a concept, as such changes are only visible over time. To what extent has the intentional substance remained the same, and to what extent has it changed with the passage of time? This temporal question posed by *Begriffsgeschichte*, in terms of a concept’s persistence, change, and novelty conceived diachronically, leads to the identification of semantic components, of persisting, overlapping, discarded, and new meanings, all of which become relevant for social history.

In periods of heightened social change, how concepts change and what they signify also occurs at an increased pace. Koselleck calls such periods *Sattelzeit* – saddle time – bridging periods of time. While historians generally refrain from applying their concepts to contemporary times, as a sociologist and criminologist



I feel free to argue that this period of time, late modernity, constitutes such a period of heightened social change (see chapter 3). It is because of the non-determined, but mutually reciprocal relationship between the sociohistorical and the linguistic – Koselleck uses the term *explosive* to characterize their relationship – that makes periods of rapid social change especially interesting for conceptual studies (Koselleck, 2004; Koselleck & Presner, 2002).

## The narrative of crime and fear of crime in late modernity

### A common sense of crime

The questions of this thesis aim towards understanding the role, saliency, and prominence of the concept of *otrygghet* in late modernity. The process by which the research discourse was established is not only a historically recent phenomenon, it has from its very emergence (as outlined in chapter 6) been highly politically entangled. To make sense of this entanglement, and understand *why* this development has taken place during this time, we must ask ourselves what role the politics of crime and law plays in relation to the structural and economic. The argument is that in order to understand the prominence and saliency of the concept of *otrygghet*, we need to address how the politics of law and crime has come to occupy a far more central place in societal debate, and what role *otrygghet* has played in this shift.

Seemingly paradoxical developments (outlined in chapter 3) suggest that a rapid expansion of the judicial has coincided in time and space with stable or decreasing levels of crime. We can call this development a *surface appearance of a crime crisis*, i.e., this development is not caused by what it appears to be – a crime wave – but that the reasons for this expansion of tools of control at the state’s disposal must be sought in something other than “internal” reasons, i.e., crime. A purpose of this thesis is to analyze how fear of crime measurements and the concept of *otrygghet* fits into the construction of a *common sense of crime*, a notion that has been analyzed by Hall et al. (2013/1978) in their study of the British mugging panic in relation to the economic crisis of the 1970s. Their historical account of the conjunctural shift from the postwar consensus to the neoliberal era

depicts a shift from a *consensual* to a *coercive* management style. This analysis is credited with having been the first to discern the emergence of new social forces and discourses that would result in public support for the “new right” politics of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom (Gilbert, 2019). They argue that the “mugging panic” was a symptom of the emergence of a new *common sense*: a new set of widely diffused and shared understandings of the social world. Central to this new common sense is the notion that a deplorable breakdown in “law and order” has occurred (Hall et al., 2013/1978).

## Roll-back transformation of the state

Many scholars have described late modernity as a period characterized by the roll-back of the state (Boltanski & Chiapello, 2005b; Karlsson, 2017; Oksala, 2013). Responsibilities that used to lie with the state, in terms of housing, schooling, employment, and health care, are now subject to the logic of the market. This creates an inherent instability and need for greater coercive control mechanisms of the state to maintain order. Some scholars have criticized the notion of the market as being central to this shift, and instead emphasized how neoliberalism has become increasingly authoritarian (Bruff, 2014). Nils Christie describes the problem in simple terms:

Wealth everywhere is unequally distributed. So is access for paid work. Both problems contain potentialities for unrest. The crime control industry is suited for coping with both. (Christie, 2016, p. 1).

Scholars have described this shift in terms of an emerging culture of control established in tandem with the retreat of the welfare state (Garland, 2001), from welfare state to security state (Beckett & Sasson, 2000b), crime in the age of Reagan (Hagan, 2010), of rolling back the state (Farrall, 2006) and punishing the poor under Thatcher (Andrews & Jacobs, 1990), of an alarmist and emotional response to crime in late modernity (R. Nilsson & Andersson, 2017; Tham, 2018). Beckett and Sasson (2000b) suggest that the war on crime is a hegemonic strategy, explaining the shift from a welfare state to a security state. Hall et al. (2013/1978) borrow from Cohen (1972) the concept of the moral panic as a form of a deep-seated historical crisis of hegemony for the state. This moral panic is a surface manifestation of a crisis, a key ideological form in which the historical crisis is “experienced and fought out” (Hall et al., 2013/1978, p. 218). The moral

panic is a means to win over the “silent majority” to the coercive efforts of the state, and lend legitimacy to “more than usual” force and exercise of control.

## The hegemonic function of crime

Viewing late modernity penal politics as a matter of understanding the dominion and oppression of an authoritarian state is perhaps too great a simplification. Modern democracy depends on successful narratives; on maintaining hegemony. There must be legitimacy and consent also for an exceptional state using an exceptional amount of control and coercive force (Hall et al., 2013/1978). Effective penal politics depend on the construction of suitable enemies; they imply battlelines drawn between good and evil. If the increased coercive power of the state is to be legitimized, crime must be constructed as an existential threat and a hegemonic conflict in society. For Beckett and Sasson (2000b), a key aspect of this hegemonic strategy is the convergence between “poor”, “urban”, and “black”, replacing the earlier association between “rural”, “poor”, and “white”. Associating poverty with crime and drugs legitimizes a law-and-order response:

As part of this new hegemonic strategy, the wars on crime and drugs are simultaneously ideological and practical; they are mechanisms for winning the consent of the majority and are ways of governing with important material and institutional consequences. From an ideological standpoint, the rhetoric and policies of the wars on crime and drugs have transformed the symbolic meaning of poverty, thereby legitimating the replacement of the welfare state with the security state. Beckett and Sasson (2000, p. 68)

This thesis is about how the concept of fear of crime, *otrygghet* in Swedish, figures in these new forms of penal politics. The establishment of a new hegemonic conflict in society, between the criminal and the law-abiding, is central to understanding the discourse on crime in late modernity which, in the Swedish context, is alarmist, doom-laden, and emotionally charged (Andersson & Nilsson, 2009; Hermansson, 2019a; Tham, 2018). The construction of this conflict can be understood in terms of a number of factors, including convergence and signification, the construction of a suitable enemy, imagining the police as good guardians, and an immeasurable and self-amplifying crime problem.

## Convergence and signification

This thesis will examine how the concept of *otrygghet* plays into the construction of crime as a social problem. This process is *discursive*, meaning that it takes place in what is being said about crime. Hall et al. (2013/1978) offer key theoretical concepts to help us disentangle the discursive, by showing how the content of debate on crime and law can be located in a *signification spiral*, in which how events are signified also intrinsically escalates their threat. This is a corresponding concept to the *amplification spiral* (a concept borrowed from Cohen (1972) labelling theory), in the sense that the response is disproportionate to the threat and is *self-amplifying*.

Convergence is the practice of (linguistically) linking two or more issues such that a new issue can draw on already established social knowledge. It is a central theoretical concept developed by Hall et al. (2013/1978), and will aid us in deconstructing and disentangling the content of contemporary penal politics. For Hall et al. (2013/1978), the convergence of issues is the process of associating them with each other, of denoting linguistically that they are part of the same underlying social problem. It is part of a *signification spiral* which continually constructs the problem of crime as a worsening crisis, by linking issues together and denoting them as being caused by a lack of social order. Hall et al. (2013/1978) write that necessary aspects are the identification of a specific issue and the identification of a subversive minority. This issue then converges, linked to other previously established social problems. Hall gives the example of “student hooliganism”, in which the newly identified “problem” of student activism converges with an established social issue, “football hooliganism”, so as to denote that they are the same. This is reminiscent of the concept of commensuration, of how counting things together makes them similar and obscures difference. Convergence can be considered a corresponding concept, one concerned with the linguistic and discursive rather than the numerical and quantitative.

The signification spiral also contains the concept of the *threshold*, which marks the limit of societal tolerance when it comes to perceived societal problems and denotes a point of no return. The prophecy of troubling times to come is another related aspect, and denotes that firm steps must be taken, otherwise crime will become an existential threat and society as we know it cannot continue (Hall et al., 2013/1978).

## Construction of a suitable enemy

Hall et al. (2013/1978) argue that the construction of a subversive minority is a crucial aspect of the surface appearance of a crime crisis, and fundamental to the construction of a new common sense of crime. This minority, which is constructed by its historical configurations, differs by national context. In the United States, the African American population has long been designated a subversive minority, while in Britain, Hall et al. (2013/1978) describe the historical and economic factors that led to the British Caribbean population, with their supposedly amoral lifestyles, being labelled the cause of the mugging crisis. In Sweden today, immigrants from the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa are placed in the role of the threatening “other”. In agreement with Hall et al. (2013/1978), this is not a matter of “discriminatory racism”, where individual people hold negative views of certain ethnicities and which can be corrected with the “right” training. Hall et al. (2013/1978) write that “race, for the black labour force” is a critical structure of the social order of contemporary capitalism” (Hall et al., 2013/1978). The economic system depends on there being a group of non-assimilated second-class citizens who play a part in the economic structure by laboring for less money and in worse conditions than ethnic British (or ethnic Swedes) will accept, and thus keep wages down. More relevant for this analysis is the role of the scapegoat, and in the analysis of Hall et al. (2013/1978), it is precisely the societal shifts discussed above that make the role of the scapegoat necessary. Breakdowns and transformations in societal responsibility, in terms of housing, schooling, work, and the environment, have created a concrete sense of loss, and a need for explanations and the allocation of blame. It appears to be an enduring characteristic of late capitalism to allocate blame to a minority, and for that minority to be associated with crime, disorder, immorality, and with everything that is wrong with society:

[T]he reigning public image of the criminal is not just that of “a monstruum—a being whose features are inherently different from ours”, but that of a black monster, as young African-American men from the “inner city” have come to personify the explosive mix of moral degeneracy and mayhem. (Wacquant, 2015a, p. 56)

Several Swedish studies support the notion that race is an crucial analytical dimension for understanding Scandinavian penal politics in late modernity. Lindgren (2009) analysis of media reporting finds the Swedish “youth robber” can be viewed from a similar perspective, as a scapegoat constructed as a symbolic tool in order to fulfill the constant need of late capitalist societies, of

reconstructing a consensus under conditions of recurring crises, without changing the fundamental social relations of domination and exploitation. Herz (2019) analysis of unaccompanied young male immigrants in Sweden shows how this group became associated with sexual violence through the assumption that they carry specific cultural views on gender and sexuality from their place of origin, and thus need “re-programming” upon entering Europe. This convergence between ethnicity and criminality, in which “foreign” subsets of the population are made to symbolize the problem of crime, is maintained by a closer association between the penal system and defense of national borders. In this process of *criminalization of immigrants* (Wacquant, 1999), or the *criminalizing of migration* (Barker, 2012), the police play a unique role in upholding the borders of the national state. The entanglement of security, crime, anti-terrorism, and border and migration politics legitimize the use of coercive force against immigrants while downplaying structural and economic factors. Importantly, it is their very “foreignness” that makes immigrants uniquely suited to this role as scapegoat. Designating them as the cause of social problems designates the cause as something external, something foreign. On why causes cannot be structural Hall et al. (2013/1978) write:

Crisis must have their causes, and the cause cannot be structural, public or rational, since they arise in the best, the most civilized, most peaceful and tolerant society on earth – then they must be secret, subversive, irrational, a plot. Plots must be smoked out. Stronger measures must be taken – more than “normal” opposition requires more than normal control. (Hall et al., 2013/1978, p. 313)

If it is caused by structural reasons, by inequality and unfairness, no amount of force or control can solve the problem of crime. Thus the legitimacy of force depends on there being a designated external factor: an immoral culture, foreign values, some cause for segregation, which is the fault of the minority group. Schclarek Mulinari (2020) writes that questions related to race tend to be obscured in discourse, but visible in practice. Laws and policy are written in the language of equality. Just as the French *ancien régime* forbade rich and poor alike from sleeping under the bridges of Paris, both immigrants and ethnic Swedes are subject to the same laws. But race can be used in many ways as an analytical dimension that is crucial for understanding penal politics: in hinting on the origin of social problems in “segregated” problem areas, in religion, or in referencing “un-Swedish” morals and

values. In analyzing data on Swedish penal politics, we will aim to carefully consider when ethnicities are implied, and how this is done linguistically.

## The good guardian (thin blue line)

Historical analyses of the role of the police as a societal organization and agent support the idea that it centers on maintaining order (Emsley, 1999; Mazower, 1997; Merriman, 2006). Historically, the police are intimately associated with the concept of state building, of maintaining sovereignty, and upholding and protecting the social organization and its allocation of resources. “Fighting” crime, as in preventing, investigating, and solving crime, has not been a central task for the police for much of their history (Mazower, 1997).

Hall et al. (2013/1978) argue that the police have been active agents in constructing the crime problem in the public imagination for much of the twentieth century. Not only does police action shape crime statistics, police analysis of the crime problem enjoys a high level of confidence from the public, and the police are often active participants in judicial and penal debate. The concept of the “thin blue line” is characteristic of the role assigned to the police in contemporary penal politics, designating them as the force standing between society and chaos, anarchy, lawlessness, and social depravity. Studies of police culture suggest that this view is common among police themselves (Correll et al., 2007; Dicker, 1998). In constructing a hegemonic conflict in society around the issue of crime, the police are given an especially salient role. They are cast as protectors and upholders of civic virtue and values. If the criminal other is the villain of the story, the police are the good guardians.

In this thesis, we will analyze this role of the good guardian in relation to the content of penal policy debates. How does the concept of the “police” function in the discourse of *otrygghet*? How does the concept of *otrygghet* figure into debates on the allocation of resources to, and discretionary powers of, the police? What role are they assigned in relation to the problem of fear of crime?

## An immeasurable crime problem

For this strategy to be successful, crime has to be construed as a societal problem. Furthermore, it must be construed as a worsening problem, as something that is growing, increasing and intensifying: a crisis. Legitimacy for expansion of tools of control at the state’s disposal cannot be won by the type of discourse on crime

that used to be the Swedish midcentury norm, which was expert-focused, measured, and technological (R. Nilsson & Andersson, 2017; Tham & von Hofer, 2014). The emergence of a new common sense of crime depends on constructing crime as a political problem in need of forceful and decisive political solutions (Hall et al. (2013/1978). Crime must be in the public eye. Crime must be a problem that concerns the common person. It must evoke an emotional response. Perhaps paradoxically, statistics are uniquely effective tools in constructing crime as an expanding social ill:

Statistics – whether crime rates or opinion polls – have an ideological function: they appear to ground free floating and controversial in the hard, incontrovertible soil of numbers. (Hall et al., 2013/1978, p. 13)

It is a key research interest of this thesis to explore fear of crime research methodology and its effects on how fear of crime is understood. This relates to a greater interest in how crime is framed as a social problem. The penal politics of late modernity must be explained by “external” factors, in other words, crime trends cannot explain the reaction to crime, as chapter 3 on crime trends discusses. As Hall et al. (2013/1978) argue:

It is impossible to explain the severity of the reaction to muggings by using arguments based solely on objective, quantifiable facts. (Hall et al., 2013/1978, p. 15)

For this narrative to be effective, crime needs to be an existential threat. Crime needs to be seen as something that must be eradicated in order to be able to continue societal life as we know it. Crime needs to be expanding and increasing, yet it must also be constructed as something uncontrollable, of unknown size, a lurking problem. Crime needs to be a problem that is grounded in facts, in numbers, and a problem that is immeasurable. The nature of crime statistics lends itself well to this role, of representing both knowable and unknowable entity. Citing increasing official statistics on crime rates opens up to speculation on the dark figures of crime that are not revealed in the numbers, and even more dramatic increases to come. In this we should endeavor to take an unflinching look at the field of criminology, and how the fear of crime discourse influences and intersects with the public common sense of crime.




# 5. Review of the Fear of Crime literature

## Introduction

Where to start to unravel the threads that constitute fear of crime research? Some would point out that crime is a concept born of modernity, and begin by describing the processes in the eighteenth century that constituted our modern states and their rule of law. They might, perhaps, go on to discuss the formation of modern police forces during the industrial revolution. However, the concept of fear of crime didn't exist during much of these processes. Most researchers within the field would agree that before the 1960s there was certainly crime, and also fear, but fear of crime was a non-entity; the two words were seldom put together (Lee, 2013). Searching for the term "fear of crime" using Google Ngram function<sup>13</sup> lends support to Lee's (2013) claim:

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<sup>13</sup> Google Ngram scans books uploaded to the internet.



**Figure 17** Results from searching for "Fear of Crime" with Google's Ngram function

A prerequisite for the birth of the concept of fear of crime was the development of modern social science. As Gubrium and Holstein point out in their discussion on the history of interview research, the notion that ordinary people have valuable knowledge about their lives is a modern sentiment, hailing from the second half of the twentieth century (2001). The emergence of fear of crime research was made possible by the invention of new instruments to generate data about people – surveys and structured interviews – and new statistical operations to make sense of the data.

But these by themselves do not explain the developing interest in fear of crime, and its subsequent expansion into a field of research. By discussing the results, but also the methods and implicit and explicit premises and boundaries of the research, this literature review seeks not only to summarize and describe fear of crime research, but also to historicize it: to provide insights on *why* it happened *when* it happened. The conjunctive perspective pays attention to what coincided with the expansion of fear of crime research: what other sociohistorical developments intersected with, supported, developed in tandem, paved the way for, and influenced this burgeoning research discourse? The relationship of these developments to the fear of crime phenomenon is not causal, but one of mutual tension.

## Motives behind the 1960s emergence

Traditional descriptions of the emergence of this field of research to the high crime levels and general political strife in the United States during the 1960s, and point to how new instruments, such as questionnaires and opinion polls, enabled researchers to find out how fearful the public actually was. For example, Wilson writes in his influential 1975 book *Thinking about Crime*: “In May 1965 the Gallup Poll reported that for the first time ‘crime’ (along with education) was

viewed by Americans as the most important problem facing the nation” (Wilson, 1975, p. 65). Wilson argues that public opinion led to the newfound political interest in crime and criminal justice. Analyses of American poll data by Smith (1985) and Niemi, Mueller, and Smith (1989) come to similar conclusions, finding that in 1967, 41 percent of Americans considered “social control” their most important problem.

However, this causal direction of the emergence of fear of crime research is questionable. A re-analysis of Gallup data from the 1960s was published in 2004 by Loo and Grimes, in which they contest the traditional description of political interest in crime being caused by public worry about increasing crime rates. They point out that when Barry Goldwater made his speech on crime in 1964, and Lyndon B. Johnson convened a President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice in 1965, public worry about crime was low. The Gallup Poll is a monthly survey measuring what the American public consider their most important problem however, in 1964, the proportion of participants answering “crime” to that question was less than 1 percent, and “juvenile delinquency” less than 2 percent (Loo & Grimes, 2004). The percentage of participants that considered “civil rights demonstrations, Negro riots and the violence and lawlessness connected with them” their most important problem was also below 2 percent, while 24–58 per cent said that “civil rights integration and racial discrimination” was the most important problem (Loo & Grimes, 2004). This contrasts with the view that the unrest of the civil rights movement caused public concern about crime, presented by Niemi et al. (1989); Smith (1985); and Wilson (1975). It wasn’t until the end of the decade, in 1968–1969, that public worry about crime started to creep upwards, reaching 10 percent for the joint category “crime/juvenile delinquency”, but never did a majority cite crime as the most important social problem (Loo & Grimes, 2004). These results question the causal direction between political interest in crime and public worry about crime.

Similar results are reached by Chambliss (1994), who writes:

The Gallup Polls never showed that crime was perceived by the respondents as the most important problem facing the nation... Wilson's claim that public opinion forced politicians to pass wide-ranging criminal law legislation in the 1960s is simply not supported by the data. (Chambliss, 1994, p. 188)

Interestingly, Loo and Grimes also shed light on how conclusions not supported by the raw data Gallup gathered came to be widely reported. They show how Smith (1985) and Niemi et al. (1989) merged items measuring violence, riots,

crime, juvenile delinquency, drugs, moral decay, lack of religion, and fears about communist subversion into the constructed category of “social control” and used that as a proxy for fear of crime (Loo & Grimes, 2004). A thread running through this relates to issues of methodology: how results are reached and reported, and how claims and facts are constructed significantly affect results. These themes will continue to shape the research discourse around fear of crime. Chambliss comments on Wilson’s claim about the Gallup Poll of 1965:

Contrary to Wilson's claims, crime was not reported in the Gallup Poll of May 1965 as the main problem; in May 1965 the Gallup Poll did not even ask what respondents' thought was the most main problem facing the nation. But in June 1965 the question was asked and the responses were as follows: Vietnam 23 percent, civil rights, 23 percent; threat of war, 16 percent; prestige abroad, 9 percent; spread of world communism, 9 percent, juvenile delinquency, 2 percent. (Chambliss, 1994, p. 189)

The analysis by Loo and Grimes also finds that Gallup data showing low crime fears was consistently under-reported, and in some cases, not even published by Gallup themselves. When Gallup data showed low or decreasing crime fear, the *New York Times* chose instead to publish the Harris Poll in 1968, which had a rather bizarre methodology (Loo & Grimes, 2004). This found that 81 percent of Americans believed a breakdown in social order had occurred. Upon closer inspection, the wording used in the Harris Poll makes it impossible to answer the question without agreeing with the premise that a breakdown of law and order has occurred:

I want to ask you about some things which some people think have been causes of the breakdown of law and order in this country. For each, tell me if you feel it is a major cause of a breakdown of law and order, a minor cause, or hardly a cause at all:

Organized crime  
Negroes who start riots  
Communists  
The Courts  
Anti-Vietnam demonstrators  
National leadership  
Hippies and student protestors  
Right-wing demagogues  
Police brutality

(Loo & Grimes, 2004)

These re-analyses of polling data from the 1960s show that while the public's increasing fear of crime was widely reported, this was not supported by data. There was however a dramatic and well-documented increase in political, academic and administrative interest in crime. One example of this newfound interest is Barry Goldwater's famous acceptance speech when nominated as the Republican presidential candidate in 1964, where he emphasized a new social problem:

The growing menace in our country tonight, to personal safety, to life, to limb and property, in homes, in churches, on the playgrounds, and places of business, particularly in our great cities, is the mounting concern, or should be, of every thoughtful citizen in the United States. Security from domestic violence, no less than from foreign aggression, is the most elementary and fundamental purpose of any government, and a government that cannot fulfill that purpose is one that cannot long command the loyalty of its citizens. History shows us – demonstrates that nothing – nothing prepares the way for tyranny more than the failure of public officials to keep the streets from bullies and marauders.

Goldwater identified crime as a political problem, in need of political solutions. Some have also credited Goldwater with being the first to connect the civil rights movement to crime and unrest (Loo & Grimes, 2004). This interest in crime and criminal politics could be argued to remain a part of American politics from this point onwards. Goldwater names “security from domestic violence” the utmost responsibility of any government to uphold.

Even though Goldwater lost the election, this notion did not disappear from the political scene. It is not a coincidence the three studies that were the first to ask the American public about their levels of fear and victimization all began their work in 1965 and were published in 1967. All three were commissioned by a special committee, the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice initiated by President Lyndon B. Johnson, after he won the 1964 election. In his State of the Union address in 1965, Johnson cemented his interest in law and order:

Every citizen has the right to feel secure in his home and on the streets of his community. To help control crime, we will recommend programs:

- to train local law enforcement officers;
- to put the best techniques of modern science at their disposal;
- to discover the causes of crime and better ways to prevent it.

I will soon assemble a panel of outstanding experts of this Nation to search out answers to the national problem of crime and delinquency, and I welcome the recommendations and the constructive efforts of the Congress.

## The origin of fear of crime

The panel of outstanding experts that Lyndon B. Johnson constituted as the President's Commission in turn commissioned three teams of researchers to study crime, victimization, and fear of crime. These were three research teams: one from the University of Michigan and led by Arthur Reiss; one from the Bureau of Social Science Research in Washington led by Albert Biderman; and one from the National Opinion Research Center led by Philip Ennis.

The Reiss study was based on official crime statistics, and compared rates of offending and victimization across different groups of gender and race. The official statistics were supplemented with a study of 200 structured interviews in Boston and Chicago, about public perceptions about crime and the police. While Reiss writes in the introduction to the interview study that "For many inhabitants, particularly within the inner cores of our cities, crime ranks first among the problems they regard as confronting our society" (Reiss, 1967), his results doesn't quite support this view. Reiss comments in the report that the "low salience" of crime was among the more surprising results of the study, and states: "Despite the rather high crime rates in the white areas and the very substantial ones in the Negro areas, a majority of residents think their neighborhoods are reasonably free of crime and problems that might get them into trouble". Only 10 percent of the respondents listed "too much crime" as one of "main thing respondent doesn't like about living around here". The report doesn't mention fear of crime as a joint concept, and the closest question is probably "When you think about the chances of getting robbed, threatened, beaten up or anything of that sort, would you say your neighborhood is (compared to other neighborhoods in town", where 19 percent considered their neighborhood "less than safe" and 4 percent "one of the worst". There was no significant difference between men and women (Reiss, 1967). This mismatch between the described crime situation and measurements of public perceptions is in line with a re-analysis of Gallup data from the 1960s by Loo and Grimes (2004), and by Chambliss (1994). While the data seemed to indicate the "low salience" of crime, political, administrative and academic interest remained high.

Biderman's team studied crime, victimization and attitudes towards crime in Washington, DC, using a structured interview design. Differing from the Reiss team, they aimed to analyze fear of crime as a concept. His operationalizations of fear of crime are somewhat similar to what Reiss used, but Biderman uses several items to construct an index measuring "anxiety about crime".

The index constructed from the questions shown in **Figure 18** represents a more sophisticated measurement of fear of crime. While it measures aspects that could be considered related to fear of crime, it should also note that it doesn't mention any specific crimes by name other than "beaten up", conflates "moral" and "safety", and defines crime as something happening in the neighborhood, rather than, for example, in the home. The participants were predominantly black (79 percent), women (60 percent), and older (mean age 56 years). Key results include finding no correlation between personal victimization and fear of crime. Biderman writes in the analysis:

We have found that attitudes of citizens regarding crime are less affected by their past victimization than by their ideas about what is going on in their community, fears about a weakening of social controls on which they feel their safety and the broader fabric of social life is ultimately dependent. (Biderman, 1967a, p. 160)

Biderman was the first to find a correlation between victimization and fear of crime in an unexpected direction: less-victimized groups, such as elderly women, were more afraid. This would become a widely reproduced result, and come to be known as the fear-victimization paradox. Other results included that participants felt safer closer to their home, and thought it was more likely that criminal activity in their area was committed by strangers coming into their neighborhood. Biderman is also the first to speculate that the higher levels of fear of crime reported by women might be caused by fear of sexual assault (Biderman, 1967a). The effect of personal victimization, and the fear-victimization paradox, would become key research problems in the coming decades.

Reiss and Biderman, and their ideas on how to measure crime and victimization, have been very influential within criminology. But it is the Ennis study that is key to understanding the future development of the research, mainly due to the way he chose to operationalize fear of crime. As with Reiss (1967) and Biderman (1967a, 1967b), the main purpose of Ennis' study was to measure victimization. A secondary purpose of the structured-interview study was to study

attitudes and reactions to crime, and the interview guide provides several questions intended to measure this.

The Ennis study asked participants if they felt safe walking around their neighborhood during the daylight, after dark, alone, or with another person, and additionally asked how often they walked around their neighborhood after dark, and if they avoided any place around their city, as shown in **Figure 19**. It was primarily the results from the second question that were reported in the results section of the Ennis study, i.e. the question asking participants how safe they would feel walking around their neighborhood after dark. This part of the study left a lasting impact on fear of crime research, even though few studies cite Ennis (1967) directly.

In this dissertation, I will call this question the “Ennis (1967) operationalization”. **Figure 20** shows how results of this indicator were reported in the original study. The only reason stated by Ennis for primarily showing the results from this question has to do with variance. The report states that almost all participants felt safe walking alone in the day or with someone (Ennis, 1967, p. 73), and he judged that the results from the other indicators were not very interesting due to this lack of variation. Ennis himself remarks that almost half (45 per cent) of crimes seem to happen inside the home (Ennis, 1967, p. 30). Another interesting result is that very few participants say they go out after dark. As shown in **Figure 21**, this was rather unusual in most of the participants’ lives. The study was thus constructed in a way that made many of the participants answer a hypothetical scenario they did not often experience. Among other results from the study are higher levels of fear among women and black Americans, which would go on to be widely reproduced. Ennis also discusses the lack of a clear relationship between fear of crime and victimization, and between fear of crime and perceived risk of crime (Ennis, 1967).

The three studies commissioned by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice had certain similarities. They sought to study crime and victimization using new methods, and did so in relatively sophisticated ways for the times, using structured interview guides with many questions and control questions. Reiss’s comments on “Negro crimes” are imbued with institutional racism, but otherwise there are examples in the studies of methodological and theoretical reasoning that seem rather contemporary. All in all, there is very little in the three reports to enlighten us on why the Ennis (1967) operationalization came to so dominate. In the Ennis (1967) report, it is only one question among many, though reported more thoroughly, as it showed more variance.



TABLE 3-1

## RESPONSES TO ITEMS FORMING AN INDEX OF ANXIETY

Indices of Anxiety		
1. What was it about the neighborhood that was most important? (For those who placed greatest emphasis on neighborhood in selecting residence.)	%	N
Safety or moral characteristics. . . . .	56	194
Convenience or aesthetic characteristics. . . . .	44	157
2. When you think about the chances of getting beaten up would you say this neighborhood is		
Very safe. . . . .	22	113
About average. . . . .	56	283
Less safe than most. . . . .	18	89
One of worst. . . . .	2	12
Don't know. . . . .	2	12
3. Is there so much trouble that you would move if you could? (For those who did not characterize neighborhood as very safe.)		
Yes. . . . .	24	89
No. . . . .	76	277
4. Are most of your neighbors quiet or are there some who create disturbances?		
All quiet. . . . .	69	348
Few disturbances. . . . .	23	116
Many disturbances. . . . .	8	40
5. Do you think that crime has been getting better or worse here in Washington during the past year?		
Better. . . . .	10	50
Worse. . . . .	75	373
Same. . . . .	16	78

Figure 18 Indicators of Fear of Crime used in Biderman (1967a)  
 Source: Biderman (1967a, p. 121)

1. A. How safe do (would) you feel walking alone in your neighborhood during the daylight--very safe, somewhat safe, somewhat unsafe, or very unsafe?			
	Very safe . . . . .	1	17/5
	Somewhat safe . . . . .	2	
	Somewhat unsafe . . . . .	3	
	Very unsafe . . . . .	4	
B. What about walking alone when it is dark--how safe do (would) you feel? READ CATEGORIES.			
	Very safe . (GO TO D) . . . . .	1	18/5
	Somewhat safe . (ASK C) . . . . .	2	
	Somewhat unsafe (ASK C) . . . . .	3	
	Very unsafe . . (ASK C) . . . . .	4	
C. <u>UNLESS VERY SAFE IN B:</u> How safe do (would) you feel walking with another person in the dark? READ CATEGORIES.			
	Very safe . . (ASK D) . . . . .	1	19/R
	Somewhat safe . (ASK D) . . . . .	2	
	Somewhat unsafe (ASK D) . . . . .	3	
	Very unsafe . . (ASK D) . . . . .	4	
D. <u>ASK EVERYONE:</u> How often do you actually walk in your neighborhood when it's dark? READ CATEGORIES			
	Every day . . . . .	5	20/R
	Few times a week . . . . .	6	
	Few times a month . . . . .	7	
	Less often than that . . . . .	8	
	Never . . . . .	9	
<hr/>			
2. Is there any place in ( <u>city/suburb/county</u> ), outside of this neighborhood, where you would not feel personally safe?			
	Yes . . . . (ASK A) . . . . .	1	21/3
	No . . . . (GO TO Q. 3) . . . . .	2	
A. <u>IF YES:</u> How often do you go there? READ CATEGORIES.			
	Every day . . . . .	5	22/R
	Few times a week . . . . .	6	
	Few times a month . . . . .	7	
	Less often than that . . . . .	8	
	Never . . . . .	9	

**Figure 19** Indicators of Fear of Crime in Ennis (1967)  
Source: Ennis (1967)

TABLE 42

HOW SAFE DO YOU FEEL WALKING ALONE IN YOUR  
NEIGHBORHOOD AFTER DARK?

Response	White		Non-White	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Very safe . . . .	65%	35%	33%	16%
Somewhat safe . .	22	24	25	19
Somewhat unsafe .	9	23	22	28
Very unsafe . . .	4	18	20	37
Total . . . . .	100%	100%	100%	100%
N . . . . .	(4,628)	(7,495)	(646)	(1,033)

**Figure 20** Results reported in Ennis (1967)

Source: Ennis (1967, p. 74)

TABLE 43

## HOW OFTEN DO YOU WALK IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD AFTER DARK?

Response	Whites		Non-Whites	
	Male	Female	Male	Female
Every day . . . . .	14%	6%	17%	6%
Few times per week . . .	21	13	28	21
Less often or never . . .	65	81	55	73
Total . . . . .	100%	100%	100%	100%
N . . . . .	(4,572)	(7,361)	(632)	(1,035)

**Figure 21** Results reported in Ennis (1967)

Source: Ennis (1967)

## The 1970s

Moving into the 1970s, the research questions asked by the three studies continued to shape the field. Victimization, and its effect on fear of crime, was a key research question, as were sociodemographic characteristics such as gender, race and age. Most studies from this period used these as independent variables to explain fear of crime as a dependent variable with some form of quantitative analytical methodology such as regression analysis. The assumption that fear of crime is directly caused by victimization, perhaps with conditional effects depending on vulnerability, placed fear of crime research close to the developing field of victimology.

### Establishing the analytic themes of the discourse

In the 1970s, the growing research paradigm of fear of crime tried to address different paradoxes, such as less victimized people being more fearful and residents even of high-crime areas reporting that they experience their own area as safe, but other areas as unsafe. Hale writes in his 1996 meta-analysis of fear of crime research that “theoretical casualness and empirical chaos has been part of the field from the beginning” (Hale, 1996, p. 94). Ferraro and LaGrange delivered strong methodological critiques in a 1987 study which tried to classify the different meanings of fear of crime used in the research. They concluded that “even a casual review of the literature indicates that the phrase ‘fear of crime’ has acquired so many different meanings that its current utility is negligible” (Ferraro & Lagrange, 1987, p. 71). As research into fear of crime took off during the 1970s, concepts such as concern about crime, perceived vulnerability to crime, perceived risk of crime were often used interchangeably.

Indeed, Furstenberg (1971) criticizes the President’s Commission for using concern about crime and fear of crime interchangeably. However, examining Furstenberg’s own methodology, his own measurement for fear of crime is actually an index of perceived crime risk. The respondents were asked to estimate the likelihood of eight different crimes happening to them. Perceived risk was unrelated to Furstenberg’s measurement for concern for crime, which was the percentage of participants that ranked “crime and lawlessness” as the most serious problem facing the nation (Furstenberg, 1971). This is an interesting result in its own right, that the perceived risk of personal crime was found to be unrelated to concern about crime on a national level, but it does not reduce the conceptual

muddiness of the field, which is already considerable. A similar conceptualization of fear of crime as estimated risk of crime, can be found in Boggs (1971) who shows that while inner-city inhabitants perceived crime to be more likely than suburban or rural inhabitants, participants generally felt safe or very safe in their neighborhoods (Boggs, 1971).

It is also interesting to note that using Furstenberg's perceived risk index, gender and age were found to be unrelated to fear of crime (Furstenberg, 1971). Thus, when another measure than the Ennis question is used, the general results of women and elderly people being more fearful, and people being fearful in general, are challenged. This notion of fear-inducing crime as something that happens elsewhere, is also found in Conklin (1971) comparative study of a high-crime and a low-crime neighborhood. While the residents of the high-crime neighborhood were indeed more fearful (using the Ennis question, in addition to questions about likelihood of victimization), 56.6 percent still believed their neighborhood crime levels were below the metropolitan average. Conklin was also one of the first to study if media consumption (newspapers and television news) are related to fear of crime, but found no significant effect (Conklin, 1971).

Furstenberg suggests measures that could be implemented to decrease fear: adequate light and locks, patrols and "safe zones" (Furstenberg, 1971). While he was the first to propose such measures, the suggestions themselves did not change much over time. Interestingly, Furstenberg's introductory history of the research into fear of crime states that "some polls revealed that the public ranked crime as the most serious problem facing our nation" (Furstenberg, 1971, p. 1), suggesting that even if re-analyses of poll data showed this to be incorrect (Chambliss, 1994; Loo & Grimes, 2004), it was a widespread assumption within criminology at the time.

## Emergence of large-scale survey research

An important step towards modern fear of crime research was taken in 1972 and 1973, when the General Social Survey (GSS) and the National Crime Survey (NCS) (Paez & Shenk, 1983) were introduced in the United States. The General Social Survey collects data on sociological factors such as values, attitudes and sociodemographic factors, while the National Crime Survey studies victimization, crime and fear of crime. Both of the survey's samples are the entirety of the United States and use a structured interview design. The National Crime Survey was the first of the so-called crime surveys, and uses a large-scale survey design to study

crime and victimization quantitatively. It is important to note a transformation in the research here – from academic to administrative – as concern about fear of crime moved from the universities into the public and political spheres. Data produced by these surveys were widely used in academic research, and in the coming years secondary statistical analysis of survey data became much more common in fear of crime research. Responsibility for the production of these statistics shifted with the introduction of large-scale crime and victimization surveys. Two examples of the new fear of crime research are Garofalo (1979) and Balkin (1979), who used National Crime Survey data, and Clemente and Kleiman (1977), who used data from the General Social Survey to analyze the demographic variables that correlate with fear of crime.


In the United States, the National Crime Survey (later the National Crime and Victimization Survey, NCvS) was premiered in 1973, and administered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). This asked a nationally representative sample of about 90,000 households, comprising nearly 160,000 persons, questions about the frequency, characteristics, and consequences of criminal victimization in the United States. It used the following variation on the Ennis question, with four response choices of very safe, reasonably safe, somewhat unsafe and very unsafe:

How safe do you or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night?

The more generally sociological General Social Survey (GSS) was first conducted in 1972, but included a variation of the Ennis question for the first time in 1973. It asked its participants:

Is there any area right around here – that is, within a mile – where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?

The question is asked every other year, and it has been asked the same way every time except in 1977, where the word “right” was omitted. It is dichotomous, with the alternatives yes/no. As **Figure 22** shows, the percentage of participants answering yes to this question has remained high. In 1973, 40 percent of participants felt fearful and almost 40 years later, the number of fearful participants had decreased slightly, to around 30 percent. This number is still very high compared to the previously discussed literature, where the percentage of fearful participants usually hovers around 10–20 percent.



**Citation**

Smith, Tom W, Peter Marsden, Michael Hout, and Jibum Kim. General Social Surveys, 1972-2016 [machine-readable data file] /Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Co-Principal Investigator, Michael Hout; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. -NORC ed.- Chicago: NORC at the University of Chicago [producer and distributor]. Data accessed from the GSS Data Explorer website at [gssdataexplorer.norc.org](https://gssdataexplorer.norc.uchicago.edu/).

**Figure 22** Results from the American General Social Survey

## Fear of crime, victimization and rationality

Cook and Cook also use secondary data (and the Ennis question) to evaluate if the “rhetoric of crisis” about elder victimization is warranted. They argue that the rhetoric about a victimization crisis in elderly care, gerontology and sociology of the elderly does more harm than good: tales about elderly people refusing to answer the door from fear might tug at the heartstrings, but are not supported by empirical data. Elderly people are less victimized, but more fearful, according to their data. Their suggestion is to combat fearfulness among elder by informing them about actual victimization rates (Cook & Cook, 1976). This solution might seem an obvious one to combat the often discussed “mismatch” between actual rates of victimization and levels of fear, but is not commonly suggested in the literature.

Balkin proposes a model where fear of crime is an effect of the “real victimization rate”, which he argues is victimization per exposure to risk (Balkin,

1979). He argues that this real victimization rate, based on people's rational behavioral response to crime, causes fear of crime, which causes exposure-avoidance behavior. This in turn causes the recorded crime rates. This model is an attempt to explain the aforementioned crime paradox, where less victimized groups are more afraid. According to Balkin, it is because groups that feel vulnerable engage in more risk-avoidance behavior. He uses the classic Ennis question, and finds very limited support for his model (Balkin, 1979).

Taking a look at the operationalizations in the survey, the theoretical model Balkin (1979) proposes is rather confusing: the percentage of people who says they feel unsafe while out alone in their neighborhood after dark is explained by the number of people who have been victimized by a stranger, divided by the percentage of participants who say they have limited or changed their activities in the past few years because of crime. If fewer people went out, fewer people would be victimized by strangers, which in turn would decrease fear of crime, which in turn causes people to not go out. The causal direction on the issue of fear influencing behavior (avoidance), leading to less crime, and experiences of crime leading to avoidance, is highly unclear, which Lee (2013) argues is typical for much fear of crime research. Balkin's model is an attempt to theoretically model an explanation for the presumed crime paradox, where people are seen as more fearful than the actual rates of victimization warrants. One could call it an attempt to rescue the notion of fear of crime as a rational response to the crime rate.

A different position is taken by Clemente and Kleiman (1977) in their multiple regression analysis of General Social Survey data. They write: "fear of crime is only one of a variety of areas where the definition of the situation is out of phase with the empirical world" (Clemente & Kleiman, 1977, p. 530). Their use of the Ennis question, collapsed into a dichotomy, shows gender to be the most important explanatory factor. Interestingly, they also cite the high levels of fear of crime recorded by the Gallup poll and the surveys resulting from the President's Commission as reasons for stating that "fear of crime has become a problem as serious as crime itself" (Clemente & Kleiman, 1977, p. 519), in a similar manner as Furstenberg (1971) argues for the importance of studying fear of crime. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the results from the studies by Reiss (1967) indicate the "low salience of crime", and Biderman (1967a, 1967b) finds a large majority not fearful.

Garofolo uses National Crime Survey data to test a model in which fear of crime is explained by actual risk (crime rates), experience of victimization, role socialization, media and perceived protection. His study uses data from the National Crime Survey, and therefore the Ennis questions, to measure fear of



crime. Garofalo is one of the first critics of the question in the survey, remarking that it does not mention crime, it asks for hypothetical feeling (how scared *would you* feel...) and that “neighborhood” is undefined and might have different meanings to different people. He also asks if people might misunderstand the meaning of “alone” (i.e. the individual among strangers, or the individual alone including from strangers) (Garofalo, 1979). He finds little support for the claimed effect of victimization on fear of crime, and concludes that gender and race seem to explain variance more than victimization. However, remarking on the effect of gender and age, he argues that it should be seen as role socialization – that women are taught and learn to be afraid as a means of control – rather than approaching the more essentialist arguments of his contemporaries like Balkin (1979). Garofalo also performs an aggregated analysis, checking for correlation between crime rates and thoughts about one’s neighborhood in terms of safety. His data show no significant correlation, and can be read as a criticism of Balkin’s assumption of rationality (Balkin, 1979). Other interesting results include finding a correlation between believing that crime is much worse than the media portrays it to be, and fear of crime. He also critically engages with the influence of the media, and ponders whether overrepresentation of women portrayed as victims on television might have some effect on women’s fear (Garofalo, 1979).

Hartnagel (1979) also remarks that previous research indicates other variables than victimization as predicting fear of crime. He tries a model with both perceptions of crime and fear of crime as dependent variables, and neighborhood cohesion as an explanatory factor, along with social activity and affect for one’s community. To measure fear of crime, Hartnagel uses both the Ennis question, and a question about general feelings of personal safety in the city (Hartnagel, 1979). Neither of these questions specifically mentions crime. We can see here how other theoretical ideas start to influence fear of crime research, where the individual’s relation to the community starts to become a central research question. Hartnagel (1979) finds statistically significant correlations only between fear of crime and affect for one’s community, and also finds that victimization has no effect on fear.

## The conjunction of origins of fear of crime

The first section of the literature review has outlined the motivations behind the emergence, and presented the origins of fear of crime research. It has also examined the early period of methodological innovation and the establishment of praxis. This development did not happen in a social and historical vacuum. Fear of crime research emerged and became established as part of a greater social, political and academic interest in crime and penal control. This increased interest also didn't emerge out of a social vacuum, but was motivated by contemporary social and political tensions. Central to the conjunctive perspective is paying attention to historical and social factors concurring with the emergence of fear of crime research. This section applies a perspective on the development of this research that is conjunctive, but also processual and discursive. It tries to unravel how other discursive surfaces, related to for example gender and feminist struggle, race relations in the United States, scientific methodology, and the emerging academic subject of criminology, condition the formation of the research discourse.

## Controversy and ambiguity surrounding the emergence of fear of crime

An interesting aspect of the early fear of crime research is the ambiguity surrounding the motivations behind the enquiry. Furstenberg (1971) writes that "some polls" showed that the public considered fear of crime to be the most important issue facing the nation during the 1960s. Wilson writes in his 1975 book that the growing academic interest into criminology, victimization and fear of crime was caused by public demand, which was in turn caused by increasing levels of crime. He also writes that the Gallup data of the time reflected that the public rated crime as the most important issue facing the nation (Wilson, 1975). This has been criticized as outright incorrect by Chambliss (1994), and more recently by Loo and Grimes (2004). However, the assumption that fear of crime was a concept born out of high levels of crime is widespread. Clemente and Kleiman (1977) write that the polls resulting from the President's Commission showed crime and fear of crime to be problems of unknown proportions, and motivated the research that followed. But, upon closer inspection, these are not the reported results from the Reiss (1967) study, nor the Ennis (1967) study, or from Biderman (1967a, 1967b). Years later, Niemi et al. (1989) and Smith (1985)

also refer to non-existent polls, and describe research into fear of crime as born of public outrage and demand. Skogan and Maxfield (1981) also mention Gallup Poll data as a reason for the emergence of fear of crime research.

What are possible reasons for this misconception about actual polling data? The late 1960s and early 1970s constitute a period when criminology was gaining traction as a subject, and defining its position within academia. Several of the early researchers went on to distinguished careers as researchers in criminology. Perhaps a certain synergy between the budding academic field of criminology and current political interests can be noted here, and were certainly intertwined to a degree. The relationship between American conservative politicians and criminologists of the time has been described as symbiotic:

Marvin Wolfgang's Philadelphia study provided the concept of the "chronic offender". Alfred Blumstein delivered "criminal careers". Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredsson promoted "self-interest" and "evil" as constitutive of human nature. Finally, James Q. Wilson provided the solution to the issue of crime: incapacitation (Hagan, 2010).

C. Wright Mills is in agreement about how individual researchers in the growing American academic milieu found ample career opportunities in the entanglement of government, business, and academia:

Men at the centers of learning become experts inside administrative machines. This undoubtedly narrows their attention and the scope of such political thinking as they may do (Mills, 1959, p. 99).

Other researchers have pointed out that the American right needed a new ideological project to counter the passions of the 1960s. Beckett and Sasson (2000a) use Gramscian terminology for the new political and ideological project that was needed, calling it a new "hegemonic strategy". They argue that a massive re-organization of the American state took place at this time, when the state transitioned from a Keynesian welfare state, to something they call a "security state". They support this empirically with statistics on the massive increases in judicial spending and number of convictions (Beckett & Sasson, 2000a). A similar transformation is described by Garland (2001). Garland calls the system that was replaced "penal welfarism", and describes it as characterized by individual treatment and a strong tradition of rehabilitation and treatment. Crime was a problem that one could solve through social engineering, and a strong neo-

positivist trend within social science and criminology supported this perspective (Garland, 2001). Beckett and Sasson (2000a) describe their “welfare state” as characterized by social responsibility, scientific planning and risk management. They argue that this was a successful strategy following the Depression in the 1930s, which served the American capitalist class well until the 1960s.

The 1960s is an oft-discussed decade in social science, perhaps because of the unique synergy between countercultural and protest movements. The Vietnam anti-war movement, the civil rights movement, the second wave of feminism, and other movements related to socialism, anti-colonialism and environmentalism all took place in the same period. On their own, they might not have had the political momentum to mount a challenge to the structure of society, but co-existing and intersecting, they, in Beckett and Sasson’s Gramscian terminology, amounted to a “counter-hegemonic challenge” (Beckett & Sasson, 2000a). The authors argue that the reaction to demands of increased welfare was an organized effort by American conservative politicians and intellectuals to associate poverty with crime. Quoting Nixon advisor, sociologist and Lyndon B. Johnson’s assistant interior minister, Daniel Patrick Moynihan:

Among a large and growing lower class, self-reliance, self-discipline and industry is waning. Families are more and more matrifocal and atomized; crime and disorder are sharply on the rise. It is a stirring, if generally unrecognized demonstration of the power of the welfare machine. (Beckett & Sasson, 2000a, p. 67).

The conservative tenet that coming generations were lacking compared to the previous ones was echoed in popular sociology during this period. *The Lonely Crowd*, a bestselling sociology book, was a lament about the loss of American frontier individualism as the population became emotionally insecure and not sufficiently self-reliant in authors Riesman, Glazer, and Denney (1953) view. The Moynihan quote is curious because it demonstrates how several types of criticism of the dominant structure of society are converged. The “lower class” is described as large and growing, constructing the idea of an imminent crisis if nothing is done. The feminist critique of patriarchal family relations, which is central to the second wave of feminism, is claimed to cause crime via a new matrifocal family structure. This is all tied together with a need to dismantle the welfare state, which is claimed to be the cause of it all. Beckett and Sasson (2000a) argue that it was crucial for conservative interests of the time to associate poverty with the dangers

of street crime, which made it possible to describe political enemies as criminals rather than opponents.

The establishment of fear of crime as a political issue to be solved, is part of a greater focus on the social issue of crime. It played a certain part in the discursive transformation of the deserving poor into the undeserving (criminal) poor. Garland describes the transformation from his “penal welfare state” to what he calls a “culture of control”, characterized by a declining rehabilitative ideal, a resurgence of moralism in criminal justice, an increased focus on victims of crime, combined with a new enthusiasm for punitive retribution (Garland, 2001). He (2001) argues that the rise of the victim of crime, along with a highly dramatized narrative relating the trauma of crime, was instrumental in arguments for harsher penalties.

## Race and fear of crime

Related to this is the so-called Southern Strategy, an election strategy used by the Republicans to win the traditionally Democratic American South. Republican strategist Lee Atwood reflected on the strategy in a 1981 interview:

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger” – that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.... “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger... I’m not saying that. But I’m saying that if it is getting that abstract, and that coded, that we are doing away with the racial problem one way or the other. You follow me – because obviously sitting around saying, “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”(Robin, 2011, pp. 50-51)

During the 1960s and 1970s, race relations in the United States were rapidly changing. What was acceptable to put into words and what was considered racist was undergoing a transformation, thanks to the organized political push of the civil rights movement. What Atwood describes is a strategy to win over white

southern voters who were displeased with the dismantling of the Jim Crow laws,<sup>14</sup> one of the victories of the civil rights movement. The strategy can be summarized as a plan to win over white, disenfranchised voters, not by being openly racist, but through implementing inconspicuous policies that just happened to have negative social and economic consequences for black people (Robin, 2011). The Southern Strategy was largely successful, and thus remained in use for a long time, as a part of a republican top-down advancement strategy (Aistrup, 2014; Brown, 2016). With the likelihood of a black American man being convicted of prison at some point in his life being as high as one in four (Chambliss, 1994), and the incarceration rate of black Americans seven times higher than for white Americans (National Research Council, 2014), it is not hard to argue that the penal politics of late modernity have had profoundly negative effects for African Americans.

The point of including a discussion on race is to demonstrate that it is possible to argue that there was a certain political demand during the 1960s and 1970s: a demand for a new language, of being able to talk about black people in a negatively charged way without seeming obviously racist. According to Beckett and Sasson (2000a) this demand was fulfilled by associating blackness with criminality and poverty. Beckett and Sasson (2000a) argue that a key component of the hegemonic strategy of associating poverty with crime was changing the imagery of a poor person. When, since the Depression of the 1930s depictions of poverty were associated with rural whiteness, this had to be exchanged with depictions of urban blackness for the strategy to be effective. By talking about crime, it became possible to again describe the black population as a problem, without having to refer to skin color. Crime and fear of crime can be used to imply ethnicity, and appeal to fear about the "other".

## Gender and fear of crime

In the examined literature from the 1960s and 1970s, the effect of gender on fear is unclear. Some studies find gender to be the single factor with the most explanatory power, such as Clemente and Kleiman (1977), and Garofalo (1979). Others find gender to have no effect on fear of crime at all, as for example Reiss

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<sup>14</sup> Jim Crow laws are the race laws implemented in the United States following the abolition of slavery, to ensure segregation between black and white Americans. Kousser (2003) describes their function as "regulated social, economic, and political relationships between whites and African-Americans, were passed principally to subordinate blacks as a group to whites and to enforce rules favored by dominant whites on non-conformists of both races."

(1967) and Furstenberg (1971). A key difference seems to be if fear of crime is operationalized using the Ennis question or not (“How safe would you feel walking around your neighborhood after dark?”). In Clemente and Kleiman (1977), and Garofalo (1979), where gender was found to be the most important factor, only the Ennis question was used. In the Reiss (1967) and the Furstenberg (1971) study, fear of crime is measured in other ways, and the results show no significant variance between the sexes. Furstenberg, for example, uses a measurement for fear of crime which is really an index of perceived crime risk. Using other measurements than the Ennis question seem to generate results that question the generally accepted view that women are more fearful. Related to this is a similar view of elderly fear, criticized by Cook and Cook (1976) as politically seductive but possibly lacking empirical support.

Are women more afraid than men? During the 1960s and 1970s, there was yet no critical discussion on whether men’s fear level should be reported as the norm. Anything that indicated difference between men and women was reported as “women’s higher fear”, rather than “men’s lower fear”. Nor were there any methodological discussions in the literature that questioned if men were willing to state that they were fearful in an interview situation. The threat to masculinity that such a question poses could perhaps influence men’s willingness to admit that they are fearful. Both more sophisticated explanations of women’s presumed fearfulness – such as Garofalo’s suggestions that it has to do with processes related to role socialization and societal expectations – exist in the literature, along with more essentialist reasoning by, for example, Reiss (Garofalo, 1979; Reiss, 1967). Parallels can be drawn to Messerschmidt’s criticism of criminology as a “gender blind” science, that shies away from issues concerning the body, gender, and power relations (Messerschmidt, 2004).

## Boundary work

In his 1975 book *Thinking about Crime*, Wilson writes that he will not deal with white-collar or any “victim-less crimes” save for heroin addiction. His examples of victimless or white-collar crimes include prostitution, consumer fraud, antitrust violations, and gambling. He explains that the police devote limited resources to these crimes, and it is his view, along with the public, that the real issue is “predatory crime” (Wilson, 1975). This reasoning exemplifies how certain types of crime were defined early on as more suitable to criminological enquiry than others. It also happens to have a certain overlap with the type of fear of crime that

the Ennis (1967) operationalization can reasonably be considered to measure. It defines the problem as something that happens at night, away from home, in the dark, perpetrated by strangers.

These inherent characteristics of the question, and some interesting results from the examined literature, invite us to consider distance and where the research discourse locates threats to, as relevant in relation to fear. Conklin (1971) finds that even the inhabitants in his designated “high-crime neighborhood” tended believe that crime was worse elsewhere. Similar results are reached by Boggs (1971). There is also something to be said about the way crime is framed in the fear of crime research discourse, by its operationalizations of fear of crime and what crimes are specifically asked about, as fear of a certain *type* of crime. That type of crime (assault, committed by strangers, at places away from home) constitutes the boundary of what types of crime fears the research discourse is concerned itself with.

## Consequences of the emergence of large-scale crime surveys

The 1970s saw the launch of several large-scale surveys asking question of criminological relevance. These had several impacts on the growing field of research into fear of crime. They enabled comparison of data covering a large population sample, which was largely representative of the United States. The also moved the issue of fear of crime closer to government rather than academia. As pointed out earlier in the chapter, the birth of research into fear of crime was largely a politically initiated project carried out by researchers. However, during the 1970s, much of the research seems to have taken place by university-employed researchers, and published in academic journals. The spheres of government and academia have arguably always been rather close in this field of research. But, as the large-scale crime and victimization surveys entered the stage, they grew even closer.

Large-scale victimization surveys enabled researchers to access high-quality large-sample data. As data gathering is usually both the most time-consuming and expensive part of research, it simply enables *more* research. The data can be centrally generated and used for a plethora of analyses by researchers who, in turn, can publish a lot more. Lee argues that a driving force in the fear of crime research is the desire to be a knowledgeable society (Lee, 2013). It can certainly be argued that the growing wealth of research that large-scale crime surveys have enabled has made society rather more knowledgeable. However, the issue with gathering data



centrally is that methodological flaws in the data gathering process are inherited by any independent analysis that follows. There are several examples of studies using large-scale survey data in the examined literature: Garofalo (1979), Balkin (1979); Clemente and Kleiman (1977). These are all based on variations on the Ennis question, and inherently measure someone's fear of walking alone at night.

As research progresses, other facets of this development make themselves known, such as comparability. One advantage of continuous large-scale surveys is that they create data that enable valid comparisons of *development over time*. However, an analysis of change in different samples of participants' responses over time have methodological validity only as long as the questions don't change. These types of longitudinal comparative data are expensive and work-intensive to generate, and thus highly prized by researchers. They also generate an inherited inertia and professional resistance to changing the operationalizations of large-scale survey items. It can also be argued that they lead to a cultural conditioning of how certain items should be operationalized. Researchers generally value comparability and generalizability; research is a collective effort, and to be able to add to a collective understanding of a scientific field is, arguably, the whole point. Taking these facets into consideration, it can be argued that the large-scale victim surveys increased *methodological homogeneity and inertia* in the fear of crime research discourse.

## The 1980s and onwards

An article by Garofalo (1981a) summarized and took stock of the existing fear of crime research in 1981. Based on the literature he examined, he modelled the causes and consequences of fear of crime, arriving at the theoretical model shown in **Figure 23**. This rather complicated model serves well as a summary of all the variables that research during the 1960s and 1970s suggested as relevant for explaining fear of crime. Several of the cited studies and incorporated models found limited support for their hypothesis in their original studies. For example Conklin (1971), Balkin (1979) both find very limited support for their theoretical explanatory models (*social cohesion* for Conklin, and *rational avoidance* for Balkin). However, this model demonstrates the width of variable considered relevant by fear of crime research as we move into the 1980s.




Figure 23 Theoretical model of Fear of Crime according to Garofalo (1981a)  
 Source: Garofalo (1981a, p. 843)

## A period of expansion

The strongest trend during this period was a massive expansion of research. Up until this point it has been possible to chart the development of research and ideas both comprehensively and chronologically. From the 1980s, the sheer amount of research, in combination with the breadth of theoretical models and key concepts, makes it very hard to summarize the research in a way that is digestible, comprehensible, and chronologically organized. Therefore, this literature review will now summarize the research thematically. For example, *vulnerability* and *signs of disorder* are two explanatory models that gain traction during this period. Another trend is an expansion over national borders, for example to the United Kingdom and other European countries. Significant critiques began to be formulated, both from the growing body of feminist criminology, and from a methodological perspective. This section will first discuss the expansion into other national contexts, focusing mainly on the United Kingdom, which was the first outside the United States to implement fear of crime research, and can be seen as a forerunner to Sweden. The chapter will then summarize fear of crime research thematically. The literature review will deal more cursorily with more recent work which has had little influence on the governmental fear of crime research that is of special interest to this thesis.

## The jump over the pond: Fear of crime in Britain

During the 1980s, a key trend was the geographical spread of fear of crime research. It had been initiated in an American political context and, up until this period, flourished in a domain between academia and governmental administration, localized in the United States. This changed as the British Home Office, an administrative unit of the UK government, launched its first large-scale victim survey, the British Crime Survey, in 1981. A commemorative methodological report, published on the British Crime Survey's 25th birthday in 2007, described the motivations behind the survey:

The surveys followed debates about whether changes in police recorded crime reflected actual changes in crime rather than reporting and recording practices (...) The British Crime Survey was essentially a research tool designed to:

- obtain a better count of crime (as it included crimes that were not reported to or recorded by the police);
- identify risk factors in victimisation; and
- examine people's worry about crime and their perceptions of and contact with the police. (Jansson, 2007, p. 4)

The British Crime Survey asks a number of questions related to crime, crime perception and victimization. It also asks about *worry* about various forms of crime, such as rape, burglary and assault (i.e. "How worried are you about being mugged?"). Three levels of worry are operationalized: very worried, fairly worried, and not worried at all. In a report comparing the results from the 1981–1996 British Crime Survey, the authors note the conceptual muddiness of the field. They write that fear of crime might be a misnomer, because they consider fear to be a situational feeling, triggered by "footsteps in the dark" and the prospect of immediate victimization (Mirrlees-Black, Mayhew, & Percy, 1996a). Interestingly for such a technical report, the authors seem to take a critical standpoint and problematize if the feeling a participant can access while filling in a survey has anything to do with what is emotionally experienced when threatened by victimization. However, while the survey asks about worry, the results are reported and discussed under the heading "fear of crime" (Mirrlees-Black et al., 1996a). Moreover, only women were asked about worry about rape, a fear that appears to be constructed as a highly gendered activity.

While the questions regarding worry about specific types of crime are more reminiscent of early methodological operationalizations used by Reiss (1967) and

(Biderman, 1967a, 1967b), the Ennis question was used as a general measurement of fear of crime. The authors note that the discrepancies between how worried people say they are of specific types of crime, and how fearful they are of walking around their neighborhood after dark, is rather stark. The survey uses this specific formulation of the Ennis (1967) operationalization: “how safe do you feel (or would you feel) walking around in this area after dark?”. This question, in comparison with the worry questions, show only moderate variance over time, as depicted in **Figure 24**.

The proportion of participants who feel very unsafe while walking in their neighborhoods is quite constant over time, at about 10–12 percent (Jansson, 2007). This can be compared to the results of the questions about worry about specific types of crime shown in **Figure 25**, which rose until 1995 and then clearly decreased. It is noted in the earlier report that the differences between men and women are much wider using the Ennis question compared to the worry questions, and also much wider between older and younger people.

This review has previously discussed that differences between men and women’s fear of crime, and also between elder and younger people, tends to be more pronounced using the Ennis (1967) operationalization, compared to using crime worry-questions, which is also what the British Crime Survey finds, as shown in **Figure 26** (Mirrlees-Black et al., 1996a). This is in accordance with the rest of the examined literature. The BCS uses a formulation of the question that is open for hypothetical answers, but follows up with a question asking how often the participant actually walk around their neighborhood after dark. This enables analysis of how many participants answer based on actual experience in their lives, and how many answer based on how they imagine they would feel if they were to walk alone after dark.

As **Figure 27** shows, a large percentage of women participating in the British Crime Survey, especially older women, answered “very unsafe” or “a bit unsafe” on the Ennis question. The percentage of fearful participants shows very little variance over time. The survey includes a question which was rare, maybe even unique, at that time: “How safe do you feel when you are at home alone at night?” This also has significant variances between men and women: where 15 percent of women felt a bit or very unsafe, compared to 4 percent of men in the 1996 survey (Mirrlees-Black, Mayhew, & Percy, 1996b). Another noteworthy question asks if participants have experienced being in danger of physical attack by a stranger over the last year. The results are almost inverted, in terms of age and gender, in comparison with the Ennis question. Young men reported experiencing considerably more threat than older women (26 percent compared to 3 percent).


This indicator seems closely related to actual victimization recorded in the survey, where younger men were found to be more victimized than other groups (Mirrlees-Black et al., 1996a).

Both questions represent methodological innovations within the research discourse. But they are also both constructed such that certain types of crime fears cannot be recorded, such as domestic violence. Nor can fear stemming from any other form of violence or abuse from people known to the participants, be recorded, as two questions specify that the participant is alone, and the third specifies a stranger attacking. Thus, the question about fear in the home specifies fear when alone. What types of fears are thought to be measured by the question? Excepting home-invasion and crimes people do to themselves, such as drug consumption, rather few crimes occur to people alone at home, as crime is a social activity. It can be noted that a young woman involved in an innocent activity in the home is a common cultural symbol, a stereotype for how a horror movie begins, for example. These questions further construct the fear that is to be measured by the fear of crime research as fear of the stranger. We can note here that fear of burglaries seems a specifically British type of fear, as it is much more commonly mentioned in British crime surveys than in their Swedish or American counterparts.


The 1980s were a period of rapid political, economic, and social change in the United Kingdom. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected as the Tory party prime minister, and spent 11 years in office, covering the entirety of the 1980s. Her political legacy is one of social conservatism and economic neoliberalism. Farrall (2006) summarizes her government policies and their various effects: deregulation of housing, rising unemployment, a general scaling back of the social responsibilities of the state. Others have remarked that the main result of her policies were to have “closed down the escape hatches from poverty” (Andrews & Jacobs, 1990). Still others have pointed out the criminogenic nature of many of these reforms (Farrall, 2006; Riddell, 1985). Thatcher’s policies promoted continued use of prisons and invested in new ones, and disapproved of social intervention as a crime fighting policy. As Thatcher said about social workers, “they create a fog of excuses in which the muggers and burglars operate.” During her period in office, sentences for personal violent crime rose 20 percent (Riddell, 1985). There was two different initiatives to bring back capital punishment (Carlen, 1996). There were reports from the 1978 Tory party conference of calls for public flogging and reviving the use of the stocks. Thatcher said her view was that her country wanted “less tax and more law and order” (Farrall, 2006).

One could say that during the 1980s, crime gained a newfound political status in the UK. Never before had matters of crime and law been as politicized, propagated, and popularized, as in Margaret Thatcher's time. Researchers have pointed out that the rising crime levels of the period helped sell a narrative of the failures of rehabilitation and social work (Farrall, 2006). However, researchers generally agree that the increase in crime during the 1970–1090s was primarily an increase in property crime, and is best explained by an increase in general wealth and the availability of suitable objects for property crime (Wells, 1994), along with rising inequality (Farrall, 2006). This is in accordance with results from the British Crime Survey (Mirrlees-Black et al., 1996a). As previously discussed, the first fear of crime and victimization studies were published during the Lyndon B. Johnson presidency when crime and fear of crime received increased political attention. and the same can be said for the United Kingdom during Margaret Thatcher's time. Johnson's and Thatcher's elections preceded the introduction of the General Social Survey and National Crime Survey, and the British Crime Survey respectively, by only a few years. There is a synergy to be noted here between the establishment of fear of crime research, and the growing importance of crime as a political problem.


Fear of crime in the UK became an established phenomenon, and a wealth of research was published during the 1990s and 2000s (Ditton, 2000; Farrall, Bannister, Ditton, & Gilchrist, 1997; Farrall & Ditton, 1999; Farrall & Gadd, 2004; Farrall, Jackson, & Gray, 2009a; Gabriel & Greve, 2003; Gilchrist, Bannister, Ditton, & Farrall, 1998; Gray, Jackson, & Farrall, 2008; Nair, Ditton, & Phillips, 1993; Short & Ditton, 1998; I. Taylor & Jamieson, 1998; Williams & Dickinson, 1993). Many of these articles are discussed under the section on methodological critique, as a number of the UK studies are critical of the established research norms of the discourse and seek to launch methodological innovations. Many of these originated from a research project funded by the British Economic and Social Research Council in 1994 (Ditton, 2000; Ditton, Bannister, Gilchrist, & Farrall, 1999; Ditton, Chadee, Farrall, Gilchrist, & Bannister, 2004; Ditton, Farrall, Bannister, & Gilchrist, 2000; Ditton, Farrall, Bannister, Gilchrist, & Pease, 1999; Farrall et al., 1997; Farrall & Ditton, 1999; Gilchrist et al., 1998; Nair et al., 1993).




**Figure 24** Fear of Crime according to the British Crime Survey, 1982-2005  
 Source: Jansson (2007, p. 17)



**Figure 25** Worry about different crime types according to the British Crime Survey, 1982-2005  
 Source: Jansson (2007, p. 17)



**Figure 26** Women's Fear of Crime according to the British Crime Survey, 1982-1996  
 Mirrlees-Black et al. (1996a, p. 53) Mirrlees-Black et al. (1996a, p. 53)



**Figure 27** Fear of Crime, divided by gender, according to the British Crime Survey, 1982-1996  
 Mirrlees-Black et al. (1996a, p. 53)



## ...and, subsequently, to the rest of Europe and the world

From the new millennium, fear of crime research could be considered a truly international phenomenon. The research discourse was established in Europe during the 1990s and 2000s, with examples of research from Switzerland (Killias & Clerici, 2000), the European Union (Visser, Scholte, & Scheepers, 2013), Italy (D'Andrea, Roccatò, Russo, & Serafin, 2015; Sironi & Bonazzi, 2016), and the Netherlands (Vrij & Winkel, 1991), to give only a few examples.

There is also the International Crime and Victimization Survey, ICVS, which attempts to compare fear of crime and victimization over national contexts. It was premiered in 1989, and has been implemented in 1992, 1996 and 2000. It is sponsored and administered by the Dutch government, and by the United Nations (Walklate, 2006)

During the 2000s and 2010s we see expansion into a global context, for example in Israel (Shechory-Bitton & Soen, 2016), Australia (Michael L. Chataway, 2016), Trinidad and Tobago (Chadee & Ditton, 2005), and Hong Kong (Chui, Cheng, & Wong, 2012). Sweden could certainly be included in the list of countries into which fear of crime research was imported as well. The next chapter will describe how fear of crime research came to be established in Sweden. This literature review will finish by presenting prominent themes in the fear of crime research towards the end of the examined period.

## Prominent themes in later fear of crime research

### Vulnerability

The *vulnerability* model is an attempt to explain why women and the elderly are found to be more fearful in many fear of crime studies. This model proposes that greater fear (which is what is discussed in the research, not some groups' lesser fear) that these demographic groups feel, is caused by stronger feelings of vulnerability. The model assumes that the fear is caused by feeling that one would be helpless if an attack were to occur because of physical weakness. Baumer (1985) argues that a coherent understanding of fear of crime as caused by perceived risk and perceived vulnerability is emerging. He finds women, the elderly, the poor, and inhabitants of neighborhoods perceived as dangerous, along with those who believe it is likely that they will be robbed, to be more fearful (Baumer, 1985).

Maxfield (1984) finds gender and age to be strong predictors, along with perceived crime problems. However, Maxfield (1984) also finds that the effect of age is weaker in high-crime neighborhoods.

Both Baumer (1985) and Maxfield (1984) use the Ennis (1967) operationalization. Ortega and Myles (1987) ask what amount of variation in fear of crime is explained by age, race, and gender. They find support for all three, along with the perceived risk of victimization as an explanatory variable for fear of crime. Ortega and Myles (1987) also use the Ennis operationalization, with the exact wording “Is there an area around here – that is, within a mile – where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?”. This can be considered the Ennis (1967) operationalization collapsed into a dichotomy. However, it also contains the word “afraid”, which conceptually ties it closer to “fear” than the original version, which asks how “safe” the respondent would feel. Baumer (1985) admits that a multi-item scale would be a more appropriate dependent variable for his multivariate fear of crime study, but defends his use of the Ennis (1967) operationalization by stating that the widespread usage of this item should provide some comfort. A similar reasoning is found in Maxfield (1984) who also defends his use of the Ennis operationalization by referring to its widespread use in large-scale victim surveys, such as the National Crime Survey and General Sociological Survey.

Early conceptualizations of vulnerability understand it to be a straightforward measurement of physical strength and fitness, which in their view explains why the weaker sex, women, score higher on the Ennis operationalization, along with the elderly (Baumer, 1985; Maxfield, 1984). Feminist writers have engaged with this hypothesis, which is elaborated on in the next section on women and fear of crime. Later fear of crime research tends to offer a more sophisticated conceptualization of vulnerability, for example in Jackson (2004). Here, fear of crime is suggested to consist of two separate constructs, the experience and the expressive. The experience denotes the individual’s judgement of the risk of victimization and how that would affect a person, and the expressive denotes how the individual feels about crime in a societal sense; how much of a problem is crime? Vulnerability, part of the experienced side of fear of crime in this conceptualization, is then defined as self-efficacy and perceptions of the consequences of victimization. This is closer to what Killias and Clerici (2000) find; the respondent’s own judgement of vulnerability is a better predictor for fear of crime<sup>15</sup> than the interviewers’ judgements of vulnerability. Vulnerability seems to be a highly subjective construct.

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<sup>15</sup> Measured using the Ennis (1967) operationalization.

## Women and fear of crime

My review has presented the view that women's higher fear of crime in comparison with men might partly be an artefact of the Ennis operationalization, as it tends to be more pronounced in studies that do so (Clemente & Kleiman, 1977; Garofalo, 1979; Lagrange & Ferraro, 1989). However, Lagrange and Ferraro (1989) find women's fear of crime to be higher than men's using their 11-item fear of crime index, as does Warr (1984). LaGrange and Ferraro (1989) do not find similar support for elderly people having more fear.

This might indicate that the higher fear for older people found in several studies might be a result of using the Ennis operationalization, but not women's higher fear, which seems to have more robust empirical support. Warr (1984) asks his respondents to rank their fear and perceived risk of several types of crimes, in an attempt to tackle the fear paradox of lower risk and higher fear among women and the elderly. His results indicate possible differences in the relationship between risk and fear among different demographic groups, and explains these through his concept of *differential sensitivity to risk*. His reasoning is that women are more afraid even though they judge the risk to be lower. His research question, along with almost all other researchers in the field, is an effort to explain why women are so afraid. This reasoning is well in line with the description of criminology as a science for, by, and about men, where women are perpetually considered to be the other; an anomaly that remains to be explained Messerschmidt (2004).

Already in the 1970s, feminist researchers proposed the idea of rape as a tool of social control in, for example, Brownmiller's (1976) influential book. Brownmiller maintains that rape, both in peacetime and in war, functions as a tool for the patriarchy to assert power and dominance over women, and criticizes the notion that rape has anything to do with sexual desire. Brownmiller (1976) also argues that women are raised to be victims: docility, passivity, and physical fragility are part of what constitutes femininity. Through early childhood socialization, women are taught these behaviors and rewarded with social acceptance (Brownmiller, 1976). Griffin writes in her 1979 book:

I have never been free of the fear of rape. From a very early age I, like most women, have thought of rape as part of my natural environment – something to be feared and prayed against like fire or lightning (Griffin, 1979, p. 3).

Griffin analyses rape as a functioning social mechanism of patriarchal control. Not all women are raped, but the social mechanism of fear of rape affects all women, through teaching female dependence on male guardians. Rape functions

as the threatened consequence of disobedience should the woman not obey her male guardians: her fathers, brothers, and husbands (Griffin, 1979).

Brownmiller and Griffin describe a taught, socialized form of vulnerability, one which is gendered and socially constructed. This understanding of vulnerability is part of a general understanding of gender as a social construction, and was a key theoretical development of second-wave feminism. Key feminist thinkers of the era, such as de Beauvoir (1949/2010) emphasized the non-essentialist, taught, and socialized nature of gender. De Beauvoir's famous words on the constructed character of gender summarize this position eloquently: "one is not born, but rather becomes, a woman" (de Beauvoir, 1949/2010).

Out of this development grew a feminist understanding of gender that differentiates between the socially constructed role of gender, and the physical characteristics of the sexes. Brownmiller and Griffin's form of taught vulnerability, socially constructed as part of the feminine gender role, should be juxtaposed with the vulnerability explanatory model proposed by other researchers, where experienced vulnerability is simply a rational response to physical weakness (Baumer, 1985; Maxfield, 1984). These perspectives are seemingly similar, but in fact rather different. Are women afraid of crime because of their physical attributes which make them vulnerable to attackers? Or, are women taught to think of themselves as weak, encouraged to be frightful and to avoid potential danger, as a form of social control that keeps women in the home? If the first model is correct, fear of crime should correlate with general physical strength and fitness. Killias and Clerici (2000) find that vulnerability assessed by the respondents themselves explained more variation in fear of crime (using the Ennis (1967) operationalization) than interviewer-assessed measures of vulnerability, which discredits the idea that it is a matter of actual physical attributes.

The idea of imposed vulnerability as an aspect of social control taught to girls, was picked up by researchers as a possible explanation for women's fear of crime. Riger and Gordon's 1981 study attempted to empirically evaluate the model of taught vulnerability:

We asked women in our in-person interview how strong they thought they were and how fast they thought they could run compared to the average woman and man. Sixty-three percent of the women thought they were less physically competent than both the average man and the average woman; only 28% perceived themselves to be better or even similar in speed and strength when compared to the average woman. These perceptions of physical competence were significant predictors of women's fear levels: Women who

perceived themselves as less physically efficacious were more likely to say they were afraid” (Riger & Gordon, 1981, p. 81).

Mathematically speaking, a majority of women cannot be weaker than the average woman. However, a majority of women can be taught to think of themselves as weak, a hypothesis Riger and Gordon (1981) find support for. This can be considered empirical support for the idea of socially constructed vulnerability, as part of the gender role of femininity, and as an explanatory variable for the gender discrepancy in fear of crime. Additionally, Riger and Gordon find elderly women, non-white women and women living in poor neighborhoods to be more fearful. Along with perceived physical weakness, they also find support for other attitudinal variables, such as perceived risk of victimization and attachment to neighborhood. However, it should be noted that they use the Ennis (1967) operationalization, while generally agreeing on its unsuitability (Riger & Gordon, 1981). Asking participants how safe they would feel in their neighborhoods after dark can well be considered a better operationalization for perceived risk of victimization than for fear of crime, and thus their model suffers from circular reasoning. While their study makes an important contribution towards explaining men’s and women’s fear levels, it suffers from much of the same conceptual unclarity as the rest of the research discourse. While this conceptual unclarity is discussed within the literature (Ditton et al., 2000; Farrall & Ditton, 1999; Garofalo, 1979; Hale, 1996; Lee, 2001), let us take a moment to further examine the dynamic interplays between issues of methodology, and our evolving understanding of women’s fear of crime.

## The feminist critique

Stanko (1995) writes that there are several problems with the contemporary understanding of women and fear of crime in the 1990s. She points to attempts to make women protect themselves from the threat of violent crime, such as the National Rifle Association’s campaign to make women buy more guns. The image of the threat women face, as depicted in the campaign, is perfectly in sync with how the fear of crime research determines what women are fearful of: crime committed by strangers, in the dark, away from home. However, Stanko (1995) argues this is not in line with empirical research about the kinds of crimes that women are statistically more victimized by. Women are statistically most at risk of being victimized by men they know personally, in the presumed safety of their

homes. Moreover, Stanko (1995) argues that the instruments used to measure fear and victimization are unable to capture this fear, and indeed commonly do not ask about fear inside the home, or fear caused by men who are relationally close.

Stanko (1990, 1995) took part in an ongoing academic conversation during the 1990s, along with Jo (1994) and Pain (1994), as women criminologists using qualitative methods and feminist theory to further the understanding of the gender discrepancy. Stanko (1990) interviewed men and women on their everyday strategies to avoid crime and danger, and Jo (1994) interviewed schoolchildren to study fear of crime socialization patterns in early childhood.

Up to this point much, but not all, of the fear of crime research had some quantitative aspect, commonly via collecting data through surveys or structured interviews. The qualitative approach favored by Stanko (1990, 1995) and Jo (1994) changed the scope of possible research questions. While qualitative methods are rarely suitable to quantify the varying aggregated fear levels of different demographic groups, they have other strengths. Pain (1994) finds that the women she interviewed spoke about fear of crime as “stranger danger”; something that happened away from home and was committed by strangers, even though many had real-life experience of assault and sexual violence at home, committed by men they knew. Jo (1994) interviewed children and finds that the idea of the dangerous stranger was firmly rooted in early childhood socialization, and was emphasized especially strongly to girls. Stanko (1990) emphasizes that her interviewees’ avoidance behavior was reinforced and maintained from childhood into adulthood.

These results hint at the complex socialization mechanisms at play. Is the taught, reinforced idea of *stranger danger*, somehow more potent than actual experiences of victimization in shaping the mental image of fear-inducing crime? These are matters for research that cannot possibly be studied using quantifying methods; they require deep interviewing techniques that allow researchers to take part in the mental world of the interviewee. Studies of fear of crime using qualitative methods produce a different type of knowledge than quantitative methods, and fear of crime is usually described differently as a result; less as a constant, and more transient, fleeting and situational (Heber, 2007; Koskela, 1999a; Koskela & Pain, 2000; Stanko, 1990, 1995). Second-wave feminism stressed the transformative and powerful tool of speaking out and sharing experiences, of the personal made political. The ties between second-wave feminism and qualitative methods have been expanded on by, for example, DeVault (1999), who writes:

the truths of feminism are smaller, more tailored, more pointedly defined truths than discredited Truths of grand theory and master narratives. They are truths that illuminate varied experience rather than insist on one reality; they seem, to many of us, more useful and sturdy than abstract and ostensibly universal formulations. (DeVault, 1999, p. 3).

Some studies from this period seek to empirically disprove “feminist” theory by trying to find a correlation between the Ennis operationalization and having experienced partner violence (Smith, 1988). There are many misconceptions to be noted here. Feminist theory around fear of crime stresses that gendered violence functions as a latent threat. Not all women have to experience partner violence for it to function as a tool of social control. Feminist theory also criticizes the use of the Ennis (1967) operationalization as it continues to frame fear-inducing crime as something that happens away from the home. Feminist researchers stressed the nuanced nature of experiences of partner violence: many women are taught not to think about it in terms of crime, and prevalence is hard to measure with the quantitative design Smith (1988)<sup>16</sup> uses.

The tailored, smaller truths yielded by qualitative methods do indeed challenge the contemporary understanding of the fear of crime research. Methods, research questions, and operationalizations had until this point defined the scope of the research as being about stranger danger. Very few studies had designs that allowed for fear of any other kind of crime. Feminist researchers started to emphasize that stranger danger violence was not in line with the empirical data about the risks of violence that women faced. Second-wave feminism describes how women inhabit a world of male violence, and feminist researchers have mapped this violence. They find that the violence rarely has the form of clear categories of crime, but rather exists on a sliding scale: catcalling, harassment, stalking, groping and a range of unwanted sexual attention from men all exist on this scale (Gilchrist et al., 1998; Hille, 1999; Pain, 1994; Stanko, 1990). Some characterize women’s fear of crime as not a brief moment of panicked fear of victimization, but rather as constant, low-level alertness (Stanko, 1995). Some researchers describe the risk-avoidance behaviors that this alertness results in, such as avoiding dark and empty places: shrubbery, badly lit parks, empty subway stations, and so on (Pain, 1994; Stanko, 1990). However, researchers stress that it is not actually shrubbery and

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<sup>16</sup> Fifty percent of contacted women wanted to participate in Smith’s structured interview study, which phoned women in the home to ask about experiences of partner violence – something which should merit a discussion of the validity of the method.

empty places women fear; women fear men jumping out of the shrubbery or assaulting them in the empty subway (Riger & Gordon, 1981; Stanko, 1995).

Feminist attention to men's violence towards women started to result in mainstream political attention, and led to campaigns and policies. These have, however, been criticized in how they frame the problem. Stanko (1995) writes that most policies firmly place the responsibility of avoiding victimization on women themselves. Women are encouraged to not walk alone, to buy protective products such as pepper spray, to avoid certain areas such as parks after dark and so forth (Stanko, 1995). These types of policies continue to frame the issue of female victimization of violence as something that happens away from home, in public areas during night. Very little public effort is expended in addressing men as the cause of female fear, or changing the behavior of men. They also firmly place the burden of changing behavior on the victim. Another development, which intersects with fear of crime and criminology, feminism and the judicial sphere, is the rise of victimology and the crime victim.

## Fear of crime and the media

In the 1990s, the relationship between fear of crime and media consumption was seen as a promising avenue of research. The link between cultural consumption and fear of crime was first suggested by Gerbner and Gross (1976), who argued that the world of television was much more violent than reality. Intuitively, it makes sense to try to establish links between media consumption and fear of crime, given the paradoxical finds of the research discourse as a whole; if fear of crime isn't empirically strongly correlated with personal victimization or societal crime rates, perhaps it can be explained by the individual's beliefs about society, developed by the sources of information she consumes? The amount and character of crime news is more or less unrelated to how much crime actually happens, as it is not how common a crime is that is the organizing principle behind news reporting, but rather if the crime is *newsworthy*, meaning sensational, interesting, rare, or upsetting. That media portrays crime in a way that has very little to do with actual crime rates is a central notion in Hall et al. (2013/1978) work, and also what Garofalo (1981b) finds in a meta-analysis of crime news. But attempts to empirically link fear of crime with consumption of media (Chadee & Ditton, 2005) or entertainment and news about crime have had limited success (L. Heath & Gilbert, 1996; Weaver & Wakshlag, 1986).



Indeed, the effects of media consumption on fear of crime seems to only hold for certain groups and certain forms of news. For example, Chiricos, Eschholz, and Gertz (1997) find the frequency of watching television news and listening to news on the radio is significantly related to fear of crime, while reading newspapers and news magazines is not. However, when disaggregating their data they find that news consumption is only significantly related to fear of crime for white females between the ages of 30–54 years (Chiricos et al., 1997). This is a group that is commonly portrayed as victims of violent crime in entertainment, but not as commonly victimized in reality. There are studies supporting the notion that the type of content matters, for example Williams and Dickinson (1993) find consumption of tabloid-style sensationalist crime news correlates to fear of crime. L. Heath (1984) uses the Ennis (1967) operationalization and finds that consumption of crime news where the crime is local, random and sensational<sup>17</sup> relates to higher fear of crime. When considering how the Ennis (1967) operationalization asks participants how safe they feel in their neighborhood during night, it is reasonable that being informed about gruesome crimes happening seemingly randomly in the area could have an effect. Other studies have investigated if the link is in the other direction; do more fearful people seek out or avoid crime news and entertainment? Some support for this has been found, for example by Wakshlag, Vial, and Tamborini (1983) who find that more fearful people avoid violent content and prefer content with more retaliatory justice.

The media research often uses more sophisticated measurements of fear of crime, like constructing an index or using multiple indicators (Chadee & Ditton, 2005; D’Andrea et al., 2015; Gerbner & Gross, 1976; Weaver & Wakshlag, 1986; Williams & Dickinson, 1993), but respondents are often undergraduate students and the sample sizes are limited (Wakshlag et al., 1983; Weaver & Wakshlag, 1986). There are also examples of studies where the indicators used to measure media consumption are quite sophisticated, but fear of crime is measured using only the Ennis (1967) operationalization (L. Heath, 1984). Nevertheless, attempts to analyze the relationship between media consumption and fear of crime have persistently failed to empirically establish a link:

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<sup>17</sup> “Sensational” here denotes a crime with non-normative elements, like a man beheading his wife and hiding her head in the freezer.

At a more general level, that a connection between media consumption and the fear of crime that is so intuitively obvious cannot convincingly be made decades after the first attempts to do so is a puzzle. (Ditton et al., 2004, p. 608)

This is especially true if the independent variable, media consumption, is measured by the amount of media consumed (Chadee & Ditton, 2005; Ditton et al., 2004). Ditton et al. (2004) remark that it seems more relevant what people think about crime media content, than how much of it they consume. Qualitative studies support the view that media consumption matters, but that the relationship between what the individual views and reads, and how that information is processed in relation to an existing worldview, is highly complex (Ditton et al., 2004).

## Signs of disorder – the spatial turn

From the 1980s onwards, the research discourse is characterized by a strong and continual interest in the local, the environmental, the neighborhood, and in how signs of disorder and social disorganization affect fear of crime. The inspiration and origin of this connection with the physical environment likely came from two different sources. The first is an interest in how the built environment affects the social experience of people. This came from the field of architecture, and can be considered to originate in Jacobs (1961) book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, and was further developed by the introduction of Newman (1972) concept of “defensible spaces”. For Newman, a defensible space is an area such as a neighborhood, house, park, or office which has features that convey ownership and control over public and private property. Territoriality, surveillance, and symbolic barriers are key features, and Newman writes that walls, gates, hedges, and fences should mark out both private and public property to denote it as the collective property of residents and to “deter criminal activity”. Crime and fear of crime are treated interchangeably by Newman (1972), and assumed to have a straightforward causal relationship, where crime causes fear of crime. Jacobs (1961) stress a clear demarcation between the private and public, and Newman (1972) argues for privatization of public resources, for example having private litter bins instead of public.

Another strand of thought comes from criminological control theory, which could be considered to originate with Hirschi (1969/2002). While there are many different iterations of control theory, they all share a general belief that people will commit crimes if sufficient control mechanisms are lacking. Some versions

emphasize social informal control mechanisms, while others, most notably the broken windows theory of Wilson and Kelling (1982), stress the need for penal control and retributive and punitive action. Broken windows theory suggests that young potential offenders view “signs of disorder”, like broken windows, as a societal suggestion that rule-breaking and delinquency will be accepted. Many fear of crime studies from this period are based on a theoretical model in which “signs of disorder” or “incivilities” are assumed to cause fear of crime.

An early example is the study by Skogan and Maxfield (1981) which serves as the methodological and theoretical inspiration for early Swedish fear of crime surveys. Skogan and Maxfield (1981) have a more advanced methodology than their Swedish imitators, and the survey is complemented by observations and media analysis of crime news. The study is concerned with the “flight to the suburbs”, also known “white flight”, of which Skogan and Maxfield (1981, p. 16) say: “politically and economically this may be the most significant reaction to crime.” The study also cites the Harris Poll<sup>18</sup> and Smith (1985) assertion that the American public has long considered crime a central problem, a statement that has been contested by Loo and Grimes (2004) in their re-analysis of poll data. The Skogan and Maxfield (1981) study is theoretically concerned with the city, the neighborhood, the local, and its relation to crime;

We also were interested in the conditions and events which characterize people’s immediate environment. By almost any standard, some places are “good places” and other are “bad places”, and that should make a significant differences in what the residents of an area think and do. (*Skogan & Maxfield, 1981, p. 15*).

“Signs of disorder”, the theoretical foundation of the New York Model, theoretically influenced what the Skogan and Maxfield (1981) study measured, and thus what its Swedish replica studies, as we will go on to discuss in chapter 6. The construction of a dichotomy of right and wrong, good and bad, social order and disorder, is evident in both the previous quote and this one:

By the social order we mean people’s expectations about fit and proper conditions and conduct, especially in public and semi-public places. Improper conduct includes boisterousness, drunkenness and untidiness, as well as proneness to violence or acquisitive behavior. Where these standards seem to

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<sup>18</sup> See chapter 5 for a discussion on the Harris Poll methodology.

be in decline, people feel that they are watching the disintegration of rules that ought to govern public life. (Skogan & Maxfield, 1981, p. 91)

Another typical example can be found in Taylor and Covington (1993) survey of Baltimore, which models the effects of social change in a neighborhood on the fear of crime. The theoretical model assumes that change, in the form of increased presence of minorities and youth, will create more "incivilities", i.e. signs of disorder, and thus increase fear of crime. While the study finds limited support for this, it is an interesting example of how implicit assumptions in the research discourse continue to shape what is being measured. First, fear of crime is considered a salient social problem in need of a solution, even though the survey itself supports the notion that most people actually feel rather safe, even using the methodologically limited Ennis (1967) operationalization. Of Taylor and Covington (1993) 1622 participants, 1481 felt safe or somewhat safe during daytime, 966 felt safe or somewhat safe during nighttime, and 881 didn't feel teen gangs were a problem, even though response alternatives were skewed<sup>19</sup> and the city of Baltimore was chosen for its transient character. The study found no significant effects due to crime rates or incivilities or changes in social composition of a neighborhood on fear of crime (Taylor & Covington, 1993).

There are numerous similar studies. These typically follow a similar type of methodology as Skogan and Maxfield (1981) and Taylor and Covington (1993), with a quantitative study that measures fear of crime using some iteration of the Ennis (1967) operationalization, as well as data collected on neighborhood characteristics and "signs of disorder", either by asking respondents to evaluate their neighborhood (Owens, 2013; Shechory-Bitton & Soen, 2016; Snedker, 2010), or by researchers walking around and collecting "signs of disorder" (Nasar & Fisher, 1992; Sampson & Raudenbush, 1999; Taylor & Covington, 1993), and sometimes complemented this with official data on reported crime (Owens, 2013).

Some studies use secondary data from national or international crime and victimization surveys, for example from the ESS (Mellgren, Pauwels, & Levander, 2010; Visser et al., 2013) or the CVPCS (Snedker, 2010). Multiple regression analysis is then used to explain fear of crime by these variables measuring neighborhood conditions. Many studies have found that gender is still the variable explaining most variance using this methodology (Killias & Clerici, 2000; Skogan

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<sup>19</sup> Respondents could choose between calling teen gangs a big problem, somewhat of a problem or no problem (Taylor & Covington, 1993).

& Maxfield, 1981; Taylor & Covington, 1993; Visser et al., 2013), and some have explained this by arguing that women are more sensitized to “signs of disorder” (Snedker, 2010). There are studies of many other national contexts than the United States, for example Switzerland (Killias & Clerici, 2000), the Netherlands, (Vrij & Winkel, 1991), Sweden (Mellgren et al., 2010), Israel (Shechory-Bitton & Soen, 2016), and Great Britain (Jackson, 2004; Nair et al., 1993). Some studies argue for the demolition of public housing in the United States (Owens, 2013), similar to how Newman (1972) argued for privatization in order to decrease crime.

### Can fear of crime be built away?

If fear of crime is caused by the physical environment, can it be built away? Can street lamps, CCTV, “defensible spaces” and removal of threatening shrubbery “solve” fear of crime? A study by Vrij and Winkel (1991) finds that none of the locations marked out by participants as “unsafe” had “signs of disorder” or “incivilities”, and only 2 out of 13 had an elevated crime rate in the official statistics. Rather, factors like poor lighting and being deserted during the evening had a greater effect on perceived location safety. A second experiment phase of the study found that increasing street lighting made people feel safer (Vrij & Winkel, 1991). It seems however, that positive effects are more easily found in studies with an experimental design than when attempting to measure real life change. A Scottish study measured fear of crime after significant changes to a neighborhood, including wholesale flat refurbishment, remote door entry systems, increased door and window security, enhanced lighting, widened and resurfaced paths, and cutting back trees, bushes and undergrowth. The study found that the inhabitants were more afraid of crime after the changes (Nair et al., 1993). Additionally, several studies of street lighting and CCTV in Glasgow indicate that people expected to feel safer after the installation, but actually didn’t, and whatever small positive effects seemed to disappear quickly (Ditton, 2000; Short & Ditton, 1998). All in all, the empirical support for changes to the built environment seems limited. In a meta-analysis of fear of crime in relation to the spatial, Pain (1994) writes:

A lack of consistency in findings about the long-term benefits to feelings of safety characterizes much of the literature on the effects of these schemes. (R. Pain, 2000, p. 370)

The environmental focus has also received feminist critique. Koskela and Pain (2000) surveyed and interviewed women in Edinburg and Helsinki to find answers to the key question if the built environment plays a fundamental role in influencing women's fear of crime, or if its effects are simply underlain by processes which originate elsewhere. In other words, does the environment really cause fear of crime? Koskela and Pain (2000) note how the marriage of discourses of women's fear and the spatial locates both causes and solutions in urban planning, rather than understanding it as embedded in socio-political structures like gender, class, race, and age. Furthermore, the spatially oriented fear of crime discourse locates solutions to the positivistic micro-scale, and goes against the feminist argument that violence can be decreased by focusing on the behavior of offenders. While the spatially oriented fear of crime discourse locates the source of women's fear in environments away from home, research supports the claim that the most dangerous place for a woman is, in fact, the home (Lehti et al., 2019).

Central conclusions from the feminist critique about the spatial turn in fear of crime discourse are that while the physical environment plays a role, in that it might trigger feelings of fear, it is a simplification to say it causes women's fear of crime. Life experiences, such as motherhood, moving, ageing, victimization, harassment, and bereavement, influence individual women's responses to their physical environment. There is nothing wrong with improving lighting in parks, but it won't "solve" the fundamental issue: that women feel unsafe in an unequal and patriarchal society (Koskela, 1999a, 1999b; Koskela & Pain, 2000; Stanko, 1990, 1995).

## Crime, space and race

The genealogy of fear of crime is closely linked to American politics on race. This was discussed previously, in the section on race and the fear of crime. That section concluded that there was need for a new language of race in the United States: a political desire to be able to talk negatively about the existence of black people in American society without appearing overtly racist. In the words of republican strategist Lee Atwood, "You start out in 1954 by saying, 'Nigger, nigger, nigger.' By 1968 you can't say 'nigger' – that hurts you, backfires." Fear of crime research has since its conception been used to imply ethnicity. Let us consider some examples from the more recent fear of crime research discourse on talk about race:

We similarly argue that a larger migrant population in a country will increase the probability that people perceive minorities as a threat, since ethnic minority groups are often associated with aggressiveness, violence, and criminal behavior. (Visser et al., 2013, p. 282)

Unexpected change influences incivilities only because it shapes neighborhood racial composition. Neighborhood racial composition, by itself, due to connections between race and the sociology of urban property relations, and race and employment patterns, shapes the extent of physical and social incivilities (...) In the social disorganization perspective, ethnic heterogeneity and rapid population turnover prevent urban communities from organizing collectively against groups migrating into neighborhoods, or from adequately controlling the antisocial behavior, 2). Heterogeneity and turnover also undermine ties between neighbors, limiting their ability to agree on a common set of values or to "solve commonly experienced problems. (Taylor & Covington, 1993, p. 385)

The media depicted in great detail the severe deterioration of residents' sense of safety and security, i.e., the feeling that African refugees are contributing to the run-down profile of the area and the filth in the streets, as well as to the sense of threat hovering over their jobs and home (...) Notably, many in the Israeli public believe that the foreigners are jeopardizing Israeli national identity and that they pose a threat to Israel's very existence as a Jewish state (Semyonov, Reichman, & Yom-Tov, 2002). The feelings of threat described above are aggravated by the fear of being a victim of crime. Fear of crime is regarded as one of the most serious problems in contemporary urban areas (Chui, Cheng, & Wong, 2012; Ferguson & Mindel, 2007), so much so that some researchers regard the fear itself as a much graver problem than actual crime or victimization. (Shechory-Bitton & Soen, 2016, pp. 291-292)

The research discourse contains repeated claims that ethnic heterogeneity is negative, and causes crime and fear of crime. The existence of ethnic minorities can be discussed as a negative because of the mechanisms through which they are thought to generate fear and often by referencing broken windows theory. This, after all, is what Atwood asked for; a new language in which to discuss race and ethnic heterogeneity as a negative, but without appearing overtly racist. Or, at least not so racist you can't get your paper published even if it discusses "Israel as belonging to the Jewish people" and African refugees as contributing to filth in the streets (Shechory-Bitton & Soen, 2016), or, for Stinchcombe et al. (1980) to

claim that proximity to white people makes all Americans feel safer, and proximity to black people makes all people more fearful.

The empirical evidence for these claims tends to be weak, even using the Ennis operationalization to measure fear of crime. Visser et al. (2013) compared European countries using ESS data, and expected citizens of countries with larger immigrant populations to be more fearful of crime (measured by asking about worry of burglary and violent crime) and to feel less safe (measured using the Ennis (1967) operationalization), but doesn't find support for this. Nor do Taylor and Covington (1993) find support for their theoretical model in which racial composition affects fear of crime through the existence of "uncivilities". Shechory-Bitton and Soen (2016) find only very weak correlations in general, and their "symbolic dimension" is a stronger predictor of the "distress" of having ethnic minorities close than their index measuring fear of crime:

Our findings reveal that perceptions of symbolic threat seem to play a much more important role than real feelings of threat, or than fear of socioeconomic competition, among all respondents regardless of their place of residence. Similar to the sense of threat described by Stephan & Stephan (2000), in the current study as well, foreign residents are perceived as a threat to the cultural and national homogeneity of Jewish Israeli residents. This threat does not appear to be associated with daily contact with foreigners, but rather with ideological conceptions of Israel as belonging to the Jewish people. The consensus that Israel should be a Jewish state and the fear that an increase in the number of foreigners can be a threat to the Jewish majority in Israel are common fears among Israeli society. (Shechory-Bitton & Soen, 2016, p. 299)

Discriminatory views on race seems relevant in relation to how people rate their fear of crime. Skogan (1995) finds that white people who are more prejudiced towards black people are also more fearful when using the Ennis operationalization. Visser et al. (2013) find a weak correlation between believing immigration to be a negative, and their two fear of crime measurements. The effects are weak compared to gender and country-level expenditure on social welfare (Visser et al., 2013). Hipp (2009) find that white people perceive more "signs of disorders" than people of non-majority ethnicities. Dowds and Ahrendt (1995) find that fear of crime measured using the Ennis (1967) operationalization is associated with a surprising set of variables, dependent on the respondents' age and class. Young men who held rightwing views and were of a higher social class were more likely to feel unsafe than those who did not. Middle-aged men who wanted to restrict immigration and held



more authoritarian values were similarly more likely to be fearful of crime. For older women, important predictors were negative attitudes towards those on welfare benefits, and the feeling that the acknowledgement of the rights of minority groups had “gone too far” (Jackson, 2004).

There is also a curious tendency to confuse economic structures with matters of race, or rather, to designate something that should rightfully be considered a consequence of a racialized class-based society as caused by a group’s inherent criminogenic nature. Take, for example, the mechanism through which Taylor and Covington (1993) suggest that the presence of black people in a neighborhood leads to higher fear of crime. They write that white property owners stop maintaining and investing in buildings when black people move into the neighborhood, leading to increasing signs of disorder and fear of crime. We can note how the research discourse expends considerable effort in explaining white people’s fear as an effect of black people’s existence, but very little in considering how the actions of white landlords affects “signs of disorder” and the living situation of black people; in other words, in considering how race and class intersect. This is even though it is well established that black people in the US often score higher than white people using the Ennis operationalization (R. Pain, 2000; Skogan, 1995). We can note that it is rare for new immigrants to settle in the richest and most established neighborhoods, but racial heterogeneity is the salient explanation in the fear of crime research discourse, rather than socioeconomic and material factors. There is a curious form of class blindness in the silence of the discourse, on for example why recipients of social welfare tend to move to high-crime neighborhoods. From reading Owens (2013) it is easy to gain the impression that they simply like it that way:

Boston residents perceived their neighborhoods to be less safe if more voucher users lived there, perhaps because voucher users tend to move to higher crime areas.(Owens, 2013, p. 77)

## Methodological critique

Acknowledgments of the methodological shortcomings of the Ennis operationalization steadily increased in the literature, but it was not until the second half of the 1980s that researchers seriously engaged with them. Ferraro and Lagrange (1987) examined the previous fear of crime literature with a focus on methodology and operationalization, with a purpose similar to this review. They write that the fear of crime research is “replete with methodological problems that

impede our ability to make useful generalizations”. One of the problems they discuss is the poor conceptualization of “fear” and argue that fear is an emotional reaction, “both a cause and effect”, in its relationship to judgements of risk. It is therefore meaningless to discuss in terms of (ir)rationality (Ferraro & Lagrange, 1987). As Garofalo (1979) discussed previously, there are a number of problems inherent in the Ennis operationalization: it doesn’t mention fear or crime, “neighborhood” can have different meanings, few people are probably alone in their neighborhoods, it is possible to answer hypothetically. (Ferraro & Lagrange, 1987) also critically engage with the variation of the Ennis operationalization which asks respondents to judge the likelihood of being attacked while alone at night in their neighborhoods. This explicitly asks the respondent for a judgement of risk, which must be considered conceptually different from fear of crime. It is possible to believe an attack to be likely without being afraid, and vice versa. Ferraro and Lagrange (1987) find that 40 percent of the 46 fear of crime studies they examined used a single-item indicator of fear of crime. This dissertation argues that they all can be considered variations on the Ennis operationalization, as they all ask respondents to make a judgement of their safety while alone and outside in their neighborhoods.

In Lagrange and Ferraro (1989), statistical analysis is used to further examine the validity of the most commonly used single-item indicator of fear of crime, i.e. the Ennis operationalization. Based on 320 structured phone interviews, they measure several different fear of crime operationalizations to use statistical measurements from factor analysis, such as Cronbach’s Alpha, to examine these different indicators’ relationships to each other. Factor analysis is a statistical method for assessing the *unidimensionality* of a set of indicators; if they are strongly correlated with each other and can be considered to represent a single concept. Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  is a statistical measure of reliability, which ranges from 0 to 1, with the value of 0.7 generally considered the lower threshold for reliability (Hair Jr, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2014). Cronbach’s  $\alpha$  can be viewed as the expected correlation of indicators that measure the same concept, as a function of the number of indicators in a test, the average covariance between indicator-pairs, and the total variance (Bland & Altman, 1997).

The operationalizations Lagrange and Ferraro (1989) examine are: “What do you think is the likelihood that you will be victim of a ‘personal’ crime (such as being assaulted or beaten up) within the last year?” and “What do you think is the likelihood that you will be victim of a ‘property’ crime (such as a burglary or theft) within the last year?” for crime risk. They find that these indicators only have a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.39, and must therefore be considered to measure two

different variables. For crime fear they use: “How safe do you feel, or would you feel being out alone in your neighborhood at night?”, which is very close to the original “How safe would you feel walking around your neighborhood after dark” (Ennis, 1967). They use eleven other operationalizations for fear of crime, which asks for specific crime fears:

How afraid are you of...

Being mugged?

Having your car stolen?

Having your home burglarized while away?

Having your home burglarized while at home?

Being raped or sexually assaulted?

Being conned out of money?

Being attacked?

Being approached on the street by a beggar?

Being murdered?

Having rowdy youths near your home?

Having your property vandalized? (Lagrange & Ferraro, 1989)

From these 11 items several factors were constructed. When the Ennis operationalization was tried as an indicator, it was the only one with a lambda correlation lower than .5. When the correlation between the two factors measuring fear of personal crime and fear of property crime was tried, it was quite low (.41 for personal fear and .47 for property fear, using unweighted least squares in confirmatory factor analysis). Further on, the correlation between the index of all 11 indicators, and the Ennis operationalization was also quite low (.45 polyserial and polychoric coefficients). The correlation coefficients between the each of the individual 11 items and the NCS question ranged between .25 and .45. To summarize, this all indicates the unsuitability and low validity of the classic question used to measure fear of crime (Lagrange & Ferraro, 1989).

From its very inception, this field has relied almost exclusively upon quantitative surveys, which have suggested that the fear of crime is a prevalent social problem. However, doubts about the nature of the instruments used to investigate this phenomenon have cumulatively raised the possibility that the fear of crime has been significantly misrepresented. Dealing with the

epistemological, conceptual, operational and technical critiques of quantitative surveys in general and of fear of crime surveys in particular, this article suggests that our understanding of the fear of crime is a product of the way it has been researched rather than the way it is. (Farrall et al., 1997, p. 946)

As time went on, and the fear of crime research discourse grew, two types of studies became increasingly common: meta-analyses (Garofalo, 1981b; Hale, 1996; R. Pain, 2000) and critical studies aimed at improving the validity and methodology of the research discourse. Many of these originated from a UK research project funded by Economic and Social Research Council in 1994. This aimed at developing more valid and accurate methods for studying fear of crime, and used a mix of quantitative and qualitative methodologies (Ditton, 2000; Ditton, Bannister, et al., 1999; Ditton et al., 2004; Ditton et al., 2000; Ditton, Farrall, et al., 1999; Farrall et al., 1997; Farrall & Ditton, 1999; Gilchrist et al., 1998; Nair et al., 1993; Short & Ditton, 1998).

At the heart of these methodological critiques is the question of what is actually being researched. Interestingly, this doubt about the conceptual soundness of fear of crime is as old as the research discourse itself, originating with Biderman (1967b) who found that what people think about the crime problem, *the common sense of crime* to use Hall et al. (2013/1978) term, exists independently of crime and victimization rates. In other words, fear of crime is not closely related to crime. Related to this is the question of validity. Validity in the social sciences denotes the consistency of the underlying theoretical concept an operationalization is considered to measure, with what the instruments actually measure. All in all, this boils down to two central questions. First, what is fear of crime: is it thinking about crime? Is it being angry about crime? Worrying about crime? Is it the self-evaluated risk of victimization?

The second question is, can you measure it quantitatively in a valid way? There have been attempts to empirically evaluate this, for example in Farrall et al. (1997), where respondents were first asked quantitative interview questions about fear of crime, and then qualitatively interviewed about these questions. The study found large mismatches between the quantitative and qualitative answers. The most common related to the *different epistemological focus of the interview*, meaning that in interviews respondents commonly rated fear levels as fluctuating, differing between contexts, milieus and times of the day. *The measurement of formless or concrete fears* was found to differ greatly between quantitative and qualitative interviewing, including the Ennis operationalization, which the study found could be interpreted significantly differently:

For example, one respondent when asked “How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?” chose the answer “Very unsafe”. However, at the qualitative interview she said “I know exactly the areas where I could go for a walk and know reasonably well I’d be reasonably safe, not one hundred per cent, but reasonably safe.” (Farrall et al., 1997, p. 668)

*The nature of open/closed questions*, was found to produce significant mismatches, where respondents often adapted their answers to fit the scale of the quantitative interviews. *The meaning of the word “worry” is variously interpreted by the respondent* was a common source of mismatches, as it meant different things to different people. *The interpretation of the question by the respondent* was another source of mismatches, for example some questions were interpreted as hypothetical by the respondents. *Memory decay*, and participants misremembering for example the number of victimizations, also happened. In total, they found 114 mismatches from their 64 respondents, most commonly found measuring fear of crime, rather than victimization. Out of these 114, 41 mismatches were classified as “catastrophic”, or completely contradictory (Farrall et al., 1997).

Research also indicates that “fear” might not be the most common emotional reaction to crime. Ditton, Bannister, et al. (1999) find “angry about crime” to be a more common response than “afraid of crime” across demographic groups. The study design used a mixed-methods approach, where respondents were interviewed about their experiences with victimization and crime, and a quantitative survey was designed with operationalizations of crime reactions from the qualitative interviews. While the survey supported the claim that anger was a more prominent feeling than fear (Ditton, Bannister, et al., 1999), the qualitative interviews showed that emotional reactions to crime are complex and multifaceted (Ditton, Farrall, et al., 1999). Respondents felt angry, but also shocked, disappointed, afraid, upset, or didn’t feel anything at all. Time passed since the victimization was also an important factor, where feelings of anger might change into other feelings, or vice versa, and some people who didn’t initially feel anything grew angry or fearful, and some people who felt strongly after the victimization didn’t feel that way later. The writers ask why anger, the most prominent feeling in the study has been ignored by the research discourse (Ditton, Farrall, et al., 1999). The study also demonstrates something that is sounds trivial and common-sensical, but which has consequently been ignored by the research discourse: emotions are complex, messy, context-dependent and hard to quantify.

Farrall et al. (1997), following the example of Ferraro and Lagrange (1987), end their study with suggestions for methodologically improving future fear of

crime research. Farrall and Ditton (1999) further developed alternative survey questions in order to improve validity. They stress the need to break down “fear” or “worry” into the emotional components that research has shown to be most common in relation to crime; thinking about a specific crime, being afraid of a specific crime, and being angry about a specific crime. Furthermore, they recommend avoiding the unstable category of “crime”, and instead asking about specific crime, for example burglary. The study proceeded to do validity assessments of these questions, using similar quantitative/qualitative methodology as Farrall et al. (1997), along with statistical assessment of *unidimensionality* like Ferraro and Lagrange (1987). They found that “thinking about” and “afraid of” were reasonably unidimensional, but that “feeling angry about” loaded on another factor. Furthermore, the unidimensionality of survey questions, and qualitative interview questions, were not satisfactory (Farrall & Ditton, 1999). Even if the questions suggested undoubtedly represent an improvement in validity over conventionally used fear of crime operationalizations, the results must be interpreted as asking people to quantitatively rate their fear levels in surveys are still wrought with issues related to validity. Even conventional survey indicators about fear of crime aren’t necessarily reliable, even when compared *in the same survey*. When asked “In your everyday life, are you afraid of someone breaking into your home”, and then, later in the survey, “Could you tell me how worried you are about having your home broken into and something stolen?”, 31 percent rated their fear as high on one question, and low on the other (Ditton et al., 2000).

Further probing of the validity of the Ennis (1967) operationalization yielded interesting, but distressing results. It is common practice across the research discourse to collapse the Lickert-scale typically used to measure fear of crime into a dichotomous variable,<sup>20</sup> fearful or not fearful. Ditton et al. (2000) do this to a Scottish sample and are left with a typically “fearful” distribution: 55 percent feel safe and 45 percent unsafe when “very safe” and “fairly safe”, and “very unsafe” and “a bit unsafe” are added together. When presenting the four alternatives by themselves, it is shown that “very unsafe” is actually the rarest category, and thus the most inflated by the practice of commensuration: 24 percent felt very safe, 31 percent felt fairly safe, 32 percent felt a bit unsafe and 13 percent felt very unsafe.

Ditton et al. (2000) added two follow-up questions to the classic Ennis (1967) operationalization, and asked how often the respondents went outside locally after dark, in addition to asking how safe they would feel walking around in their neighborhood after dark, and how safe respondents felt at home alone at night.

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<sup>20</sup> A practice further discussed in chapter 7

Using common commensurative practices and only the Ennis operationalization, 23 percent of participants felt unsafe. Linking the two extra questions together with the Ennis (1967) operationalization created eight possible combinations, outlined in **Figure 28**:

		%	N
1	Feel unsafe in, stay in, feel unsafe out	4%	45
2	Feel safe in, stay in, feel unsafe out	14%	152
3	Feel unsafe in, go out, feel unsafe out	1%	14
4	Feel safe in, go out, feel unsafe out	2%	26
5	Feel unsafe in, stay in, feel safe out	1%	14
6	Feel safe in, stay in, feel safe out	57%	627
7	Feel unsafe in, go out, feel safe out	1%	8
8	Feel safe in, go out, feel safe out	19%	206

**Figure 28**  
Source: Ditton et al. (2000, p. 15)

The table illustrates that presentation of data matters. This is the same dataset that, when the typical commensurative practices were applied, was reported as showing 23 percent of participants feeling unsafe. Looking at the actual distribution in the table, however, the situation is far less worrying. The largest group, 6, feel safe both inside and outside, but stay inside during evening. Only 2 percent in group 4 feel safe inside and unsafe outside, but go out regardless. Nineteen percent, in group 8, feel safe both inside and outside and go outside during evening while 14 percent feel safe inside and unsafe outside, and remain inside. The most troubling group can be considered to be group 1, the 4 percent who feel unsafe both inside and outside. Only 8 percent of all respondents have a safety problem using this way of measuring, belonging to groups 1, 3, 4 and 5. Note however, that this is actually four separate safety problems, something that the original distribution of data has no way of conveying. Ditton et al. (2000) remarks that perhaps group 4, which feels safe in but goes out and feels unsafe there should stay in; while group 5, which feels unsafe in and stays in, but feels safe outside, should go out. This is certainly a simplification, but as Ditton et al. (2000) quip, it should likely be read as a comment on how the political dimensions of fear of crime as a significant social problem often appear blown out of proportion.

## Political persistence and methodological inertia

A curious phenomenon may be observed in the later fear of crime research. There is plenty of methodological innovation and critique. Fear of crime as a concept is broken down into components, for example by Jackson (2004), into the experienced and the expressive. For Rader (2004); (2007), the threat of victimization consists of three components: the emotive (fear of crime), the cognitive (perceived risk), and the behavioral (constrained behaviors). Anger is suggested to be a more common emotional response (Ditton, Bannister, et al., 1999; Ditton, Farrall, et al., 1999), alternative and more accurate operationalizations of fear of crime have been offered (Farrall et al., 1997; Ferraro & Lagrange, 1987; Gray et al., 2008). These studies are often well-cited but otherwise left little mark on the methods of the research discourse. There is simply not a lot of engagement with the methodological critique. No matter how empirically proven the unsuitability of the Ennis (1967) operationalization is, it still absolutely dominates the research.

Why is this? Part of the reason likely has to do with mechanisms internal to the research discourse and to social science, as previously discussed. Methodological inertia is likely due to a combination of factors: a desire to generate comparable data, the availability of large-scale survey data, a tendency to depend on accepted practices within a field, especially for researchers coming into criminology from other disciplines, like geographers, architects, and psychologists. However, there are probably reasons external to the discourse itself, and these have to do with political need and motivation.

Although it goes against the commonsensical grain to say this, why should fear be reduced? Little if any justification is ever advanced in support of this common policy thread. Much post hoc muttering about its 'negative impact on the quality of life' is normally paraded in the place of calm reasoning, but 'fear' (or whatever it is that questions on the 'fear' of crime actually tap into) is a very basic drive whose retroductively supposed role is the protection of those who fear. As a result the whole of Britain is now being tasked to reduce something it does not understand and cannot measure reliably. (Ditton et al., 2000, p. 3)

There are suggestions in the literature that the attractiveness of the study of fear of crime, the reason the research discourse has proliferated as it has, the political interest in reducing fear of crime, has nothing to do with the research itself, and



that looking for answers to the question if fear is rational or irrational is futile (Lee, 1999, 2001, 2013). Lee (1999) picks up a question posed by Hale (1996):

What is it about fear of crime that has led to its “discovery” over the last quarter of a century?

Lee (2013) genealogy of fear of crime research argues, in agreement with this dissertation, that fear of crime wasn’t empirically discovered as much as it was discursively formulated at an empirical level. Lee argues that the quantification of crime, risk, fear, and victimization began to develop a new way to conceptualize the criminal and victim, and carried within itself the potential to return to a depoliticized criminology: an administrative criminology (Lee, 1999, 2001, 2013). Social context in the form of structural factors that constitute the individual’s life; gender, class, labor market, and ethnicity, could then be airily referred to as “background” factors. Lee argues that when we, as criminologists, ask if a project like Neighborhood Watch really reduces people’s fear, we are being naive. The goal was never to reduce people’s fear, but to constitute people as *fearing subjects*, to engage people in the project of order maintenance, and to gain legitimacy for increasing the control-mechanisms of the state:

My emphasis here is that one of the main foci of the New Right neo-conservative law and order political campaigns was precisely the object of investigation first “discovered” empirically in the administrative crime surveys: the fear of crime. Were it not for this “discovery”, the New Right campaigns would have been unable to engage in the same forms of populism that we have witnessed. Claims of the existence of a fearing population could now be backed up by statistical “proof”. (Lee, 1999, p. 238)

Through fear of crime surveys, a fearful population could be located and used to motivate further penal policy oriented towards increased control. If scientific achievement is to be measured by amount of research or political influence, the marriage of fear of crime to signs of disorder must be considered a remarkable success. Indeed, Skogan (2015) sounds somewhat flattered as he cites Beckett and Herbert (2008) very critical article on how fear of crime, signs of disorder, and penal control of the city have become dominant themes in late modernity:

Finally, interest in disorder can be driven by politics and ideology. In broad strokes, Beckett and Herbert (2008) attribute policymakers’ contemporary

interest in disorder reduction to the ascendance of neoliberal global capitalism and the restructuring of urban political economies around the world. The resulting competition between cities to create the most hospitable environment for corporate headquartering, luxury living and high-end tourism has led to the intensification of urban social control efforts aimed at keeping center-city public spaces crime and nuisance free. Policy in turn can drive, or make use of, social measurement. Government-sponsored reports used the British Crime Survey to track individual social and physical disorders that were on the list of antisocial behaviors, including abandoned cars, noisy neighbors, drunkenness, drug use, youth nuisance, litter, vandalism, and graffiti. (Skogan, 2015, p. 9)

## Discussion of the reviewed literature

This literature review has attempted to summarize the history of fear of crime research. This has entailed presenting origins, motivations behind the emergence, methodological innovation and praxis, and discussing key questions and paradoxes that the research discourse has grappled with. Certain themes have emerged: women, crime and feminist critique, modern media, the spatial turn, race and disorder, and the establishment of modern quantitative survey research. These themes should not be considered to have a causal relationship to the emergence of fear of crime research. This research did not cause the spatial turn of criminology to happen, nor was it caused by the growing focus on the physical milieu and its criminogenic characteristics. But they are conjunctive to each other, they take place in the same space-time, and they influence and affect each other. A new and emerging common sense of crime is constituted by fear of crime research together with other, related and adjacent issues. The next chapter will present the emergence of this research discourse in Sweden, and discuss some conjunctive factors that are especially prominent in the Swedish setting.

## 6. The Emergence of Fear of Crime in Sweden

This chapter will describe the moment at which the fear of crime research discourse was imported into Sweden. This is a story that began in the late 1970s, with the addition of a fear of crime indicator to the Survey of Swedish Living Conditions,<sup>21</sup> developed rapidly during the 1990s, and was institutionalized in the 2000s. Fear of crime was, by then, already a sprawling beast of a research discourse, laden with methodological conventions and theoretical assumptions.

This chapter will chart the institutional story of this moment of importation. Which instruments, in the form of surveys, were imported and from where? What theoretical assumptions did they bring with them? Which Swedish institutional actors carried out this research? The methodological approach in this chapter is reminiscent of the institutional ethnography of DeVault and McCoy (2001) in the sense that it joins together interview data and documents in the form of government reports and academic research. The chapter will finish with a discussion on the conjunction of the moment of import. What kind of penal politics developed in Sweden during the 1980s and 1980s, and how does fear of crime fit into this construction of a new common sense of crime?

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<sup>21</sup> More on this in chapter 7

## The first fear of crime survey – The Stockholm Project

While questions on fear of crime have been part of the Swedish Living Conditions (ULF) survey since 1978, the first study dedicated entirely to crime, victimization, and fear of crime in Sweden was the Stockholm Project. It collected data in 1989 and published its results in 1990 (Wikström, 1990). Two American studies inspired the methodology of the 1990 study; Skogan and Maxfield (1981) and Taub, Taylor, and Dunham (1984), according to Wikström, Torstensson, and Dolmèn (1997).

The Stockholm Project was a research project initiated in the late 1980s through a collaboration between the Crime Prevention Council and the Department of Criminology at Stockholm University. The project aimed to study crime and victimization in the city of Stockholm using a variety of methods. One of these was a structured quantitative phone interview with adult inhabitants of eight Stockholm neighborhoods (Wikström, 1990). This study included a variation of the Ennis operationalization,<sup>22</sup> which was likely the first time this indicator was used in Sweden.<sup>23</sup> Participants were also asked how much of a problem they considered the following in their neighborhoods: littering, drunken people, fighting and violence outside, young people fighting or making trouble, women or children being harassed, homes for addicts, disruptive children, and disruptive neighbors (Wikström, 1990, pp. 210-232). The project was highly focused on the ecological perspective, and on studying the relationship between crime and the city. At times it proposed an (unreferenced) general correlation between urbanization and crime, and a correlation between the size of a city and the level of crime (Wikström, 1990). The term “traditional crime” was used repeatedly to denote theft, vandalism, and violence. Two theoretical models were presented, shown here in **Figure 29** and **Figure 30**.


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<sup>22</sup> “*Om du går ut ensam sent en kväll i \*ditt område\* känner du dig trygg, eller otrygg, eller går du aldrig ut sent på kvällarna?*” (P.-O. Wikström, 1990, p. 215)

<sup>23</sup> The Survey of Swedish Living Conditions (ULF) also asks participants if they have avoided going out because of fear of crime. This question was first included in 1978.



**Figure 29** Theoretical model presented in Wikström (1990, p. 7)  
 Source: (Wikström, 1990, p. 7)



**Figure 30** Theoretical model presented in Wikström (1990, p. 18)  
 Source: Wikström (1990, p. 18)

The first model, depicted in **Figure 29**, is clearly inspired by Clarke and Felson (1993) theory of routine activity, a type of control theory which explains crime as an effect of a lack of social control and shares with other types of control theory the assumption that people will commit crime if not sufficiently controlled. In the first model, urbanization is thought to lead to weaker social control and increased opportunities for crime. These two factors lead to an increased number of motivated offenders and increased crime.

The second model, depicted in **Figure 30** aims to explain the level of crime in a neighborhood primarily as a function of the type of housing in the area, which is thought to explain the socio-economic status and the sizes of the families living there. The type of housing, socioeconomic status and type of families gives the level of “problem homes” in the neighborhood and thus its crime level. Problem homes are homes receiving social welfare (Wikström, 1990). Thus, the crime

levels of a neighborhood are thought to be caused by the type of housing, where large, poor families are considered criminogenic. Multi-family homes with large, cheap apartments cause high crime levels in a neighborhood, the model suggests.

The Stockholm Project was redeveloped into Stockholm's local fear of crime project. The three largest Swedish cities, Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö, all have their own local fear of crime surveys. They are not examined in detail, but some data from the contemporary Stockholm fear of crime survey will be dealt with in chapter 7.

The project (and its methodology) was later absorbed into the Crime Prevention Council (BRÅ) and inspired the methodology of what was to become the Swedish Crime Survey (NTU), launched in 2006. This is a typical example of institutional practices that shape what the research discourse *becomes*. American studies are copied in terms of methodology and theory, are empirically tried out in Sweden on a smaller scale, with only small differences in methods, and become the blueprint for fear of crime studies with impressive scope and longevity. The Swedish Crime Survey has collected data for over 15 years, with the survey sent to 200,000 participants annually (more on Swedish Crime Survey in chapter 7).

## Between the governmental and academic

Another actor with an active role in the establishment of the fear of crime research discourse in Sweden was the research unit of the Swedish police. The origin of fear of crime research in Sweden, as in the American case, was entangled with the political and governmental. The Research Unit at the Swedish National Police College was first established in 1988 (Tham & von Hofer, 2014), and then had an interesting history of being abolished and re-established several times, depending on how the police leadership felt about research as a matter for police engagement. An informant describes working at the police research unit in the mid-1990s as a "very strange period". They were supposed to do research and had very generous resources ("we never applied for any grants"), but research was looked down upon by senior police and was met with considerable resistance in the police organization.

An informant says the initiative to start measuring fear of crime was motivated by change in how the mission and purpose of the police was formulated. The government sends the police a letter of regulation, a document stating what the

police are meant to do, annually.<sup>24</sup> Since 1992 this has stated that the police are supposed to “minska brottsligheten och öka tryggheten” – to decrease crime and increase trygghet. The goal of increasing trygghet was introduced in 1992. The exact formulation of this mission is shown in Table 2.

**Table 2:** Formulation of the purpose and mission of the Swedish Police in its Letter of Regulation<sup>25</sup>

Year	Formulation (Swedish)	English translation
1991	Polisen ska särskilt rikta in sin verksamhet på åtgärder som går ut på att värna om människors trygghet till liv, hälsa, integritet och personlig egendom.	In particular, the police shall focus their activities on measures aimed at safeguarding people's security of life, health, integrity and personal property.
1992/1993	Målen för polisverksamheten ska vara att minska brottsligheten och öka människors trygghet i samhället	The objectives of police activities shall be to reduce crime and increase people's feelings of safety.
1997	Det övergripande målet för polisen är att minska brottsligheten och öka människors trygghet	The primary goal of the police is to reduce crime and increase people's feelings of safety.
1998	Målet för kriminalpolitiken är att minska brottsligheten och öka tryggheten.	The aim of penal policy is to reduce crime and increase feelings of safety
1999		
2000	Målet för kriminalpolitiken är att minska brottsligheten och öka människors trygghet.	The aim of penal policy is to reduce crime and increase people's feelings of safety.
2001		
2002		
2002		

The survey the research unit imported and implemented was the Skogan and Maxfield (1981) survey discussed in chapter 5. The reason why this study provided the blueprint for Swedish fear of crime surveys was both circumstantial and structural. Skogan was a representative of the Chicago School, which has greatly influenced Swedish criminology and sociology. An informant remarks that they (the researchers) were trained in urban sociology and socio-ecological theory that placed great emphasis on the physical environment and thus had a theoretical affinity with Skogan's work. Interestingly, the informant also remarks that the focus on the individual, which was to become a defining feature of fear of crime research, wasn't necessarily part of this theoretical socialization, but rather something they “fell into”. Signs of Disorder is often described in the interviews as the “only available theory at the time”.

According to Wikström, Torstensson, and Dolmèn (1997, pp. 4-6), local fear of crime measurements had the following three purposes: to describe the local crime problem and use this description as a basis for crime prevention and

<sup>24</sup> Before the reorganization of the Swedish police into a single agency in 2015, Letters of Regulation were sent to the National Police Board.

<sup>25</sup> The Letters of Regulation were collected from the Department of Justice in spring 2021.

allocation of resources; to use the description of local crime to educate the police and other local crime prevention actors; and, through repeating measurements, obtain information on how well central goals for the police were met locally, in terms of decreasing crime and increasing trygghet. The main problem with fear of crime surveys, according to the authors, is that they describe the crime problem as something experienced by individuals, and do not consider how businesses experience crime. The authors also write that they are aware that it is mainly the established and conventional citizenry who are represented in these surveys, and that marginalized groups are under-represented. The respondent rate is a respectable 80 percent (Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmèn, 1997, pp. 4-6).

Some aspects of these early surveys align well with how Tham and von Hofer (2014); Wikström (1996) describe the “new” criminology of the 1990s. They all have a strong focus on the local, the neighborhood and factors related to it. Their theoretical model is depicted in Figure 31.




Figure 31 Theoretical model presented in Per-Olof H. Wikström et al. (1997, p. 11) Per-Olof H. Wikström al. (1997, p. 11).

Figure 31 depicts a version of control theory with socio-ecological aspects, where crime is thought to be caused by urbanization and segregation, which causes (lack of) social integration, and leads to a lack of informal control, which in turn causes crime. We can note that crime is thought to be a result of both segregation and informal social control in turn. Wikström, Torstensson, and Dolmèn (1997) argue that a “lack of reaction” from society leads to a downward spiral. This orients the



model towards the New York-model type of control theory, where crime is thought to cause crime, and fighting “signs of disorder” is central to response. Indeed, referencing Wilson and Kelling (1982), the authors equate “problem” and “crime” with “signs of disorder” (ordningsstörningar), and write that they assume social integration, cooperation and familiarity among neighbors, to be lower in cities, and thus cite urbanization as a factor that causes crime. This model has limited place for structural factors: crime is explained primarily by the local.

Nine “problem areas” are included in the survey, of which seven are outside, in the neighborhood: littering, vandalization, drunken people, fighting and violence, young people fighting or making trouble, women being harassed, and traffic problems. Two are assumed to happen inside the house but not inside the home: fighting neighbors and knarkarkvartar or drug dens (Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmèn, 1997).

We can note the strong influence of the New York model and its focus on disorder rather than crime. We can also note how all types of domestic crime are excluded. Fear of crime is operationalized in three different ways. First, a “general” fear of crime is measured by asking about the respondents’ fear of burglary, car and bike theft and vandalization, and fear of violent assault. “Concrete” fear of crime is operationalized using the Ennis (1967) indicator: how do respondents feel walking around their neighborhoods late at night? The survey also asks if there are people whom respondents feel fearful of in their neighborhoods, and if they have refrained from certain activities because of fear of crime (Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmèn, 1997).

These types of surveys have a certain empirical and quantitative appeal. Since they repeat measurements using the same survey instrument in different local contexts and over time, the data collected is thought to be suitable for comparisons, for analyzing police efficiency, for generating “national measurements of results” (Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmèn, 1997, pp. 2-5). This underlying principle explains the methodological inertia of the research discourse as a whole: the will to generate comparative results, generating data that can be compared over time and in different national and local contexts. These reports are in a form that grew increasingly common as government organizations became central actors in the research discourse. They are light on theory, have few references and many tables and charts. The form can be described as “scientific-light”, a simplified quantitative knowledge product which borrows its aesthetics from the social sciences. As Espeland and Stevens (1998) write, the process of quantification might be motivated by the desire to look rational, limit discretion,

conform to powerful expectations, to hide behind numbers, impose order, or shore up weak authority.

The survey was first piloted in Gävleborg in 1994, and conducted again in 1995, and the results were published by the Research Unit of the Police Academy. The same survey was then used in several locations during the mid and late 1990s: Stockholm, Gävleborg again, Dalarna, Borås, Östergötland, and Örebro. Whether it was tried in a particular location depended on the local chief of police, says an informant. Interest in research varied greatly, and regions with “active and innovative” chiefs implemented it. The publications that resulted from the Skogan surveys in different parts of Sweden by the research unit of the Swedish Police Academy are shown in **Figure 32**.

	Year of measurement /publication
Wikström, P.-O. H., Torstensson, M., & Dolmén, L. (1997). Lokala problem, brott och trygghet i Stockholms län : delrapport 1. Polishögskolan	1996/1997
Wikström, P.-O. H., Torstensson, M., & Dolmén, L. (1997). Lokala problem, brott och trygghet i Gävleborgs län. Polishögskolan	1996/1997
Wikström, P.-O. H., & Dolmén, L. (1997). Lokala problem, brott och trygghet i Dalarna. Polishögskolan	1997/1998
Torstensson, M., Wikström, P.-O. H., & Olander, S. (1998). Lokala problem, brott och trygghet i Borås. Polishögskolan.	1997/1998
Torstensson, M., & Olander, S. (1999). Lokala problem, brott och trygghet i Östergötlands län : 1998 års trygghetsmätning. Polishögskolan.	1998/1999
Torstensson, M., & Persson, C. (2000). Lokala problem, brott och trygghet i Örebro län : 1999 års trygghetsmätning. Polishögskolan.	1999/2000

**Figure 32** Early Swedish Fear of crime surveys

## The Police

During the late 1990s, both the Stockholm Project and the Research Unit of the Police Academy continued to measure fear of crime. The survey from the Stockholm Project inspired the National Crime Council’s Swedish Crime Survey. The survey of the Research Unit of the Police Academy became the fear of crime survey conducted by the police. That is, the administration of the latter survey moved from the research unit to the police, and the survey was simplified as a result.

Several informants describe the development of the fear of crime measurements of the Swedish police as determined at least in part by personal conflict and power struggles. Research has had an ambiguous position in the police organization; sometimes it has been considered important for the police to produce their own knowledge products, and at other times it has been seen as unnecessary, as not

proper police work, or as tools of control over the police, according to several informants. Police research units have been shut down and restarted several times. The relationship and division of responsibilities between the police and the Crime Prevention Council (BRÅ) has also undergone changes over time.

For research enthusiasts within the police, part of the attraction of the fear of crime survey was the possibility of more evidence-based police work. Several informants lament how police work is organized based on tradition and unverified common sense. An informant says that the police depend on official statistics on reported crime, police reports, their own informants, spontaneous phone calls, the criticism of local politicians, their colleagues, and mass media in order to generate a view of local levels of crime and fear of crime. Not only is information gathered in arbitrary ways, according to the informant, it is very hard to prioritize and plan. Police work becomes unfocused, sluggish, sprawling, and ruled by current events and therefore inefficient, the informant says. The notion that the police could generate their own knowledge about how the public experience crime, and use it as a basis for prioritization and allocation of police resources, was considered very interesting by some, says my informant.

Another informant says it is a common misunderstanding that we (the police) are resistant to change and don't want to learn new methods or theories. Indeed, it is the other way around, according to the informant: "we are open to everything", but nothing changes anyway. Something will be presented, there might be a working committee, some meetings take place, but everything remains the same. It is continual change without any change at all, according to an informant with extensive professional experience in the police organization. In some ways, this is perhaps what happened with the fear of crime measurements of the police. As the Swedish police was organized in regional departments until the reform of 2015, it was up to the regional chiefs to decide if they wanted to implement the measurements. A working group within the police started doing fear of crime surveys in 1997, and whether it would be invited to a police district depended on the regional police chief. The implementation of fear of crime measurements by the police was therefore geographically and chronologically unsystematic.

## The Police Survey

The Police Survey is a simplified version of the survey used by the Research Unit of the Police Academy. It includes almost the same "problem areas": littering, vandalism, people under the influence of alcohol or drugs, drug flophouses in

the area, fighting and violence, gangs of youth, women being harassed, and traffic problems. It asks about victimization through violence, theft, and vandalization of personal property. It asks respondents how fearful they feel of burglary, theft, vandalization, violence and assault, and “general” fear of crime. It asks if respondents are afraid of people living in the neighborhood. The operationalization for “concrete” fear of crime is the Ennis (1967) operationalization, just like the survey of the research unit of the police.<sup>26</sup> The survey also asks if the participant has refrained from doing any of the following activities because of fear of crime: going out to eat, going to the cinema, using public transport, going to meetings or courses, or going to sport events. Informants speak of the survey’s advantages: its consistency, how little the survey has changed, and its limited length.

The Police Survey inherited the theoretical framework of control theory and the New York model, but there was some concern over the police understanding of the theory. An informant says they (“the police”) didn’t really understand that if you ask about littering, you are not really interested in littering; it is an operationalization of an underlying concept, like disorder. An informant says that the theoretical perspective was “what was available”, and not something they actively choose. Another informant says that they don’t know if the survey measures the right things, but don’t want to change it until they get something better from “the university”. In documents from the police, the theory behind the surveys is described as follows:

The theory can, in simple terms, be explained as an attempt to analyze levels of crime and disorder, and its consequences in accordance with the so-called “zero tolerance” theory. The fear of crime survey is based on this hypothesis.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> This is in direct opposition to Ferraro and Lagrange (1987) methodological critique, which defines “concrete” operationalizations as questions about fear of specific crime, and calls the Ennis (1967) operationalization “formless”.

<sup>27</sup> ”Teorin kan enklast förklaras som att mätningen är ett försök att undersöka nivåer av utsatthet för brott och ordningsstörningar med dess konsekvenser enligt den s.k. ”nolltolerans-teorin”. Trygghetsmätningen bygger helt på denna hypotes. Frågeformuläret ställer frågor kring vilka problem den boende uppfattar i sitt bostadsområde som redan inträffat i utemiljön, eller som pågår vid passage. Det är också frågor kring egen utsatthet för brott, respondentens allmänna oro för brott, hens mer konkreta känsla av otrygghet inkluderat konsekvenser av detta samt en bedömning av polisens engagemang i bostadsområdet.”

## The Police and the Swedish Crime Survey

Concurring with the reorganization of the Swedish police into a single government agency in 2015, fear of crime measurements came up for discussion. Two main alternatives were debated according to my informants: to scale up the police fear of crime survey and use it nationally, or to implement changes to the Swedish Crime Survey to break it down locally.

One of the main differences between the Stockholm Project Survey (which became the NTU), and the survey the police inherited from the Research Unit of the Police Academy is how each breaks down at the local level. The Police Survey breaks down results into neighborhood units with 300 respondents each. The Swedish Crime Survey does not, but asks about several types of crime and how fearful the respondent is of them. Since the police started doing its own measurements in 1997, its version of the survey of the Research Unit of the Police Academy has been used in 232 municipalities and broken down into over 1,200 local segments, on at least 200 occasions. The number of participants over the years is likely over a million.<sup>28</sup>

Eventually, it was decided that the Swedish Crime Survey would be used. This resulted in the change of the Swedish Crime Survey, NTU, into NTU-lokal as described in chapter 7. The number of participants grew from 20,000 to 200,000<sup>29</sup> and the data collected was broken down to local police district level, among other changes. The cost of the survey also increased, part of which the police paid. Most of the reasons for this, the informants have shared, had to do with the division between the *operative* and the *political*.

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The theory can best be explained as an attempt to examine levels of victimization of crime and disorder and its consequences according to the so-called "zero tolerance theory". The fear of crime measurement is based entirely on this hypothesis. The questionnaire contains questions about the problems that residents perceive in their neighbourhood that have already occurred in the outdoor environment, or that are ongoing when passing through. There are also questions about the respondent's own vulnerability to crime, his/her general concern about crime, his/her more concrete feeling of insecurity including the consequences of this, and an assessment of the police involvement in the residential area.

<sup>28</sup> There are no technical reports or other official documentation published on the police fear of crime survey. These numbers come from interviews with, and documents sent to me by, the people doing the surveys. While these numbers do seem reasonable from what else is known about the measurements, the amount of published documentation on the Police Survey is very low compared to fear of crime surveys by other governmental agencies.

<sup>29</sup> The American equivalent, the National Crime and Victimization Survey, is sent to 40,000 participants. The Swedish survey is five times larger in terms of participants, while the United States has about 35 times the population of Sweden.

Since the Police Survey was never implemented nationally, it cannot generate fear of crime knowledge products at the national level, to say, for example, that “25 percent of Swedes don’t dare leave their houses because of crime.” It is, however, well suited to generating statements like “people living in this specific neighborhood consider drunk youth and vandalization to be their worst local problems,” or “people in southern Malmö are 15 percent more concerned about traffic problems this year compared to last year.” Some informants say that the Police Survey is more *operative*; appropriate for informing police work at the local level. The Swedish Crime Survey is more *political*, suitable for generating knowledge about crime that informs the political debate on crime.

The technical reports of the National Crime Survey from (2018b; 2017) cite the police’s need for more local statistical data as the reason for the transformation of the Swedish Crime Survey from NTU into NTU-lokal. Most of my informants think the police have a need for the *operative* knowledge that can be generated by the Police Survey, and that there is no way for the Swedish Crime Survey to fulfill that need. Two main reasons are cited, which are also mentioned in a document on the fear of crime survey of the police.<sup>30</sup> First, some say both the high participation rate and the operative function of the Police Survey depends on the short time period between data collection and results. About 6–8 weeks pass between the survey company sending out the surveys, and the results being communicated in special meetings with the fear of crime survey group, local police, and local politicians and officials. By comparison, a full year can pass between data collection for the Swedish Crime Survey and the communication of results. Secondly, even if the changes implemented to the Swedish Crime Survey makes it more locally specific, it still is not locally specific enough, according to my informants. The smallest measuring unit of the NTU-lokal is the police district (*lokalpolisområde*), which is a far larger unit than the neighborhood units in the Police Survey. An informant notes the low participation rate in the Swedish Crime Survey,<sup>31</sup> and expresses doubts about the quality of the data.

While the decision to adapt the Swedish Crime Survey to collect local data, instead of expanding the Police Survey nationally, is described as “idiotic” and

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<sup>30</sup> ”Vad det gäller BRÅs Swedish Crime Survey sedan år 2005 är den ursprungligen byggd på samma grund som polisens operativa trygghetsmätning, men den har ett antal annorlunda mer vitt förgrenande frågor av uttalad akademisk typ, men ger inte möjlighet att gå ner på kommuner och kommundelar samt redovisa färska resultat för operativt arbete. Inte heller en utökad Swedish Crime Survey Lokal 2017 tycks i dagsläget kunna motsvara de lokala operativa behov som polisen behöver.”

<sup>31</sup> This is further discussed in chapter 6.

“incomprehensible” by several informants, they also suggest various reasons for this decision. The police did not want a specific measurement of police performance, which is what the operative model was considered to be. A detailed survey which measured satisfaction with police performance on a neighborhood level was considered too much of a control mechanism on the police, and a scientific one at that: one which was in the hands of researchers. An informant remarks that, for police chiefs, it is very important to be able to show “good numbers”, and the police survey could be seen as threatening this. Other types of “numbers”, such as numbers of arrests, can be produced by changing police prioritizations, but a survey would be harder to manipulate to show constant improvement. Another reason cited for not implementing the Police Survey on a national level is worry about the scientific competence of the police. Are the police capable enough to handle the problem of “catching data”? An informant pondering this also remarks that the participation rate in the Police Survey is about twice that of the Swedish Crime Survey.

Several informants also argue there is a clear need for the types of political statements about crime that are readily produced by the Swedish Crime Survey. The police experienced a pressure to “meet the needs of the politicians” to be able to say something generally about fear of crime and trygghet. Some mention the change in the formulation of the letter of regulation which gave the police the mission to “decrease crime and increase trygghet.” If this is the mission of the police, we must have some way to find out if we are succeeding, says an informant. Several refer to BRÅ as the “tool of the government,” a resource for politicians concerning the political matter of crime, rather than something that informs the practice of police work. One informant expresses worry about the dominant position that Swedish Crime Survey and BRÅ have taken, as *the* sources on knowledge on fear and fear of crime in Sweden. Another says that the attempt at a compromise between the two models, the Police Survey and the Swedish Crime Survey, has satisfied no one.

## The conjunction of import

This chapter has presented an institutional account of the import of fear of crime research to Sweden. It has focused on what was imported, in terms of instruments of research and what theoretical implications they carry. But what was this research discourse imported into? What was going on with Swedish penal politics in the 1980s and 1990s? This chapter will end with a discussion of the factors that

are conjunctive to the establishment of fear of crime research in Sweden. These are aspects of late modern penal politics that are not in a causal relationship with fear of crime, but rather intersect and interlock, influencing and reinforcing each other. Together, they construct a new common sense of crime.

## Rise of the Victim of Crime

The emergence of the “victim of crime” is an international phenomenon, and is crucial for the construction of penal politics in late modernity (Christie, 1986; Garland, 2001; Wacquant, 2009). It is hard to imagine that the fear of crime research would have been established in Scandinavia in the way it has, had it not been for this concurring discourse. As discourse on crime in Scandinavia became increasingly victim-centered, the shift represented a move from collectivist to an individualist form of penal politics, as Demker and Duus-Otterström (2009) argue. For them, underlying processes of societal individualization cause the victimization of penal politics, which in turn results both in fear of crime, and increasingly punitive penal policy.

Not only are the rise of the crime victim and the establishment of fear of crime research in Sweden contemporaneous, they have several other commonalities. Both crime victim and fear of crime represent the formulation of new concepts. Indeed, the earliest examples of use of the word brottsoffer, meaning “crime victim”, are from the 1970s (Bergenlöv, Lindstedt Cronberg, & Österberg, 2002), and its expansion throughout the 80's and 90's matches the expansion of fear of crime research well. Another parallel is the high level of institutional and governmental engagement. The notion that the state has a responsibility towards the victims of crime – to compensate, retaliate, and lessen the negative impacts of crime – is increasingly taken as self-evident, write Tham, Rönneling, and Rytterbro (2011). The Crime Victim Compensation and Support Authority was formed in 1994, and a Justice Department inquiry in 1998 lists nine national voluntary organizations for crime victims (Tham et al., 2011).<sup>32</sup> Since 2001, crime victims have been a prioritized group for the Swedish Social Services (Socialtjänsten) (Ljungwald, 2011). Tham et al. (2011) list 32 examples of crime

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<sup>32</sup> Swedish Association for Victim Support, National Organization for Women's and Girls' Shelters in Sweden, Swedish Association of Women's Shelters, National Association for Children's Rights in Society, Swedish National Association for Victim Support for Men, Association Dare to Protect One Another, Swedish National Association for Passengers Exposed to Crime, Crime Victims' Association, National Organization for Relatives of Persons Killed by Violence (Tham et al., 2011, p. 558).



victim legislation in Sweden between 1978 and 2009, with the most intensive period of legislation in 1989–2009.

Victimology, and the rise of the victim of crime, intersect with feminism, and in the case of Sweden, the establishment of state feminism. Ericson (2005) analysis shows that it was through the role of the victim of crime, that women took their place within penal political discourse in Sweden. Before this increasing focus on the victim of crime during the 1980s, women were rarely mentioned in penal political debates (Ericson, 2005). For Walklate (2014), the prioritization of women's fear of crime and as crime victims is intimately connected to the use of fear of crime surveys for measuring women's fear and victimization. In a similar vein as this dissertation, Walklate (2014) argues that this practice severely limits the kinds of violence and oppression that are considered relevant and problematic social problems.

## Organization of the Police

This chapter demonstrates how crucial the police organization of Sweden was for the establishment of fear of crime research. A pre-requisite for this strong institutional support is perhaps an actual police organization. In Sweden the police were not nationalized until 1965, and were still dealing with the institutional effects of re-organization during the 1970s and 1980s. According to Furuhausen (2009), nationalization created a police organization that was more technically savvy and better equipped. They travelled by car rather than on foot, and were criticized for distancing themselves from the citizenry. Policework became more reactive and bureaucracy increased. Reforms during the 1980s were intended to increase citizen contact, but had the opposite effect (Furuhausen, 2009). This nationalization of the police created institutional pre-requisites for what we recognize as a modern police organization, which is in itself a political actor. Perhaps the failed attempt to reform police work during the 1980s reinforced the view of the police as a hard-to-steer government agency.

## Swedish media

From low saliency during the 1970s, crime grew significantly as a social issue in Sweden during the 1980s. Pollack (2001) argues for understanding the late 1970s and early 1980s as an interregnum; a period of discursive shifts. The dominion of the rehabilitative discourse was accompanied by very little discussion of penal politics in media and political debate (Pollack, 2001; Tham, 1995). This was

replaced by modern penal politics, in which crime became both sensationalized and salient. An analysis of media content during this period finds both increasing, and increasingly sensationalized, crime content, especially on youth and drug crime (Pollack, 2001). Estrada (1997) analysis of the Swedish debate on youth crime finds the 1980s to be a period of increased mobilization on the issue of crime, and a shift in concern from youth property crime to youth violent crime. The 1980s were also a period of changing ownership and organization of media in Sweden, primarily with the privatization of television (Tham, 2019).

The literature review in chapter 5 discusses the difficulty of empirically supporting a causal relationship between an individual's fear of crime, and consumption of media content on crime, with no quantitative link established. The salient role of the media in the construction of a common sense of crime is easier to establish empirically. In her study on how the Swedish media cover fear of crime, Heber (2007) writes that the reporting is often stereotypical: crime and fear of crime are increasing, crime is becoming more vicious, women are especially afraid, and places away from the home, at night are considered to generate more fear. The police are ascribed a special role as defenders of citizens and upholders of the law, and a common solution to the problem of fear of crime is increasing the number of police (Heber, 2007). Crime has potential as a mobilizing issue. Swedish media content studies show that twice as many editorials on youth crime were published when the center-left Socialdemokraterna were in government, compared to the Moderate-led rightwing coalition, the Alliance (Estrada, 2004). It is difficult to see how this relationship might be explained in terms of the crime problem being much more serious during periods of Social Democratic government, Estrada (2004) writes.

## Criminology in Sweden

Accounts of the development of Swedish criminology during the 1970s and 1980s support the notion that this period was an interregnum, even while differing on whether changes were in a positive direction. Most would agree that early Swedish criminology was strongly oriented towards forensic psychiatry, and that Swedish criminology after the Second World War retained a strong rehabilitative ideal, interest in social engineering, and a theoretical orientation towards labelling theory, anomie, social disorganization, and socio-ecological and conflict theory (Tham & von Hofer, 2014; Wikström, 1996). Causes of crime were understood to be structural, and it was believed they would be socially engineered away as

Socialdemokraterna continued to construct egalitarian people's homes, folkhemmet. The ascendancy of this discourse was definitely at an end when our period of analysis begins in 1978.

Andersson (2002) writes that Swedish criminology of the 1960s and 1970s was primarily characterized by growing criticism of the rehabilitative model. He divides this into neoclassical criticism and liberal criticism, though earlier forms were also influenced by a leftist materialist analysis of the causes of crime. The legalistic neoclassical criticism of the rehabilitative model, where individual characteristics and "potential for improvement" was heavily factored into sentencing, departs from the classical position of valuing legal certainty and the rule of law. Liberal and neoclassical criticism differed on general deterrence, a basic tenet of classical criminology, in which the punishment of the individual is considered to have a deterrent effect on the population as a whole, which liberals considered highly problematic (Andersson, 2002). A sign of the demise of the rehabilitative discourse was the publication of *ett nytt straffsystem*, a New Penal System by the Crime Prevention Council in 1977 (Brå, 1977). Andersson (2002) writes that the Brå (1977) report is best described by what it doesn't contain: any references to structural or social causes of crime. The report launched the concept of *straffvärde*, the punitive value of the crime, as central for sentencing, and is very pessimistic about the state's ability to affect crime rates in any way (Andersson, 2002; Brå, 1977; Tham, 2019).

Tham and von Hofer see the establishment of the Crime Prevention Council (BRÅ) in 1974 as signifying growing political interest in crime prevention during the 1970s (2014). They argue that, in practice, the establishment of BRÅ (in 1974) and the Research Unit at the Swedish National Police Academy (in 1988) strengthened administrative criminology, at the general cost of critical university criminology. For Wikström, the establishment of these institutions brought criminology closer to a social science discipline (Wikström, 1996). Andersson (2002) sees the Crime Prevention Council as an institution entrenched in the ideals of modernity, whose conception was motivated by the need for a knowledge-based consent for penal politics.

Wikström describes the criminology of the 1980s as focused on trying to resolve issues of governance related to crime, and the evaluation of crime policies (Wikström, 1996). Influential studies aimed to analyze the structural impact of a particular intervention or policy, such as the effect of prisons (von Hofer & Tham, 1989), or of different alcohol policies, on violent crime (Lenke, 1990). Prisons, for example, were the target of much academic criticism, which contributed to an organized political effort to end their use for young offenders (Andersson &

Nilsson, 2009; von Hofer & Tham, 1989). This was a critical criminology, with occasionally radical policy implications, and it took place within academia.

The Crime Prevention Council (BRÅ), on the other hand, was moving towards prioritizing practical knowledge, and was increasingly inspired by the crime policies of the British Home Office (Andersson, 2002). Establishment of these government criminological institutions enabled the production of quantitative criminological knowledge about crime trends and the etiology and demographic characteristics of individual offenders. This type of knowledge aims to enable efficient policing, without critical analysis of the social construction of crime and deviancy (Tham & von Hofer, 2014). Departing from the “nothing works” skepticism which preceded it (Brå, 1977), this governmental, practical criminology was primed and ready for the next cycle of criminological development, designated “the spatial turn” in this dissertation.

Central to this spatial turn is Clarke and Felson (1993) routine activity theory, first published in 1979. Summarizing from the year 1996, Wikström describes his own research as situated in this next cycle of development:

The introduction of community and problem-oriented policing, as well as the growing interest in local crime prevention initiatives, generated a great deal of quantitative research aimed at describing local problem pictures and serve as a basis for evaluating local crime prevention programs (by repeatedly measuring rates of victimization and fear of crime) (Wikström, 1996, pp. 291-292).

Wikström describes the new forms of survey research into fear of crime as tools that enables continual evaluation of the efficacy of local crime prevention policies. Wikström (1996) also mentions a general increased use of survey data for criminological research, and, compared to the structural analyses of the 1980s, criminological development in the early 1990s was characterized by an increased etiological focus (Wikström, 1996).

## Political interest in the issue of crime

During the Swedish liberal-conservative government of 1976–1982,<sup>33</sup> Tham and von Hofer observe an increased alarmism in crime politics (Tham & von Hofer, 2014). According to Andersson (2002), this period is an interesting example of the complex relationship between power and knowledge. New crime statistics

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<sup>33</sup> In contrast with American politics, the traditional political divide in Sweden is between social democratic and liberal conservative, rather than conservative on one side, and liberal on the other.

were being produced by BRÅ, but to the surprise of politicians, these showed the increasing crime trend to be levelling off. Andersson (2002) remarks on the unavailability of the type of knowledge that the conservative government needed: useful expert knowledge that would support its penal politics. Andersson (2002) finds two alternative historical solutions to this problem of legitimacy. The first was an argument that, because of the “dark figure” of crime statistics, the levelling-off trend did not accurately represent reality. The second argument was that any amount of crime is too much crime. This zero-tolerance approach was inspired by the work of Wilson (1975), which Andersson (2002) cites as politically useful criminological knowledge.

Demker and Duus-Otterström (2009) offer an alternative explanatory model through their discussion of how the rise of the victim of crime made it possible to express punitive political ideals that otherwise would be considered distasteful. Conservative interests had wanted to change Swedish criminal policy at least since 1969, but did not succeed until the crime victim discourse during the 1980s made it possible to argue for a criminal policy that focused on individual responsibility. A victim-centered discourse, coupled with the widespread belief that effective rehabilitation is difficult to achieve, paved the way for a more punitive discourse on crime, argue Demker and Duus-Otterström (2009). Estrada writes:

Those on the political Right appear to have understood much earlier than others the potential of the crime problem as a means of criticizing the government’s “expensive welfare policy” as “ineffective”. Thus when the ideas associated with neo-liberalism began to make a serious impact in the public debate in Sweden at the beginning of the 1980s (Boreus 1997), there already existed a ready interpretative framework for use in relation to the crime problem. (Estrada, 2004)

When Socialdemokraterna returned to power in 1982, they did so with a newfound interest in crime and penal politics. Drug politics became a key concern in this new interest, culminating in the criminalization of use in 1988 (Tham & von Hofer, 2014). This supports the general notion that while rightwing governments push penal politics in a control-related direction, the Social Democratic government do not roll back these changes and, in some cases, push them further (Estrada, 2004; Tham, 2018).

## Conclusion

Institutional, political, and social factors: increased political interest in crime, the establishment of state feminism and victimology, and the institutionalization of administrative criminology through the founding of the Crime Prevention Council, along with the new purpose of the police to increase trygghet, must be considered the contemporary background to the publication of Sweden's first "real" fear of crime study in 1990, and the conjunction in which fear of crime emerged. This was, a discursive break, motivated by frustration at the inability of the "old" criminology to solve the problem of crime, as Sweden had experienced increased crime during the ascendancy of the rehabilitative ideology in the 1950s and 1960s. This "old" criminology, which focused on rehabilitating offenders and was influenced by social-democratic ideals of social engineering, had two competing heirs. The more critically inclined university-located criminology, with its occasionally radical policy implications, was further removed from influence by the establishment of something new: a quantitative criminology that engaged primarily with crime trends, demography, and etiology of individual offenders. Routine activity theory, signs of disorder and control theory, rather than anomie, labelling, or conflict theory. A criminology that addressed an existing crime problem, and didn't question its causation. A criminology fit for fear of crime research.

In the conclusions to his analysis of Swedish criminology and its relation to penal politics, Andersson (2002) emphasizes the central role played by the production of knowledge in the rationalization of crime policy. But his analysis also shows how criminological knowledge is questioned. As crime statistics diverged from the expected increasing trend and showed a levelling-off during the 1970s, they were considered less reliable and valid. Perhaps we can understand this as a conditional welcome of criminological knowledge. The "right" criminological knowledge could be certain of political support.

## 7. Fear of Crime Surveys in Sweden

### The establishment of a research discourse


The fear of crime research discourse was introduced in Sweden on a limited scale in 1978, when the Swedish Survey of Living Conditions was amended to include a fear of crime indicator. It was further developed with the introduction of the specialized crime, victimization and fear of crime surveys in the late 1980s and 1990s discussed in the previous chapter. But, for the overarching purpose of this dissertation, which is to construct a historical account of how the establishment of fear of crime research fits into the developing political narrative of crime in late modernity, the 2000s were a time of particular interest. It was during this period that fear of crime research discourse became established and institutionalized in Sweden, as illustrated in **Figure 33**.

This chapter empirically illustrates the period of intense government engagement with fear of crime research during the 2000s, when several government surveys amended their questionnaires to include fear of crime indicators, and other surveys were introduced with a special focus on measuring *otrygghet*. It is these surveys that are compiled in **Figure 33**, which depicts the timeline of their introduction. This chapter will present the surveys and the government agencies that administer them.

This dissertation aims to examine what is made into statistics on fear of crime, and one way to answer this question is by asking what is needed for the scientific

production of statistics. This provides an opportunity to discuss which institutions concern themselves with fear of crime, whose fear are being quantified, and to examine the questionnaires and indicators that function as data-generating instruments in the production of fear of crime knowledge. The surveys are analyzed in terms of methodology, results and participants, using the reports and technical reports from Swedish fear of crime surveys, along with e-mail and phone conversations with Swedish municipalities and the Swedish Bureau of Statistics, the Public Health Agency of Sweden, the Crime Prevention Council, the Swedish Contingencies Agency, the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society and the police during the period 2016–2019. The chapter will then discuss other forms of government engagement with fear of crime, primarily on a local, municipal level. The data for the second part of the chapter consist of a survey of Swedish municipalities, and e-mail and phone conversations with representatives of Swedish municipalities.

**Figure 33** depicts the growth from zero surveys before 1978 to six annual surveys in the 2000s. The Swedish Survey of Living Conditions existed for more than twenty years as the only national government survey measuring fear of crime. The new millennium began with a period of rapid expansion, with new fear of crime surveys introduced every year between 2003 and 2007 until six yearly large-scale national surveys were administered by government agencies. This then remained constant, with subsequent trends being the result of some surveys being biannual and others annual.



**Figure 33** Number of national government fear of crime surveys conducted per year



## The Swedish Survey of Living Conditions

The first time Swedes were asked about their experiences of crime and fear of crime was in 1978. That was the first year the Survey of Living Conditions (Undersökningen om Levnadsförhållanden, ULF), administered by the Swedish Bureau of Statistics (Statistiska Centralbyrån, SCB) was amended to include questions about crime, safety and fear of crime. The Survey of Living Conditions itself was initiated in 1975, with a general focus on health, well-being and living conditions. This is an annual, structured interview survey with around 6,000 randomly selected Swedes aged 16–84 years. The SCB also regularly publishes reports examining a selected area more closely, such as education, economy, health, working life, or living conditions. Safety and crime fear were studied in 1992–1993 and 2000–2001. Major changes in the survey were implemented in 2006–2008 in order to harmonize it with the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions Survey (SILC). This also included a switch from in-person interviews to phone interviews. The number of randomly selected participants was increased to 12,000–13,000. The interviews are complemented with register data on, for example, income, pensions, taxes, social and housing welfare, and educational grants (SCB, 2010). Crime statistics are not included in the survey material.<sup>34</sup>

## Local Youth Politics Survey

The Local Youth Politics Survey has been administered by the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society (Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamhällesfrågor) since 2003. It is commonly known as LUPP, an acronym of Lokal uppföljning av ungdomspolitiken, (local monitoring of youth politics), and will be referred to as the Local Youth Politics Survey in this dissertation. This measures the socio-political situation of youth, and exists in three forms, studying youth aged 13–16 years, 16–19 years and 19–25 years. It has no national sample, and is offered annually as an elective survey to municipalities. The survey contains questions about family, economy, school, leisure, political and societal influence, health, alcohol and drug use, work, future prospects, and, relevant for this analysis, safety and fear of crime. The three versions of the survey are similar in most aspects, but the survey aimed at a younger age group has more simplified language and the response options generally assume the respondent to be living at home and

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<sup>34</sup> The data on the Survey of Living Conditions (ULF) is from reports (SCB, 2004, 2010, 2019b, 2019c), the Bureau of Statistics database (SCB, 2019b) and email conversations with the Bureau of Statistics.

attending school. The version for the oldest group also has response options suitable for those who work or have moved away from home.<sup>35</sup>

## The National Public Health Survey

The Public Health Agency of Sweden (Folkhälsomyndigheten, FHM) has, since 2004, implemented the National Public Health Survey in cooperation with the SCB . This was conducted annually between 2004 and 2016, but changed to a semi-annual format from 2018, along with a doubling of the number of participants from 20,000 to 40,000. The survey has a general focus on health and is complemented with register data on marital status, citizenship, year of immigration, level of education, income, social welfare, sick leave, retirement, use of health services, and prescribed drugs. The survey contains questions about general experienced health, symptoms and health problems, physical activity, eating habits, consumption of cigarettes and nicotine, gaming habits, alcohol consumption, environment and health issues, economic security, work, education and social relations, demographic background, and, relevant for this analysis, safety, security, and infringement.<sup>36</sup>

## The Citizen Survey

The SCB has also administered the Citizen Survey (Medborgarundersökningen) since 2005. This is offered as an elective survey to Swedish municipalities each year, and does not have a nationally selected sample. It aims to measure several aspects of life in the municipality. The survey was conducted biannually until 2017, and annually ever since. It includes a variety of questions related to quality of life in the municipality, such as work, school, and housing opportunities, communication, commerce, leisure activities, quality of services, such as the fire

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<sup>35</sup> The data on LUPP is from reports, (MUCF, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2017a, 2017b), the LUPP website (MUCF) and email conversations with the Agency for Youth and Civil Society.

<sup>36</sup> “trygghet och *kränkning*” a hard-to-translate Swedish word with meaning close to infringement and violation. The data on the National Public Health survey is from reports (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2018a; Folkhälsomyndigheten & SCB, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c), the Public Health Agency of Sweden webpage (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2018b) and statistics database (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2019) and email-conversations with the Public Health Agency of Sweden.

department and the police, school, elder- and childcare, culture, roads, garbage collection, water and sewers, the environment, experience of influence over local politics and decision-making, and safety and fear of crime. Municipalities have the option of adding questions to the questionnaire.<sup>37</sup>

## The Swedish Crime Survey

The Swedish Crime Survey, (Nationella Trygghetsundersökningen, NTU) was launched in 2006 by the Crime Prevention Council. It is the only national survey that solely covers fear and victimization of crime, and annually surveys 16–79-year-olds. It has a rather wide scope of questions related to victimization of crime and experiences with the courts and the police. Along with demographic variables, it asks about car theft, bike theft, car break-ins, burglary, robbery, assault and violent crime, rape and sexual assault, threats, fraud, harassment, and “other crime”. It asks if participants have experienced contact with the police or the courts, if criminal victimization was reported, and how the respondent was treated by the police. The survey also includes questions about respondents’ trust in the police, prosecutors, courts and correctional agencies. The NTU was conducted by telephone during 2006–2016, but became an online and postal survey in 2017, along with several other changes and a new name: NTU-lokal. NTU-lokal introduced new categories of crime: pickpocketing, two types of fraud (credit card and selling goods), and online harassment. The age bracket was amended to include people aged 16–84 years. NTU-lokal changed the selection mechanism from a national random sample to a stratified sample based on local police districts. It also selects almost 10 times as many participants: 200,000 instead of 20,000. In 2017, both versions of the survey were implemented, but from 2018 only NTU-lokal is administered.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> The data on the Citizen Survey is from reports (SCB, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c), the Citizen Survey Webpage, (SCB, 2019a), the Bureau of Statistics database (SCB, 2019b) and email-conversations with the Bureau of Statistics.

<sup>38</sup> The data on the National Crime Survey is from reports (BRÅ, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2020a, 2020b; BRÅ & SCB, 2017), the Crime Council webpage (BRÅ, 2019b), and email-conversations with the Crime Council.

## The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey

In cooperation with the SCB, the Swedish Contingencies Agency (Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, MSB) conduct a survey which measures participants' experiences of safety, security, fear, and risks, called Trygghetsundersökningen (the Safety/Security Survey). This has measured fear of crime and other safety and security-related issues twice, in 2007 and 2010<sup>39</sup> and generally has a broader scope than is common in fear of crime surveys, reflecting the Swedish Contingencies Agency's role in handling national risks such as natural disasters, terrorism, pandemics, and other crises. Along with demographic variables, the surveys measure experienced risk and worry about fire; drowning; electrical accidents; falls and injuries; boat, air, or train accidents; being poisoned; natural catastrophes; traffic accidents; water unavailability; unavailability of services such as electricity, IT, and phone; pandemics; terrorism; and war. It prompts participants to evaluate if they feel they can affect their own safety in terms of these different risks, and ask if they think about their own safety and change their behavior to reduce risks. There are also several questions about specific safety-related tools and behavior (MSB & SCB, 2007a, 2010b, 2011, 2014b).<sup>40</sup>

## Questionnaires and indicators

### What is a survey?

Along with institutions to carry out the research, attempts to quantify something requires instruments of quantification. In social science, these instruments are often in the form of survey questionnaires. The questionnaires are compilations of questions, or indicators, considered to measure different theoretical constructs. Answers are given a numerical value which is used to calculate (using statistical software) the aggregated value of the theoretical construct in question, in this case

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<sup>39</sup> Related surveys were implemented also in 2014 and 2018 but with different formats. They are not included in the analysis.

<sup>40</sup> The data on the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey is from reports (MSB & SCB, 2007a, 2010b, 2011, 2014a, 2014b), the MSB webpage (MSB), and email correspondence with the Swedish Contingencies Agency.

fear of crime. Central to this chain of production are the indicators or operationalizations that are assumed to measure some latent theoretical construct. While other things, like institutions to formulate and distribute, and respondents to answer the surveys, are needed to produce the research, the instruments of quantification are the indicators themselves. They are questions attributed an ability to transform immaterial mental constructs into actual numerical measurements of something.

A common definition of an indicator is something used as if it were a measurement of the concept (Bryman, 2011). This dissertation argues the opposite is also true: a concept is defined by how it is measured. The link between the indicator and the underlying concept it is supposed to measure is a theoretical one, and can vary in validity. What we really find out in survey research is not necessarily what we think we are measuring, but rather how most people would answer a question, given the offered alternatives for answers. How questions are posed and which alternatives are offered, affects responses (Kalton & Schuman, 1982). Fear of crime, as a concept, is made up of the questions thought to measure it. Therefore, an analysis on quantification of fear of crime needs to pay careful attention to these questions.

## What is a general fear of crime indicator?

The examined surveys often contain both general and additional fear of crime indicators. A general fear of crime indicator is defined as an indicator that produce a general measurement of otrygghet. In other words, what is reported under the heading of o/trygghet in the reports is what is considered to be a general measurement of otrygghet in this analysis. The only indicator discussed under the heading of Oro och otrygghet, “Worry and fear of crime”, in the Swedish Crime Survey (2019c) and the only indicator discussed for the first five pages, is the translated version of the Ennis (1967) operationalization, shown here in **Table 4**.

The heading Otrygg i olika situationer, “Fearful in different situations”, in The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey, reports on the indicator shown in Table 3 (MSB & SCB, 2011). The argument here is not that these general indicators are designated as “general” fear of crime indicators because they are the best suited to providing a general measurement of fear of crime, but rather that they are designated as such because of how they are reported on. What is considered to measure fear of crime is *made into* fear of crime.

This analysis will primarily examine which general indicators are used in which survey, as shown in Table 3. Additional indicators in the surveys which can be considered to relate to fear of crime are placed in Appendix A.

The Survey of Living Conditions indicator, as depicted in Table 4 is inspired by the Ennis (1967) operationalization, with a notable difference in that this question (henceforth called an “avoidance” operationalization) is about actual behavior. The avoidance operationalization lacks the risk of eliciting hypothetical answers since it specifies a behavior assumed to be caused by fear of crime, and tries to measure the prevalence of that behavior. It also mentions a few types of crimes (“being assaulted, mugged or otherwise harassed”), and specifies these crimes to be the reason for avoidance. It limits the kinds of crime fear the indicator can be considered to measure, but can also be considered a more precise indicator of fear of crime in the sense that it specifically asks about crime. The Survey of Living Conditions also measures victimization several types of violent crime and property crime, and contains questions about the prevalence of vandalism in the respondent’s neighborhood. The survey also contains questions about other forms of worry, about one’s health, family finances, the international situation or burglary (SCB, 2004). These are considered additional indicators, and placed in Appendix A (SCB, 2004, 2010, 2019c).

The form of fear of crime operationalization used in the Local Youth Politics Survey is similar to the one in the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey, with the difference that the former is about how often respondents feel safe, while the latter asks how often respondents feel unsafe. The Local Youth Politics Survey doesn’t specify time of day, which is unusual. Another unusual aspect is that it contains questions asking whether respondents feel safe in their homes (MUCF, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2017a, 2017b).

The National Public Health Survey uses an indicator that is a variation on the avoidance operationalization used by the Survey of Living Conditions. This version is slightly different because it does not provide a timeframe for the behavior, and because it specifies specific crimes as reasons for not going out: assault and robbery. This limits the scope of crime fear that the indicator can be thought to measure. The lack of a specific timeframe may elicit responses that happened far back in time, and can create variations depending on how good a memory the respondent possesses. As with most fear of crime indicators, the premise for the indicator is that fear-inducing crime happens away from home and when the respondent is alone, but it differs from classic variations of the Ennis (1967) operationalization in the sense that it does not specify night-time or evening (Folkhälsomyndigheten, 2018a, 2018b; Folkhälsomyndigheten & SCB,

2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).

The fear of crime indicator in the Citizen Survey consists of three questions. The first, asking about feelings of safety at evening and night outside, is close to the original Ennis (1967) operationalization. It differs in that it does not specify if the respondent is alone. The second question is closer to an evaluation of risk of victimization, but should not perhaps be seen as only asking about actual risks, since it is about feelings of safety, which might elicit a more emotional response. The same is true of the last question, regarding how safe and secure the respondent feels against burglary. Theoretically, a respondent might judge the actual risk to be low but still feel unsafe. The questionnaire used from its start in 2005 until the changes made in 2010 had slightly different fear of crime questions. Two questions were removed, one asking how safe respondents considered their families and close ones to feel in the municipality, and one asking them to judge how close the municipality was to “ideal safety”. The remaining questions was slightly re-worded, and added “how safe and secure” instead of “how safe” (*hur trygg och säker* instead of *hur trygg*) The second question about how safe participants feel from being threatened, robbed, and assaulted was added (SCB, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2019a).

The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey has a slightly different focus. Since it includes questions about many kinds of accidents and catastrophes, two or three types of crime are included in several questions. Participants are asked to judge if they have experienced any of these, how worried they are about them, and if they do anything to avoid them. The 2007 and 2010 surveys measure fear of crime in similar ways, while 2014 and 2018 use different indicators (MSB; MSB & SCB, 2007a, 2010b, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; SCB, 2004).

The Swedish Crime Survey includes the Ennis (1967) operationalization in its typical form, asking about feelings of safety alone in the respondent’s neighborhood after dark, with a modification in that it includes as a response option to say that one never goes out after dark. This can be assumed to relate to the criticism presented by, for example Garofalo (1979), arguing that the Ennis operationalization elicits hypothetical answers from respondents who do not go out alone late in the evening. There is thus a follow-up question for such respondents prompting them to specify why, and to find out if it is because of fear for their safety or other reasons, such as having no reason or possibility to go out.

In 2016 the Swedish Crime Survey changed its methodology. The structure of the indicators is different in NTU-lokal, as shown in **Table 3**.

When “No” is one of five alternatives instead of one of two, it might be reasonable to expect that a higher percentage of participants will respond that they have felt some degree of worry, and indeed this is what occurred in NTU-lokal, compared to the old NTU (BRÅ, 2016a, 2016c, 2017a, 2018a, 2019c, 2020a, 2020b; BRÅ & SCB, 2017).

This structural change covers all questions that previously had a yes/no form. Other changes include rephrasing the question about worry about crime in society as a whole, from an open question, (In terms of the whole society, are you worried about crime?) to a question about degrees of worry (To what extent are you worried about crime in society?). Other changes include new questions specifically about additional types of crime that respondents are worried about: robbery, sexual assault, online harassment, and internet fraud.

**Table 3** Comparison between old and new versions of the Swedish Crime Survey

<b>NTU</b>	<b>NTU-lokal</b>
28. Have you during the last year worried about being a victim of assault or violent crime?	Have you during the last year worried about being a victim of assault or violent crime?
Yes	Very often
No (jump to question 29)	Rather often
B. how often have you worried?	Rather rarely
Very often	Very rarely
Rather often	Never
Rather rarely	
Don't know	



**Table 4**

<b>GENERAL FEAR OF CRIME INDICATORS</b>		<b>Response alternatives</b>
Survey of Living Conditions	Have you, sometime during the last 12 months, avoided going out at night, because of worry of being assaulted, mugged, or otherwise harassed?	<i>Yes, often</i> <i>Yes, it has occurred</i> <i>No</i>
Local Youth Politics Survey	How often do you feel safe at the following places: At home? In my neighborhood? On my way to or from school? In school? Out on town or in the local town center? On trains, buses or other similar means of transport? On internet? At sports practice or other organized activity? At my local youth center?	<i>Never</i> <i>Rarely</i> <i>Often</i> <i>Always</i>
National Public Health Survey	Does it happen that you refrain from going out alone out of fear of being assaulted or robbed?	<i>No</i> <i>Yes, sometimes</i> <i>Yes, often</i>
Citizen Survey	What is your view on: How safe and secure are you outside during evenings and night time? How safe and secure are you against being threatened, robbed and assaulted? How safe and secure are you against being burglarized in your home?	<i>10-point scale where 1 represents "Not at all good" and 10 represents "Very good".</i>
Swedish Crime Survey	If you go out alone late in the evening in your neighborhood, do you feel very safe, rather safe, rather unsafe, very unsafe or do you never go out alone late in the evening?  (If you answered 5, I never go out alone) What is the reason you don't go out alone late in the evening?	<i>Very safe,</i> <i>Rather safe,</i> <i>Rather unsafe,</i> <i>Very unsafe</i> <i>I never go out alone</i>  <i>You have no reason or possibility of going out alone late in the evening</i> <i>You don't feel safe</i> <i>Other reason</i>
Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey	How often do you feel unsafe: at home during daytime? at home during nighttime? outside in your neighborhood during evening? out on town/in the streets during daytime? out on town/in the streets during evening? travelling by train? travelling by bus? travelling by car?	<i>Never</i> <i>Rarely</i> <i>Sometimes</i> <i>Most of the time</i> <i>Always</i> <i>Don't know</i>

## On indicators

Two of the six examined surveys, the Survey of Living Conditions and the National Public Health Survey, use indicators that can be described as “avoidance” operationalizations, about how often participants avoid going outside because of crime fear. It should be noted that the type of crime fear is specified as being mugged or assaulted. Two of the surveys, the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey and the Local Youth Politics Survey, ask participants to rate how safe they feel in different places. These two are also the only ones that can potentially measure fear of, for example, domestic violence, or other crimes committed in the home by people close to the respondent. While the Citizen Survey and some versions of the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey ask about fear of burglary, which can potentially take place inside the home, it specifies the source of the fear as an outside actor breaking in. All other survey indicators define the potentially fearful situation as happening outside of the home.

Most of the indicators use the word *trygg*, translated in this dissertation to “safe”, but there are also examples of the participant being asked to judge their risk of victimization, particularly in the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey, and of questions investigating if participants worry about different types of crime, in the Swedish Crime Survey. The number of fear of crime indicators in the Swedish Crime Survey is far greater than in the other surveys, but few of them are discussed in the reports. The reason for the large number of unreported indicators may possibly be to collect data for secondary analysis.

Crime is a broad and multifaceted phenomenon. A limited number of types of crime are defined by the different indicators as generating fear of crime. Assault is by far the most common, followed by being robbed, threatened or burglarized. The outlier here is probably the Swedish Crime Survey which also contains questions about worry of break-in in the participant’s car and the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey, which prompts the participant to judge the risk of being victimized by burglary, violent crime and assault, online harassment, credit card fraud, and violent riots and demonstrations. It is somewhat unclear what being the victim of a violent demonstration actually involves, which may be why this question has only been asked once, in 2014 (MSB & SCB, 2014b). Espeland and Stevens (2008) write: “numbers often help constitute the things they measure by directing attention, persuading and creating new categories for apprehending the world.” The types of crime that constitute fear of crime knowledge are classic street crimes: assault, robbery, threats, and burglary are the most common. This is an example of inherent theoretical heritage, resulting from the early fear of crime

surveys being inspired by Signs of Disorder (Per-Olof H. Wikström et al., 1997), and thus corresponds well to Wilson (1975); Wilson and Kelling (1982) insistence that criminology should focus on street crime.

Asking about fear or worry about specific crimes is one way to generate the fear of crime statistics in the examined surveys. Most surveys have some kind of more “general” measurement of overall fear of crime and feelings of unsafety. These measurements are generally inspired by Ennis (1967) classic operationalization: “How safe do you feel walking around your neighborhood after dark?” The Swedish Crime Survey and the Citizen Survey are the two surveys with indicators that are very close to original Ennis (1967) operationalization, but other indicators asking about feelings of safety in the neighborhood at night, or when out alone, can also be considered to be inspired by Ennis (1967). In these indicators several premises are implicit, and constitute what fear of crime knowledge is about. The indicators define fear-generating situations to occur when the respondent is alone, at night or in the dark, and outside the home. Even though these “general” indicators rarely mention crime, they define fear of crime as fear of being attacked by strangers, in the dark, away from home. Together with the limited number of actual crime types that figure in the questionnaires, they make up a framing mechanism of what fear of crime is about, which further locates it to street level. The selection and wording of indicators of variables are *perlocutionary* (Espeland & Stevens, 2008); they are acts of speech that enact upon the world by generating a framework for the kind of knowledge being produced.

## Results

Five of the government agency surveys contain fear of crime indicators that are presented as a percentage of fearful participants. The results from these surveys – the Survey of Living Conditions, the Swedish Crime Survey, the Local Youth Politics Survey, and the National Public Health Survey – are shown in **Figure 34**. The Citizen Survey is coded differently and is discussed separately. For each year the survey has been implemented, a percentage of participants who answered that they are fearful is calculated. The legend displays the different surveys and indicators that resulted in that percentage; how many were considered *otrygga* (fearful of crime), according to which survey and indicator.

From this, a few analytical points can be made. First, change over time in the level of *otrygghet* for each specific survey is rather modest, especially compared to

discrepancy between surveys. Only the Survey of Living Conditions offers data from before the new millennium, since most of the surveys began to collect data sometime in the early 2000s. The curve during the 2000s is slightly U-shaped but rather flat in most of the surveys, depicting an initial small decrease and an increase during the last 2–4 years. Most depict modest variance over time, but the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey is an exception; between 2007 and 2010 people became a lot more fearful according to this study.

Secondly, the discrepancy between the different surveys and indicators is often large. This means that for any given year when multiple surveys have been implemented, several answers to the question of how “otrygga” people are can be considered scientifically correct. What is being used and reported as a general fear of crime indicator in different surveys result in different answers to that question. Take the year 2017 as an example: 15 percent of respondents in the Survey of Living Conditions, 19 percent in the Swedish Crime Survey, and only 6 percent of youths aged 13–19 years participating in the Local Youth Politics Survey are “otrygga”. The National Public Health survey was not implemented in 2017, but according to the 2018 version, 28 percent are “otrygga”, while according to the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey, 63 percent were “otrygga” in 2010.

The scientific validity of these percentages is dependent on the validity of the indicators used to produce them. Does asking “Have you, sometime during the last 12 months, avoided going out at night, because of worry of being assaulted, mugged or otherwise harassed?”, as the Survey of Living Conditions does, produce a better measurement of otrygghet, or general fear of crime, than asking “If you go out alone late in the evening in your neighborhood, do you feel very safe, rather safe, rather unsafe, very unsafe or do you never go out alone late in the evening?” as the Swedish Crime Survey does? These indicators produce different results according to this analysis. The conclusion that different fear of crime indicators result in very different levels of fear of crime is generally supported by the fear of crime literature (Ferraro, 1995; Ferraro & Lagrange, 1987; Lagrange & Ferraro, 1989).

Additionally, even seemingly very similar indicators produce different results in different surveys. In 2013, 11 percent avoid going out because of fear of assault according to the Survey of Living Conditions (SCB, 2019b), and 19 percent avoid going out according to the National Public Health (Folkhälsomyndigheten & SCB, 2013), while 5 percent of participants in the Swedish Crime Survey say they don't go out because of fear of crime (BRÅ, 2014a). It should be noted that the stated purpose of the sampling mechanism of most of these surveys,<sup>41</sup> is to

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<sup>41</sup> Local Youth Politics Survey is the exception.


generate a representative sample of people living in Sweden, commonly between 16–18 and 79–85 years old. It is therefore hard to explain the differences in results by arguing that the surveys measure fear of crime in different demographic groups.

There are theoretical explanations for the lack of consistency in results that may be interesting to consider. One is that the surveys have not succeeded in gathering data from a representative sample. The other theoretical explanation is that the context and scope of the surveys may have influenced the results. For example, the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey has notably higher levels of fear of crime than the others. This could be because answering a questionnaire about accidents, crises, and catastrophes puts people in a more “fearful” mindset, and causes them to rate their crime fear higher. This explanation rests on the premise that emotional reaction to crime, which these indicators aim to measure, is not an especially stable construct, but something fleeting and situational. This is the argument mainly of qualitative researchers (Koskela, 1999a, 1999b; Stanko, 1990). While it could explain the discrepancies between the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey and, for example, the Survey of Living Conditions, it is unclear how this explains the large discrepancies between the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey and the Swedish Crime Survey, which is a survey about crime and victimization.

The focus in this analysis has been on examining the requirements for scientific production of quantified “facts” about fear of crime. But the dissertation also addresses the perlocutionary function of the fear of crime research and how the concept of fear of crime is used and understood in societal and political debate. Quantified measurements have reactivity. Numbers cause people to think and act, a tendency that Espeland and Stevens (2008) describe using the term *perlocutionary*. The actual results of measurements are relevant to examine to understand the reaction. Crime is politically and socially charged, and thus the relation between the results of measurements and the reaction is rarely as simple as a retelling of research results. Considered what Hall et al. (2013/1978) writes in their analysis of the British reaction to a perceived crimewave of muggings during the 1970s:

When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons, or series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered, when “experts” in the form of police chiefs, the judiciary, politicians and editors perceive the threat in all but identical terms, and appear to talk with “one voice”, of rates, diagnoses, prognoses, and solutions, when the media representations universally stress sudden and dramatic increases (in numbers or actual events), and novelty,

above and beyond that which sober, realistic appraisal could sustain, then we believe it is appropriate to speak of the beginnings of a moral panic. (Hall et al., 2013/1978, p. 20)




**Figure 34** Aggregated results from government fear of crime surveys: percentage of fearful participants. Sources: (Brå, 1977, 2007, 2008a, 2008b, 2009a, 2009b, 2010a, 2010b, 2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d, 2019e, 2020a, 2020b; BRÅ & SCB, 2017; Folkhälsomyndigheten & SCB, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018b, 2018c; MSB & SCB, 2007a, 2010b, 2011, 2014a, 2014b; SCB, 2004, 2018b, 2018c, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c)

# The Citizen Survey

While the results of the Citizen Survey are available in the SCB database (SCB, 2019b), unfortunately they are only available for each municipality individually, not in nationally aggregated form. However, through email correspondence with the SCB I was able to obtain data on aggregated results for the participating municipalities for 2010–2018, and present it in **Figure 35**.

This data is not nationally representative since it is derived from the municipalities that chose to participate in any given year. Figure 35 shows a rather stable development of the indicators during the 2010s. Participants rate their safety at around 6 on a 1–10 scale, where 10 is “very safe”. There is little difference between the indicators. Survey respondents rate their safety against being burglarized in the home as quite similar to their safety outside during the evening or at night. This is a different result compared to the other examined surveys.



**Figure 35** Aggregated results of the Citizen Survey  
Source: (SCB, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2019a)

## Commensurative practices

Two main factors together make up the “result” of a survey. The first comprises the actual results of the measurements, and the other is how these results are calculated and reported. The second factor can be considered to be the result of acts of *commensuration*: how categories are counted together to produce numbers. The previous section presented a binary conception of fear of crime, where survey participants were divided into two groups, *otrygga* and *trygga*, fearful and not. This is the most common way to report results in reports from government surveys. The section on indicators makes it obvious that something must have been done to the data to produce this binary conception, as the most common scale used in the surveys is the classic Likert-scale with five response options.

The report of the Swedish Crime Survey (2019c) gives an idea of how the 28 percent aggregated level of fear of crime, shown in **Figure 36** for 2018, is distributed between response categories. “Rather unsafe” makes up 16 percent of the 28 percent, while 6 percent answered that they are “very unsafe” and 6 percent that they don’t go out because of fear, as depicted in **Figure 37**. **Figure 36** shows how the answers are distributed by age group and gender.

The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey has published two reports based on their fear of crime surveys, one in 2007 and one in 2010. In the 2010 report, it is remarked that *otrygghet* seems to have increased dramatically since 2007. The compiled results in **Figure 34** support this, as do the figures published by the Swedish Contingencies Agency in its reports, here shown in **Figure 38** and **Figure 39**. But examining commensurative practices critically, and examining just how these numbers are constituted tells another story. **Figure 38** shows the results emerging from the indicator on how safe participants feel in different contexts, comparing data from 2007 (yellow) and 2010 (green). **Figure 39** shows a comparison between how worried participants are about different *potential* risks (green) and those they have *experienced* personally (yellow).


A comparison between the reports and the data spreadsheet, also published on the website (MSB), makes it obvious how these numbers are constructed, and why they are drastically higher than in other surveys. The Swedish Contingencies Agency has added together the three higher response options on their Likert-scale indicator to construct a binary measurement of fear of crime. The inclusion of the “sometimes” answer radically inflates the numbers. Thus, the 63 percent proportion for those designated as *otrygga* in 2010 is derived by adding up three response options: 48 percent sometimes, 11 percent often, and 4 percent who said they always feel unsafe out in town during the night.



The large percentage of people worried about burglary illustrated in **Figure 38** is constructed in a similar way: only 2 percent answered always, 5 percent often and 47 percent sometimes on the question if they worry about burglary, which is combined to give a fear of crime proportion of 54 percent (MSB & SCB, 2010a).


Statistics on fear of crime are the product of processes of commensuration that construct a binary conceptualization of fear of crime. The most common way to produce a graph that divides the surveyed population into fearful/not fearful is by collapsing a Likert-scale survey indicator. By commensurating the response options “sometimes fearful” and “often fearful” into simply “fearful”, a binary statistic is produced. This is how the percentages shown in **Figure 38** and written up in the survey reports are constructed. Through this simple commensurating process, the differences between always, often and sometimes are rendered invisible and, in practice, lost. How this binary conception is constructed is perhaps the single most powerful explanatory factor for how much “fear” a survey “finds”. By including the middle alternative, traditionally a neutral response in a Likert-scale, the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey find considerably higher fear levels than other surveys (MSB & SCB, 2007b, 2011). The Swedish Crime Survey (2019c) also includes the “sometimes” option in its binary fear of crime measurement, and again, it is by far most common answer in the “fearful” category, as shown in **Figure 37**

**Figur 4.3** Otrygghet vid utevistelse sent på kvällen i det egna bostadsområdet 2018. Andel som känner sig mycket/ganska otrygga samt de som avstår från att gå ut på grund av otrygghet, inom olika åldersgrupper bland männen respektive kvinnorna i befolkningen.




**Figure 36** The percentages of fearful people according to the Swedish Crime Survey 2018, split between genders (red for women and blue for men) and percentage somewhat and very "otrygg", (saturated) and "wont go out because of fear of crime" (pale)  
Source: BRÅ (2019c)


**Figur 4.1 Otrygghet vid utevistelse sent på kvällen i det egna bostadsområdet 2018. Andel av samtliga och av männen respektive kvinnorna i befolkningen (16–84 år).**




**Figure 37** The percentages of fearful people according to the Swedish Crime Survey 2018, showing the distribution between response alternatives  
Source: BRÅ (2019c)



**Figure 38** Percentages of "otrygga" participants in different contexts, according to the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey, comparing data from 2007 (yellow) and 2010 (green).



**Figure 39** Comparing how worried participants are about different *potential* risks (green) and those they have *experienced* personally (yellow), according to the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey, comparing data from 2007 (yellow) and 2010 (green).  
Source: MSB and SCB (2011)




**Figure 40** Breakdown of binary 63% "otrygga" in the The Swedish Contingencies Agency survey of 2010  
Source: MSB and SCB (2010a)

# Participants

For there to be a quantified measurement of a population’s fear of crime, a population is required. People are needed to answer the instruments of quantification; the surveys. But what is considered a population is not a simple issue in itself. How many in a population need to be selected to create a representative sample, and how many of the sample need to answer surveys for the answers to be representative of the population as a whole, are two other aspects of the issue of participation.

## Response rate



**Figure 41** Fear of Crime surveys non-response rate in percentages  
 Sources: (BRÅ, 2007, 2008b, 2009b, 2010b, 2011b, 2012b, 2013b, 2014b, 2015b, 2016b, 2017a, 2018b, 2019c, 2019d; BRÅ & SCB, 2017; Folkhälsomyndigheten & SCB, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018b, 2018c; MSB & SCB, 2007a, 2010b, 2014b; SCB, 2010, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c, 2019a, 2019c)

**Figure 41** is constructed from the response rates reported in the technical reports of five of the national surveys. The trend is remarkably similar across surveys; the

percentage of respondents that does not reply is steadily increasing. Response rates are decreasing over time.

### *The Swedish Survey of Living Conditions*

The number of participants in the Survey of Living Conditions has varied from around 12,000 to 6,000 and then to 10–12,000. The response rate has also varied across time, but the trend is decreasing. The percentage of selected respondents that chooses not to participate is approaching 50 percent in recent years, from around 20 percent in the survey's early years and as low as 10 percent during the 1980s.

### *Local Youth Politics Survey*

It has not been possible to obtain data from the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society on the number of participants selected or the response rate. The agency states by email that each municipality is given the tools to calculate its own response rate, and that the agency does not compile technical reports or results reports for the survey as a whole.

### *National Public Health Survey*

The selection mechanism is in two parts. A random national sample is selected, paid for by the Public Health Agency. The response rate is decreasing over time. When the survey began in 2004, the response rate was 60 percent. It has since gone through a slow decline towards 42 percent in the latest version in 2018. The number of selected participants has increased twice during the period, from 10,000 to 20,000 and again to 40,000 in 2018. In addition, regions (*län*) can choose to participate and add their own questions, resulting in modified surveys going out to an additional number of participants. The Public Health Agency of Sweden ensures that a single person cannot be part of both the national and local selections. Data on the number of participants per year in the municipality selection is only available for three years (according to email correspondence with the Public Health Agency). In 2009, the municipality selection was 42,293; in 2015 it was 76,540; and in 2018 it was 242,086. Technical reports contain an analysis of non-response and find that these are not random: people who are young, male, uneducated, immigrant, poor, unmarried or living in a larger city, answer to a lower degree (Folkhälsomyndigheten & SCB, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2018a, 2018b).

### *The Citizen Survey*

The total number of participants is dependent on how the number and size of municipalities that choose to participate. For small municipalities, 800 participants are randomly selected; for middle-sized municipalities 1,200, and for large municipalities 1,600. It costs the municipality 50,000–70,000 SEK to participate, depending on size. According to SCB, 268 of Sweden's 290 municipalities have participated at least once since 2005. The response rate has decreased from around 60 percent in 2005 to 40 percent in 2018.

### *The Swedish Crime Survey*

The reasons the Crime Prevention Council gave for changing the data gathering method from phone to web and postal surveys is that people are increasingly unwilling to participate in phone interviews, and the expectation that web and postal surveys would provide a better and more stable response rate, thus hopefully breaking the decreasing trend (BRÅ & SCB, 2017). In fact, the opposite trend is depicted in **Figure 41** response rates have been steadily decreasing for years and took an additional jump downwards after the changes. The response rate has declined from almost 80 percent in 2006 to around 40 percent after the changes in 2017. There are also strata of the NTS-lokal where the response rate is as low as 16 percent. The technical report discusses that this is problematic but claims that the loss of responses does not mean that the survey lacks validity (BRÅ, 2019d). The strata that have low response rates are weighted (generally these are male, young, immigrant, low-income demographic groups) to deal with the problem of the response rate, in the hope of creating representative material.

### *The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey*

The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey has quite a different selection mechanism from the others. About a quarter of the participants are randomly selected from all Swedish citizens between 18–79 years of age, and the rest are randomly selected from municipalities that choose to participate. The response rate shows a declining trend; 65 percent answered in 2007, 55 percent in 2010, and 52 percent in 2014. Technical reports analyzing the non-responders find them to not be randomly distributed. Women respond more than men, older people respond more than younger, people born in Sweden respond more than immigrants, married people respond more than singles, people with a higher income respond more and people with longer education respond more. Some weighting of answers is used to correct for this (MSB & SCB, 2007a, 2010b, 2014b).

## On falling response rates

Analysis shows similar developments across the surveys; response rates are decreasing. For surveys that were launched in the early 2000s, the response rates have decreased from around 60 percent to around 40 percent for the Citizen Survey, the Public Health Survey and the Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey. For these surveys, the decline is steady, and a 50/50 equilibrium was reached around 2012–2014. For the Swedish Crime Survey, the development is more dramatic, with decreasing response rates from an impressive 77 percent in 2006 to 37 percent in 2018. The Survey of Living Conditions has gathered data for a longer period than the other surveys, and had a remarkable response rate of 87 percent in the early 1980s. Since then, it has been decreasing and even though it is still slightly higher than in the other surveys, it has fallen to a much less remarkable 50 percent in recent years. The decline was slow during the 1980s and 1990s, and more rapid during the 2000s. As the response rate has gone down, the number of selected participants has gone up. This is most dramatically evident in the Swedish Crime Survey, where the changes implemented in the NTS-lokal included ten times more selected participants, from 20,000 to 200,000, but also a much lower response rate.

It is well known, and most of the technical reports discuss this, that not all demographic groups have the same response rate. Demographic groups that are associated with lower response rates are young, uneducated, male, immigrant, and poor, while older, female, highly educated, ethnically Swedish, and wealthy respondents have higher response rates. This can cause a non-response bias.

There are theoretical reasons to believe that there are *differences* between groups that choose to answer and groups that do not. It is not hard to imagine that a person who is very worried about the crime situation in society and has a high level of fear of crime might consider it much more important to answer a fear of crime survey than a person who is unconcerned with crime, generally speaking. Särndal and Lundström (2001) point out that while non-response bias is recognized as a problem, it is hard to evaluate statistically, and while weighting operations can possibly reduce non-response bias by estimating non-response values based on known co-varying help-variables, the basic problem is the lack of information in the dataset on those who did not respond. Truly estimating non-response bias must be done by somehow finding out if the non-responders differ from the responders on key variables. Hill, Roberts, Ewings, and Gunnell (1997) contacted non-responders to a health survey by telephone, and found significant

differences on key variables such as smoking between non-responders and responders.<sup>42</sup>

Weighting assumes the non-response rate is random in relation to key variables; the operation is based on the premise that the young, immigrant males who do answer are representative of their demographic group. When the level of response is as low as 16 percent, as it is for certain strata in recent versions of the Swedish Crime Survey (BRÅ & SCB, 2017), this becomes increasingly doubtful. A comparative response rate for a similar study would be the European Social Survey, which requires at least 70 percent response rate for each country (ESS, 2019). One could argue that the procedure of weighting answers for groups with low response rate will aggravate rather than resolve this issue. Berg (2005) writes on the issue of non-response rates:

If one believes that non-responders are different from responders in ways critical to the focus of one's research, then the possibility of non-response bias needs to be taken seriously. (Berg, 2005, p. 32)


Is there data to indicate if there are significant differences between the groups on this key variable in question, fear of crime? Finding data that can be used to evaluate this question is not easy; we know very little about the views of the people who do not answer. But there are some empirical indications that this might be the case. The regional Stockholm fear of crime survey, administered by the police and the city of Stockholm, did an analysis in 2018 on key variables in relation to how long the respondent waited before responding. This found some very interesting results. They found significant differences in how *otrygga*, fearful of crime, the respondents felt depending on which months they sent in the survey. The differences are shown in **Figure 42** for the youngest group, 16–25-year-olds.

As **Figure 42** shows, the people who answered the survey at the earliest opportunity, in February, were considerably more fearful than the group that answered at the latest opportunity, in May. The differences are rather large; 40 percent *otrygga* compared to 15 percent in May. The people who answered at the first given opportunity were much more fearful than the people who only answered after several reminders. This indicates that the tendency to respond correlates with fear of crime, and is bad news for anyone hoping that the low and sinking response rates for the fear of crime surveys will have no effect on validity.

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<sup>42</sup> It can be noted that their original response rate was 56 percent (Hill et al., 1997); far higher than most contemporary fear of crime surveys.





**Figure 42** Percentage of otrygga 16–25-year-olds according to what month the survey was sent in  
Source: Stockholm City Fear of Crime survey powerpoint presentation<sup>43</sup>

## Swedish municipalities and fear of crime

### From the national to the local

A significant amount of the work related to fear of crime and the concept of otrygghet in Sweden is organized and administered by municipalities. These comprise 290 local governments with significant autonomy and administrative responsibilities, for example concerning schooling, childcare, and elderly care. Many municipalities reported that they do some form of local measurements of fear of crime. These are commonly done as extensions to participation in the national surveys discussed above. Some surveys that are “national” in the sense of producing aggregated quantitative results on a national level, are optional for municipalities. Municipalities pay some of the costs of the survey in exchange for obtaining detailed data on their municipality. The Citizen Survey and the Local Youth Politics Survey are two surveys that are locally elective, while the National Public Health Survey has a two-part selection mechanism, and is regionally elective.

In total, 104 of the municipalities responding to my survey said that they were currently participating in the National Public Health survey, or 53.6 percent of all responding municipalities. Fifteen (8 percent) said they do not participate, 4 (2 percent) said they had previously participated and 71 (37 percent) said they didn’t know if they participate in the National Public Health survey.

<sup>43</sup> Data sent to me by the police, who collaborate with Stockholm City in administrating its fear of crime survey.

According to my survey of Swedish municipalities, 120 municipalities or 62 percent said they participate in the Citizen Survey. Nineteen (10 percent) said they don't participate, 10 said they have participated but don't continually, while 45 municipalities (23 percent) said they don't know if they participate.

Moreover, 64 (33 percent) said they participate in the Local Youth Politics Survey while 53 (27 percent) said they don't participate, 19 (10 percent) said they had previously participated but don't do so continually, and 58 (30 percent) said they don't know.

## Development of local fear of crime measurements over time

**Figure 43** depicts the changes in the number of survey participations in municipalities over time, based on the municipality survey that forms part of the empirical material of this analysis. This survey asks whether municipalities participate in a number of national elective surveys and if they conduct local fear of crime surveys of different types. It also asks when they started doing each survey and if implementation has been continual. The response options are six time periods: before 1995, 1995–1999, 2000–2004, 2005–2009, 2010–2014, and 2014–2018 (the questionnaire was administered in 2018). For this graph, survey implementation and participation<sup>44</sup> have been added together for each time period per municipality. For example, if a municipality started doing one survey in 2000–2004, another in 2010–2014, and a third in 2015–2018, they get 1 for 2000–2004, 1 for 2005–2009, 2 for 2010–2014, 3 for 2014–2018, and 0 for all other time periods. If a municipality says they started doing a survey in a time period but did not participate in that survey continually, the survey has been counted for that specific time period but not for consecutive time periods. The theoretical max is the numbers of fear of crime surveys and survey types in the municipality survey, multiplied by the participating municipalities:  $9 \times 194 = 1,746$ . “No” and “Don't know” have both been coded as 0, so the count of surveys errs on the conservative side.

The number of fear of crime surveys over time in Swedish municipalities is shown in **Figure 43**. Very few municipalities did any fear of crime surveys during the first period, before 1995. Only four municipalities did fear of crime surveys

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<sup>44</sup> Participation is defined as electing to participate in the municipal sample of locally and regionally elective surveys, such as the Citizen Survey, the Local Youth Politics Survey or the National Public Health Survey. Implementation is defined as electing to measure fear of crime independently, with self-designed (or copied) surveys.


at all, and none did more than two, the sum of participation in surveys during the period was 7. During the next period, 1995–1999, it became slightly more common: 11 municipalities did some form of fear of crime survey, for a total of 17 survey implementations. After this, the sum starts to rise rapidly: 74 in 2000–2004, 168 in 2005–2009, 301 in 2010–2014, and 469 in 2015–2018.

We can also see that the number of different surveys is also increasing. The average number of fear of crime survey participations per municipality for the examined periods is shown in **Figure 44**.


The mean number of fear of crime participations per municipality was 0.036 before 1995, 0.088 in 1995–1999 (approaching one participation per ten municipalities), 0.381 in 2000–2004 and 0.866 in 2004–2009, 1.551 in 2010–2014, and 2.418 in 2015–2018. Thus, in the final period, the average municipality participates in 2.5 different fear of crime surveys. We can also use this data to examine the percentage of municipalities that do *not* do fear of crime surveys, and how this develops over time, depicted in **Figure 45**.

The percentage of municipalities that don't do fear of crime surveys decreases from 98 percent before 1995, to 94 percent in 1995–1999, 74 percent in 2000–2004, 51 percent in 2005–2009, 30 percent in 2010–2014 and only 16 percent in 2015–2018.


**Figure 43**, **Figure 44** and **Figure 45** depict a striking and rapid development of fear of crime measurements during the 2000s. While the accumulation of fear of crime surveys begins during the 1990s in municipalities, and in 1978 nationally, the most rapid development takes place during the 2000s. For national fear of crime surveys, the most interesting period is the mid-2000s, when five new surveys were initiated. Most of these do not have fear of crime as a main theme, but all contain fear of crime indicators. From 2003 to 2007, the number of national surveys containing fear of crime indicators grew from one to six. For the municipalities, the period with the most dramatic increase in fear of crime measurements comes later, in the 2010s, though the development was well underway from the 2000s. The curve is almost exponential shape. This probably has to do with an increasing number of local fear of crime measurements along with participation in elective national surveys.



**Figure 43** Total number of fear of crime measurements per measuring period, according to surveyed municipalities



**Figure 44** Average number of fear of crime measurements per municipality and measuring period, according to surveyed municipalities



**Figure 45** Percentage of municipalities *without* fear of crime measurements

## Forms of local fear of crime research

One of the most common forms of local measurements of fear of crime is a quantitative survey administered by the municipality itself. Of municipalities that responded to the questionnaire, 76 or 39 percent answered that they administer local fear of crime surveys; 93 (48 percent) said they do not administer their own fear of crime surveys, 14 (7 percent) said they don't know and 11 (6 percent) said they have previously done so but do not any longer. The period in which local fear of crime surveys administered by the municipality itself started most often was 2015–2018.

Municipalities can also measure fear of crime locally by participating in regional surveys, administered by their region. Thirty-one participating municipalities (17 percent) said they do this form of regionally administered fear of crime surveys. Ninety (46 percent) said they do not, 69 (36 percent) said they don't know and 3 municipalities said they have previously done so but don't continually. The most common period to have started participating in regional fear of crime surveys was 2015–2018.

Alternatively, Swedish municipalities can measure fear of crime by commissioning companies that specialize in such services. There are several such Swedish companies, and they range from general research institutes like MIND Research or Enkätfabriken, to companies that specifically offer fear of crime surveys like Tryggare Sverige (Safer Sweden). Thirty municipalities, or 16 percent of those participating, said they have ordered fear of crime surveys from a research institute, 120 (62 percent) said they have not, 39 (20 percent) didn't know if they have ordered fear of crime surveys from a company, and 5 (3%) said they have done so previously but don't continually. The most common period to have started these kinds of local surveys was 2009–2014.

Another common way to measure fear of crime locally is through surveys done in cooperation between the municipality and local actors such as local housing companies, special-interest organizations and local traders and businesses. It is not uncommon for local housing companies in Sweden to be owned at least in part by the local municipality, which then usually has board representation and close cooperation. Of the participating municipalities, 34 (18 percent) said they do fear of crime surveys in cooperation with these types of local actors; 119 (62 percent) said they don't, 40 (21 percent) didn't know and 1 (0.5%) said it had previously done so. The most common period to have started local cooperation on fear of crime surveys was 2015–2018, followed by sometime during 2009–2014. Only one municipality started earlier than 1995.

## Other local ways of measuring fear of crime

Of the participating municipalities, 173 (89 percent) said they do some form of non-quantitative measurement of fear of crime. Their methodology generally does not equate to what we would refer to as qualitative methods in the social sciences, and is therefore referred to here simply as “non-quantitative”. There is a difference between the quantitative and non-quantitative, in the sense that the quantitative surveys bear a closer resemblance to what we would refer to as scientific quantitative methods. The concept of measurement is self-defined by the municipalities, as they were asked if they do any other forms of measurement of fear of crime (*trygghet*) and answered uniformly. Two forms of self-defined non-quantitative measurements of fear of crime emerged as very common: fear of crime walks (*trygghetsvandringar*) and citizen dialogues (*medborgardialoger*).

### *Fear of crime walks*

Many municipalities mentioned fear of crime walks as a way to measure fear of crime in the municipality. The National Crime Council (*Brottsförebyggande Rådet*) has published a methodological guide for organizing such walks, together with the Housing Agency (*Boverket*) and Gothenburg’s fear of crime committee, Safer and more Humane Gothenburg (*Tryggare och Mänskligare Göteborg*) (BRÅ, 2010c). Gothenburg is one of Sweden’s largest municipalities and has a very advanced and established municipal organization whose purpose is to measure and decrease fear of crime. Actors in these projects, such as local police, seem to understand their work in the fear of crime discourse as being politically “ordered” from higher up, according to a student thesis on Gothenburg’s Fear of Crime project:

I hope it (the project) is allowed to continue, and it might, since it comes from up high. It is ordered from the Government and the Parliament, and the Police Commissioner, so it can’t easily be changed. (Johnsson, 2017, p. 30)

The descriptions in the guide are quite consistent with how municipalities themselves described fear of crime walks. The intended purpose is for a group consisting of municipality workers and people living in the area to examine the local milieu from a fear of crime perspective. The guide suggests engaging “municipality administration, politicians, landlords, renter’s associations, police, local entrepreneurs, local associations and other actors” (BRÅ, 2010c, p. 9). It suggests that walks are done both during daytime and in the evening and at night, and that areas are marked out on a map as safe and pleasant, or unsafe and

unpleasant. Walkers are urged to consider when they were last in the areas in question alone, and how that felt. Areas are evaluated from a fear of crime perspective in terms of sightlines and possible obstructions such as shrubbery, and light, but also if the area looks generally pleasant and cared for.

### *Citizen dialogues*

During its 2011 congress, the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (*Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting*, SKL) took the following decision: “SKL shall support its members in working towards developing dialogue with citizens and integrating the results of this dialogue in decision-making processes and organizational and operational development” (SKL, 2019). This decision was implemented as an ongoing project, *Citizen Dialogue (Medborgardialoger)*. The purpose is to combat declining civil engagement, where fewer people are joining parties and election turnout is decreasing. According to SKL, the goals are to improve relations between citizens and local government, to gain legitimacy, provide more efficient services, and improve knowledge (SKL, 2013). In practice, fear of crime seems to be a central issue in these dialogues, as many municipalities mention citizen dialogues as one of their ongoing means of measuring fear of crime. Citizen dialogues seem to be used as a term for all ongoing attempts to engage citizens in debate and dialogue about life in the municipality. Some municipalities mention going out into different settings such as schools, hospitals, or local town centers, and attempting to talk to citizens, while others seem to invite citizens to come to the town hall for arranged meetings.

### *Problems in integrating citizens in inquiries into fear of crime*

Both citizen dialogues and fear of crime walks are problematic from a methodological perspective in terms of both validity and representativeness. While all attempts to engage citizens in the running of the municipality might be considered positive from a democracy perspective, other problems arise when the municipality considers them as ways of measuring fear of crime in the municipality. These forms of unstructured interviews have problems with uneven representativeness. Surveys have problems with uneven response rates where some groups answer to a higher degree than others, as discussed previously in the chapter. These issues are likely to be even more pronounced when it comes to going down to a town hall and participating in an organized meeting or taking time out of one's day to stop and discuss the issue in the town hall. When it comes to participating

in an organized walk along with municipality administrators, local entrepreneurs and local police, issues of representation are even more likely to be present.

In short, demographic groups that tend to be underrepresented as survey participants, for example young, immigrant men, are probably even less likely to participate in fear of crime walks. The same goes for single, working mothers, for example. The participants are likely skewed towards older and more socially established groups. This is problematic for a number of reasons. First, groups like young, immigrant men and single mothers are among the most relevant to reach from a fear of crime perspective, as they are among the most victimized (BRÅ, 2019c). Secondly, it likely exacerbates the general democracy problem where older and middle-aged, socially established community members are more heard, more catered to, and wield greater social influence in their municipality. Thirdly, removed from issues of demographic representativeness, there is simply nothing that says that the people who show up and engage in these kinds of activities have views on fear of crime that match those of the general public. It could be that the worse a problem an individual considers crime to be, in the local community, the more likely is it that they choose to engage in such activities. While there might be positive effects from making people feel heard and engaged, but considered as *measurements*, as municipalities tend to do, according to this analysis, these kinds of semi-qualitative fear of crime measurements leave much to be desired.

### *Professions*

Aside from the surveys and inquiries into fear of crime among citizens, another indication of the saliency given to crime and fear of crime in local government is the professions it has generated.

My data collection from the municipalities included questions about the professional title of the person answering my questions, and which personnel conduct fear of crime measurements for the municipality. The results indicate that new titles for professions have emerged. Four categories of professions are the most common:

*Trygghetssamordnare*, which translates into fear of crime/safety coordinators, is one of the most common professional titles. There are variations on this title, such as fear of crime/safety strategist and fear of crime/safety director. This title indicates that the person mainly works with fear of crime issues, and if the title adds director, that there are multiple people employed in the municipality for this purpose.



*Brotts- och drogförebyggande samordnare* (crime and drug prevention coordinator) is also a common title which indicates that the person is mainly employed to deal with crime-related issues.

*Säkerhetschef* (director of security), and related titles, such as coordinator of security, is also commonly title. This title is more common in mid-sized and smaller municipalities, and indicates that the person also coordinates security services such as the police and the fire department.

*Folkhälsostrateg* (public health strategist) is a professional title that indicates that the person is responsible for working with issues related to public health. This is also a common professional group to be responsible for fear of crime issues, and implies that fear of crime is seen to be related to health. This is more common in smaller municipalities.

In the smallest municipalities, the person answering the questionnaire might be the director of the municipality, communication officer, or administrative director. This suggests that there might not be specific personnel who solely work with fear of crime issues in the municipality, and that the municipality might have a rather small staff. Interestingly, almost all municipalities except for the very smallest seem to have staff solely working with fear of crime issues. As the historical development of fear of crime surveys suggests, this is likely a rather new professional group.

### *Marketing and virtue signaling*

During phone and email exchanges with municipality representatives, some interesting aspects of how municipalities describe and frame their fear of crime measurements emerged. This might shed some light on what meaning and purpose these measurements are given by the municipalities.

For municipalities without many fear of crime measurements, there is a tendency to excuse and justify why the municipality has not done more. Instead of simply explaining, “No, we do not have this”, they signal their willingness to engage. One municipality wrote, for instance, “we will soon begin” and another “it is really about time to do so again”. The same is true if the types of measurements seem unmodern or unsophisticated, generally meaning that the same kind of survey has been used for a long time without change: “I personally would like to see some review and development of the questionnaire”. While some municipalities, mainly sparsely

populated municipalities in the north of Sweden, that answered they don't do fear of crime measurements, none described this as an active choice. One could imagine arguments such as fear of crime not being seen as a problem in the municipality, or choosing to prioritize other issues in terms of municipal resources, but these arguments are notably absent from the collected data.

On the other hand, municipalities with advanced and established fear of crime "work", in terms of a great number of surveys and initiatives, write extensively about it and describe their work as a source of pride for the municipality. This is true both of municipalities that do a great number of surveys (and here there is a curious tendency to also list participation in randomly selected national surveys, such as the Swedish Crime Survey, in which all municipalities participate equally), and for municipalities that have low levels of fear of crime levels, to use those for marketing purposes. One municipality wrote: "we are the safest municipality in the region, and one of the safest in the country," and another "80% feel safe in municipality X", or citing results from national surveys with geographical comparison "municipality X is at the very top in national comparisons." This was though none of the questions posed to the municipalities related to the results of fear of crime measurements. Some even have banners ending their official emails, such as "WE ARE THE SAFEST MUNICIPALITY IN THE STOCKHOLM REGION".

## Summary and discussion

For there to be quantified facts, someone has to do the quantification. There have to be people working on assembling these numbers, and they have to work somewhere. This is absolutely crucial for the numbers to be taken seriously. Numbers produced by someone on their free time, unconnected to any institutions, are not generally considered scientific. This is the key point made by Latour and Woolgar (2013) in formulating their action-network theory; for facts to be considered scientific, they need to be situated in networks of actors that consider each other to be producers of science according to the generally accepted norms for that production. This analysis therefore begins by examining the institutions that administer national fear of crime surveys in Sweden, and which surveys they administer. There is also research in fear of crime that is not executed by any of the institutions listed here, for example by local government, the private sector, and in academia. But continual and returning fear of crime surveys, based on nationally representative samples, tend to be administered by government agencies: the central

Bureau of Statistics, the Public Health Agency, the Swedish Contingencies Agency, the national Crime Council and the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society. There are likely practical reasons for this, as large-scale survey research is very resource-intensive. But it also tells us that the issue of fear of crime is nowadays considered to exist within the scope of government interest and responsibility. It should perhaps be noted that this has not always been the case.

Things are lowly in their origins, stated Foucault (1977): “the lofty origin is no more than a metaphysical extension which arise from the belief that things are the most precious at the moment of birth” (s143). The origin of fear of crime exemplifies this, both in terms of its American origins and the moment of its import to Sweden. As outlined in the previous chapter, fear of crime research begin with three studies with different methodologies, none of which produced results that would be considered alarming. Biderman (1967a) remarks on the low saliency of crime in his respondents’ lives, while Ennis (1967) famous operationalization only became famous because of how little variation in safety the others showed. The origins of fear of crime research cannot explain what the research discourse has grown to become.

Similarly, the early Swedish fear of crime surveys cannot explain the proliferation of research that was to come. The first specialized Swedish fear of crime surveys were simple translations of American originals. Skogan and Maxfield (1981) study was the blueprint for the studies administered by the research unit of the police (Marie Torstensson & Olander, 1999; Marie Torstensson & Persson, 2000; M. Torstensson et al., 1998; Wikström & Torstensson, 1998; Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmén, 1997; Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmén, 1997). The methodology, indicators, and theoretical assumptions that then dominated the American fear of crime research discourse, which were oriented towards signs of disorder and the spatial turn, were imported. This represented a discursive shift from earlier Swedish criminology, and oriented research towards quantitative criminological knowledge about the demographic characteristics of individual victims and offenders and strengthened the administrative aspects of criminology.

The early Swedish fear of crime surveys did not produce any scientifically startling results. There is really nothing in the studies themselves that explains the proliferation of research that would follow. Indeed, that must be considered the most remarkable of the developments outlined in this chapter: the speed and intensity of the expansion of fear of crime research, and how it managed to penetrate many segments of Swedish governance. In 1995, it was a more-or-less unknown phenomenon in Sweden. While the Swedish Survey of Living Conditions had

contained a fear of crime indicator since 1978, no specialized fear of crime surveys had been published. The average number of fear of crime measurements per surveyed municipality was below 0.1. 20 Twenty years later, in 2015, there were six national government surveys measuring fear of crime, and regional and local fear of crime projects at all levels of governance, not to mention by private enterprises. The average number of fear of crime measurements in the municipalities surveyed for this dissertation was 2.4 for the last examined period, 2015–2018.

The level and intensity of government engagement in this research discourse during the 2000s is astonishing. For a certain period, one government fear of crime survey was introduced yearly. But what have we learnt about *otrygghet* from these surveys? Results from the analysis of Swedish fear of crime surveys supports the general claim of Hale (1996), that fear of crime is primarily a result of how it has been *researched*. The level of *otrygghet* reported in each survey can primarily be explained by how the binary conception of *otrygghet* is constructed in that particular study. The surveys have had problems with representation and response rates for a long time, and response rates seem to be further deteriorating. For some demographic stratas, the representativeness is questionable. But the surveys are efficient in other ways: by asking specifically formulated questions, they locate the source of the problem of *otrygghet* in specific forms of street crime and stranger danger.

## 8. The Concept of “Otrygghet”

This chapter aims to find out how the meaning and modality of the concept of “otrygghet” has changed during late modernity. Based on political documents in the form of motions and bills from the Swedish Riksdag, the analysis compares usage between two parties, Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna, across five periods: 1978, 1988, 1998, 2008, and 2018. The theoretical framework is derived from the German conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck and has moved from synchronous analysis to diachronous analysis of the quotes, in other words, from comparing texts within the same time periods to comparing texts between time periods. The results are shown two ways. The first section presents the three most common contexts “otrygghet” was used in: crime, economics and welfare, and children and families. The second part addresses questions on conceptual change over time.

# The Crime Context

## The state as a central actor in 1978

There are two examples of “otrygghet” used in a context related to crime from 1978. Motion 1978/79:384 argues for banning the possibility of copying keys, because people must feel” otrygghet” since keys can be quickly machine-copied. Through this method burglars can enter thousands of homes after a few minutes of work, suggests the text. That people feel” otrygga” due to the risk of being burglarized is perhaps the first example in the material of conceptual usage of ”otrygga” where the concept roughly corresponds to ”fear of crime”. The phrase ”must feel” is almost suggestive, hinting perhaps on a lack of public opinion on the matter; the public ought to feel ”otrygga” when faced with this objective threat but perhaps does not realize it.

Another example of” otrygghet” used in a crime-related context from 1978 can be found in Motion 1978/79:1108 from Moderaterna, on the problem of laws that are too generally worded. It is a curious contrast to what will come, as the problem here is not crime but the law. What is interesting about this is that the concept is used in a context related to penal politics but does not denote fear or victimization of crime. Instead, a typical contemporary conceptual meaning, one which is close to uncertainty and unpredictability, is given to” otrygghet” for this case concerning the rule of law. If the law is not predictable and instead is subjective and generally stated, it risks causing people who are prosecuted to feel” otrygghet” and uncertainty. The text argues that the individual has a right to be able to predict what consequences breaking the law will have. In the examined text, “Otrygghet” is not caused by criminal actions, the breaking of the law, but rather by unclear, subjective and generally stated laws. This is in accordance with the contemporary pattern whereby the central actor is the state, both as cause and solution to “otrygghet”. Perhaps a parallel can be noted here to the critique directed at the rehabilitative ideology of the 1970's that was discussed in chapter 6. The state's consolidation of power was viewed as deeply suspicious.

## Vulnerable groups in 1988

There are only three examples of “otrygghet” used in a crime-related context from 1988. One example is the Social Democratic Motion 1988/89:Ju619, which bridges a boundary towards a conceptual context where “otrygghet” is associated to crime through concern for some “vulnerable” group, in this case women:

Var 20:e minut misshandlas en kvinna i Sverige av sin man. Totalt misshandlas ca 24 000 kvinnor varje år. 40- 60 av dessa dör av skadorna. För andra innebär misshandeln livslånga fysiska och psykiska men. Förutsättningarna för att leva ett människovärdigt liv upphör. Också barnen skadas allvarligt av att åse misshandeln. Misshandeln är en ond cirkel. Männen slutar inte slå, när de en gång har börjat. Kvinnorna har mycket svårt att ta sig ur situationen. Och om de förmår att bryta sig loss så väntar ofta ett liv på flykt i ständigt **otrygghet** och rädsla.

In Sweden, a woman is abused every 20th minute by her husband. In total, around 24 000 women are assaulted every year. 40-60 of these women die from obtained injuries. For others, the abuse means lifelong physical and psychological damage. The conditions for living a dignified life are ended. Children are also seriously harmed by witnessing abuse. Domestic violence is a vicious circle. The men do not stop beating once they have started. The women find it very difficult to break free of the situation. And if they are able to break free, a life on the run in constant fear and insecurity awaits them.

Domestic violence (or violence against women as it was understood to be at the time) gained traction as a social problem during the 80s. This can be understood in the context of developing feminism<sup>45</sup>, as second wave feminism was gaining increasing political traction. That the feminist movement gained political and governmental influence during this period is probably truer for Sweden than for most countries, and there are contemporary local political occurrences reflecting this growing influence. These include establishing the assault of women in the home as a matter for public prosecution in 1982. The crime statistics referenced in the text above are likely from Socialdepartementet's 1983 report "*Kvinnomisshandel - kartläggning och överväganden*", the result of a committee appointed by the government in 1977. The same committee suggested making violence against women a matter of public prosecution in a 1981 report (Boethius, 2015). Facts from Socialdepartementet's report are used in the quote above in a mobilizing effort, presented as a call for action. The actual number of women being assaulted in Sweden every day was not something criminological research could reliably determine in the 80s (nor today), due to various methodological difficulties associated with measuring domestic violence. Yet that does not lessen the political impact of the criminal statistics used in the examined quote, as they form an effective call for political action. It can be noticed that the life that follows after leaving an abusive spouse is the cause of "otrygghet" in this argumentation rather than the violence itself. A life on the run is a life of "otrygghet" and fear. "Otrygghet" is given a meaning close to instability, unpredictability and uncertainty.

A closer association between crime and "otrygghet" is visible in Moderate Motion 1988/89:Ju805, where "Otrygghet" is described as a causal consequence of what Garland (2001) names *high crime society*. The state, according to the text,

<sup>45</sup> This is addressed in the literature review, for example under "women, fear and crime".

should protect the individual's life, health, integrity, and private property. Crime that is not punished, or punished lightly, makes people lose faith not only in the penal system, but in all state authority. The argumentation seems to be inspired by classical liberal political thought that stresses the state's role as a guarantor of individual freedoms rather than a provider of social services and welfare. It is the earliest of the examined quotes which present a clear causal model of "otrygghet" as the result of living in a society with widespread crime.

From 1988, there is also Social Democratic bill 1988/89:124, which uses the concept to discuss potential problems that follow from giving police the authority to tap phones. This motion is interesting since it uses the concept "otrygghet" in a context related to criminal justice, but not as a consequence of crime. Rather it is the fight against crime and the tools the police are provided with that is discussed as a potential cause of "otrygghet". To allow police to listen to private phone conversations is seen as threatening the integrity of private citizens and may foster a social environment of spying, informing, and spreading rumors. The cause and source of "otrygghet" is the state, and the citizens should be protected from it. Privacy from the state is considered to be a right, and the text is concerned with upholding the integrity of private citizens, who can be seen as threatened by the state's actions. Perhaps the concern of an eavesdropping state could be considered in relation to the contemporary existence of the Soviet Union. Otrygghet is associated with surveillance and spying, something that breeds mistrust among people.

The most striking aspect of the 'crime context' of the concept in these early periods is its absence. There are very few examples of "otrygghet" used in a crime-related context from 1978 and 1988, and the few examples we have look very different than what is to come. Out of a total of five examples, two from 1978 and three from 1988, there are two quotes where the presumed cause of otrygghet is the state. These motions argue for the right of the individual to be able to know and predict how laws are enforced and for the individual's right to privacy from the state. This is in accordance with contemporary conceptual usage where the state has a double role as both a cause and a solution of "otrygghet".

## Crime and criminological knowledge in 1998


There are far more examples from 1998 of "otrygghet" used in a context related to crime than from the previous periods. Furthermore, use of the concept takes on new forms and is now often accompanied by references to crime statistics, as seen in motion Motion 1998/99:Ju202 on the organization of the police:



"Som exempel kan nämnas att under 1997 ökade våldsbrotten i riket med 3 procent, men med hela 14 procent under årets sista kvartal. Stöldbrotten ökade med 6 procent. Mest ökade bilbrotten, varav bilstöldrarna ökade med 14 procent och stölderna ur och från bilar med 13 procent. Bostadsinbrotten ökade med 9 procent och personrånen med 18 procent. Det som är gemensamt för alla dessa brott är att de slår direkt mot människornas vardagsliv. Detta skapar rädsla och **otrygghet** för många. Vad som också är allvarligt är att antalet upklarade brott har sjunkit från drygt 30 procent 1994 till 21 procent 1996. Denna situation innebär att endast var femte gärningsman binds till sitt brott och detta leder i sin tur till färre dömda brottslingar."

"For example, violent crime increased nationally by 3 percent in 1997, but by a full 14 per cent during the last quarter. Property crime increased by 6 percent. Car crime increased most, with car thefts up by 14% and thefts from cars up by 13%. Burglaries increased by 9% and robberies by 18%. What all these crimes have in common is that they directly affect people's everyday lives. This creates fear of crime and insecurity for many. It is also of serious concern that the number of solved crimes has fallen from just over 30% in 1994 to 21% in 1996. This situation means that only one in five offenders is tied to their crime, and this in turn leads to fewer convicted criminals."

The key thesis of the text is that crime increases, and this causes fear and "otrygghet". Crime and otrygghet are presented together, as a joint concept signifying fear that is caused by crime. Crime statistics are used in a mobilizing way, as a call for action, or as Hall et al. (2013/1978) puts it, as a call for *firm steps*. The use of numbers presents this as a matter-of-fact issue; crime is increasing, and something must be done. The statistics in question are from official Swedish crime statistics published by BRÅ. **Figure 46**, generated from the official crime statistics database of Sweden, shows the development of car theft and theft from cars during this period.



**Figure 46** Number of reported car thefts (yellow) and thefts from cars (grey), 1976-1998. Source: BRÅ (2021)

We can note that there is an increase during the period of 1998 compared to 1996 or 1995. We can also note that levels were even higher further back. While it is well known among criminologists that the relationship between reported and actual crime is complex and far from straight-forward, this is an example of how the use of statistics constructs a convincing argument. We can note that it is just as easy to construct the opposite narrative, that crime is decreasing compared to the 80s, using statistics from the period. But arguing that crime is increasing is a consistent theme in the examined texts and serves a salient role. Statistics function in the text as a call to action, or to use a term from Hall et al. (2013/1978), a signification spiral, *a prophesy of more troubling times to come* (Hall et al., 2013/1978). Crime, but not just *any* crime, is increasingly associated with “otrygghet”. Street crime, or everyday crime, is emphasized as *the* form of crime that generates “otrygghet”. While this motion is from Moderaterna, neither the emphasis on everyday crime nor presenting the police as a remedy for “otrygghet” seems to be an exclusive emphasis of Moderaterna. The Social Democratic motion 1998/99:Ju205, titled “The Police Organization” references increasing “otrygghet” in a crime-context to call for more resources to the police. *Prophecies of more troubling times to come*, according to Hall et al. (2013/1978), often come accompanied by references to the paradigmatic example of the USA, and that is not absent from the examined material, for example in Motion 1998/99:Ub258:

Motion 1998/99:Ub258	English translation of Motion 1998/99:Ub258
<p>“Många förändringar - oro, <b>otrygghet</b> och destruktivitet  Ökande ungdomsvåld allt längre ner i åldrarna är en växande epidemi i hela västvärlden. I USA döms 2 300 barn och ungdomar för mord varje år. Problemet är långt ifrån förhållandena i Sverige, men tendenserna finns i alla länder. Problemen stannar inte i vissa områden utan sprider sig med tiden”</p>	<p>“Many changes - worry, fear and destructiveness  Increasing youth violence, with ever-younger perpetrators, is a growing epidemic across the Western world. In the US, 2,300 children and adolescents are convicted of murder each year. The problem is far removed from conditions in Sweden, but similar trends are present in all countries. This issue is not isolated to specific areas but spreads over time.”</p>

Note here how numbers are presented with the intention to shock. Violent crime among youth is increasing, expanding, and constantly spreading, according to the text. It is a global phenomenon, existent in all countries. Use of the word “epidemic” associates crime with something contagious that spreads exponentially. The first line associates the concept of “otrygghet” with destruction, worry, and another repeating theme in this examined discourse, that of *change*. The references to different words associated with development, growing, spreading, function again as *a prophesy of more troubling times to come* and project the issue of youth violence into the future, to be judged not by what it currently is in this time and place, but by what it has

the *anti-social potential* to become (Hall et al., 2013/1978). Other examples use statistics to paint a picture of an acute situation in contemporary Sweden, and in one particular motion we find the first explicit reference to results from fear of crime surveys in the examined material, in Motion 1998/99:Ju901:

Motion 1998/99:Ju901	English translation of Motion 1998/99:Ju901
<p>“Våld upplevs av svenska folket som det största samhällsproblemet efter arbetslösheten. Fyra av tio svenskar oroar sig för att en anhörig eller de själva skall drabbas av misshandel. Det motsvarar 2,5 miljoner svenskar. Motsvarande 2 miljoner svenskar anger att de inte vågar gå ut själva när det är mörkt.”</p>	<p>"Violence is perceived by the Swedish people as our largest social issue after unemployment. Four out of ten Swedes worry that themselves, or someone close to them, will be assaulted. This corresponds to 2.5 million Swedes. Correspondingly, 2 million Swedes say they are afraid to go out alone after dark."</p>

Fear of crime surveys are referenced for the first time in the examined materials. Take note of how commensurative practices are visible here and used to produce an arbitrary number: “motsvarande två miljoner svenskar”(‘corresponding to 2 million Swedes’). This figure is likely constructed from the actual proportion of respondents of the referenced survey who said they were fearful, a percentage that would correspond to 2 million swedes *if* the sample was representative for the population (it is not). Numbers intended to shock and mobilize are constructed here using fear of crime surveys instead of other crime statistics. The operationalization of fear of crime defines the problem. By asking people how safe they feel alone out at night, the fear of crime surveys define what this new social issue surrounding "otrygghet" is about, which makes this a good example of the *perlocutionary* function of fear of crime surveys. The implicit assumption is that crime causes the participants to feel "otrygga" outside at night. The crime-related context of both the survey and the motion makes the assumption visible. The motion goes on reiterate non-statistical forms of criminological knowledge by presenting a summarization of a criminological theory that gained widespread political attention during the 80s and 90s, the ‘Broken Windows theory’ or the New York Model:

Lär av New York-modellen

Den krossade fönsterrutan har fått symbolisera strategin för att få ned brottsligheten i New York. Tanken är att reaktionen på små brott sänder en signal om hur samhället ser på brott i stort. Reagerar inte samhället för små brott är det alltför lätt att det skapas onda cirklar i en stad eller ett bostadsområde. Om ungdomar tillåts slå sönder rutor utan att någon vuxen reagerar - om värden sedan låter fönstren stå olagade - så blir ofta fler rutor sönderslagna - så kommer sedan allmän skadegörelse och nedskräpning att öka - då blir människor otrygga, de stänger dörren och tar hand om sitt. Sammantaget kommer "buset" då att få dominera ett bostadsområde.

Learn from the New York model

The broken window has come to symbolise the new strategy for bringing down crime in New York. The central notion is that the reaction to petty crime sends a signal about how society views crime in general. If society does not react to petty crime, is it all too easy to create vicious circles in a city or neighbourhood. If young people are allowed to break windows without any grown-up reaction - if the landlord then leaves the windows broken - then more windows will be broken - and general vandalism and littering will increase - and then people become unsafe and fearful, they will close their doors and mind their own business. All in all, the 'trouble' will then come to dominate a residential area.

The motion argues that a lack of reaction from society concerning misdemeanors will lead to a vicious circle ("en ond cirkel") that will make people "otrygga" and enable criminals to dominate a neighborhood. The motion uses the term "buset" for criminals ("the trouble"), which is noteworthy, as it is police vernacular and not widely used. It can perhaps here be understood as an attempt to communicate "inside knowledge" of crime. The theory presented by Wilson and Kelling in their (1982) article, suggests a causal relation between "signs of disorder", such as broken windows, and crime, where broken windows are seen as a sign of societal abandonment of a neighborhood, and a lack of legal reaction to small infringements sends signals to youth that crime is acceptable. Criminological knowledge, theory about crime that derives from criminological studies, has left its mark upon which ideas about crime are being communicated through political documents during this period in a way that was not visible during the earlier examined periods. The New York model puts everyday petty crime, "dussinbrott" at the root of the issue of crime; disorder is crime-in-the-making.

This sentiment is visible not only in Moderate motions, but also in Social Democratic Bill 1998/99:1D9, where we see clear causal explanations offered in relation to the concept "otrygghet". The paragraph begins by stating that the vast majority of crimes that happen belong to the "everyday crime" category. The text goes on to name car theft, burglary, graffiti, bike theft, and shoplifting. The sentence is structured in a way that states that other crimes should be added, due to their causal relation to "otrygghet", to this category of everyday crime. The specific types of crime that the text argues cause "otrygghet" are the illegal sale of drugs and alcohol as well as violence and threats in the streets and neighborhoods. Let us note that these are street crimes, which is the form of crime that has received extensive political and academic attention in late modernity. According to some

criminologists, this attention has been out of proportion to the harm that these forms of crime cause for society compared to crimes that are traditionally committed by people higher up in the social hierarchy (Hagan, 2010; Tham, 2018; Tham & von Hofer, 2014; Wacquant, 2015b).

Furthermore, the aforementioned crimes are explicitly stated to occur in the streets and neighborhoods. They are neither domestic, state, nor corporate crimes (what Hagan (2010) names “the crimes of the suits”). Locating the problem of crime on the street level and outside of the home is in accordance with how “otrygghet” is operationalized. The kind of crime that generates fear happens in the street, away from the home, and after dark. The last sentence in the above bill states that these crimes victimize individuals and that individuals cannot foresee the or protect themselves. The text argues that these specific crimes do this, which can be noted in relation to several of the crimes being what is sometimes called “victimless crimes”, in the sense that they involve only willing participants. The illegal sale of alcohol and drugs falls into this category. In the first paragraph, “otrygghet” appears seemingly fused together together with “brott” (crime) into the joint concept, “brott och otrygghet”. This joint concept also appears in a motion about homelessness and living conditions, Motion 1998/99:Bo218, where ”Brottsligheten och otryggheten ökar” (“criminality and "otrygghet" are rising”) is mentioned as a consequence of homelessness. Drugs and drug policy have an especially salient position within Swedish penal policy during this period, and Bill 1998/99:1D9 contains a paragraph on the topic. Drugs are stated to be the underlying cause of both crime and “otrygghet”, and fighting drug crime is emphasized as the highest priority. Drugs are not only a problem in themselves, but they also cause other crimes, according to the text. This echoes ideas of crime as a contagion that are visible both here and in the examined texts on street crime and disorder.

The term “war on drugs” references a speech made by American president Richard Nixon in 1971, but the phenomena itself, an attempt to eradicate all form of illegal narcotics from society, has been a Swedish political reality as well. Much political effort was extended towards this goal during the 1980’s, 1990’s and 2000’s. Träskman writes in his aptly named article, *Drug Control and Drug Offences in the Nordic Countries: A Criminal Political Failure too often Interpreted as a Success*, that drug policy in Sweden has been inconsistent with other forms of Swedish penal policy (Träskman, 2005). This is true in the sense that, historically, expert-generated and “rational” penal policies dominated the political discourse on crime in general during most of the twentieth century (Tham & von Hofer, 2014), whereas the policy on drug crimes in particular has been highly repressive and lacking in scientific evidence. Drugs have been described as something

contagious in Swedish policy debate, something that must be eradicated in all of society to prevent it from spreading. Crime is not judged by how much of an issue it is right now, but rather by what it has the potential to become, its anti-social potential (Hall et al., 2013/1978). One way to project issues into the future is to prophesize on who will become the criminals of tomorrow.

Otrygghet in a crime related context becomes slightly more prominent in 1988 compared to 1978 and then far more prominent in 1998. This crime-related theme becomes increasingly more entangled with other contexts, like children, women, and elderly people. It is as if the crime-context is launched out of concern for some other vulnerable group. The issues of violence against women and concern about children out of control become stepping stones towards the convergence between otrygghet and crime. A common aspect here is the shifting function of the state in the argumentation, from a threat and cause of otrygghet towards being designated the guarantor of trygghet and the protector of “vulnerable” groups. These groups are depicted as threatened by other citizens, and the state is what will save them, which is a sharp contrast to the examples from 1978 and 1988, where the state’s will towards control and surveillance was deemed threatening and a cause of otrygghet.

Another contrast between 1988 and 1998 is not only how crime has become far more common but also that crime statistics are used and fear of crime surveys are explicitly referenced for the very first time. As references to fear of crime surveys in political debate is a central question for this thesis, this is discussed in greater detail below. However, we can note that referencing fear of crime survey results can be seen as an aspect of a broader tendency to reference criminological knowledge. Beginning in 1998, there are several references to various forms of knowledge on crime that have been produced using methods and ideas from criminology. These include crime statistics and an explanatory theory of crime in the form of the New York model, also known as Broken Windows theory. As discussed, it would have been equally possible and “correct” to construct other types of narratives using crime statistics and criminological theory. Policy debate could have referenced Labeling Theory and argued for less police intervention, and Motion 1998/99:Ju202 could have used a longer time period to show a decreasing crime trend, but that has not been the case. The type of crime statistics referenced is used to construct a very specific type of narrative, one of rising and accelerating crime levels. We can note how this is accompanied by what Hall et al. (2013/1978) name as a *call for firm steps*, the reiteration that if society doesn’t react and “stop” crime, it cannot continue to exist in its current form. Starting in 1998, crime is presented as an existential threat towards society.

## Crime as growing, expanding and increasing in 2008

The association between crime and “otrygghet” continues to be strong as we progress into the 21th century. In 2008 there is no lack of examples that use the concept “otrygghet” in a crime-related context and commonly reference both fear of crime survey results and other types of criminological knowledge, such as Moderate Motion 2008/09:Ju231:

Motion 2008/09:Ju231	English translation of Motion 2008/09:Ju231
"Många kvinnor känner en oro för att utsättas för någon form av våldsbrott som misshandel, överfall eller rån, och många undviker därför att gå ut själva på kvällen eller om natten. I Brottsförebyggande rådets nationella trygghetsundersökning från 2007 framkommer att kvinnor i betydligt större utsträckning än män anpassar sitt beteende efter <b>otryggheten</b> . 50 procent av kvinnorna i Sverige upplevde en oro för att utsättas för någon form av våldsbrott efter mörkrets inbrott. Över hälften av alla tillfrågade kvinnor svarade att de undvek att gå ut på kvällen, medan bara 17 procent av männen uppgav samma svar."	"Many women feel worried about the risk of being victimized by violent crime such as abuse, assault or robbery, and many avoid going out alone during the evening or at night. The Swedish Crime Survey of the Swedish Crime Prevention Council from 2007 shows that women are much more likely than men to adapt their behaviour because of fear of crime. 50% of women in Sweden feel fearful of being the victim of some form of violent crime after dark. More than half of all women surveyed said they avoided going out at night, while only 17% of participating men said the same."

This motion from Moderaterna references the Swedish Crime Survey (Nationella trygghetsundersökningen) from 2007. Let us compare the statements from the motion with results from the survey, which is also discussed in chapter 7. The motion states that 50 percent of women in Sweden felt worried about being victimized by violent crime during night and that more than half of the surveyed women refrain from going out at night, in comparison with 17% of the men. First, there is no question in the Swedish Crime Survey 2007 that asks if the participant is worried about violent crime after dark. There is a question about whether one worries about crime in society, and there is the Swedish Crime Survey version of the Ennis (1967) operationalization, asking participants how safe they feel walking around their neighborhood after dark. The percentage of women who say they feel worried about crime in society or that they don't feel safe walking around their neighborhood after dark is less than 50%. 28% of women feel "otrygga" according to the Swedish Crime survey<sup>46</sup>, and 30% felt worried about crime in society (BRÅ, 2008a). We can remind ourselves of the commensuration practices discussed in chapter 7: Swedish Crime Survey generates their binary "trygg/otrygg" variable by collapsing an ordinal variable and combing the answers of 'rather unsafe', 'very unsafe' and 'refrains from going out' because of fear of (BRÅ, 2008a). By doing this,

<sup>46</sup> This number is reached through adding the "sometimes" "often" "I avoid going out because of crime" response alternatives together.

they arrive at the result that 17% of all participants, and 28% of women, felt unsafe ("otrygga") in 2007. In other words, 72% of women felt safe or very safe, which the report explicitly states. 7% of women refrained from going out at night because of fear of crime, which can be considered quite a large percentage but quite far from a majority (BRÅ, 2008a, pp. 90-92).

There is a possible way that the author of the motion could have arrived at the baffling interpretation that a majority of women refrain from going out alone. The Swedish Crime Survey 2007 report compares extremes in terms of variation in fear of crime, as an analytical exercise in order to illustrate how different demographic groups vary, depicted here in **Figure 47**.

	2006	2007
Kvinnor, 65–79 år, boende i flerfamiljshus	55 (36)	50 (35)
Män, 25–44 år, boende i småhus	3 (0.1)	2 (0.2)

<sup>1</sup>Andel som svarat att de antingen känner sig ganska eller mycket otrygga eller att de inte går ut på grund av otrygghet.

**Figure 47**  
Source: ((BRÅ, 2008a, p. 95)

By using variables for gender, age, and living situation, they compare the most fearful group, elderly women living in apartment housing with young men in small houses. 50% of elderly women in apartment housing answered that they felt rather unsafe, very unsafe, or refrain from going out because of fear of crime. This doesn't answer, however, how the author arrived at the number 17% of men and also does not explain why the author cites a variable that does not exist in the Swedish Crime Survey, worry about violent crime after dark. All in all, this must be considered either a blatantly incorrect referencing of a fear of crime survey or a very fast reading by politicians not trained in reading statistical reports. Nonetheless, we must take notice of the fact that fear of crime surveys are being referenced in calls for penal policy-making, in this case for allowing people to carry pepper spray. By reasoning that fear of crime mainly concerns women, the matter is being framed as a feminist issue. This fusion of crime, "otrygghet", and women's rights is a repeated theme in the material, where this fusion commonly is motivated by results from fear of crime surveys that depict women as more afraid than men. Another example is Social Democratic Motion 2008/09:C411:



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**Motion 2008/09:C411:**

"I många av dessa områden kan man som boende uppleva otrygghet och jämfört med andra bostadsområden är fler rädda för att gå ut ensamma eller när det är mörkt. Rädslan som uppstår vid att man känner sig otrygg leder till en försämrad livskvalitet och det är främst kvinnor som drabbas av det."

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**Motion 2008/09:C411:**

"In many of these areas, residents feel unsafe, and compared to other neighbourhoods, more people are afraid to go out alone or when it is dark out. The fear that comes from feeling unsafe leads to a reduced quality of life, and mainly women suffer from it."

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The causal explanatory model presented here assumes that "otrygghet" causes fear, which leads to a diminished quality of life, and that it is a problem mainly for women. Fear of crime research is commonly criticized for being conceptually unclear, which we can note also here. "Otrygghet" and fear are commonly used as synonyms, but here "otrygghet" is presented as a precursor to fear. Ennis (1967) operationalization is leaving clear marks here on the framing and formulating of "otrygghet" as a social problem. Since being out alone after dark is what the survey measures, that is what is being framed as the problem, even if it should be noted that the surveys generally measure being in the dark *and* alone, rather than being in the dark *or* alone. We can also note how "otrygghet" is being located and defined as something happening in certain types of neighborhoods. The text is about the 'Million Program areas' (miljonprogramsområden), which are socially disparaged areas that are typically dominated by immigrants and economically poor, roughly corresponding to the American 'projects' or British 'social housing.' In Sweden, these are called the 'Million Program' areas since they were built in an effort to combat a housing shortage in the 60s and 70s, when Socialdemokraterna vowed to build a million new homes. While the cultural significance of these milieus has been rightfully pointed out, they have also been criticized for being badly built, "bare bones", and lacking in social and recreational facilities (Särnbratt, 2006). As housing, the areas have had a hard time attracting socio-economically established Swedes and have been associated with poverty, scarcity, immigration, and crime. In short, they are the sort of milieu where measurements of "otrygghet" are likely at higher levels but where there is also low representation in surveys. Using Fanon's (1967/2008) concept, we can say that the Million Program is a setting that commonly represents *the Other* in Swedish politics.

Chapter 7 on Swedish fear of crime surveys discussed how these surveys commonly locate and define "otrygghet" as something happening in the public sphere and away from the home, in tandem with the most common operationalizations. The Bill from Moderaterna, Bill 2008/09:35, illustrates how this defining process of "otrygghet" locates it to specific places, such as the public transport system.

Forskning visar att kvinnor och män upplever offentliga miljöer och trygghet inom transportsystemet olika. Kvinnor och män gör olika riskbedömningar och generellt är det betydligt fler kvinnor än män som känner sig **otrygga** i transportsystemet.

Research shows that women and men experience public spaces, and safety within the public transport system differently. Women and men make different risk assessments, and in general, far more women than men feel unsafe in the public transport system.

Out of the national fear of crime surveys discussed in chapter 7, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's survey and The Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society's survey ask explicitly about feelings of safety while traveling, and the Swedish Crime and Victimization survey asks if the participants have avoided traveling because of fear of crime. The Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society's survey is a youth survey, and because the 'traveling operationalization' in the Swedish Crime and Victimization survey is not included in the report, it seems likely that the referenced fear of crime survey that shows women to be more fearful is from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's survey. The first Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's survey from 2007 fits the timeline well. It can be repeated here, as was discussed in chapter 7, that the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency's survey reports radically higher level of fear of crime than any of the other surveys, even using very similar operationalizations, probably because of how results are commensurated. The concept "otrygghet" is used twice in the bill, first to state that more women than men feel "otrygga" in the public transport system and second to argue that "otrygga" milieus can be "built away". This is not an uncommon idea in the fear of crime literature, that there are certain environments that are inherently "otrygga", such as dark tunnels.

The Social Democratic Motion 2008/09:Ju379 can be read as theoretical positioning on the causes of crime, which are numerous and systemic in this description. The text argues that socioeconomic and individual factors — such as "otrygghet", substance dependence, and segregation — combine to cause crime. Sometimes these factors lead to 'long-term alienation' ("långvarigt utanförskap") and, in the worst cases, criminality. We can note that the causal relationship between crime and "otrygghet" is described here in the opposite direction; "otrygghet" causes crime. The motion is also about violence as a social problem. It says that violence causes both physical and psychological harm, "otrygghet" among people, and significant economic strain on society. The motion states that each violent crime is one too many. This is a position that Andersson and Nilsson (2009) call the *zero tolerance vision* in Swedish penal politics. In short, this means that the goal of penal policy concerning crime or drugs is not to merely decrease but rather to *eradicate* the social issue in question. Andersson and Nilsson (2009) write that

the *zero tolerance vision* is generally motivated by arguing that crime poses a threat to democracy and to society itself; if crime is not dealt with as the serious and increasing problem that it is, society as we know it will cease to exist. The authors remark that the argumentation for this position is in no way based on empirical evidence. Statements such as “crime is a threat to society” constitute the position and all required evidence for it. In the above Motion, the concept “otrygghet” plays a salient role as a consequence of crime, and “otrygghet” and crime are described as having a two-way causal relationship, where “otrygghet” is described as both the cause and the effect of crime.

This presumed causal relationship is also evident in Social Democratic Motion 2008/09:Ju234, where the premise is evident in the title as “Increasing crime rates”. The motion states that one of the most important tasks of society is to reduce crime and that this used to be a prioritized goal for the previous Social Democratic government. This indicates the new salience of *otrygghet* and crime as a social problem and how the issue of crime is being used to mobilize support within party politics. The convergence of *otrygghet* and crime is also present here. The motion goes on to claim that organized crime should be fought with all available means. Reasoning along these lines also enables suggesting solutions that might be seen as threatening the integrity of citizens, such as through widespread surveillance. This is in line with the *zero tolerance vision* (Andersson & Nilsson, 2009) discussed above. If crime is a threat to our existence and democracy, fighting it with any available means becomes reasonable. The motion describes crime as increasing and becoming more violent. Organized crime “expands” (“breder ut sig”) into people’s everyday lives, and gangs shoot at one another openly on the streets in the larger cities. This causes “otrygghet” among ordinary people. As discussed in chapter 3 on Swedish crime statistics, there were signs of decreasing crime in 2008. To say despite this that the current government is not being tough on crime and that crime shows no signs of decreasing is perfectly aligned with the politicized and alarmist discourse of crime during this time. In this way, crime is depicted as an ever-increasing and worsening social problem. “Otrygghet” plays a very specific role in this reasoning as the consequence of crime that motivates fighting against it with any available means, which provides a means of projecting the issue of crime into the future.

Organized crime is a prevalent theme in how crime is described as expanding and growing, for example in the Social Democratic Motion 2008/09:Ju246. The motion describes bank robberies as a serious, increasing, and worrying threat that poses a risk for individual citizens and causes “otrygghet”. The text argues that there is a clear tendency whereby bank robberies become more spectacular and are

committed using heavier weaponry and violent distraction tactics. Crime is presented as the cause of “otrygghet”, and there is no shortage of words that denote that this should be considered a developing and increasing problem. The text can be read as expressing worry about the increasing professionalization of criminals, a sentiment that is repeated in the Motion 2008/09:Ju315 from Moderaterna on prison breaks. The motion argues that escapees from prisons, hardened criminals under pressure, cause “otrygghet” when they are out in society among ordinary people. The cause of the prison breaks is a lack of security. “Otrygghet” causes worry among the public and is thus presented within a causal chain. The lack of security causes prison breaks, which leads to “otrygghet”, which in turn causes worry. There are a multitude of causal models and explanatory factors visible in the examined texts during this period, and the presumed relationships between the concepts of “otrygghet”, fear, worry, and crime are not always clear.

Crime is commonly imagined to cause otrygghet, as implied in the text above, but “otrygghet” is also presented as a cause of crime, as in Social Democratic Motion 2008/09:Ju235, which calls for a more nuanced debate on the causes of crime instead of simple explanations that demand more police and harsher sentencing. The true causes of violence, according to the text, are to be found in inequality and social injustice. A society with widespread violence is bad for everyone and causes “total otrygghet”. Here, the concept of “otrygghet” is given a salient role in motivating why crime is bad. The motion expresses worry that people in a stable societal position will protect themselves with increased repression, technical crime prevention, and increased use of prison sentencing. According to the text, this would bring about substantial negative societal consequences, since it does not address the true causes of crime.

In these motions, crime is described as something expanding and growing. Interestingly, this was a couple of years after Sweden likely reached “peak crime” according to crime statistics. Most analyses of Sweden’s crime trends find that, after 1995, many forms of crime decreased or remained stable (see chapter 3). Crime was increasing most dramatically during the earlier post-WWII decades and decreasing during the 2000’s and 2010’s. This is in stark opposition to the narrative presented in these examined quotes. There were, as discussed, very few examples of “otrygghet” used in a crime-related context during the earlier periods. Starting with a clear increase of “otrygghet” appearing in such a context during 1998, there is a veritable explosion of examples within the last two examined periods, 2008 and 2018. Crime becomes discussed in an increasingly militarized way. It must be pushed back and fought, and honest citizens must be defended.

## Crime dominates the discourse in 2018

Moving into 2018, it becomes clear how dominant the crime context has become in the discourse of “otrygghet”. There are no less than 22 motions and bills where “otrygghet” is used in a crime-related context from 2018, and a clear majority are from Moderaterna. A typical example, Motion 2018/19:2936, describes the problem. The number of “disadvantaged” or “vulnerable”<sup>47</sup> areas is increasing, and “otryggheten” is great. This motivates the solutions suggested by the rest of the text, and “otrygghet” is central for the how the problem is formulated. It can be noted that “disadvantaged” or “vulnerable” areas denotes socio-economically underprivileged areas commonly inhabited by immigrants. The text continues by arguing that CCTV surveillance is an important instrument in the struggle to increase the individual’s feelings of safety and to solve crimes. It states that correctly used CCTV surveillance is a useful tool in complement to other measures, such as a continual and strong police presence. The use of the word “correctly” is interesting, as it seems to suggest that there is incorrect usage, in a text that solely focuses on positive features. The text argues that all “vulnerable areas” should be outfitted with CCTV surveillance, and the police should have plentiful resources for CCTV surveillance. The aim is to decrease “otrygghet” and simplify crime-solving for the police. The Motion ends by arguing for additional canine police units. The Motion serves as an example of how firmly located in a crime context the concept of “otrygghet” has become in 2018. The actors are the police, and the Motion suggests extended discretionary powers granted to them in the form of extensive surveillance and the use of dogs. This will deter, prevent, and solve crime, which is very closely associated with “otrygghet” in the text.

It is increasingly common that the concept “otrygghet” is used to argue for increased control and surveillance. An example of this is Motion 2018/19:2871, arguing that the police should be able to implement a zone-ban in order to “secure safety” (“säkra tryggheten”), where certain people should be prohibited from loitering in some places, such as malls or town squares. People who are “otrygghet-generating” (“otrygghetsskapande”) create “otrygghet”. This word is something of a linguistic novelty, created by joining together “otrygghet” and “skapare” (creator). People who generate “otrygghet” should be banned from public places at the discretionary powers of the police, according to this argument. It should be considered here that the police already have extensive possibilities to do this by using the Police Laws, (*§13 av Polislagen 1984:387, Svensk lagbok*) that enable

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<sup>47</sup> "Utsatta områden".

them to remove people from areas because of suspected crime *or* for threatening general order. The text goes on to state that this form of law exists in Denmark and that the purpose of the "zone-ban" is to guarantee the safety and security of people within areas with extensive criminal activity. To state that it exists in Denmark can be read as a preemptive defense of the suggestion. The stated purpose, to "secure safety" has almost military connotations, which fits into a narrative where the police are the defenders and front men in the war on crime.

How central the police have become in relation to the concept of "otrygghet" is further emphasized in several other motions, for example Motion 2018/19:2650. The motion lists problems related to police presence in Jämtland, in northern Sweden, mainly related to having been sent to the wrong address or lacking local knowledge. For our purposes the second to last sentence is the most interesting; these issues are argued to cause great "otrygghet" for the inhabitants. We can note how closely associated the concept of "otrygghet" have become to the police generally and particularly to police presence. An often-presented explanatory model is that lack of police presence causes "otrygghet". A variation on this theme is that organizational problems within the police cause "otrygghet", which is visible in Motion 2018/19:922. The motion depicts crisis within the police, while "otryggheten" among people increases, and the police solve less crime. Referencing crime statistics from western Sweden, it states that over 50% of crimes are theft-, robbery- or violence-related. The last sentence references a theme discussed in the section on 2008, a *zero tolerance vision* (Andersson & Nilsson, 2009), it is unacceptable that crimes committed against people from Skaraborg should continue. Calling for an absolute eradication of crime is reminiscent of control theory and the New York model, where even minor crimes are seen as societal threat. Motion 2018/19:2569 contains another reference to the paradigmatic example of New York and the US:

"När otryggheten breder ut sig i samhället knackar den nu på kollektivtrafikens dörr. Vår kollektivtrafik ska vara till för hederliga betalande resenärer och det kräver att våld, brott och droger trycks tillbaka. För att öka tryggheten i Stockholms län behövs många åtgärder komma på plats i allt ifrån fler trygghetskameror, bättre villkor och löner för polisen samt en rad skärpta straff och nya brottsrubriceringar. Det tog årtionden för New York och dess invånare att återta sin tunnelbana och de offentliga rum som omger den. Den utvecklingen får inte riskeras här. Därför krävs att vi på allvar ser vad **otryggheten** gör med vår stad, erkänner problemen och nu agerar med kraft för att trycka tillbaka den brottslighet som försöker vinna mark."

"Fear of crime spreads through society and is now knocking on the door of public transport. Our public transport should be for honest paying travelers, and that requires that violence, crime and drugs are fought back. In order to increase security in Stockholm County, many measures need to be put in place, ranging from more surveillance cameras, better conditions and salaries for the police, and a series of harsher penalties and criminalization of further behavior. It took decades for New York and its residents to reclaim their subway and the public spaces that surround it. We can't risk a similar development here. That's why we need to take seriously what fear of crime is doing to our city, acknowledge the problems, and act now to forcefully push back the criminals who are trying to gain ground."

The criminological critique of the New York model, or broken windows theory had been extensive by 2018 (see for example (Dixon, 1998; Harcourt, 2009; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Hinkle, 2015; Robert & Stephen, 2004; Shelden, 2004). The theory no longer represented cutting-edge criminology, but from the quote above we can note that it remains popular to reference. Let us examine how the text constructs a war-like metaphor; it took decades for the New York citizens to *reclaim* their subway and public space. The author states that the subway is intended for honest, honorable, and paying citizens. For their sake, violence, crime, and drugs must be *pushed back*. The concept of "otrygghet" is described as almost sentient. It is *expanding* and *knocking on the subway door*. We must *act with strength* and *push back* crime back now as it attempts to *gain ground*, argues the motion. The solutions suggested are CCTV surveillance, better pay, and work conditions for the police, and to extensively sharpen sentencing and introduce new crimes. The many words referencing movement, such as 'expanding', 'knocking', 'push back', 'reclaim', 'development', and 'attempts to gain ground' construct battle lines where ground is gained or lost in the struggle between honest people and crime, drugs, violence, and "otrygghet". Wacquant (1999, 2015) calls this type of construction of a dichotomous conflict between 'honest' and 'criminal' the construction of a *suitable enemy*. Criminological knowledge, in this case Broken Windows theory (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), legitimizes this construction.

As Hagan (2010) points out, certain types of criminological knowledge have been considered highly useful and are heavily referenced in crime policy debates. 'Broken windows', the idea that fighting signs of disorder is more fruitful for crime prevention than other, more structural, efforts is one such idea that has been

extensively popular. Another one is the idea of the *chronic offender*, visible for example in Motion 2018/19:1550, stating that very few people commit a majority of all crimes, and that these people inflict significant harm, fear, and cause “otrygghet” to expand and grow. Themes repeat here that are commonly mentioned in relation to “otrygghet” in this period: organized crime, shootings, losing control over the cities, and chronic offenders. The concept of “otrygghet” is described as growing. The idea that very few people are committing a disproportional amount of crime has been presented in several criminological studies, notably by Wolfgang (1958) and Blumstein (1986). These so-called *Chronic Offenders*, career criminals, are described as people who end up in lifelong criminal careers. As Hagan (2010) points out, the idea of the chronic offender has been very politically attractive and is often presented together with other criminological knowledge products, such as the New York model. The above text calls for abolishing the practice of reducing one’s time in prison when a person is sentenced for several crimes at the same time (“mängdrabatt” or ‘quantity reduction’). The result would be longer prison sentences, and thus this argument aligns itself with a general trend of calling for harsher sentencing. The theme of harsher sentencing is often connected with “otrygghet” in the examined texts, for example in Moderate Motion 2018/19:891:

Motion 2018/19:891	English translation of Motion 2018/19:891
<p>"Trygghet och säkerhet är grundläggande förutsättningar för livskvalitet. Vi oroas bland annat över gängbrottslighet, rån, butiksstölder, inbrottsvågor i mindre samhällen på landsbygden och äldre som utsätts för stölder i sina egna hem. Vi vill därför fortsätta kampen mot brottslighet och otrygghet. Därför har Moderaterna och allianspartierna i riksdagen drivit igenom fler förbättringar och förstärkningar. Tidigare, under föregående mandatperiod, skrevs historia i riksdagen då vi bland annat fått igenom hela 29 skarpa beslut att ytterligare skärpa straff och fortsätta öka tryggheten för människor."</p>	<p>"Safety and security are fundamental to quality of life. We worry about gang crime, robberies, shoplifting, waves of burglaries in small rural communities, and elderly people being robbed in their own homes. We want to continue the fight against crime and fear of crime. That is why Moderaterna and the Alliance parties in Parliament have pushed through more improvements and reinforcements. Earlier, during the previous parliamentary term, history was written in the Parliament when, among other things, we got through no fewer than 29 tough decisions to further tighten penalties and continue to increase feelings of safety for people."</p>

A practice Hall et al. (2013/1978) names *convergence*, the linking of multiple issues, is observable here. Gang criminality, robbery, shoplifting, burglary in small towns, and elderly people being the victims of theft in their homes are converged here, and this cluster of worrying issues forms the basis of Moderaterna’ motivation to “continue the fight against crime and “otrygghet””. The use of militarized semantics in the argumentation is visible in the construction of the “we” that leads the fight against crime. The solution of harsher sentencing is



presented as a closing argument; Moderaterna have pushed through 29 decisions that have led to harsher sentencing during their last term in office, and this has led to increased “trygghet”. In this sense, the text departs from the trend of describing the concept of “otrygghet” as increasing and expanding and thus approaches a paradox that is discernible in the argumentation presented in many of these texts. If harsher sentencing and more police increase “trygghet” and diminish “otrygghet”, how can “otrygghet” be described as growing after penal policy has moved in a more punitive direction for more than 25 years in Sweden (Tham, 2018)?

The above text resolves this paradox by describing the “improvements and reinforcements” Moderaterna have pushed through as steps taken in an ongoing struggle against crime that must be allowed to continue. There are other examples where harsher sentencing is described as the primary weapon employed in this struggle against “otrygghet”, for example Motion 2018/19:2870:

**Motion 2018/19:2870:**

"Gemensamt för alla brott som begås mot äldre är att kriminella individer utnyttjar människor som typiskt sett har svårare att värja sig. Denna typ av brott riskerar att sprida **otrygghet** och rädsla och medföra att många äldre drar sig för att till exempel gå utanför hemmet."

**English translation of Motion 2018/19:2870:**

"Common for all crimes committed against the elderly is that criminals take advantage of people who typically have more difficulty defending themselves. This type of crime risks spreading insecurity and fear of crime and causes many elderly to refrain from leaving their homes."

Elderly people are described here as an especially vulnerable group that is being exploited by criminals. The crimes these criminals commit against the elderly spread “otrygghet” and fear and cause the elderly to not dare to leave their homes. That the specific consequence of these crimes is described as not leaving their homes is a reference to fear of crime survey operationalizations. What is being measured in the surveys affects what can be said about “otrygghet”. “Not daring to leave the home” is used to indicate the most severe form of “otrygghet” in for example the Swedish Crime Survey. The assumption made in the research, that not wanting to leave the home is a measurement of underlying feelings of “otrygghet”, is echoed here in political argumentation. “Otrygghet” is associated with fear in the text, and together fear and “otrygghet” cause the elderly to not want to leave their homes. While the motion says that several interventions are needed to hinder this form of crime, only one is actually argued for in the text: harsher sentencing. The concrete political action called for is allowing Moderaterna to continue pushing through punitive reforms, for example by making sure the Public Prosecution office adheres to the Alliance’s harsher sentencing reform of 2010. The use of sympathy-worthy (Clark, 1987) groups to

strengthen the case for punitive measures is evident in the argumentation concerning the elderly in the example above and concerning women in Motion 2018/19:2806:

Motion 2018/19:2806	English translation of Motion 2018/19:2806
"Krafttag mot mäns våld mot kvinnor	"Firm action against men's violence against women
En av tre kvinnor känner sig otrygga utomhus i sitt eget bostadsområde om kvällen. Kvinnors utsatthet för sexualbrott har ökat kraftigt de senaste åren.	One in three women feel unsafe outdoors in their own neighbourhood during the evening. Women's exposure to sexual offences has increased significantly in recent years.
Det bör även införas en möjlighet att förbjuda moralpolisering på offentliga platser genom ett tillträdesförbud. Det innebär att en viss person förbjuds att uppehålla sig inom ett visst angivet område om personen skapar <b>otrygghet</b> och begränsar andra personers möjlighet att röra sig fritt i samhället i syfte att upprätthålla en viss persons eller grups heder."	The possibility of banning moral policing in public places through a zone-ban should also be introduced. This means that a certain person is prohibited from being in a specified area if he or she creates fear of crime and insecurity and restricts other people's ability to move freely in society in order to maintain the honour of a certain person or group."

The first sentence references fear of crime studies and states that one in three women are “otrygga” in their neighborhoods during the evening. It is another example of how the Ennis (1967) operationalization shapes what can be said about “otrygghet” and defines it as a problem occurring outside the home, in the neighborhood, and during night-time. The text continues by referencing another type of criminological statistical knowledge and claims that sexual harassment is increasing. While results from the Swedish Crime Survey support this claim (BRÅ, 2019c), it has also been suggested that the increase in measured sexual violence is caused by heightened social attention to the problem of sexual violence. A 2019 report from BRÅ analyses the increase in both survey-reported and police-reported sexual violence and comes to the conclusion that the increase is likely caused by a combination of changing leisurely activities such as the frequenting of bars and clubs and an increased willingness to “name” non-consensual sexual activities as criminal, likely caused by changing social attitudes (BRÅ, 2019a). No matter the actual development, the notion that sexual violence increases is used here to structure an argument for punitive measures. The argument consists of an interesting intersection of three themes that have been prominent in Swedish penal politics in late modernity: men’s violence against women, retribution and punishment, and the establishment of the crime victim. The motion argues that to combat the issue of “otrygga” women, interventions must “prevent, protect and punish”. In this way, the rehabilitation and redress of the crime victim is tied to the punishment of the offender. Tham (2018) , Gallo and Svensson (2019) and

Demker and Duus-Otterström (2009) have been among those that have argued that the rise of the crime victim to political prominence plays a central role in understanding Swedish penal policy development in late modernity.

During this period, the concept of “otrygghet” is increasingly often used in a way that *implies* ethnicity. The motion argues for prohibiting certain people, “moral police”, from being physically present in some public spaces if they create “otrygghet” and try to limit the freedoms of other people. The real keyword for understanding the racialized context of this proposal can be found in the last sentence with the word “heder” (honor). It invites the reader to associate the problem of violence with certain ethnic groups, not ethnically Swedish, living in suburban projects, with a “foreign” religion and view of women's societal position. In this way, it references ‘the Other’, the racialized minority (Hall et al., 2013/1978). The immigrant population of Sweden is commonly described as both victims and perpetrators of “otrygghet” in the examined material. “Otrygghet” is increasingly described as something located in specific areas, for example in Motion 2018/19:1188:

Motion 2018/19:1188	English translation of Motion 2018/19:1188
<p>”Förebyggande insatser i brottsutsatta bostadsområden Narkotikaförsäljningen, kriminella indrivningar av skulder och skjutningar gör att många föräldrar oroas för barnen. Vissa föräldrar har till och med skickat sönerna till släktingar i andra bostadsområden för att de inte ska hamna i destruktiva miljöer. Enligt nya mätningar från Brottsförebyggande rådet är otryggheten högre i socialt och ekonomiskt eftersatta bostadsområden, jämfört med andra områden.”</p>	<p>”Preventive action in crime-ridden neighbourhoods Drug sales, criminal debt collection and shootings have made many parents worried about their children. Some parents have even sent their sons to live with relatives in other neighborhoods to prevent them from ending up in destructive environments. According to new measurements from the Crime Prevention Council, the fear of crime is higher in socially and economically deprived neighborhoods, compared to other areas.”</p>

Fear of crime surveys, specifically the Swedish Crime Survey, is referenced to support an argument that areas with low socioeconomic status have more “otrygghet”. We can remind ourselves of the issues with representation that the Swedish Crime Survey has in socioeconomically challenged areas, where the participation rate has been as low as 16% for some strata in later waves of the Swedish Crime Survey (see chapter 7). That low economic status seems to be correlated with higher recorded levels of fear of crime is however well known in the fear of crime research discourse. The text doesn’t argue that it is socioeconomic scarcity itself that leads to “otrygghet”. The context in which the concept of “otrygghet” is used depicts crime as the cause, using the examples of the sale of narcotics, settling of criminal debts, and shootings.

We can note how conceptual usage has changed over time. During the earlier examined periods, especially 1978 and 1988, factors that denote low socioeconomic status, such as poverty, unemployment, precarious work relations, and lacking social cohesion would have been seen as synonyms to and causes of “otrygghet”. The reasons why an area is experiencing scarcity were seen as socio-structural. Now, areas are seen as disparaged because of crime. The shift towards crime being denoted as the cause of “otrygghet” locates both the cause and effect of the issue to the people who live in these areas. They both suffer from “otrygghet” as crime victims and cause “otrygghet” as criminals.

During this last period, 2018, there are some interesting novel tendencies. Fewer examples of official crime statistics used in a mobilizing fashion can be found. Instead, fear of crime surveys are used to argue for the need for increased control-related interventions. More police, harsher sentencing, and increased coercive measures are motivated by referencing people’s increased fear of crime. There are also more examples of what Andersson and Nilsson (2009) calls the *zero tolerance vision* of crime, which argues that it is unacceptable that crime happens at all. Perhaps this can be seen in relation to the decreasing crime levels that can be discerned when analyzing traditional crime statistics from the 2000s and 2010s. As official crime statistics do not show the increasing levels of crime that would lend themselves to constructing arguments for control-related interventions, the argumentation shifts in two ways. It more often uses fear of crime survey results, and it argues that *any* crime is too much crime.

## ”Otrygghet” in a context related to families and children

The concept “otrygghet” is used in a context related to children and families with varying frequency throughout the examined periods. There is only one example from 1978, the Motion 1978/79:1266, from Moderaterna, on the subject of divorce:

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**Motion 1978/79:1266**

"De sociala följderna av de många skilsmässorna är mycket kännbara. Många fränskilda tvingas till en drastisk sänkning av levnadsstandarden. Även för barnen blir det stora problem; vid en skilsmässa förlorar de en stor del av den trygghet som är väsentlig för en harmonisk utveckling. Barnen behöver båda föräldrarna. När ungdomar kommer "på sned i samhället, visar det sig ofta att föräldrarnas skilsmässa och den därav följande **otryggheten** haft en negativ inverkan."

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**English translation of Motion 1978/79:1266**

"The social consequences of the numerous divorces are very tangible. Many divorced people are forced to face a drastic reduction in their standard of living. Children also face major problems: divorce deprives them of much of the security that is essential for harmonious development. Children need both parents. When young people find themselves "on the wrong track in life", it often turns out that the divorce of their parents and the resulting insecurity have had a negative impact."

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The traditional family, consisting of two married parents with children, is associated with "trygghet", harmonious development, and a happy childhood in this text. This is threatened by divorce, which divides the home, deprives children of having both their parents, lessens the resources of the parents, and causes children to feel "otrygga". The Swedish idiom, "komma på sned i samhället", would literally be translated as "end up on the skewed side to society" and corresponds to idioms such as "take a wrong path", "stray from the right path", or to end up in "bad company" or "on the wrong side of the tracks". It signifies ending up in social depravity and misery with crime, drugs, or prostitution. We thus have here a Swedish example of the type of associative chain that is common in contemporary American political debate (see chapter 5). The breakdown of the family, caused by feminism and women leaving the home and associated with modernity, causes children to be "otrygga" and emotionally stunted, thus leading them to a path of crime and vice.

### "Otrygghet", children, and modernity in 1988

It is not until 1988 that this theme starts to become highly visible in the material. Children and families were the most common context in the examined motions and bills from 1988. Eight of the examined examples of usage of the concept concern children, and the examples are evenly divided between Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna with four each. It is the physical environment that is proposed as a threat against children's feelings of "trygghet", in Motion 1988/89:So614 from Socialdemokraterna:

"Barns intressen riskerar alltid att komma i kläm, därför att de inte kan hävda sin egna intressen på samma sätt som vuxna kan. Det finns mycket i samhällsutvecklingen som inneburit förbättringar för våra barn. Samtidigt finns det tendenser till att det på vissa områden har blivit sämre. Särskilt utsatta är givetvis barn som på olika sätt lever i **otrygga** miljöer. Lekmiljöerna i dagens samhälle är mycket olika gårdagens lekmiljöer. I nya bostadsområden har man alltför ofta tagit bort naturliga lekområden och ersatt dem med stereotypa lekredskap. Utrymmet för spontan lek och fri fantasi har krympts, därför att andra behov i bostadsmiljöerna ansetts viktigare. Det är därför mycket viktigt att barns behov hävdas på lokal nivå vid tillämpningen av den nya plan-och bygglagen, som är en ramlag, men som i detalj inte reglerar hur lekmiljön ska garanteras.

"Children's interests are always at risk of being overseen, because they cannot assert their own interests as adults can. The development of society has improved many things for our children. At the same time, there are tendencies for things to get worse in some areas. Particularly vulnerable are children who live in in unsafe environments. Playgrounds in today's society are very different from the environments of play of the past. In new housing developments, natural play areas have too often been removed and replaced with stereotypical play equipment. The space for spontaneous play and free imagination has been reduced because other needs in the residential environment have been prioritized. It is therefore essential that children's needs are asserted at local level in the application of the new Planning and Building Act, which is a framework law but does not regulate in detail how the play environment is to be guaranteed."

The motion expresses ambivalence on if "progress" has been good for children or not. Some aspects of it has, states the text, while others have meant a decreased quality of life. Especially worrisome is the situation for children in "otrygga" environments. The text proposes that children from "otrygga" milieus are more affected by changes in their environment brought about by social progress. This progress is described as implying a shift from natural environments for children to play in to man-made and "stereotypical" playgrounds. This is seen as threatening the children's need for spontaneity and "free" fantasy, needs that have been downgraded in favor of other (adult?) needs. Progress threatens security and stability as well as the needs of children. Their need for the natural, the non-man-made, the primitive is described as more acute than the adult's. The idea that social progress is threatening children's "trygghet" appears in other examples, such as Moderate Motion 1988/89:So612 about day care. Women are being driven towards taking less responsibility for the family, and the children suffer. This results in children being "otrygga", as men do not step up to claim responsibility, according to the motion. Something that can be considered a bit outside of the political norm for Moderaterna is that the state is presented as a custodian of fairness. The text argues that the responsibility of the family should, in the eyes of the law, fall equally heavy on the mother and the father, and the laws concerning divorce proceedings should reflect that.

Yet as with the previously examined Motion 1988/89:So614 and also Motion 1988/89:L406, the proposed underlying cause of children's increased feelings of "otrygghet" is social progress, here in the form of modernity, feminism, and new forms of organization of social life. These issues are *converged*, associated together.

A generalized fear of modernity is one of the early stages of the chain of social reaction that Hall et al. (2013/1978) charts as ending with the establishment of an law-and-order society: “*It is experienced, first, as a diffuse social unease, as an unnaturally accelerated pace of social change, as an unhinging of social patterns, moral points of reference*” Hall et al. (2013/1978, p. 314). The function of social progress in the text is as a force with agency of its own; it drives women away from the home. Women are not choosing to engage themselves outside the home, they are being driven away from it. They are not the agents in this development. Social progress, or modernity, the newness of society, is described as a source of “otrygghet”. The counter-concept to “otrygghet” would be the traditional organization of home and family. “Otrygghet” signifies something disjointed, fragmented, changeable, fickle, and inconsistent. The text suggests that children bear the brunt of the negative consequences of modernity. This is a repeating theme in this child-related context, and indeed in the discourse as a whole. The most sympathy-worthy groups with the least agency are the most “otrygga”.

How children are affected by the rules and laws of the adult world is a reoccurring theme, for example in Motion 1988/89:So327, from Moderaterna. Vulnerable children risk being relocated from a “bad” home to one that is even worse. “Otrygghet” appears in the quote in several inflections; “otryggare”, “otryggt” and “otrygghet”. What causes “otrygghet” in the home is not clearly stated in the text. This could be seen as “otrygghet” possessing an implied meaning inherent in the word itself. The reader is supposed to already know what makes a home “otryggt”. While the state might have good intentions when moving children away from unsuitable parents, the end result might be an even less “trygg” situation for the child. The state is not the guardian of “trygghet” here but rather a potential cause of “otrygghet” with its autocratic, cumbersome, and unwieldy power. This way of seeing the state as either a problem or a provider of solutions seems to follow a right/left divide, but in the quotes about children being “otrygga” potentially because of the state do not seem to follow this divide. The tendency to consider the state a problematic source of children’s “otrygghet” is evident not only in Moderaterna’s previous quote, but it is also seen in Social Democratic Motion 1988/89:L410, which asks if a child should be removed quickly from an “otryggt” home by the authorities or if the burden of proof should be on the authorities to prove that the situation is indeed “otrygg”, even if the process takes a long time. The rights of adults are here juxtaposed against the “trygghet” of children. The text does not define what makes the social situation of the child “otrygg” in the same way as the previous quote. The state has a double role, both as a potential savior of a child and as a slow-acting bureaucratic

behemoth. Social-democratic Motion 1988/89:Kr4 is an especially interesting motion as it ties together many of the prominent themes from the 80’s and hints at a development in conceptual usage.

Motion 1988/89:Kr4	English translation of Motion 1988/89:Kr4
<p>”Många barn och ungdomar känner stor otrygghet i dagens samhälle. Socialarbetare talar om allvarliga problem hos 10-14-åringar. Många är utsatta för de vuxnas övergrepp. Antalet fall av barnmisshandel och incest ökar, liksom självmorden bland barn. Ungdomar känner rotlöshet, tomhet och brist på samhörighet med de vuxnas värld. Deras protester kan ta sig uttryck i klotter och vandalisering. De känner ofta inga gränser, gör sig omöjliga och straffar ut sig från den ena gemenskapen efter den andra tills situationen blir ohållbar. Ett uttryck för detta är att ungdomar som lämnar sina hem tar avstånd från kontakter med vuxna och driver omkring utan någon fast punkt i tillvaron.”</p>	<p>”Many children and youths feel very unsafe in today’s society. Social workers talk about how 10-14 year olds have serious problems. Many are vulnerable to abuse by adults. The number of cases of child abuse and incest is increasing, as are suicides among children. Young people feel rootless, empty and disconnected from the adult world. Their protests can take the form of graffiti and vandalism. They often don’t respect boundaries, make themselves impossible and get themselves pushed out of one community after another until the situation becomes unsustainable. One sign of this is how young people leave their homes and distance themselves from any contact with adults, drifting around without any fixed points in their lives.”</p>

Children and youth are “otrygga” in today’s society is declares the motion. The text references crime statistics and claims that incest, violence against children, and child suicide are increasing. It is doubtful that this was true during this period when it comes to violence against children (see Tham (2018)), and incest falls within a type of crime that is notoriously hard to measure. The text consequently uses “youth” instead of “children”, which has different connotations in political debate. While children are to be protected and safeguarded from threats, “youth” can be threatening themselves and require both protection and control. The text claims that today’s youth suffer from a lack of “roots”, meaning, and affinity with the adult world. They are the victims of adult assault but also commit crimes of their own in the form of vandalism and graffiti in retaliation. They lack boundaries, become “impossible”, and are as a result excluded from (“*punished out of*”) various social communities. In short, the text calls for increased social control, and thus orients itself towards explanatory models of crime derived from control theory (Wilson, 1975; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). The text bridges a boundary towards a conceptual context where “otrygghet” is associated with crime. There are themes of concern on how children fare in a modern society, mingled with the mobilizing use of (arbitrary) crime statistics to paint a picture of a society in decline. Youth are described as out of control and delinquent at the same time as they are the victims of this new, modern world.



## From concern to control in 1998

There are fewer examples of the use of the concept “otrygghet” in a context related to children and families in 1998 compared to 1988. Furthermore, the concept changes character and becomes more entangled with the context of crime. The last examined quote from 1988, Motion 1988/89:Kr4, seems to be ahead of its time, conceptually speaking. The entanglement of children and crime and the call for firmer social and parental control is highly visible in the examples from 1998 in this context, exemplified here in Moderate Motion 1998/99:Ub258:

Motion 1998/99:Ub258	English translation of Motion 1998/99:Ub258
"2 Många förändringar - oro, otrygghet och destruktivitet	"2 Many changes - worry, fear, and destructiveness
... En orsak är att många barn växer upp med våld, aggressivitet, hot på gatan, i skolan och hemma. En annan är att föräldrar inte hinna, orkar eller kan ta tillräckligt stort föräldraansvar. Till detta kommer det idealiserade våldet i TV och andra medier. Osäkra och aggressiva barn hamnar alltför lätt i situationer som ger fel inställning till livet och hur problem skall lösas."	One reason is that many children grow up with violence, aggression, threats on the street, at school and at home. Another is that parents don't have the time, the energy or the ability to take sufficient parental responsibility. Added to this is the idealised violence on TV and in other media. Insecure and aggressive children too easily end up in situations that teach them the wrong attitude for life and how problems should be solved."

The heading links the concept of “otrygghet” with destruction, worry and another repeating theme in this context, *change*. A lack of parental control is presented as a cause of crime and “otrygghet”. “Video violence”, referenced in the second to last sentence, was a commonly discussed social worry in the 80’s and 90’s, characterized by Springhall (1999) as a moral panic, using Cohen's (1972) theoretical concept. “Video violence”, violence in movies and television, was a contemporary concern also in Sweden, as Dalquist (1998) illustrates. It is well known that new expressions of youth culture historically have been met with great suspicion and outright hostility from the adult world, whether the subject of ire has been jazz, rock music, or video games. The explanatory model suggested in the text places video games in a causal chain where weak parental control allows children to consume such culture, which results in aggressive and insecure children that will end up with the wrong perspective on life and life’s struggles. This control-theory explanation of crime, which assumes that crime is caused by inadequate parental control (Hirschi, 1969/2002; Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2017), is repeated in the context of children and crime in other Moderate motions, for example Motion 1998/99:Ju904. This motion offers suggestions for changes in policy in order to solve the problem of crime and “otrygghet”. They are oriented

towards strengthening the repressive and penal powers of the state in the form of harsher penalties for drug crimes (including life in prison), increased budgets for the police and courts, increased discretionary power of the police in the form of bugging, disciplinary actions in prison also for prisoners with life sentences, rehabilitation and education in prison, and increased “responsibility” to families. We can note how these suggestions are oriented towards an expansion of the criminal justice system, with calls that are characteristic for a crisis of hegemony (Hall et al., 2013/1978). Tham (2018) argues that this has been the main trajectory in Swedish penal politics in late modernity. An idea derived from a classic control theory explanation of crime is echoed here; the family is the central locus for crime prevention.

Children’s “otrygghet” is a repeating theme in 1998 and is referenced in two more Moderate motions and one Social Democratic bill. Bill 1998/99:115, referencing ”oroliga and otrygga barn” (“worried and otrygga children”), and Motion 1998/99:Ub802, stating that ”otryggheten i skolan breder ut sig” (“otryggheten” in school is expanding”), are both about Sweden’s educational system, and Moderate Motion 1998/99:So238 uses the concept in a context related to children’s healthcare.

The theme of children and families rises and falls in importance. From a single mention in 1978 it grows to dominate the discourse of “otrygghet” in 1988, being the most common context among the examined texts. In 1998, it is still prominent but has changed in character. Two themes were prominent within the context in 1988. The first was a worry about how modernity and new social organization in the family impact children. The second theme involved an argument for the role of the state as guarantor for “trygghet” for children from abusive homes, which was countered by concern about how children fare as wards of the state. In 1998, these concerns are still discernible in some texts but become entangled with the issue of crime. Oriented towards the control theory of crime, the texts propose explanatory models concerning crime that place responsibility on the parents and their ability to control their children. Petty crime and out-of-control youth are being converged with a fear of modernity, or a “diffuse social unease” (Hall et al., 2013/1978). Concern slides from the children themselves being ‘otrygga’ in 1988 to the whole society becoming “otrygg” in 1998 because of crime, in turn caused by children growing up in inadequate homes.

## Crime, children, and “otrygghet” in 2008

In 2008, the theme is far less visible. Only a few examples can be found in material dominated by “otrygghet” used in a context related to crime or economics. These examples are, as in 1998, characterized by the entanglement of “otrygghet”, children, parents, and crime. Social Democratic Motion 2008/09:So501 begins by stating that children are affected when the family situation is “otrygg”, unemployed, in bad health, and not earning enough money for life’s necessities. The consequences of an “otrygg” childhood can lead to children feeling excluded or frustrated, an impact on their mental or physical health, bad grades, or a heightened risk for a criminal path. It is not only bad for the children but also for the society. The text offers a causal explanatory model<sup>48</sup> where an “otrygg” childhood, caused by poverty, unemployment and illness, leads to various negative consequences, leading up to a criminal lifestyle. Motion 2008/09:So278 is almost identical. Several of the themes here; children, disorder, inadequate parenting, and crime are even more visible within Social Democratic Motion 2008/09:Ju379 on the causes and explanations of crime:

Motion 2008/09:Ju379	English translation of Motion 2008/09:Ju379
"Anledningen till att en del ungdomar faller in i kriminella beteenden varierar. Ofta handlar det om en kombination av individuella faktorer och strukturella socioekonomiska faktorer. Ett stort antal barn och ungdomar växer upp under ojämlika förhållanden, med otrygghet, missbruk och segregation runt sig. Ibland leder det till både ett långvarigt utanförskap och i värsta fall till kriminalitet."	"The reasons why some young people fall into criminal behaviour vary. Often it is a combination of individual factors and structural socio-economic factors. A large number of children and young people grow up in unequal conditions, with fear of crime, drug abuse and segregation all around them. Sometimes this leads to both long-term societal exclusion and, in the worst cases, criminality."

The text can be read as theoretical positioning on the causes of youth crime, which are numerous and systemic in this description. Socioeconomic and individual factors combine, and the text specifically mentions “otrygghet”, substance abuse, and segregation. Sometimes these factors cause long-term alienation (“långvarigt utanförskap”) and, in the worst cases, criminality. We can here note that the causal relationship between crime and “otrygghet” is described in an opposite direction; “otrygghet” causes crime, in the sense that children brought up in “otrygga” homes commit crime. “Unequal” homes, caused by (economic?) “otrygghet”, addiction, and segregation are what cause youth to become criminal, which can be considered a more structural explanation of crime. Thus, this Social

<sup>48</sup> This model is somewhat clumsily worded; the translation sounds quite bad grammatically, but so does the original in Swedish.

Democratic motion proposes a different causal model from the many examples of control theory oriented explanatory models of crime, which were common in 1998. "Otrygghet" signifies here a disordered home, without stability. Another example of "otrygghet" as disorder can be found in this Social Democratic motion on education, Motion 2008/09:Ub591, where students' learning is debilitated if there is disorder in the classroom, or it is "otryggt" in school. We can discern how "otrygghet" is given a meaning related to the paired concept in the text, disorder. Other possible translations of "stökigt" could include messy and rowdy. This seems especially common in a children-related context. Almost identical wording can be found in Motion 2008/09:Ub589.

### "Otrygga" children because of crime in 2018

The importance of the context of children and families further declines as we reach the last period of examined texts, 2018. In 2008, there were a few examples, and these generally emphasize a closer association between "otrygghet" and crime, also in a children-related context. Control theory models were referenced alongside models that cite more structural and economic causes of crime, but with a common focus on how inadequate upbringing, either in an economic or disciplinary sense, causes children to become young criminals. From 2018, there is a single example of "otrygghet" used in a context related to children and families. However the example in question, Motion 2018/19:1202, demonstrates how very entangled the concepts of "otrygghet", crime, and children have become:

Motion 2018/19:1202	English translation of Motion 2018/19:1202
<p>"Skyddsnet för brottsutsatta barn Vi måste kunna garantera att alla barn som växer upp under otrygga omständigheter upptäcks och får hjälp i tid. Det kräver mod att våga ställa obekväma frågor, det kräver att samhället tar sig tid att undersöka om det finns barn i olika riskmiljöer, som riskerar att fara illa. Hälso- och sjukvården har trots allt samma skyldighet som polisen att rapportera misstanke om att ett barn far illa till socialtjänsten men vad händer om de inte tar sitt ansvar eller blundar för problemen?"</p>	<p>"Safety net for children victimized by crime We need to guarantee that all children growing up in insecure circumstances are found and helped in a timely manner. It requires courage to dare to ask uncomfortable questions, it requires society to take the time to investigate whether there are children in risky environments, who are at risk of harm. After all, the health services have the same obligation as the police to report suspicions of child abuse to social services, but what happens if they don't take responsibility or turn a blind eye to problems?"</p>

The text states that "we" must guarantee that all children raised under "otrygga" conditions must be identified and helped. The heading of the motion, security for children victimized by crime, suggests that "otrygga" conditions can be interpreted as meaning a criminal milieu. This motion concerns children as

victims of crime, or growing up in an environment where crime is common. Crime is what makes the environment "otryggt" for children. During this last period, 2018, when the material as a whole becomes dominated by a crime-related context, concern for children themselves makes a comeback. In this example, children are considered to be at risk because of adults' criminality, either as crime victims or because of growing up with parents who are criminals.

As concern shifts from the young themselves to what they may do to society, "children" is often exchanged for "youth", which carries different connotations. Judicially and legally, the terms have little to no difference. People under 18 are considered to be non-adults legally, and people under 15 cannot be prosecuted for crimes in Sweden. A 14-year old is a child in the eyes of the law. Yet the term "children" is usually associated with younger children, and "youth" tends to signify post-pubertal children. While children are blameless and sympathy-worthy, youth can cause societal trouble and unrest. It is harder to win legitimacy for mobilized repressive force, in the form of policing, against children than against youth. We can call this a shift from *concern* to *control*. To use the concept "otrygghet" in relation to children seems from the examined texts to be a way of projecting issues into the future. Children growing up in "otrygga" conditions (meaning for example undisciplined, structurally disparaged; i.e. poor with inadequate parents) will grow up to make society "otrygg", by committing crime. The use of the concept of otrygghet functions to enable the discussion of potential, future problems.

## The economic context

### "Otrygghet" related to employment, labor and welfare in 1978

The economic context is here defined as relating to employment, labor, work, and welfare. From 1978 there are five motions that use the concept of "otrygghet" in an economic context, which makes it the most common context of the period. All of the motions are Social Democratic. A typical example would be Motion 1978/79:2025, where the concept "otrygghet" is used to argue that when competition grows too fierce, retail workers suffer. The cause of "otrygghet" is attributed to the market and its mechanics. The context is clearly work-related, which is further defined by the construction the concept appears in, "otrygghet" in employment, where an "otrygg" position of employment can be understood as

unstable, insecure, and unpredictable. It can also be interpreted that positions are “otrygga” when a place of work is understaffed. A pattern can be discerned, whereby the concept is used in motions on various subject matters but in a context related to work and labor conditions. Several examples of this can be found among the examined texts, for example motion Motion 1978/79:1906 on the organization of education for special needs students, where the concept ”otrygghet” is used to describe a potentially problematic situation for teachers’ work conditions. In bill 1978/79:138, concerning defense, the concept ”otrygghet” is used to describe potential negative consequences for the working conditions of people employed in the Swedish weapons industry:

Bill 1978/79:2253	English translation of Bill 1978/79:2253
<p>"Det kommer således att även i framtiden finnas kvar en inhemsk flygindustri, ehuru med annan struktur än i dag. Färre personer kommer att sysselsättas i utveckling och tillverkning av militära flygplan, vilket gör frågan att finna ny sysselsättning påträngande. Även om omställningen kommer att ske över en lång tidsperiod har den borgerliga beslutsvåndan skjutit upp problemen. Det har lett till en oaccepTable <b>otrygghet</b> för de anställda."</p>	<p>"There will therefore continue to be a domestic aerospace industry in the future, albeit with a different structure than today. Fewer people will be employed in the development and manufacture of military aircraft, which makes the question of finding new employment pressing. Although the transition will take place over a long period of time, bourgeois indecisiveness has postponed the problem. This has led to unacceptable insecurity for employees."</p>

The concept of ”otrygghet” is used as a counter-concept to ”trygghet”, specifically to a type of ”trygghet” defined as security and safety in working life. It can be interpreted as the individual worker’s right to a life-situation that is foreseeable, certain, and possible to plan for. The counter-concept, “otrygghet” is thus defined as unpredictable, uncertain, and unstable. When “trygghet” is defined as the right to something, a predictable work-life, “otrygghet” becomes defined as the denial of that right. In the text, “otrygghet” is not something acceptable, but it is a limited problem that can be possibly corrected through swift political action. In Motion 1978/79:2399 the concept “otrygghet” is defined as a potential problem for a specific group of workers, people employed by the Swedish transportation administration. Because the meaning of the concept is clearly conveyed in the text despite no description of how the working conditions of the employees are “otrygga”, we can interpret the concept as having a commonly accepted meaning in this context. In other words, it is not necessary to spell out that a lack of work security makes the work conditions “otrygga”. “Otryggheten” is again a limited problem; it can be solved with a political decision to allocate resources to the ministry. Motion 1978/79:1928 argues for nationalizing youth worker education and states that a lack of political decision-making on the subject has caused a situation of “*otrygghet och ovisshet*”, “otrygghet” and uncertainty. The common

proposed cause in these examples is political inaction and indecisiveness. “Otrygghet” is a consequence of a lack of political action to mitigate various market mechanisms, or in other words, a consequence of hold-ups by the conservative opposition. All of these examples have in common that “otrygghet” is a limited problem that can be solved with decisiveness and good governance.

In Motion 1978/79:1990 the use of industrial chemicals is described as sharply rising. Two negative aspects of this are discussed in the text, environment impacts and the risk of work-related injuries. We can discern a slightly different conceptual use while still operating in a work-related context; here the concept denotes a fear of being injured while working. Thus, the concept is given a meaning closer to fear and anxiety than to unpredictability and instability. The solution is similar to other examples from the period. Efficient political action may mitigate the risks that work poses for the individual.

If this analysis had included empirical material from further back than 1978, it is likely that the type of conceptualization that is visible in these examples would have been far more common: otrygghet related to one’s position in the labour market. The examples from 1978, most of them Social Democratic, present a fairly straight forward view of what otrygghet is: having a life situation that is unpredictable and insecure due to one’s employment. This can mean being a substitute or temp worker, working without a contract, working short-term contracts, or working outside the type of protections that cover most full-time workers such as unemployment insurance, sick leave, and parental leave. The concept is often used as a moniker, joined together with for example employment in “otrygga anställningar”. Counter concepts would be secure, even, and predictable. This conceptualization of otrygghet is quite divisive along political lines between the two parties.

The Social Democratic heritage of being the workers’ party of Sweden and the political formulation of a larger workers’ movement is visible in for example Motion 1978/79:788, where the market is the central cause of “otrygghet”. The motion presents a narrative about how the Swedish workers’ movement formulated goals concerning housing. The slum and misery, overcrowding, and lack of housing that characterized the Swedish pre-war situation would be eliminated. Political interventions ensured socially responsible housing policies, where the state organized that citizens were provided with adequate housing, free from market mechanisms and speculation. Scarcity, destitution, and “otrygghet” in housing was eradicated. This example presents a causal model of how the market causes a problem that the state must solve. “Otrygghet” is linked together with scarcity and destitution and denotes the lack of a right to something. What

the concept signifies aligns with what is a common understanding during this period, that the housing situation is insufficient in that it lacks both in size and amenities and is also unsure and uncertain:

Motion 1978/79:788	English translation of Motion 1978/79:788
<p>"Med utgångspunkt i denna syn på bostaden som en social rättighet satte arbetarrörelsen som mål för den sociala bostadspolitiken att undanröja den bostadsslum, trångboddhet och bostadsbrist som präglade boendeförhållandena före andra världskriget. (...) Nöd, brist och otrygghet inom boendet skulle avskaffas"</p>	<p>"Based on an understanding of housing as a social right, the goals of the social housing policy of the labour movement were to eliminate the slums, overcrowding, and housing shortages that characterized housing conditions before the Second World War. (...) Need, scarcity and insecurity in housing were to be abolished"</p>

The quote illustrates how the general goals of the workers movement of Sweden have been formative for the Socialdemokraterna' view of themselves as the guardians of certain rights. An understanding of otrygghet from this perspective could be formulated in this way: people in Sweden have the right to a secure position of employment, housing, schooling, and to a certain standard of living. To not have these things, these material securities, is to be otrygg. There is a type of objectivity associated with the concept here; *otrygghet* signifies not being secure in one's material living situation. It is concerned with the material world, rather than describing an internal, emotional state. Let us call this definition the *materialist* meaning of otrygghet. Perhaps the difference between the two English words *insecure*, with a stronger psychological association, and the more materialist *unsecure*, is analogous.

### “Otrygg” as an employee in 1988

Moving into 1988, the concept continues to be closely associated with labor and employment rights. Three motions and a bill from 1988 use the concept of “otrygghet” in a context related to work-life, employment, and labor rights. Motion 1988/89:N352 is a Social Democratic motion about the textile industry, arguing that the industry had a recruitment problem in 1988 due to low wages and “otrygga” job positions that were unsecure and unpredictable. Here the reason for the recruitment problems is two-fold: low wages and unsecure employment. In this conceptual usage, the low wages do not make the positions unsecure. Rather the problem of recruitment exists because the positions are unsecure/”otrygga” and pay low wages. The conceptual usage defines an “otrygg” position of employment as a job which is subject to fluctuations in the market and the economic situation and can be affected by mass lay-offs.



To use the word “otrygghet” in this way, as a synonym for unpredictable, unsecure, and volatile in a context related to labor rights and employment is evident in several more quotes. In Social Democratic Motion 1988/89:Sf323 this usage is employed to argue for a worker’s right to retire early from physically heavy jobs, maintaining that it is unreasonable that workers with 40 years of hard labor behind them should experience “otrygghet” at work as they grow older. In Social Democratic Bill 1988/89:108 ”otrygghet” is used to describe the risky work situation that results from the circulation of staff within the police. “Otrygg” used to describe jobs that are unsecure, unpredictable, and subject to market fluctuation can be politically associated with Socialdemokraterna rather than Moderaterna, due to the strong ties between Socialdemokraterna and the labor movement and trade unions.

However, both parties seem to use the concept in a similar way during 1988. Moderate Motion 1988/89:A753 argues against new labor laws that give employees extensive rights to take time off from work. This improved “*anställningstrygghet*”, security of employment, creates the need for more substitute workers for short periods and thus generates “otrygga” positions of employment. Noteworthy here is that even though this Moderate argumentation might not agree with Socialdemokraterna on whether these laws were an improvement or not, it is in perfect agreement with them on what constitutes “otrygga” jobs. “Otrygga” positions of employment are created when regular staff demands time off and substitutes are needed. These temporary posts are not protected by the same labor laws as permanent staff; they are unprotected, unsecure, “otrygga” jobs. This is in accordance with the *materialist* definition of the concept. It should be noted that this definition is more visible in 1978 than in 1988.

## A polemic push? Otrygghet as reliance on welfare in 1998

Koselleck writes that each use of a concept can be read as a contemporary polemic push, constituted by elements of earlier socio-historical configuration and by intentions directed at the future. Meaning can be located in the relation between these two aspects of what the concept is intended to signify (Koselleck, 2004). In 1998, there is an attempt to introduce a new meaning to the concept of ”otrygghet”, which takes as its socio-historical configuration the close connection between welfare, employment, and ”otrygghet” that is visible in the material from 1978 and 1988. From the many repeating examples of conceptual usage in

Moderate Motion 1998/99:Sk311, we can discern that the concept of “otrygghet” is central to the strategy:

Motion 1998/99:Sk311	English translation of Motion 1998/99:Sk311
<p>"När det allmänna också tar över ansvaret för sådant som medborgarna normalt både kan och vill klara själva blir de utlämnade. Den grundläggande trygghet som i att ha kontroll över den egna ekonomin försvinner och förbyts i en <b>otrygghet</b> som urholkar välfärden.</p>	<p>"When the public sector also takes over responsibility for things that citizens are normally both able and willing to do themselves, they are at the mercy of the public. The basic security of being in control of one's own finances disappears and is replaced by an insecurity that erodes welfare.</p>
<p>... Tillvaron blir <b>otrygg</b> för alla dem som tvingas till en tillvaro där varje krona går till att täcka nödvändiga utgifter och inkomsten ofta ändå inte räcker till.</p>	<p>... Life becomes insecure for all those who are forced into an existence in which every penny goes to cover necessary expenses and the income is often insufficient anyway.</p>
<p>... Livet blir <b>otryggt</b> för alla dem som tvingas till en tillvaro där varje krona går till att täcka nödvändiga utgifter och inkomsten ofta ändå inte räcker till. Socialbidragsberoendet ökar och allt fler lever på marginaler där en oförutsedd större utgift kan innebära en katastrof. Till skillnad från äldre tider har dagens <b>otrygghet</b> ett element av hopplöshet som gör den särskilt socialt stötande. När individer och familjer är hänvisade till bidrag för sin vardagsförsörjning saknar de en reell möjlighet att själva förbättra sin situation.</p>	<p>... Life becomes insecure for all those who are forced into an existence where every penny goes to cover essential expenses and the income is often insufficient anyway. Dependency on social benefits is increasing and more and more people are living on the margins, where an unexpected major expense can spell disaster. Unlike in earlier times, today's insecurity has an element of hopelessness that makes it particularly socially distasteful. When individuals and families rely on welfare benefits for their daily subsistence, they lack a real possibility to improve their situation themselves.</p>
<p>... Bristande social rörlighet är ett allvarligt problem. Att vissa människor inte kan förbättra sin ekonomiska, och därmed ofta också sociala, situation är en form av ekonomisk segregation som bidrar till att skapa hopplöshet och <b>otrygghet</b>.</p>	<p>... The lack of social mobility is a serious problem. The inability of some people to improve their economic, and therefore often social, situation is a form of economic segregation that contributes to hopelessness and insecurity.</p>
<p>... När det allmänna också tar över ansvaret för sådant som medborgarna normalt både kan och vill klara själva blir de utlämnade. Den grundläggande trygghet som i att ha kontroll över den egna ekonomin försvinner och förbyts i en <b>otrygghet</b> som urholkar välfärden</p>	<p>... When the public sector also takes over responsibility for things that citizens are normally both able and willing to do for themselves, they are abandoned. The basic security of being in control of one's own finances disappears and is replaced by an insecurity that undermines the welfare system.</p>
<p>... Men de höga skatterna får också stora direkta negativa konsekvenser för enskilda och familjer. Tillvaron blir <b>otrygg</b> för alla dem som tvingas till en tillvaro där varje krona går till att täcka nödvändiga utgifter och inkomsten ofta ändå inte räcker till."</p>	<p>... But high taxes also have major direct negative consequences for individuals and families. Life becomes precarious for all those who are forced into a life where every penny goes to cover essential expenses and where income is often insufficient anyway."</p>

The concept ”otrygg” is used seven times in the text, four of those times as a noun (“otrygghet”). The multiple examples of usage in the same text, the noun form, and the new, innovative meaning that “otrygghet” is given in the text hint at the weightier meaning given to the concept and how crucially it supports the main argument in the text. We can remind ourselves of how Koselleck (2004) defines

a concept from a mere word, *“a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word”*. Indeed, if “otrygghet” was removed, the text would appear quite different. The first section states that if the state take over responsibility from its citizens, it leaves them exposed and abandoned. “Trygghet” is exchanged for “otrygghet” as people lose control over their lives, and the generated “otrygghet” hollows out the welfare state. Not having enough money makes people “otrygga” by making them rely on welfare. Social mobility is threatened, and being stuck in a social position makes people feel hopeless.

This, together with the crucial role in which the concept ”otrygghet” supports the meaning of the text, is a repeating theme in several of the motions from 1998 from Moderaterna, for example also in Motion 1998/99:N329. In this motion ”otrygghet” is not employed as a counter-concept to ”trygghet” but rather to something that can be described as having *agency*. “Bidragsberoende” is an interesting term to use, because while a correct translation would be “reliance on welfare”, the literal translation is closer to “addiction to welfare”, and the term carries associations with sickness and health. To rely on is something you can do unproblematically, but an addiction is always a problem. We can also note the moniker “växande”, growing, being used together with “otrygghet”. This locates the problem of “otrygghet” within the realm of the developing, the accelerating, the non-static and gives it a sense of urgency. ”Otrygghet” is again given a meaning close to stagnation and immobility and associated with hopelessness and social segregation. This implies ”being stuck” rather than ”being left out”, which was what the traditional conceptual usage of “otrygghet in an economic context signified. Individualism and the individual’s agency is threatened by collective oppression. Building upon the close association between the welfare state and the counter-concept “trygghet”, the text argues that being provided with multiple and large welfare ”hand-outs” actually fosters growing ”otrygghet”. The causal chain is thus reversed. If being left out of the secure protection of the state is generally understood as ”otrygghet”, in this conceptual usage, it is that very protection that causes ”otrygghet”. This reversal is visible also in Motion 1998/99:Fi203, which argues that something that has generally been associated with trygghet, in this case labor laws, is actually causing the opposite, ”otrygghet”.

Motion 1998/99:A802 and the almost identical Motion 1998/99:Sf214 form an interesting bridge between several themes that are visible in the material from 1998. The motions argue that the Swedish welfare state oppresses women by locking them into poorly paid public sector jobs. “Otrygghet och inlåsning” is an example of conceptual work that aims to converge “otrygghet” with new, different

terms; to be “otrygg” is to be locked in. The public sector, previously associated with welfare and “trygghet”, should instead be associated with stagnation, monopoly, and “systemberoende” (‘system addiction’), reliance on the system. This is a repeating theme of the Moderate motions from this period. More novel, and characteristic of the political discussions in Sweden during the late 90’s, is the specific theme of women’s economic situation. The motion uses the phrases “de låser fast kvinnor i systemberoende och otrygghet” (‘they [the Socialdemokraterna] trap women in system dependence and ‘otrygghet’’) and “Alltför många kvinnor har i dag fastnat i en otrygg offentliganställning med låga löner, höga skatter och i många fall bidragsberoende” (‘too many women are today caught in “otrygg” public employment with low wages, high taxes, and often dependence on welfare’). Both of these phrases echo critique from, and explicitly reference, “Kvinnomaktsutredningen”, literally translated as “the investigation of women’s power,” which was a politically appointed committee that investigated the social and economic situation of women in Sweden, in terms of family, welfare, and working life. The committee released a total of 13 reports in 1997 and 1998. It found that Swedish society is not equal, the organization of working life is not rational, affirmative action is common (for men), and that the public sector exploits women (1998) It is evident from the examined text that this series of reports influenced the political debate during late 1990’s. To link this polemic push for associating “otrygghet” with dependence on welfare to the ongoing struggles of feminism can be read as an attempt to converge the issue of the secondary position of women in society with the strong welfare state.

Something interesting happens here that can be labeled a *contemporary polemic push*, an attempt to launch a new and different meaning of the concept. We will call the meaning given to the concept in the Moderate motions from 1996 the *stagnated* definition of otrygghet. This definition of the concept is given more weight, repeated many times through the texts, and is vital to the central points presented. Can this be seen as an attempt to wrestle from Socialdemokraterna one of their traditional weapons, the close association between the party and the material gains of the workers movement in the form of secure jobs, housing, and welfare? In that case, did it succeed? While we can note that Moderaterna lost power in 1994 and did not regain it until 2006, the ups and downs of Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna are not the central questions here. Questions on if the strategy succeeded can also be answered by conceptual analysis. Did the new meaning that Moderaterna launched for otrygghet in 1998 change the concept for subsequent periods?

## Return to a *materialistic* definition in the wake of the 2008 crisis

There are no less than 19 motions where the concept “otrygghet” is used in a context related to labor rights, work life, and employment from 2008. All of them are Social Democratic motions, and they have many similarities. A typical example, Motion 2008/09:A366, argues that “otrygghet” has increased in the labor market during the last years:

Motion 2008/09:A366	English translation of Motion 2008/09:A366
"De senaste åren har otryggheten på arbetsmarknaden ökat. Arbetslivet har blivit stressigare, kraven har ökat och medfört en ökad ohälsa. Ytterligare en påverkansfaktor är den ändring av turordningsreglerna som trädde i kraft den 1 januari 2001."	"Insecurity in the labour market has increased in the last years. Working life has become more stressful, demands have increased, and this has resulted in an increase in ill health. A further factor is the change of the rules on employee rotation that were implemented 1st of January 2001."

“The last years” can perhaps be interpreted as ‘since Socialdemokraterna lost power in 2006’, and the argumentation in the motion follows a structure that is typical. First there is a general statement of the problem, where the concept of “otrygghet” defines the issue. Then comes a breakdown of various factors that the text argues have caused the issue, starting with more general factors and ending with a concrete example of how this is at least partly the fault of the right-wing coalition ruling Sweden. The example in question is the change of the rules on employee rotation of the Employment Protection Act that enabled small employers to exempt two employees, which was voted through parliament by a coalition between the right-wing parties and the Green party. The concept of “otrygghet” is central in the argumentation. It is paired with the moniker “increased”, which means increased “otrygghet” in the context of the labor market. Furthermore, the problem is described in general terms and does not point out any specific groups as being especially affected. Several motions use very similar conceptual usage. Wage dumping, jobs with decreased job safety, and jobs with “otrygg” insurance must be stopped, argue Motion 2008/09:Sf375 and Motion 2008/09:Sf373, which state that involuntary part-time jobs and “otrygga” positions of employment entail the risk of getting stuck in work with limited developmental and advancement opportunities. Motion 2008/09:A309 argues that the rules determining priority for reinstatement are an important factor for workplace democracy and freedom of speech, and “otrygga” employment contracts silence people.

“Otrygg” here means precarious, unsecure and uninsured. An “otrygg” employment is a position exempt from the protective laws, collective agreements, and insurance forms that traditionally protect workers in the so called “Swedish model”. It should be noted that phrases such as “the workers of Sweden” are not used, probably because of the political connotation of class struggle they entail. Instead, the issue is framed as being very general, and a concern for the public at large.

There are also several examples where “otrygg” employment and work conditions are claimed to impact different issue, which is the main subject of the motion. This is the case for Motion 2008/09:So575 on dentistry. Dental health and its correlation to socioeconomic status is the main theme of the motion, and ”otrygga” work conditions are mentioned as part of the explanatory factors: young people study for longer and debut on the labor market later, often in “otrygga” temporary work contracts. In addition, Motion 2008/09:Sk491 uses the concept in a motion about economic crime, where one of the side effects of economic crime is trapping people in ”ytterst otryggt arbetsliv”, highly precarious work situations, and Motion 2008/09:Sk409 is very similar and also describes ”otrygga” employment as a consequence of economic crime. There are also texts where specific groups are considered to be especially affected by “otrygghet”, for example women.

Motion 2008/09:A397 states that the government increases “otryggheten” for groups that are already in disadvantageous labor market positions. Since women are stuck in “otrygga”, precarious positions of employment to a larger degree than men, this implies a risk for worsening gender-based inequality. The motion ends by arguing that dismantling Swedish labor protection laws, together with the deterioration of unemployment insurance, leads to unacceptably low levels of protection for wage-earners on the Swedish labor market. “Otrygg” employment here, in a similar fashion as the examples discussed above, means precarious, unsecure, part-time, flexible work.

Several motions follow this type of argument and use “otrygghet” to describe a deteriorating labor market and how political changes concerning labor protection will impact women more than men. Motion 2008/09:A260 states that ”otrygga” and temporary jobs, such as jobs that are involuntarily part-time, are more common among women. Motion 2008/09:Ub6 is about the academic labor market and mentions that women to a higher degree than men leave academia after obtaining their PhD, because of the “otrygg” financial situation as young researchers. Motion 2008/09:A368 mentions both young people and women as especially impacted by increasing ”otrygghet” and uses the concept no less than five times to describe young people’s life situations and labor market position and

the correlation between "otrygghet" and bad health. In rare superlative form, the Motion uses "otryggaste" to describe a form of on-call employment. Motion 2008/09:A334 also describes young people as especially impacted; they commonly work part-time with low wages with a great deal of "otrygghet". We can note that there is an association between "otrygghet" and bad health that is stressed in several motions.

The *stagnated* definition of "otrygghet" is not very visible in the material and seems to rise and fall during the 1990's. The defining feature of "otrygghet" used in the 2008 material is the Socialdemokraterna' re-launch of the *materialistic* definition and use of "otrygghet" to describe unsecure positions on the labor market. Koselleck (2004) stresses the importance of conjuncture and context within the synchronous analysis of a what a concept signifies and to be mindful of the tension of the linguistic and the political, social, and historical. We can note here that Socialdemokraterna lost power to a liberal-conservative coalition in 2006 and that that the recession and subsequent financial crisis of 2008 were the worst in modern history, with far-reaching consequences. It is perhaps through this lens that we should view the Social Democratic attempt to re-launch a materialistic definition of otrygghet, one that was far less visible in 1988 and 1998 than in 1978 and 2008. Yet we can also note some novelties in 2008. There is a closer association between otrygghet and bad health, and otrygg is more commonly used to describe an emotional state, or to be more precise, an emotional reaction to a material state. There is also a tendency to talk about economic "otrygghet" as something especially affecting certain groups in society, for example women.

## To feel "otrygg" in 2018

There are six motions where the concept "otrygghet" is used in a work-related context in 2018, which is a much smaller percentage of motions compared to 2008. They are all Social Democratic, and a typical example would be Motion 2018/19:1959 on labor market relations for young people. "Otrygghet" is used to denote that young people who employed in precarious ways — as substitutes, in short-term contracts and at temporary work agencies — have "otrygga" life situations. Their lives are "otrygga" because their work is. "Otrygghet" signifies precarious, unsecure, part-time, flexible work. How work affects an individual's life and the risks that work can entail is a repeating theme, for example in Motion 2018/19:957 on work life and mental health. This motion further stresses the association between "otrygghet" and bad health, stating that mental health issues

such as stress, depression, and burnout are a leading cause of extended sick leave in Sweden. The text argues that an underlying cause is factors related to work life, such as high work load, "otrygga" contracts of employment, workplace harassment, and difficulty in finding a work-life balance. The concept of otrygghet is used to denote a certain form of employment contract, and while the text doesn't outright state it, we can extrapolate that this refers to substitute, short-term, temporary, or otherwise irregular employment contracts. Also Motion 2018/19:744 describes the negative effects of unsecure employment: stress, "otrygghet", an unsecure economic situation, and problems obtaining bank loans and housing. It can be noted that instead of describing the employment itself as "otrygg", as is common in work-related conceptual use, the state of the employment is called unsecure and "otrygghet" is listed as a negative effect. In this example, you can *feel* otrygg because of your work situation, while examples from 1978 might state that you *are* otrygg because of your work. This can be read as using the concept to describe a subjective feeling rather than an objective state, which can be seen as a different way to use the concept compared with earlier periods.

In this economic context, neither the *stagnated* definition, nor the relaunch of the *materialistic* definition seem to have made a lasting impact on what the concept of otrygghet signifies in 2018. Relatively few examples exist from 2018 that use otrygghet in an economic context at all. The existing examples are Social Democratic and use the materialistic definition in the sense that they describe a work-related otrygghet, otrygghet as in unsecure employment. However the concept has come to signify something different than in the documents from 1978, when otrygghet referred to people's materialist lifeworlds, where unpredictable and instable work, welfare, and living conditions made you otrygg. In contrast, "Otrygghet" in 2018 describes an emotional state that is a potential effect of precarious and unsecure work and life-conditions. Being in unsecure and temporary employment can make you feel otrygg and affect your health. Otrygghet has become a way of describing an internal state of mind. We can call this the *subjective* definition of "otrygghet".

## Conceptual change

This section addresses the central questions for this analysis in terms of how the concept of "otrygghet" is used and how usage has changed over time.

How are of crime surveys fear referenced in use of the concept?



Year	Empirical examples	English Translation
1978	No examples of references to fear of crime surveys	
1988	No examples of references to fear of crime surveys	
1998	<i>"Motsvarande 2 miljoner svenskar anger att de inte vågar gå ut själva när det är mörkt."</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ju901)	"Correspondingly, 2 million Swedes say they are afraid to go out alone after dark"
2008	<i>"Många kvinnor känner en oro för att utsättas för någon form av våldsbrott som misshandel, överfall eller rån, och många undviker därför att gå ut själva på kvällen eller om natten. I Brottsförebyggande rådets nationella trygghetsundersökning från 2007 framkommer att kvinnor i betydligt större utsträckning än män anpassar sitt beteende efter otryggheten. 50 procent av kvinnorna i Sverige upplevde en oro för att utsättas för någon form av våldsbrott efter mörkrets inbrott. Över hälften av alla tillfrågade kvinnor svarade att de undvek att gå ut på kvällen, medan bara 17 procent av männen uppgav samma svar."</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju231)	"Many women feel worried about the risk of being victimized by violent crime such as abuse, assault, or robbery, and many avoid going out alone during the evening or at night. The Swedish Crime Survey of the Swedish Crime Prevention Council from 2007 show that women are much more likely than men to adapt their behavior because of fear of crime. 50% of women in Sweden feel fearful of being the victim of some form of violent crime after dark. More than half of all women surveyed said they avoided going out at night, while only 17% of participating men said the same."
	<i>"I många av dessa områden kan man som boende uppleva otrygghet och jämfört med andra bostadsområden är fler rädda för att gå ut ensamma eller när det är mörkt"</i> (Motion 2008/09:C411)	"In many of these areas, inhabitants might experience fear of crime, and compared to other areas, more people are afraid to leave their home alone or after dark"
	<i>"Forskning visar att kvinnor och män upplever offentliga miljöer och trygghet inom transportsystemet olika."</i> (Proposition 2008/09:35)	"Research show women and men differently experience public spaces and safety when using public transportation."
2018	<i>"Denna typ av brott riskerar att sprida otrygghet och rädsla och medföra att många äldre drar sig för att till exempel gå utanför hemmet."</i> (Motion 2018/19:2870)	"This type of crime risks spreading insecurity and fear of crime and causes many elderly to refrain from leaving their homes."
	<i>"En av tre kvinnor känner sig otrygga utomhus i sitt eget bostadsområde om kvällen."</i> (Motion 2018/19:2806)	"One out of three women feels insecure in their own neighborhood during the evening"
	<i>"Enligt nya mätningar från Brottsförebyggande rådet är otryggheten högre i socialt och ekonomiskt eftersatta bostadsområden, jämfört med andra områden."</i> (Motion 201/19:1188)	"According to new measurements from the Crime Prevention Council, fear of crime is higher in socially and economically deprived neighborhoods, compared to other areas"

Figure 48

From the literature review we know that there has been a lot of research, globally and over time, on how people feel about walking around their neighborhoods after dark. This is the Ennis (1967) operationalization, discussed throughout this thesis. It asks people how safe they feel walking alone in their neighborhoods after dark, and this has been widely assumed to measure fear of crime. Chapter 5 also discussed how this has been extensively criticized as lacking validity, as it doesn't mention crime and has been shown to have a low correlation to questions that directly ask about fear of crime (Ferraro & Lagrange, 1987). The Ennis (1967)

operationalization operationalization could conceivably measure some internal emotional configuration, such as fear of the dark or dislike of being alone. Scholars have remarked upon the need for the fear of crime research discourse to differentiate between personal traits and situational factors (Gabriel & Greve, 2003), or between worry and fear of crime (Gray et al., 2008), between anger and fear (Ditton, Bannister, et al., 1999) experienced fear and "expressive" fear, and to reflect upon the cultural meaning of crime and social change (Jackson, 2004). Furthermore, the instrument of measurement tends to be a survey, where people are asked to judge their level of fear on a Lickert-scale, which researchers have criticized as unable to capture the transient nature of fear (Koskela, 1999b; Koskela & Pain, 2000; Stanko, 1990, 1995).

The limited scope of the above research influences how "otrygghet" figures in political debate. It is stressed at several points that certain demographic groups are more afraid, for example, women and the elderly. These types of demographic categories are common in survey research and easy to measure using common quantitative instruments, such as surveys. However, they provide very little information either on the socio-psychological mechanisms that make one individual more afraid than the next *or* on the structural explanations for the fear of crime. I argue, with Mills (1959) that the above is by limit of design. We can say that the measurements have well known deficiencies, but no matter what this measurement actually measures, it *is considered to be* a measurement of fear of crime. Heber (2007) also reaches the conclusion that Swedish authorities, politicians, and the media see crime as the most obvious explanation for people's fears. She writes that it is generally believed that fear can be reduced if crime is reduced. Heber's (2007) study of Swedish media reporting on fear of crime also shows the daily press links fear of crime with crime. Walklate (2006) that connecting fear and crime risk has been a perpetual and consistent feature of the criminal victimization survey industry.

The fear of crime surveys that have produced this knowledge are not always correctly interpreted, in a methodological and technical sense, in these texts. For example Motion 2008/09:Ju231 claims that women refrain from going out during the evening because of fear of violent crime, which is not something the Swedish Crime Survey measures. However, it is an interesting example of how the results are interpreted and how the underlying assumption that otrygghet (as in feeling unsafe alone outside after dark) is caused by violent crime is fundamental for the research discourse as a whole. We can note other technically incorrect results in this material. For example no fear of crime survey has reported that a majority of women feel "otrygga". There are also commensurative practices at

work here. To be able to claim that “corresponding to 2 million Swedes” we have to apply some creative statistical procedures, such as applying results from a limited sample that is only representative for some demographics to the whole population and collapsing variables to produce a dichotomous measurement of fear of crime. There is also a tendency to locate “otrygghet” within certain contexts, such as socio-economically disparate neighborhoods, even if the fear of crime surveys generally have very low response rates from these neighborhoods (see chapter 7). We should of course remind ourselves that politicians are not trained statisticians or social scientists. To read and interpret surveys correctly is a skill that not all politicians have. Furthermore, it is perhaps unfair to expect politicians to think critically about what the Ennis (1967) operationalization actually measures, as it is the generally accepted way to measure fear of crime in the field of criminology. If anyone should be held responsible for the spread of this operationalization and the conceptual confusion it is associated with, it should be criminologists. That being said, it is interesting to note that in all of the examined materials, I have not found a single example of a survey that was misinterpreted in the opposite direction. In other words, there are only mistakes that report a higher level of “otrygghet” than in the surveys, and no examples misreport a lower level of fear of crime than in the surveys.

### Is the concept common?

<b>Year</b>	<i>Total number of motions and bills from S and M</i>	<i>Number of motions or bills where the concept “otrygghet” is used</i>	<i>Number of times the concept “otrygghet” is used in motions and bills</i>	<i>Percentage of total motions and bills where “otrygghet” is used</i>
<b>1978</b>	1490	16	19	1.1%
<b>1988</b>	1850	21	25	1.1%
<b>1998</b>	1313	29	44	2.2%
<b>2008</b>	2689	65	96	2.4%
<b>2018</b>	1650	54	69	3.2%

**Figure 49** Frequency of use of the concept "otrygghet" 1978-2018

“Otrygghet” becomes more commonly referred to as time progresses, as shown here by **Figure 49**. During later periods there are more political documents being produced in total, but the use of the concept increases quicker still. “Otrygghet” appears in 1.1% of all motions and bills during 1978, compared to 3.2% in 2018.

# Is meaning of the concept disputed?

<b>1978</b>	No
<b>1988</b>	No
<b>1998</b>	Yes and no: its meaning in a crime-related context is undisputed, but M launches a new economic meaning close to stagnation, system dependence, and hopelessness.
<b>2008</b>	Yes and no: its meaning in a crime-related context is undisputed, but only S uses the concept in a traditional economic context to signify unsecure and precarious employment.
<b>2018</b>	No. While some few examples of an economic context remain, the crime context dominates and is undisputed.

**Figure 50** Is meaning of the concept "otrygghet" disputed?

Whether the meaning of the concept of “otrygghet” is disputed is addressed by comparing use of the concept of “otrygghet” between the two examined parties, Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna. **Figure 50** depicts the analysis. If the parties give a similar meaning to the concept within a time period, it is considered undisputed. If distinct differences can be found between the parties in how the concept is used, its meaning is considered to be disputed during the time period.

## In what contexts is the concept used?

Shown here in **Figure 51** are the most common context from 1978 was the economic; "otrygghet" was primarily used related to employment, industry, labor and welfare. The economic context was also the most common in 1988, but it also became common to use the concept in relation to children and families, and to a lesser extent, in relation to women and the elderly. In 1998 the economic context was still common, but with a new meaning, one that related otrygghet to stagnation and reliance on welfare. Additionally, the crime context became increasingly common in 1998. The economic context is the most common in 2008, with many examples from Socialdemokraterna that try to revive an older economic definition, but crime is also a very common context in 2008, along with children and families. During the last period, 2018, crime became the dominating context, with far more examples than for either the economic or ‘children and families’ contexts.

**Figure 51** shows the categorization of all examined examples according to context. It should be noted that the chart shows the total number of examples and not averages. This means that there are far more examples from the last periods compared to the earlier periods, and how common a context is should be interpreted accordingly. For example, the economic context dominates in 1978,

even though more examples can be found from 2008 in the economic context. The economic context is composed of examples concerning employment and labor market, welfare, industry, and commodities. The three most common contexts of crime, economics, and ‘children and families’ have been discussed and presented in detail and were chosen because there are numerous examples from all periods in these three categories. The most striking development is how dominating the crime context becomes as time progresses.




Figure 51 Examples of "Otrygg" used in different contexts 1978-2018

## What solutions are suggested to the problem of otrygghet?

	Empirical examples	Translation
<b>1978</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- en bättre kontinuitet (Proposition 1978/79:178)</li> <li>- att undanröja den bostadsslum, trångboddhet och bostadsbrist (Motion 1978/79:788)</li> <li>- ett förstatligande av utbildningen (Motion 1978/79:1928)</li> <li>- ett slutligt ställningstagande (Motion 1978/79:1906)</li> <li>- om åtgärder mot skilsmässor (Motion 1978/79:1266)</li> <li>- anslagen till vägnätet ökas (Motion 1978/79:2399)</li> <li>- att insatserna för att komma till rätta med problemen skulle samordnas, en gift- och kemikommission tillsätts, forskningen intensifieras, lagstiftningen ses över, nya ämnen förhands-kontrolleras och administrationen samordnas (Motion 1978/79:1990)</li> <li>- domänverkets jämna virkesuttag (Motion 1978/79:2140)</li> <li>- Användning av generalklausuler i lagstiftningen bör därför från rätts säkerhetssynpunkt undvikas (Motion 1978/79:1108)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Better continuity</li> <li>-to eliminate the housing slums, overcrowding, and housing shortages</li> <li>-nationalization of education</li> <li>- measures against divorce</li> <li>-expenditures for the road network increased</li> <li>-efforts to address the problems would be coordinated, a poison and chemistry commission would be appointed, research intensified, legislation reviewed, new substances pre-checked, and administration coordinated</li> <li>-Even timber extraction</li> <li>- The use of general clauses in the legislation should be avoided from a legal safety point of view</li> </ul>
<b>1988</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- fördjupad (specialpedagogisk) kunskap (Proposition 1988/89:4)</li> <li>- Tillräcklig kunskap (Motion 1988/89:Sf266)</li> <li>- att sänka pensionsåldern (Motion 1988/89:Sf323)</li> <li>- att barns behov hävdas på lokal nivå (Motion 1988/89:So614)</li> <li>När någon överträder lagen skall en reaktion inträffa (Motion 1988/89:Ju805)</li> <li>- Skärpta krav vid omhändertagande av barn (Motion 1988/89:So327)</li> <li>- Ökad rätts säkerhet vid omhändertagande av barn (Motion 1988/89:So278)</li> <li>- Därför bör lagen ändras (Motion 1988/89:L403)</li> <li>- Familjen skall därför stimuleras till att hjälpas åt att ta detta ansvar (Motion 1988/89:L406)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- in-depth (special educational) knowledge</li> <li>-Sufficient knowledge</li> <li>- to lower the retirement age</li> <li>- that children's needs are asserted at the local level</li> <li>- When someone violates the law, a reaction must occur</li> <li>- Stricter requirements state custody of children</li> <li>-The law should be changed</li> <li>- the family should be stimulated to accept this responsibility</li> </ul>
<b>1998</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ha kontroll över den egna ekonomin (Motion 1998/99:Sk311)</li> <li>- längre planeringar i sin ekonomi (Motion 1998/99:Sf9)</li> <li>- (mer) polis (Motion 1998/99:Ju205 Motion 1998/99:Ju202)</li> <li>- Nytt påföljdssystem för unga brottslingar</li> <li>- Ökat skydd för utsatta kvinnor</li> <li>- Skärpta insatser mot narkotika</li> <li>- Livstids fängelse för grova narkotikabrottslingar</li> <li>- Möjlighet till buggning vid misstanke om mycket allvarlig brottslighet</li> <li>- Bättre rustat rättsväsende</li> <li>- Fängelse tiden skall användas till adekvat vård och utbildning</li> <li>- Disciplinätgärder även för livstidsdömda</li> <li>- Fler alternativa påföljder (Motion 1998/99:Ju904)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-have control over their own finances</li> <li>- long-time financial planning</li> <li>- more police</li> <li>- New sanction system for young criminals</li> <li>-Increased protection for vulnerable women</li> <li>- Stricter interventions against drugs</li> <li>- Life imprisonment for serious drug offenders</li> <li>- Bugging should be a possibility for serious crime</li> <li>- Better equipped justice system</li> <li>- Prison terms should be used for adequate care and education</li> <li>- Discipline measures also for criminals sentenced for life</li> <li>- More alternative sanctions</li> </ul>

<b>2008</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>(mer) polis</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju235; Motion 2008/09:Ju360)</li> <li>- <i>Varje misshandelsfall bör betraktas som ett för mycket</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju379)</li> <li>- <i>Vi behöver en debatt om orsakerna till det ökade våldet</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju235)</li> <li>- <i>Den organiserade brottsligheten måste bekämpas med alla medel</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju234)</li> <li>- <i>att förhindra att brottsligheten får fotfäste i vårt samhälle</i> (Motion -2008/09:Ju360)</li> <li>- <i>Därför vill vi förbättra både arbetslöshetsförsäkringen och sjukförsäkringen</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi25)</li> <li>- <i>kvalificerade utbildningsalternativ och kompetenskonton</i> (Motion 2008/09:U349)</li> <li>- <i>bekämpa våld och brottslighet</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju360)</li> <li>- <i>Att ha ett tryggt arbete</i> (Motion 2008/09:Sf373)</li> <li>- <i>Företrädesrätt till återanställning</i> (Motion 2008/09:A309)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- More police</li> <li>- Every assault case should be considered one too much - We need a debate on the causes of the increased violence</li> <li>- Organized crime must be fought by all means to prevent crime from gaining a foothold in our society</li> <li>- Therefore, we want to improve both unemployment insurance and health insurance</li> <li>- Qualified training alternatives and competency funds</li> <li>- Fight violence and crime</li> <li>- Having a secure job</li> <li>- Primacy for re-employment</li> </ul>
<b>2018</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>fler trygghetskameror, bättre villkor och löner för polisen samt en rad skärpta straff och nya brottsrubriceringar</i> (Motion 2018/19:2569)</li> <li>- <i>gängkriminalitet som breder ut sig måste slås tillbaka</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)</li> <li>- <i>en stark och kontinuerlig polisnärvaro</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)</li> <li>- <i>underlätta polisens brottsupplärande arbete</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)</li> <li>- <i>Drogtester i skolan</i> (Motion 2018/19:1189)</li> <li>- <i>polisära resurser</i> (Motion 2018/19:1428)</li> <li>- <i>En förstärkt och mer effektiv polis</i> (Motion 2018/19:960)</li> <li>- <i>Moderaterna vill därför införa ett särskilt brott – olaga frihetsbegränsning</i> (Motion 2018/19:2918)</li> <li>- <i>tillträdesförbud för personer som skapar otrygghet</i> (Motion 2018/19:2918)</li> <li>- <i>Kameraövervakning</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)</li> <li>- <i>ytterligare skärpa straff</i> (Motion 2018/19:891)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- more security cameras</li> <li>- better conditions and salaries for the police as well as a series of stricter penalties and new criminalizations</li> <li>- gang crime that spreads must be fought back</li> <li>- a strong and continuous police presence</li> <li>- facilitate the police's crime-solving work</li> <li>- police resources</li> <li>- A strengthened and more efficient police</li> <li>- Moderaterna therefore want to introduce a new crime category: unlawful restriction of liberty</li> <li>- bans for people who create insecurity</li> <li>- CCTV</li> <li>- Further sharpen penalties</li> </ul>

**Figure 52** Solutions suggested to the problem of otrygghet 1978-2018

**Figure 52** depicts suggested solutions to the problem of "otrygghet" in the examined motions and bills. In 1978, the most commonly suggested solutions to the problem of "otrygghet" are state interventions. Rules and laws should be clear and easy to understand. Forceful and decisive political decision-making and policy can and will solve the problem of "otrygghet". The state is often assigned a double role, as both potential a cause of and a provider of solutions to the problem of "otrygghet". Looking at 1988, many solutions are oriented towards families and children, mainly concerning the rule of law and custody, but also in "stimulating" families. Some suggestions are knowledge-oriented. Some judicial and penal interventions are also suggested. In 1998, there are arguments that people should have more control of their economic situation and be able to plan for the long-term. Most suggestions are oriented towards the judicial sphere: more money for the police and courts, extended legal means and discretionary powers, and more judicial sanctions and disciplinary interventions. Drugs feature as something that must be eradicated to solve "otrygghet". In 2008, a zero-tolerance vision of crime is suggested as a solution to otrygghet, hinting at the closer convergence between otrygghet and crime. Violence and crime must be fought to end "otrygghet". There are also some suggestions oriented towards an economic context, arguing for secure employment and opportunities for re-training. In 2018, the judicial context dominates the suggested solutions of "otrygghet". The police force is now a key actor in solving "otrygghet" and should have more discretionary powers, resources, and legal means. Almost all suggestions mention the police. The state is not very visible as a solution, with the exception of law enforcement. New crime categories and criminalization efforts are commonly suggested, a judicial expansion.



## What causes are attributed to “otrygghet”?

Empirical examples	Translation
<p><b>1978</b> <i>den borgerliga beslutsvåndan</i> (Motion 1978/79:2253)  <i>det stora oljeberoendet</i> (Proposition 1978/79:115)  <i>hänvisas till olika läkare</i> (Proposition 1978/79:178)  <i>orimligt lång försöksperiod</i> (Motion 1978/79:1906)  <i>de många skilsmässorna</i> (Motion 1978/79:1266)  <i>anslagen till vägnätet har inte anpassats till kostnadsutvecklingen</i> (Motion 1978/79:2399)  <i>kraftigt ökade användningen av kemikalier</i> (Motion 1978/79:1990)  <i>ojämna avverknings-verksamheten</i> (Motion 1978/79:2140)  <i>Mycket allmänt hållna lagbud. s. k. generalklausuler</i> (Motion 1978/79:1108)  <i>personalminskningar</i>  <i>och långt gående rationaliseringar</i> (Motion 1978/79:2025)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The right-wing indecisiveness</li> <li>- Over-reliance on oil</li> <li>- Being referred to different doctors</li> <li>- Unreasonably long trial-period</li> <li>- Too many divorces</li> <li>- Expenditures for roads have not kept up with costs</li> <li>- sharply increased the use of chemicals,</li> <li>- uneven felling operations</li> <li>- Very generally worded laws. so-called general clauses</li> <li>- staff reductions and far-reaching 'rationalizations'</li> </ul>
<p><b>1988</b> <i>Myndighetsingripande</i> (Motion 1988/89:So327)  <i>bristen på läkare</i> (Motion 1988/89:So513)  <i>De långa vårdköerna</i> (Motion 1988/89:So423)  <i>ett ökande hjälpbehov</i> (Motion 1988/89:Sf266)  <i>Personalcirkulationen</i> (Proposition 1988/89:108)  <i>Kvinnomisshandel</i> (Motion 1988/89:Ju619)  <i>många brott begås och om de skyldiga går fria eller endast får milda påföljder</i> (Motion 1988/89:Ju805)  <i>stora barngrupper och långa vistelsetider för barnen</i> (Motion 1988/89:So612)  <i>Kommunala daghem med stora barngrupper och stor omsättning på personal</i> (Motion 1988/89:So612)  <i>kvinnan drivs till att ta mindre ansvar för barn och familj och mannen</i>  <i>inte tar över</i> (Motion 1988/89:L406)  <i>stora samhällsomdaningars</i> (Motion 1988/89:A422)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- State authority intervention</li> <li>- Shortage of doctors</li> <li>- The long health care queues</li> <li>- increasing health care needs</li> <li>- Staff circulation</li> <li>- Violence against women</li> <li>- many crimes are committed, and the culprits go free or receive lenient sentences</li> <li>- large groups of children and long stays at daycare</li> <li>- Municipal daycare centers with large groups of children and a large turnover of staff</li> <li>- women are driven to take less responsibility for children and family, and the man does not take over</li> <li>- major societal transformations</li> </ul>
<p><b>1998</b> - <i>De s.k. trygghetslagarna</i> (Motion 1998/99:Fi203)  <i>-större bidragsberoende</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ju904)  <i>-våldet i tv</i>  <i>- med våld, aggressivitet, hot på gatan, i skolan och hemma.</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ub258)  <i>-stor arbetslöshet, höga skatter och ett allt större bidragsberoende</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ju904)  <i>-ungdomar tillåts slå sönder rutor utan att någon vuxen reagerar</i>  <i>- om värden sedan låter fönstren stå olagade</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ju901)  <i>-gatulangning av narkotika, försäljning av illegal sprit till unga samt våld och hot i gatumiljö</i> (Proposition 1998/99:1D9)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The so-called labor security (trygghets) laws</li> <li>- Increased reliance on welfare</li> <li>- Video violence</li> <li>- violence, aggression, threats on the street, at school and at home</li> <li>- high unemployment, high taxes and a growing reliance on welfare</li> <li>- young people are allowed to break windows without any adult reaction</li> <li>- the landlord allows windows to remain broken</li> <li>- street drug trafficking, sale of illegal alcohol to young people, and violence and threats in the street</li> </ul>

<p><b>2008</b> <i>ojämlika förhållanden</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju379)  <i>Våld</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju235; Motion 2008/09:Ju379)  <i>våldsbrotten blir allt mer synliga</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju234)  <i>grovt kriminella under stark press vistas ute bland allmänheten.</i> (Motion 2008/09:315)  <i>Bankrån</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju246)  <i>tillfälliga anställningsformer</i> (Motion 2008/09:A260)  <i>De ungas otrygga situation på arbetsmarknaden</i> (Motion 2008/09:A368)  <i>Lönedumpning, skattefusk och svartarbete</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi269)  <i>Ekobrott</i> (Motion 2008/09:Sk409)  <i>våld eller trakasserier</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju266)  <i>Regeringen har skapat den nya otryggheten.</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi270)  <i>omfattande strukturförändringar och en tydlig risk- för sämre reallöne-utveckling</i> (Motion 2008/09:U349)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Unequal conditions</li> <li>- Violence</li> <li>- Violent crimes are becoming increasingly visible</li> <li>- Serious offenders under strong pressure are out among the public</li> <li>- Bank robbery</li> <li>- Temporary jobs</li> <li>- The precarious situation of young people in the labor market</li> <li>- Wage dumping, tax fraud and undeclared work</li> <li>- Economic crime</li> <li>- Violence or harassment</li> <li>The government</li> <li>- extensive structural changes and a clear risk of poorer real wage development</li> </ul>
<p><b>2018</b> <i>Moralpolis</i>  (Motion 2018/19:2865; Motion 2018/19:2806)  <i>den polisiära frånvaron</i> (Motion 2018/19:2650)  <i>Polisen upplevs som frånvarande</i>  (Motion 2018/19:2934)  <i>våld, brott och droger</i> (Motion 2018/19:2569)  <i>skjutningar</i>  (Motion 2018/19:1706)  - <i>Förekomsten av droger i skolan</i> (Motion 2018/19:1189)  - <i>Bedrägerier mot äldre</i> (Motion 2018/19:2870)  - <i>gängkriminalitet</i>  (Motion 2018/19:2934)  - <i>den grova organiserade brottsligheten</i> (Motion 2018/19:1706)  - <i>Mäns våld mot kvinnor och hedersrelaterad brottslighet</i> (Motion 2018/19:2865)  - <i>bluffakturor och falska muntliga avtal</i> (Motion 2018/19:1741)  <i>gängbrottslighet, rån, butiksstölder, inbrottsvägar i mindre samhällen på landsbygden och äldre som utsätts för stölder i sina egna hem</i> (Motion 2018/19:891)  <i>ett nytt utanförskap</i> Motion till riksdagen 2018/19:960  <i>kortsiktiga anställningar via bemanningsföretag eller som timvikarier med korta varsel</i> (Motion 2018/19:1959)</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- 'Moral police' among the public</li> <li>- The absence of police</li> <li>- The police are perceived as absent</li> <li>- violence, crime and drugs</li> <li>- shootings</li> <li>- The presence of drugs in school</li> <li>- Fraud against the elderly</li> <li>- gang crime</li> <li>- Serious organized crime</li> <li>- Men's violence against women and honor-related crime</li> <li>- fraudulent invoices and false oral agreements</li> <li>- gang crime, robbery, shoplifting, burglary in small rural communities and thefts from the elderly in their homes</li> <li>- a new social exclusion</li> <li>-short-term employment through staffing companies or as hourly substitutes with short notice</li> </ul>

**Figure 53** Causes attributed to "otrygghet" 1978-2018

**Figure 53** depicts causes of "otrygghet" suggested by the examined material. In 1978, "otrygghet" is both depicted as caused by and solved by large structural constructs, such as the state, the law, and the market. A lack of political leadership and decision-making is described as a key cause of otrygghet. The state is needed to mitigate a cause of otrygghet, the market's tendency to be uneven, irregular, and erratic. The state is thus seen both cause and solution. Unclear rules and laws cause otrygghet; otrygghet is when something is unpredictable. In 1988, modernity, new social formations, and changes in the family structure are common themes among the suggested causes. Children being brought up away from the home and women working both cause otrygghet. Otrygghet is associated with major social transformations. The lack of welfare and health care is also considered a cause of otrygghet. Crime, violence against women, and lenient sentencing are suggested as causes of otrygghet. Moving onto 1998, violence and crime are the dominating causes of otrygghet. The form of crime that causes otrygghet is primarily juvenile crime in the streets and schools. Young people out of control is a common theme. There are several references to broken windows theory. There are also economic causes suggested, such as reliance of welfare and high unemployment. Also in 2008, violent crime is the leading cause of otrygghet, with an increasing focus on professional criminals. The economic context is visible among causes, suggesting causes such as unequal conditions, precarious jobs, and wage dumping. An intersection between crime and economic contexts is suggested in causes such as economic crime, undeclared work, and tax fraud. At the chronological finishing point of our analysis in 2018, crime dominates the suggested causes of otrygghet. Shootings, organized crime, men's violence against women, burglary, and gang crime are mentioned as causes. At the same time, less serious crimes are also considered causes of otrygghet, including shoplifting, drug crimes, fraudulent invoices, and theft from the elderly. "Honor crimes" and "moral policing" by the public are considered serious causes of otrygghet and imply a foreign, immigration, or non-Swedish context.

## What is the valence of the concept “otrygghet” within the structure of political vocabulary?

Year	Empirical examples	Translation
1978	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>otrygg försörjningssituation</i> (Proposition 1978/79:115)</li> <li>- <i>en tid av ovisshet och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1978/79:1928)</li> <li>- <i>en oaccepTable otrygghet för de anställda</i> (Motion 1978/79:2253)</li> <li>- <i>större risker för ofullgångna ansträngningar, otrygghet och kanske kaos.</i> (Motion 1978/79:119)</li> <li>- <i>otrygghet i anställningen</i> (Motion 1978/79:2025)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "otrygg" supply situation.</li> <li>- a time of uncertainty and "otrygghet".</li> <li>- an unacceptable "otrygghet" for employees.</li> <li>- greater risks of incomplete effort, "otrygghet" and perhaps chaos.</li> <li>- "otrygghet" in employment</li> </ul>
1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>otrygghet hos personalen</i> (Proposition 1988/89:108)</li> <li>- <i>skall behöva känna otrygghet</i> (Motion 1988/89:Sf323)</li> <li>- <i>oro och otrygghet hos många människor</i> (Motion 1988/89:So423)</li> <li>- <i>otrygga anställnings-förhållanden</i> (Motion 1988/89:A753)</li> <li>- <i>blir människorna otrygga.</i> (Motion 1988/89:Ju805)</li> <li>- <i>lever i otrygga miljöer</i> (Motion 1988/89:So614)</li> <li>- <i>Ett barn som redan är otryggt</i> (Motion 1988/89:So327)</li> <li>- <i>barnet är fortfarande i en otrygg situation.</i> (Motion 1988/89:L410)</li> <li>- <i>vuxna som lever i en socialt otrygg situation</i> (Proposition 1988/89:4)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "otrygghet" of the staff</li> <li>- must feel "otrygga",</li> <li>- anxiety and "otrygghet" of many people</li> <li>- "otrygga" employment conditions</li> <li>- people become "otrygga".</li> <li>- living in "otrygga" environments</li> <li>- A child who is already "otryggt" " the child is still in an "otrygg" situation.</li> <li>- adults living in a socially "otrygg" situation</li> </ul>
1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>otrygg offentlig-anställning</i></li> <li>- <i>är tillvaron otrygg.</i> (Motion 1998/99:A802)</li> <li>- <i>brott och otrygghet</i></li> <li>- <i>otrygghet i närmiljön</i> (Proposition 1998/99:1D9)</li> <li>- <i>Otryggheten breder ut sig</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ju901)</li> <li>- <i>Känslan av otrygghet hos människor ökar</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ju205)</li> <li>- <i>otryggheten på storstädernas gator och torg</i> (Motion 1998/99:A216)</li> <li>- <i>Splittrade och otrygga familjer</i> (Motion 1998/99:So238)</li> <li>- <i>Otryggheten i skolan breder ut sig</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ub802)</li> <li>- <i>den ökade otryggheten</i> (Motion 1998/99:Bo407)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "otrygg" public employment</li> <li>- "otrygg" life situation.</li> <li>- crime and "otrygghet"</li> <li>- "otrygghet" in the local environment</li> <li>- "Otryggheten" spreads</li> <li>- Peoples feelings of "otrygghet" increase</li> <li>- "otrygghet" on the streets and squares of big cities - Divided and "otrygga" families</li> <li>- "Otrygghet" in school spreads</li> <li>- the increased "otrygghet"</li> </ul>
2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- <i>otrygghet hos befolkningen</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju379)</li> <li>- <i>en total otrygghet</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju235)</li> <li>- <i>Medborgarna upplever att otryggheten har ökat</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju360) - <i>i samhället en växande otrygghet</i></li> <li>- <i>den växande otryggheten</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi25)</li> <li>- <i>otryggare anställningsförhållanden</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi241)</li> <li>- <i>en otrygg tillvaro</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ub348)</li> <li>- <i>en ökad otrygghet</i> (Motion 2008/09:So500)</li> <li>- <i>bygga bort otrygga miljöer</i> (Proposition 2008/09:35)</li> <li>- <i>ny otrygghetschock</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi270)</li> <li>- <i>fler otrygga och korta anställningar</i> (Motion 2008/09:N431)</li> <li>- <i>väntar ökad otrygghet</i> (Motion 2008/09:U349)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>"Otryggheten" of the population</li> <li>- a total "otrygghet"</li> <li>- Citizens feel that "In society there is an increasing "otrygghet"</li> <li>- a growing "otrygghet"</li> <li>- the growing "otrygghet"</li> <li>- more "otrygga" employment conditions</li> <li>- a "otrygg" existence</li> <li>- An increasing "otrygghet"</li> <li>- To 'build away' "otrygghet"</li> <li>- A new shock of "otrygghet"</li> <li>- An increase of "otrygga" and short employments</li> <li>- Increased "otrygghet" awaits</li> </ul>

<p><b>2018</b> <i>otryggheten är stor på flera platser</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)  <i>otrygghetsskapande</i>  <i>personer som skapar otrygghet</i> (Motion 2018/19:2918)  <i>När otryggheten breder ut</i> (Motion 2018/19:2569)  <i>När otrygghet breder ut sig måste samhällets svar vara tydligt.</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)  <i>Antalet utsatta områden har ökat och otryggheten är stor</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)  <i>- Otryggheten ökar i Sverige</i> (Motion 2018/19:1891)  <i>- otryggheten ökar</i> (Motion 2018/19:2934)  <i>- Känslan av otrygghet ökar</i> (Motion 2018/19:969)  <i>- En sådan otrygghet går aldrig att försvara</i> (Motion 2018/19:1812)</p>	<p>- "otryggheten" is great in many areas  - "Otrygghets"-creating  - People who cause "otrygghet"  - Society's answer must be clear when "otryggheten" is expanding  - The number of vulnerable areas has increased and "otryggheten" is great  - "Otryggheten" is increasing in Sweden  - Growing "otrygghet"  - Increasing "otrygghet"  - The feeling of "otrygghet" increases  - That kind of "otrygghet" cannot be defended</p>
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**Figure 54** Valence of the concept "otrygghet" in the structure of political vocabulary 1978-2018

**Figure 54** depicts how "otrygghet" has been used in constructing argumentation. Valence is here interpreted in a broader way than the strictly linguistic sense, which denotes how the concept binds to other grammatical structures. It is taken to mean what function the term of "otrygghet" plays in making a statement coherent and with which other types of terms it is presented.

In 1978, the concept of "otrygghet" is primarily used to describe situations. It is also presented together with terms of closely related meaning, together forming a joint structure. It is commonly used to describe a material reality, for example relating to the availability of commodities or welfare. "Otrygghet" in 1988 is increasingly used to describe people's feelings, but using "otrygghet" to describe a situation is still common. "Otrygghet" is also used to describe physical environments. The adjective form of the word seems to be the most common. In 1998, "Otrygghet" is being described as something that is growing and expanding. It is used to describe people's feelings, often in a general sense, as well as to describe locations such as streets and town squares. The substantive form, "otrygghet" seems to become more common, sometimes linked with crime, while the adjective form, "otrygg" remains a descriptor for people, families, children, and locations. Moving onto 2008, examples are dominated by "otrygghet" being used to describe something growing, expanding, and increasing. It is also paired with words indicating novelty, such as 'new' and 'more'. The substantive form, "otrygghet", and its definitive form, "otryggheten" are the most common. There are new forms of composite word structures where "otrygghet" is added together with other words, for example in "otrygghets-chock". In 2018, "otryggheten" in its definitive, substantive form is common. "Otryggheten" is still generally described as growing, expanding and increasing. It seems to have gained an established meaning, as it is increasingly rarely paired with other descriptive words. There

seems to be an increased weight to the concept, where the meaning of the sentence itself often depends on an implicit understanding of what “otrygghet” is.

## With what terms does the concept overlap and converge?

	Empirical examples	Translation
1978	<p><i>Osäkerhet och tveksamhet</i> (Proposition 1978/79:178) <i>otrygghet och bristande omhändertagande</i> (Proposition 1978/79:178)  <i>Nöd, brist och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1978/79:788)  <i>ovisshet och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1978/79:1928)  <i>människor känner otrygghet och rädsla</i> (Motion 1978/79:1990)  <i>beskrivna ojämna (...) därav följande otrygga råvaruförsörjningen</i> (Motion 1978/79:2140)  <i>ofullgångna ansträngningar, otrygghet och kanske kaos skapar osäkerhet och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1978/79:119)</p>	Doubt, lack of care, scarcity and shortage, uncertainty, fear, unevenness, incomplete efforts, insecurity
1988	<p><i>oro och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1988/89:So423; Motion 1988/89:Sf266; Motion 1988/89:So612)  <i>otrygghet och rädsla</i> Motion 1988/89:Ju619  <i>istället oroliga och otrygga.</i> (Motion 1988/89:So612)  <i>ovisshet och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1988/89:A422)  <i>ofullkomliga och då också otrygga förhållanden</i> (Motion 1988/89:K230)  <i>skadlig otrygghet och ryktesspridning</i> (Proposition 1988/89:124)</p>	Anxiety, fear, worry, uncertainty, incomplete, rumours, and incriminations
1998	<p><i>otryggt och ovärdigt i systemberoende och otrygghet</i>  <i>otrygghet och inläsning</i> (Motion 1998/99:A802)  <i>hopplöshet och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1998/99:Sk311)  <i>otrygghet och en förståeligt oro</i> (Motion 1998/99:Sf9)  <i>rädsla och otrygghet</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ju202)  <i>Brottsligheten och otryggheten ökar</i> (Motion 1998/99:Bo218)  <i>oro, otrygghet och destruktivitet</i> (Motion 1998/99:Ub258)  <i>osäkerhet och otrygghet.</i> (Motion 1998/99:A266)  <i>otrygghet och olägenhet</i> (Motion 1998/99:L501)</p>	Unworthy, system dependence, stagnated, locked in, hopelessness, understandable concern, fear, crime, anxiety, destructivity, uncertainty, nuisance
2008	<p><i>med otrygghet, missbruk och segregation</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju379)  <i>brottslighet</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ju234; Motion 2008/09:Ju360)  <i>oro och otrygghet</i> (Motion 2008/09:U349)  <i>otrygghet och rädsla</i> (Motion 2008/09:U349)  <i>fler otrygga och korta anställningar</i> (Motion 2008/09:N431)  <i>de orättvisor och den otrygghet</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi269)  <i>otrygga och tillfälliga</i> (Motion 2008/09:A260)  <i>ensamma och otrygga</i> (Motion 2008/09:C331)  <i>en osäker eller otrygg</i> (Motion 2008/09:Kr371)  <i>Otryggheten och orättvisorna</i> (Motion 2008/09:C437)  <i>oro och otrygghet</i> (Motion 2008/09:Ub215)  <i>Klyftorna och otryggheten</i> (Motion 2008/09:Fi276)  <i>farligt och otryggt</i> (Motion 2008/09:Sf366)  <i>stor rädsla, osäkerhet och otrygghet</i> (Motion 2008/09:MJ294)</p>	Abuse, segregation, crime, anxiety, fear, short-term, injustice, temporary, alone, uncertain, unfair, unequal, danger, insecurity

<b>2018</b> <i>otrygghet och rädsla</i> (Motion till riksdagen 2018/19:2870) <i>osäkra och otrygga</i> (Motion till riksdagen 2018/19:1428) <i>ensamhet och otrygghet</i> (Motion till riksdagen 2018/19:2794) <i>oro och otrygghet</i> . (Motion till riksdagen 2018/19:2828) <i>Osäkerheten och otryggheten</i> (Motion till riksdagen 2018/19:1503)	Fear, insecurity, alone, anxiety, loneliness, uncertainty
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**Figure 55** Terms overlapping with the concept of "otrygghet" 1978-2018?

Figure 55 show what other terms "otrygghet" converges with. This topic has been interpreted as concerning what terms "otrygghet" appears together with, in a form that insinuates a joint structure. Examples where "otrygghet" and another term appear together but seem to signify two distinct and different concepts have not been included. The aim is to identify what terms have been given a meaning close to "otrygghet" or used as synonyms to "otrygghet" and whether this changes over the examined periods.

It is interesting to note that during the last period, 2018, much fewer terms appear in a joint structure with "otrygghet" or have been interpreted as having a meaning close to "otrygghet". This is true even if the total number of examples of use of the concept of "otrygghet" are more numerous in this period than any other. Why is this? Perhaps "otrygghet" has been given a meaning in this period that cannot be fully encapsulated by any other concept. It has perhaps risen to such prominence that pairing it with other concepts would lessen the rhetorical impact. This would indicate that "otrygghet" then has been established as a true concept, according to Koselleck (2004, p. 85), who writes, "*a word becomes a concept only when the entirety of meaning and experience within a sociopolitical context which and for which a word is used can be condensed into one word*". In other words, when a single word describes a phenomenon better than multiple words can, it is an indication that the word is a concept.

# 9. Discussion

## Introduction

The goal of this dissertation has been to construct a historical account of the fear of crime discourse, in order to understand it in relation to the contemporary context in which it became established. Reviewing the fear of crime literature and discussing this field of research in its conjunctive context has been a central part. A related purpose has been to study how knowledge on fear of crime is produced. This has included studying what goes in "the black box" when quantified measurements are constructed of how fearful the population is, in terms of surveys, indicators, and the theoretical underpinnings of these statistics. I have traced how fear of crime research emerged into a Swedish context, and how it came to be institutionally established here.

The last of the empirical chapters dealt with changes in the political rhetoric of what "o/trygghet" signified over the period of 1978-2018. This analysis of conceptual change was methodologically inspired by the conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck, and found significant changes in how the word "o/trygghet" was used. From being used as a descriptive term in different contexts in earlier times, commonly signifying economic and materialistic unpredictability, "o/trygghet" during the most recent period of 2018 come to be used almost exclusively in a crime context. Both what the word signified and how it is used has changed. Statements like "*o/tryggheten ökar*", ubiquitous in 2018, would have made much less sense in 1978 and would have required the specification of a context. In 2018, such specifications are unnecessary as the reader is assumed to



implicitly understand that what is being said in the statement "otryggheten ökar" is that more people are afraid of crime.

From insights gained from three empirical sets of data, academic research into fear of crime, the analysis of the institutionalization of fear of crime research in Sweden and its methodology, and empirical examples of how the use and meaning of the concept of "otrygghet" has changed during the examined period, a set of paradoxes emerges. Why are we more "otrygga" than ever, according to contemporary discourse, after 40 years of extensive governmental and academic engagement with the matter of "otrygghet" in Sweden? Why has extensive methodological criticism left little impact on the contents of fear of crime research? Why has fear of crime research spread and expanded so impressively, even though it has little potential to actually make people safer? In the following concluding discussion of this thesis, I lay out an argument that attempts to explain these paradoxes. More accurately, I point out that they can be understood by understanding the political function and usefulness of the new content of the concept of "otrygghet".

## The fear of crime research discourse

The fear of crime research discourse has been examined by other researchers, and many have reached a similar conclusion about the quality of the research itself. It is wrought with methodological problems, conceptual unclarity, vague theoretical assumptions, and has in general failed to achieve a scientific consensus on what fear of crime is or why it should be studied (Farrall, 2004; Farrall et al., 1997; Farrall & Ditton, 1999; Farrall, Jackson, & Gray, 2009b; Gray et al., 2008; Hale, 1996; Heber, 2007). Most studies use survey methods to generate a quantitative measurement of a feeling of fear. According to more qualitative approaches, fear is probably ill suited to quantification because it is situational, transient, and fleeting. Interview research supports that emotional responses to crime are complex and multifaceted (Ditton, Farrall, et al., 1999; Hille, 1999; Koskela & Pain, 2000). Emotions are complex, messy, context-dependent and hard to quantify, which sounds trivial and common-sensical but goes against basic assumptions of the research discourse. When interviewing respondents on how they interpreted fear of crime survey questions, Farrall et al. (1997) found a high propensity for individual interpretations and mismatches when analyzing accepted methods of the research discourse. My own review of how fear of crime

has been studied by Swedish governmental agencies adds that the research is likely suffering from response bias and that this bias will continue to worsen as response rates fall further.

Fear of crime research has not been able to establish a link between crime victimization and fear of crime (Baker, Nienstedt, Everett, & McCleary, 1983; Furstenberg, 1971; Garofalo, 1979; Skogan & Maxfield, 1981). Despite this, fear of crime is widely assumed to be caused by crime, even though what the Ennis (1967) operationalization — how safe people feel alone outside at night — actually measures is probably different for different people (Farrall et al., 1997) and thus lacks sufficient reliability. The widespread assumption that asking people how safe they feel alone outside at night constitutes a valid measure of the respondent's fear of crime is hard to empirically support, but even harder to support is the implicit assumption that this feeling of safety has anything to do with general crime levels. Fear of crime research is misinterpreted in Sweden in this way as well (Heber, 2007).

The dominant use of quantitative survey methods, and the narrow focus on etiological and demographic variables, such as gender and age, have resulted in a research discourse that contains a lot of knowledge on who is afraid, and very little on why (Farrall et al., 2009b; Hale, 1996). By design, the research omits a structural understanding of fear of crime, or the mechanisms involved. The structure of the research instruments, what type of knowledge they are able to produce, allow only one type of knowledge to be produced. It can inform us if women 16-29 feel more or less safe walking around their neighborhoods after dark than men 16-29-year-old, for example. It can provide a percentage of elderly people that report not leaving the home due to being afraid. Reviewing the fear of crime literature leads one to the conclusion that the quality of the research produced, at least not if that quality is tied to its ability to solve the problem of fear of crime through investigating its causality and mechanisms, cannot explain the dramatic expansion of the research discourse.

## Emergence and expansion

The speed and intensity of the expansion of fear of crime research, as outlined in chapter 6 and 7, and how it managed to penetrate into many segments of Swedish governance, must be considered remarkable. The research discourse began humbly in Sweden with the addition of a general fear of crime indicator in the

survey of Swedish living conditions in 1978. For most of the 1980's, not much else happened in Sweden in terms of fear of crime research, while internationally, it was growing rapidly. It was introduced into a British context with the launch of the British Crime Survey in 1981 and expanded in that national context from then onward (Jansson, 2007; Mirrlees-Black et al., 1996b). It can be noted that the British Crime Survey was launched during a period of substantial political, economic and social change in the UK. In 1979, Margaret Thatcher was elected as British prime minister, and she spent the entirety of the 80's in office. British criminologists have chronicled how her goal of "less tax and more law and order" represented a new intersection of economic and penal politics (Farrall, 2006). In the US, fear of crime research had been ongoing since it was politically initiated in the 1960's by the Lyndon B Johnson administration. During the 1980's, fear of crime research went through a period of growth and theoretical innovation, influenced by new criminological theory in the forms of Signs of Disorder (Wilson & Kelling, 1982), and a new criminological interest in the physical environment, visible for example in Newman's (1972) concept of "defensible spaces".

Fear of crime research in Sweden took an important step forwards through the first specialized fear of crime and victimization survey, The Stockholm Project. The study collected data in 1989 and published results in 1990 (Wikström, 1990), and was theoretically and methodologically inspired by Skogan and Maxfield (1981). A period of specialized fear of crime and victimization studies followed through the 90's, implemented by either the Crime Council, or the Research group of the Police, in collaboration with Swedish criminologists. An important motivation behind these was the altered phrasing of the mission of the Swedish police, changed to "*decrease crime and increase safety (trygghet)*" in 1992. Still, in 1995 fear of crime research was rare in Sweden. The average number of fear of crime measurements per municipality was less than 0.1 during the period of 1995-1999, and 94% of municipalities did not conduct any form of fear of crime measurement, according to the survey of Swedish municipalities that forms part of this dissertation's empirical data.

A period of special interest to this dissertation followed in the 2000's, when Swedish governmental agencies amended several national surveys to include fear of crime indicators. From one national-level government survey containing fear of crime indicator (ULF) in 2001, the number of surveys increased by one per year until 2007, when six surveys collected data on fear of crime. The rate has been more or less constant since then, with minor fluctuations caused by semiannual surveys. This period also saw the introduction of the Swedish Crime

Survey (NTU), arguably the most influential of them all in terms of putting "otrygghet" on the agenda. On the local level, interest and engagement in the fear of crime issue also accelerates during the 2000's. During the earlier period of 2000-2004, local fear of crime measurements were still somewhat uncommon, with an average number of fear of crime measurements per municipality at 0.4 and a total number of 74 across all municipalities. Only 26% of municipalities measured fear of crime during this period. By 2005-2009, there is an expansion, as the average is up to 0.9, 168 measurements are reported, and the percentage of municipalities participating is up to 49%. This may be seen as a kind of tipping point, where measuring fear of crime at the local level is becoming the norm.

During the 2010's, there are five national-level government surveys measuring fear of crime, and regional and local fear of crime projects at all levels of governance, not to mention private enterprises. The average number of fear of crime measurements in the municipalities surveyed for this dissertation was 1.55 by 2010-2014 and 2.4 for the last examined period, 2015-2018. The total number of reported fear of crime measurements on the local level is up to 301 in 2010-2014 and, for the last period of 2015-2018, the count is 469. The percentage of participating municipalities increased as well, from 70% in 2010-2014 up to 84% in 2015-2018.

## The establishment and salience of the concept

At the end of the examined period of 1978-2018, the range and wealth of examples of the salience of "otrygghet" in contemporary Swedish society is staggering. Measurements of fear of crime have increased, and this discourse has grown in scope and become integrated in other forms of political and social life. There is not only governmental engagement in several ways with the issue of "otrygghet", but many more actors from different sectors of Swedish society are also participants in the discourse. There are examples from the private, public, and political sector, and non-profit and for-profit organizations alike could be described as stake-holders in the discourse. A contemporary snapshot of fear of crime follows, providing some examples that aim to illustrate what an encompassing phenomenon fear of crime has become.

Socialdemokraterna appoints a parliamentary committee in 2020, in order to "propose long-term measures to increase "trygghet" and reduce crime". The committee is supposed to deliver a report in 2024 (Regeringen, 2021). Its three

main goals of decreasing "otrygghet" and crime, and supporting crime victims are illustrative of how the concept of "otrygghet" occupies a central position in contemporary penal political discourse at the time when this dissertation is published in 2021.

Most municipalities not only participate in measuring fear of crime with quantitative surveys but also have special professional roles, such as safety coordinators, "trygghetssamordnare", who work full time with the issue of fear of crime, "otrygghet". There are fear of crime walks and citizen dialogues that aim to reduce fear of crime and increase "trygghet". There are local initiatives, programs, or special municipal projects promoting "trygghet" in many municipalities.

There are non-profit organizations active in the discourse. One such example is "Tryggare Sverige", a foundation with a board of politicians, retired police chiefs, criminologists, journalists, and housing directors. According to their website, they have elected to define the concept of through its link to crime and disorder and their mission is to promote this understanding through defining and operationalizing the concept of "trygghet" in accordance with "up-do-date science". Their engagement in the fear of crime discourse takes many forms; they make reports, offer consulting services, and organize think tanks on fear of crime and crime victimizations, on feminist city-planning, for survivors of violent crime, and for safer environmental design (TryggareSverige, 2021).

An app launched in 2021 called "Vakta" ("to Guard"), and it is marketed by a Swedish influencer with a following primarily among young women. It is a subscription service that provides the customer with an alarm via the phone. Its marketing relies heavily on the concept of "otrygghet", illustrated here by how the CEO describes the idea behind the app: *"There is a growing sense of "otrygghet" in Sweden. Unfortunately, is this not only a feeling, but a harder and tougher social climate. At the same time are crime and victimization rates are increasing!"*<sup>49</sup>. Testimonials include influencers and the owner of a private security firm who shares the following expert knowledge:

"Actually, after 30 years in the security business and 28 year of running a security company, robberies, violence against women and burglaries are increasing significantly, causing "otrygghet" to increase. I myself have moved

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<sup>49</sup> <https://www.vakta.se/post/darför-foddes-companion> "Det finns en ökande känsla av otrygghet i Sverige Tyvärr är detta inte bara en känsla, utan klimatet har blivit hårdare och tuffare. Samtidigt har brottsutsattheten ökat"

to the countryside and my children and children's children are have moved as well. Acquaintances that still live in the city say they don't leave the home after 18:00, which is really frightening and worrying".<sup>50</sup>

If the function of the research discourse was to make people safer, to solve the problem of "otrygghet", to make people fear crime less, shouldn't forty years of extensive engagement with the issue have had the opposite effect? Why is "otrygghet" at the beginning of the 2020's constructed as a more salient issue than ever, a worse problem than ever before?

## The function of fear of crime research

I argue the following; knowledge produced by the research discourse has very limited potential to improve people's lives, in terms of making them feel or be safer, and this is the case by limit of design. What can then explain the rapid expansion and considerable institutional engagement with fear of crime research summarized above? How can the salience and central position of the concept of "otrygghet" in contemporary Sweden be understood? What is the function of fear of crime research?

The research discourse's ability to remake something complex into something very simple is a part of its appeal. It generates scientific knowledge (or, at least knowledge produced loosely according to the principles and methods derived from social science) that is fit for late modern penal politics. It frames the social issue in question, "otrygghet", according to an understanding that defines it as related to crime and proposes solutions derived from an understanding of crime as a problem of order maintenance. That is, the research discourse omits any understanding of structural causes of crime. In the words of Law (2009), the knowledge produced implies a world fit for that knowledge. Knowledge that is fit for the penal politics of late modernity supports a specific narrative of what crime *is*.

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50 <https://www.vakta.se/blog> "2. Under 30 år har du samlat på dig en enorm erfarenhet, men också sett hur branschen och samhället förändrats. Vad är din bild av "livet på stan" idag? Finns det skäl att vara mer orolig? Ja det är faktiskt att – efter 30 år i branschen varav 28 år som föreståndare för ett auktoriserat bevakningsföretag i Sverige – att personrånen, våld mot kvinnor, inbrott i bostad har ökat rejält gör att otryggheten ökat. Jag har själv flyttat ut på landet med familj. Barn och barnbarn har flyttat efter. Bekanta som bor kvar i stan nämner att de inte går ut efter 18:00 vilket är riktigt skrämmande och oroväckande."50

## Constructing a uniquely useful concept

I point here to a certain synergy between two aspects. On the one hand, the fear of crime research discourse is influenced by theoretical perspectives that assume specific causes and mechanisms of crime and defines which crimes are considered to generate fear. On the other hand, the discourse then in turn produces knowledge that reinforces these conceptions. The influence of this theory on the framing of which instruments should be used as well as on the instruments themselves shapes what kind of knowledge can be produced. Through the translation of fear of crime into "otrygghet" in Sweden, this concept was imbued with new meaning, the contents of fear of crime research. This frames what the problem of "otrygghet" is about. Koselleck writes that concepts are like joints that link language to the extralinguistic world: to the historical, the social, and the political. Concepts are words with a special ability to carry meaning, words with baggage. Words can be unambiguous in use, but concepts must always be interpreted and their baggage investigated (2004).

The new and particular baggage of "otrygghet" is evident in statements like "one out of three women feel 'otrygga' in their own neighborhood after dark" (Motion 2018/19:2806), "this type of crime risks spreading 'otrygghet' and causes many elderly to refrain from leaving their homes" (Motion 2018/19:2806). What made this concept especially salient, perhaps "explosive", to use a term borrowed from Koselleck (2004) in Swedish political debate, is how well the contents fit with the constructed common sense of crime in late modernity. A crucial aspect of this construction is the location of the threat of crime as coming from below. Fear of crime research rests on theoretical assumptions largely derived from 'Signs of Disorder' theory. The early fear of crime studies cite this theory (Wikström, 1990, 1991) Its assumptions shape what knowledge can be produced, which is visible for example in the specific examples of problems that are possible to choose for respondents of the first specialized fear of crime survey: littering, drunken people, fighting and violence outside, young people fighting or making trouble, women or children being harassed, homes for addicts, disruptive children, and disruptive neighbors (Wikström, 1990, pp. 210-232). The authors of these early fear of crime studies write that a "lack of reaction" from society will lead to a downwards spiral (Wikström, Torstensson, & Dolmèn, 1997). Broken Windows wasn't actively chosen as a theory; it was the only choice available. It was what was offered at the time. The fear of crime studies organized by the police also inherited also its methodology from the same American origins and are also explicit about its theoretical foundations:

“The theory can in simple terms be explained as an attempt to analyze levels of crime and disorder, and its consequences in accordance with the so-called “zero tolerance” theory. The fear of crime survey is based on this hypothesis.”<sup>51</sup>

The New York model is renowned for being widely implemented. Harcourt and Ludwig (2006) write that New York, Chicago, and, Los Angeles have all adopted at least some aspect of Wilson and Kelling's theory, especially seen in the aggressive enforcement of minor misdemeanor laws. It is associated with providing a theoretical basis for so called zero tolerance policing. The theory, and the implied causality between Broken Windows policing and crime reduction has been extensively criticized (Dixon, 1998; Harcourt, 2009; Harcourt & Ludwig, 2006; Hinkle, 2015; Robert & Stephen, 2004; Shelden, 2004)<sup>52</sup>. Putting this critique aside for a moment, there is no denying that ‘Broken Windows’ theory, or the ‘New York model’, also known as ‘Signs of Disorder’, has been widely popular among politicians, as demonstrated by the examined materials in this dissertation. References among examined motions and bills are numerous; for example, Motion 1998/99:Ju90 under the heading of "learn from the New York model" provides a summary of the theory: society's lack of reaction on small infringements will make people otrygga and allow criminals to dominate a neighborhood.

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<sup>51</sup> ”Teorin kan enklast förklaras som att mätningen är ett försök att undersöka nivåer av utsatthet för brott och ordningsstörningar med dess konsekvenser enligt den s.k. ”nolltolerans-teorin”. Trygghetsmätningen bygger helt på denna hypotes. Frågeformuläret ställer frågor kring vilka problem den boende uppfattar i sitt bostadsområde som redan inträffat i utemiljön, eller som pågår vid passage. Det är också frågor kring egen utsatthet för brott, respondentens allmänna oro för brott, hens mer konkreta känsla av otrygghet inkluderat konsekvenser av detta samt en bedömning av polisens engagemang i bostadsområdet.”

<sup>52</sup> The theory is widely credited with being “proved right” by New York’s historical reduction of crime during the 90s. Predictably, Kelling writing with the New York Police commissioner Bratton, credits zero tolerance policing for the New York crime drop. The suggested causal relation has been disproved; for example Shelden (2004) and Dixon (1998) draw attention to the fact that crime reduction happened chronologically before implementation of these police tactics, and the crime reduction was likely caused by New York’s rapid economic upsurge. Robert and Stephen (2004) empirically show that the ethnic and economic composition of a neighborhood was a better predictor for perceived disorder than actual signs of disorder. In other words, *disordered* is a euphemism for non-white and poor. Furthermore has Goffman (2009) ethnographic Philadelphia study illustrated the widespread social negative consequences of zero tolerance policing in already disadvantaged communities.



## Fear of crime research constructs a threat from below

The fear of crime research discourse frames the problem of crime as coming from outside and below through defining what kinds of crimes are fear-inducing and where they happen. The focus on "street crime" is an old problem of criminology, discussed for example by Hagan (2010). Wilson (1975) argues that his influential book, *Thinking about Crime*, will not deal with any victim-less crime nor any white-collar crime, and motivates this by saying that the police spend little to no time on these crimes, and so will he focus on the real problem, "predatory crime", street crime committed by strangers. This theoretical inheritance that insists on a street crime focus is evident in fear of crime surveys in several ways.

The home is generally assumed to be a safe place, according to fear of crime survey operationalizations in Sweden. In addition to asking if the respondents feel safe outside of the home during night-time, other questions specifically ask how afraid they are of the crimes that constitute classic "street crimes", namely robbery, assault, and vandalism. The police survey specifically asks the respondent how afraid she is of being assaulted outside the home. If fear is thought to exist in the home, it is assumed to come from outside, for example, as seen in how the 'Citizen survey' asks about respondents' fear of being burglarized<sup>53</sup>. In addition, the 'Police Survey' contains questions on what problems exist in your area and the possible answers are limited to the following groups; gangs of youth, drunk people, and drug addicts. In addition to the Ennis operationalization, fear of crime is measured through asking about worry about burglary in the home or the garage, vandalization or theft of a vehicle, and worry about being assaulted outside in the neighborhood. The surveys often assumes that the participant owns and worries about property, such as cars, bikes, and motorcycles. There is a boundary drawn between what is owned and private — and must be protected — and the threatening public sphere. Fear of crime is located in the subway, the town square, and the neighborhood. This is perhaps an inheritance from the architectural influence of Newman and his (1972) concept of "defensible spaces". He argues

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<sup>53</sup> Out of the examined surveys, only the Civil Contingencies Agency survey and the Local Youth Politics survey ask about feelings of safety inside the home. This variable has quite a lot of variance; in 2010 version of the Civil Contingencies Agency survey, more than 30% said they do not feel safe at home during the evening, more than said they do not feel safe outside during the day, and while only a small percentage of all youth said they do not feel safe at home, for those that chose the third gender alternative "other", more than 20% did not feel safe at home.

that private spaces are inherently more secure and crime-detering. In order to make the city safer, the private should replace the public. This line of reasoning seems amazingly well-coordinated with the expansion of market-oriented thinking and the retrenchment of the welfare state in Sweden.

The argument that fear of crime statistics generate legitimacy for increased penal control does not have to be made on a theoretical level. There are a lot of empirical arguments supporting this in the chapter on conceptual development of the Swedish word of *otrygghet*, chapter 8. We can see how “*otrygghet*” in the earlier periods is being used in a variety of contexts, most commonly denoting unpredictability in the economic sense; you were “*otrygg*” if your employment, housing, or availability of social resources and welfare support was insecure. In the examined empirical material from 1978, the suggested causes of *otrygghet* are for example: right-wing indecisiveness, over-reliance on oil, generally formulated laws, staff reductions, and far-reaching cost-cutting rationalizations in various organizations, even expenditures for roads that have not kept up with costs, and uneven tree-felling operations. Suggested solutions are also oriented towards stability and control. Empirical examples include better continuity, the elimination of housing slums, overcrowding and housing shortages, nationalization of education, even timber extraction and coordinated state research and legislation on toxic substances.

The difference between the examples from 1978 and 2018 is stark. According to the empirical examples from 2018, the causes of *otrygghet* are violence, crime and drugs, shootings, the presence of drugs in school, fraud against the elderly, gang crime, organized crime, robbery, shoplifting, burglary in small rural communities and thefts from the elderly in their homes, and the absence of police. The solutions to solve the problem of *otrygghet* in 2018 are oriented in a single direction. According to the examined materials, we should have strengthened and more efficient police forces, more security cameras, a strong and continuous police presence, facilitation of the police's crime-solving work, bans for people who create insecurity, CCTV, further sharpened penalties, better conditions and salaries for the police, as well as a series of stricter penalties and new criminalization measures. The suggested solutions are singularly oriented towards increased police and penal control. To examine the function of fear of crime research is to examine what the concept of “*otrygghet*” is used to argue for. Each of the above interventions aims at increasing the availability of tools of control at the state's disposal.

This is an excellent fit to the narrative of late modernity penal politics, where crime is framed as an existential threat, always in need of urgent intervention, lest

it threatens society as we know it (Hall et al., 2013/1978). It supports the construction of a new hegemonic conflict, to follow Beckett and Sasson (2000b) reasoning, between the honest, decent people and the unruly, criminal, foreign poor. The way the discourse represents an opportunity to imply ethnicity is reminiscent of what Schclarek Mulinari (2020) writes about how race tends to be obscured in discourse, but visible in practice. By locating both the cause and effect to "crime-ridden" disadvantaged (read inhabited by immigrants) neighbourhoods, Motion 2018/19:1188 can legitimize arguing for control-related measurements by referring to fear of crime research: "*according to new measurements from the Crime Prevention Council, fear of crime is higher in socially and economically deprived neighbourhoods, compared to other areas.*" Hall et al. (2013/1978) names the construction of the subversive minority as a central aspect of the construction of a new *common sense of crime*. Using crime as a tool for scapegoating, and as a code for the racialized other is a largely successful conservative political strategy, known in the US as the *Southern Strategy*, still functioning today (Aistrup, 2014; Brown, 2016).

Walklate considers ways that feminism, victimology and the symbol of the female crime victim have resulted in penal policy pitting the victim against the offender. She writes that this is far from the only course of political action possible as a response to the problem of a society that is culturally and socially saturated with sexual violence. Walklate writes

"(...) these other choices are not made, not because they may not provide meaningful alternatives, or solely because of the power of actuarial justice, but because of the myriad ways in which the hegemonic capitalist and, it has to be said, masculine state, operates to maintain its interests" (Walklate, 2006, p. 156).

A key function of fear of crime research is that it generates knowledge that is useful in legitimating late modernity penal politics. That is, in Walklate (2006) words, the crime politics strategy to pit the victim against the offender is no coincidence, as it supports an existing division of power. The salience and strong institutional engagement in the fear of crime discourse points to what Wacquant (2009) analysis presents as central for understanding the shift from a welfare state outlined in the background chapter. It consists of the need to reinsert an understanding of punitive penal policy as a key function of the modern neo-liberal state. Wacquant (2009) writes:

"inserting the police, the courts, and the prison as core constituents of the "Right hand" of the state, alongside the ministries of the economy and the budget. It suggests that we need to bring penal policies from the periphery to the center of our analysis of the redesign and deployment of government programs aimed at coping with the entrenched poverty and deepening disparities spawned in the polarizing city by the discarding of the Fordist-Keynesian social compact" (Wacquant, 2009, p. 289)

Several works in Swedish criminology have also emphasized the need to understand late modern penal politics in terms of its relation to the declining welfare state (Demker & Duus-Otterström, 2009; Estrada & Nilsson, 2001; Gallo & Svensson, 2019; Tham, 2019). Constructing crime as a threat coming from below, and a matter of order maintenance omits a structural understanding of the causes of crime, and a structural critique of the current order. Kelling and Bratton (1997) argue that an understanding of crime as caused by economic inequality, poverty and racism has the "disastrous" consequence of "de-policing" crime.

In a time where the issue of crime is heavily politicized and symbol-laden (Hermansson, 2019b), understanding of crime becomes simultaneously strangely de-politicized. The consensual position of understanding crime as a matter of control, means that crime cannot have material cause (Hall et al., 2013/1978). The research discourse's ability to simplify should be understood as a feature, not a flaw. It consists of the ability to conceal the political and ideological behind the cool detachment of statistics. We turn to Hall et al. (2013/1978) yet again:

Statistics – whether crime rates or opinion polls – have an ideological function: they appear to ground free floating and controversial in the hard, incontrovertible soil of numbers. (Hall et al., 2013/1978, p. 13)

To exemplify how this is done in practice in the fear of crime research discourse we can examine the historical intersection of fear of crime, feminism and the crime victim.

## Fear of crime and feminism

Consider how the feminist movement has expanded considerable effort in getting women's experiences of male violence appreciated as a real, social problem. Gruber (2009) writes that pushing the issue of rape and domestic violence towards

a crime-related framework must be considered to be a landmark of the feminist movement. Political victories of the feminist movement in Sweden related to an ascendent feminist movement includes establishing domestic violence as a matter for public prosecution in 1982 (Boethius, 2015). Brownmiller (1976) was influential in promoting an understanding of rape as a tool of oppression and domination, rather than a form of sex. The strong feminist movement helped to promote an understanding of society as culturally and socially saturated with sexual violence.

Undoubtedly, the strong position of the feminist movement in Sweden has influenced how the fear of crime discourse became established here. There are plenty of examples from the examined materials on how women are mentioned as a group that is especially impacted by otrygghet, which is used as an argument for the salience of the problem of otrygghet. Indeed, one of the first examples of "otrygghet" used in a crime-related context is from 1988 and discusses the issue of domestic violence (Motion 1988/89:Ju619). Women's experiences are from that point on consistently in a central position in the arguments about both the causes and solutions for the "otrygghet" issue. There are such examples from each examined year, for example arguing for "*increased protection for vulnerable women*" as a solution to the problem of "otrygghet" in Motion 1998/99:Ju904 and citing "*men's violence against women and honour-related crime*" as a cause of otrygghet in 2018 in Motion 2018/19:2865.


Let us now consider the kind of understanding of the issue of women's fear that is produced by fear of crime knowledge. How the fear of crime discourse functions as a tool for incorporating a conjunctive discourse — feminism and the symbol of the female crime victim — and uses arguments from this contemporary political movement to promote and strengthen itself is a crucial step for understanding its spread.

The theoretical assumptions that survey methodology on fear of crime rests upon shape a particular kind of knowledge about women's fear. The assumptions are built into the instruments themselves, the surveys, and act to constitute the subject of fear of crime: what women are assumed to be afraid of. For example, as mentioned above, the home is generally assumed to be a safe place, as most indicators ask about feelings of fear or safety outside of the home. This in turn locates the threat to women's safety within the public sphere. Potential sources of danger to women are located in the town square, the neighborhood, or the public transport system, by the design of the survey instruments. This in turn shapes the understanding of what "otrygghet" is, which is visible in, for example, Motion 2008/09:C411, stating that "*more people are afraid to go out alone or when*


*it is the dark out. The fear that comes from feeling unsafe leads to a reduced quality of life, and mainly women suffer from it.*" Similarly, Bill 2008/09:35 reports that "*far more women than men feel unsafe in the public transport system*". The work place is never mentioned at all and by omission is assumed to be a safe location. This is in stark contrast to how the MeToo-movement highlighted how sexual violence is embedded in power structures (Tambe, 2018). In Sweden, the coercive nature of sexual violence in the work place was especially emphasized (Johansson, Johansson, & Andersson, 2018; Pollack, 2019).

The way in which fear of crime discourse defines the problem of women's fear is very different from how it was discussed by feminist criminologists. In the research discourse, women are assumed to be safe in the home with the men they know. They are in turn unsafe out in the public where they can be victimized by unknown (foreign?) men. This is not supported by crime statistics about the locations of women's victimization, which do not support the notion of the safe home. Indeed, when examining where women are killed, the home appears to be a very dangerous place. According to Lehti et al. (2019) analysis based on death registry statistics, shown in **Figure 56**, more than 80% of all women that died from a violent cause between 2007 and 2016 in the Nordic countries, were killed in a home. Less than 20% were killed outside, in the public sphere. In fear of crime surveys, the person that is the cause of fear is assumed to be a stranger. Many general fear of crime indicator specifically asks the person to imagine they are alone. Thus, from the perspective of women's fear, the research discourse also assumes that known men are safe. This is also not supported by victimization statistics. British Crime Survey statistics on the perpetrators of violent crime also supports the idea that being victimized by a stranger is less common than being victimized by an acquaintance or a partner, for both genders, as seen in **Figure 57** (Jansson, 2007).

The alleged safety of 'known men' for women is not only empirically not true, but it also obviously supports a very patriarchal view of how women are supposed to live their lives. It completely omits the structural understanding of why women are fearful for which feminist scholars have argued. Stanko writes for example that a feminist understanding of women's fear derives from an understanding of what it is to live in a patriarchal society, and the myriad of ways it limits women's lives. The allocation of power in society is crucial for understanding why women are afraid, and solutions to the problem of women's fear must address this issue primarily (Stanko, 1990, 1995).



**Figure 56** Where female victims are killed according to death registry statistics  
 Female victims killed in private homes by type of home in Nordic Homicide in 2007-2016 (% by victims).  
 Source: Lehti et al. (2019, p. 35)



**Figure 57** Perpetrators of violent crime according to the British Crime Survey 1981-2005/6  
 Trends in perpetrators of violent crime, in thousands of crimes, based on data from the British Crime Survey 1981-2005/6 Source: Jansson (2007, p. 12)

## Initiated by political interests

The idea that political interest in the issue of crime and its social consequences, was caused by public demand is echoed at several points in the fear of crime literature. Furstenberg (1971) writes that “some polls” showed that the public considered fear of crime to be the most important issue in the USA during the 1960’s. Wilson writes in his 1975 book that the growing academic interest into criminology, victimization and fear of crime was caused by public demand, in

turn caused by increasing levels of crime. He also writes that the Gallup data of the time reflected that the public rated crime as the nation's most important issue (Wilson, 1975). Years later, Niemi et al. (1989) and Smith (1985) also refer poll data, and describes research into fear of crime as born of public outrage and demand. Skogan and Maxfield (1981) also refers to Gallup poll data as a reason behind the emergence of fear of crime research. Reanalysis of Gallup polls data by Chambliss (1994), and more recently by Loo and Grimes (2004) have found that this causality is incorrect; public interest in crime was never high, until political interest was.

Fear of crime knowledge function as a legitimizing construct is analogous to the function of the concept of the crime victim in penal discourse. Demker and Duus-Otterström (2009) analysis of the concept of the crime victim in Swedish politics finds that political interest in being "tougher on crime" predates the interest in the crime victim per se. They write that their initial hypothesis, that crime policy became tougher because of increasing sensitivity to crime victims and their interests was not supported. Instead they drew the following conclusion:

"Recall that our initial hypothesis (H) was that criminal policy became tougher as a consequence of its increasing sensitivity to crime victims and their interests. (...) But in Moderaterna's extensive activity on the criminal policy area, it seems, sequentially, that the desire to get tough on crime was expressed before the desire to better protect crime victims (...) a victim-centred discourse served as a window of opportunity something which facilitated making the kind of policy changes that were deemed necessary or desirable "(Demker & Duus-Otterström, 2009, pp. 288-289)

They write that the opportunity to launch the concept of the crime victim should be understood as a political opportunity that was taken advantage of. The interest in crime comes from above, not below, and the causality of fear of crime research may point in the same direction. There are several empirical clues pointing to that fear of crime research in Sweden was also conceived because of political interests rather than public demand.

There are some clues in the empirical materials that indicate that political interest in the issue of fear of crime has shaped and motivated the expansion of fear of crime in Sweden. The inclusion of "increasing trygghet" in the regulatory letter of the police in 1992 was an important motivation behind the police's interest in trying to measure fear of crime (see chapter 6). The people interviewed for the analysis have long experience working within the fear of crime research



discourse in the police or other Swedish governmental agencies and universities. Several of them referred to fear of crime measurements as "ordered from above".

It seems like the establishment of the Swedish Crime survey and their crime and victimization survey occupies a central position in the production of general and politically useful measurements of fear of crime:

"While, on the other hand, in order to meet the policy, to have as a basis for the government's statement whether fear of crime is increasing or decreasing, then we go to the Swedish Crime Council which is, so to speak, the government's body, to, among other things, measure the fear of crime"

When discussing the internal disagreements over the police organization decision to invest resources in the Swedish Crime Surveys expansion and redesign in 2017 instead of further developing their own measurements, political pressure is also cited. An interviewee says there was political interest in more general measurements of fear of crime on the national levels, rather than the type of local level data the police themselves found useful:

"Fear of crime measurements have two dimensions. On the one hand, fear of crime measurements are usually carried out at local level in order to support operational activities. Then there are safety measurements that are carried out nationally, to verify and prove to politicians that they are on the right track, if you want to be a bit cheeky."

The statement above assumes politicians to be interested in data showing people feeling safer to confirm they are on the right track. Note that shows not how fear of crime research is interpreted but rather how it is actually used. Here is another empirical clue showing the unique function of fear of crime research. The analysis in chapter 8 shows that no matter what fear of crime measurements actually show, "otrygghet" is continually described as increasing, getting worse, a crisis. There are several examples of how surveys are misinterpreted by politicians as showing higher fear of crime than they actually are but no examples of misinterpretation in the other direction.

Another indication is the absolute lack of discussions or concerns over costs. Municipal governmental debate, and really political debate on the welfare state in general, is usually steeped in the issue of resource allocation. From the "blank checks" allotted to the research group of the police, to the heady expansion of respondents in governmental surveys, or the hiring of specific municipal personnel, is the lack of concern over costs visible in its absence.

The analysis of survey methodology and the commensurative practices involved in producing binary measurements in chapter 7 show that fear of crime levels are somewhat flexible. The discrepancy between the different surveys and indicators is often large. This means that for any given year when multiple surveys have been implemented, several answers to the question of how "otrygga" people are can be considered scientifically correct. Furthermore, how this binary conception is constructed is perhaps the single most powerful explanatory factor for how much "fear" a survey "finds". Concerns over lacking validity are echoed by several interviewees:

"I think it's worrying with such low response rates with the data you get.. and then you try to compensate for the low response rate by weighting the responses in different ways. So it would have been very interesting if "statskontoret" had gone in and done a review... can we trust the results, because very categorical statements are made and I have a very high level of confidence in BRÅ as a brand, and it seems that all the newspapers, all the television shows and all the politicians have that too"

Thinking about the paradox outlined in the intro, that the expansion of this kind of research cannot be explained by the research discourse's ability to make people be or feel safer, the "low quality" of fear of crime data should perhaps be considered *a feature*, not a flaw. It is politically useful to have measurements of fear of crime that are just the right degree of 'scientific'.

## Knowledge production within governmental control

We return then to an aspect of fear of crime that can seem perplexing; the high level of methodological inertia in relation to methodological criticism. An answer may lie in the shift from an academic to a governmental context that has taken place. The fear of crime research that was examined as part of this dissertation's literature review was largely produced in academic settings, and as such, was the object of critical methodological examination. For example, much research cited in the section on methodological analysis and critique of the Ennis (1967) operationalization was produced as part of a British research project that aimed to improve fear of crime research (Chadee & Ditton, 2005; Ditton, 2000; Ditton,

Bannister, Gilchrist, & Farrall, 1999; Ditton, Chadee, Farrall, Gilchrist, & Bannister, 2004; Ditton, Farrall, Bannister, & Gilchrist, 2000; Ditton, Farrall, Bannister, Gilchrist, & Pease, 1999; Farrall, Bannister, Ditton, & Gilchrist, 1997; Farrall & Ditton, 1999; Short & Ditton, 1998). Research being produced in an academic context is no guarantee for excellence, but perhaps at least brings the possibility of critical examination and engagement.

Heber (2007) asks in 2007 if the topic of fear of crime has been taken over by business and governmental interests, a question the results of this dissertation answers affirmatively. Heber (2007) writes:

"The researchers' survey methodology has spread and today Swedish authorities, media and companies conduct their own measurements of fear of crime. Criticism of quantitative methods and the development of surveys has not been widely disseminated or applied outside the academic world. Fear of crime is still often measured with only one or two questions and sometimes with very vague wording. In many cases, authorities, politicians and the media also see crime as the most obvious explanation for people's fears. It is believed that fear can be reduced if crime is reduced. This is therefore very different from the research understanding of the subject. The press study in this thesis also shows that the daily press clearly links fear of crime with crime." (Heber, 2007, p. 231)

Tham and von Hofer (2014) refers to the loss of critique as a consequence of establishment of organizations like the Swedish Crime council, which functions like a buffer between the academic and the governmental spheres, and increases the distance between them. This shift has resulted in a lack of engagement with the critical discussions of methodology that has taken place in the academic sphere concerning fear of crime research. has had curiously preserving quality. Fear of crime research methodology has grown tenacious

Andersson (2002), emphasize the central role played by the production of knowledge in the rationalisation of crime policy, his analysis also show how criminological knowledge is questioned. As crime statistics diverge from the expected, increasing trend and show a levelling-out during the 70's, they are considered less reliable and valid in political debate and policy-making. Criminological knowledge has had a conditional welcome.

Producing fear of crime measurements within the sphere of government enables the state to produce its own legitimizing knowledge without having to rely on university criminology and possibly inconvenient results. I have outlined quite

seemingly paradoxical lines of development in this dissertation. Crime isn't increasing and has not done so for 20-30 years. At the same time, we have had a period of rapid expansion of the judicial sphere. I argue that fear of crime surveys fulfil a unique role in resolving this paradox. If people are fearful, further interventions in terms of police control and surveillance can be constructed as legitimate and even fulfilling an important need. If that fear can be quantified, defined in scientific terms, the need for interventions is not a point of view and thus possible to ideological critique, but it is an empirically supported fact. *Fear* of crime surveys remove the issue of "crime" from official crime statistics and other estimates of crime levels. Even if crime is not increasing, one may argue that people are "otrygga", and that can be used to legitimate further judicial expansion. This is a key result of the analysis of the use of the concept of "otrygghet" in later periods. As official crime statistics do not declare the increasing levels of crime that would lend themselves to constructing arguments for control-related interventions, the argumentation shifts to two new forms, to using fear of crime survey results and arguing that any crime is too much crime.

## The unique opportunity of "otrygghet"

I think a basic Foucauldian notion of the constitutive relationship between power and knowledge is useful for understanding how the discourse expanded and became institutionally established. Knowledge is produced that naturalize the current social organization and division of power, and power in turn enables the production of knowledge materially (Foucault, 1966, 1969; Foucault, 1980). Power and knowledge are thus caught in a cycle of mutual support and legitimatization. I have laid out the argument that the spread of fear of crime research should be understood in terms of its legitimizing function. The fear of crime research found an institutional welcome in Sweden because it represented a conjunctive opportunity. The causality behind the emergence of the research discourse is in the opposite direction. Instead of emerging from widespread worry about crime among the public, the research discourse has been launched "from above"; it is motivated by political interest in the issue of crime, and the need for legitimizing knowledge for this interest. The theoretical assumptions of fear of crime research assumes crime to be a problem of order maintenance, which in turns generates knowledge used to legitimize an increased level of order maintenance. Conservative interests in being "tougher on crime"; in penal politics

based on a higher level of punitivity and control, predates both significant fear of crime research and interest in the crime victim in Sweden (Demker & Duus-Otterström, 2009; Estrada, 2004). The expansion and spread of fear of crime research in Sweden can be understood in the same way as the launch of the crime victim as a central symbol in Swedish penal policy; terms of political opportunity (Gallo & Svensson, 2019; Tham et al., 2011).

The opportunity consisted of filling the concept of "otrygghet" with another kind of content: one derived from the fear of crime research discourse. That content defined the issue of "otrygghet" as inescapably tied to crime and order maintenance. The spread of research into fear of crime internationally should be understood in terms of the high level of political interest in the issue of crime that characterizes late modernity in general. In a Swedish context, this opportunity contains not only the possibility of new contents that motivates a penal politics that was already desirable from a conservative perspective, but it also represents an opportunity to wrestle the concept away from political opponents. This is because of how fear of crime came to be translated into Swedish as "otrygghet", rather than word-for-word into "rädsla för brott". "Otrygghet" already meant something in Swedish, as the negation of trygghet. "Trygghet" is a word with very old linguistic roots in the Germanic languages. Its meaning in Swedish at the start of the analysis is closely tied to the welfare state. It is understood in terms of materialistic predictability and even availability of social resources. "Trygghet" is essentially what the welfare state *is*. That the association between trygghet and the welfare state was seen as problematic by Moderaterna is indicated by the attempt to launch a new meaning for the concept in 1998, through associating it with stagnation and reliance on welfare. That approach was not successful in terms of replacing the content of the concept. The results from how the concept is used in 2018, showing its undisputed association with crime in material from both Socialdemokraterna and Moderaterna, indicates a more successful strategy.

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# Appendix

## Appendix A

### Additional fear of crime indicators

<b><i>The Survey of Living Conditions</i></b>	
<i>Local Youth Politics Survey</i>	Several questions regarding perceived unfair treatment and discrimination.
<i>The National Public Health survey</i>	<b>Have you during the last 12 months been the victim of physical violence?</b> <b>Where did the violence happen?</b> <b>Have you during the last 12 months that you have been threatened or threatened with violence, causing you to become afraid?</b> <b>Have you during the last three months been treated in a way that you felt violated? ("kränkt")</b> <b>Was the violating treatment caused by any of the following?</b> (possible answers include ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, age, ability, religion, skin colour, looks, gender identity and other)

**The Citizen Survey**

*the Swedish Crime Survey*

**In terms of the whole society, are you worried about crime?**

- 1, Yes, to a large extent
- 2, Yes, to a limited extent
- 3, No, not at all
- 4, Don't know

**Have you during the last year worried about being victim of:**

- assault or violent crime?
- burglary in your home?
- break-in or vandalism of your car?

Yes

No (jump to next question)

**B, how often have you worried?**

- Very often
- Rather often
- Rather rarely
- Don't know

**Have you during the last year worried about someone close to you being the victim of crime?**

- 1, Yes
- 2, No

**Have you sometime during the last year chosen another way or another means of travel**

**because you were worried about being the victim of a crime?**

- 1, Yes
- 2, No (jump to next question)

**B, how often has this happened?**

- 1, Very often
- 2, Rather often
- 3, Rather rarely
- 4, Don't know

**Have you sometime during the last year abstained from some activity, such as going for a walk, going to the cinema or meeting someone because you were worried about being the victim of a crime?**

- 1, Yes
- 2, No (jump to next question)

**B, how often has this happened?**

- 1, Very often
- 2, Rather often
- 3, Rather rarely
- 4, Don't know

**Did you happen to see someone else being beaten, kicked or assaulted in some other way during the last year?**

- 1, Yes
- 2, No

**Was someone close to you or someone you know the victim of a serious crime during the last year?**

- 1, Yes
- 2, No
- 3, Don't know

	<p><b>Do you go out to have fun, for example to a restaurant, to dance, to the cinema or the theater more often than once a month?</b>  1, Yes  2, No (jump to the next question)</p> <p><b>How often do you normally go out to have fun?</b>  1, 2-3 times a month  2, At least once a week</p> <p><b>Does worry of crime affect your quality of life?</b>  1, Yes  2, No (jump to the next question)</p> <p><b>To what extent?</b>  1, To a large extent  2, To a limited extent  3, To a small extent  4, Don't know</p> <p><b>Taken as a whole, do you believe the amount of crime in Sweden has increased, decreased or remained the same during the last three years?</b>  1, Increased a lot  2, Increased some  3, Remained the same  4, Decreased some  5, Decreased a lot  6, Don't know/have no opinion</p> <p><b>Have you yourself been prosecuted for a crime during the last three years?</b>  1, Yes  2, No  3, Don't know  4, Don't want to answer</p>
<p><i>The Swedish Contingencies Agency Survey</i></p>	<p><b>How often do you feel worried about to being victimized by the following:</b>  <b>Burglary?</b>  <b>Violence and assault</b></p> <p><b>To what degree do you avoid the following activities due to feeling unsafe:</b></p> <p>being out alone in their neighborhood during daytime?  being out alone in their neighborhood during evening?  being alone in the forest?  do longer travels?  work out alone for example by jogging during daytime?  work out alone for example by jogging during evening?</p> <p>Response alternatives are "never," "rarely", "sometimes", "most of the time", "always" and "don't know".</p> <p><b>What do you think is the risk that you are the victim of:</b></p> <p><b>Burglary?</b>  <b>Violence and assault?</b></p> <p>Response alternatives are "very small", "rather small", "neither small nor large", "rather large" "very large", and "don't know".</p>



# Appendix B

## The municipal survey

Vilka trygghetsundersökningar deltar din kommun i?

Den här enkäten är en del av ett avhandlingsprojekt vid Lunds universitet, som syftar till att undersöka svenska kommuners arbete med att mäta trygghet. Det kan handla om frågor till medborgarna om rädsla för brott eller upplevd trygghet genom enkäter eller telefonintervjuer. Till sist finns det också en fråga som handlar om andra sätt att samla in information, som vandringar och spontana möten med allmänheten.

\*Obligatorisk

1. E-post \*
2. Vilken kommun svarar du för? \*
3. Vad är din yrkestitel?
4. Deltar din kommun i Statistiska Centralbyråns "Medborgarundersökning"? \*  
*Markera endast en oval.*  
Ja  
Nej  
Vet ej  
Har deltagit, men deltar inte längre
5. Om JA, när började din kommun att delta i SCBs "Medborgarundersökning"? \*  
*Markera endast en oval.*  
Tidigare än 1995  
1995-1999  
2000-2004  
2005-2009  
2009-2014  
2015-2018  
Vet ej

6. Deltar din kommun i Folkhälsomyndighetens "Nationella folkhälsoenkäten – Hälsa på lika villkor"? \*

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

Vet ej

Har deltagit, men deltar inte längre

7. Om JA, när började din kommun att delta i Folkhälsomyndighetens "Nationella folkhälsoenkäten – Hälsa på lika villkor"?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2014-2018

Vet ej

8. Deltar din kommun i Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamhällesfrågor ungdomsenkät "LUPP - lokal uppföljning av ungdomspolitiken"? \*

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

Vet ej

Har deltagit, men deltar inte längre

9. Om JA, när började din kommun att delta i Myndigheten för ungdoms- och civilsamhällesfrågor ungdomsenkät "LUPP - lokal uppföljning av ungdomspolitiken"?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2014-2018

Vet ej

10. Gör din kommun lokala trygghetsmätningar som har initierats och utförts av kommun? \*

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

Vet ej

Har gjort, men gör inte längre

11. Om JA, när började din kommun att utföra lokala trygghetsmätningar?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2015-2018

Vet ej

12. Har din kommun beställt lokala trygghetsmätningar som utförts av ett företag eller opinionsinstitut? (som exempelvis Tryggare Sverige eller MIND Research) \*

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

Vet ej

Har gjort, men gör inte längre

13. Om JA, när började din kommun att göra lokala trygghetsundersökningar som beställts av ett företag eller opinionsinstitut?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2015-2018

Vet ej

14. Gör din kommun lokala trygghetsmätningar utförda i samarbete med lokalpolis? \*

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

Vet ej

Har gjort, men gör inte längre

15. Om JA, när började din kommun att utföra lokala trygghetsmätningar tillsammans med lokalpolis?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2015-2018

Vet ej

16. Deltar din kommun i trygghetsundersökningar som utförs av län eller region? \*

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

Vet ej

Har gjort, men gör inte längre

17. Om JA, när började din kommun att delta i trygghetsundersökningar som utförs av län eller region?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2015-2018

Vet ej

18. Utför din kommun trygghetsundersökningar tillsammans med andra lokala aktörer, som exempelvis fastighetsägare, intresseorganisationer, lokala handlare eller liknande? \*

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

Vet ej

Har gjort, men gör inte längre

19. Om JA, när började din kommun att utföra trygghetsundersökningar tillsammans med andra lokala aktörer, som exempelvis fastighetsägare, intresseorganisationer, lokala handlare eller liknande?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2015-2018

Vet ej

20. Har din kommun undersökt medborgarnas trygghet med andra metoder, som exempelvis trygghetsvandringar, dialoger på allmän plats eller liknande? Om JA, i vilken form?

21. Om JA, när började din kommun att undersöka medborgarnas trygghet med andra metoder, som exempelvis trygghetsvandringar, dialoger på allmän plats eller liknande?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Tidigare än 1995

1995-1999

2000-2004

2005-2009

2009-2014

2015-2018

Vet ej

22. Finns det något du vill tillägga om din kommuns trygghetsarbete?  
23. Kan jag kontakta dig med vidare frågor om din kommuns trygghetsarbete?

*Markera endast en oval.*

Ja

Nej

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