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The Politics of Public Transport Policy and Planning in Malmöhus and Skåne 1970-2020
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Constructing transit corridors
The politics of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne 1970 – 2020

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Planning local and regional public transport in so-called ‘transit corridors’ – i.e., to concentrate infrastructure and resources to few, but attractive corridors in a city or a region – is commonplace in contemporary public transport planning. In this thesis I analyze how transit corridors have come to dominate the policies and planning practices of public transport governance through a case study of Malmöhus County and Region Skåne between 1970 and 2020.

The thesis shows how the organization of decision-making, planning practices, and the spatial and technological configuration of public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne have been sites of an ongoing struggle between political actors and levels for influence over ideas and resources. The analysis offers a new understanding of the fundamental values and processes of public transport policy and planning, and the conflicts that arise when values and organizations collide in the search for efficient, equitable and sustainable mobility.
Constructing transit corridors
The politics of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne 1970 – 2020

Jens Portinson Hylander

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION
by due permission of the Faculty of Engineering, Lund University, Sweden.
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Faculty opponent
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Abstract
Planning local and regional public transport in so-called ‘transit corridors’ – i.e., to concentrate infrastructure and resources to few, but more attractive corridors in a city or a region – is commonplace in contemporary public transport planning. This has not always been the case, however. In this thesis I analyze how transit corridors have come to dominate the policies and planning practices of public transport governance through a case study of Malmöhus County and Region Skåne between 1970 and 2020, and show how the organization of decision-making, planning practices and the spatial configuration of public transport have been central sites of an ongoing struggle between different actors and levels over influence over ideas and resources. Understanding the fundamental values and processes that shape public transport system and the conflicts that arise when values and actors collide can contribute to increased possibilities to shape a just and inclusive public transport system that enables sustainable mobility for people.

The research is based on qualitative analyses of archival records and interviews with individuals who were involved in the planning and politics of public transport in Malmöhus County and Region Skåne. Through an analysis of how change and permanence in the public transport system have been motivated and turned into institutional practice, the thesis shows how the transit corridor paradigm evolved in through an interplay between the regional political dynamics and the wider societal context. A recurring tension exists in public transport policy and planning between values of equity and efficiency on the one hand, and how these values are translated into the organization of public transport governance through policies of coordination and competition on the other. These values and policies have been decisive for the motivations to the organizational and spatial re/configurations of public transport since the introduction of regional public transport authorities in Sweden since the end of the 1970's.

Initially, spatial and economic equity were leading principles that motivated a rapid expansion and distribution of the regional public transport system. At the turn of the 1990's, a set of interlinked policy processes assisted the formulation of transit corridors as a strategic development policy for public transport in Malmöhus County. These ideas were institutionalized through a reorganization of public transport governance with a stronger regional mandate and a more peripheral role for the municipalities and was materialized through infrastructure investments in train and express bus systems at the expensive of areas with weaker demand. When Region Skåne was formed in 1999, the transit corridor paradigm was fully developed and contributed to shaping spatial relations in the new region and has continued to be a core in public transport policy in Skåne. However, despite (or perhaps because of) the dominance of transit corridors, conflicts persist between the parts of the region that have gained the most from transit corridor planning, and those that remain concerned over declining public transport supply from the planning orientation.

Keywords
Public transport, policy, planning, rationality, power
Constructing transit corridors

The politics of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne 1970 – 2020

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This thesis is based on work conducted within the interdisciplinary graduate school, entitled Graduate School in Energy Systems. The research groups that constitute the Graduate School in Energy Systems are established at universities and institutes all over Sweden. The national Graduate School in Energy Systems aims at creating competence in solving complex energy problems by combining technical and social sciences. The research analyses processes for the conversion, transmission, and utilization of energy, combined in order to fulfil specific needs. More information is found at www.foes.se.

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For Hugo
Someone said to me that writing a doctoral thesis is a teamwork. And although there is only one author at the front page of this book and at times it has felt extremely lonely (not least in the windowless rooms at the regional archives and the corona isolation), there have been so many people who have helped turn this research from a confused jumble of ideas to a final product. That said, any and all mistakes that remain in the thesis are my own.

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As I have been affiliated with no less than four different organizations, naming
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For my wife, Frida, I doubt that there are words enough to express the love and
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Without you I am certain that I would have never gotten this far. And finally, Hugo,
thank you for bringing a whole different meaning to life, the everyday and the future.

To quote Jane: now it feels like I’m really getting started.
Populärvetenskaplig sammanfattning

Att planera lokal och regional kollektivtrafik i så kallade ’starka stråk’ – det vill säga att koncentrera infrastruktur och resurser till ett antal färre, men attraktivare stråk i en stad eller en region – är ett standardförfarande i samtida kollektivtrafikplanering. Så har inte alltid varit fallet dock. Denna avhandling visar hur organiseringen av beslutsfattande, planeringspraktiker och den rumsliga utformningen av kollektivtrafiken i Skåne har varit skådeplatser för en ständig kamp mellan olika aktörer och nivåer om inflytande över idéer och resurser. Liknande utvecklingar och tendenser kan skönjas på andra platser såväl inom Sverige som internationellt och även om dessa följer sina egna unika händelseförlopp så finns det lärdomar att dra från denna studie till andra. Att förstå de grundläggande värderingar som kollektivtrafiksystem utformas efter och de konflikter som uppstår när dessa värderingar krockar kan bidra till förbättrade möjligheter att planera ett rättvist och inkluderande kollektivtrafiksystem som möjliggör hållbar mobilitet för flertalet.

Avhandlingen analyserar hur starka stråk har kommit att dominera kollektivtrafikens styrning och rumsliga utveckling genom en fallstudie av Malmöhus län och Skåne mellan 1975 och 2020. Analysen bygger på närstudier av arkivdokument och intervjuer med personer som var involverade i planeringen av kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län och Skåne. Genom en analys av hur förändring och stabilitet i kollektivtrafiksystemet har motiverats och omsatts i praktik visar avhandlingen hur starka stråk-planeringen utvecklades i samspel med viktiga samhällsförändringar under denna period, såsom ökad regionalisering, mer fokus på miljö och klimat och integrationen inom Öresundsregionen. En genomgående spänning existerar i kollektivtrafikens styrning mellan idéer om rättvisa och effektivitet å ena sidan, och organisering av kollektivtrafikens styrning genom samordning och konkurrens å andra. Dessa idéer har varit avgörande för att motivera kollektivtrafikens organisatoriska och rumsliga omorganisering sedan införandet av ett regionalt huvudmannaskap för kollektivtrafiken i slutet av 1970-talet.

Inledningsvis var geografisk och ekonomisk rättvisa viktiga leddor och motiverade en kraftig utbyggnad och spridning av de regionala kollektivtrafiksystemen. I Malmöhus organiserades kollektivtrafiken med starka kommuner och kommunförbund i relation till landstinget, vilket ytterligare förstärkte denna tendens.
Reaktioner på de kraftiga underskotten för kollektivtrafiken som detta resulterade i, tillsammans med en under 1980-talet förändrad syn på den offentliga politikens roll och möjlighet, leddes till ett ökat fokus på ekonomisk effektivitet.


Men trots (eller kanske på grund av) de starka stråkens dominans fortlever konflikter mellan de delar av regionen som har gynnats kraftigast och de som oroar sig för ett minskats kollektivtrafikutbud av den förda politiken. Även om de starka stråken framstår som en ohotad princip i den samtida kollektivtrafikdiskursen utgör den pågående omställningen mot hållbar mobilitet en fortsatt utmaning för den framtidiga kollektivtrafikpolitiken. En slutsats av min studie är att kollektivtrafikforskningen skulle gynnas av att bli mer självmedveten om de implicita ideologiska antaganden och maktanspråk som den bygger på.
Abstract

Planning local and regional public transport in so-called ‘transit corridors’ – i.e., to concentrate infrastructure and resources to fewer, but more attractive corridors in a city or a region – is commonplace in contemporary public transport planning. This has not always been the case, however.

In this thesis I analyze how transit corridors have come to dominate the policies and planning practices of public transport governance through a case study of Malmöhus County and Region Skåne between 1970 and 2020. The analysis shows how the organization of decision-making, planning practices and the spatial configuration of public transport have been central sites of an ongoing struggle between different political actors and levels over influence over ideas and resources. Similar trends can be observed in other contexts in Sweden as well as abroad, and even though each local context has its own specificities, the case of Malmöhus and Skåne likely shares commonalities with other places. Not least concerning the tug-of-war over public transport’s role in the transition toward sustainable mobility across the world. This thesis offers a novel analysis of the fundamental values and processes that shape public transport systems, and the conflicts that arise when values and organizations collide in the search for efficient, equitable and sustainable mobility.

The research is based on qualitative analyses of archival records and interviews with individuals who were involved in the planning and politics of public transport in Malmöhus County and Region Skåne. Through an analysis of how change and permanence in the public transport system have been motivated and turned into institutional practice, the thesis shows how the transit corridor paradigm evolved in through an interplay between the regional political dynamics and the wider societal context, for example through discourses of regional expansion and integration in the Öresund region, international competitiveness, and environmental issues.

A recurring tension exists in public transport policy and planning between values of equity and efficiency on the one hand, and how these values are translated into the organization of public transport governance through policies of coordination and competition on the other. These values and policies have been decisive for the motivations to the organizational and spatial re/configurations of public transport since
the introduction of regional public transport authorities in Sweden since the end of the 1970’s.

Initially, spatial and economic equity were leading principles that motivated a rapid expansion and distribution of the regional public transport system. In Malmöhus County, decision-making in public transport was organized with strong municipal organizations and a relatively weak central planning organization, a power dynamic that further strengthened the focus on spatial distribution. Reaction to the rising deficits in public transport that these policies resulted in, coupled with transformations in public administration ideology, resulted in an increased focus on economic efficiency and redistribution toward more profitable parts of the public transport system.

At the turn of the 1990’s, a set of interlinked policy processes assisted the formulation of transit corridors as a strategic development policy for public transport in Malmöhus County. The transit corridor policy was defined by a clear market-orientation in public transport planning, a focus on regional expansion and a wish to strengthen public transport’s competitiveness and attractivity as a sustainable alternative to automobility. These ideas were institutionalized through a reorganization of public transport governance with a stronger regional mandate and a more peripheral role for the municipalities and was materialized through infrastructure investments in train and express bus systems, at the expense of areas with weaker demand. When Region Skåne was formed in 1999, the transit corridor paradigm was fully developed and contributed to shaping spatial relations in the new region and has continued to be a core in public transport policy in Skåne. The region has become connected through investments in transit corridors, not least the inauguration of the Öresund Bridge and the Citytunnel under Malmö.

However, despite (or perhaps because of) the dominance of transit corridors, conflicts persist between the parts of the region that have gained the most from transit corridor planning, and those that remain concerned over declining public transport supply from the planning orientation. Even though the transit corridor paradigm seems hegemonic in the public transport discourse, the transition toward sustainable mobility constitutes an ongoing challenge for future politics of public transport policy and planning. A main conclusion from the research is that public transport research needs to become more sensitized to its own ideological assumptions and the power that its knowledge constitutes.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Prologue

As 2018 drew to a close, Skånetrafiken, the administration body for regional public transport within Region Skåne, Sweden’s southernmost region, suffered an economic blow in the coming year’s regional budget.¹ A demanding austerity package coupled with a political demand to maintain at least 50% cost coverage in public transport meant that costs had to decrease. Despite suggestions to raise ticket prices and cut administration at Skånetrafiken, traffic supply would have to be cut to meet the target for a balanced budget.² To match the shrinking budget the planners at Skånetrafiken proposed cutbacks on 46 local and regional bus services, chosen on the basis of low ridership levels.³ This meant that the lion’s share of cutbacks would fall on the already least serviced parts of the region, and the proposal sparked protests from politicians representing local municipalities and the political opposition.⁴ The main complaints were that it would disadvantage rural services and communities that already had a poor public transport supply, which in turn would lead to adverse environmental effects as inhabitants, it was argued, would be left with no other option than using the car. It was claimed by the opposing parties to be both unfair and un-strategic to cut traffic in already weak parts of the system while leaving the best supplied parts of the system untouched by the crisis. Several municipalities also complained about the lack of communication and dialog from the regional public transport authority prior to presenting the proposal, and voiced frustration that Skånetrafiken asked the municipalities to pay for keeping services with low occupancy, seemingly ignoring the fact that regional politicians had had full economic responsibility for public transport.

¹ Region Skåne, “Protokoll Regionfullmäktige 2018-12-10,”
³ Region Skåne, “Kollektivtrafiknämndens prokoll 2019-03-29,” bilaga “Samlade synpunkter.”
for over 20 years.\textsuperscript{5} Carina Zachau from the conservative party, chairing the public transport council since the elections in 2018, defended the proposal by stating that the public transport council’s primary responsibility was to achieve a balanced budget. Besides, she argued, the proposed savings “in no way lead to a large cutback in services. Only two bus services are cancelled, the rest [of the cutbacks] are adjustments to existing services that […] affect between 0.4 to 4 persons per departure.”\textsuperscript{6} After a great deal of uncertainty about the final decision, on March 28, 2019, the proposed cuts (with minor alterations) were passed by a minimal margin in the regional public transport council and were implemented from August 2019.\textsuperscript{7}

1.2 The politics of public transport supply

To anyone who takes an interest in public transport – whether they be citizens using it, civil servants planning it, politicians deciding on it or researchers and consultants analyzing it – the events recounted in the prologue above are probably not at all unfamiliar. Similar episodes have taken place in many different places at different times and competing perspectives on where resources for public transport should be invested, or in this case reduced, make up a longstanding conflict in public transport politics, and public transport as a policy arena is rife with political contention, a fact that is highlighted not least when austerity reigns.

In the 1930s, politics was described by the political scientist Harold Laswell as ‘who gets what, when, how’.\textsuperscript{8} And indeed, almost everywhere where the public sector is involved, struggles over resources and how to allocate them are present, whether latent or open. My research seeks to understand the contemporary politics of public transport supply through the lens of regional public transport policy and planning and unearth their historical roots through a case study of the Swedish region of Skåne. The thesis starts from the observation that what I call in this thesis \textit{transit corridors} (‘kollektivtrafikstråk’ in Swedish) constitutes a core development strategy among many

\textsuperscript{5} Region Skåne, “Kollektivtrafiknämndens prokoll 2019-03-29, Bilaga ‘Samlade synpunkter’”; Zillén, “Skånska kommuner vill inte betala för hotade busslinjer”; Zillén, “Kommuner kan rädda linjer - om de betalar.”


\textsuperscript{7} Region Skåne, “Kollektivtrafiknämndens prokoll 2019-03-29” §18.

public transport authorities, in Sweden as well as abroad.9 What this means in practice is that infrastructure and resources are concentrated on a limited number of high-quality links to and from major destinations within and between cities. Planning public transport in corridors is a core feature of what is today considered ‘best practice’ in the international public transport policy literature and is overall a dominant policy orientation for public transport development.10 In the name of sustainable development, the interest in public transport systems has for several decades experienced a resurgence in many countries around the world: public transport is mobilized to varying degrees to mitigate climate change, alleviate local environmental pollution and provide a basis for new models of regional economic development and improved mobility. Claiming a stake to challenge the system of automobility that was rolled out across the world during the 20th century, public transport - together with other transport modes such as walking and biking - has started (yet again) to become an important factor structuring urban and regional development.

Skåne is an emblematic case of where transit corridor planning has become a dominant strategy for regional development. In the development strategy for Skåne from 2014 the region is pictured as a nested, spatially hierarchical structure in which the larger urban areas constitute ‘growth engines’, and smaller cities are designated as ‘local cores’ for economic activity.11 It is further argued that “it is by focusing on the growth engines’ conditions for economic growth that the other cores of Skåne can best be supported.”12 Translating this reasoning into public transport strategy, development focus is put on the ‘growth engines’ as the central nodes, and corridors as the inter-urban links where the greatest passenger flows can be found, in the hope that the economic activity in the growth engines will induce spill-over effects in other areas in the region and beyond. In the traffic supply plan for Region Skåne the classification of public transport links as ‘strong’, ‘medium-strong’ and ‘weak’ makes up the base of every corridor’s development strategy, clearly illustrating the influence of the transit

corridor over public transport planning. Based on this I argue that transit corridor planning can be seen as an overarching ‘paradigm’ in current public transport discourse. Here, I use ‘paradigm’ in a Kuhnian sense of the word, by which I mean that the concept of transit corridors constitutes the dominant and hegemonic metaphor for how public transport policy and planning is discussed, organized, and carried out, that all public transport policy must relate to. Throughout the thesis I will show how this has come to be in the case of Malmöhus and Skåne.

For what is of importance is that this orientation toward transit corridor planning has not always been self-evident. In Sweden, the ownership and governance of public transport were historically fragmented and public transport networks were more widespread, but both have over time become concentrated, organizationally as well as spatially. Moreover, despite being considered by most transport planning theorists and practitioners to be the best way to plan public transport, as we saw in the prologue, such policies and planning practices frequently lead to tensions and conflicts between politicians representing different geographical parts of a public transport system. Public transport policy and planning is a political arena fraught with conflicts over values, goals, and decisions. Although it may be hidden from sight in the day-to-day actions of planners and civil servants, it explodes into view in times of crisis, which the example above illustrates well. (The still ongoing Covid-19 pandemic is another exogenous shock that has highlighted the politics of public transport all too well, as public transport authorities have struggled to maintain traffic supply in the face of an unprecedented drop in passenger numbers).

When conflicts such as these arise it is the fundamental values of public transport that are up for debate. Hard choices need to be made and the political imperative to meet budgetary requirements is pitted against a desire to maintain traffic supply in areas with already low demand. These choices involve frequent trade-offs between a variety of political goals for regional public transport, which include e.g., economic growth and regional development, movement and accessibility, environment and sustainability, and social integration and equality. Embedded in these conflicts lie deep questions about the functions and responsibilities of the welfare state and market forces, and which values, goals, and knowledge ought to guide decision-making in public transport. The fact that contested and often contradictory values permeate public transport policy implies that the shaping and implementation of public transport rests on a bedrock of power that can help enforce

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13 Region Skåne, 31.
certain values over others. In this thesis it is my intention to lay bare the historical processes that have shaped the power dynamics involved in molding transit corridors into the solid foundation for public transport policy and planning that they currently are, and to discuss its role in the future. To paraphrase Laswell’s formulation of what politics is, the politics of public transport can be summarized as ‘who gets what, when, how – and where’.

1.3 Aim of the thesis

Based on these problem statements and motivations outlined above, the overarching aim of this thesis is to contribute to a deeper understanding of the politics of public transport through analyzing the development of rationalities in regional public transport policy and planning. This will be done through an analysis of the development of public transport policy and planning, focusing on a historical case study of regional public transport governance in Malmöhus, one of the two counties that preceded what is today Region Skåne. The study will focus on the period from the creation of regional public transport authorities in Sweden in 1978 and will follow the development of public transport policy and planning, first in Malmöhus Län and later Region Skåne, until the current day. In chapter three I will develop empirical questions that guide my analysis, derived from the analytical framework I develop in the same chapter.

1.4 The rationalities of public transport policy and planning

Wanting to understand the politics of public transport policy and planning and the development of transit corridor as a dominant policy orientation, I approach the subject by focusing on the development of rationalities of public transport. By this I mean the central values, ideas and logics that underpin the organizing of governance and policymaking as well as the planning and development of public transport systems. This Foucauldian-inspired understanding of rationality will be further developed in chapter three but contains at its core a rejection of a universal, objective and atemporal understanding of rationality. Rather than existing as an independent variable of human thought and behavior, rationality is seen as a socially and historically constructed phenomenon that is entangled in relations of power and knowledge. From this standpoint, my interest in this thesis is to understand how the notion of transit
corridors has been constructed at the intersection of power, knowledge and organizing, and how this rationality has been instrumental to reshaping public transport systems.

By writing a story to help us to understand the ‘conditions of possibility’ of transit corridor paradigm, I want to contribute with a historically situated account of the proliferation and institutionalization of today’s dominant planning paradigm for public transport. Engaging with the concept of transit corridors there is thus an ambition to understand and critically evaluate discourses and practices that over time have become taken for granted, while at the same time refraining from an outright judgment of whether transit corridors are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ as such. However, by highlighting the origins and consequences of transit corridors through a historically and politically sensitized account of what is regularly pictured as ‘the only way’ to approach public transport policy in modern society, my ambition is to open a discussion of the power relations embedded in them, and their impact on regional politics, public welfare, and sustainable mobility.

1.5 Defining transit corridors

In Sweden, the concept used to designate the planning orientation described above is called ‘stråkplanering’ or planning in ‘starka stråk’, which can be roughly translated into English as ‘corridor planning’ or ‘transit corridors’ (however, see box 1 for a discussion of the difficulties of translation). The concept of corridors in public transport is commonly used in technical literature on the planning of public transport services and is central to the best practice literature on public transport network design (for a further discussion of this, see section 2.2).16 If describing contemporary public transport planning as being dominated by the idea of ‘transit corridors’, we need to briefly determine what this means in relation to other forms and modes of public transport planning. Here I believe it is important to draw a distinction between corridors as an infrastructural feature of the public transport system, and corridors as a central policy aim for public transport governance. The existence of transit corridors as tools for urban development is evident in the early histories of suburbanization through rail and light

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16 A search on “transit corridors” on Lubsearch returns 666 hits, most of which are related to modelling and optimization. However, it is also used in the social sciences, see e.g. Anne Jensen and Per Homann Jespersen, “From Corridor to Region: Trans-Border Co-Operation on Infrastructure, Innovation and Research as Participative Planning in Practice,” Transport, no. September (2014); Augustine Kwabena Tufour, “The Nature of Corruption along Ghana’s Transit Corridor: Is It More of ‘Bribery Involving Evasion’ Or ‘Bribery Involving Theft’?,” Journal of Arts and Social Sciences 13, no. 9 (September 1, 2020); Thomas Oommen and Ryan Christopher Sequeira, “The Politics of Infrastructural Aesthetics: A Case of Delhi’s Bus Rapid Transit Corridor,” International Development Planning Review 43, no. 4 (October 2021): 479–99.
rail around the turn of the 20th century. The notion of ‘star cities’ and ‘band cities’ has also circulated, for example in the corridor-oriented planning and implementation of metro and rail systems in the post-war metropolitan expansion with the Stockholm metro and the Copenhagen finger plan. However, such strategies were predominantly urban and were more the exception than the rule, and after the Second World War, urban as well as regional transport systems were generally geared toward automobility.

Box 1.1. A brief discussion on the translation of stråk to corridor

I have chosen to translate the word ‘stråk’ as ‘corridor’, which may seem self-evident given the use of the latter in public transport literature. Looking a bit closer, it is not a straightforward translation, however. As the architecture scholar Rickard Persson writes in an interesting article dedicated entirely to the use of the Swedish word ‘stråk’ in urban and spatial planning, “somewhere in between stråk and the English language there is a gulf of possibilities that somehow seems to disappear when translated.” He does not find concepts such as ‘route’, ‘strip’, ‘way’, or ‘passage’ suitable translations. In comparison to the word ‘route’, for example, stråk denotes a collective space: whereas one can think of a ‘route’ as the spatial trajectory of a vehicle or service, a ‘stråk’ relates to the spatial ‘container’ where both the vehicle, the passengers and the surrounding together form the connection between one place and another in a continuous fashion. According to Persson, when ‘stråk’ are considered in planning they refer to “linear structures that hold institutionalized human movement whose points of entry and exit cannot always be specified (and which can change).” Persson argues that a stråk encompasses both “form and function, or rather it is a word sprung from a picture of the universe that does not recognize such a dichotomy.” A stråk thus denotes a spatial structure that combines both the people and objects moving through a ‘stråk’ and the topographic context in which that movement occurs: they institutionalize individual mobility with the help of the physical surroundings. In the context of public transport, we may understand a ‘stråk’ as referring to linear spatial relations between different places, which are institutionalized through both geographical relations, technical infrastructures, and patterns of mobility. Persson’s discussion of ‘stråk’ reminds us to be careful about using imperfect translations between languages since subtle meanings of words may be lost in the process. Wanting to engage in a discussion with international literature, a translation, however imperfect, is needed. In this thesis I use the concept of a corridor, since much like a stråk, a corridor can be thought of as a passage that, although it has a start and an end, may have multiple entries, and exits along the way. Furthermore, it is not the start and end points of a corridor that are necessarily the most defining features, but the totality of relations between the nodes along the corridor.

20 Persson, 269
21 Persson, 268
While certainly influenced by earlier transit-oriented spatial developments, contemporary policy focus on transit corridors represents a break from auto-oriented transport policies, rather than a linear continuation of developments in policy and planning. Also, whereas previous transit developments were predominantly urban, my focus lies on the formation of policy and planning of regional public transport, and I am interested in understanding transit corridors on this geographical level. In this thesis I thus develop an understanding of a paradigm of transit corridor planning as a distinct feature of regional public transport policy. To summarize, while transit corridors as a systemic phenomenon are basically as old as the first passenger railways, the concept of transit corridors as a regional development policy was, as I will show throughout the thesis, not at all a self-evident principle for planning, but is in fact a rather recent invention.

The focus in this thesis is on regional public transport. However, the concept of transit corridors can be mobilized on multiple geographical scales. It is possible to identify transit corridors on at least four different scales: an example of local transit corridors is the recently opened tramway in Lund, Sweden which runs through a designated ‘knowledge corridor’ [sv. kunskapsstråket] (relating back to Box 1, the concept of a knowledge corridor illustrates perfectly well how it is both the spatial and social characteristics that are make up a corridor or ‘stråk’). On the regional level, transit corridors connect the major cities and towns in the Öresund region (or Greater Copenhagen as it is called nowadays for marketing purposes) On the national level, the proposed development of a high-speed railway between Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmö is a perfect example of the vision of a national transit corridor. Finally, on an international level, the plans for a pan-European high-speed train network constitute a transit corridor principle on an international level.

A second aspect highlighting the importance of a new historical reading of public transport policy and planning is that the shift toward transit corridors may, at first glance, be considered as a straightforward response to shifting technological and economic conditions. This idea follows a standard narrative within transport studies that sees shifts in transport modes as merely a technological substitution on the innovative and progressive road toward more proficient solutions to the mobility needs of people and businesses.22 In this account, the decline of public transport in the wake of the rollout of the automobile society as well as the resurgence of investments in public transport in many countries are simply rational responses to economic pressures and large-scale structural shifts in industrial society. While I think that this storyline

holds on a general level, I believe that it misses two central points. First, it risks succumbing to an apolitical and technologically deterministic view of history where it is only the techno-economic factors associated with each transport mode that explain their function and diffusion in society, and that such factors are historically constant. Second, such an aggregated view rarely provides a proper understanding or knowledge of how these transformations have occurred. As the Marxist geographer Eric Swyngedouw explains, transport and communication systems should rather be understood as simultaneously forming a condition for economic processes, being sites of struggle, and shaped as an outcome of the political-economic dynamics of capitalism. Besides, different transport modes have deep cultural meaning-making functions to people and societies, as the political ecologist Matthew Paterson has elucidated in his book on the cultural political economy of the automobile society. Following this argument, it is my intention to complement – and more deeply investigate – the aforementioned narrative in my account of the development of public transport policy and planning by providing a detailed analysis of how the transformation of public transport policy and planning has been constructed, struggled over and implemented in practice. This means that we need to consider the spatial development of public transport as sites of struggle and not simply as linear outcome of macro-economic processes (although these most definitely are of great importance!); and how these processes are provided with meaning for stakeholders and actors; as well as how this meaning-making is integral to the ongoing struggle for influence over resources and accessibility.

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1.6 Situating policy and planning

This thesis focuses on the politics of public transport policy and planning. Both policy and planning are notoriously broad concepts which have been defined and employed in a wide array of ways, and are often used in tandem. Aiming for the simplest possible distinction, one can claim that policy relates to the overarching strategies and goals within a political arena (e.g., transport), whereas planning relates to the construction of (more or less) concrete plans to implement such goals. Slack and Notteboom provide such a distinction between policy and planning in the transport arena:

Transport policy deals with the development of a set of constructs and propositions that are established to achieve particular objectives relating to social, economic and environmental development, and the functioning and performance of the transport system. Transport planning deals with the preparation and implementation of actions designed to address specific problems.26

However, in both instances there are significant overlaps and there is an unclear boundary between where policy ends, and planning begins. The planning theorist Andreas Faludi has for example defined planning as the “application of scientific method – however crude – to policymaking.”27 In a similar fashion, Rune Premfors has defined both the guidelines for action and the measures taken to ensure that these are implemented as individual links in the chain that constitutes the policy process.28 Given the difficulties in erecting a strict boundary between the concepts, policy and planning are conceptualized in this thesis as separate but complementary parts of an overall process of (public) intervention in spatial development processes that unfold over time and space.29 Over time, policy and planning processes create an ‘institutional mesh’ that influences and provide actions in a given political field with structure and direction.30 However, it is important to recognize that while policy and planning are processes that interlock, it may also be the case that policy is developed without direct implications

for planning or that planning takes place without a direct connection to specific policy.  

My perspective on policy and planning also draws on critical policy and planning studies, which implies understanding both policy and planning in terms of the “interests, values and normative assumptions – political and social – that inform these processes”. and, in doing so, seeking to “identify and evaluate existing commitments against normative criteria such social justice, democracy and empowerment.”

1.7 Malmöhus and Skåne: Introducing the case

Public transport in Skåne is today governed at the regional political level, with the regional political council Region Skåne designated as the regional public transport authority (PTA). In terms of organizational setup, there is a public transport council governing public transport with a regional agency, Skånetrafiken, acting as both the administrative branch and the brand that regional public transport is operated under. While the thesis takes its point of departure in Skåne today, its main empirical focus is on Malmöhus County (sv: län). The reason for this focus is developed further in chapter four on methods and material, but rests on two conditions: first, that the rationalities embedded in the contemporary transit corridor discourse were already well-developed at the time of the creation of Region Skåne, and second that events in the Malmöhus corridor were crucial for their development and institutionalization. This is not to say that the establishment of the rationalities of the transit corridor discourse were unique to Malmöhus County, merely that the context constitutes a good empirical case to study the proliferation of transit corridors.

Skåne is in the southernmost region of Sweden and has a long history as a border region between Sweden and Denmark. Prior to 1658, Skåne (together with Halland, Blekinge and Bohuslän) was a Danish province, but after a succession of wars between the two powers, Skåne and the other regions were incorporated into the Swedish state. From 1719, the geographical region of Skåne (sv: landskap) was divided into two counties, Malmöhus and Kristianstad. This regional administrative division would remain until the creation of Skåne Län in 1997 (see Figure 1.1). The partitioning of different parts of Sweden into counties was related to the government’s oversight of the regions in

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Sweden, represented by a *County Administration* (sv: länsstyrelse) led by a county governor (sv: landshövding) who was appointed by and answered to the government.

The current organization of local and regional political self-rule dates back to 1862, when *municipalities* (sv: kommuner) and *county councils* (sv: landsting) were established by parliamentary decrees. Municipalities and county councils are both democratically elected bodies and function independently from one another, each with distinct policy areas: municipalities govern local political matters and the county councils govern regional ones. In Malmöhus County the municipalities of Malmö and Helsingborg chose to stand outside the county council organization, which meant that they took on the political functions of both municipalities and county councils at the municipal level. Helsingborg municipality was incorporated into Malmöhus Län in 1963, but Malmö remained a ‘county-free municipality’ until 1999, when Region Skåne took over all regional political functions in the whole county as well as some responsibilities that hitherto had rested with the county administration.

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34 In administrative language, municipalities and county councils are also referred to as ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ municipalities, where the local level constitutes the ‘primary’ municipal level, and the regional level is designated as ‘secondary’.

35 In 2018 all county councils in Sweden were replaced by regional bodies, but as this is a historical study, we will dwell mostly on the county council organization.

One further regional administrative function with bearing on public transport politics in Malmöhus is the Municipal Association (sv: kommunalförbund). Municipal associations were introduced as a legal unit in 1919 to make it possible for municipalities to jointly govern certain policy areas that required collaboration over municipal borders, such as policing, fire departments and poor relief.37 As will be discussed throughout the empirical analysis, public transport would, over time, become an area of importance to the municipal associations in Malmöhus County.

The distinction and relation between municipalities, municipal associations, county councils and county administrations – and especially the first three – is important to keep in mind in the continued reading of the thesis, as these political units would be at the center of the political dynamic of local and regional public transport in Malmöhus during the second half of the 20th century.

1.7.1 Literature on the history of public transport in Skåne

A body of literature on the historical development of public transport in Skåne exists, but academic research on it is scant. Historical reference works usually provide an overview of the introduction and development of the railway in Skåne since railways had an immense impact on the economic geography of any region they were developed in.38 The local community association of Skåne has also published an anthology dedicated to the railways in the region, and a chapter on the ‘renaissance of regional trains’ in Öresund by Mats Améen and Jens Möller was published in the anniversary book when the state railway company, SJ, reached its 150th anniversary.39 Public organizations responsible for public transport have also published stories of the development of public transport in Skåne, including a history of the creation and development of Skånetrafiken, the story of Malmöhus Trafik during the 1990s, and the local traffic systems in Malmö and Lund.40 In 1994, the county administration of Malmöhus published a short report on commuting by public transport between 1975

38 See e.g., Skansjö, Skånes historia; Wetterberg, Skånes Historia III 1720-2017.
and 1990. As for academic research on the history of public transport in Skåne, Jens Möller has published an article on the early history of the railway in Skåne. The most extensive work on public transport development in Skåne is probably Sven Godlund’s doctoral thesis from 1954, a vast chorological study of the impact of the introduction and diffusion of bus services in Skåne. These publications are highly valuable as resources for information about the public transport system but are, with the exception of Godlund’s thesis and Möller’s article, aimed at the general public and are thus not defined by a scientific approach to the understanding of public transport.

There are also relevant studies of critical geographical research that have employed different concepts to understand aspects of mobility, infrastructure and region-building in the Öresund region, for example Hanna Dekker Linnfors’s licentiate thesis on the environmental discourses of the Öresund Bridge, Markus Idvall’s doctoral thesis on the construction of the Öresund region through cartographic practices and representations, Richard Ek’s doctoral thesis on the formation of the Öresund region through the construction of visions and actor-alliances and Maja Essebo’s doctoral thesis on the role of myths in the lock-in of the infrastructures and institutions of high-mobility in Malmö. None of these theses focus exclusively on public transport, but the construction of mobility as idea and practice a crucial aspect of the process of shaping the Öresund region, and I will return to them throughout the thesis.

1.8 Overview of the thesis

The thesis is divided into three parts. Part I consists of three chapters and provides the theoretical and methodological foundations for the thesis. Over the course of six chapters, Part II contains the empirical analysis and presents the historical development of national legislation and public transport policy in Malmöhus and Skåne. The thesis ends with Part III, a single chapter in which I discuss theoretical reflections and draw conclusions from the thesis. Below I will present each chapter in more details.

43 Sven Godlund, Busstrafikens framväxt och funktion i de urbana influensfälten, Samhällsvetenskapliga Studier, 99-0351351-8 ; 11 (Lund: Gleerup, 1954).
In chapter 2, I present previous literature to which I relate my research. I discuss both research that has been conducted about the historical developments of public transport, and a discussion of the status of ‘best practice’ in the public transport policy and planning literature. Based on these topics, I identify two gaps in the existing knowledge and theories of public transport policy and planning that this thesis can contribute to: one relating to the need for historical analyses of public transport systems, another related to an incorporation of analyses of power in public transport policy and planning.

I develop a theoretical reading of the concept of ‘rationality’ in the policy and planning literature is developed in Chapter 3, relating both to the broader literature and research dedicated to transport policy and planning. Following this discussion, I develop an analytical framework that is used throughout the thesis, drawing on theories developed by, and following on, the French historian Michel Foucault. The analytical framework is made of three interrelated concepts in a reciprocal dynamic: the rationalities in public transport policy and planning, how these are institutionalized through decision-making frameworks, policy tools and planning instruments, and how the materialize in the public transport system through the spatial and technological configuration of public transport. I argue that the construction of rationalities of public transport policy and planning can be understood as the outcome of struggles between actors for resources and influence that shape the public transport system.

In chapter 4, I describe the methodology of case study research and motivate why a single case study was chosen. I discuss methodological issues related to the case study approach, including reflexivity, transferability, and the theoretical relevance of the case results. I also present and discuss the main material used in the research undertaking (archive material, traffic supply plans, government commissioned inquiries and data from interviews), the methods employed (archive research, document analysis and interviews) and the analytical process, from which I build my historical narrative.

Part II begins with chapter 5, which presents an overview and analysis of national public transport policy, with a focus on how the legislation concerning regional PTAs has developed since its first formulation in 1978. The chapter’s main function is to establish an understanding of national public transport policy, to relate to developments that occurred in Malmöhus and Skåne – the main empirical material – over the last half century. The chapter presents the background to the establishment of the regional PTAs and the subsequent development of national public transport policy, where I argue that public transport policy is defined by a double tension between the values of efficiency and equity and the policies coordination and competition.

After the overview of national policy and legislation, chapter 6 introduces the main empirical analysis of the politics of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus. I first present a brief account of the early history of public transport in Malmöhus, after
which I concentrate on the formation of the regional PTA in Malmöhus Län, and its first years of operation. It includes an analysis of the central values, policies and planning practices that were inscribed in the organization, and how the public transport system developed in the first few years after the PTA reform.

In Chapter 7, the narrative focus is on the conflict over the deficit arising from public transport operations, and the struggles of public transport supply and control over traffic planning that this sparked. Managing the deficit became the central focus for public transport policy and planning by the mid-1980s. This conflict culminated in a budgetary and political crisis in the first years of the 1990s. Parallel to this, struggles over the authority over different parts of the local and regional public transport system also developed. I trace how the policies of deficit management was instrumental both to establish a nascent practice of planning public transport in transit corridors and push the governance of public transport toward the regional level.

Chapter 8 covers the three policy processes that took place around the beginning of the 1990s, which all had a lasting impact on the development of public transport in the region and helped stabilize the rationalities of transit corridors. The first process was the production and establishment of a regional development strategy for public transport in Malmöhus Län and was partly a response to the growing tensions described in chapter 7. The process of regionalization of public transport was further developed by the twin processes of the Metropolitan negotiations and the Malmöhus agreement. These government-led negotiations over transport infrastructure helped fundamentally change the conditions for public transport in Malmöhus.

I chart the implementation of transit corridors through the reformed PTA in the wake of the deficit crisis and the metropolitan negotiations in chapter 9. There, I analyze how the central values, decision-making frameworks, and planning practices were shaped to fit the new governance situation. I also show how this policy shift was met with resistance from stakeholders that did not initially agree with the benefits of the new strategy. The central elements of the strategy included a greater degree of market-orientation in the financial steering system, an increased focus on quality and customer-orientation, and the implementation of large-scale infrastructure investments in the transit corridors in the county.

The final empirical chapter, chapter 10, takes the thesis back to the present day through a short recount of public transport governance since the creation of Region Skåne in 1999. The transit corridor orientation was fully developed already by then, but the merging the previous counties of Malmöhus and Kristianstad consolidated all of Skåne into a single public transport system that has successively been extended farther into the neighboring regions as well as across Öresund into Denmark. I end the chapter by discussing some of the tensions over financing and traffic supply that have beset public transport policy and planning in Skåne over the last few years.
The final part of the thesis is made up of just one chapter, 11, in which I present my overarching analysis and discussion of the empirical chapters and the larger trends that have come to shape public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne over the years that my thesis focuses on. I focus on how the transit corridor paradigm has been constructed at the intersection power relations between stakeholders, the development policy and planning practices that have fostered certain ways of thinking and doing public transport policy and planning, and the political and ideological implications of these. I also discuss the conditions for the transitions toward a sustainable mobility system under the transit corridor paradigm, and the role of crises for public transport policy.

After this introduction to my study, we shall now turn to an overview of the previous research on the subject of public transport policy and planning. In the next chapter I will discuss previous research with the aim of identifying the contribution of the thesis to the existing literature.
Part I
2 Previous research

The aim of this chapter is to present previous research on public transport that my thesis seeks to relate to and build upon. The discussion is divided into three sections. First, I review literature that has studied the historical development of public transport and identify a gap in research about public transport policy and planning after the Second World War. Second, I present contemporary research that focuses on ‘best-practice’ design of public transport networks, public transport’s role in regional development, and the governance and implementation of public transport policy. Based on this, in the final section of the chapter I propose the need for more research both into the historical development of public transport as well as an explicit incorporation of analyses of power in public transport policy and planning research.

2.1 Historical studies of public transport systems

Given the looming climate crisis and the strive to decarbonize the transport sector, public transport has increasingly been awarded a central place in a transition toward sustainable mobility. While I fully support this and agree that the need to achieve a transition toward altered mobility systems on all levels of society deserves sustained attention, this focus has also shaped an inclination toward much public transport research being predominantly oriented toward the present and the future, and less attentive to analyzing the historical conditions of public transport policy and planning. Furthermore, where public transport’s history has been at the center of attention, such studies have typically focused on the early history of public transport. For example, the inspiring anthology Suburbanizing the Masses: Public Transport and Urban Development in Historical Perspective focuses on the introduction and expansion of public transport systems in the urban fabric around the turn of the 19th century. On the other side of the historical spectrum, occasional historical analyses in contemporary literature tend to focus on developments over the last few decades, from the new millennium until

45 Divall and Bond, Suburbanizing the Masses: Public Transport and Urban Development in Historical Perspective.
today. Between a focus on the early histories of public transport and more recent developments, there thus seems to exist a research gap, specifically development in the second half of the 20th century remains understudied. Examining the titles of *The Journal of Transport History* certainly strengthens this conclusion: only a handful of articles were identified that focus on post-war public transport, and these were all concentrated to the decades directly following the war.47

Of course, notable exceptions to this rule exist. One is Tomas Ekman’s doctoral thesis on sociotechnical choices in the politics of tramway governance in Stockholm during the 20th century is of relevance, as he analyzes how the tramway was gradually replaced by a car-oriented city building regime.48 He identifies an interesting aspect of transport systems, namely how the spatial and physical rigidity of tramway technologies have been loaded with positive or negative values by policymakers depending on the surrounding economic and planning context.49 During the heyday of automobility after WWII, tramway systems were considered as a hindrances to economic development and mobility, whereas their status was rehabilitated from the 1980’s and onward, as environmental crises hit and economic growth slowed down, and urban governance transitioned from managerialism to entrepreneurialism, in David Harvey’s words.50 Dejan Petkov’s analysis of the tramway renaissance in Western Europe from the 1980’s provide further insights to how contemporary public transport policies centered on light rail have been shaped.51 I shall have reason to return to some of these aspects throughout the thesis.


49 Ekman, 30.


Another example is Alexander Paulsson’s article about how the expansion of the metro system in Stockholm contributed to reshaping local and regional transport politics. Paulsson describes the processes of shaping integrated and collaborative planning in Stockholm’s public transport system over time, which was a forerunner in Swedish public transport governance and development through the construction and expansion of the Stockholm Metro system, which opened in 1950. Paulsson identifies how different processes of agreements, collaboration between local and regional authorities, and interventions from the government have shaped the ways that public transport planning has been integrated or de-integrated with land use planning. I will also return to Paulsson’s analysis later, as there are interesting parallels to be made between the case of Stockholm and the developments of regional public transport governance in Malmöhus.

Lastly, Ralph Buehler, John Pucher and Oliver Dümmler’s have analyzed the establishment and diffusion of the *Verkehrsverbund* (VV) to 58 metropolitan regions across Germany, Austria, and Switzerland between 1967 and 2017. The VV’s carry many similarities to the development and function of regional public transport authorities in Sweden. VV’s are associations between operators and public authorities, which differs from Sweden where the formal responsibility for public transport governance rests entirely with the public transport authorities. Their research highlights that the process of regionalization of public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne that I will present in this thesis have comparable counterparts in other countries as well.

In light of the existence of only a handful of analyses dedicated to the longer historical trends and developments in public transport policy and planning over the last 50 years, during which public transport policy has undergone seminal shifts, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by analyzing the medium-long history of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne. In the next section I shall discuss how contemporary public transport policy and planning research understands its subject matter, and how my study may contribute to a developed understanding of policy and planning processes in public transport.

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2.2 Studies of contemporary public transport policy and planning

2.2.1 Research on public transport network design

A central feature of the literature on public transport concerns how public transport networks are best designed to achieve specific aims such as increased patronage, improved attractiveness, better technoeconomic performance, and the like. This research is often technically or economically oriented and aims to understand and prescribe how to best plan transport network design, frequency, and technology. Technical and economic studies tend primarily to focus on how to analyze and optimize the efficiency of parts of or the whole public transport system.

Regarding public transport network design, there have been a lot of effort to establish ‘best practice’ for network design and planning, and it seems that a sense of maturity regarding knowledge about what constitutes a good public transport network has been reached. As McLeod et al. state in a review of public transport planning principles and practices from 2017: “[a]s the global renaissance of urban public transport (PT) continues, consensus among researchers for what constitutes ‘best practice’ in network design has broadly been reached”, and continue to list what this consensus entails: intermodal connectivity, provision of high-quality services, strategic congruency, and integration of transportation and land use policy. In the Hi-Trans project, Nielsen et al. identified the elemental features for a for high-quality public transport network design in 2005: an integrated, multimodal transit network with good transfer opportunities; a differentiated traffic supply to cater to varying customer demand; a simple network with clear service structures; direct routes, high speeds, high frequency where feasible, reliable timetables; and efficient commuter services. They also identified the competition with the car and cost efficiency as the main criteria for success of public transport systems, and a central recommendation was to focus on developing the strong

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corridors of a transit network. Likewise, the planning handbook for ‘attractive and efficient’ public transport in Sweden, *Kol-TRAST*, highlights transit corridors as a key feature of best-practice in public transport planning. As we can see, transit corridors stand out as a central feature of the package of planning principles and network designs that are typically associated with ‘best practice’ network design.

Of course, the network design of public transport networks cannot be optimized outside of the political goals and aims established for the system in question and in the end, public transport policy and planning boils down to how the values of public transport are expressed in the design of the public transport system. Jarett Walker claims that public transport planning face an inescapable conflict between opposing values or purposes that cluster around *patronage* goals on the one hand, and *coverage* goals on the other. Patronage goals relate primarily to issues of optimization of cost-efficiency and/or environmental goals, whereas coverage goals cater to balancing mobility needs and options within the population and/or geographic equity. These purposes imply different spatial strategies and network designs: patronage-oriented policy and planning tend to focus on delivering frequent all-day services in dense and walkable areas; frequent all-day connections between major activity centers, and frequent peak-period services in commuter markets. Coverage-oriented services on the other hand tend to be devoted to low-density and rural areas, infrequent and circuitous. There is, however, as Walker puts it, an inevitable conflict between the purposes of patronage and coverage that stem from public transport’s structural conditions, including its economy and geometry’. The patronage-versus-coverage dichotomy is explicit in Swedish public transport policy: in the proposition to the current public transport legislation, it was stated that the goals and conditions of public transport differs between urban and rural areas. In urban areas, public transport is a “precondition for mobility and through its beneficial effects it contributes to creating the good city. Public transport is a spatially efficiency transport mode and if a larger share of trips is made with public transport, walking and biking, congestions can decrease.” In rural relations, conditions are different. Here the main purpose of public transport is to

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57 Nielsen et al., *Public Transport – Planning the Networks - HiTrans Best Practice Guide* 2 passim.
provide inhabitants with alternatives to the car and create travel opportunities for people without the car, especially for youth and elderly. As was noted above, current best-practice planning principles clearly emphasize patronage goals and a focus on developing public transport in corridors.

2.2.2 Research on public transport and regional development

In this thesis I focus primarily on the development of the regional public transport system. I will therefore also briefly discuss existing research on the connection between public transport and regional development. The literature on public transport network design and development tends to have a predominantly urban focus (although the analytical concept of the ‘urban’ is vague and may thus incorporate parts of what some would consider as ‘regional’). While there exists research on the design and pricing of regional public transport, as well as the conditions for rural public transport, in this section I am primarily interested in research that explicitly discusses public transport’s role in regional development.63 And on this subject, the existing literature is less abundant. Malin Henriksson and Jane Summerton have conducted a literature review on the effects of high-speed rail on local and regional development and public transport, in which they note that the effects of high-speed rail on regional development are inconclusive. The benefits are context-dependent and necessitate conscious politics that guide land use planning to make the most of investments. They also note that there is a “fundamental conflict between fast travels and regional equity”, as high speeds are premised on as few stops as possible.64 A broader approach to public transport and regional development has been undertaken by Tomas Svensson and Johan Holmgren, who conducted a research overview on the contributions to regional development of


public transport. One of their conclusions is that public transport at the time (2012) was seldom used systematically and consistently as a tool for regional development in Sweden. However, if public transport were to be employed in such a manner, the way to do so is to follow the best practices described above, i.e., investing in trunk lines, network integration, spatial prioritization and an integration of transport and land use planning. They connect the growing interest in especially rail-bound transport as an expression of the new urban economy that has developed over the last decades, with a focus on regional cohesion and expansion. At the same time, they also note that it is very difficult to establish a clear causal connection between public transport economic growth and development, due to the difficulty in isolating a single factor in complex economies. This issue is a recurring problem in the transport and regional economic literature, which can be summarized in the question “does transport investment promote economic growth or does growth encourage more demand for transport, and thus further investment”? Nonetheless, public transport has become an important policy tool for spatial development in post-industrial region, often motivated by the potential for sustainable growth through labor market expansion.

This is exemplified not least by the impact of the theories and policies of Transit-Oriented Development (TOD). As an umbrella concept for spatial development centered on the integration of transport and land use policy, TOD combines several features described above and aims to concentrate land use development around public and other sustainable transport modes. As Robert Hrelja et al. note in a literature review of the TOD concept, the concept has a strong tilt toward English-speaking countries such as the US, Australia and Canada. In Swedish policy and planning practice the phenomenon is at least partly encompassed by so-called stationsnära lägen

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65 Svensson and Holmgren, “Kollektivtrafik som verktyg för regional utveckling. en kunskapsöversikt.”
66 Svensson and Holmgren, 8
or stationssamhällen (station-adjacent sites or station-towns). With the rapid development of data driven platform services the mobility as a service (MaaS) and ‘smart mobility’ concepts have provided a further refinement and expansion of what sustainable mobility systems may look like in the future.

The orientation toward TOD resonates with the notion of transit corridor planning, as both emphasize the necessity of high-quality public transport links to connect the central nodes in a transport system. However, an important difference between TOD and transit corridor planning lies in where the emphasis is put. In a historical overview of the TOD-concept, historian Ian Carlton makes a subtle but neat distinction between Transit-oriented development and what he terms ‘Development-oriented transit’ (DOT). Carlton argues that the former tends to be primarily oriented toward the planning of housing around transit whereas the latter is focused more on the planning of transit to lead urban (and regional) development. Thus, while transit corridor planning and TOD are naturally related, I view them as two distinct sides of the same coin, where transit corridor planning is concerned primarily with the planning of public transport while TOD takes a broader perspective on spatial planning. We can thus situate studies of transit corridor planning in proximity with the literature on TOD without conflating them entirely.

2.2.3 Research on the implementation of public transport policy

Having discussed literature on public transport network designs, the goals that permeate public transport policy, and theories on the development of regional public transport systems, brings us to another body of literature related to the policy and planning processes involved in the implementation of ‘best practice’ in public transport systems.

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If the best practices of public transport network design are considered as well-established, research on how to realize them seems less self-assured. At most, a consensus exists among public transport policy and planning researchers that existing legislation and planning systems tend to result in difficulties in implementing the measures needed to increase public transport use according to the best practice network design knowledge presented above. Hence, in parallel with the knowledge of best practices in public transport network design, a growing body of literature focusing on analyzing the institutional and organizational aspects public transport, as well as which policy and planning processes result in implementation of these best practices has developed.

In a literature review about how to create efficient public transport systems, Hrelja, Kahn and Pettersson identify three main areas of research for implementation research: governance challenges for sustainable transport systems, governance of public transport systems, and issues related to integrated transport and land use planning. The first concerns the role and prioritization of public transport systems in a wider societal shift toward sustainable mobility; the second relates to governance arrangements and practices related to the internal functioning of public transport systems; and the third the topic of policy integration between public transport and land use planning, a topic that was identified as a core feature of high-quality public transport systems in the section above. Similarly, in a recent article, Fabio Hirschhorn et al identified four central issues of coordination for public transport policy and governance: where to provide PT, how to integrate land use planning and PT planning, how to integrate actor knowledge in the planning process, and how to deal with tighter economic frames.

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These issues of cooperation, collaboration and coordination have greatly influenced the research on public transport policy and planning. This has been motivated by a number of reasons, for example that public transport is a policy arena distinguished by ‘multi-level governance’, in which authority and decision-making is distributed among local, regional, national and supranational public bodies. The existence of formally independent organizations, coupled with varying degrees of deregulation and privatization of public transport services that have been implemented in many European countries over the last decades is often depicted as public transport being defined by a ‘fragmented governance landscape’. In chapter five I will discuss how well the notion of fragmentation fits the Swedish public transport arena.

As a means to overcome the institutional fragmentation in public transport policy and planning, a growing interest in the interplay between formal and informal institutions in the governance of public transport systems can also be discerned. Formal institutions here refer to the legislated distribution of decision-making authority, whereas informal institutions refer to structured norms, interactions, and behavior that are not defined by laws and regulation. Studies conducted by Hrelja et al. and Hirschorn et al. both point to that, because of the multi-level nature of public transport governance, the role of informal institutional arrangements is crucial to achieve well-

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functioning public transport systems. In an analysis of public transport governance in Skåne, Hrelja et al. identify what they term ‘critical interfaces’, where informal institutional arrangements fill a need that formal structures don’t or can’t. Hirschorn et al. also highlight the role of so-called ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ in shaping and facilitating the interactions between formal and informal institutional arrangements in the Oslo and Amsterdam metropolitan areas. Fredrik Pettersson and Hanna Frisk have also employed the intriguing concept of ‘soft spaces’ to analyze how actors on the local and regional levels erect semi-formal project organizations to achieve an integration of land-use and transport planning.

Lastly, there is also a body of policy literature on the implementation of policies and planning tools to achieve better economic performance in public transport, often geared toward understanding and improving the cost of public transport provision. The economic rationale for subsidizing public transport is well-established since long and include benefits from economies of scale, efficiency gains from decreased congestion, as well as social benefits through improving mobility options and reducing pollution. However, what constitutes the optimal level for subsidies in different geographical areas with varying uptake remains a topic of investigation within transport economics. In Sweden, research has focused upon, inter alia, analyses of cost-drivers in public transport operations, the use of cost-benefit analyses in regional public transport planning and the use and organization of tendering and contracts. This literature


provides insights into how actors shape and navigate economic and legal frameworks in the planning of public transport operations. As an exogenous shock to mobility systems, the ongoing covid-19 pandemic has stirred an intensified attention to the future conditions for the financing, organizing and usage of public transport, outcomes which will of course only be known in the future.88

2.3 Identifying a research gap in the literature

All of the research referred to above has made valuable and important contributions to the knowledge about public transport systems, including their design, implementation, and consequences. However, this literature tends to have a policy-oriented focus and is primarily concerned with how to achieve these high-quality public transport systems, and less often enquire critically into the political nature of public transport policy and planning. Hence, while there seems to be broad and relatively consistent knowledge regarding what constitutes a ‘best practice’ of public transport policy and planning, that includes an orientation toward transit corridors, there is less research on how these ideas and knowledges have been constructed, developed and over time have come to dominate public transport policy and planning in the first place.

This is congruent with the conclusions of transport researchers Greg Marsden and Louise Reardon, who have identified a lack of engagement with real-world policy making also in the broader transport policy literature. They conclude that there is a focus on analyzing the means and tools of policy, rather than the ends and aims of policy. Thus, they argue that transportation policy literature tends to end up as knowledge for policy, rather than knowledge of policy.89

To build upon this, while there certainly exists a broad body of research addressing power relations and critical perspectives regarding sustainable transport in a broad sense (of which public transport is and will remain an important part in the foreseeable future) and the ways in which car-oriented policies continue to displace investments in


88 A search on “covid-19 AND ‘public transport’” conducted in November 2021 returned 850 hits on published articles.

more sustainable modes of transport, there is less research attending to the politics and power dynamics *within* the public transport policy arena.90 (Notable exceptions in recent public transport research are e.g. the power of strategic documents in public transport policy, power relations in procurement processes, and public transport and smart mobility, micro-mobility, mobility justice, and gender structures and violence in public transport.91) I therefore suggest that there is ample room to further develop critically inclined studies that seek to understand the historical development of how public transport policy actually has been shaped, and not only what it seeks to do, as well as the role of power in this process. To contribute to this, in the next chapter I shall develop an analytical framework for the analysis of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne.


3 Rationality in public transport policy and planning

Having discussed previous research related to public transport policy and planning and identified a research gap to be filled by studying the historical conditions for the present policymaking and planning practices, this chapter develops the central concepts that I employ in my study of regional public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne. As presented in the introduction my focus lies on the development of rationalities of public transport. To arrive at an operationalization of the concept, I will first present an overview of how the concept of rationality has been theorized in policy and planning literature broadly, and in transport research. From there, I develop the concept of rationality from a Foucauldian perspective, where I also focus on how rationalities become institutionalized and materialized in the public transport system.

3.1 Rationality in policy and planning

Rationality is defined by the dictionary Merriam Webster as “the quality or state of being rational”, with rational defined as “relating to, based on, or agreeable to reason”, as in opposed to emotion. Rationality and reason have a long history in western philosophy and social theory, and the strive to harness and apply rationality and reason in social and scientific affairs are often considered hallmarks of the historical processes of the Enlightenment and Modernity. In sociology, rationality also relates both a way of thinking and reasoning and to specific ways of justifying or motivating action and

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92 “Rationality,” in Merriam Webster; “Rational,” in Merriam Webster.

93 In Western philosophy the concept of rationality has been construed as central to the human condition since at least the writings of Plato and Aristotle. For example, Aristotle distinguished humans from other sentient beings by attributing a rational faculty to humans that he thought other beings did not possess. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H Rackham (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1926), 63 Book I, Ch. 13.
decision-making. \textsuperscript{94} As the organization theorist Barbara Townley states, “Reason and the need for action to be rendered rational are […] essential dimensions of any collective endeavour.” \textsuperscript{95}

3.1.1 Theories of rationality in policy and planning

The centrality of rationality is true for planning and planning as well, and the planning theorist Yvonne Rydin claims that “the search for legitimation is an inherent part of the policy process”, and that “in contemporary society, such legitimation takes the form of demonstration of rationality.” \textsuperscript{96} While there is a broad consensus around the idea that rationality is an important element in planning, there is less consensus over how to understand and normatively assess what rationality in planning actually entails.

In the discussion rationality in policy and planning one may distinguish between two central perspectives on or uses of rationality. Both relate to questions of the status of knowledge and the processes to establish adequate knowledge in planning processes, but they approach them from different angles. One perspective on rationality focuses on the normative question of ‘what kind of knowledge planning should be based on?’, and the procedures involved in reaching this knowledge. Another perspective seeks to understand rationality primarily not as a normative ideal, and instead aiming to define what rationality in planning ought to look like it inquires why a certain perspective has come to dominate policy and planning knowledge and how rationality has been constructed in this process.

Urban and spatial planning as a distinct profession and policy area developed around the turn of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, both from the need to control and support the urbanization and industrial capitalism that developed rapidly during the 19\textsuperscript{th} century (not least as an effect of new transport modes). \textsuperscript{97} Aiming to both control and harness industrial urbanism, utopian visions for spatial planning and urban development, such as Ebenezer Howard’s ‘Garden cities’, Frank Lloyd Wright’s ‘Broadacre city’ and Le

\textsuperscript{94} Max Weber’s influential sociological theory of rationality postulated a relation between different types of social actions as determined by different justifications, or rationalities, on behalf of the actors. See e.g. Stephen Kalberg, “Max Weber’s Types of Rationality: Cornerstones for the Analysis of Rationalization Processes in History,” \textit{American Journal} 85, no. 5 (1980): 1145–79.


Corbusier’s ‘Radiant city’ were developed. In terms of the implementation of visions of rationally ordered planning, James C Scott traces the development of what he calls an ‘authoritarian high modernism’ from the experiences of industrial warfare planning of the early 20th century as well as the Great depression, which led to the formation of theories of planning with social engineering as ideology and comprehensive planning as practice, in socialist and capitalist countries alike from the 1930’s and onward. The belief in the rational discovery of scientific truths, objective knowledge and technocratic expertise that would underpin planning methodology was strong, with its zenith in the rational and systems theories of planning during the 1960’s and 1970’s. In these, a rational approach to planning was to be defined by the pursuit of positivism, i.e. be based on and derived from empirical facts, with the central problem of planning methodology being the procedures applied to distinguish well-founded from ill-founded decisions. For example, criticizing the conflation of the ends and means of planning, the rational planning scholar Andreas Faludi argued for a focus on the procedural aspects of planning theory and practice, where rationality in planning is narrowed down to establishing and following methodological procedures, and allowing them even to ‘envelop’ the substantive aspects of planning.

In a similar fashion, systems theories of planning built on the combination of two central assumptions, one ontological and one epistemological. The ontological assumption was that people and systems are defined by the rational maximization of utility, and the epistemological assumption was that it is possible to correctly identify and model system constraints and boundaries. Together, these assumptions imply that social systems could be theorized, modelled, and predicted and that “planning’s role in this is to anticipate the dynamics of a system such as a city or regional in a holistic way and plan accordingly.”

Representing a dominant force in post-WWII society, the scientistic ideals in rational and systems planning theory received criticism from a variety of angles almost from the outset. Such critiques stemmed both from reactions the substantive outcomes of large-scale comprehensive planning and a critique of the theoretical foundations of planning.

103 Allmendinger, Planning Theory, 57.
rationalist planning. Regarding the substance of planning, the large-scale urban reshaping after the war, not least in the United States, had a large impact on local communities that was perceived by some as both undemocratic and detrimental to livability and prosperity.\textsuperscript{104} This discrepancy brought rising social conflicts over space and the environment from the 1960’s and onward (not least in the area of transport and accessibility!). In parallel with critiques of the outcomes of planning, a theoretical critique was voiced as well, in which the central assumptions of rationality in policy and planning stood in the firing line. In a ‘post-positivist turn’, rational and systems planning theories were accused of an over-emphasis on instrumental rationality that strictly separate means from ends and downplays and obscures the societal power planners wield through its scientized application.\textsuperscript{105} As Roy Darke argue, rationality can be used in an ideological and legitimatory way, as well as a foundation for truth.\textsuperscript{106}

The critiques against the rationalistic planning of ‘authoritarian high modernism’ also inspired the development of alternative ways of understanding and approaching rationality in planning. This includes radical Marxist critiques of planning under capitalism\textsuperscript{107}, neoliberal critiques of centralized planning\textsuperscript{108}, as well as more pragmatic theories that see policy and planning as a science characterized by satisficing rather than optimization.\textsuperscript{109}

Another important development in planning theory is the broadening of the view of where and how planning knowledge is created and whose knowledge is valid in the


\textsuperscript{105} Post-positivism is here understood as the critical rebuttal of positivist or empiricist (social) science. It involves the acknowledgment of the establishment of knowledge as a meaning-making activity that is socially (and technically) constructed. Frank Fischer, “Beyond Empiricism: Policy Analysis as Deliberative Practice,” in Deliberative Policy Analysis: Understanding Governance in the Network Society, ed. Maarten A Hajer and Hendrik Wagenaar (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2003); Michael J Breheny and Alan J Hooper, eds., Rationality in Planning: Critical Essays on the Role of Rationality in Urban & Regional Planning (London: Pion, 1985).


\textsuperscript{107} See e.g. David Harvey, Social Justice and the City (London: Edward Arnold, 1973); Andy Merrifield, Metromarxism: A Marxist Tale of the City (New York: Routledge, 2002); Allmendinger, Planning Theory, 2017, chap. 4.

\textsuperscript{108} Friedrich A von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972); Allmendinger, Planning Theory, chap. 5.

planning process. Another is the influential communicative planning theory. Rather than abandoning reason and rationality, communicative planning advocates seek to ‘rescue’ it from its technocratic chains. For example, Tore Sager urges planners and policymakers to balance efficient goal achievement and democratic procedures by “bounding the domains of instrumental and communicative rationality in public planning”. A third perspective includes more radical planning orientations, including feminist and post-colonial perspectives, that doesn’t necessarily seek to achieve consensus in planning, but rather the empowerment of the previously disadvantaged. Another critical perspective on rationality in policy and planning has also developed from scholarship influenced by historian Michel Foucault. As part of the post-structuralist turn, just like communicative planning theory it involves a focus on language and discourse and how these structure and condition social processes. However, in a critique of the rationalist and communicative planning paradigms alike, the Foucauldian perspective on rationality in policy and planning starts from the recognition that knowledge, rationality, and power are inextricably linked; thereby any attempts at attaining policy and planning conditions free from power are misguided.

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113 Sager, Communicative Planning Theory, ix.


The planning scholar Bent Flyvbjerg turns the problem on its head and argues that researchers need to embrace that “rationality is context-dependent, and the context of rationality is power.” Power, from this perspective, is thus not something that can be dissolved and separated from or overcome by recourse to rationality through objective analyses or dialogue, rather a certain rationality is the outcome of power relations.

As we can see, there are many ways to approach and understand rationality in planning. Before summing up, I will briefly discuss the concept of rationality in relation to transport policy and planning.

3.1.2 Rationality in transport policy and planning

Just as with the general perspectives on rationality in policy and planning theory, transport policy has also been subjected to refined critique, along similar lines as drawn up above. According to Max G. Lay, transport planning prior to the 1950’s was viewed as a subsidiary to town planning and was dominated by qualitative methods. With the development and application of computer power it became possible to process ever larger amounts of data, which enabled quantitatively oriented planners to analyse traffic movement patterns in a more systematic manner. The quantification of transport studies also led to the development of new tools for modelling and prognosticizing traffic, which came to center transport planning around a paradigm that has been dubbed ‘predict and provide’ that has been tightly wedded to the expansion of automobility during the second half of the 20th century. In the predict and provide paradigm, future transport demand is predicted through modelling based on historical data by planners and decision-makers. While critiques of the roll-out of freeways and adaptation of cities to the car were voiced early on, it took several decades until the predict and provide paradigm started being seriously challenged. As the construction of more roads were unable to prevent congestion, and citizens and policymakers woke up to the complex challenges of sustainability, a new paradigm for transport planning was sought where the goal was to rather to ‘predict and prevent’ traffic and provide other means of satisfying accessibility and mobility needs.

117 Flyvbjerg, Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice, 2.
119 Richardson, in Lay, 167.
Faced with increasing complexity, some transport scholars have embraced communicative planning theory to address the disparities that exist between different interest and knowledge claims when it comes to transport planning.\textsuperscript{122} Analyzing the supposedly ongoing shift from the rationality of ‘predict and provide’ to the ‘predict and prevent’ that underpinned the new discourses of sustainable mobility, the planning scholar Tim Richardson suggested that the success of such discourses required not just new ideas and visions, but that the existing tools of analysis and decision-making frameworks that underpin transport planning would be supplanted by new ways of analyzing, understanding, valuing and prioritizing in the transport system.\textsuperscript{123} And while there definitely have been gradual changes to the way that transport planning is carried out and the values of sustainability have been incorporated into transport policies at various levels of government, as much research has pointed out, transport policymaking and planning are still deeply wedded to notions of a traditional techno-economic rationalism.\textsuperscript{124}

3.1.3 A multifaceted understanding of rationality in policy and planning

From this brief overview, we can conclude that there are multiple approaches to rationality in the broad policy and planning literature, as well as in the transport policy literature existing alongside and layered on top of each other in an uneasy, but also theoretically rich, relationship. The gradual development of alternative and competing conceptualizations of rationality in policy and planning has generated, what political scientist Dalia Mukhtar-Landgren calls “a broadened set of theoretical outcomes.”\textsuperscript{125} By this she means that the development of theories of rationality in policy and planning have not resulted in the replacement of one theory for another, but a historical

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sedimentation and layering of the theories and practices of policy and planning. In transport policy, this is exemplified by the strained relation between traditional rationalistic technoeconomic analyses and more critical approaches to transport policy and planning. To me, this implies that instead of searching for a single, objective, rationality that should guide policy and planning, it is better therefore to think of multiple, and context-bound, rationalities permeating policymaking and planning. Still, the establishment of specific conceptions of rationality and what counts as rational within different policy fields serve as powerful ways of creating institutional stability (indeed it is hard to imagine policymaking and planning without the establishment of hierarchies of rationalities; the central question is how this is done). Hence, the emergence of what political theorist Stewart Clegg identifies as ‘rules of practices’ resting on different ‘modes of rationality’ is highly relevant for an analysis of power in public transport policy and planning.  

And while there is a good amount of research discussing various aspects of rationality in transport policy and planning, not least related to questions of sustainable transport, when it comes to studies that focus on rationality in public transport policy and planning in and of themselves, and not primarily in relation to wider transport policy, the selection becomes a lot thinner.  

As I see it, it is thus warranted to engage with rationality in public transport policy and making on its own terms.

After this general discussion of rationality in policy and planning theory, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to developing my analytical framework for the study.

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3.2 Analytical framework

3.2.1 Rationalities in public transport policy and planning: ideas, values, and knowledges

Just as any other area, public transport policy and planning is underpinned by different claims about which values to pursue and what knowledge counts as legitimate. These values and knowledges inform the way that decision-making is carried out and which ways policymakers and planners analyze the policy issue at hand. The planning theorist Tim Richardson defines rationalities as the “core ideas, values and policy knowledge” in transport policy.\textsuperscript{128} He further describes the construction of rationalities in policy and planning as the translation of overarching discourses into local settings, where specific ideas, practices, problems and solutions are judged as possible, justified and worthwhile, whereas others are ruled out, in a setting of ‘discursive competition’.\textsuperscript{129} Discourses are here understood as the “historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects and objects.”\textsuperscript{130} I thus understand the relation between rationalities and discourses as a nested hierarchy. If we for example consider the public transport discourse as the overarching structure that provides meaning to public transport policy and planning practices, then within this discourse certain rationalities figure more prominently than others. For example, if values of efficiency are given a higher degree of importance in policymaking than equalization, this means that efficiency is a more central value than equalization in the public transport discourse. We can also dig even further and unfold different perspectives on what a rationality of ‘efficiency’ actually should entail in public transport policy and planning. Rationalities may thus be thought of as the ‘normative substance’ that is incorporated within a specific discourse, and the ways in which different rationalities are ordered in relation to each other. What I call the transit corridor paradigm is thus a historically specific expression of the public transport discourse.

Through establishing ‘conceptual horizons’ that define the appropriateness of social action through values, knowledges and norms, the imposition of specific rationalities within a policy area function as implicit ‘acts of power’ and is an important element through which social life is governed.\textsuperscript{131} Rationalities are constructed through rules and

\textsuperscript{129} Richardson, 301–7.
\textsuperscript{130} David Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000), 9.
\textsuperscript{131} Tim Richardson and Ole B Jensen, “Linking Discourse and Space : Towards a Cultural Sociology of Space in Analysing Spatial Policy Discourses,” Urban Studies 40, no. 1 (2003): 7–22; Margo Huxley,
methodologies for knowledge production, and problem formulations that are adapted to these knowledges. This notion resonates with ideas from Carol Bacchi who argues that in policy processes, problems do not simply exist ‘out there’ waiting to be addressed but are actively created.132

In her thesis on market bureaucracy and neoliberal rationality political scientist Linda Nyberg provides a further distinction of rationalities as consisting of claims along three dimensions of thought: claims about how things should be, and who should make it so (moral dimension); claims about what exists and the nature of what exists (ontological dimension); and claims about what kind of knowledge we can rely on to know what exists (epistemological dimension).133 With these dimensions we can make a useful amendment to the definition of rationality above, by identifying more specifically which values, ideas and policy knowledges, expressed as claims or justifications, are crucial to pinpointing a specific rationality, since all values, ideas and knowledges cannot be accounted for. Exemplifying with the difference between the ‘predict and provide’ and the ‘predict and prevent’ paradigms in transport planning, we can identify differences in the moral dimension (what kind of transport futures do we aim for, and which actors are best equipped to realize it?), the ontological dimension (which problems exist and need to be addressed?), and the epistemological dimension (techno-economic analysis vs. a more holistic foundation for knowledge and policy creation). In transport policy and planning, this amounts to differences in perspectives on what knowledge counts as valid (e.g., quantitative transport economic models and/or qualitative narratives and perspectives on experiences of transport environments) and whose knowledge counts as valid (e.g., technical experts and/or the knowledge of ‘ordinary citizens’). These differences in rationality carry over into ideas concerning how policymaking and planning are best organized and can thus be utilized to analyze the expression of rationality both in policy and planning documents and the concrete organization of decision-making.

3.2.2 Institutionalizing rationalities: practices

A focus on rationalities in public transport also draws our attention to the interrelation between thought and practices in policymaking and planning. As Barbara Townley states that “practices ‘rest’ on ‘modes of thought’ [and] rationality is ‘always embodied

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133 Linda Nyberg, “Market Bureaucracy - Neoliberalism, Competition, and EU State Aid Policy” (Lund University, 2017), 47.
in institutions and strategies and has its own specificity.”

134 Tim Richardson also describes how rationalities become “institutionalised in and reproduced by tools of analysis, decision-making frameworks and local practices.”

135 I here understand institutions as the rules and practices, formal or informal, that give stability and durability to policy and planning processes (p. 30). Institutionalization I here understand as the processes through which specific rationalities become inscribed into rules and practice, both formally defined legislation, policies and organization of decision-making authority and the informal ways in which power is distributed and operates through the application of policy tools and planning practices by different stakeholders.

I am thus arriving at a complementary, but analytically distinct definition of rationalities and how they are implemented in practice, and the intricate relationship between thoughts and practices in policymaking and planning. This implies an conceptualization of rationalities in public transport policy and planning needs to include an analysis of how rationalities – values, knowledge claims, and justifications – become institutionally embedded through practices: the organization of decision-making and the decisions actually made as well as the application of policy tools and planning instruments, which simultaneously are imperative for the implementation of a given rationality, but also its development and reproduction. The focus lies, then, on how different ways of thinking and acting come together to produce specific forms of rationality. For example, it is through the employment of specific tools of analysis, such as transport models, categorizations, and measurements, that we arrive at knowledge about policy problems, knowledge that then informs policymakers and planners’ ideas about which is the right course of action. Thus, rationalities exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship with the practices that underpin them.

Richardson states that such a perspective points to the importance of close attention to the ‘fine grain’ of the policy process:

The focus is turned towards how commonly used techniques of analysis construct particular forms of knowledge, providing legitimacy for particular spatial strategies while marginalising other ways of understanding policy problems. The tools and frameworks of policy making may mask such conflicts, but inevitably they are marked by them.


Wanting to understand the ‘strategies and tactics’ of power rather than (only) its abstract rules, this means focusing attention both to the overarching shifts in rationalities and institutional setups and how these shifts shape and have been shaped by the concrete practices of politics, administration, and planning.\textsuperscript{138}

3.2.3 Materializing rationalities: space and technology

Ultimately, if successfully implemented, the rationalities and their associated policies and practices are materialized in the \textit{spatial and technological configuration} of the public transport system. By this I mean the ways in which transport systems are shaped, function and form, their spatial extension, infrastructural and physical qualities, choices between transport modes and services frequencies. Developing the notion of \textit{spatial rationality}, Margo Huxley points to the importance of incorporating “the productive role of space in governmental rationalities”.\textsuperscript{139} Spatial rationalities concerns the ways in which spaces becomes known and understood as ‘objects’ that are analyzed, reshaped and mobilized in the formulation of policy problems and solutions.

The control, design, regulation, and administration of space is a central element in modern governmental power and their attempts “to produce and regulate particular behavior and subjectivities”.\textsuperscript{140} In Discipline and Punish, where he developed the spatial metaphor of the ‘panopticon’, Foucault proclaims that “discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space.”\textsuperscript{141} Through the organizing of ‘cells’, ‘places’, and ‘ranks’ “the disciplines create complex spaces that are at once architectural, functional and hierarchical.”\textsuperscript{142}

Tightly coupled to the ordering of space is also the organization of \textit{circulation}.\textsuperscript{143} Organizing the spatial circulation of various resources both material (e.g., goods, people, water, and energy) and immaterial (e.g., authority, discourses and policies) is a central feature of governing, and the importance of controlling and structuring circulation has only grown as the world has become increasingly interconnected over

\textsuperscript{138} Flyvbjerg, \textit{Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice}, 5.
\textsuperscript{142} Foucault, 154.
the course of the historical development of industrial capitalism.\textsuperscript{144} The role of transport in organizing circulation of goods and people is as self-evident as it is fundamental: it is transport networks and technologies that ultimately enable their mobility. (And while digital communication technologies allow for a virtual mobility of immaterial goods, this development has not abated physical mobility of neither people nor goods.) Extending the metaphors of ordering space and enabling circulation to public transport systems, the ordering of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ corridors, and the tools employed to determine which transport relations belong to which category can be understood as a hierarchical ordering of places and their importance in the architecture of the public transport system.

However, it is important to keep in mind that (public) transport doesn’t create connections between ‘inert’ space, rather transport and other network infrastructures are part of the active and social construction of spaces and places. With the influential French urban theorist Henri Lefebvre, we can thus understand the spaces of public transport as both a material \textit{product} of social relations and a \textit{determinant} of social relations.\textsuperscript{145}

The role of spatial visions in the institutionalization of rationalities in transport policy is also of relevance. Huxley argues that spatial rationalities can be exemplified “by a scheme or ‘diagram’ that crystallizes the particular logics and governmental aspirations at work in it.”\textsuperscript{146} A good example of such a scheme with import for transport planning is ‘the pattern of the metropolis’ by Lynch from 1961 in five different types of metropolitan development is laid out (see Figure 3.1).\textsuperscript{147} Each figure can be thought of as representing a specific spatial rationality for urban planning, from the scattered dwellings if the ‘dispersed sheet’ to the extremely dense ‘urban core’, each with different ways of connecting places through transport networks. While obviously only constituting theoretical ideal types, such schemes act as powerful metaphors for urban


\textsuperscript{145} Henri Lefebvre, \textit{The Production of Space} (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing, 2011); Zieleniec, \textit{Space and Social Theory}; for an application of Lefebvre’s conceptualization of space in a swedish transport planning context, see e.g. Idvall, \textit{Kartors kraft: regionen som sambälsvision i Öresundsbrons tid}; Isaksson, \textit{Framtidens trafiksystem?: maktutövningen i konflikterna om rummet och miljön i Dennispaketets vägfrågor}.


development and have large implications for the types of transportation systems and networks that are best suited for each ideal type.

Figure 3.1 Different patterns of the metropolis. From top left: The urban core, the dispersed sheet, the urban galaxy, the urban star, and the ring. Source: Lynch, “The pattern of the metropolis”.

In terms of public transport policy and planning, the rationalities of public transport inevitably involve spatial aspects that carry certain logics for change or stability with regards to spatial relations. To return Walker’s notion of coverage versus patronage goals in network design, these represent polar opposite spatial logics. A network design oriented toward aspects of equal accessibility prioritizes a fine-grained network design, whereas a transit corridor orientation seeks to concentrate resources spatially.

Different transport technologies also carry different spatial logics: in his thesis on tramway politics in Stockholm in the 20th century, Tomas Ekman shows how with the advent of mass automobility the technological – and thus spatial – rigidity of trams in the city was considered to be a barrier to mobility and circulation in post-war Stockholm. Perhaps somewhat ironically, that very rigidity is today considered as one of the primary qualities and selling points of local trains and urban light rail, qualities that are sought to be emulated in Bus Rapid Transit systems.


Shifts and competition between spatial rationalities technological configurations of transport systems affect opportunities for different groups in different ways, and they also distribute power in different ways. Tim Richardson argues convincingly that the discourses and rationalities of transport policy are expressed in the design and form of the transport system, through the configuration of:

street patterns and motorway networks, high-speed railway stations, cycle routes and pedestrian areas. Patterns of mobility are affected by the changes and growth of these systems, and neighbourhoods, cities and regions are gradually reshaped, redefining boundaries of opportunity and exclusion.150

When transport policy redefines and reshapes spatial relations, however, spatially differentiated effects arise which are likely to be “complex and contested, rather than harmonious and coherent.”151 That this is the case becomes evident not least in the deeply politicized issues of sustainable transport systems, in which benefits and costs of different policy measures are unevenly distributed throughout population groups.152 Thus, staying attentive to the way that power is exercised through the construction of spatial rationalities that inform the material configuration of transport systems is thus of utmost importance for a deeper understanding of the relation between power, practice and knowledge in public transport governance.

It is also important to stress here that rationalities do not materialize on their own, but are mediated through institutionalized practices. This means that the existence of a specific rationality does not necessitate its materialization; this process is dependent on relations of power and authority within the public transport governance arena. As I will show in my analysis, the transformation of ideas into reality through institutional practices can be seen as the central issue of conflict in public transport governance.

151 Richardson, 314.
3.2.4 Rationality and power

Another benefit of analyzing the construction of rationalities of public transport policy and planning is that it draws attention to the connection between through and practice through discursive and material practices, and how power is simultaneously produced and exercised within these relations. Power is one of many ‘essentially contested’ concepts in social theory, but staying consistent, in this thesis I build my understanding of power on a Foucauldian perspective on power.

To Foucault, power does not exist as an independent force, but only when it is ‘put into action’. This perspective implies that power is not something that can be held, acquired or shared, but is something that is exercised “from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations.” Also, power is not external to other forms of social relations, but are immanent in all social processes, including economic processes, the construction of knowledge and so forth. This also means that power is not just restrictive or coercive, something that represses people and things; it is also a productive force constitutive to any and all social relations. As such, power should be understood, Foucault suggest, as “a way in which certain actions modify others”. In this sense, power in public transport involves both how decisionmakers’ and planners’ actions are modified by structural relations that enable or limit them, but also, the public transport system itself can be thought of as a system that modify citizens’ actions by enabling and limiting different behaviors.

Power is also something that is exercised at all levels and in all directions of social relations. This does not mean that power is exercised equally between individuals or organizations, merely that power is not a one-way relation from the powerful top tiers of society to the powerless bottom. Lastly, power is, according to Foucault, at the same time intentional and non-subjective. As he writes: “the rationality of power is

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155 Michel Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” Critical Inquiry 8, no. 4 (1982): 788; This description of power resonates, in my understanding, with how critical realism illustrates power as a capacity or potential. Power is in this sense inherently structural in that the exercise of power is predicated on an internal relation between subjects or objects. See e.g. Andrew Sayer, “Power, Causality and Normativity: A Critical Realist Critique of Foucault,” Journal of Political Power 5, no. 2 (2012): 179–94.

156 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 The Will to Knowledge (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990), 94.

157 Haugaard and Ryan, “Power in Social And Political Theory.”

158 Foucault, “The Subject and Power,” 788.
characterized by tactics that are often quite explicit at the restricted level where they are inscribed [...] the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case that no one is there to have invented them.”159 I interpret this as implying that while the exercise of power is usually done with purpose and intent, the source and logic of power is not defined by individual actors, but on the structural level of society. This also means that we can understand the structural features of power by studying how it is exercised locally, without conflating its exercise with its general characteristics.

The rationalities that underpin public transport policy and planning are mobilized strategically by actors vying for influence and control over the public transport system, but actors don’t decide the rationalities of public transport. Over time, as decisions are made and contested, rationalities become strengthened and stabilized, or undermined and thwarted, making it easier (or harder) for actors to mobilize them to justify policy and planning actions.

Here, the relation between power and knowledge becomes central: as Mark Haugaard and Kevin Ryan state in a discussion of Foucault’s perspective on power, the most effective power that which ‘constitutes reality, and in particular social subjects’.160 This also means that knowledge, power and politics become conflated: “It is not simply at the level of consciousness, of representations and in what one thinks one knows, but at the level of what makes possible the knowledge that is transformed into political investment.”161 A broad literature of ‘governmentality studies’ have developed from this line of inquiry and is closely related to my research interest and recognizes the interrelationship between power over and power to; the subjects of power are simultaneously empowered and subjected to power.162

I thus interpret the rationalities and the discourses which they underpin as constituting expressions of power, as they help define which values, knowledges, and actions are deemed justified and rational or not. However, as Jonas Anshelm writes, discourses (and, thus also rationalities) are “not tools of power for the aims of specific actors, as everyone who speaks within the discourse do it on its terms. I however imagine that certain actors appear closer to the center of the discourse whereas other, primarily the critical and deviant voices, disappear to the margins.”163 I interpret this as

159 Foucault, *The History of Sexuality Vol. 1 The Will to Knowledge*, 95.
meaning that actors do not, and cannot ‘control’ or ‘rule’ discourses or rationalities. However, within a certain discourse, actors struggle for control over resources and decision-making by mobilizing or employing different rationalities to justify their standpoint and get their will through.

Foucauldian analyses of power have been subjected to critique from several angles, not least for inadequately defining and explaining the workings of power.¹⁶⁴ Inspired by Metzger et al. I also want to demystify the concept of power as an all-powerful entity that ‘just is’, to instead explain how power is simultaneously an input-variable in politics, and an outcome, an effect, in the politics of region public transport policy and planning.¹⁶⁵ Crucially, as I will show in my empirical analysis, power is constantly negotiated and renegotiated, and while an important aspect of power is its ability to be reproduced by actors, it is not an entirely path-dependent process. Rather, the ‘micro-physics’ of power is twisted and turned through the reciprocity between internal political dynamics and wider societal processes.

Bent Flyvbjerg suggest that we should combine the traditional sociological question of ‘who governs?’ with the Nietzschean/Foucauldian question of what ‘governmental rationalities are at work when those who govern govern?’¹⁶⁶ As the organization scholar Barbara Townley states, analyzing “how actors use forms of rationality in different situations and for different purposes, is the analysis of power.”¹⁶⁷ Analyzing how rationalities are mobilized, constructed and materialized in competition between actors is therefore a central undertaking in my analysis of public transport policy and planning. To me, this means analyzing the rationality of public transport policy and planning not as a question of ‘either or’ (i.e., is public transport policy rational or not?), but rather ‘which kind?’ (i.e., which kind of rationality is espoused, by whom, and in what situations). This emphasizes the nature of my analysis of rationalities as exploratory and explanatory rather than normative, with an aim of understanding the concretization of rationalities as they are employed and enacted and not as mere ideal types. Without succumbing to a radical relativism where any knowledge claim is as good as any other, I find the notion of a historicized understanding of reason and rationality to be a fruitful endeavor for research; through understanding and explaining


¹⁶⁷ Townley, Reason’s Neglect: Rationality and Organizing, 11, italics added.
social reality we can arrive at a sustained critique of current practices and the modes of thought that they rest on, and possibly suggest alternative ways forward.168

3.3 Operationalizing the study of rationalities of public transport planning

Based on the discussion above, I will summarize the analytical framework. I view the rationalities of public transport policy and planning as the values and knowledge claims that underpin the formulation of problems and solutions, which in turn justify decision-making. These rationalities become institutionalized through practices associated with the formal and informal organization of decision-making frameworks and the employment of policy tools and planning instruments. Together, rationalities and the practices that they rest upon become materialized in the spatial and technological configuration of the public transport system. The spatial and technological configuration of public transport systems, i.e., their materiality, act back to condition, re/produce, and restrict the further development of rationalities and their institutionalization through practices. Power in public transport policy and planning is understood as both an effect of and a condition for all parts of this process. This processual relation is illustrated in Figure 3.2. This way of separating the expressions of rationality can be thought of as analytically distinct but dialectically interrelated ‘moments’ in the continuously ongoing social process of shaping the public transport system.169 Based on this understanding of the processes of construction of rationalities in public transport, I have developed a set of empirically focused questions that guided the analysis, summarized in Table 3.1.

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168 Yvonne Rydin offers a nuanced and fruitful engagement of the role and status of knowledge claims in planning process, see: Rydin, “Re-Examining the Role of Knowledge within Planning Theory.”

Table 3.1 Overview of analytical concepts and empirical questions that guide the research

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analytical concept</th>
<th>Empirical questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rationalities</strong></td>
<td>- Which are the central values, ideas and knowledges of public transport expressed in the policy and planning process?</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- How are values, ideas and knowledges mobilized, and by which actors?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- What are the central points of contestation between different ideas, values and knowledges and how does this translate into political conflicts?</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Based on these values, ideas and knowledges, which problems, solutions and actions for public transport are formulated?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institutionalization</strong></td>
<td>- How are decision-making frameworks and procedures organized?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Which policies are implemented to achieve intended outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- How are planning instruments and practices employed to achieve intended outcomes?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Materialization</strong></td>
<td>- How is the public transport system configured spatially and technologically in terms of infrastructure and services levels and frequencies, (e.g. bus lines, railway lines, levels of service, relation between urban and rural transport, etc.)?</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Having discussed different theoretical vantage points from which to understand and study rationality, I developed an analytical framework based on rationalities, practices and spatial/technological configurations, and the institutionalization and materialization of rationalities that occur between these processual moments. In the next chapter I will discuss methodological considerations related to the case under study.
Figure 3.2 Analytical framework. A schematic overview of the processual relationships between rationalities, institutionalization and materialization. Note the reciprocal relation through which practices and spatial and technological configurations act back to condition the other moments of the process.
4 Methodology

In the previous chapter I outlined the analytical framework and conceptual tools to analyze the construction, institutionalization, and materialization of rationalities in public transport policy and planning. In this chapter I will discuss methodological choices and research design, the methods, and data sources that the study employs, and describe the analytical process.

The chapter starts with a discussion of case study research and argues for the study’s potential transferability as a case, and the process of selecting and delimiting the case. Following this, the methods and sources that have been used throughout the research are presented and discussed. The main method has been archival research, complemented with other written documents and interviews persons who have been involved in developing the policies and planning of public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne. The analytical method has been qualitative text analysis, with a close reading and coding of the material gathered.

4.1 Case study research

This research project has been carried out as a single case study, which is here defined as “an in-depth, multifaceted investigation, using qualitative research methods, of a single social phenomenon.” Case studies have a long history in sociology and anthropology and can be carried out both as studies of multiple cases or of single cases. The strength of single case studies lie in the richness in detail and the ability to approach the complexities and contradictions of real life. Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg

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172 Bent Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” Qualitative Inquiry 12, no. 2 (2006): 237 Single case studies (and case studies in general) have over the years been criticized by academics favoring other methodological foundations for lacking both scientific rigor and the
highlight four ‘fundamental lessons’ that can be conveyed by case studies: i) social action and social structures are studied in their natural settings; ii) through the use of multiple sources they permit a “more holistic study of complex social networks and of complexes of social action and social meanings”; iii) they enable researchers to examine continuity and change in life worlds, and; iv) it facilitates theoretical innovation and generalization. My research takes the form of a historical case study, which differs from other case studies by way of the methods and sources available to the researcher (for example, the extensive use of archival records and other historical material and the impossibility of using participant observation for data gathering.) Robert K Yin draws a sharp distinction between historical case studies and case studies of contemporary life, however, with Feagin, Orum and Sjoberg, I view this as a difference of degree, not of kind. Whether the focus is historical or contemporary, a case study approach requires that researchers immerse themselves in a holistic understanding of the ongoing social processes within the boundaries of the social system under study as well as the wider socio-political context outside the system.

4.1.1 Reflexivity and interpretation

Engaging with complex issues of meaning-making and organizing in an open-ended social setting, a reflexive approach to the research is warranted. Reflexive research means that research is conducted with an awareness and attention to the complex relation between the knowledge processes and their production and the different contexts of such processes, as well as the role of the producers of knowledge, which includes the research herself. This will assist the researcher to uncover and reflect upon biases and deepen the learning process during the course of the research. In a critical, reflective approach to the study of social phenomena, the centrality of interpretation is crucial. Knowledge and facts are viewed as interpretations, rather than reflections, of reality. Constructing the research as a single case study, also means embracing a more particularist perspective on the knowledge that is created in the research process, a

limitations to the creation of theoretical knowledge, or to transfer results from the single case studied to a more general knowledge of the world. Such critiques have been (in my opinion) successfully refuted by proponents of the single case methodology, see e.g.; Joe R Feagin, Anthony M Orum, and Gideon Sjoberg, A Case for the Case Study (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).


knowledge that has the character of insight rather than truth.\textsuperscript{176} This further means that I embrace a ‘double hermeneutical’ approach to the research, which means that in social science researchers engage in interpretations of interpretations: empirical data of the social world represents a first interpretation of reality, upon which the researcher layers their own interpretation of the first interpretation.\textsuperscript{177} Measurements, statistics, interview responses – all data are products of some form of interpretation of the external world, and the task of reflexive research is to interpret these interpretations. Following this, Alvesson and Skölberg stress the importance of shifting focus from a straightforward methodical handling of empirical data to the inclusion of the “perceptual, cognitive, theoretical, linguistic, (inter-)textual, political and cultural contexts which form a backdrop to interpretations.”\textsuperscript{178} This does not mean that a methodical and systematic approach to the gathering and analysis of data is unimportant (far from it!), merely that this is a precondition for more elaborate reflexive research, but does not guarantee its presence in the research process.

A focus on interpretation and insight through the case study does not leave us outside the terrains of explanation, however. David Howarth argues that even if the general purpose is to understand and interpret meaningful practices, this does not exclude the necessity of explanation, since explanation and understanding are linked: “the process of explaining social processes requires some form of initial understanding of social phenomena, no matter how partial or fragmentary, otherwise our research objects would not be intelligible, and the task of explanation is to render these incomplete understandings more coherent.”\textsuperscript{179} Understanding and interpreting developments in public transport policy and planning thus also means providing a convincing explanation for these developments.\textsuperscript{180}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{176} Mats Alvesson and Stanley Deetz, \textit{Kritisk samhällsvetenskaplig metod} (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2000), 36.  \\
\textsuperscript{178} Alvesson and Skölberg, \textit{Tolkning och reflektion: vetenskapsfilosofi och kvalitativ metod}, 21, my translation.  \\
\textsuperscript{179} Howarth, \textit{Discourse}, 131.  \\
\textsuperscript{180} Here I also agree with Andrew Sayer, who in his critique of Foucault and other post-structuralists’ unwillingness to address causal explanation insists that interpretation and explanation are mutually dependent, because whether explicit or not, we all operate with notions of causality, and to understand how power operates, also implicates some fundamental understanding why power operates the way it does. See e.g. Sayer, “Power, Causality and Normativity: A Critical Realist Critique of Foucault.”
\end{flushright}
4.1.2 Transferability and case categorization

A common question during research seminars over the course of working with this thesis, is ‘what is your case a case of?’. This is of course a central question to any researcher, and one that needs a proper answer. However, as Charles C Ragin notes, it may be important not to start the research process with a predefined notion of what the cases we study are cases of, since “what it is a case of will coalesce gradually.” Rather, the question of what a case consists of should be asked repeatedly throughout the research process, and here the employment and utilization of theoretical and analytical concepts become crucial tools in the delimitation of the case. Thus, the development of concepts and theory in case research is an iterative process of testing theories, analyzing case material, re-evaluating concepts, returning to the material to test again, resembling what is often called an abductive methodological approach. This situates the research within the hermeneutical tradition, where the conceptual apparatus develops in dialectical movements between empirical data, theoretical reflections, and analysis in ways that allow for the construction of new knowledge and insight. How this process evolved in this study will be described in greater detail in the next section.

The question of what a case is also relates to its importance for knowledge beyond the site where knowledge was produced in the first place: what, if anything, can be taken from the case findings to inform general knowledge about the world? This is a classical question that relates to the generalizability from case research. Here, I lean upon both upon Lincoln and Gupta’s concepts of working hypotheses and transferability, and Bent Flyvbjerg’s categorization of different cases.

Rejecting the idea that there is such a thing as generalizability in social science (in the sense of law-like knowledge that can be copied and reproduced in all settings), Lincoln and Gupta propose that we instead think of knowledge produced from cases as working hypotheses, since “when we give proper weight to local conditions, any generalization is a working hypothesis, not a conclusion.” From this position, they further argue that we should think of the transferability of these working hypotheses, which is seen as a function of the similarity between two contexts. As they state: “[i]f Context A and Context B are ‘sufficiently’ congruent, then working hypotheses from the

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sending originating context may be applicable in the receiving context.\textsuperscript{184} Any potential transferability lies always in the theoretical analysis, as the actual empirical context will always be unique. And while learning about the world is often fulfilling in and of itself, research must strive for higher ambitions than that. The theoretical relevance of the study is then, according to my reading, whether the conceptualization of public transport policy and planning that I have constructed, and the associated analysis of the rationalities and the process of institutionalization and materialization of them, has any import for other contexts? Of course, as Tim Richardson notes, the construction of rationality will always be locally conditioned, but the theoretical model of how this occurs (through institutionalization and materialization) may be transferred and tested for its relevance in other settings.\textsuperscript{185} For public transport research, I hope that this study can maintain relevance in that it helps unbox this process of how policy knowledges are constructed and that it emphasizes the role of power in the shaping of regional public transport.

Turning to Flyvbjerg and his discussion of different categories of cases, we can think of what kind of case a study represents. Is it an extreme or deviant case (unique or highly unusual), a case of maximum variation (where process and outcome highly differ), a critical case (of strategic importance), or a paradigmatic case (highlighting general characteristics in society).\textsuperscript{186} To reiterate what was stated above, in qualitative case research it is close to impossible to know beforehand what kind of case your case at hand constitutes. However, by now it seems that I should be able to answer this question, and to try a humble answer, I view my case as a potentially paradigmatic study of rationality and power in public transport policy and planning. I add the caveat ‘potentially’ since, as Flyvbjerg notes, it is dependent on the choice and execution of the case study, but also on the reception of the case.\textsuperscript{187} After my labors it is the research community and the readers who will decide the fate of my study, not I.

\section*{4.1.3 The process of case selection and delimitation}

When I started my PhD research project, I already had a well-developed interest in environmental politics and issues of sustainability and transitions, thus studying public transport’s role in the transition toward a low-carbon society was an intriguing task. At the same time, drawing on my background in human ecology and having employed a political ecology perspective in previous research education, I also have a strong interest

\textsuperscript{184} Lincoln and Gupta, 40.


\textsuperscript{186} Flyvbjerg, “Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research,” 229–33.

\textsuperscript{187} Flyvbjerg, 233.
in issues of environmental justice and power. Given public transport’s important role in shaping the future of sustainable mobility I wanted to develop a deeper understanding of the politics of public transport and issues of distribution of power and mobility through the shaping of public transport systems. Additionally, having a bachelor’s degree in history I felt drawn toward contributing with a historical perspective in a research field that is (for good reason) highly future-oriented (see chapter 2). Wanting to critically analyze public transport policies rather than accepting them at face value, these inclinations together with my education background gradually led me toward my object of study, i.e., the historical development of rationalities in Swedish regional public transport policy and planning.

The analysis is concentrated to the development of regional public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus Län between 1970 to 2020, with the main part of the analysis focusing on 1981 to 1999 (i.e., from the year public transport authorities took over the governance of local and regional public transport to the year that Region Skåne took over public transport governance in the new region). The main empirical focus on the regional level is preceded by a chapter analyzing the development of rationalities in regional public transport at the national level, that I see as necessary to follow the developments at the regional level.

Through an initial reading of regional public transport policy strategies, plans and programs in Sweden, an exploratory investigation of contemporary public transport governance in Scania, and previous research and policy literature, I identified transit corridors as the dominant paradigm that structures public transport policy and planning. Wanting to understand the development of the apparent hegemony of transit corridor planning, I decided to study the evolution of the rationality of regional public transport in Sweden. Drawing on previous policy and planning research, I aimed to create a detailed and critical case narrative, staying attentive to what Sharp and Richardson call the “minutiae of changing institutional structures and practices, in events within the policy process, and in policy outcomes.” Following this logic and based on my initial exploration of Scanian public transport policy, the research was framed and carried out as a single case study on the rationality of regional public transport and its development, institutionalization and materialization in the overarching public transport discourse.

Geographically, the research was delimited first to Skåne, and later to Malmöhus, one of the two counties that was merged into Region Skåne in 1999. This delimitation was based on methodological considerations that were empirically and theoretically motivated as well as based on the availability of sources.

188 Sharp and Richardson, “Reflections on Foucauldian Discourse Analysis,” 199.
Empirically, Skåne was chosen as it is a dynamic region that has been in the forefront of regional public transport since the introduction of the local train service Pågatågen in 1983. Also, being a border region to Denmark and Sweden’s ‘gateway to Europe’ with ferry connections to the continent, it has also undergone several institutional shifts and infrastructure developments from the 1990’s and onward, most notably the creation of Region Skåne in 1999 and the opening of the fixed link across Öresund in 2000. The years around the millennium shift also coincided in time with a post-industrial renaissance of Malmö, that had lived through a crisis of deindustrialization and depopulation during the 1980’s and 1990’s. While these developments make the region’s history unique in this regard, the organization and planning of public transport in the regional has been beset with similar dynamics and issues in public transport governance as other regions in Sweden, including long periods of declining ridership levels and economic hardship. Choosing Skåne as a region to study, allowed for an exploration of the commonalities of regional public transport governance in Sweden (and internationally) as well as of the uniqueness of the Scanian case.

A theoretically motivated delimitation was the time-period studied, as I was interested in understanding the development of the current practices of transit corridor planning. Thus, after initially studying policy documents and transport plans for the current public transport authority, Skånetrafiken, it was clear that the principles and practices of transit corridor planning was established already by the start of Skånetrafiken’s operations in 1999. I therefore decided to look further back into the historical records produced by the public transport authorities that preceded Region Skåne. Over the course of the research process, by studying documents and conducting interviews, I developed an interpretation of the development of the orientation toward transit corridor planning as having been formed during the 1980’s and early 1990’s, which helped focusing my analysis in time.

Regarding source material, after an initial exploration and analysis of the archival records for the two PTAs preceding Region Skåne, a further delimitation was made to focus primarily on public transport governance in Malmöhus County. This delimitation was made for three strategic reasons: First, the archival material from Kristianstads Läns Trafik AB covering the 1980’s was less complete than the records from Malmöhus, making a comparative analysis between the two counties harder to conduct; second, to make the material size more manageable; and third, and most importantly, it was in Malmöhus County that the institutional and infrastructural politics was most elaborated, constituting a complex arena with strong municipalities and municipal organizations. This made the internal processes of public transport governance especially intriguing and provides a good account of the political process of

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regionalizing public transport governance in Sweden. It would have of course been interesting to make a comparison between the two counties (or between Malmöhus and other counties in Sweden) and to make a comparative study of how the rationalities of public transport developed in different geographical and administrative contexts after the introduction of the regional public transport authorities. The strength in choosing to focus only on Malmöhus, however, is that I got the chance to follow the complexities and turns of events in high resolution, compared to when comparative analyses are undertaken.

To sum up, I propose that an analysis of the development and changes of public transport policy in Malmöhus and Skåne is interesting from a broader perspective as the region has to a large extent been a forerunner in the adoption of the kind of regional public transport management and policy that we see today, with an early regionalization of the political and administrative responsibility for public transport. Strictly speaking, Stockholm County was the first in Sweden to gather public transport authority at the regional level through the so-called Hörjel agreement in 1964. 190 This was however related to the unique planning context that the expansion of the Stockholm metro system presented, a transport infrastructure that only exists in this part of Sweden. That it would take another 27 years before the next region took the step toward such a similar solution suggests that the Hörjel agreement did not directly inspire a reorganization of public transport in the rest of Sweden. 191 Although having its own unique context, the reorganization, and subsequent developments in Malmöhus and Skåne were more transferable to other counties, and many PTAs have visited Malmöhus and Skåne to draw inspiration for the planning process here.

4.2 Methods and sources

The research has been based on qualitative analyses of texts and interviews as the central method for analyzing the rationalities of public transport. In the research process I have drawn on multiple data sources, using three primary methods for the collection of data: archival research, collection of published documents and reports, and semi-structured

190 Bo Malmsten and Magnus Carle, “Från Hörjel till Cederschiöld - 40 års förhandlingar mellan staten och regionen” (Stoc, 2007).
191 Two caveats to this argument deserves to be mentioned. First, the organization of public transport at the regional level in Stockholm and the introduction of travel cards in the county (as well as in some other counties) was clearly an inspiration for the creation of regional public transport authority reform in 1978. Second, Gunnar Davidsson recalled that when serious discussions of a reform of the PTA in Malmöhus count were initiated, he found inspiration for the proposed solution to gather the PTA at the regional level came from experiences in Stockholm County. (Telephone conversation with Gunnar Davidsson, 2021-10-29)
interviews. The archival material represents the bulk of the material has been gathered from archival records, which has been complemented with analyses of other policy documents and semi-structured interviews.

The sources have been produced in different contexts, for different reasons, and represent different genres: for example, the purpose, content, and context of board protocols differ immensely from interview transcripts or public government reports. Staying aware and sensitive to the quality of the material that is gathered and analyzed, and its context of production has therefore been essential to be able to conduct a reasonable analysis. To enhance the credibility of qualitative research findings, it was important to ensure that research findings are submitted to the interview respondents, what is referred to as ‘respondent validation’.

Throughout the research process I ensured this by testing analytical conclusions with those persons who I interviewed more than once, as well as by sending out a draft of my empirical analysis to the respondents inviting them to examine and comment on it. The responses I received from the respondents were overall positive toward the analysis and narrative; they were also very helpful by the respondents providing extra details about some events and filling some gaps that I had left in my narrative. The gathering of multiple data sources – archival records, published documents, and interviews – have also served as an instrument for triangulation of information, which strengthens the credibility of the analysis.

In the following sections I describe and reflect upon the nature and quality of the main material that I have used over the course of the research. I will first discuss my main material, gathered from archives in Skåne, and then present other written material as well as the interview process.

4.2.1 Archive records

The archive material gathered consists of a range of documents. The sources were predominantly from the public transport company and thus primarily represents the perspective of the new institutional agent in the public transport arena. However, as the company was (initially) owned jointly by the three parties: municipalities in Malmöhus County, the County Council, and Malmö municipality, the material in itself is rich in perspectives from different organizations with partly different interests. This means that the perspectives of the different organizations were represented on the shareholder meetings, in board protocols and in other archival documentation. Below, I list the different main types of documents and discuss their relevance to the analysis as well as some methodological considerations related to each type of material.

The main data was gathered at the Regional archives in Skåne located at the outskirts of Lund. I began with the archive collection for **Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB**, the public transport company between 1981 and 1998 (the company changed name to **Länstrafiken i Malmöhus AB** in 1990, but the material is kept in the same records). I also gathered material from the records of the **Municipal association for public transport** that was created in 1992 as a new owner of the public transport company. Furthermore, from **Malmöhus County Council**’s records, I gathered material on the process and discussions preceding the creation of the public transport company. I also visited the city archives of Malmö and the City Library of Malmö to complement the regional material with material produced primarily by **Sydvästra Skånes Kommunalförbund** (SSK). To facilitate the possibility of controlling my data and analysis, in the bibliography I include information on from which archive each material comes from.

In the following sections I will describe the different categories of archive material that I have focused on in my data gathering and analysis.

**Traffic supply plans**

The traffic supply plans (TSP) are – together with the budget – the central steering documents for regional public transport governance and their production have been legally mandated since the introduction of regional PTAs in Swedish legislation. TSPs describe the planned and decided activities for the coming year of operations and define policy and planning principles for the public transport system. They also provide information on events, changes, and realignments regarding how public transport is described, debated, and motivated. Since they are produced on an annual basis, they provide a good picture of how policy and planning issues have developed. TSPs thus constitute a good and reliable source for exploring, analyzing and (re)constructing a narrative of the development of public transport policy and planning over time. At the same time, the TSPs are politically approved planning documents produced by the PTAs, a fact that must be considered when reading and analyzing them.

A brief reflection on the TSPs can be useful regarding how their character evolve over time. During the first years the TSPs were predominantly a collection of timetables and route information with dense but also very detailed data about the developments and changes in the system. The TSPs were initially produced as a document mainly for internal use within the PTA and other directly engaged stakeholder organizations, and as basis for receiving state subsidies to unprofitable traffic. As they were first and foremost seen as an internal document the early TSPs often address conflicts between organizations explicitly in the plans to explain deviations from the plan. As the institutional conditions and the organization of public transport governance changed, so did the documentation. When a new PTA was formed in 1992, the TSPs were
transformed into a different kind of document that communicated different things. They became more focused on strategic development and upcoming projects, but also much less detailed. I propose four possible interpretations to explain this change. One reason is that, as state subsidies to local and regional public transport were phased out throughout the 1980s, there was no longer a need for assembling and organizing timetables, vehicle kilometer production and other data that formed the basis for receiving state subsidies. A second reason, somewhat related to the first, is that the TSPs have over time turned been into tools for external rather than internal communication and follow-up. This coincided with the reorganization of the PTA and the changing institutional landscape during the 1990’s, when the PTA had to communicate with more external stakeholders. A third explanation for the transformation of the TSP into a strategic document is that, in line with a general transformation of Swedish public administration, from the 1990’s the PTA became more focused on setting goals and guidelines, rather than prescribing detail planning for traffic planning. A fourth reason is that the continual digitalization of data processing and documentation may have played a part in changing the composition of the documents. I see it as likely that all these factors played a role in this transformation.

Annual reports

Annual reports were produced by the public transport company for the shareholders and other stakeholders with an interest in the public transport system. The annual reports summarize the previous year’s activities, including major events and investments, and provide number and statistics regarding operations, e.g., ridership and economy. As they describe the results of the plans laid out in the transport provision plans, the annual reports served as a good complement in the construction of a narrative for the development of the public transport system. The annual reports were discussed and approved at the annual meetings.

Protocols from shareholder meetings

Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB held two shareholder meetings each year. At the ordinary meeting the annual report and budget were discussed and approved, and at the extra meeting the coming year’s transport provision plan was debated and decided. These records made possible an identification and analysis of differing viewpoints, perspectives, and motivations. Gunnar Davidsson recalled that at the outset there was little political interest in the public transport company and shareholders meetings were

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often finished in 30 minutes without political debate. It is of course hard to verify this information, but it can be noted that the protocols from the shareholder meetings initially were short and showed little political conflict, but grew longer and more detailed as tensions over traffic supply increased as the 1980’s carried on.

**Board protocols**

Board protocols include meeting protocols from the company board, consisting of 15 politically appointed representatives, five from each owner group. These protocols include large volumes of reports, motions, and other documentation of discussion points. Given their large size, board protocols were collected selectively: rather than analyzing all board protocols, I focused on those episodes that – through analysis of other documents and interviews – were deemed as critical for the development of the public transport system. This has the potential consequence that processes and contestations that may have deepened our understanding of the rationality of public transport have been left unanalyzed. However, I feel confident that through triangulation with other documents and interviews, this methodological issue was minimized, and that the most important processes have been covered.

**Other archival documents**

This includes strategic policy documents, correspondence between stakeholders, travel statistics and reports from project committees. Apart from ordinary operations, there were several development projects and other related processes taking place in relation to regional public transport governance. Projects committees were formed and dismantled continuously. I have selectively used material from several committees, for example the project committee on local train services and reports from project groups on strategic planning.

### 4.2.2 Other documents

**Swedish Government official reports, propositions, and parliamentary motions**

While archive material constitutes the main bulk of the source material in the thesis, I have also used public government material, including reports by Government commissions of inquiry (SOU series), propositions from the Government and motions to parliament. In chapter 5, where I analyze regional public transport policy on the national level, the source material is made up exclusively of SOUs and government proposition (as well as large amounts of secondary literature). In the analysis of public

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194 Interview with Gunnar Davidsson, 2020-03-23
transport politics in Malmöhus, I also make use of SOUs, propositions, parliamentary motions, and published protocols from the County Council. The second part of chapter 8, for example, is a dedicated analysis of the policy process surrounding two government commissions, the Metropolitan agreement (SOU 1991:19) and the Malmöhus agreement (SOU 1992:114). The two reports were chosen for deeper analysis due to the seminal importance that, as I will show, these processes had both for the institutional arrangements and infrastructure configurations of regional public transport in Malmöhus, Scania, southern Sweden and the Öresund region.

All Swedish government official reports were gathered through the national database with digitalized government reports hosted by Linköping university. Propositions and parliamentary motions were gathered from the Swedish parliament’s website, and the published protocols from the County Council was found at the Regional archive.

Other document sources

Apart from the documents gathered from archives, libraries, and the internet, I was given the opportunity to borrow a binder with collected internal memos and reports from one of the interview respondents, Gunnar Davidsson, who worked at Malmöhus County Council during the 1980’s and at the PTA from 1992. Some of the material collected were published reports, whereas other documents were internal memos produced by and for the County Council that provided an alternative perspective to those of the PTA in the archive. The internal memos provide an intriguing perspective as they were produced for internal use among County Council employees, and thus provide different kinds of argumentation than the transport supply plans and other public documents. With the help of these documents, I could grasp elements of the argumentations and strategies that civil servants at the County Council developed vis-à-vis the PTA.

Using material provided by respondents of course requires methodologically sensible handling, as it has been saved and selected by individuals who have a personal interest and perspective in the material that they have saved and that which they present to the researcher. The main risk associated with the material is that the analysis becomes biased toward a perspective selected by other persons. (of course, also archive material has been filtered throughout the policy process). However, I maintain that the internal memos were helpful in furthering the triangulation of data as a complement to other published and unpublished documents in the construction of my narrative and analysis. The material was used together with the other empirical material to reconstruct policy processes, primarily to develop a further understanding of the reasoning of the County

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195 https://ep.liu.se/databases/sou/
196 https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/
Council and not as an establishment of factual statements. The material is used primarily in chapter 7, where the conflicts between different stakeholders over the deficits in public transport is narrated. In the bibliography, references from this personal archive are noted as such.

4.2.3 Interviews

Another data source that I use in the thesis is material from interviews. The employment of interviews has worked as a complement to the archive material and other written documentation. During the research I conducted interviews with six persons, identified throughout the research process as central actors in the policy and planning processes for regional public transport, and who had previously worked at the public transport company and the County Council (see Table 4.1). All respondents were civil servants who worked intimately with public transport policy and planning during the period under study, and one respondent was selected for his knowledge of contemporary planning, primarily connected to the events related to cutbacks in recent years. The interviews were carried out in person at my office or over the phone, due to the Covid-19 pandemic. The interviews lasted between 45 minutes and 1 hour and 45 minutes and were recorded digitally and then transcribed, either by me or with the help of professional transcribers.

Table 4.1 List of interview respondents, their roles and affiliations, and interview dates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Years active</th>
<th>Interview dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carl Björklund</td>
<td>Strategic planner</td>
<td>Skånetrafiken</td>
<td>2015 –</td>
<td>2019-09-26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The purpose of the interviews was to let the respondents tell their history and recount their description of events and processes that were of interest for the analysis with three perspectives in mind: first, to discover relevant analytical tracks to follow throughout the research process through the informants' own recollections and memories of events; second, to probe deeper into information that I came across in other documents; and third, as a way of confirming or contesting my interpretations of the archival data that I gathered.

The interviews concerned events going as far back as fifty years ago, and the respondents' memories and narratives were likely affected both by the way in which they view the developments in the system over time, and their role in it. Having invested a large portion of a professional career in public transport, memories and evaluations of past events naturally become colored by later experiences. Also, as archival records constituted the main data source, I chose not to carry out so many interviews. Over the course of the interviews, I also developed a sense of saturation in the responses regarding the processes and events discussed, which led me to not seek more interviewees. Still, the interviews, combined with the archive documents have served as an important complement to the gathering of archive sources.

The interviews were designed according to a semi-structured interview protocol. I did not construct one single interview guide for the interviews. Instead, an interview guide was prepared for each interview based on the person's role and position in the organizations where they had worked, as well as on readings of archive material and other sources. Interviewing persons about their professional life story necessitated giving a lot of space for the respondents' own reflections. I therefore allowed for a large flexibility in the interview process, following the respondents' narrative path and using unstructured follow-up questions and then bringing the discussion back to the original topics of interest when needed.

I started each interview by asking the respondent an introductory question to recount their background and role within the public transport system. After this initial question the interviews were centered around different topics depending on the interview, but they all concerned questions of relations between the organizations responsible for local and regional public transport; the relation between planners and politicians; the relation between public and private actors; and the development of planning principles for public transport. The interview guide rather served to structure the topics covered in the interview, than as a blueprint for the discussion. In some cases, I also used the archive material as a springboard for the interviews. For example, during one visit at the archive I found a proposal for heavily reduced public transport supply authored by

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one of the respondents. I photographed the proposal and the meeting protocols, and used them as a point of departure for an interview with Mats Améén, who had been responsible for the development of the proposal. With the help of the respondent, I could thus deepen my understanding of the events and processes described in the transport provision plans and meeting protocols.

4.3 The analytical process

As noted earlier, the research approach has been marked by an abductive approach of iteration between theoretical perspectives, empirical data collection and analysis. For example, the study’s focus on transit corridors was selected based on a reading of empirical sources, which led me to theorize around the concept. Based on theoretical literature, I ended up with the concept of ‘rationalities’ as a fruitful way to analytically frame the study. With this conceptual tool in hand, I then returned to the empirical sources and structured my reading of them according to this understanding. This iteration was carried out repeatedly throughout the research process and helped refine both my conceptual tools and the search for further empirical sources.

The first selection of relevant information was conducted at the archive. The archive material was read at the archive and quotes and notes were recorded digitally in the qualitative data software NVivo or photographed and imported in NVivo as pdf documents. Reading the material, I focused primarily on the sections where planning processes and decisions were described, discussed, and motivated.

NVivo served as software both for sorting, organizing, and analyzing the material. A first coding phase was used to identify and assign relevant passages in documents and notes to keep track of the analytical process. As my theoretical understanding of the case developed over the course of the research project, so did the organization and employment of thematic codes. Therefore, the coding and subsequent analysis has progressed and changed as my understanding and analysis of the case has developed. Over time, codes have been split and combined in order to better reflect the continuous development of the analytical process. The coding of material has not served as tool for computer assisted qualitative analysis, but primarily as a way of structuring the gathered material.

In the note taking and coding process, I searched for information about the policy and planning processes along the three dimensions of inquiry identified in chapter 3: i) values, knowledge claims and logics (rationalities); ii) decision-making frameworks, policy tools and planning practices (institutionalization), and iii) the spatial and technological configuration of the public transport system (materialization).
Rationalities as expressed in values, ideas and policy knowledges can be analyzed by identifying how policy decisions (or non-decision) have been motivated and justified in policy documents, plans, protocols, and interviews. Analytically, focusing on this category entailed interpreting the material in terms of argumentations and justifications for and against different policy and planning problems to be addressed. A quote from the traffic supply program for 1993/94 can serve as an illustration of this. It reads: “One of the foundations for [...] a system is that the customer’s opinions – expressed as the willingness to pay – to a higher degree shall be governing, i.e., that traffic shall be customer and market adjusted.”\textsuperscript{198} This quote was coded as ‘market adjustment’ and ‘customer orientation’, two expressions that are used in conjunction and serve to justify a market orientation by reinforce the valuation of the travelers as customers paying for a service on a market, as opposed to the organizing of public transport according to other values, for example keeping ticket prices as low as possible.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the quote does not inform us whether there was an actual market adjustment and customer orientation, only that there was a discursive commitment toward these values and ideas. Addressing the question how such values and ideas were institutionalized meant instead to focus on the outcome of decisions, and the ways in which the employment of policies and planning instruments reinforced or undermined the process of market adjustment and customer orientation. Such an analytical move also includes following how decision-making structures were organized and changed, as this reflected which stakeholders could and did influence different aspects of the system, including budgets, traffic supply, etc. Here it is important to keep a distinction between the formal authority over decisions, and the informal or actual power to influence which decisions were eventually taken.

Finally, focusing on questions of the spatial and technological configuration of public transport, the ambition was to follow how the rationalities and institutional practices together influenced the spatial and material configuration of the system over time. This includes the spatial extension of the public transport system: which parts of the systems that have seen more departures and upgraded facilities and which parts have been disfavored by way of investments in or reductions of services, terminals, and other physical artefacts. To do so, I analyzed the transport supply programs, annual reports and other relevant documents, searching for descriptions of changes to the system, for example the closures or expansions of train services, the removal of bus stops on an express service, or the construction of park and ride facilities. In this matter, maps, figures and charts from transport plans and other reports have been widely used. A methodological challenge was that investments and reductions in the system were presented in varying detail in different plans and reports, making systematic

\textsuperscript{198} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1993/94}, sec. 2.
comparisons between years harder; in some instances, bus service numbers changed between years, so that the same service number designated two different routes at different times, which complicated comparability further. Therefore, in the analysis of the spatial and technological configuration of the transport system, I focused on painting the broad strokes of developments in the system.

Taken together, this kind of analysis, when conducted on many documents and refined over time, have enabled me to construct a holistic narrative of the processes under study, and as Bent Flyvbjerg contends, it is the narrative itself that is the result of the research and the answer to the research question. Since the rationalities of public transport coevolve with the institutional practices and system developments, the coding and presentation of the empirical data was not easily divided into separate sections covering the development of rationalities, institutional practices and system configurations. As stressed in chapter 3, in the real world these aspects are not airtight containers, but flow in and out of each other, often occurring simultaneously and with multidirectional effects.

Having thus presented and discussed my data sources and the analytical process, it is now time to turn to the empirical material and present the concrete analysis of how the rationality of public transport has developed.

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Part II
Before diving into the details of regional public transport politics in Malmöhus and Skåne, it is necessary to understand the national framework within which local and regional public transport operates. The aim of this chapter is thus twofold: first, to provide a brief overview of the development of regional public transport policy at the national level in Sweden, and second, to analyze the central rationalities inscribed in regional public transport policy and how these have influenced the formation of institutions and policy instruments over time. The chapter focuses specifically on two interdependent aspects: i) how the relation between values of efficiency and equity have been expressed in public transport policy and ii) how these values have been incorporated into policies aiming to utilize coordination and competition within regional public transport. To do this I will begin by outlining a brief historical background to situate public transport policy in Sweden before the public transport reforms, after which I present an overview of the major legislative changes concerning public transport since the 1970's. I will focus specifically on four major changes in public transport legislation: i) 1978, when regional public transport authorities were introduced; ii) 1985, when PTAs were given a monopoly on regional bus traffic and the possibility to procure traffic freely; iii) 1997, when policies for a more accessible public transport were introduced; and iv) 2010, when the last major reform on public transport was passed. In parallel to these, there have also been other policy developments which will be mentioned throughout the chapter. In the last part of the chapter, I draw some conclusions for the reader to bring along to the case study of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne.
5.1 The early development of national public transport policy

Modern mass transport came with the railway, which profoundly transformed society. Towns along the new railways grew rapidly at the same time as dense cities were suburbanized and could extend their effective reach further from the city cores. In Sweden, the first parts of the publicly financed national trunk railroads opened in 1856, while parliamentary loan guarantees to private railway establishment spurred an intense development of local railroads by the end of the century. In the first decades of the 20th century there were more than 200 railway companies in Sweden. In cities the old stagecoaches were replaced by horse-drawn tramways, which were in turn succeeded first by steam-powered trams and later electrical powertrains from around 1900. Usually started as private enterprises, most tramway companies were municipalized by 1900, partly driven by the switch to electrical engines.

The first legislation regulating motorized road traffic was passed in 1906, and after an unsteady initial period road-based transport started taking off after World War I. Initially, both urban and rural public transport was operated on a purely commercial basis, i.e., financed wholly by ticket sales. To govern bus operations county administrations conducted an oversight of public transport companies by issuing commercial traffic permits and route concessions. Traffic permits allowed companies to run commercial transport services, and route concessions awarded a monopoly to operators over specific routes and/or areas. Since each company had their own pricing and ticket systems, public transport was highly fragmented: services were almost entirely uncoordinated between operators and road-based public transport consisted of a multitude of largely uncoordinated systems.

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203 Godlund, *Busstrafikens framväxt och funktion i de urbana influensfältens*.


205 Godlund, *Busstrafikens framväxt och funktion i de urbana influensfältens*, chap. III.
The development of the Swedish transport system in the first half of the twentieth century was characterized by two main features: a gradual increase in competition between railways and road-based transport and a shift toward greater public ownership of transport infrastructure and systems. Due to both the growing competition from road-based transport and poorly planned railway, minor railways began experiencing declining profits already by the first decades of the 20th century; in Skåne the first railways were closed already during the 1910’s. With local and private railway operators facing growing economic problems and a desire to modernize the transport sector based on theories of economies of scale, road and rail infrastructure were nationalized in the 1930’s and 1940’s. In 1935 the Swedish state railway company Statens Järnvägar (SJ), was charged with purchasing bus services, leading to a process where commercial services that competed with rail traffic, or those that were considered to be important connecting services, were also nationalized. In 1941, restrictions on route concessions for road-based public transport were introduced to existing services from what was considered as unsound competition. With the last purchases of private railways SJ, from 1952, held a practical monopoly on passenger traffic on railways in Sweden, as well as a substantive part of the road-based public transport market.

After World War II Sweden, like most industrial countries, saw a staggering increase of automobility. Technological development and structural shifts within industry, agriculture and services drove a rapid process of urbanization toward regional centers and the larger cities. Aided by a planning system aimed at facilitating automobility and rising household incomes, individual car ownership and travel distances skyrocketed: between 1950 and 1973, the average distance travelled per capita in Sweden more than tripled.

The shift in mobility patterns greatly affected the public transport sector. The extension of the Swedish railway network peaked in 1938 at 16,900 km of railway tracks. As Lena Andersson-Skoog & Jan Ottosson note, somewhat ironically the monopolization of the Swedish railroad at the hands of SJ coincided with the start of

206 Björn Hasselgren, argues in “The Reluctant Infrastructure Manager: 70 Years of Government Ownership of Transport Infrastructure in Sweden” from 2013 that the push for nationalization was driven by economic pragmatism rather than an ideological commitment to state ownership.
208 Godlund, Busstrafikens framväxt och funktion i de urbana influensfälten, 23–25.
211 Kaijser, I fädrens spår: den svenska infrastrukturens historiska utveckling och framtida utmaningar.
the great decline of the Swedish railway: between 1950 and 1972, 25% of the Swedish railway system was closed. As the rail network shrank and road capacity increased, the importance of road-based public transport in the form of bus services continued to grow. The transfer from rail to road also led to a shift of cost responsibility from the state to municipalities; the state paid the full deficit for SJ’s rail traffic, while the economic burden of unprofitable bus services was borne mostly by the municipalities.

Combined with a concern for growing disparities in regional development between different parts of the country, the economic transformation of society outlined above sparked an urgency regarding transport politics (see below). During the 1940’s preparations for a national transport policy legislation had been made and road planning on the national level had been taking place since the 1950’s, but it was not until 1963 that a formalized national transport policy was passed in the Swedish parliament. The policy established that the goals of Swedish transport policy was to ensure an adequate transport supply for the different parts of the country at the lowest economic cost to society, goals that have remained at the heart of Swedish transport policy since. The transport sector was considered too heavily regulated, and the ambition was to improve the economic efficiency of the transport system through freer competition between transport modes. While the proposition recognized that not all parts of the country and transport system were suited to free competition and therefore might be in need of state subsidies, there was a general reluctance toward subsidizing specific parts of the transport system.

The initial support for the national transport policy quickly waned, however, and had by the turn of the 70’s turned into broad critique. Objections targeted both practice and theory: practically, the effects of continuous cutbacks in state railway services were met with increasing political and popular resistance in the parliament and across the country. Theoretically, a central critique against free competition in the transport sector was that it didn’t take into enough consideration a wider economic perspective on transport supply. For example, the professor in economics Guy Arvidsson argued that the transport system is defined by a natural monopoly that constitutes an insurmountable market failure, rendering business economic calculations of costs and

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benefits in the transport sector an impossibility in practice. Following this logic, Arvidsson argued that principles of free competition were suboptimal for the purposes of optimizing the transport system. The difficulty in identifying the true costs of transport was also recognized in governmental inquiries aiming to establish price signals in the transport sector. Proponents of the competition principle, on the other hand, argued that competition was the only way to ensure effectiveness, with the alternative being regulations, bureaucracy and ineffectiveness, and that the main issue with the transport political decision was that the principles of free competition had yet to be implemented to a sufficient degree to realize the benefits of competition.

The increased concerns for local and regional public transport also coincided with the development of regional policy as a distinct policy area. Beginning in the end of the 1940’s, a so-called ‘localization policy’ was developed in the 1950’s that aimed at an adjustment of the pace of economic restructuring that occurred in the northernmost parts of Sweden. As the geographical restructuring affected the whole society, when the 1960s turned to the 1970s ‘localization policy’ was broadened into ‘regional policy’, defined by an ambition to balance economic development and imbued regional development policy with a strong welfare dimension. Jan-Evert Nilsson notes that the introduction of regional planning was emblematic of the faith in the prospects for societal planning that grew during the second half of the 1960s to eventually create a ‘planning complex’ comprising physical national planning, regional political planning and transport planning.

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216 A natural monopoly means that the structure of a specific market is such that there can be no economically efficient competition between two or more competitors. Natural monopolies are often associated with geographically bounded phenomena, such as transport and communication systems or electric grids. A market failure occurs when actors do not pay fully for the positive or negative effects that arises from the consumption of a good or service.


218 See Swahn, “PM. Kostnadsansvaret i trafikpolitiken från 1960-talet till idag.”


221 Nilsson, “Från aktiv lokaliseringspolitik till regional politik.”

222 Nilsson, 20.
5.2 The development of regional public transport policy since the 1970’s

5.2.1 The public transport authority reform

Following the heightened importance of regional policy and transport systems’ role in it, the 1970’s saw increases in both planning efforts and state subsidies to unprofitable traffic. In line with Arvidsson’s argument, planning-based coordination and prioritization of efforts within the transport sector was increasingly considered a basic condition for achieving the transport political goals of accessibility at the lowest possible cost to society.223 Facing increasing pressure from expanding car traffic several commissions into the conditions for public transport were initiated which, among other things, led to municipalities and county administrations being required to develop local and regional traffic plans, respectively.224 State subsidies to unprofitable regional bus traffic had been available since 1961, but were gradually expanded throughout the 1970’s.225 Municipalities and county councils across Sweden had also begun to develop a deeper engagement in local and regional public transport by providing economic support, taking over route concessions from companies, and developing new organizations to organize public transport in the regions.226

The government sought to build upon the increasing local and regional engagement in public transport and initiated a governmental commission regarding the implementation of regional travel cards in every county in Sweden in 1974.227 Following the political sentiment at the time, economic and geographical equalization was central


226 This included Stockholm, where the County Council took full responsibility for public transport from 1967 after the so-call Hörjel agreement, but also Örebro, Västmanland, Södermanland and Uppsala Län. See Utredningen avseende regionalt gällande generella trafikrabatter, ”Länskort i kollektivtrafiken (SOU 1976:43),” 83–86; Sveriges regering, “Prop. 1977/78:92. Om åtgärder för att förbättra lokal och regional kollektiv persontrafik,” 22–24.

227 Utredningen avseende regionalt gällande generella trafikrabatter, ”Länskort i kollektivtrafiken (SOU 1976:43),” Bilaga 1, direktiv.
values in the rationale of the directive and the inquiry. The point of departure for the work was that the traffic political goals for a satisfying traffic supply could not be upheld without an extensive public transport system. The inquiry, presented in 1976, targeted on the so-called 'price problem', i.e., that it was steadily becoming more expensive to travel by public transport relative to the car, at the same time as a third of the population still did not have personal access to a car. In the directive, it was stated that “the public’s demand for somewhat equal conditions motivates a reasonable equalization of [travel] costs.”

Public transport suffered from structural issues deriving from a growing urbanization of industry and services coupled with a suburban sprawl of population together with growing levels of automobility. In the proposition to the PTA reform of 1978 the central role of public transport was described as twofold: first, to provide accessibility to those without a car and second, to create a competitive alternative to personal automobility. The latter ambition was motivated by efforts to tackle environmental, traffic safety, and energy issues caused by the rapid growth of road transports, highlighting that the focus on public transport were directly influenced by the oil crisis in 1973 and the ensuing increases in energy costs.

The central policy tool to address the price problem was the introduction of regional travel cards, i.e., cards often with a monthly validity period that subsidized the use of public transport. It was argued that “a basic precondition for the introduction of a regionally valid travel cards system is that there is a common principle for local and regional traffic.” Thus it was concluded that the establishment of regional public transport authorities (PTA) was needed. To ensure an integration of local and regional traffic and increased coordination of traffic resources, PTAs were to be formed in collaboration between municipalities and county councils. The PTAs would take over the responsibility to compile an annual transport supply plan (TSP) from the municipalities and county administrations. The TSPs would serve as the basis for state subsidies to regional public transport.

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228 Utredningen avseende regionalt gällande generella trafikrabatter, 279.

229 Sveriges regering, "Prop. 1977/78:92. Om åtgärder för att förbättra lokal och regional kollektiv persontrafik," 17. In terms of environmental issues, it was exclusively local environmental issues that were discussed in 1970s. Concerns for energy issues are clearly an echo the oil crisis of 1973; in the directives to the committee, it is stated that “not least the new energy situation with a probable permanent increase of fuel costs entail a need to, via public transport, provide an energy saving alternative to the car”.

230 Sveriges regering, 27.

231 Sveriges regering, 1. Stockholm and Gotland were exempt from this rule because of unique institutional conditions: in Stockholm the county council already held sole authority since the Hörjel Agreement, and on Gotland there is only one municipality, which means that they act as both municipal and county authority.

An important question was finding the best fit between planning authority and actual travel patterns, in the form of ‘functionally cohesive units.’ The governmental commission recognized that the administrative boundaries of counties were not by default representative of population and travel patterns, but except for a few regions, existing travel patterns corresponded relatively well to county borders. Therefore, the governance of public transport was found to be best suited to existing administrative divisions. Malmöhus Län and Kristianstad Län was one of the geographical areas were the inquiry suggested that public transport governance should be organized over the county border, due to the high degree of interregional commuting.233 Along with the introduction of regional PTAs and regional travel cards the commission also proposed an expansion and reform of state subsidies for public transport, both in scope and level. In all, the cost of the reform was estimated to be 190 million SEK, amounting to a doubling of the current subsidies to bus traffic in 1976.234

On June 8, 1978, the Swedish parliament passed law (1978:438) based on the proposition, according to which the regional PTAs was to take over responsibility for local and regional public transport July 1, 1981.235 It is reasonable to conclude that the establishment of regional public transport authorities was inspired and helped along by the critique of the traffic political decision of 1963. Increased public involvement through coordination and planning were seen as remedies to the adverse effects of the market failure within the transport sector, a position reinforced through the traffic political decision of 1979 through which regional PTAs were given the legal possibility to forcedly take over route concessions held by private operators, if it could be motivated from a planning perspective.236 In his thesis on the political and public debates surrounding and following the transport political decision of 1963, the political scientist Anders Sannerstedt notes that “with the new measures in the 1970’s one can perhaps discern a shift from the principle of competition toward the principle of political steering.”237

233 Utredningen avseende regionalt gällande generella trafikrabatter, 114–16. The other border counties that the inquiry proposed joint collaboration were Stockholm and Uppsala län; Jönköping and Skaraborg; Halland, Göteborg-Bohuslän and Älvsborgs län; and Uppsala and Gävleborg län.
234 Utredningen avseende regionalt gällande generella trafikrabatter, sec. 4.4.
235 SFS 1978:438 Lag om huvudmannaskap för viss kollektiv persontrafik. Bohuslän, Hallands län and Västra Götaland were given two more years to complete the transition to the new system due to difficult circumstances with high interregional commuting between the three counties.
237 Sannerstedt, Fri konkurrens eller politisk styrning?: 1963 års trafikpolitiska beslut - debatten om innehåll, tillämpning och effekter, 178.
5.2.2 Introducing open tendering of public transport

The increased subsidies and the creation of regional PTAs had their intended consequences. Between 1980 and 1984 average traffic supply and patronage increased by 20% and 30% respectively, with countryside bus services and patronage increasing by 30 and 55%, in accordance with the intentions of the reform.238 The expansion of traffic supply and responsibility were costly, however, and the share of subsidies jumped from 20% of total operating costs in the beginning of the 1970’s, to between 50 to 60% in 1983, totaling around 4 billion SEK in subsidies to local and regional public transport.239 The social democrats, returned to government in 1982 with the intention to cut public expenses as a response to the ongoing economic crisis.240 The government requested an investigation from the Ministry of Communication with the intention to coordinate and rationalize local and regional public transport in 1984, and put forward a proposition for an amendment of the PTA legislation the following year.241 The proposition signaled a return of a focus on cost-efficiency as the central policy problem. Arguing that the previous years’ expansion in public transport provision and associated subsidies could not be expected to continue, efforts had to be targeted toward making existing traffic more cost-efficient.242

To improve cost-efficiency, both policies of coordination and competition were mobilized. With the aim to provide “unbound traffic planning and a free utilization of available resources”, the route concession monopolies held by the public transport operators were to be cancelled, thereby providing “increased possibilities for rational traffic planning as well as greater freedom and increased competition in the PTAs procurement of transport services.”243 By abandoning the system of route concessions, regional PTAs were provided with the authority to plan traffic as they saw best fit, without having to go through the traffic companies. In the same vein of improving

238 Ringqvist, “Kollektivtrafikens styrning och organisering. Utveckling och erfarenheter av lokal och regional kollektivtrafik 1970 - 2015,” 12. Of course, not all increase in ridership can be attributed to the creation of public transport authorities. For example, fuel prices increased drastically between 1975 and 1982, which can be assumed to have affected individuals’ modal choices in favor of public transport.

239 Sveriges regering, “Prop. 1984/85:168. Om rätt att driva lokal och regional kollektivtrafik på väg” (Stockholm, 1985), 9. Ringqvist (2016) notes, however, that the increase in ridership between 1980 and 1984 was higher (30%) than the increase in supply (20%) during the same period, resulting in a (temporary) increase in the cost coverage of public transport.


242 Sveriges regering, 23.

coordination, local complementary traffic services (demand-responsive traffic) were added to the public transport authorities’ responsibilities.244

The second aspect of increasing cost-efficiency was through improving conditions for competition in the public transport sector. In the proposition, Curt Boström, Minister for communications, emphasized a strongly market-oriented approach to public transport governance:

As for the rest of the Swedish commercial and industrial life, it is built on the principle of sound competition between companies with the intention to further the citizens welfare through an effective resource utilization. With my proposal an increased competition will also be attained between different transport companies.245

To achieve more competition procurement of traffic in open competition between public transport companies was to be introduced. Through procurement and open tendering of contracts, the aim was to utilize competition among commercial actors to achieve set societal goals in the most cost-effective manner possible.246 Procurement was presented as a win-win for both the public and private sectors:

With freer procurement it should be possible to find new contract designs. Development along these lines will lead to a sector with more business-like relations between the traffic operators and the transport authorities, which in the long run should lead to more cost-effective regional public transport.247

There were several reservations against the proposal. Both that a monopolization of traffic at the hands of the PTAs would hamper competition and a concern about the effects of the reform on public transport services in rural areas.248 Rural bus services had benefited the most of all from increasing subsidies, but they were also more costly than other forms of traffic. Since the government didn’t see any prospects for continuously increasing subsidies, they responded to these concerns by arguing that the possibility

244 Demand responsive traffic as a way of organizing public transport developed in Sweden during the 1960’s in areas where distances were long and demand was low, making regular timetable scheduled public transport costly. Replacing scheduled bus services, citizens could order public transport, usually in the form of a taxi car, when they needed it. Citizens would pay the same fare as for a regular journey with public transport, and the public transport authority covered the cost difference for the operator. In this way only transport services that were requested by citizens were executed and paid for, which was “often more economically profitable for society than regular traffic at the same time as citizens can be offered a satisfactory level of service” (prop. 1984/85:168, 35).


246 Lisa Hansson, “Public Procurement at the Local Government Level - Actor Roles, Discretion and Constraints in the Implementation of Public Transport Goals” (Linköping University, 2010).


248 Sveriges regering, see pages 96-102 for a discussion of comments on the proposition.
for rationalizing traffic through improved planning freed from concessions monopolies would allow cost savings to be made specifically in rural areas, rather than having to discontinue rural services to cut expenses.\textsuperscript{249}

The bill was passed in 1985 and the new rules came into effect in 1989, giving actors in the public transport business four years to adjust to this major change.\textsuperscript{250} The effect of the deregulation of public transport was lower production costs through procurement. By 2001 around 98\% of all traffic was procured in competition, and PTAs reported cost reductions for contracts of between 15 and 25\%. The procurement reform also instigated a rapid structural shift in local and regional public transport, with a gradual disappearance of municipal bus companies and a further concentration of operators toward large traffic companies.\textsuperscript{251}

### 5.2.3 Public transport policy in the 1990’s

Toward the end of the 1980’s the regional policy discourse shifted from a focus on distributed regional development toward promoting regional growth.\textsuperscript{252} Transport policy became more explicitly oriented toward tying urban areas with economic growth to regions without growth potential of their own. This shift is evident in the following quote from the transport political proposition of 1988:

> If better development potentials are to be created for the weak regions, they must be tied to growth-centers and to the strong transport links. Therefore, the shaping of the transport system is of central importance. This concerns not only infrastructure investments but also the shaping of the transport systems in services and operations. It is partly about tying together different towns with the growth centers in different regions, but also to tie the regions to the national corridors.\textsuperscript{253}

After several decades of falling investments into rail infrastructure, the new policy orientation ushered in what the transport scholar Fredrik Pettersson calls the ‘decade of infrastructure’ with a rapid increase in investments for transport infrastructure, not least in railroads.\textsuperscript{254} This included investments in a new high-speed rail system, X2000, which was introduced in 1990, as well as investments in several regional train systems around the country, such as Mälartåg in the region west of Stockholm and Kustpilen


\textsuperscript{250} SFS, “Lag (1985:449) Om rätt att driva viss linjeförfart”.

\textsuperscript{251} Alexandersson, \textit{Den svenska bus- och tågtrafiken: 20 år av avregleringar}, 55–63.

\textsuperscript{252} Nilsson, “Från aktiv lokaliseringspolitik till regional politik.”


from Kalmar and Karlskrona to Malmö and Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{255} The increased focus on infrastructure transport systems was also coupled with a further regionalization of authority and responsibility for public transport, by transferring local and regional train services to the PTA authority from 1991 and giving them the right to operate services on the trunk railroads from 1996. Another important institutional shift was the split of State railway administration in two: one entity to operate traffic (which kept the name 	extit{Statens Järnvägar}) and the Swedish Rail Administration (Banverket) to govern infrastructure provision.\textsuperscript{256}

In 1997, another reform of the public transport legislation was introduced.\textsuperscript{257} The main purpose was to address both efficiency and equity issues in public transport by making ordinary public transport services more accessible to people with disabilities. By making it possible for municipalities and county councils to gather the responsibility for special service transport (sv: 	extit{färdjäns}) at the regional PTA, the costs, and benefits of attracting disabled persons to ordinary transport services would be gathered at the same place. Besides improving accessibility, this was also expected to lower the costs for public transport through lower demand for special transport services and increased coordination between municipalities and PTAs.

In the legislation of 1997, a distinction was also made between the political responsibility for local and regional public transport and the administrative task to uphold traffic supply. The former was to reside at the political assemblies, whereas the second was handled by the PTAs, which could be (and most often was) a transport company. Second, to improve coordination mandatory consultations between local municipalities, county councils and regional PTAs were written into law.\textsuperscript{258}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{255} Andersson-Skog and Ottosson, “‘Hela folkets järnväg’ och marknaden,” 20.
\textsuperscript{258} Consultations were to cover 1] ordinary traffic supply, 2] special-needs transport, 3] pricing of transport 4] measures to improve accessibility to public transport for people with disabilities, and 5] measures to protect the environment, all of which were to be included in the traffic provision plansWhile there existed no formal legal hindrances for a greater influence from municipalities and county councils over regional public transport planning, the government stated that it nonetheless would be “suitable that the governance [over public transport] is formalized to some extent.” Sveriges regering, “Prop. 1996/97:115. Mer tillgänglig kollektivtrafik,” 59.
\end{flushright}
5.2.4 Public transport policy in the new millennium

Despite renewed investments into public transport systems and new procurement practices, the outlook for public transport at the beginning of the 2000’s seemed bleak. The initial cost reductions after the introduction of tendering gave way to rapidly rising costs which, combined with tighter public sector budget frames, strained public transport operations. Another governmental commission into the prospects for public transport was commissioned with an explicit focus on putting the public transport users at center.\(^{259}\) Along these lines several policies were suggested, including a more customer oriented public transport system that catered to the needs of travelers, improved learning from feedback and complaints and a call for the responsible authorities to seek a “deepened collaboration with others whose work directly or indirectly can advance the development of public transport”\(^{260}\). One such response was the Partnership for doubling public transport that was initiated by organizations representing PTAs, municipalities and public transport operators in 2008. The partners gathered around a vision for doubling both the absolute number and relative share of total trips in the country, with a value-based focus on the travelers permeating all participating organizations. The project included the encouragement of new forms of contracts to promote innovation and service orientation in public transport provision.\(^{261}\) The doubling partnership led to the national parliament formally emphasizing the role of the state in contributing to that the doubling target could be reached and legislated for expanded rights for travelers to compensate for delays in public transport have also been introduced over the last decades.\(^{262}\)

The latest major reform to local and regional public transport legislation occurred in 2012 when a new public transport law presented by the government entered into force.\(^{263}\) There were several motivations for the reform, including to update Swedish public transport legislation to better reflect both current Swedish transport policy and EU regulations. In accordance with the new legislation, transport supply plans were to be given a more strategic role to improve public transport as an instrument for societal development, and the requirements for consultation introduced in 1998 were expanded to include not only municipalities and county councils but also neighboring counties, other affected authorities, organizations, public transport companies as well as


\(^{260}\) Kollektivtrafikkommittén, 21.


\(^{262}\) Sveriges regering, Prop. 2015/16:13 Stärkta rättigheter för kollektivtrafikresenärer; Sveriges Riksdag, Betänkande 2015/16:CU9.

representatives of industry and passenger groups. To improve coordination across county borders and improve comparability, the transport provision programs were to be streamlined with the help of an appointed government agency.

Another central ambition was to increase freedom of choice in the transport system by opening the local and regional public transport sector to commercial actors. The government noted that local and regional authorities rarely took commercial operators interests in consideration; often they actively resisted private initiatives. Inspired by recent decisions to open long-distance passenger rail to commercial competition, a government commission led by Ulf Lundin, general director for Rikstrafiken was set up to investigate the possibilities for similar reforms in local and regional public transport. The commission concluded that, to promote commercial initiatives in regional public transport, private traffic operators should be allowed to choose which routes to operate on a commercial basis, after which the PTAs would take responsibility for those areas and routes that were considered unprofitable and unattractive to private operators. The proposal was harshly criticized for the apparent risk of cherry picking by private operators extracting value to the detriment of the system as a whole. Facing staunch opposition, when the government put forward their proposition in 2010 it was stated explicitly that the proposition did not build on the prior inquiry and while the formal monopoly on local and regional public transport was removed, PTAs were given the right to initiate public transport services ahead of commercial operators by defining so-called ‘public service obligations’. This partial market opening hasn’t so far resulted in any shifts in the provision of public transport services, a fact reflected in that in 2020, 99.9% of scheduled regional public transport was operated under public oversight, with boat traffic having the largest commercial share.

268 Sveriges regering, 23.
5.3 Conclusion: regional public transport between state planning and the market

The development of public transport legislation sketched above has been defined by the ambition to create more better suited forms of public transport governance to achieve the Swedish transport policy goals, balancing ideals of a cost-efficient transport system and equitable access to transport and mobility opportunities.

From this chapter, some tentative conclusions can be drawing with regards to the idea of efficiency. Efficiency is typically considered a hallmark public administration, but efficiency is in and of itself an empty signifier (as is equity). Efficiency therefore must be filled with a substantive content, and a central conclusion from this chapter is that what has been considered as ‘efficient policy’ indeed changes over time. For example, in the traffic political decision of 1963, the concept of efficiency was equated with free market competition between transport modes. A decade later, during the 1970’s, the notion of free competition and the idea that all costs for different transport modes could be calculated and priced in standard economic bottom lines had been all but abandoned. Instead, an efficient governance of the transport system was premised on wider economic perspectives that considered benefits that lie outside of the direct cost of producing traffic. To accommodate this, planning and coordination by public authorities was deemed necessary, as the market itself could not internalize the costs and benefits of different transport modes. For the public transport sector, such a perspective on efficiency – which also derived power from demands on equitable accessibility – prompted the introduction of the regional public transport authorities (PTA) coupled with expanded state subsidies to improve public transport supply throughout the country. This period lasted only for a short while. By the mid-1980’s, faced with an economic recession and growing subsidy levels, the government wanted to lower state expenses, a more competition-oriented perspective on efficiency returned. However, the baby wasn’t thrown out with the bathwater, and improved coordination was also encouraged. The twin objectives of competition and coordination were achieved by dismantling the existing system of route concession and giving all control over local and regional public transport services to the PTAs, at the same time as procurement of traffic in competition was implemented. Since the introduction of competitive tendering in public transport, there have been few large-scale changes in this model, although both coordination (for example through further transfer of authority over train traffic and the possibility to integrate special transport services with ordinary public transport) and competition (for example through allowing commercial public transport in parallel with the PTA’s operations) have been emphasized in different legislations (see Figure 5.1 for a timeline overview of central decisions).
Identifying the interrelation between coordination and competition is not a novelty in itself: for example the Swedish Association for Local Public Transport released a report in 2002 where they highlighted competition and coordination as the defining features of public transport governance in Sweden.\textsuperscript{270} However, from a theoretical perspective, we can understand the relation between the principles of coordination and competition as a rivalry between different political rationalities over time. The focus on planning and coordination (primarily between public authorities) during the 1970’s was, as Nilsson notes, the pinnacle for the faith in public planning that was emblematic for a Keynesian post-war political economy. Keynesianism was, however, hanging on by a thread, and during the 1980’s, public transport policy came to be defined by the development of a neoliberal rationality.

Drawing on Foucault, Linda Nyberg argues that in neoliberal rationality, markets and the mobilization of competition has the function of a form of ‘truth-telling’, i.e., it is through the markets that we learn the true value of goods and services.\textsuperscript{271} A good example of this can be seen in the proposition of 1985, where it was stated that public transport companies going out of business due to increased competition was an example that previous regulations of public transport had acted as a veil covering the ‘true value’ of public transport services, and that the public had paid an overprice for services that could be produced more efficiently by other companies in the sector.\textsuperscript{272} On the other hand, Nyberg also notes that a neoliberal rationality is open to strong state intervention, as long as the state intervenes \textit{in favor} of market competition.\textsuperscript{273} Therefore, the procurement reform also strengthened the PTA’s control over regional public transport in order to mobilize market forces competitive tendering.

There has, however, been limits to the willingness to allow competition in the public transport sector, and I dare to say that there exists a rather solid consensus in Sweden that the public sector is needed to address the ‘market failure’ of public transport. This was shown not least in the opposition to free competition in response to the governmental inquiry prior to the legislation of 2010.\textsuperscript{274} Compared to experiences in the U.K., with its almost entirely unregulated competition in the public transport sector, Sweden has, in the words of the transport researcher Didier van de Velde, kept competition ‘off the road’ through tendered contracts rather than allowing for open

\textsuperscript{271} Nyberg, “Market Bureaucracy - Neoliberalism, Competition, and EU State Aid Policy,” 69.
\textsuperscript{273} Nyberg, “Market Bureaucracy - Neoliberalism, Competition, and EU State Aid Policy,” 78.
\textsuperscript{274} Utredningen om en ny kollektivtrafiklag, “En ny kollektivtrafiklag (SOU 2009:39).”
competition ‘on the road’. In practice public transport policy has over the period studied been defined by a strengthening of both the faith in the values of planning and the values of the market. Public transport authorities have become much more powerful as the authority over planning local and regional public transport has become increasingly concentrated at the regional level. At the same time, however, the market orientation within the public transport sector has grown and traffic operations have consolidated into the hands of large multinational companies. We can conclude that public transport policy for the last 30-40 years has been defined by an attitude of planning with the market in mind.

Public transport governance – toward fragmentation or concentration?

The analysis above suggests that public transport policy in Sweden has developed over time to emphasize both competition and coordination as complementary means to achieve an efficient public transport system. I argue that this contributes to the public transport research literature by highlighting that, at least in Sweden, has been defined by a concentration of authority and power in the public transport sector. This finding stands in contrast to the common characterization of public transport policy being defined by an increased fragmentation, a description that is not seldom taken as a point of departure in the literature on public transport governance (see section 2.2.2.).

That we have seen a concentration rather than fragmentation in Swedish public transport policy is true for both the public actors governing public transport and the companies operating on the market. Over time the authority of the regional PTAs over public transport has been gradually expanded, in terms of their control over traffic planning, the kinds of traffic that they plan, and the possibility of integrating planning across county borders. Likewise, ownership of public transport companies has also gone through a process of concentration, from a multitude of operators (although often publicly owned) to just a few large, often multinational companies (although still often publicly owned). In sum, the public transport sector is today defined by a much larger concentration of ownership and authority than it was fifty years ago.

This is not to say that fragmentation of responsibility and authority in public transport policy is not an issue: for example, issues of integrating land use planning at the municipal level with public transport planning at the regional level certainly is and remains a central policy issue. However, this should be considered as a feature, not a bug: as long as there exists multiple scales of public authorities who are responsible for different policy areas, and as long as there exists a public sector governing and a private sector operating public transport, ‘fragmentation’ in one form or another constitutes a

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fundamental condition of governance. A conclusion from this is that, rather than treating fragmentation as a problem to be overcome, it constitutes a democratic feature to be handled.

This analysis of the national framework for regional public transport governance has served as a backdrop to the regional politics and practices of public transport policy and planning. I have established the relationship between efficiency and equity in the governance of public transport, and how policies of coordination and competition have been employed, often in tandem, to address varying issues of regional public transport governance. In the following chapters I shall turn to the politics of public transport policy and planning ‘on the ground’, and show how these policy discourses and institutional framework, together with other contextual factors, has shaped the public transport system over the last fifty years.
Figure 5.1 Timeline over central policy decision for regional public transport.
6 Establishing the Public Transport Authority in Malmöhus (1974 – 1984)

After having presented an overview of how national public transport policy has developed over time, this chapter takes the reader to the empirical setting of Malmöhus. In it, I describe the process of establishing the public transport authority (PTA) in Malmöhus Län and how public transport governance was organized and carried out during the first years of the 1980’s. The main aim of the chapter is to set the stage for the politics of public transport policy and planning that developed in Malmöhus after the introduction of the regional PTAs in Sweden. It presents the organizations involved in governing local and regional public transport and how these approached the new regional public transport governance. The attention in the chapter is centered Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, the organization that was created to govern local and regional public transport in the county. The chapter analyzes the rationalities that underpinned the structure of decision-making among the stakeholders involved in the regional PTA, the planning practices that defined public transport, and the spatial and technological configuration of the public transport system during the PTA’s first years of existence.

The chapter begins with a brief history of public transport prior to the establishment of the PTA. After this background, the values and goals that permeated the PTA’s initial setup, the political debate before the creation of the traffic company, and a description of the organization of decision-making and planning in the new organization is presented. The chapter also describes how the bus and rail systems developed during the early 1980’s. Lastly, I draw some conclusions from the analysis.
6.1 Public transport in Malmöhus before the public transport authority

Economically and demographically, the history of Skåne has tended to tilt toward the southwest, both due to its fertile soils and its proximity to Denmark.276 The area that constituted Malmöhus Län has since long been more populous than former Kristianstad Län, and the three most populous cities in Skåne – Malmö, Helsingborg, and Lund – are all located in Malmöhus. When the parliament decided that a number of national trunk railways was to be built in Sweden in the 1850’s to connect Sweden’s cities, there was some debate whether the southern trunk railway should end in Malmö or Ystad. As the major seaport in the region during the mid-19th century Ystad had a reasonable case to become the southern endpoint of the railway, but Malmö eventually won out due to its status as residence town in the county.277 The first railway in Sweden opened between Malmö and Lund in 1856 and the railway would come to have a revolutionary impact on Skåne’s economic geography. Complementing the state-owned trunk railways, regional and local railways were built by associations of local landlords and other private and public stakeholders (the railway between Malmö and Ystad was colloquially known as the ‘count line’ due to the high number of estates that it passed.278) Aided by generous government loan guarantees and driven by a boom in agricultural exports first in grains and later sugar beets, local railways were quickly rolled out across Skåne.279 The railway expansion contributed to a nascent industrialization of the region, and pulled parts of the rural population to towns along the railway stations, several of which grew rapidly as they became hubs for the many rail lines that were built: Eslöv, Hässleholm, Kävlinge, and Tomelilla are such examples.280 In 1910, Skåne had the largest concentration of railways in Sweden in relation to its area, and as Figure 6.1 shows, almost all cities and towns in Skåne have at some point in time been connected to a railway. Many railways were poorly planned however: some saw decreasing profits already during the first decades of the 20th century. And while bus traffic was initially started as complements to existing railways they soon started

276 Skansjö, Skånes historia.
278 Möller, “The Landed Estate and the Railway.”
280 Eli F Heckscher, Till belysning af järnvägarnas betydelse för Sveriges ekonomiska utveckling (Stockholm, 1907).
Figure 6.1 The historical railway system in Skåne. Image showing the historical railway system in Skåne at its maximum extension (left) and the rail network with passenger services in 2008 (right). Red circles indicate cities and towns, the yellow lines is the railway extension. As can be seen, almost every town in Skåne has been connected to the railway at some point in time. Source: Region Skåne. Tillgänglighetsatlas. 2008, 19.
competing with the railways. Sven Godlund has charted the growth and spread of bus traffic in Skåne in great detail and showed how areas and routes serviced by bus traffic grew from 1907 to 1951 to practically cover all major and many minor roads in the region. From the time that buses started traffic in Skåne to the early 1950’s, 8% of the railways in the region were closed, and almost all of them were replaced by bus services. The closure of railways would speed up significantly in the coming decades, as SJ closed many railways and replaced them with bus services after they attained a monopoly on railway services in Sweden. The initially high concentration of railways in the region also meant that when railways began being closed, Skåne was subject to the highest share of railway closures in Sweden.

6.1.1 Local and regional engagement in public transport before the PTA reform

As the conditions for public transport increasing became a part of the regional policy discourse during the 1960’s and 70’s (see chapter five), it also stirred activity among local and regional authorities in the country. In tandem with national policy and planning initiatives, in 1974 a regional committee called “Skånetrafiken” was formed with the ambition to preempt the coming national policy and work for a single regional public transport authority in Skåne. There was plenty of cross-county travel between Malmöhus and Kristianstad Län: in the regional travel card inquiry, northwestern Skåne was recognized as one of three areas in Sweden where work commuting across county borders was particularly prominent. A Skåne-wide perspective was also highlighted in the County Administrations’ regional plans; the County Administration in Kristianstad County went so far as to designate all traffic within Skåne as regional due to the intense exchange between the two counties. The Skånetrafiken committee concluded that Skåne would be best served by dividing it into three ‘traffic areas’: one for the south, one for the northwest and one for the northeast. Such a division would

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281 However, Godlund argues that the declining profits for several railway lines cannot be explained solely by the competition from car traffic, but as the result of the low cost-efficiency of the rail services themselves. Rather it was the poorly constructed and highly fragmented railway system that inhibited its attractiveness (see chapter XX)

282 Godlund, *Busstrafikens framväxt och funktion i de urbana influensfälten* see utviksblad III in chapter X.


arrange the home and workplace for 95 % of the population in Skåne within the same traffic area.\textsuperscript{286}

Scanian members of parliament from both the social democratic and liberal political blocks representing both Malmöhus and Kristianstad handed in motions to the parliament. With the argument that one PTA for each county would cut off travel patterns and ‘contact surfaces’, create tensions between the two counties’ organizations, and create unnecessary double-work for both sides, the politicians argued that public transport in Malmöhus and Kristianstads län should be organized under a single PTA.\textsuperscript{287} Such a construction would, however, have required adjusting the phrasing of the coming legislation to allow a different geographical-administrative boundary than the county level, or to allow for an exception for Skåne. Although there were representatives from Kristianstad Län included in the motions to the national parliament, politicians in Kristianstad Län were hesitant to join in a unified PTA with the much larger county of Malmöhus, and as the Scanian motions fell on deaf ears in the parliamentary traffic committee the ambition fell through.\textsuperscript{288} And while Scanian politicians continued to lobby the parliament for the creation of a single PTA in Skåne over the coming years, for the time being each county would have to coordinate and govern their own public transport.\textsuperscript{289}

Apart from the ultimately fruitless attempts to form a unified PTA in Skåne, other actors also took on an increasing responsibility for public transport. In 1972, the municipal association Sydvästra Skånes samarbetskommitté (SSK) produced a regional development plan which included ambitious visions for train traffic in the region.\textsuperscript{290} However, in accordance with the regional development policy at the time, the policy goal was to slow down urban growth and spread economic activity throughout the region and the policy adopted favored a sprawled spatial development that disfavored public transport.

Like in most other regions in Sweden, SJ’ aim during the 1970’s under the guidance of the director Lars Peterson was to replace all local and regional trains in southwestern Skåne with bus services.\textsuperscript{291} Operating an ageing train fleet, SJ stated that they would

\textsuperscript{286}Motion 1978/79:208 Om huvudmannskapet för viss kollektivtrafik.
\textsuperscript{287}Motion 1977/78:1824 Med Anledning Av Propositionen 1977/78:92 Om åtgärder för att förbättra lokal och regional kollektiv persontrafik; “Motion 1978/79: 1956 Om gemensamt huvudmannskap för kollektivtrafiken i Skåne”.
\textsuperscript{288}Malmöhus Läns Landsting, Yttranden vid malmöhus läns landstings möte 1980-04-21 (Malmöhus läns landsting, 1980), 12 Several interviewees indicated that there was a strong resistance to the idea of a joint PTA in Kristianstad, claiming that it was posed as “little brother” against “big brother”.
\textsuperscript{289}“Motion 1984/85:353. En gemensam huvudman för skånes lokala och regionala kollektivtrafik”.
\textsuperscript{291}Wetterberg, Skånes historia III 1720-2017.
not engage in local rail services unless municipalities took a greater economic responsibility for traffic. However, southwestern Skåne was a geographically small region with a comparatively large intermunicipal commuting and train services were deemed necessary to uphold decent transport provision.\(^{292}\) When Bengt Furbäck replaced Peterson as general director at SJ, the attitude toward closing all unprofitable train services softened and so in 1978 SSK could sign an agreement with SJ for a continuation of train services in the region. The municipal association Nordvästra Skånes kommunalförbund (NSK) followed suit, and also carried out an extensive investigation for an upgraded public transport system in all their associated municipalities (which included several municipalities in Kristianstad Län). While NSK failed to establish a system across the county border, NSK’s and SSK’s contracts with SJ would become the basis of what would later develop into a novel local train service called Pågatågen.\(^ {293}\)

### 6.2 Organizing decision-making and distributing power

After the national legislation concerning public transport principals was passed in 1978, county councils and municipalities across the country were given three years to adapt to the new rules.\(^ {294}\) Especially important was of course to set up a formal organization to function as public transport authority (PTA) and the framework necessary for its successful operation. After the unsuccessful campaign to create a unified public transport authority between Malmöhus and Kristianstads Län, another regional committee was formed in Malmöhus Län in September 1979, consisting of elected officials from the county council and civil servants from municipal traffic companies and planning organizations with the task to investigate how the alignment with the new legislation could best be handled.\(^ {295}\) Given that the failed attempt at forming a Scanian PTA had taken a lot of time and the PTAs were to assume authority over public transport in July 1981, there was little time for setting up a PTA in Malmöhus.


\(^ {293}\) Information from email correspondence with Bertil Sturesson, October 21, 2021. Bertil Sturesson was the civil servant responsible for NSKs inquiry and would later become head planner at the regional PTA. NSK’s inquiry was published as Samordnad kollektivtrafik i Nordvästra Skåne in 1979, but unfortunately the report is missing from the national library.

\(^ {294}\) Except the counties of Västra Götaland, Halland and Bohuslän, who due to geographical-administrative complexity of interregional transport flows were given an additional two years to implement the reform.

In February 1980 proposals for a *consortium agreement* and *traffic agreement* for a transport company called Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB (MLT) were presented. These documents were the central legal documents that defined the ownership structure and operational principles for the company. The consortium agreement defined the formal constitution of the company, including ownership structure and procedures for changes in authority and representation from the owners, whereas the traffic agreement defined the activities and processes that the company should engage in, including aims and operational principles for the company. Through studying these documents in closer detail, we can understand the organizational set-up of the PTA and how power relations were established through both formal and informal arrangements.

### 6.2.1 The consortium agreement

The new legislation stated that the regional public transport authorities were to be governed jointly by the municipalities and the county councils. Since Malmö municipality was at the time a ‘county-free municipality’ and was not part of Malmöhus County Council (see section 1.6), there were three main parties in the organization: Malmöhus County Council, Malmö municipality, and the other 19 municipalities in Malmöhus County, who were represented by the Municipal Association of Malmöhus. The ownership and governance structure were intended to ensure an even distribution of influence over public transport between the three parties, with approximately one third of shares owned by each stakeholder group (see Table 6.1).

### 6.2.2 The traffic agreement

The consortium agreement defined the judicial functioning of the company. To understand the way the PTA’s operations were organized in practice I will also look closer at the *Traffic agreement*, where the aims and principles that were supposed to guide the regional PTA were formulated between the parties. The core of the PTAs purpose was formulated in an overarching aim, that stated that the PTA, through contracts with traffic operators or on its own, was to:

> conduct regular services for carriage of passengers with accompanying goods in a regional traffic network within aforementioned municipalities, and when needed in certain adjacent areas. The company shall also – should the shareholder meeting so decide – be

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296 Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, *Konsortialavtal* (Malmöhus läns landsting, 1980); Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, *Trafikavtal* (Malmöhus läns landsting, 1980).
able to run complementary traffic, chartered school services, certain boat traffic and regional passenger traffic by rail.297

To fulfill this general aim of public transport supply in the region, the traffic agreement listed nine goals that the company was to especially aim for when fulfilling its duties (see Box 6.1). These goals corresponded well with the intentions of the public transport authority reform of 1978 and reiterated the central values and ideas of the travel card inquiry and government propositions: improving work commuting, coordinating a regional fare system, and accommodating regional connections, for example. Importantly, one of the goals in the traffic agreement was “to equalize traffic standards within the county with respect to existing traffic conditions”. This goal clearly

Table 6.1. Stakeholders, shares and population size in Malmöhus Län in 1980. Malmö municipality held the largest number of shares, just above 33 %, the County Council slightly less and the remaining municipalities shared the last third based on population size. Source: konsortialavtal 1980223, population data from Statistics Sweden

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Shares</th>
<th>Pop. Size (1980)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malmöhus Läns Landsting</td>
<td>33,159 %</td>
<td>743 286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmö municipality</td>
<td>33,682 %</td>
<td>233 803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helsingborg municipality</td>
<td>6,587 %</td>
<td>101 956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lunds municipality</td>
<td>5,412 %</td>
<td>78 487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landskrona municipality</td>
<td>2,427 %</td>
<td>36 493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trelleborgs municipality</td>
<td>2,194 %</td>
<td>34 445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eslövs municipality</td>
<td>1,720 %</td>
<td>26 829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vellinge municipality</td>
<td>1,534 %</td>
<td>23 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ystads municipality</td>
<td>1,499 %</td>
<td>23 773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Höganäs municipality</td>
<td>1,423 %</td>
<td>22 111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kävlinge municipality</td>
<td>1,321 %</td>
<td>20 643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lomma municipality</td>
<td>1,120 %</td>
<td>16 607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffanstorps municipality</td>
<td>1,096 %</td>
<td>16 368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svedala municipality</td>
<td>0,985 %</td>
<td>15 471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bjuvs municipality</td>
<td>0,949 %</td>
<td>14 323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sjöbo municipality</td>
<td>0,945 %</td>
<td>15 016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burlövs municipality</td>
<td>0,922 %</td>
<td>12 990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Svalövs municipality</td>
<td>0,840 %</td>
<td>12 903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hörby municipality</td>
<td>0,805 %</td>
<td>12 624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skurups municipality</td>
<td>0,704 %</td>
<td>12 583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Höörs municipality</td>
<td>0,676 %</td>
<td>10 902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

297 Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, Trafikavtal, 1.
alluded to the value of equalization of accessibility to and cost of mobility that was an important feature of the PTA reform. However, equalization in the public transport system in Malmöhus was to be achieved ‘with respect to existing traffic conditions’, a vague statement which left the door open for interpretation of what equalization would mean in practice. This would later become an important point of contestation between the stakeholders of MLT.

Box 6.1 Aims of the Public transport company in Malmöhus Län. Source: Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus län, Trafikavtal, 1980-03-11

- to uphold and develop public transport in Malmöhus county,
- to plan and procure traffic in a way that ensures an efficient use of resources,
- to equalize traffic standards within the county with respect to existing traffic conditions,
- to improve possibilities for work commuting,
- to accommodate the need for regional connections between the county’s municipalities,
- to design schedules and routes to facilitate transfers,
- to coordinate different modes of public transport within the county,
- to already from the start adopt a simple, coordinated regional fare system for the traffic for which the company is responsible for,
- to as soon as possible establish collaboration with the Public transport authority in Kristianstads Län to achieve coordination of fares and services across the county borders.

How the aims and goals of MLT were to be operationalized was described in a number of paragraphs that defined the responsibilities and roles in relation to different aspects of transport planning. A crucial aspect in the functioning of the PTA was the distribution of authority and control over planning. Central to this were responsibilities in five areas: local public transport; local and regional rail services, planning processes, the financing of public operations, and, finally, the route concessions held by operators.

Local public transport. While MLT, as public transport authority, held the formal authority over both local and regional road-based public transport according to the new legislation, according to the traffic agreement they were to “hand over the decision-making power over the design of routes, timetables, density and fares of local traffic” to each municipality with local public transport through separate agreements.298 Local public transport was defined as scheduled services where more than 75% of the route length was located inside one and the same municipality. This meant that MLT handed decision-making power over a large portion of transport within the county to individual municipalities. In 1980, seven cities and towns in Malmöhus had local public transport: Eslöv, Helsingborg, Landskrona, Lund, Malmö, Trelleborg and Ystad.

298 Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, Trafikavtal §9.
Local and regional train services. In 1980, railway traffic in Sweden was under an almost complete monopoly with the state railway administration (SJ). As described in section 6.1., SSK and NSK had struck agreements with SJ to run a local train service under the municipal associations’ authority that was to start in 1983.299 At the time of the establishment of MLT the municipalities in the southwest and northwest were therefore already heavily engaged in the financing and planning of local rail traffic. And while in MLT’s consortium agreement it was stated that all local and regional train services were to be incorporated under the authority of MLT “as soon as it is practically possible”, the authority over regional rail services provided the western municipal associations with considerable control over regional public transport.300 (Although also considerable costs: several interviewees recalled that the County Council was initially not interested in taking over local trains as it was considered a bad economic decision that the municipalities should bear the burden for.301)

Planning processes. In the traffic agreement, a key role in regional transport planning in Malmöhus Län was awarded to four so-called traffic committees. These traffic committees organized all municipalities in Malmöhus in referential bodies according to existing municipal associations (see Figure 6.2). Consisting of one representative from each municipality in the area, plus one representative each from the company and the County Council, the traffic committees were to play a key role in traffic planning through surveying and gathering the municipalities’ transport needs and passing this along to the central administration at MLT. While the formal decision on traffic supply was made at the shareholder meeting, it was stated in the traffic agreement that “the transport provision plans shall be designed on the basis of the municipalities’ local traffic plans and with consideration of the viewpoints and wishes that in other ways are presented during the planning process.”302 And since the municipalities were represented both in the traffic committees and at the shareholder meeting, they could count on getting their way.

Financing public transport. The way local and regional public transport was financed was of course crucial to the distribution of power over public transport. Traffic was to be financed from three sources: i) incomes from ticket sales and auxiliary commercial operations, ii) state subsidies to unprofitable services, and iii) economic support by the owners to cover the deficit that remained after incomes and state subsidies had been collected. The state subsidized the production of transport services

300 Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, Konsortialavtal §2.
301 Interviews with Mats Améen, 2019-01-13, Bertil Sturesson, September 17, 2020, Gunnar Davidsson 2020-08-17
302 Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, Trafikavtal §8.
Figure 6.2. Subregional traffic planning committees in Malmöhus län. The thicker lines indicate the border between the traffic committees. Source: Malmöhus läns trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1981/82, 6.

...with the intention to support unprofitable services with low ridership based on the metric of vehicle kilometer production. The deficit was distributed among the owners based on the character of the service. For deficits in regional bus traffic, Malmöhus Län and Malmö municipality covered 50% of the deficit, and the...

303 ‘Vehicle kilometer production’ was the unit used to measure the total volume of traffic in the county and served as a basis for calculating state subsidies for traffic. 1 bus travelling 1 kilometer equals 1 vehicle kilometer, 2 buses travelling 2 kilometers equals 4 vehicle kilometers, and so on. This measure is thus independent from the number of passengers travelling on the given vehicle. The total volume of ridership is measured in passenger kilometers, representing the sum distance of all passenger trips on a route, service, transport mode or in the entire system.
municipalities (including Malmö) covered the remaining 50%. The municipal share was distributed based on the total amount of vehicle kilometers produced within each municipality, with the addendum that for a service running through a municipality with “limited accessibility or utility for said municipality’s inhabitants” a redistribution of the municipal cost should be made with regards to the utility for the municipality in question.\textsuperscript{304} The deficits in local public transport were calculated based on the number of hours of transport produced rather than kilometers and was calculated separately for each municipality with local services. Malmöhus Län and Malmö municipality covered 20% and the relevant municipality covered the remaining 80%.\textsuperscript{305} The point of the deficit distribution was to provide a system of economic balancing between the owners in which everyone contributed to upholding the system. However, as we shall see, when the deficit grew the distribution model would become a topic of fierce conflict and debate.

**Route concessions.** The existing route concessions limited the practical ability for MLT to decide over traffic supply. As described in chapter five, route concessions were awarded to operators and gave them a protected monopoly on specific services. The PTA had plan regional public transport with existing route concessions in mind. In the traffic agreement it was stated that MLT should apply for route concessions for new or expanded traffic and in the long run aim to take over all existing route concessions, i.e., to run traffic either on its own or through the operators.\textsuperscript{306}

Through the arrangements laid out in the consortium agreement and traffic agreement, governance over local and regional public transport was constructed in a distributed network where municipalities and traffic committees each provided a piece to the regional public transport jigsaw puzzle, and the traffic planners at MLT would adjust the regional traffic plan in accordance with the viewpoints and wishes of municipalities and traffic committees (see Figure 6.3 for an illustration of the governance structure). The company ceded control over local public transport to the municipalities; rail services were controlled by SJ and the western municipal associations (SSK and NSK) who had developed a governance structure and planning competence for public transport within their own organizations; and bus services were to some extent controlled by the traffic operators who held route concessions. At the outset, MLT was to function primarily as the legally mandated public body that compiled the four traffic plans developed by each subregional traffic committee into a regional transport supply plan, which in turn served as material for attaining state

\textsuperscript{304} Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, *Trafikavtal*, §11.
\textsuperscript{305} Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, §13
\textsuperscript{306} Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, §6.
Figure 6.3. Governance structure for public transport in Malmöhus 1983. Organizational chart showing the relations between the authority over different modes of traffic in local and regional public transport in 1983.
subsidies for unprofitable local and regional services. As the chairman of the company, Sten Norin, reflected ten years later, “the idea that it would be natural with a transport supply plan for the whole region was never there.”\textsuperscript{307} Several interviewees confirmed the existence of this attitude: the PTA was initially thought of as “something the cat dragged in”, as Gunnar Davidsson, who worked with public transport at the County Council, expressed it.\textsuperscript{308} The animosity toward MLT was likely caused by the sense of intrusion into an already existing governance framework, with strong intermunicipal planning bodies that held both knowledge, resources and authority over an extensive transport apparatus. This shone through in the initial construction of the local and regional public transport governance system as a bottom-up process where the subregional traffic committees were in the driver’s seat.

6.2.3 Debating the role of public transport

On April 21, 1980, the proposed organizational and operational structure was presented and discussed at the County Council board. Since the County Council (unlike the municipalities in SSK and NSK) hitherto hadn’t had any responsibility for local or regional public transport at all, it is interesting to study the debate and the consideration for and against the way the new PTA was to be organized and run a little closer. As was noted above, the municipalities saw the County Council as something of an intruder. And the County Council’s initial interest in public transport can rightfully be questioned: in a wry remark, Stig F Hansson from the center party (c) opened the debate stating that “there are reasons to ask oneself why county councils and municipalities shall have more tasks. It seems in some contexts that we have enough difficulties as it is. If the question relates to the now delayed issue [of forming a regional public transport authority] the answer is that there is no real choice.”\textsuperscript{309} However, there the County Council were with an involuntary responsibility for public transport, and they now needed to establish their political position going into a new policy area. The debate at the County Council centered around three topics: the aims of regional public transport, the financial responsibility for public transport, and the organizational form that the PTA should take.

A central aim was making public transport more attractive. Doing so through a combination of cheaper fares and more frequent departures was according to Stig F Hansson (c) ‘self-evident.’ However, he also stressed, “this must also apply to those who

\textsuperscript{307} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Årsstämma 1990-05-17}, bilaga 5, “Anförande av Sten Norin vid Malmöhus läns Trafik AB:s bolagsstämma den 17 maj 1990.”, 2

\textsuperscript{308} Interview with Gunnar Davidsson, 2020-08-17.

live a bit more off and where it is most cumbersome.”310 The importance of this way of thinking was reflected in the traffic agreement through the aim to equalize traffic standards within the county (see Box 6.1). Representatives from the communist party (v) were critical of the proposal and wanted it sent back to the executive committee and argued that, while the aims of the public transport authority were uncontroversial, they lacked a holistic approach to the transport system. Such an approach implied considering public transport and automobility in relation to each other rather than creating a policy for public transport without taking automobility into consideration. Ulf Nymark (v) argued that while there was no inherent tension between cars and public transport on the level of individual vehicles, there was “a very clear tension between automobility as today’s dominant transport system, and public transport.”311 The question here was, as Nymark formulated it, “we have to decide: shall we have a public transport system as the dominant societal traffic system, or shall automobility be dominant?”312 Representatives from the other parties were not as sceptic toward the car, rather they lauded the freedom of movement and choice of living situation it provided (not least for the working class!), and although the social democratic (s) representative Stig Blix acknowledged that in the postwar period “we have not built for public transport, we have only built for the car”, he saw “no clash of interests between the car and public transport.”313 Overall, though, there was a consensus that public transport needed to be expanded. Interestingly, there was also an across-the-board consensus that the growth of private automobility had to be curtailed.

Given the ambitions for expanded public transport displayed in the aims and goals the traffic agreement, the question of financing public transport was of course important. There was no questioning that the public sector was going to have to accept a financial responsibility for public transport. Stig F Hansson (c), for example, stated that “we shall presuppose that the social motives for this reform will require that a deficit must be accepted and that we will have to finance it with taxpayer money and that it will weigh down the County Council’s budget. We shall be aware of this, and accept it.”314 A greater undertaking was motivated from a socioeconomic perspective, something no party objected. This coincided with the issue of energy and resource scarcity that also hovered over the political debate. For example, Fredrik Swartling from the conservative party (m), argued that the ‘oil situation’ (i.e., the energy scarcity following the two oil crises during the 1970’s), both in terms of its levels of supply and

310 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 3.
311 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 9.
312 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 14.
313 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 3, 10.
314 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 4.
cost for the individual, motivated an extensive and coordinated public transport system. However, as representatives from both the social democrats and the conservative party stressed, it was also a question of coordinating and improving existing resources. Stig Blixt (s) stated that “I don’t believe that we will be receiving any large additional resources for this responsibility; instead, I think that the biggest asset will be all the good forces within the county, no matter where they come from and what size they represent, really gather around the task of utilizing the resources already at our disposal, but that we don’t use to the fullest.” It was thus a matter of accepting a greater financial responsibility, while also being mindful of the limited additional resources at disposal for the operations of the PTA.

The third major topic in the debate was the organizational form that the PTA should take: whether it would be formed as a publicly owned company or as a municipal association. As a company, the PTA would act in accordance with the Swedish companies act, whereas as a municipal association it would stand under direct political leadership and control. In the draft for the consortium agreement, it was suggested that the PTA was to be organized as a publicly owned company. Arguing in favor of organizing the PTA as a company, Stig F Hansson (c) stated that

> The kind of business operation this concerns would fare well from choosing such a format for decision-making. It is, in other words, more convenient and does not risk running into the same cumbersome and time-consuming decision-making processes such as the forceful regulation in the municipal associations act can be expected to have.

Erik Nilsson (v) retorted that, based on a focus on efficiency in decision-making and resource acquisition, the committee had chosen,

> the least democratic form of municipal administration that can be found, […] a form that greatly reduces possibilities for transparency and influence and where the principle for public access to official documents is not applicable as in other decision-making organs in municipalities and county councils.

The left communis party’s preference for a municipal association rather than a company was motivated by a grander vision for public transport: “to build a well-functioning public transport not only economic resources are needed. A broad engagement is also needed. Not only from public bodies but also from parties, unions, environmental

316 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 5.
317 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 3.
318 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 7.
groups, and other interest groups.” As the quotes imply, both councilmen’s posited efficiency and transparency in decision-making as (partly) mutually exclusive values in the operation of the PTA. However, due to their ideological roots, they drew entirely different conclusions from this reasoning.

From the presentation of the debate sketched above, I conclude that there was a broad consensus over a deepened and widened responsibility for public transport and that this responsibility needed to extend especially to those who lived outside the more populous areas of the region. Thus, the primary value expressed in the debate was that of equalized accessibility. The oil crisis had made public transport a more important supplement to the car and increased financial undertakings for the County Council was broadly supported by the council members in the debate, although coordination of resources was emphasized as a countermeasure to increased funding. The only political party that criticized the proposal was the communist party, who both wanted a more holistic approach to regional transport where public transport would be put at the center of regional transport policy at the same time as they criticized the choice of organizing public transport governance in a company and sought a more democratically controlled public transport apparatus. The communist party’s critique amounted to nothing, however, and following the committee’s recommendations the proposal was accepted unanimously by all other parties in the County Council.

6.3 Organizing planning

After the other stakeholders in the PTA had also accepted the proposed wordings, on August 19, 1980, a publicly owned company named Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB (henceforth, MLT) was incorporated to act as regional PTA in Malmöhus. Malmöhus Läns Trafik was seated in Lund and started building a small secretariat. Following an interim period with a consultant as acting CEO, Nils Wahlberg, at the time head of the roadworks department in Linköpings kommun, was hired as CEO from December 1, 1980, together with Britt Bjursten as secretary and Bertil Sturesson as head traffic planner. On July 1, 1981, MLT formally took over the authority over regional public transport planning in Malmöhus Län, and a year later the secretariat

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319 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, Yttranden Vid Malmöhus Läns Landstings Möte 1980-04-21, 7.
321 All 21 counties except for Kronoberg and Jämtland chose to organize the public transport authority as a company. Kronoberg and Jämtland organized the PTA as a municipal association instead.
had expanded to five persons, with Ingemar Bryman hired as traffic economist and Ane Sjetne as clerk.\footnote{Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Årsberättelse 1982, 1983, 2.}

As we saw in the previous sections, the company’s aims inscribed in the traffic agreement between the owners of Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB corresponded well with the intentions of the public transport reform of 1978. The central tenets in the public transport reform of 1978 were to improve the conditions for public transport through lowering prices for passengers through regional travel cards, coordination of public transport services and expanded state subsidies for unprofitable rural public transport services. All these measures were to be administered and achieved with the help of the newly formed public transport authorities. So how did these ambitions play out in practice?

Standardized fares and travel cards were introduced when MLT assumed authority over regional public transport. The fare structure was divided into single tickets with validity divided in zones, sub-regional travel cards (one for each municipal association) and a county-wide travel card. The system included transfers between regional and local services with both single tickets and travel cards, travel card validity on a number of local train services, and local municipal fare reductions. Another aspect showing the ambition to coordinate public transport from the new public transport authority was that from the outset the company board added an informal goal for the company to work for “a mandatory coordination of traffic issues and an increased consideration of the role and cost of public transport in physical planning in the municipalities.”\footnote{Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1982/83 see also ; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1981-11-25.}

Coordination between Malmöhus and Kristianstads Län was organized so that travel cards were valid on all interregional services to the nearest city or town in the other county, and from there passenger had to buy a new ticket to continue their trips.\footnote{Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1983/84, 4.} However, the coordination of traffic between the two counties was not unproblematic. In MLTs traffic supply plan for 1984/85 it was commented that

In earlier plans and timetable scheduling there has in reality been large difficulties in finalizing the timetables for the county borders, since KLT [the PTA in Kristianstad] has made last minute changes. […] MLT has sharply stated that for this year’s planning this situation will under no circumstances be accepted anymore by MLT and its municipalities.\footnote{Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1984/85, 1984 section A.1.2.1.}
This quote of course only highlights MLT’s perspective on cross-county coordination, and it may well be that KLT’s views on the matter was entirely different, but it indicates that the collaboration between the two PTA’s was not without friction from the very start.

Overall, the first years of operations were marked by the ambition to create a coherent system of operations. However, as a new organization without a solid experience of traffic planning of its own, MLT’s initial analyses and traffic planning were “based for the absolute most part on long-time experience of the traffic demand in different areas”.327 Aware of their limited power – in terms of control over decisions as well planning resources – vis-a-vis both municipalities and operators, the planners at MLT initially adopted a cooperative strategy. Bertil Sturesson, chief of traffic planning between 1981 and 1989, stated in an interview that,

…we didn’t have many resources for planning, but my work was based on collaboration with municipalities, on how much they were willing to pay. And then I had meetings with planners at SJ Buss and we went over ’this much [the municipalities] want, and this and that change’. […] And then SJ Buss made the detailed schedule with exact runtimes and routes; there is a lot of work going in to make schedules work properly. That was traffic planning back in my days.328

The detailed scheduling of services was made by the traffic operators rather than the PTA. Ingemar Bryman recalled that since the operators held the concessions, MLT’s “hands were tied”, and that his initial function as traffic economist was first and foremost to try to analyze the operators’ costs to ensure that they were realistic.329 Thus, the first years of operations for MLT consisted mainly in establishing an oversight over traffic and establish processes for traffic planning. The tasks of compiling and finalizing timetables and schedules were distributed to each sub-regional traffic committee – including printing and distributing timetables to the public. The subregional traffic committees also provided the information to be compiled in the transport supply program. Thus, in practice it was at the level of the subregional traffic committees and the traffic operators that traffic planning was controlled and conducted. Already in the first yearly report it was however noted that “the material has shifted in quality and completeness, which has caused difficulties in the company’s processing of the material”, and it was suggested that “there is a need to eventually develop a better system for how the company’s traffic committees shall be utilized”.330 This comment indicates

327 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1981/82, 4.
328 Interview with Bertil Sturesson, 2020-09-17
329 Interview with Ingemar Bryman, 2020-09-23
that there was a volatility in the interface between MLT and the traffic committees already from the start, although there were no open conflicts during the first years of operation.

We can thus conclude that there were few policy tools and planning instruments that the PTA held at their own disposal, but that these resources were primarily located elsewhere in the system. The same went for decision-making, that had been distributed away from the PTA.

### 6.4 System developments

#### 6.4.1 The regional bus system

A key motivation for the public transport reform of 1978 was to provide better and expanded access to public transport, with special attention to regional and rural public transport. The travel card inquiry presented in 1976 concluded that state subsidies could be expected to increase by 60 percent following the reform. The expansion was measured both in terms of patronage, i.e., number of passengers, and by vehicle kilometer production (vkp) – i.e., the total number of kilometers that all vehicles under the authority of MLT produced during a business year.

The increased subsidies initially had their intended effects on the public transport system. During the first year of MLT’s authority 11 new services were introduced and 2 services were discontinued. In the plan for 1983/84, 8 new services were introduced. Due to the introduction of the new Pågatåg service, the closure of the Öresund Wharf in Landskrona, and relocations of military units in Skåne, there were major adaptations of many bus services, and several school bus services were removed from the regular network. In terms of traffic production, there were 167 regional bus

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331 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *Trafikförsörjningsplan 1981/82*, 11. The two closed services were the rail service between Landskrona and Eslöv, and a bus service between Trelleborg and Anderslöv.

Figure 6.4. Map of the 'trunk line network for regional public transport in Malmöhus for the traffic year 1982/83. The image is of poor quality but shows the very fine-grained network that existed in the beginning of the 1980's. Source: Malmöhus trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsprogram 1983/84, 12.
services in the county producing a total of 14.1 million vehicle kilometers in 1982 (see Figure 6.4). In 1983 traffic production increased to 15 million vehicle kilometers, and 16.2 million in 1984. Between 1976/77 and 1984/85 the traffic production in Malmöhus increased from 9 million vehicle kilometers to over 17 million.

Patronage also increased dramatically in the early 1980’s: the travel surveys of 1979 and 1982 showed an increase of 82 % boardings. There was a general increase on most routes, but some areas benefited more than others: for example, the area northeast of Malmö and east of Lund, with the towns of Staffanstorp, Dalby and Södra Sandby doubled their patronage in three years. Patronage increased most in rural areas and between smaller towns and urban centers, where ridership had previously been low. The growing ridership in regional public transport can be summed up as an effect of expanded subsidies, an urban sprawl coupled with a continued concentration of workplaces to the larger cities, and high gasoline prices as an aftermath to the oil crisis. The growing spatial separation between housing areas and workplaces drove demand for all forms of mobility, including public transport.

Although there was clearly an expansionist mentality in the early phase of the PTA with a focus on the most traffic-deprived areas, a stated goal for the PTA was also to improve efficiency and resources use. This prompted both technical adjustments of vehicle utilization and other efficiency improvements, as well as an oversight of departures with low patronage that were already known or discovered through travel counts. As a first policy to impose some form of systematic rationalization, in 1983 a criterion on minimum occupancy level of 3 persons was introduced for a departure or service to remain as a regular scheduled service. If it did not meet the criterion, the departure or service was to be demoted to a complementary service with lower frequency; these were at the time paid for by the municipalities. In his role as head of traffic planning, Bertil Sturesson had also been given political go-ahead from the board of MLT to cut bus services that had the character of pure school buses, which prior to 1984 were technically the municipalities’ responsibility.

The introduction of the PTA and the decision to impose minimum ridership levels prompted a desire for more knowledge about journeys made throughout the system, and the criterion would later become an important conflict surface between MLT and

333 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Årsberättelse 1982, 3 In 1982 the traffic was run on contracts by 13 different traffic companies.
336 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförörjningsplan 1982/83 section 2.4.
337 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1983-10-31, § 161; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kriterier för granskning av trafiksvaga turer i länstrafiken PM 1983-10-10.
the municipalities. When MLT was given authority for public transport, there were no systematic travel surveys over regional traffic, making such decisions harder to justify. Furthermore, the planners had to rely on the bus companies to conduct the travel counts. As the cancellation of a service could risk the bus drivers’ contracts and the travel counts were conducted by the bus drivers, the planners at MLT didn’t trust the bus drivers to report correct data. Therefore, Bertil Sturesson also hired people to conduct incognito travel counts to match against the official statistics reported by the drivers. 338

While the planners at MLT aimed at a rationalization of traffic by cutting the very weakest traffic, straightening routes and speed up travel times where it was possible, Bertil Sturesson recalled that there was no “dramatic shift in that direction.” 339 This was because it was the municipalities (through the traffic committees) who largely controlled the planning process, and they were reluctant to cut local service supply. Therefore, Sturesson said, “we had to do this carefully, since everything was based on agreements with municipalities.” 340 The improved state subsidies for unprofitable public transport also meant that MLT got more state subsidies the more roads they spread traffic on. And while the subsidies were not large enough to motivate buses on every rural road, the subsidy system “didn’t stimulate any concentration of services, rather the opposite.” 341 This tendency was further strengthened by the deficit distribution model, where Malmöhus Län and Malmö municipality covered 50 % of the deficit in regional traffic. This meant that municipalities didn’t have to pay fully for the traffic generated within their area of jurisdiction. This model was of course in line with the goals of the PTA reform in which expanded subsidies for unprofitable services and a sharing of cost increases between different regional actors were considered as cornerstones in providing more equal accessibility throughout the Swedish counties, and these values and policies had also been transferred to Malmöhus. Thus, the combination of political support, economic incentives and the decision-making framework ensured that a more spatially distributed public transport system was built up during the first years of the PTA’s existence.

338 Interview with Bertil Sturesson, 2020-09-17
339 Interview with Bertil Sturesson, 2020-09-17
340 Interview with Bertil Sturesson, 2020-09-17
341 Interview with Bertil Sturesson, 2020-09-17
6.4.2 The railway system

While the bus system in Malmöhus was rapidly expanded during the first 1970’s and the early 1980’s, the railway was experiencing the opposite treatment. An important aspect of national transport policy at the time was that closures of railway traffic was accompanied by a substantial government subsidy paid out for five years as a compensation to the regional PTAs for running bus traffic instead of trains. The subsidy gave an incentive for PTAs to take over responsibility for traffic supply as there were no extra costs incurred for the; in fact, the subsidy was often more generous than the cost for running buses. For example, when a discussion about keeping rail services on Lommabanan between Malmö and Kävlinge or replacing them with buses was initiated, it was stated that if the train services were closed and replaced with buses, the balance between costs for bus services and the subsidy for rail closures would be 0.5 million extra per year for the PTA.342 By granting economically generous conditions for the transfer of public transport from railways to roads the subsidy filled the double role of cutting costs for SJ and transferring traffic responsibility from the state to the regional authorities.

In the early 1980’s the last railways to date were closed. These were traffic between Landskrona and Eslöv (1982), on Lommabanan between Malmö and Kävlinge (1983), and between Eslöv and Tomelilla (1983). The closure of traffic between Eslöv – Tomelilla stirred protests, and MLT received a folder with 9000 signatures protesting the closure; however, the local passion for the railway swayed neither MLT nor the government, who gave the final approval to close the service in 1983.343

More railways were also up for debate to be closed: The ‘count line’ between Malmö and Ystad was part of the national trunk network, but the service level provided by SJ was low and adapted to international traffic to and from the continent via Ystad harbor and not the needs of the local labor market.344 A discussion to transfer all regional traffic to buses was initiated, but before any final decisions, a review of the entire train system in the southeast was to be conducted.345 This also included the railway between Ystad and Simrishamn, which crossed the county border into Kristianstads Län. After a detailed analysis comparing the economic conditions and effects in choosing between rail and bus between Ystad-Simrishamn was conducted, both MLT and KLT, the PTA

343 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, “Styrelseprotokoll 810319,” §35; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styrelseprotokoll 830210, §18.
345 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Program för utredning om kollektivtrafik i sydöstra skåne. PM 1982-10-05.
in Kristianstad, wanted to close the railway service and substitute it with buses. However, the proposal to close the railway was highly unpopular among the affected municipalities, as well as the chamber of commerce and the public in southeast Skåne. To avoid a political crisis, the two PTAs opted for a continuation of traffic running on interim contracts with SJ until a final decision could be reached. The same solution was chosen for Malmö-Ystad, with the municipalities along the railway choosing to pay SJ for a higher service standard than the base services. The public and municipal engagement for the railways thus saved Skåne from further railway closures.

The western part of Skåne had already passed this stage of the railway debate. As discussed in section 6.1, SSK and NSK signed contracts with SJ to start a new local passenger train service which was to be called Pågatågen. Traffic with Pågatågen commenced on January 9, 1983, between Malmö, Lund, Kävlinge, Eslöv, Landskrona and Helsingborg. From the outset, the system spanned 110 km of railway stopping at 12 stations that were serviced by 9 trains (see Figure 6.5). The train system was successful from the outset: compared to the previous regional train traffic ridership increased by 85% between 1982 and 1985.

There were two important consequences of SSK and NSK assuming authority over local trains for public transport governance. First, and most importantly, they managed to counter the trend of dismantling the train system. While the takeover of local train traffic was not motivated by a visionary instinct to develop a large-scale regional public transport system so much as by necessity to uphold commuter relations between the major cities in western Skåne when SJ declined to do so on their own, the introduction of Pågatågen would prove in the long run to be instrumental to the takeoff of a new era for public transport in Malmöhus. Second, through the authority over Pågatågen, SSK and NSK they held authority over a major part of the transport system in the region, thus further strengthening the role and functions of the two western traffic committees both in relation to the regional PTA and to the two other municipal associations.

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347 See Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB. Kallelse till styrelsemöte, 1984-09-13. Bilagor


349 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1989/90, 2.
6.5 Summary

In this first chapter on the politics of local and regional public transport in Malmöhus län, I have covered the introduction of a new era of governance for public transport in Malmöhus county through the creation of Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB (MLT) and its operations during the first years. Through the establishment of PTAs, a new
institutional arena was formed for local and regional public transport. In Malmöhus, the agency of the PTA was circumscribed and severely limited by the incumbent actors in the region and MLT was constituted as a relatively weak entity from the outset. Instead, power was geographically and institutionally distributed through a decision-making framework favoring the municipal associations, represented by the sub-regional traffic committees, and the traffic operators who held route concessions. The sub-regional traffic committees were construed between the municipalities and the PTA as a form of ‘soft’ spatial interface for traffic planning between the municipalities and the regional authorities, inserted between the formal authority resting with the PTA.350 By a soft spatial interface, I mean that the traffic committees were not legally mandated but were setup to make regional planning smoother and more effective, but also a reflection of the existing power relations in Malmöhus County.

Planning in Malmöhus was thus constructed as a bottom-up process, where the subregional traffic committees and the traffic operators took on the role to plan and decide over both local and regional transport, and MLT’s initial role was primarily to collect and compile local demands into a regional transport supply plan. This also meant that there were very few policy tools and planning instruments for the PTA to steer planning with and thus, the public transport system was shaped mostly according to the desires of the traffic committees. Collaborative negotiations became the initial strategy of the PTA who did not want to risk confrontations in the early phase of the new governance arrangement due to dependencies on other, more powerful stakeholders to carry out transport planning.

When the PTA was established, just as in national transport policy, there were multiple values connected to the goals inscribed in the traffic agreement. This tension was inscribed in the traffic agreement as there were both a goal for improved resource efficiency and a goal for an equalization of traffic standards. To tie back to theory, rationalities are inherently incoherent; there is no all-encompassing rationality that can be implemented equally everywhere.351 Rather, each local context entails the tinkering, combination, and filtering of national policy through local political dynamics, together shaping how rationalities become expressed locally. Therefore, the ability to define and establish a hierarchical ordering between competing values and goals in a given policy arena is crucial to the workings of power in policy and planning, as it helps us understand how and why decisions over traffic supply and system configurations are

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made the way they are. At the start of MLT’s role as PTA, it was yet to be seen how the actors involved would handle the hierarchy of goal and rationalities as the situation evolved, but my analysis suggests that the values of spatial and economic equalization dominated the policy landscape and was expressed in the initial expansion of public transport supply in the county.

The policy tools available at the time also supported a spatial expansion of public transport in rural areas. With the help of the increased state subsidies to unprofitable local and regional public transport, the first years saw the introduction of new and improved bus services both between the larger population centers as well as between smaller towns and villages. The period also saw a nascent, but over time important, reconsideration of railway policy at the local level. As we saw, the train system was under pressure to be closed and transferred to road-based services, and while the PTA was reluctant to carry train services the municipalities stood fast and managed to save the railways services in the southeast and the municipal associations of SSK and NSK secured the introduction of a new local train system in Pågatågen.

This chapter has set the scene for regional public transport politics in Malmöhus, that I argue was defined by fragmented power over decision-making and a spatial rationality focused on equalization of transport opportunities. As we shall see, these aspects would be at the center of conflicts over regional public transport supply in the coming years. In the next chapter we shall discuss what rising deficits did to the rationalities, institutional practices, and the spatial and technological configuration of public transport in Malmöhus.

The regional public transport company has a societal task to perform. This task is now up for debate. Many argue that it is imperative that regional transport [company] adjusts its operations to the market. I share this point of view. Of course, regional traffic operations shall be as market adjusted as possible. But we also need to be aware that market adjustments have their limitations. Market adjustments end where we run into the problem of not being able to fulfill the societal goals set for public transport.352

- Sten Norin, chairman of MLT AB in May 1990.

In the previous chapter the regional public transport authority and the ways in which decision-making and planning was initially organized were analyzed. In this chapter I will present how, after the first tentative years, rapidly growing deficits spurred increasing tensions between the stakeholders in the regional public transport governance system. New economic discourses and frameworks halted the expansionary character of the public transport systems, causing turmoil in the sector. Attention will be given to how the ways in which power and authority were originally distributed in the system were contested and problematized in light of this development, and the ways in which actors struggled for control over the decision-making structures and planning processes in Malmöhus through the politics of deficit management.

The chapter begins with a presentation of the growing difficulties with handling growing traffic volumes and stagnating ridership levels. This is followed by a discussion of how policies and planning tools were adapted and altered to handle the situation. This in turn led to increased frictions between the owners of the PTA and ushered in a period of contestation over power over planning processes and influence over the transport supply, culminating in a crisis for public transport in the beginning of the 1990’s. The chapter ends with a discussion of the power of deficits translates into conflicts over organizing and real resources.

352 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Årsstämma 1990-05-17.
7.1 Developments of costs and traffic volumes in Malmöhus

While there was an initial uncertainty about the new PTAs role in the public transport ecosystem, during the first few years of operations the situation developed according to plan. Patronage increased rapidly, spurred by expanded subsidies and coordinated fare systems, which meant that rising expenditures could be rather easily justified. When the books for 1981, were closed 4.7 million SEK could be repaid to the owners.\textsuperscript{353} The economic results in 1982 and 1983 also exceeded targets, with 18 million SEK repaid to the owners.\textsuperscript{354} In the budget for 1983, the projections were marked by a “quiet optimism” with an expectation of 10 \% increases in travel volumes during 1983 and another 5 \% during 1984.\textsuperscript{355}

The first years’ optimism soon dissipated, however. In preparation for the traffic year 1984/85 questions concerning growing deficits was raised as a matter of concern both at the level of board and shareholder meetings.\textsuperscript{356} Discussing the budget for 1984, the social democratic group in the company board advocated for a budgeted deficit of 104 million SEK – an increase of 7 \% compared to 1983 – whereas the liberal group argued for an increase of merely 2 \% to 99 million, preferring that the 15 million SEK gap be covered by a 20 \% ticket price increase instead. Controlling a majority of the votes in the company at the time, the social democratic proposal won the votes both at the board and shareholder meetings, but this event signaled that the deficit was becoming a political issue.\textsuperscript{357} Initially, this conflict was drawn along the traditional left-right political axis, but as time progressed the divide would become more accentuated between urban/regional and rural perspectives.

Initially, the deficit was about level with incomes, and the expanding state subsidies kept the deficit below 50 \% of the traffic company’s turnover. The new public transport legislation that was passed in 1985 emphasized rationalization and efficiency (see chapter 5), and when state subsidies peaked in 1985, the expansionary momentum for regional public transport that started during the 1970’s was over. Traffic volumes had risen sharply during the first half of the 1980’s, from 12.9 million vehicle kilometers in

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\textsuperscript{353} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Bolagsstämma 1982-05-17.
\textsuperscript{354} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Årsberättelse 1982; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Årsberättelse 1983.
\textsuperscript{355} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1982-12-09, §98.
\textsuperscript{356} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1984-01-10, §8; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Bolagsstämma 1984-01-31, §10.
\textsuperscript{357} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1984-01-10, §8; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Bolagsstämma 1984-01-31, §10.
1980 to 17.2 million vehicle kilometers in the year 1985/86, a total increase of 33%, on average more than a million vehicle kilometers per year.\textsuperscript{358} Travel surveys indicated that trip numbers had also increased, but not as quickly as traffic supply. After the initial increase between 1979 and 1982 the increase of passengers had been negligible: between 1981/82 and 1985/86 traffic supply had increased by 20%, whereas passenger increases between 82/82 and 85/86 stayed at 1.6%. From 1986 costs and deficits were picking up fast in Malmöhus (see Figures 7.1 and 7.2).

MLT explained this development with an “increased competition from an ever-cheaper car traffic and a saturation for public transport demand after previous fare reductions and expansions of traffic” and a redistribution of passengers to Pågatåg services in the travel relations between the major cities and towns in southwestern and northwestern Skåne.\textsuperscript{359} An important momentum for public transport based on steep increases in gasoline costs after the oil crises had all but disappeared after fuel prices peaked in 1982 (see Figure 7.3). The popularity of the local train services, Pågatågen, was also shifting passengers from bus traffic to trains, further reducing the incomes from regional bus traffic. While beneficial for public transport patronage overall, the overflow of journeys from buses to trains clearly affected the balance sheets of MLT as they could not necessarily reduce bus supply in those relations to match the shifts in modal choice among commuters.

Expanded responsibility for traffic further added to the deficit: By 1984 all PTAs in Sweden had to decide whether weak railway lines should be transferred to bus services or bear the economic costs of keeping rail traffic, and from the traffic year 1985/86 MLT took over the economic responsibility for regional train traffic on the national railway between Malmö and Ystad, signing a contract with SJ to double the departures on the railway.\textsuperscript{360} From 1984 high school students’ commuting was also added to the PTA’s responsibilities, which were to be covered by state subsidies distributed by the Central study council (CSN).\textsuperscript{361} In 1986, it was concluded by the secretariat at MLT that the state subsidies didn’t cover the added costs of administration and distribution of school travel cards and cash reimbursements in the budget.\textsuperscript{362}

\textsuperscript{358} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1985/86}, 1985, 16.

\textsuperscript{359} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1987/88}, bilaga A.


\textsuperscript{361} SFS, \textit{Förordning (1983:599) Om statsbidrag till vissa elevresor}.

\textsuperscript{362} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1985/86} section A.4.9.
Figure 7.1 Cost development in Malmöhus Trafik AB 1982-1991. Nominal price changes. Source: annual reports from Malmöhus läns trafik AB, 1982-1991

Figure 7.2 Cost development in Malmöhus Trafik AB 1982 – 1991. Adjusted for inflation. Source: annual reports from Malmöhus Trafik AB 1982-1991
7.1.1 Policies and planning instruments to control the deficit

As we saw in the previous chapter, initially the expansive character and growing public engagement in regional public transport had been welcomed and encouraged, but by the mid-1980’s this was being reframed as a problem. As deficits started picking up and state subsidies were wound down, the company had to find new ways to balance the budget, either by increasing the financial support from the stakeholders, or by achieving better control over traffic production. So how did the PTA deal with the increasing costs, and what were the consequences for the public transport systems, both in its governance and its spatial configuration? As I will show, this prompted two parallel processes: a spatial reconfiguration of public transport from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ traffic based on the implementation of specific policy and planning instruments, and a reorganization of public transport governance.

Beginning in 1984, rationalizing traffic to achieving a more cost-effective transport apparatus started to take precedence in the regional policy and planning discourse. As the deficit was being formulated as the central policy problem in regional public transport, measures had to be implemented to counter it. This was achieved by employing a range of policies and planning instruments. The most important policies were: controlling the growth of traffic volumes, which meant imposing policies for zero-growth; developing profitable traffic and reducing unprofitable services; and aiming for...
absolute reductions in traffic volumes. This resulted in a planning oriented toward a spatial redistribution of traffic from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ traffic, as well as stricter implementations of the minimum ridership criterion. I will describe these in more detail below.

**Halting the growth in traffic volumes**

A centerpiece in the policy shift to control the deficit was halting the increases in traffic production volumes. In a memo regarding work with the upcoming transport supply plan for 1985/86, the planners stated that “a standard increase that continuously weakens the economy is ongoing and must be stopped”.363 Hans Rode, the social democratic chairman of the company board, set the tone for the new policy in the opening statement to the annual shareholder meeting in 1984 by announcing that,

> The company’s cost development shall be curbed through that planning for 1985/86 year’s traffic provision plan is geared toward a zero-growth as expressed in vehicle kilometers. Existing traffic shall be put under review and possibilities to achieve a more rational traffic evaluated.364

At the company board meeting on September 13, 1984, it was decided that the regional traffic plans were to be constructed so that traffic production would remain at the same levels as in 1984/85 and that a “reprioritization occurs from services with weak traffic to traffic duties that are more urgent and meets the demands of more passengers.”365 In doing so, the traffic committees should “investigate, sanitize and rationalize weak services and departures according to traveler statistics acquired from the regional traffic company”.366 In the traffic plan for 1985/86 the zero-growth plan meant that “wishes for improved or expanded traffic would in municipalities and [sub]regions be weighed against rationalizations and sanitizations within existing traffic”.367

**Increasing cost coverage**

Tightly coupled to the zero-growth policy for traffic volumes was a focus on improving the average cost-coverage of traffic. In 1984, Hans Rode explained that the aim was that ticket sales should be balanced so that they accounted for 50 % of the costs.368 Hence, the company needed to improve its incomes, and in the transport provision

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363 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB bilaga A2, 12.
365 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styreheprotokoll 1984-09-13, §69.
366 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB.
368 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Ordinarie Årsstämma 1984-05-30, §1.
plan for 1985/86 it was proposed that all new traffic should contain net cost calculations that “should show an above average cost coverage”. The importance put on cost coverage was also reflected in the annual reports, which from 1984 emphasize cost coverage of the different traffic modes under the PTA. The focus on cost coverage meant developing profitable services and reducing unprofitable ones.

One way of rationalizing traffic was to develop it where it was deemed most profitable. At a shareholder meeting in 1985, the chairman of the board, Hans Rode, reiterated the overarching planning principles and stated that “the board has considered in what ways traffic resources can better be utilized where there is a passenger base”. In 1987 a new express bus network was planned with the purpose to “reach new passenger groups on routes where the greatest potential passenger base can be found”, as well as an “oversight and redistribution” between weak traffic and traffic work that is more pressing and that accommodates the travel needs for more passengers, with the intent of increasing trips and incomes from traffic.” The following year it was stated that “the company’s goal is to increase public transport’s attractiveness and competitiveness with car traffic. … This will be done by striving for fast services and connections without interchange.” In the TSP for 1990/91, investments in what was termed “developable traffic” comprised several types of efforts including a concentration of traffic supply in ‘strong relations’; systematized timetables with fixed departures; establishment of new express services; measures to make existing services faster; improved possibilities for interchanges.

At the other end of the spectrum was the cutting back on services with low occupancy. As the deficit picked up, the minimum ridership criterion established in 1983 gained currency, as it was an objective (albeit subjectively decided) baseline that cutbacks could be justified against. In the transport supply plan for 1984/85 it was added to the goals of the organization to “apply criteria for a passenger minimum on weak routes and services for the traffic to remain as regional traffic”. Traffic surveys made between 1982 and 1984 showed a large increase on many services but also that many services had a small passenger base, meaning that many services and/or departures fell under the minimum criteria of three persons on average. When MLT took over

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370 See annual reports from 1984 and onward.
372 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1987/88, bilaga 1, 3.
375 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1984/85, 6.
responsibility for complementary services in 1987, the criterium for minimum ridership was raised from 3 to 5 passengers per return trip by the board.\textsuperscript{377} This meant that services and departures that fell below this level would be taken off the scheduled service network and instead be offered as demand-responsive traffic, offering six departures per week. In the TSP for 1988/89 an appendix outlining how minimum requirements for regional services and complementary traffic should be defined, measured, and handled was presented. This included the creation of detailed statistics, counting weak departures during at least three different days so that the average number of riders for each single departure could be established.\textsuperscript{378} For services with between five and ten passengers on average, reviews were to be made “if more efficient and cheaper traffic supply and routes can be achieved that accommodates existing passengers travel opportunities and specific time relations are not worsened.”\textsuperscript{379} This directive shows the way in which the redistribution of resources from weak services was to be carried out through the employment of new planning instruments, outlining the spatial and demographic prioritization of commuting between larger conurbations over rural trips, as well as how what had first been a three-person minimum criterion was bent upward to five persons, and even further, in the process to adjust traffic planning to the financial situation.

7.2 Contesting the decision-making frameworks

As described in the last chapter, the governance structure was constructed such that MLT initially didn’t have much control over the planning process or decision-making. Municipal influence over the planning process was strong and the strive to rationalize traffic was not shared equally by the municipalities. It is important to keep in mind here that the municipalities had a paradoxical relation to MLT: on the one hand, they were shareholders in the public transport company, and were thus eager to keep deficits low, so as to not have to spend more than necessary of the municipal budget on public transport. On the other hand, they were becoming adversaries to the PTA, since it was

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{377} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1988/89}, 13; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Styrelseprotokoll 1987-06-18}, § 95.
\item \textsuperscript{378} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1988/89} bilaga 1. B7.36. Each return trip should have at least five passengers on average to remain as a scheduled service (not including students commuting to and from school). The measures also included changing or shortening routes where “a part of the service or departure (for example between two towns) do not reach the aforementioned targets, if substantive savings can be made in terms of bus driver time and/or vehicle usage.”
\item \textsuperscript{379} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB bilaga 1. B7.36.
\end{itemize}
the municipalities, and in the end the citizens and the constituents, who were at the receiving end of the austerity measures imposed on the public transport system.

From around 1984 the central policy problem of the continuous growth in traffic volumes became discursively linked to the distributed planning process which, together with a cost allocation model where municipalities did not bear the full burden of the costs of traffic, left the PTA with little control over traffic volumes. Municipal influence over planning and traffic supply was beginning to be constructed as a problem for the development of regional public transport by the County Council and MLT. Three examples serve to illustrate the varying ways in which municipalities resisted rationalization policies initiated by the PTA.

First, despite working under directives to decrease traffic production, Svalövs municipality exceeded the allotted traffic production during the winter of 1984/85 by 65 000 vehicle kilometers (amounting to over 5% of the growth in traffic volumes in the region for the business year of 1984/85 while making up only 1.6% of the population in Malmöhus Län in 1985). The planners at MLT noted that “the development was not controllable by MLT’s secretariat and board, as NSK and Svalövs kommun worked with the timetable details independently between November 1984 to April 1985, while simultaneously reporting that the frames of the regional plan were [followed].”

Second, there were difficulties in coordinating timetables and services in what the PTA saw as rational. Regarding the traffic network between Lund, Svalöv and Eslöv, MLT noted that an oversight of traffic was not possible to carry out, much due to Lund municipality’s “one-sided and longstanding interest in expanding their local traffic at the expense of regional traffic and train services.” The interest from Lunds municipality was to supply the suburb of Stångby with local bus traffic, despite having a train connection between Lund Central and Stångby, which – according to MLT – created a “badly coordinated and too voluminous traffic.” (Interestingly, the exact same issue has been a point of contestation in the relation between Lund municipality and Skånetrafiken over the last years.)

Third, there were difficulties in implementing the goal to improve the coordination of traffic issues in municipal planning. Stating that there was a ‘worrying tendency’ that some municipalities didn’t discourage traffic obstacles, MLT stated that it would have

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to aim to “take measures to increase driving speeds on the service”. Several of the measures mentioned can be interpreted as a prioritization by the municipalities to create safer traffic environments for pedestrians and cyclists through lower speeds, whereas MLT favored higher speeds (which translated to both cheaper and more attractive traffic). This shows that the interest of the regional PTA was not necessarily what was desired by local politicians, planners, or citizens.

On another, deeper, level there were issues with institutional set-up and the governance over regional public transport. Two aspects stand out here: the authority over the local train service Pågatågen, and the workings of the deficit distribution model. Both these severely impacted the ability for MLT to control the development of the regional public transport system and below I describe them briefly.

**Local train services.** When MLT was established, an intention was inscribed in the consortium agreement for the company to take over authority for local train traffic ‘as soon as practically possible.’ To prepare for this, a working group consisting of representatives from the PTA, the County Council and NSK and SSK was set up in 1983. In December 1984 the group published a report that recommended a transfer of authority over Pågatågen to MLT from January 1, 1986. The municipalities in SSK and NSK were reluctant to let go of control, however, voicing concerns both for the risk associated with removed municipal control over public transport and, echoing the critique delivered by the communist party in the County Council debate, the lack of democratic transparency by leaving traffic in the hands of a company. On the contrary, SSK saw the current organization of authority over local trains as an ‘efficient use of resources’. And while they noted that “even if a joint authority seems natural in due time, we cannot find that the report would motivate this”. In a memo motivating that SSK should reject the proposal to hand local train governance over to MLT, the traffic planners at SSK also noted that the collaboration between SSK and NSK was smoother than the between SSK and the PTA, and remarked that “we find that MLT intentionally seeks to create coordination problems, to thereby accentuate the drawback with different authorities.” Practically all municipalities and municipal bodies rejected the proposal, citing some variation of ‘lacking organizational and economic

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383 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *Trafikförsörjningsplan 1984/85*, 31. Traffic obstacles mentioned in the text included lower traffic speeds, road bumps, obligations to stop for cyclists, or that municipalities demanded services to be planned through cul-de-sacs (a street closed at one end).

384 Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, *Konsortialavtal* §2.

385 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *Sammanfattning lokaltågsutredning 1984-12-03*.


387 Sydvästra Skånes Samarbetskommitté.

conditions’ for the transfer of Pågatågen to MLT. This reflects radically different perspectives on the authority over public transport that were motivated by the power balance of a reorganized institutional set-up, where municipalities would risk losing influence over regional public transport policy and planning. Authority over public transport, and especially the train system was thus a conflict between incumbent and new actors on the public transport governance arena. As a result of this, the suggestion to transfer authority for Pågatågen to MLT fell through and SSK and NSK kept control over Pågatågen for a few years more.

Deficit distribution. According to the company’s bylaws in the traffic agreement, the County Council and Malmö municipality would together cover 50% of the deficit in regional public transport and each municipality (including Malmö) would cover the other half. This model required a detailed knowledge of the distribution of deficits between each municipality, which was a difficult task in and of itself. Moreover, since the actual deficit was distributed between the shareholders, no municipality paid the full cost of running traffic (except under specific contractual circumstances, such as the train traffic between Malmö-Ystad and Ystad-Simrishamn, and the boat traffic between Landskrona and the island of Ven). This meant that the reverse relation was also a fact: individual municipalities stood to gain little economically from supporting reductions or reorganizations in traffic, since only half of the savings accrued to the municipality. Besides, as costs and deficits ramped up due to high inflation, the PTA could cut traffic and municipalities still found themselves paying more to cover the deficit than they did the previous year. Hence the incentives for a small municipality to decrease already low traffic volumes were small, especially if politicians saw that reductions in traffic supply came at a high political cost to their constituents. Thus, the economic gains of traffic reductions and rationalizations in the countryside accrued mainly to the County Council and Malmö kommun, whereas the political costs were paid by politicians in the smaller municipalities.

389 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Sammanställningar remissvar på lokaltågsutredning. PM 1985-10-29.
390 To give an example: a given service had a route that stretches over three municipalities, running a yearly deficit of 100,000 SEK. The County Council and Malmö municipality covered 50,000, with the remaining 50,000 covered by the three municipalities in question. This means that a model had to be created to decide how much of the deficit was to be allocated to each municipality. Initially deficits were calculated only by the amount of vehicle kilometers that were produced within each municipality.
391 For local public transport the County Council and Malmö municipality covered 20% with the remaining 80% covered by the municipality in question. MLT had rescinded authority over local public transport but still paid 20% of the deficit, a deficit that was growing fast during the end of the 1980’s. In the annual report for 1987 the oversized deficit was related to the subsidies to local traffic, to which the company stated that “The size of this subsidy cannot, under current agreements, be affected by the company.” Deficits in local traffic were growing but were effectively uncontrollable by the PTA since they had rescinded decision making in planning to local authorities. This created a
Already by 1984 planners at MLT argued that it had become apparent that traffic production counted in vehicle kilometers was a “very bad way to calculate the benefits and divide the costs of traffic within the county between municipalities. Unreasonable examples of cost distribution […] can be found in all [sub]regions and municipalities.”392 As the deficit grew and traffic supply was reorganized, over the course of the 1980’s the critique against the deficit distribution model grew, and some municipalities in SSK eventually chose to abandon the existing agreement.393

The problem of deficit distribution was not isolated to Malmöhus county, and an nationwide investigation of different models to distribute costs among PTA stakeholders was conducted by the state organization Kollektivtrafikberedningen (KTB), with the counties of Malmöhus and Jämtland as case studies.394 To come to terms with the situation in Malmöhus, a study was conducted with the aim to propose a new deficit distribution model.395 The study concluded that such a model would have to provide a connection between decisions over traffic and the economic responsibilities that came with such decisions; provide incentives for municipalities to plan so that public transport is favored; distribute the economic responsibility between municipalities; contribute to the interconnectivity of different parts of the county; give flexibility for changes in traffic; be easy to understand; be easy to manage; require a small data base; and – importantly – be acceptable by enough of the county’s municipalities.396 The report suggested a revised model for deficit distribution based on a combination of models developed by KTB, the existing model of vehicle kilometer production and the model that SSK used, which was based on a number of parameters, including the number of passengers boarding and the length of their journeys in each municipality, departure frequency in the larger cities, and vehicle kilometer production. Despite stated intentions at several shareholder meetings to agree on a new model for deficit distribution, no decision was ever reached, a fact that signifies the difficulties in agreeing among the stakeholders of the PTA.397

The examples discussed above show how the municipalities did not necessarily adhere to the PTA’s idea of what constituted a rational traffic planning, both by

tension, primarily between Malmöhus Läns Landsting and Malmö municipality, who was by far the largest operator of local traffic in the region; local public transport answered for 25 % the total deficit for MLT in 1987. See Årsberättelse 1987.

392 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1984/85, 34.
397 See e.g., Årsstämmor 1989-02-02; 1989-05-30
exceeding stated reduction targets and by refusing to subordinate local traffic needs to regional system priorities, both in terms of service planning and traffic safety measures, and that where MLT saw gains in coordination and planning efficiency from a regionalization of authority over Pågatågen, the municipal associations saw losses of the very same qualities. (of course, all arguments shall also be understood as rhetorical devices employed by each organization to promote that they should control resources and planning). This shows how different rationalities for public transport (and the transport system at large) prompted different responses to the organization and planning of public transport. Especially difficult was that the formal authority for public transport still had relatively little actual control over public transport. Taken together, this made for an increasingly volatile governance situation that would not hold for an infinite amount of time.

7.2.1 Initiating a regionalization of public transport governance

This resistance from municipalities to adhere to the demands from the PTA highlighted the existing power balance in the governance network for regional public transport in Malmöhus Län. In an internal analysis from 1984, the County Council’s newly hired representative in the public transport planning process Gunnar Davidsson concluded that the actual traffic planning in the county had “come to be conducted in the traffic committees … and primarily in SSK and NSK.”398 While the County Council’s role in ensuring a regional balance through providing an equalization of costs for traffic within the region had been fulfilled through the deficit distribution model, its second function as stated in the PTA reform – providing a regional perspective on transport planning – had however not been fulfilled yet since,

the combination of planning capacity and political decision-making power in the traffic committees have made the committees’ role in regional traffic planning large in relation to the role that MLT centrally plays. The conditions for introducing a regional perspective in traffic planning have thereby been bad. The transport provision plan that is adopted each year can be seen as the sum of four different regional plans over which MLT - their administration, board, and shareholders - has a relatively limited actual influence.399

398 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, Landstingen och kollektivtrafiken. PM 1984-06-08. Personal archive.
399 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 9. In an interview, Gunnar Davidsson recalled that “when i came into the picture in 1984 i could establish that this wasn’t good and there was this absence of oversight and perspective, absence of debate, absence of anchoring in the County Council. (Interview with Gunnar Davidsson, 2020-08-17)
A central issue in this relation was, according to Davidsson, that the County Council itself had so far been relatively disinterested in questions of regional public transport. As he explained, “for the County Council, the conditions for gaining impact for such overarching perspectives has been further debilitated by the fact that the County Council itself has done very little to formulate a policy for its actions in MLT and to develop an independent position in various traffic transport political issues.”

Davidsson concluded that the County Council needed to develop a strategic position in relation to its role in the PTA, its influence over the planning process, and on traffic political issues in general. Thus far the County Council had, in relation to, engaged in regional public transport governance without having a clear idea about why or how they were engaging with it. In another memo discussing the authority over Pågatågen, Davidsson stated that:

> the current planning and decision-making process in MLT needs to be tightened so that the company’s administration, board, and shareholder meeting gains full control over and insight into the planning process [since] a fundamental reason for the problems with MLT’s functionality must be the splintered authority in the company. A more unified authority - which can be achieved through that one of the current owners increase their shares in the company could in the long run improve MLTs functionality.

The ultimate goal for the County Council should, according to Davidsson, be to “gain and influence over planning and decision-making processes that answer to their shares.” However, he continued “[t]he question is controversial for some of the municipalities in the county.”

This was not lost on MLT either, whose employees also saw that they didn’t have the power to control the municipalities’ interests in their local traffic needs. This ‘splintered planning process’, which for MLT included entertaining relations with four independent traffic committees and twenty municipalities, was becoming untenable for MLT: in 1985 it was stated that,

> the present planning model, strongly based on municipal plans and local desires in combination with the current cost allocation model for municipalities, which does not take into consideration the particular service’s economy, would automatically induce a

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401 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, Letter from Gunnar Davidsson to Bo Malmsten, 1984-11-06. Personal archive.
402 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, centralförvaltningen, internal memo, 1984-12-18, 4. Personal archive.
403 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, 5.
continued growth in volume without the number of passengers increasing in at least the same pace.\textsuperscript{404}

With the support of a County Council slowly claiming greater influence over the PTA, not least through the help of Gunnar Davidsson and his colleagues at the County Council’s secretariat, MLT started down a path of transformation. In January 1986, a working group was commissioned by the company board to investigate and suggest an improved organizing of traffic planning between MLT and the municipal traffic committees.\textsuperscript{405} The central question was the status of the traffic committees in the planning process. Paragraph 8 in the traffic agreement stated that the transport supply plan was to be developed “based on the municipalities’ local traffic plans and with consideration of the viewpoints and wishes that in other ways are held by the parties during the planning process”, indicating that the regional traffic plan was first and foremost a compilation of local traffic plans.\textsuperscript{406} On the other hand, the same clause also stated that “the traffic committees shall prepare the establishment of the transport provision plan, and in other ways aid the company with the tasks it imposes on them”, claiming that the traffic committees were subordinate to the central planning organization.\textsuperscript{407} The hierarchy of the different bodies involved in traffic planning was thus unclear in the bylaws, and hitherto the subregional traffic committees had largely controlled the actual planning process.

Based on the working group’s recommendations, the board proposed a change of the model for traffic planning in the county were a working group for each subregion consisting of planners from the traffic company and the subregional traffic planners and that MLT would compensate the subregions for the work they conducted on behalf of the PTA.\textsuperscript{408} This organizational reshuffling aimed to,

enhance the secretariat’s and the board’s possibilities to affect planning and thereby the company’s economy while avoiding double work and deviations between different planning suggestions […] the [traffic committees’] regional planners will henceforth be considered as a part of MLT’s planning resources, with a detailed work order.\textsuperscript{409}

\textsuperscript{404} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1985/86}, 14.
\textsuperscript{405} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Styrelseprotokoll 1986-01-14}.
\textsuperscript{406} Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län, \textit{Trafikavtal}.
\textsuperscript{407} Länstrafikutredningen i Malmöhus Län.
\textsuperscript{409} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1987/88}, 2.
In 1987, an expanded proposal was made to hire more planners at MLT and for the company to, in a second step, take over the entire planning responsibility along with authority over the Pågatåg system.\textsuperscript{410} The board agreed to the first step and took a decision in principle for the second step but wanted to await the right conditions for such a shift.\textsuperscript{411} At the shareholder meeting in March, 1987, a new phrasing stated that the approval of the TSP at the annual meeting established “vehicle kilometer production for each service and municipality […] which may not be superseded without special review by the board”\textsuperscript{412}. Control and authority over public transport planning was thus gradually wrested from the municipal level to the PTA and the traffic committees’ roles were turned from being upward linkages from the municipalities to MLT’s central organization to becoming downward link to the municipalities controlled by MLT.

In a further move to increase control over public transport, in 1987 the County Council requested a renegotiation of the consortium agreement, and the following year the parties agreed that a review of the organization of public transport governance in Malmöhus was to be conducted.\textsuperscript{413} The results of the review, published in September 1989, suggested that Malmöhus Läns Landsting and Malmö municipality would take sole economic and political responsibility for public transport governance, by creating a municipal association owned by the two parties.\textsuperscript{414} While such a reorganization seemed more and more inevitable (not least due to changes in national legislation), it didn’t amount to a decision at the company board, and the organizational question was not to be settled until the government stepped into the picture (to which we will turn in chapter eight).

\textsuperscript{410} Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Förslag till Trafikplaneringorganisationen PM 1987-11-11}.


\textsuperscript{413} Malmöhus läns Landsting, internal memo from Göran Forsblad to the central council 1987-09-03. An internal memo from the County Council shows that the civil servants at the county council suggested using an outstanding debt from Malmö municipality to the County Council should be used as leverage for Malmö municipality to agree to the renegotiation. Internal memo written by Gunnar Davidsson at Malmöhus läns Landsting 1987-01-20. Personal archives.

\textsuperscript{414} \textit{Kollektivtrafikens organisation i Malmöhus län: rapport från trafikhuvudmannareformen}, 1989-09-28. Personal archive. The aim of the reorganization presented in the report was fourfold: first, by concentrating authority in fewer hands, the political problem of deficit distribution would be solved, in that the County Council and Malmö municipality would divide the costs for a minimum standard of traffic supply. Municipalities would be able to pay extra to receive higher traffic supply. Second, public transport would become a more clearly political question, in that questions of public transport supply would be handled in political assemblies rather than traffic committees with little transparency. Third, the political and economic responsibility for public transport was gathered in one place. Fourth, a reorganization would better ‘reflect the role of traffic in the county’, where both a birds-eye view and a local perspective in traffic planning could be accommodated.
The move toward new forms of regional public transport governance was also influenced by changes in national policy through which increased responsibility for regional public transport was gradually put on the PTAs. For example, following the changes in public transport legislation in 1985, from 1987 the regional PTAs also became responsible for both airport services and complementary services. Complementary public transport was the minimum standard of public transport offered when patronage was deemed too low for scheduled services.\footnote{Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *PM N6. 19 1986-12-07*.; Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *Styrelseprotokoll 1986-12-16*. Bengt Svensson representing Malmöhus County Council argued for a standard offering 12 weekly trips, but the board followed the proposal by the CEO.} Aiming to improve the coordination and integration of regional public transport systems, the traffic political decision of 1988 also assigned authority over all local and regional rail traffic outside the national trunk railway network to the regional PTAs.\footnote{Sveriges regering, *"Regeringens Prop. 1987/88:50 Om trafikpolitiken inför 1990-talet."*} This decision meant that MLT became responsible for railway services between Malmö and Ystad from 1990 and also forced the long-awaited incorporation of Pågatågen into the PTA from 1989. Thus, despite the intentions for MLT to take over train services ‘as soon as practically possible’, it was not until the Swedish parliament changed the legislation that the Pågatåg services were transferred to the regional level.

Through a process of problem formulations based to the need for more rational and effective coordination of resources MLT, with the support of the County Council, started transforming the decision-making frameworks regarding public transport planning by turning the traffic committees into subjects to a regional planning regime that was slowly starting to take shape.

### 7.2.2 The conflict over traffic supply intensifies

While the deficit became increasingly important as a policy issue and MLT’s planner got a bigger mandate to address it, the situation wasn’t improving. In 1986, MLT’s chief traffic planner, Bertil Sturesson, concluded that “since the inauguration of the company the frame for planned traffic according to the transport supply plan has not been maintained a single year.”\footnote{Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *Styrelseprotokoll 1987-11-19 §104.*} Aiming for a zero-growth in traffic volumes and redistributing within these frames were thus not enough and to counter the situation, by 1988 the aim was no longer to keep traffic volumes stable, but to reduce them. In the preparations for the traffic plan for 1988/89, the target was to decrease traffic volumes by 2 %, or 350 000 vehicle kilometers.\footnote{Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *Trafikförörjningsplan 1988/89*, 1.} This meant that the subregional
traffic committees were charged with removing all departures with less than five passengers, and if that did not amount to a 2 % reduction further cuts had to be made.

These requirements were met with varying responses in the traffic committees. SSK complied and suggested cutbacks and rationalizations on fifteen services (while investments were made on eleven services. And MSK, while “knowing that the reductions will be substantial within the region”, fully accepted the five-person criterion and substantial reductions and rationalizations were imposed on 11 services.419 In NSK, on the other hand, a 2 % reduction target would, according to the traffic committee, require reducing traffic supply on services and departures with high occupancy. This was deemed ‘unacceptable’ by the committee; therefore, they presented no proposals for reductions in high occupancy services.420 SÖSK, meanwhile, were in the opposite position to NSK: despite cutting more than the required 2 %, several services remained that had less than five persons per departure. In separate communication they expressed “a worry that the ambition to equalize traffic standards, that is inscribed in the bylaws’ first paragraph, is about to be abandoned by MLT.” Furthermore they stated that “The adopted directives leads to MLTs resources being concentrated to business economically oriented investments in the county’s western parts at the expense of the county’s weaker inner and southeastern parts where the traffic that has been built up over the last year’s risks being drained.”421 As a result, they did not accept the implementation of the five-person requirements on the relatively substantial traffic in the region with taxis running ordinary services (this was not complementary services).

The final suggestions in the TSP of 1988/89 comprised investments of 279,000 vehicle kilometers and reductions of 828,700 (see Table 7.1). The investments were concentrated to the western subregions, both in number of services receiving investments and the amount of vehicle kilometers, whereas reductions were distributed over the whole county. The defiance from NSK and SÖSK to follow the 2 % reduction target were reflected in the reduction package: reductions in NSK were almost half of those in SSK and MSK, and SÖSK reduced only half of that.

419 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1988/89, 1. MSK’s reductions were somewhat compensated by improved regional connectivity through the local trains and a successful express bus service between Lund and Hörby.


421 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Del A, bilaga 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Reductions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Services (no)</td>
<td>Vehicle kms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSK</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>+ 82 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSK</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>+ 124 600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SÖSK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>+ 57 500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSK</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>+ 14 800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>+ 279 000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Despite these measures the deficit kept growing and the pressure from the owners to rationalize and reduce traffic volumes continued. Toward the end of the 1980’s, the situation was dire. In a comment to the budget for 1989, it was stated that costs kept rising at the same time as incomes from traffic were stagnating, even decreasing. The main competition for public transport obviously came from the car. And as gas prices kept dropping (adjusted for inflation gas prices in 1988 were as low as in 1970), which meant that further reductions in traffic supply would only reduce public transport’s competitiveness further. In the budget from 1989, it was bluntly stated that “Public transport is in a downward spiral.”422

Wanting to avoid reductions that would only dig a deeper hole for public transport, Nils Wahlberg therefore argued in an opening comment to the discussions about the traffic supply plan for 1989/90 at the extra annual meeting that public transport needed to become more attractive.423 Acting against the policy to reduce traffic volumes the transport provision plan 1989/90 was therefore expansive in terms of both traffic volumes and other system investments (largely incurred by the takeover of Pågatågen from 1989, which increased the turnover in the company by 40 %). Investments included, among other things, expanded bus and railway services where market conditions were most favorable and investments in new ticketing machines, which would allow a better data collection about ridership and ease a better market adjustment of prices.424 The ridership drops in regional bus traffic had stabilized, but local traffic that was bleeding heavily: in 1989 the average patronage decline in local public transport was -9 %, with Lund and Malmö standing at -11 % and -12 % respectively.425 Traffic volumes continued to be expanded in the next year as well, with

422 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Extra årstämma 1989-02-02, bilaga 1 “budget 1989 - kommentarer.”
423 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB §7.
424 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1989/90.
continued investments in express services and improved frequencies in regional buses (+ 500,000 vkm) and in local trains (+ 80,000 vkm) while pursuing a continued implementation of the five-person minimum criterium.426

Figure 7.4 shows the development in traffic volumes from 84/85 to 88/89. Here it is clear that the ambitions to reduce traffic volumes were hard to realize, but also that the areas where traffic reductions were actually carried out were the central and southeastern subregions, indicating the ongoing process of spatial redistribution that was taking place from the central and eastern parts of the county toward the west coast. As the numbers show, it was only in MSK and SÖSK that the traffic volumes had decreased between 1984 to 1989. This was an effect of that the reductions made in SSK and NSK – who also conducted dutiful oversight of their weak traffic – were compensated by investments that improved the overall quality of the transport system in those subregions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Region SV–Skåne</th>
<th>Region NV–Skåne</th>
<th>Region Mellanskåne</th>
<th>Region SÖ–Skåne</th>
<th>Malmöhus län</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984/85</td>
<td>9 216</td>
<td>4 322</td>
<td>1 804</td>
<td>1 747</td>
<td>17 089</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985/86</td>
<td>9 195</td>
<td>4 309</td>
<td>1 742</td>
<td>1 623</td>
<td>16 870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986/87</td>
<td>9 447</td>
<td>4 384</td>
<td>1 677</td>
<td>1 697</td>
<td>17 205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987/88*</td>
<td>9 780</td>
<td>4 397</td>
<td>1 640</td>
<td>1 674</td>
<td>17 492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988/89</td>
<td>9 454</td>
<td>4 373</td>
<td>1 417</td>
<td>1 644</td>
<td>16 938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989/90</td>
<td>9 424</td>
<td>4 557</td>
<td>1 422</td>
<td>1 604</td>
<td>17 057</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Tidtabellen 1987/88 omfattade 53 veckor (371 dagar) mot normalt 52 veckor (364 dagar).

Figure 7.4 Changes in traffic volumes between 1984/85 to 1989/90. 1 000’s vehicle kilometers, sorted by subregion as well as the total for the whole county. The spatial redistribution of public transport toward the western part of the county is clear, as it is only the central and southeastern subregions that saw actual reductions in traffic volumes. Source: Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1989/90, 11

Public transport governance at the cross-roads between social and economic goals

With the gradual process of transferring power from the municipalities toward the regional level, resistance could be expected. Related to the social demands and economic demands on public transport, a recurring conflict at the shareholder level of the PTA was whether it was most important to stay loyal to the users of public transport or the owners of it. This boiled down to which steering document was most important: the traffic supply plan or the budget? Different perspectives on how to deal with the deficit reveals radically different ideas and values. If the shareholders were considered as the ultimate authority, then being careful with their finances and keeping a balanced

426 Malmöhus Läns Landning, Extra årsstämma 1990-02-01.
budget became a central aim. If, on the other hand, the ultimate responsibility lay with the public transport users, upholding planned traffic despite running over budget could certainly be justified. (However, since the deficit was in the end paid by the citizens in the form of taxes, one could also justify a strict adherence to the budget as the public was the final source of authority in both cases. In the end it was a matter of whether the costs for public transport should be tied to the transport users or the broader tax collective.) At the shareholder meeting in 1989, Göran Holm from Vellinge municipality asked for a new economic model where the shareholders’ economic contribution to the deficit was to be ‘locked-in’, which would result in an increased creativity at the company to adapt traffic supply and services to the demands of customers. Nils Linde, representing Lomma municipality, agreed argued that MLT ought to be treated as any other company, where necessary measures had to be taken to meet set economic targets. Other municipal and board representatives countered that the company had to adhere to the traffic that had been established in the transport provision plan in order to uphold consistency toward the users of public transport. Championing this perspective, Bertil Jönsson representing Eslöv municipality, stated that “one cannot decrease costs by cancelling departures during a current traffic plan. If we in Malmöhus county want a better traffic standard we must be prepared to pay for this.”

The twin goals of meeting a politically acceptable level of cost-coverage and providing accessibility to everyone were pulling public transport policy and planning in two different directions, resulting in a contradictory public transport policy that was not lost on anyone. Highlighting this tension and explicitly asking the company’s owners to decide how to strike a balance between cost-efficiency and social undertakings, in a comment over the budget before the extra annual meeting in 1989 MLT’s CEO Nils Wahlberg and the chief traffic economist Ingemar Bryman clarified that:

from an economic point of view, one would strive for a development where traffic resources are concentrated to areas and routes in the county that are most populous and where the accessibility by car is more limited. Here lies the largest potential. From a social point of view other aspects must obviously be added. If deficits are not allowed to increase and if an improvement of incomes cannot be achieved, costs must decrease. This can be achieved through that less sustainable traffic is substituted with cheaper traffic options, or is cancelled entirely. It is of utmost importance that the company’s social

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428 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, §7.
429 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, §7. Roland Lundberg, chairman of the board, also supported this position.
responsibility regarding weak traffic is defined and that a connection is made to demands on cost coverage and the size of deficits.430

Given the continuous debate during the late 1980’s concerning rationalization versus traffic standard, and that the budget was continuously overrun, it stood clear that many municipalities were willing to sacrifice budgetary discipline to uphold traffic supply, and at the meeting Nils Wahlberg complained that the company was not getting enough support from municipalities for traffic reductions. On the contrary “after wishes from municipalities, traffic production has [...] a tendency to increase year by year despite stagnant ridership.”431 As we have seen above, this was, at least, partly true: traffic committees were reluctant to decrease traffic, but the central organization at MLT also accepted increased traffic volumes to promote the attractivity of public transport in relation to the car.

Crisis in the Public Transport Authority

During the preparations for the transport provision plan for 1991/92 the pressure that had been building for several year blew the conflict in MLT wide open. At this point, the shareholders hit the economic brakes and the final budget for 1991 required a reduction of expenses by 15 million SEK.432 To go from a constantly increasing budget to cover cost increases and expanding traffic volumes, to a reduced budget by 15 million in an era when inflation was higher than ever before required large efforts from the planners. To make matters worse, in 1990 the government decided to apply a VAT of 25 % on public transport, which would induce a sharp price increase for passengers, with a guaranteed drop in ridership levels to follow (the gradual phasing out of state subsidies to regional public transport was now practically reversed, as the VAT translated to a transfer of funds from the local and regional governments to the state).

To accommodate the budget requirements, Mats Améen at MLT wrote a memo titled Possible cost-saving measures in regional transport, presenting possible strategies to meet the economic demands. The plan was based on a three-step reduction of traffic supply in both rail and bus services which, if fully implement would drastically cut

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431 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, §7.
regional transport supply by (see footnote for details and Figure 7.5 for a visualization of the cutbacks). While the savings packages included larger savings than were required by the board, it showed the size of reductions needed to accommodate a balanced budget in the long-term, including cuts in also in traffic relations with high demand.

As the planner responsible for the designing the reduction in traffic, Mats Améen reflected over the process in an interview and said that:

when ‘the politic’ says that costs must be lowered, as a public servant you can’t say ‘no, I am not going to do that’. But you must show the consequences… So, my idea was to be crystal clear […] with the consequences: I showed maps; what did the service [level] look at the time, [and] what will the new [level] be. No one would be able to come after the fact and say ‘we didn’t understand the consequences’, but ‘the politic’ would get a very clear picture of what the consequences would be.

Reactions to the proposal were harsh. Presented with the suggested austerity package the subregional traffic committees recoiled at the proposed cutbacks. According to meeting protocols during the fall of 1990 there was an overall fierce critique against the cutback proposal (although the representatives in the traffic committee for southwestern Skåne were more sanguine than the three other committees) and it took several rounds of negotiations between MLT and the traffic committees to arrive at a final proposal for a traffic plan for the coming year. Opposing the cutbacks, a recurring comment from the traffic committees was that, while reductions in traffic was perhaps

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433 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1991/92, bilaga 1. Step one included raised ticket fares by 30-35 % which would expectedly reduce demand by about 10 %, thereby freeing bus capacity for about 3.3 MSEK/year as well as reduce the numbers of train sets needed to uphold traffic. Furthermore, weekend traffic would be withdrawn on 12 bus services, and 16 services with feeder and/or service functionality would be cancelled, as well as all complementary services in the southwest and northwest of Skåne. These measures were expected to save 9.3 MSEK/year, of which 6.5 m was saved in regional bus services. Step two included selling two train sets (due to expected drops in travel demand because of raised prices), removing 14 high school bus services mainly between smaller towns (Trelleborg, Ystad, Höör, Eslöv and Landskrona) and their rural hinterland as well as cancellation of weekend traffic on 16 services and off-peak traffic on 5 services, and cancelling all complementary services in central and south eastern Skåne. These measures were expected to save 9.8 m/year. Step three included (but was not limited to) the removal of 40 bus services with a passenger frequency of between 8 to 50 persons per trip, but also halving traffic supply during off-peak hours on high-demand services between the larger cities and towns. Furthermore, all buses running parallel to train services would be cancelled during weekends and the school summer vacations. All remaining bus and train traffic would see halved departure frequency during evenings and weekends. These reductions would save 25.9 m/year. In total the three steps would reduce costs by 45 million yearly, of which 30 million was to be saved in regional bus traffic, leading to a 25 % reduction in total traffic supply.

434 Interview with Mats Améen, 2020-09-11

435 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1991/92 bilaga 6; interview with Mats Améen, 2020-09-11.
Figure 7.5. Maps showing proposed cutbacks in Malmöhus County. The current service supply (left) and the remaining traffic supply (right) if all cost savings measures were to be implemented. Dotted lines on the right indicates remaining services with reduced frequencies. Note that the left map only indicates geographical network coverage, not differences in frequency levels. Source: Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1991/92, bilaga 1, 10-11.
necessary to reduce costs, travel surveys had to be remade before any decisions were taken. Such arguments are an indication that at this point the traffic committees lacked the force to oppose the policy of traffic reductions as such, and the conflict was therefore transferred from the general policy of traffic reductions to become focused on the employment of specific planning instruments and the validity of the data that they provided, in this case travel surveys, as it was the outcomes of these that decided the fate of the services.

Another attempt to solve the situation was to achieve savings without reductions. The primary proposal in this category was differentiated school schedules at elementary and high schools. Chartered school buses were especially expensive since they were only needed during peak hours, running one trip in the morning and one return trip in the afternoon and stood idle in between. If schools could be persuaded to differentiate their schedules, school buses could be utilized much better at both ends of the school day without decreasing accessibility for anyone. According to calculations differentiated school starting hours would save 2 million SEK yearly across the region.437 This measure was enthusiastically supported by all traffic committees and Per-Olof Ågren, a political representative in MSK’s traffic committee, also suggested that “all politicians should take their responsibilities as employers and offer differentiated working hours in the public sector.”438 However, as was about to be realized, it was practically hard to implement since school boards did not see any savings effects for them and the teachers’ unions also opposed the measure as this would transfer power over scheduling classes from teachers and school boards to the PTA. In the yearly report for 1991 it was noted that "the resistance to change has been shown to be surprisingly large on behalf of the schools, and implementations have not been able to be made in a single school."439 In 1994, the company struck an agreement with Helsingborg municipality for a one-year trial with differentiated school hours, but it was not made permanent. The structural conditions for public transport often lie outside the control of the public transport authorities themselves and realizing cost-saving in public transport by incentivizing measures in juxtaposed sectors was a potential way of avoided cutting traffic supply. The difficulty in realizing such measures highlights how hard it was (and remains) to integrate public transport planning with other policy areas.

436 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB. _Trafikförsörjningsplan 1991/92_, bilaga 6, 6 & 14.

437 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB bilaga 1.

438 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB bilaga 6, 19. In fact, this had been proposed by the social democratic group in the company board already in 1981, but it was voted down by the majority at the time. (Styrelseprotokoll 1981-11-25, §115) This is also reminiscent of policy suggestions that have appeared as a response to the economic impact of the pandemic.

The conflict over reductions spilled over from the traffic committees into the board and the shareholder meetings too. The situation was hardly helped by the fact that shortly before the budget was to be presented to the shareholders, miscalculations were discovered that resulted in a further gap of 22 million SEK to reach a balanced budget. The budget had to be quickly revised, causing further distress in the organization that was already shaken by turmoil.\textsuperscript{440} At the shareholder meeting in March 1991, several of the smaller municipalities opposed reductions on specific services and requested lifting them out of the plan and hold separate negotiations concerning these.\textsuperscript{441} General opposition against austerity was raised as well. For example, Sjöbo’s representative opposed that the municipality, according to the plan, would see reductions in traffic but still pay a higher amount to the PTA to cover the total deficits.\textsuperscript{442} Hörby and Sjöbo municipalities handed in a formal reservation against the decision stating that, based on the reductions in countryside traffic “we question the agreements that bind us by law, whose purpose in our interpretation is to offer a relatively equal basic traffic supply. We are considerably worried for the future. What perspective will public transport authority and the board have on the concept of basic traffic supply?”\textsuperscript{443} Brita Axelsson, representing the center party and Malmöhus Municipal Association at the company board, proposed a countermeasure to the reductions: instead of cutting rural traffic supply, she wanted to push back investments in the more densely frequented parts of the network. Such a proposal represented a more radical counter-discourse than that Axelsson’s proposal a suggestion to finance traffic supply on the countryside by halting maintenance and investments (predominantly made in express service relations) suggested turning the ongoing flow of resources from the countryside to the interurban relations on its head.

Although the reductions in traffic supply were eventually implemented in the timetable change in the summer of 1991, the most radical reductions proposed in the memo produced by the planners at MLT were never fully realized. After several rounds of negotiations at the traffic committee level, and several extra board and shareholder meeting, savings in the final traffic supply program for 1991/92 amounted about 10 million SEK. Out of these, 3.3 million was expected to be saved by reduced demand due to raised ticket prices and 2 million by implementing differentiated school starting times, measures that both would result in a decrease in peak hour traffic production. The remaining 5 million were to be saved by traffic reductions and rationalizations in the regional bus network. 11 services were cancelled, and 13 services had their routes

\textsuperscript{441} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, \textit{Extra årsstämma 1991-03-22} §8.
\textsuperscript{442} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB.
\textsuperscript{443} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, \textit{Extra årsstämma 1991-03-22} reservation.
partially cancelled (see Table 7.2). Several regional bus services had their routes reconstructed, straightened, or shortened, especially in cities, and several rural services had their weekend traffic cancelled. Reflecting on the negotiations and the eventual results Mats Améen said that:

It is better to propose a very radical rationalization and then the municipalities can in the end say that it didn’t end up as bad as it could have become. And then you have given them that, so it is good to put forward a more radical solution than what you believe in to at least get something through. If we had only put forward the smallest solution as the most radical, then it would have ended up even smaller than that and then we wouldn’t have been able to save the economy.

Table 7.2 Final reductions in traffic supply in the traffic supply plan for 1991/92.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cancelled</th>
<th>Partially cancelled*</th>
<th>Reconstructed**</th>
<th>Reductions (vkm)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>SSK</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>- 1,857k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSK</td>
<td>4***</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>- 1,170k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SÖSK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>- 1258k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSK</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>- 702k</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Partially cancelled means that some departures or weekend traffic was cancelled **Reconstructed means reduced frequency or redrawn routes ***Two bus services between Bjuv and Helsingborg were cancelled and replaced a new Pågatåg connection, and one bus service remained with reduced frequency. Source: Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1991/92, 3–5

The crisis at MLT was a turning point for public transport governance in Malmöhus. While it was not the sole (or perhaps even the most important) cause of the reorganization of public transport governance in Malmöhus that was to come, it made it plain that the existing governance structure had reached its final destination. As mentioned above, there had been attempts to renegotiate the consortium agreement and the deficit distribution model, but these attempts had been thus far amounted to nothing. In an interview, Ingemar Bryman reasons that the harsh savings also forced the creation of a more strategic and structurally oriented mindset, that had been difficult to achieve thus far, and Mats Améen also argues that the crisis hastened the process of financing public transport entirely by the County Council and Malmö municipality. Not least, it showed that there was a limit to the willingness of the different stakeholders to finance a growing deficit for public transport. It also shows

445 Interview with Mats Améen, 2019-10-19
446 Interviews with Ingemar Bryman 2020-09-23, and Mats Améen 2020-09-11
that by the turn of the decade the power of the municipalities and the traffic committees to subvert the demands on traffic reductions laid out by the PTA had run out. At the same, the fact that in the end the proposed reductions were never implemented as harshly as had been announced also shows that few were really willing to make the deep cuts in the public transport system needed to meet the deficit targets.

7.3 Summary

This chapter has focused on the politics of deficit management during the latter half of the 1980’s and early 1990’s, which had profound long-term effects on both the institutional and spatial organization of public transport. Discussing the power of the deficit management, it can be useful to briefly reflect upon the objectivity of socially constructed and immaterial entities such as economic phenomena. Budgets and economic deficits are by definition social constructs: they are created and upheld by social structures and don’t exist as physical objects (unless the economy operates entirely through hard currency, but as this is not the case in modern economies, I will leave that aside). Nonetheless, they are real and tend to be treated as robustly as any physical object. There are good grounds for this, as there are very real consequences if an individual or organization runs out of money. The Marxist geographer David Harvey clarifies that social constructs often “operate with the full force of objective facts to which all individuals and institutions necessarily respond. To say that something is socially constructed is not to say that it is personally subjective.”447 Thus, while budget deficits are socially constructed, they attain objectivity through the ways in which actors organize and act in relation to them and treat them as real objects.448 And in the end, the ways in which budgets and deficits define and steer the agency of organizations and individuals have very real effects in how and where resources are made available to people. Hence, deficits (as well as other economic phenomena) attain their objectivity in a dialectical relation between discourses, institutional formations, and physical resources, and this is also why they are such powerful entities to be fought over.

447 Harvey, Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference, 211–12.
448 Of course, the robustness and power of economic discourses and the way that reality is defined through them is a constantly evolving process. This becomes clear not least when one economic paradigm is challenged by another, for example when the Bretton-Woods system was abandoned, or in the challenge of neoclassical economic theory by heterodox economic theories such as Modern Monetary Theory, which argue that states’ fiscal deficits are not as definitive for a well-functioning economy as neoclassical economic theory would have it. See e.g. Stephanie Kelton, The Deficit Myth: Modern Monetary Theory and How to Build a Better Economy (London: John Murray, 2020).
In the increasing focus on deficit management and redistribution a sharpening of the tension between the values of cost-efficiency and equalization can be observed, which had profound implications for the organization of decision-making, the policy tools and planning instruments employed, and the spatial configuration of public transport. The central battle was fought over the deficit, how to relate to it in relation to other organizational goals and how to improve the balance between revenues and expenses. As I have shown in this chapter, the problems associated with the deficit were central to the struggles over governance structure and the decision-making frameworks of public transport in Malmöhus Län, and to the developing practice of redistributing resources from unprofitable services to profitable ones.

The struggle over the deficits led to a gradual shift of the power over traffic planning becoming more concentrated at the level of MLT’s secretariat and organization, for example by making the subregional traffic committees subservient to MLT, instead of the other way around. However, cutbacks and concentrations of traffic were fiercely contested by many municipalities, who could still often effectively oppose and reverse them through the subregional traffic committees.

Through the efforts to limit the deficit new policy tools and planning instruments were also developed. This included the development of a new deficit distribution model that, although not implemented at the time, signaled a shift in the ways that public transport was calculated and understood. Similarly, changes were made in the minimum passenger criterion, with refined ways of analyzing and determining the passenger counts.

In terms of the spatial and technological configuration of the public transport system, the episode saw an uneasy reversal of the first years’ orientation toward spatial expansion and equalization. The fact that the regional PTAs were given more authority over public transport from the government, but also reduced state subsidies for operating traffic, meant that the calculations of what kind of traffic was deemed rational also changed. When the government had subsidized rural and unprofitable public transport it was, as was shown in the previous chapter, logical to run traffic that was unprofitable as the PTAs received subsidies to do so. When the situation changed, it increased the economic pressure on the PTAs to reorient public transport toward more profitable services – fully in line with the national public transport legislation of 1985 that emphasized competition and cost-efficiency over spatial and economic equity (see chapter 5).

The central conclusion of this chapter is that we should interpret the politics of deficit management during this period as the first step on the path toward the establishment of a public transport discourse centered on transit corridors. Importantly however, although there was a growing practice of redistribution toward profitable services
during this time, transit corridors were not formalized due to the existing institutional relations of power in the public transport system in Malmöhus län. However, the chapter also shows that this was first and foremost the outcome of an emergency measure to cut deficits rather the result of a conscious strategic development policy. As Mats Améen expressed it in an interview, during the 1980’s the political intentions were not very strong: “It was more about limiting the deficit than developing public transport.”

449 To me, this is a crucial difference between the public transport discourse of transit corridors and what came before it.

In the comings chapter we shall see how the fiscal pragmatism of the 1980’s was married with a rationality of strategic regional development for public transport, and how this was implemented in practice. First, I will guide us through the policy processes through which the rationalities of transit corridors in Malmöhus County were given shape and stabilized, and were decisive for the future of public transport in the region.

449 Interview with Mats Améen 2020-09-11
8 Stabilizing transit corridors  

The last chapter focused on conflicts over the growing deficit at MLT AB. In this chapter, I will describe three distinct but highly interrelated policy processes that were significant for overcoming the stalemate that the public transport authority found itself in: the development of a strategic development plan for public transport in Malmöhus county, and two rounds of government-led negotiations over transport infrastructure. These took place between 1987 and 1992, at a defining moment in time for public transport in Malmöhus. The processes analyzed in this chapter had long-term significance for public transport and stabilized the focus on transit corridors that had begun developing as an attempt to control the deficit. I begin the chapter by presenting and analyzing the process of developing a regional strategy for public transport, after which I turn to the negotiations over transport infrastructure that took place.

8.1 Developing a regional strategy for public transport  

8.1.1 Framing the problems for public transport

In Malmöhus, the process of creating a long-term, strategic plan for public transport was initiated during the latter half of the 1980’s. As we have seen in previous chapters, planning resources were initially spent mainly on creating coherent timetables and schedules through the transport provision plan. When the deficit became framed as the central policy problem to be managed work, was focused on redistributing resources from ‘weak’ to ‘strong’ parts of the transport network as well as handling the political conflicts arising from this policy shift. And despite the lofty words at the debate in the County Council before the PTA was established in 1980 (see section 6.2.3), regional politicians had thus far showed a lack of engagement in public transport as a regional political issue. Taken together, there was little room for developments of strategic plans
for public transport. To address the situation, civil servants at the County Council had argued for the need to develop a regional perspective on traffic political issues.

When discussions of a reorganized public transport authority were initiated in 1987, the idea of a traffic political forum to discuss political and strategic questions for public transport was floated. From this a process to develop a long-term plan for public transport in Malmöhus Län was initiated. A working group was assembled consisting of representatives from the four sub-regional municipal associations, Malmöhus County Council, the local chapter of the Swedish Road Agency and MLT, and two consultants from VBB (Vattenbyggnadsbyrån, today known as Sweco). The process was set up in three consecutive stages: first an outlook study for public transport in the county was produced; second, a proposal for a long-term plan based on the outlook study; and third, an action program was developed based on the long-term plan.

In the first step, an outlook study called Kollektivtrafik, för vem, varför och hur mycket? (Eng. Public transport, for whom, why and how much?) was produced to be discussed by the shareholders. The main purpose of the report was to establish a common frame for political discussion regarding the political goals for the governance of public transport in Malmöhus, since, as it was stated in the introduction of the study, “what future public transport in the county shall look like in the future, [its] size and standard is by no means a given.” The report was divided into short sections presenting aspects of relevance to the development of public transport, each section ending with problem statements and strategic questions for discussion.

The point of departure for the policy discussion was the rapid decline in public transport patronage: passenger kilometers travelled were increasing in Sweden but public transport’s share of it was decreasing. Based on this, it was rhetorically asked whether this was a “proper development in our dense region, considering the environment; energy; economy; space and congestion in cities? Can we, and do we want to, affect this development?” Just as before, the issues recounted in the question posited the central functions of public transport along similar lines as was presented in policy discussions during the 1970’s.

450 Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1987-10-22. §134. The impulse to develop long-term planning perspectives in public transport was not coming only from regional civil servants, but had been a central part of the push for transport planning since the 1970’s. The need to stimulate “long term planning to continually improve efficiency in the traffic under their authority to limit deficit developments” was also emphasized by national policy through the traffic political decision of 1988. (bilaga 1. s. 258). Here the connection between strategic planning and efficiency was spelled out clearly.


452 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 2. While ridership levels had doubled between 1975 and 1987 and outpaced other road traffic, between 1985 and 1987 road traffic had seen a 12 % increase, while regional public transport ridership had declined by 8 %.
By now, however, the question of equity was being pushed down the ladder on the hierarchy of the rationalities of public transport. This was evident not least in relation to the issue of travel costs. In the section Public transport travel’s sensitivity to price and standards the qualities of different aspects of public transport systems were discussed. The conclusions drawn had important policy implications. First, price sensitivity was considered as being of minor importance for ridership levels, since “when fares increase, ridership decreases, but seems to recover.” While the statement itself may have been true, I also interpret it as a way of shifting the discussion away from a policy of keeping prices down, in a political climate where the deficit in regional public transport was the dominant policy issue on both the national and regional level. The relative unimportance given to ticket prices in this discussion was in fact diametrically opposite from the policy discourse preceding the introduction of public transport authorities in the 1970’s, when the ‘price problem’ was at the heart of public transport discourse (see chapter 5.2.1).

Rather than focusing on monetary costs for using public transport, the report instead highlighted the relevance of time budgets, i.e., the temporal cost of traveling. It was stated that time spent walking to and waiting for public transport was viewed as more negative than time spent traveling and that “you don’t travel by public transport if you can’t get to the stop in an acceptable manner, or if walking time is perceived as unreasonably long.” Still, the analysis argued in favor for increasing stop distances, since “passengers often profit from longer walking and stop distances than what usually occurs, [since] with longer stop distances, travel time is shortened.” The conflict between proximity to stops and travel times was summarized in a strategic policy question:

Short walking and stop distances and proximity to housing often conflict with demands for direct routes and short travel times. Is the solution improved and faster bus and train traffic in [travel] relations with a good traveler base and a possibly reduced base service and complementary services elsewhere?

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453 This including price sensitivity; time budgets and travel times; and regularity, comfort, and service levels.
454 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafik för vem, varför och hur mycket? - ett trafikpolitiskt underlag, 7.
455 Utredningen avseende regionalt gällande generella trafikrabatter, “Länskort i kollektivtrafiken (SOU 1976:43).”
456 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafik för vem, varför och hur mycket? - ett trafikpolitiskt underlag, 8.
457 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 8.
458 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 9.
The issue presented in the quote above is directly related to the tension between coverage and patronage goals discussed by Walker. While refraining to take a position, the arguments laid out in the analysis favored increasing speed and patronage over local coverage.

The tension between coverage and patronage was also reproduced on the regional scale. In a section titled ‘Regional structure – threats and opportunities’, the demographic structure in Malmöhus was identified as deeply uneven, with western Skåne – and since the 1970’s especially the Malmö/Lund area – dominating population growth. It was along the coast development was expected to occur, which implied a future with a “clearer directional dependence and increased exchanges”, which in turn would lead to “higher rush hour peaks” and “increased competition for road space.” Following this, it was asked whether “regional public transport can be utilized to equalize regional differences and create a growing welfare, housing and labor market.” (Here, a notion of regional equalization was reintroduced.) Considering this disparity in regional development opportunities, it was further asked whether “there are reasons to put regional political perspectives on some types of trips and travel relations and view other travel relations more business minded? When/where should traffic be viewed one way or the other?” The formulation of one set of travel relations as ‘regional political’, and another as ‘business minded’ is very interesting and telling of a common idea in neoclassical economic theory, namely that markets can in principle exist independent from politics.

Another central strategic policy question coupled to the regional structure with profound implications for public transport was the question of integrated transport and land use planning. Public transport’s dependence on the spatial structure of housing development was common policy knowledge, but such land use had been undermined by the suburban sprawl and the so-called ‘green wave’ of the 1970’s. This was the case not least in the SSK region to the southwest, where a ‘balanced development’ to counter

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459 Walker, “Purpose-Driven Public Transport: Creating a Clear Conversation about Public Transport Goals.”

460 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafik för vem, varför och hur mycket? - ett trafikpolitiskt underlag, 12.

461 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 12.

462 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 12.

463 The attempt at a clean-cut distinction between “politics” and “the market” disappears when you consider the amount of politically directed investments required to produce the market conditions for public transport in the first place. For a classical debunking of this perspective, see: Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2001); For a contemporary argument along the same lines, see Mariana Mazzucato, The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy (New York: Public Affairs, an imprint of Perseus Books a subsidiary of Hachette Book Group, 2020).
the economic concentration toward cities had been actively pursued during the
1970’s.\textsuperscript{464} Addressing the difficulties put on a publicly owned company asked to
simultaneously supply universal accessibility and limit deficits, it was asked whether it
was "reasonable to allow the housing development that is unfavorable for public
transport? If not, who shall pay for the increased costs [of supplying traffic]?"\textsuperscript{465} A
tentative solution was suggested: "Is a possible way forward to rescind responsibility for
public transport supply for a proposed development that is deemed too costly for public
transport [provision]?"\textsuperscript{466} If municipalities would either have to pay for public transport
supply to such areas themselves or potentially lose public transport provision, this
suggestion was definitely a radical economic policy tool to steer municipal land use
planning.

In the section ‘Public transport and the environment’, the contribution of public
transport to environmental qualities was discussed. Just as in the public transport
authority reform it was mainly local pollutants, noise pollution and space requirement
from traffic that were addressed (although global warming was mentioned in passing).
Electrified rail traffic was highlighted as the most desirable from emission, comfort, and
speed standards.\textsuperscript{467} Contrasting emissions between buses and cars, the local pollutant
nitrogen oxide (NO$_x$) was used as comparison. Here it was found that the average
occupancy (13) in regional bus traffic was lower than what was needed (18-20) to
achieve environmental gains compared to new cars, where the introduction of new and
improved catalytic convertors was expected to drastically lower their NO$_x$ emissions.\textsuperscript{468}
This was not construed as a reason to reduce rural services though, since “increased
public ridership must practically be seen as an environmental gain as large parts of
public transport must likely remain either way.”\textsuperscript{469} Environmental concerns was thus
not mobilized explicitly as a reason to redistribute resources, at least for the time being.
The final section in the brochure argued for the need for a hierarchy of goals for public
transport by stating that,

For a long-term planning, goals are required that state the ambitions and direction for
traffic. Short term planning requires clear, guiding goals. For daily operations, concrete
goals are needed that can be evaluated to see results of the work. … Clear goals are also

\textsuperscript{464} See e.g., Sydvästra Skånes Samarbetskommitté, “Förslag till regionplan 1972.”
\textsuperscript{465} VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Kollektivtrafik för vem, varför och hur mycket? - ett trafikpolitiskt
underlag}, 12.
\textsuperscript{466} VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 19.
\textsuperscript{467} VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 14.
\textsuperscript{468} VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 14.
\textsuperscript{469} VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, \textit{Kollektivtrafik för vem, varför och hur mycket? - ett trafikpolitiskt
underlag}, 14.
important signals to the surrounding world about the company’s intentions and wishes.470

In this fashion, goals would permeate operations on all levels and provide simultaneously a function both for internal steering and external communication. Following this logic, it was proposed that there were to be a three-tier hierarchy of strategic goals, that answered to the overarching role and function of public transport in the region; tactical goals, that were proposed to act as “clearly guiding, but not detailing, traffic planning”; and operative goals, that were to be “concrete and realistic to reach in the short-term measurement of goal achievement, productivity and efficiency.”471 The importance attached to the establishment of goals as essential for the proper governance and development of regional public transport can be assigned to a wider shift in the public administration discourse from rule-governing to goal-governing that was taking place in Sweden around this time.472

The outlook study and the problems identified in it provided a clear direction for a strategic orientation toward developing public transport along the corridors, by focusing on speed over price levels and aiming for a division between ‘political’ and ‘market’ considerations in public transport planning. It also suggested policy tools to encourage Transit-oriented Development land use planning to further the position for public transport in the regional transport system.

In the next section I shall explore how these problems were translated into a proposal for a long-term plan for public transport in Malmöhus county.

8.1.2 The long-term plan: framing solutions for public transport

In December 1989, a year after the outlook study was presented, a draft for a long-term plan developed based on the outlook study was presented by the same working group. The plan was divided into six headings which summarized the general planning

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470 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafik för vem, varför och hur mycket? - ett trafikpolitiskt underlag, 22

471 Strategic goals included which travel needs to attend to; whether public transport should be structuring for spatial development or adapt to ‘the general development’; to what extent public transport should be seen as a regional political tool and how, and to what extent, social concerns should be considered; how environmental and resource aspects should be considered. Tactical goals should comprise which market shares to strive for; principles for network design and traffic standards; terminals; interaction with other transport networks and stakeholders; and economic frames. Operative goals could be measured by developments in ridership, incomes and cost, broken down on individual services and traffic modes. VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 22–23.

472 Sundström, “Administrative Reform.” Rule-governing means a public sector governance permeated by clearly defined rules and requirements on public operations, whereas goal-governing indicates an emphasis on setting policy goals and allowing for more flexibility in how these goals are reached.
orientation: 1) continued development of public transport in distinct commuter corridors, 2) Public transport needs to become faster and more attractive, 3) Good terminals and collaboration between traffic networks, 4) Integrated planning between public transport and spatial planning is necessary, 5) Public transport and the environment, and 6) Business economics and social utility.

Based on these sections, the general goals stated that public transport in the county “shall provide the best possible traffic supply within the framework of available resources and contribute to the accomplishment of general traffic political, regional and social goals.” To achieve this, wider economic utility was to be the guiding principle. In terms of service levels, “a basic traffic supply shall be available throughout the county”, but public transport was to be “further developed in the corridors where high ridership exists and where it can be competitive, gain market shares and improve environmental and congestion issues.” To achieve this “public transport’s customers, the passengers, shall be put at center of planning. Public transport shall be market adjusted and carried out with business economic efficiency within the frames for the overarching goals.” This also meant that the “traffic network and supply shall be adapted to demand. Qualitative aspects customers such as short travel time, comparable interchanges, reliability, punctuality, information and service shall be developed”. Furthermore, “public transport shall take responsibility for a better environment by being attractive and using environmentally friendly technology.” Investments, larger network adaptations and fare structures should ‘as far as possible’ be based on cost-benefit analyses were “environment and other evaluations of social utility is included.” Finally, the long-term plan gave consideration to integrated planning by stating that public transport was to structure localization patterns “to give public transport conditions to function effectively.” Therefore, “new housing developments should primarily be planned in the general commuting corridors within the county, close to stations and terminals where public transport with good standard exists and can be further developed.” These principles were visually presented in a ‘pearl string model’ for housing development (see Figure 8.1).

473 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafiken i malmöhus län. förslag till långtidsplan, 1989, I.
474 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, I.
475 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, I.
476 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, I.
477 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafiken i malmöhus län. förslag till långtidsplan.
478 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, I.
479 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, I.
480 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, I.
From these overarching goals, development principles for different transport modes were outlined (see Table 8.1). For *trains*, the Pågatåg system was to “also henceforth constitute the foundation in the county’s traffic” and be further developed in relations “were Pågatåg traffic will provide benefits”.481 *Regional buses* were “primarily to be developed in the heavy commuter corridors”, outside of which a ‘spatially extensive network’ for school and service trips was to be available. In ‘traffic-weak relations’ demand-responsive traffic was to be available for trips to municipal centers.482 Lastly, the possibilities of developing an extensive *light rail* network across the county was included in the plan (see Figure 8.1): “Light rail traffic, or possibly tram bus, shall be examined for stretches with heavy commuting and/or where travel times needs to be shortened. Light rail is mainly relevant toward and in the larger cities where the environmental situation also motivates this.”483 The inclusion of light rail is indicative of the era when the plan was produced and is symptomatic for the ‘tramway renaissance’ that Dejan Petkov has analyzed.484

For my analysis, it is relevant to look further at the section outlining the continued development in transit corridors. In this section, the arguments for transit corridors were elaborated and the other principles for planning and development trickled down as logical consequences of these arguments. The basic premise was that constantly increasing travel distances (due to rising incomes, sprawled settlement patterns and a concentration of workplaces and services) caused intensified interdependencies between municipalities (as could be seen from the more than tripling of intermunicipal commuting that had occurred between 1965 and 1985).485 Workplace and school com-

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481 At the time of writing, new relations to be incorporated into the Pågatåg system included Helsingborg–Klippan (which would require cross county collaboration with Kristianstads Län), Malmö-Ystad (which would require electrification), and Malmö–Trelleborg. Possible extensions toward Hässleholm and Ängelholm (both located in Kristianstads Län) were also mentioned, indicating the increasingly porous county division between Malmöhus and Kristianstad. Other developments regarded development of high-speed train as well as regional train systems, both by SJ, a rerouting of the west coast trunk line and the possible physical connection across Öresund over Malmö and Copenhagen.

482 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, II.

483 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, III.

484 Petkov, *Tramway Renaissance in Western Europe: A Socio-Technical Analysis*.

Figure 8.1 Visions for public transport and land use in the long-term plan. A TOD-oriented 'pearl band model' for spatial development (left) and a proposed light rail network (right). Source: Kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län. Förslag till långtidsplan, I & III.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning guideline</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Faster traffic, fewer interchanges</td>
<td>To make public transport more “attractive and competitive.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network integration</td>
<td>To make the most of the train and bus systems – local, regional as well as national.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Well-developed terminals and interchanges</td>
<td>To do develop high-quality terminals in the larger cities, and good quality interchanges in each town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park-and-ride facilities</td>
<td>To be developed around train stations where “demand exists and good access points can be created.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated physical planning</td>
<td>Ambition that municipalities first and foremost plan housing development in close proximity to transit corridors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fast and direct routes</td>
<td>“Bus lanes and other measures to ensure public transport accessibility and regularity should be included in detail plans and investment budgets. Route planning, stop locations, operating costs and time gains should be considered already in general [municipal] planning.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Public transport “shall contribute to sustainable mobility by being fast, attractive and gain market shares, especially in heavy commuter corridors.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning practices</td>
<td>To develop internal practices “as well as cooperation with other PTAs, municipalities and other authorities.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Muting (which took precedence in the long-term planning) indicated clear ‘star-shaped patterns’ around Malmö, Lund and Helsingborg which formed ‘three distinct cores’, and smaller corridors toward the smaller towns of Landskrona, Eslöv, Trelleborg and Ystad. Likely inspired by the famous Copenhagen ‘finger plan’, the regional structure was described as a ‘finger structure with three cores’. Based on these conditions it was argued that a distinct corridor structure was beneficial for regional public transport, for it was there that public transport could provide high standards and win market shares. Therefore, “the regional corridor structure should be maintained and strengthened through a further developed public transport and carefully planned localization of housing and workplaces.” As is shown, transit corridors were put at the very center of regional public transport policy.

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487 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus Län. Förslag till långtidsplan, 10.
In the section ‘Business economy and public utility’, the reasoning regarding the relation between the PTAs operating costs and public transport’s contribution to society was developed. It was stated that public transport is “necessary for society to function. The company can therefore not be run solely on a business economic foundation.” Instead, a macroeconomic perspective focused on wider economic benefits should be adopted, compatible with the transport political goals established through the parliamentary decisions of 1979 and 1988. A central planning instrument to achieve this was the employment of cost-benefit analyses (CBA) to investments and projects. As time gains is the key factor on the benefit-side of CBAs in transport economics, an application of such methods would further a focus on speeding up the system.

A focus on wider economic benefits was not to defer from a focus on business-economic efficiency, however. Rather, the two should reinforce each other: what was good for public utility was also good for business-economic efficiency. Efficiency was the hallmark of good policy, and traffic was efficient in the transit corridors. In terms of financing such an orientation, “effectivization and redispersion of existing resources [should be] used for changes in existing traffic.” Standard-increasing measures were to be budgeted in a rolling five-year action program, whereas larger infrastructure investments were expected to require government funding for their realization. What is of relevance for this analysis is that efficiency, whether measured in macro-economic or business-economic terms, stood in contrast to spatial distribution and equalization of traffic, as such policies would undoubtedly distribute resources more inefficiently.

If the outlook study had set the stage through problem formulation and the need for a coherent strategy for public transport in Malmöhus, it was in the long-term plan that the rationalities of transit corridors were developed and formulated in a complete bundle for the first time. This included a notion of supporting a regional dependence on the ‘urban cores’, developing public transport in commuter corridors, and strengthening the market-orientation in the network design. Importantly, the goal of equalization that was inscribed in the traffic agreement between the stakeholders in the PTA was removed, replaced by a goal for a ‘basic traffic provision in the whole county’. Instead, a balanced regional development was to be achieved by tying the different parts of the county closer to the urban cores where development was expected to occur. This was a significant redefinition from the goal for equalization that was a recurring point of contestation in the struggles over traffic supply at the time. To some extent, there was an element of such policy formulations already in the travel card inquiry and the

488 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 28.
489 WSP, Kollektivtrafikens samhällsnytta, 2017.
490 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus Län. Förslag till långtidsplan, 29.
public transport authority reform through their emphasis on improving work commuting, but the focus in the 1970’s was on contributing to better conditions for public transport everywhere. The shift was also underpinned by the employment of planning instruments such as cost-benefit analyses to the tool kit of regional public transport planning.

The long-term plan was sent out for referral to 46 organizations. The comments, summarized in a report, generally supported the proposed plan with its focus on commuter corridors and coordinated planning. For example, Lunds kommun reiterated “the need for a high standard for public transport for it to be a realistic transport alternative. […] The orientation toward heavy commuter corridors to reach large passenger volumes is judged to be correct.” Likewise, Landskrona “largely agrees with suggestions in the long-term plan and hope that the intentions can be followed through,” and Höganäs welcomed “the further development of the company’s planning and coordination efforts.” Several answers also highlighted the need for further coordination and the necessity of broadening the perspective even further and viewing public transport from a Scanian perspective.

Concerns regarding the concentration of services to corridors were also conveyed, however. The critique was based primarily on two objections: first, a worry that a focus on transit corridors would lead to lower service levels outside of the corridors, and second, a rejection of attributing a too strong role for public transport in structuring land use planning. The first concern was, unsurprisingly, expressed primarily by municipalities and planning committees in the inner part of the county. Svalövs municipality objected to the transit corridor principle, which “could contribute to demographic concentrations and depopulation of the countryside and smaller towns”, a development that would “act against goals for a balanced development and a thriving countryside.” And while supporting the ‘pearl-band principle’ as “an important planning instrument to create a better traffic demand”, Höör municipality worried “that the investments in heavy corridors primarily [will] benefit the densely populated

492 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB and VBB, 6.
493 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB and VBB, 5-6
494 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB and VBB, 8.

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areas and that rural traffic will be impoverished."495 Both MSK and SSK expressed concerns for the vitality of rural traffic supply and called for an improvement of complementary services from six to ten weekly departures.496

Regarding the second point of contestation, i.e., integrated land use planning, arguments against a concentration of housing to corridors were, equally unsurprisingly, put forward by municipalities who either had little access to the transit corridors, or who saw development potential also outside of their existing corridors. Helsingborg, Höganäs, Sjöbo, Svalöv and Vellinge municipalities disputed the proposition that public transit corridors should be allowed to dominate spatial planning. As there were only two viable public transport corridors in Sjöbo, the municipality objected to locating new housing only there.497 Likewise, for Helsingborg’s city building council it was “not apparent that new housing should be concentrated around existing corridors.”498 On a level of principle the question of whether, and how much, public transport should steer municipal spatial planning was a potentially sensitive issue as it cut to a central part of the principle of municipal self-governance, which has been a pillar of Swedish spatial planning since the Building act of 1947.499 Submitting spatial planning to the needs of public transport would undermine that self-governance and was likely a hard pill to swallow, even if it could potentially mean risking a lower traffic supply in the future.

8.1.3 The action program: framing policy and planning instruments for public transport

Based on the long-term plan and the comments received from stakeholders, an Action program was presented in December 1990. The action program was construed as a general development program for the whole county with four lower-tier programs to be developed for each of the subregions in the county. The action plan included both general and detailed principles for the planning of public transport. As the general principles were almost identical to those developed in the long-term plan, I won’t elaborate on them further here. Instead, attention is turned to the detailed planning principles developed in the Action program. These are of interest because it was through

496 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB and VBB, 13-14.
497 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB and VBB, 7.
498 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB and VBB, 4.
such planning principles that the rationalities underpinning the transit corridor orientation were to be turned into reality.

The program started out by stating that although "long-term planning is first and foremost directed at the general structure of public transport in the county", i.e., the core network. However, this “must […] not be seen as other countryside traffic and complementary traffic being neglected,” a phrasing that can be interpreted as intending to appease to the complaints that traffic outside the corridors had been downplayed in the plan (see section 8.2. above). The detailed principles stated concrete guidelines and tools for public transport planning in five different areas: 1) travel times, travel speed and service supply; 2) principles for route planning; 3) detailed layout; 4) stops, interchanges and terminals, and; 5) coordination between traffic system and planning. These included guidelines and principles for the shaping and configuration of the public transport system with important implications for the spatial layout and configuration of the system.

Regarding travel times, travel speed and service supply, where travel times exceeded 30 minutes with public transport an increased number of direct services, shorter route planning, faster roads, or ‘other transport modes’ should be considered. Other measures to improve travel speeds included configuring intersections, bus lanes and bus priority signal systems. Furthermore, “unnecessarily short stops distances should be avoided and not fall below 500 meters in urban areas and 1000 meter in rural areas.” With these measures in mind, a goal was set for bus driving speeds to increase by 10 % during the program period of 5 years. Regarding service levels, at least 10 return trips daily should be aimed for in the bus trunk network, and in local train traffic hourly traffic should be achieved, with departures every 30 minutes during peak hours.

Under Principles for route planning, dos and don’ts for bus route planning were laid out. For example, shared routes for services on the trunk networks should be aimed for to provide “higher aggregate frequency, easier information and interchanges, motivate/utilize accessibility measures and improvements of stops and access to these,” whereas “appendices and loops at the middle of a route that induces travel time loss for through travel should not be accepted.” Regional trunk services and local buses should share routes and stops where possible “to make possible joint traffic and spontaneous interchanges.” In general, train traffic and different forms of bus traffic should “complement and support each other so that interchanges and other

500 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus Län - Handlingsprogram, 1990, 1.
501 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 9.
502 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 11
503 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB.
504 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, 12
coordination is supported.” See Figure 8.2 Examples of illustrations of principles for public transport planning in the Action program. for an illustration of examples of detailed planning principles in the Action program.

The section Detailed design illustrated various ways of planning intersections, stops and safety measures. This included traffic-calming measures that didn’t affect buses, design principles for priorities of country roads with trunk bus services, and special bus lanes to shorten distances compared to detour roads around towns on the countryside (see Figure 8.2).

Under the heading Stops, interchange nodes and terminals, qualitative aspects for each of these were defined, including park-and-ride facilities, signage, and information functions. In the long-term plan, it had been stated that in Malmö, Lund and Helsingborg high quality terminals were to be developed, to provide comfortable and rational interchanges between all traffic modes. All other cities were to have terminals of similar standard and service, and good interchange nodes to be developed in towns where multiple services intersect. In the program, these principles dealt first and foremost with stops and interchanges on the trunk network.

Lastly, under the heading Coordination between the traffic system and planning, the integration between transport and housing developments were addressed. Here it was stated that new housing developments should be localized within a 1 000 meters walking distance from stops on the trunk network, and that the walking distance to train stops should not exceed 1 500 meters. Schools, kindergartens, shops, workplaces, and other services should be localized close to stops along the corridors. Housing should preferably be located close to local train stops to provide accessibility to “a very large service and workplace supply in the region’s higher centers.” As a second choice, housing should be located close to the bus trunk network. Importantly, “housing that does not have access to Pågatåg or trunk service traffic should be avoided. Normally only a modest future public transport supply can be expected for such housing.” Such principles clearly aimed to establish Transit-oriented development.

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505 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, Kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus Län - Handlingsprogram, 1990, 16.
506 VBB and Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB.
Figure 8.2 Examples of illustrations of principles for public transport planning in the Action program. From top left: illustration of bad route planning; route principle for integration of regional and local traffic; design principle for bus priority measures and local traffic safety measures; TOD-oriented housing planning principles for trains (bottom left) and buses (bottom right). Source: Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Handlingsprogram, PM 21 gemensam del, 11-16.
principles for urban and regional development to support and justify investments in the corridors and maximize their utility (see Figure 8.2).

Coming from a decade defined by uncertainty about how public transport planning in the county ought to be (and actually was) carried out, the Action program laid out a road map for future public transport planning. What is of relevance here is not that these design principles were necessarily novel in and of themselves, but that their incorporation in the action program sought to establish these as the central policy knowledge and create a more rule-governed planning process through clear, predefined principles that would guide the integrated planning process between the PTA and municipalities, and ideally serve as a blueprint for a new form of public transport planning in the county. In the Action program we can thus note a first formulation of a package of ‘best-practice’ principles for public transport planning in the region. Such principles also presupposed the organization of land use planning in a TOD-oriented fashion. The process of defining general rules for public transport planning can be compared with the construction of knowledge around automobile planning that had been subjected to similar rule-governed planning prescriptions during the 1950’s and 1960’s. As such, establishing such best-practice guidelines for public transport planning and prioritization can be seen as a way for public transport to ‘catch up’ with the institutionalized knowledges that guided automobile planning.

Such developments were not unanimously celebrated, however. At the board meeting on February 28, 1991, when the proposal for the long-term plan was discussed, the liberal group handed in a separate statement with a sharp critique of both the long-term plan and action program. On a principal level the liberal group questioned the reasonableness in voting on a long-term plan at the same time as the whole regional organization of public transport was up for debate: “in this situation, to put forward and accept a long-term action program is not natural, and any […] decision can naturally not be binding for the new organization.” They also questioned the presumed dominance of “public transport’s interests” and that thus would govern all spatial planning. Instead, they claimed that there were other interests, “just as important as public transport” and that “considerations must clearly be made on a case-by-case basis regarding which perspectives shall be prioritized.” They also emphasized that the illustrations of the detailed planning guidelines throughout the action program had “not been a point of discussion at the board. They shall be interpreted as illustrations and not as programmatic declarations.”

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507 Lundin, Bilsambhället : ideologi, expertis och regelskapande i efterkrigstidens sverige.
508 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Styrelseprotokoll 1991-02-28, särskilt yttrande från the borgerliga gruppen.
At the annual meeting on March 22, 1991 (at the same time as the budget crisis at the PTA was raging most intensely), the long-term program and action plan was up for debate and decision. Besides the appeal from the liberal group, one representative from the County Council argued for softening the formulations of how guiding the long-term plan and action program were to be. However, after a voting procedure the board’s proposal won a majority and the long-term plan and action program were accepted as steering documents, marking the formal adaptation of a development strategy for public transport in Malmöhus.509

8.2 The Metropolitan negotiations and the Malmöhus agreement – expanding the region (1990 – 1992)

To turn the strategy of transit corridors formulated in the long-term plan into material reality, investments in new and alterations to existing transport infrastructure were necessary. The following section presents another set of intertwined processes of central importance for the institutionalization of the rationalities of transit corridors in Malmöhus, with repercussions for all of Skåne and southern Sweden: the so-called Metropolitan negotiations, the decision to build a fixed link across Öresund and the subsequent Malmöhus Agreement. These processes lifted local and regional public transport in Malmöhus to a national policy concern, which would alter the outlook for public transport in the region entirely. The section starts with a presentation of the metropolitan negotiations that took place in Sweden’s three metropolitan regions. Second, the decision to build the fixed link across Öresund, which prompted a second round of negotiations around infrastructure, resulting in the Malmöhus Agreement, is presented.

8.2.1 The Metropolitan Negotiations – forcing the creation of a new regional public transport authority

Toward the end of the 1980’s the conditions in Stockholm, Gothenburg and Malmöhus – designated as the three metropolitan areas in Sweden — was becoming a growing policy issue. There were concerns for the prospects for continued economic development both within the metropolitan areas themselves and the balance between them and the other, less populated, parts of Sweden, as well as the environmental situation in the three regions. The necessity of investing in transport infrastructure had


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been lifted both by industry groups, e.g. through the Roundtable of European Industrialists who sought to identify a number of bottlenecks and ‘missing links’ in the European transport network, the European Commission, who sought to frame a common transport policy, as well as in academic circles, where the role of communication networks for the future of creative and successful regions was stressed.\footnote{Åke E Andersson and Ulf Strömquist, \textit{K-samhällets framtid} (Stockholm: Prisma, 1988); see also Isaksson, \textit{Framtidens trafiksystem? : maktutövningen i konflikterna om rummet och miljön i Dennispaketets vägfrågor}, 19–20; Jensen, “Governing with Rationalities of Mobility: A Study of Institution Building and Governmentality in European Transport Policy,” 132–38.} Swedish policymakers also acted and launched several inquiries into the environmental, infrastructural and economic conditions for the metropolitan regions, which highlighted the need for investments in and changes to the metropolitan transport systems as remedies to both the economic and environmental outlook for Sweden.\footnote{See e.g. Storstadstrafikkommittén, “Storstadstrafik 1 (SOU 1988:62)” (Stockholm, 1988); Storstadsutredningen, “Storstadsregioner i förändring (SOU 1989:69)” (Stockholm, 1989); Storstadsutredningen, “Storstädernas infrastruktur - idéer om finansiering och styrning (SOU 1989:112)” (Stockholm, 1989); Sveriges regering, “Prop. 1987/88:50. Om trafikpolitiken inför 1990-talet.”}

Wanting to address the situation, in April 1990 the government initiated a round of negotiations focusing on measures and investments in the metropolitan regions’ transport systems to improve the conditions for environment, accessibility, and regional development.\footnote{Dir. 1990:21} A negotiator was appointed by the government to handle negotiations in each of the three regions. For Malmöhus, former cabinet member Sven Hulterström was charged with leading the negotiations, and Gunnar Davidsson at the County Council was (after some hesitation due to the feasibility of reaching an agreement in the conflict-torn region) assigned as secretary for the negotiations.\footnote{The negotiations in Stockholm resulted in the so-called Dennis package, which included massive investments in both the rail and road systems, as well as a toll system surrounding the inner parts of the city. However, due to growing conflicts over the content of the Dennis package, the negotiations did not materialize into concrete infrastructure investments until much later. For analysis of the politics of spatial and environmental discourses in the public debate surrounding the Dennis package, see Isaksson, “Framtidens trafiksystem? : maktutövningen i konflikterna om rummet och miljön i Dennispaketets vägfrågor.”} For Malmöhus, the goal was the creation of a traffic system for the whole of southern Sweden. In the directive to the negotiations, regional expansion was the main agenda: the economic wellbeing of southern Sweden was linked to the status of the transport system in Malmöhus, and it was stated that “better communications would allow freer conditions

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for work, housing and localization of activities within a wider region than only the Malmö area.”

With the goal of improving conditions over a wider area, Sven Hulterström envisioned the creation of a single transport authority in Skåne, since “the current order with two counties, a double set of county bodies [i.e., county administrations and county councils], and several intermunicipal planning bodies impedes collective action and increases the risk for suboptimization and intraregional solutions. Therefore, I find it desirable that entire Skåne eventually is organized as one traffic region.” However, due to the legislative prescription of one PTA for every county in Sweden, the agreement itself focused only on Malmöhus.

Hulterström’s negotiations in Malmöhus were conducted within the existing governance framework in the region, with shared ownership of the PTA between the municipalities and the County Council. The negotiations also began around the same time as the economic and political turmoil surrounding the traffic supply plan for 1991/92 was ramping up and tensions between the stakeholders in the PTA were running high (see section 7.3.2). The negotiations in Malmöhus were deemed to have been impeded by a set of ‘particular conditions’. One such was the ‘fragmented organization’ of public transport in the county. Hulterström concluded that there had not been a clear regional counterpart in the negotiations; in the reference group that was assembled for the negotiations in Malmöhus representatives from eight different stakeholders had been included. Thus, following what was by now the dominant problem definition, the report from the negotiations concluded that since the municipalities had far-reaching control over public transport planning, “the public transport authority has not had sufficient resources to plan traffic from a holistic perspective.” Another condition was the uncertainty concerning the ongoing discussions between Sweden and Denmark related to the construction of a fixed link across Öresund. Since the way a possible connection was going to be designed was not decided at the time, there were also large uncertainties surrounding the land infrastructure needed to accommodate the link. Therefore, although relevant infrastructure projects were identified, the negotiating parties refrained from making any final suggestions about transport infrastructure. Instead, they implored the

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515 Storstadsförhandlarna, 67.
516 Storstadsförhandlarna, 66.
517 Storstadsförhandlarna, 66.
518 Storstadsförhandlarna, 68.
519 Storstadsförhandlarna, 66–67.
government to announce another round of negotiations should the question of the Öresund link be resolved (this will be developed further in section 8.2.2).

The central outcome of the metropolitan negotiations in Malmöhus was an agreement to reorganize the public transport authority in the county. The most far-reaching solution would be for Malmö to join the County Council, i.e., giving up its status as a county-free municipality and bestowing sole ownership of the PTA upon the County Council. Sven Hulterström conceded that this had not been a possible solution thus far and as a second-best option, Malmöhus County Council and Malmö municipality were to create a joint organization.\(^{520}\) In the agreement presented on January 15, 1991 (around the same time as the work with the long-term plan for public transport in Malmöhus was finalized), it was thus proclaimed that from January 1, 1992, a new PTA would be formed to oversee the activities of the traffic company without municipal ownership (except for Malmö). Importantly, the new PTA would be responsible for planning and investments in public transport infrastructure outside of state and municipal authority and be recipient of state infrastructure funds and state investments into transport infrastructure.\(^{521}\) The agreement also included the preparation of a development program with the purpose to “improve public transport’s competitiveness with the car, primarily in the dense traffic relations in the western parts of Skåne”, whose purpose was to “improve public transport’s speed, accessibility and comfort; improve coordination between different transport modes; and improve public transport’s environmental performance.”\(^{522}\) The agreement further stated that “the traffic shall contribute to that Malmöhus Län together with adjacent areas in Kristianstads Län can function as a unified region for housing, work and services. The PTA shall seek collaboration with authorities in Kristianstads Län and other counties in southern Sweden. The goal for the collaboration shall be for all of Southern Sweden to comprise a unified traffic region.”\(^{523}\)

The main achievement of the metropolitan agreement between the Government and the parties in Malmöhus county was thus to force the creation of a single counterpart in the coming discussions about infrastructure connected to the bridge. To realize this, a change in legislation was needed, as public transport legislation at the time didn’t allow for a PTA to be formed between a county council and just one of several municipalities in a county.\(^{524}\) The County Council voted in favor of the proposal and

\(^{520}\) Storstadsförhandlarna, 67.

\(^{521}\) Storstadsförhandlarna, “Storstadens trafiksystem (SOU 1991:19).”

\(^{522}\) Storstadsförhandlarna, 75

\(^{523}\) Storstadsförhandlarna, 74

most municipalities and authorities supported the proposal, with the exception of Hörby, Svalöv and Burlöv municipalities, who presented minor objections, and Ystad municipality who rejected the proposal in favor of a unified PTA for entire Skåne.\(^{525}\) As we shall see in the next chapter, regional tensions were not magically resolved just by shifting responsibility for public transport toward the regional level.

Drawing a comparison between the process of regionalizing public transport governance in Malmöhus through Metropolitan negotiations and Alexander Paulsson’s analysis of public transport governance in Stockholm County, the agreement to reorganize the PTA in Malmöhus Län bears resemblance to the Hörjel agreement, dating back to 1963.\(^ {526}\) That agreement gathered authority over public transport in Stockholm with the County Council in an attempt to untie the political knots surrounding the expansion of the Stockholm metro. Likewise, it was through a process initiated by the Government to secure infrastructure investments that authority over public transport in Malmö was ultimately transferred to the regional level; a transformation that had not been able to be decided without outside influence. And, just as with the Hörjel agreement in Stockholm almost thirty year earlier, the solution meant a formal *disintegration* of public transport and land use policy as the former was moved to the regional level, whereas the latter remained under municipal authority.

### 8.2.2 The Malmöhus Agreement and the Öresund bridge – financing transit corridors

Two months after the Metropolitan agreement was signed, the Swedish and Danish governments signed an agreement on March 21, 1991, to pursue a joint venture of building a fixed link between the two countries via Malmö and Copenhagen. A fixed link of some sort across the narrow straight of Öresund that separate the two countries had been contemplated for a century, but the plans had thus far never left the drawing board.\(^ {527}\) The first plan, presented in the 1870’s, was to build a railroad tunnel between Helsingborg and Helsingör (the narrowest part of the straight), and in 1886 a French banking group applied for a concession to build a railway tunnel between Copenhagen and Malmö.\(^ {528}\) Several other plans were presented, and as automobility became the


\(^{526}\) Paulsson, “The City That the Metro System Built: Urban Transformations and Modalities of Integrated Planning in Stockholm.”

\(^{527}\) Idvall, *Kartors kraft : regionen som samhällsvision i Öresundsbrons tid* ch. 2.

\(^{528}\) Idvall, 41–42.
dominant transport mode, plans in the 1960's and 1960's were based only on road connections. The most radical solution was the suggestion by the industrial tycoon Ruben Rausing in 1973 to drain the entire straight of Öresund of water.\textsuperscript{529}

Figure 8.3. Illustration of the proposed fixed link across Öresund in 1987. From east to west, the bridge starts at Lernacken south of Malmö, runs across Flintrännan and ends in an artificial island, Peberholm, south of Saltholm where it crosses over into a tunnel under the Drogden channel before landing at Amager Island south of central Copenhagen. Source: Den Svenska och danska Öresundsdelegationen, 41.

A renewed planning process was initiated in 1984 that in their final report proposed a combined road-and-rail bridge. The political process preceding the agreement was marked by controversy regarding both whether to build a railroad tunnel or a combined road and railroad bridge, and the environmental consequences for the Baltic sea from a bridge construction, but eventually it was agreed that a combined road and railway bridge with a tunnel under the Drogden channel connecting with each other via an

\textsuperscript{529} Dekker Linnros, Naturen, betongen och den goda jorden : Öresundsbron och motståndets diskurser, 1.
artificial island that was to be called Pepparholmen (See Figure 8.3). The decision was influenced both by a growing environmental critique of the road-based Scanlink development (of which the Öresund bridge was an important part) but also because of the perceived benefits of connecting the Danish airport of Kastrup to Sweden by railroad.

After the Swedish parliament approved the bridge proposal on June 12, 1991, a second round of negotiations regarding the infrastructure in Malmöhus was announced in August of 1991. The negotiations were called the Malmöhus negotiations and Sven Hulterström and Gunnar Davidsson were both reappointed as negotiator and secretary. The new negotiations’ stated purpose was to,

…define how road, rail and public transport systems in the Malmö region shall be shaped and connected to the decided physical connection across Öresund. The measures shall contribute to improving the environmental situation in the region, improve accessibility and improve conditions for a positive development of employment and economy.

Prior to the negotiations, Gunnar Davidsson wrote a report outlining five items of greatest importance for the public transport system: the rail tunnel under Malmö; the expansion of the West coast railway; a development program for intraregional public transport; the development of local and regional train systems; and development of better systems for data and statistics processing for prognosticating and planning public transport.

Invest in infrastructure in Skåne!

The outcomes from the Malmöhus negotiations were summed up and presented as the Malmöhus agreement on June 1, 1992. Published as an official government report, the agreement was accompanied by several reports on the status and requirements for

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532 Dir. 1991:80


534 Malmöhus Läns Landsting, Uppföljning av överenskommelserna i Malmöhusförhandlingarna. PM 1991-03-19.

transport infrastructure in Skåne: an ‘idea pamphlet’ for Scanian infrastructure; a report on development trends and investment needs in Scanian sea ports; a memo listing and calculating costs for the proposed investments in public transport in Malmöhus; and an environmental impact assessment for these investments. For the purpose of analyzing how the rationalities of public transport were formulated in the agreement, the 16-page pamphlet *Satsa på infrastrukturen i Skåne!* (Eng. Invest in infrastructure in Skåne!) is of particular interest, as in it a coherent argument for investments and measures by formulating central problems, solutions, and visions for transport infrastructure in Skåne was presented.

The pamphlet, produced in a collaborative effort between the public transport authority, the Swedish Road Agency (*Vägverket*), the Swedish Rail Agency (*Banverket*) and Malmöhus County Administration (*Länsstyrelsen*), began by stating that three political events had overthrown existing planning conditions: the decision to build a bridge across Öresund; the Swedish application to join the European Union; and the geopolitical shifts through the unification of Germany and the opening of the former Soviet bloc after the tumultuous events in 1989 when the Berlin Wall was torn down.536 Taken together these events were expected to increase trade and transit traffic through Skåne.537 As the Swedish ‘link to the EC’ [the European Community], Skåne was pinpointed as the gateway to three major corridors in Europe: to western Europe from the Öresund connection via Hamburg, to southwestern Europe from Trelleborg via Berlin, Central and Eastern Europe from Ystad via Poland.538 A key argument for investments in the Scanian transport network was that Denmark and the rest of Europe were increasing their investments and to take part of the increasing trade opportunities presented by the entrance to the EU and the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, Sweden had to follow suit.

Under the heading ‘Skåne and Zealand’ the vision for a fully integrated Öresund region was laid out, with a common labor and housing market and the potential for creating a “power center, serving as an attractive alternative to the large industrial region in the middle and south Europe; a development region that can strengthen southern Sweden”.539 The development potential was however considered uncertain and would pose both opportunities and threats, especially the labor market, which “may undergo radical shifts, why it is pressing that the geographical mobility is good.”540 The discourse mobilized in the pamphlet was one of interregional competitiveness (especially within

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536 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 24.
537 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 23.
538 Målomhusförhandlingarna, 24.
539 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 30.
540 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 30.
the EU) in which accessibility to labor and consumption markets through infrastructure investments was considered as a key to getting ahead in the competition. Thus, increasing geographical mobility and connectivity was a central element in harnessing the potential within the Öresund region.

Based on the shifting circumstances in the surrounding political environment, the public authorities behind the pamphlet argued forcefully for the need for greatly expanded mobility capacity in the region for all modes of transport. To ensure the increased geographical mobility to adjust to the coming shifts and accommodate future development, investments in rail, road and public transport systems were deemed necessary. Train traffic was designated as “the trunk in Skåne’s regional public transport. It is also the trains that will connect Skåne with the Copenhagen region when the Öresund bridge is finished.”

Rail infrastructure needed to be expanded to accommodate passenger and goods transport to increasingly be able to successfully compete with cars and lorries.

This was to be realized through investments in transit corridors: the pamphlet stated that public transport should be built around a network of trunk lines, in corridors where public transport could be competitive. Building further on TOD principles, new housing development to be kept primarily “parallel and within the corridors, to promote commuting with train or bus instead of car.” In terms of concrete plans, investments in a new interregional train system as well as the Pågatåg system required new rail infrastructure, including new double tracks, upgraded train stations and investments in rolling stock. Furthermore, the pamphlet argued for the construction of a rail tunnel through Malmö to cut travel times and improve accessibility to central parts of the city, as well as improved local and regional bus services. Express services could also be a step on the road to trolley buses or light rail: traffic systems which, it was argued, ”although they are socioeconomically profitable, cannot be financed within existing budget frames”.

Although there was a focus on public transport investments in the agreement, it was argued that more road capacity was also needed since “despite the expanded public transport systems in the region, car traffic will increase and still answer to the lion’s share of traffic”. In the agreement, the inevitability of increased car traffic due to the creation and growth of a common labor market was reiterated; therefore road investments were geared toward a high-class bridge connection, access to seaports and

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541 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 32.
542 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 23.
543 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 31.
544 Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 34.
airport, and an offloading of the road network in Malmö.\textsuperscript{545} The argument for expanding road capacity followed the well-trodden path of predict-and-provide transport planning, with road investments construed as inevitable to ensure the mobility increases that were sought and expected. As Markus Idvall concludes in his analysis of the Öresund Bridge, the bridge can be thought of as an ‘infrastructural machine’ with the expectation – and desire! – that it would \textit{produce} traffic.\textsuperscript{546} In an interesting paradox, the prognosticated incomes from the bridge fees paid by road traffic over the bridge were even motivated as an \textit{enabler} of sustainable mobility by financing rail infrastructure investments on land. (The Swedish social democratic government had, against the wishes of both a majority within the own party and their Danish counterpart, pushed strongly for a combined road and railway connection rather than a railway tunnel only.\textsuperscript{547})

\textit{Infrastructure investments in the Malmöhus agreement}

The final Malmöhus agreement comprised investments of 2.835 million SEK, distributed on 1 350 million for roads, 1 010 million for railroads, and 475 million for investments in the public transport system over a time span of twelve years between 1992 and 2003 (see Table 8.2, and maps Appendix 2). Apart from the agreed investments there were several other infrastructure projects considered in both rail and road infrastructure. For public transport, the most important project not financed in the agreement were Citytunneln under Malmö, and the connection between the Continental railroad and the bridge. Citytunneln’s role was motivated by further improvements in the competitiveness of regional railroad and shortened travel times between Copenhagen and Lund, which was expected both dampen the growth of car travels and improve the geographical reach of the economic benefits from the bridge.\textsuperscript{548} Citytunneln was initially considered in the metropolitan negotiations but was not possible to include in the final agreement due to unclarities between the parties involved in planning and financing the tunnel. There were also several other road projects that lay within the framework of “the primary goals of the Malmöhus negotiations”.\textsuperscript{549}

\textsuperscript{545} Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 34.
\textsuperscript{546} Idvall, \textit{Kartors kraft: regionen som samhällsvision i Öresundsbrongs tid}, 56, 83pp.
\textsuperscript{547} Falkemark, \textit{Öresundsbron : hur de avgörande besluten togs : rapport}.
\textsuperscript{549} Malmöhusförhandlingarna, 15.
Table 8.2 List over investments included in the Malmöhus agreement

*Italicized items were included in the plan as prioritized projects but were not financed within the Malmöhus Agreement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Cost (M SEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Rail investments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmö – Ystad</td>
<td>Electrification, meeting tracks, station</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lund – Kävlinge</td>
<td>Double track expansion</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other measures: Malmö-Hbg, Malmö – Landskrona, Hbg – Bjuv, Hbg – Ängelholm, Malmö – Höör</td>
<td>Meeting tracks, stations, platforms, park and ride facilities</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bridge connection</strong>*</td>
<td>Connection track with Trelleborgsbanan</td>
<td>(1500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>City tunnel</strong>*</td>
<td>Rail tunnel under Malmö, including new stations</td>
<td>(2900-3500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Public transport investments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional trains step 1</td>
<td>Expansion of Pågatågen</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus traffic</td>
<td>Improved accessibility: bus lanes, signal priority, motorway stops, etc. Improved intermodality through park and ride at important terminals Improved attractiveness through investments in terminals and information systems Improved environmental performance through continued investments on natural gas buses</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional trains step 2</td>
<td>Implementing the Öresundståg train system</td>
<td>(500)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Road investments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outer ring road (bridge connection)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other road investments***</td>
<td>E66 (Lund – Gårdstånga); väg 23 (Gårdstånga – Höör); E14 (Oxie – Sturup); väg 108 (Lund – Trelleborg)</td>
<td>(1150)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Reactions to the Malmöhus agreement

If the decision to reorganize the PTA that was promulgated in the Metropolitan negotiations was met largely with positive responses (one may assume that many municipalities realized that they were fighting a losing battle for the power over public transport governance by then), there was a broader critique from more municipalities concerning the Malmöhus agreement. This related to both procedural and substantive elements of the agreement. While generally positive to the agreement’s substance, Helsingborg, Lund, Landskrona, Staffanstorp and Vellinge municipalities all criticized the procedure and the lack of consultation by the parties negotiating vis-à-vis the municipalities. Lund municipality commented that “what is remarkable in these negotiation and planning rounds is that the municipality completely lacks insight and
cannot influence prioritizations and choice of projects.”

This was of course a reflection of the fact that the municipalities weren’t direct counterparts in the second round of negotiations. Based on this experience, several municipalities requested deepened influence and coordination between different levels of government in the future planning of infrastructure. As for the substantive critique over the outcomes from the negotiations, there were major concerns over land use impacts and from infrastructure investments were raised. For example, Bjuv lamented that the Malmöhus negotiations had “seemingly neglected Bjuv municipality’s interests and needs for the most part.” Burlöv municipality was highly critical of the expected impacts for the municipality from the agreement: if the proposed new ring-road around Malmö were to be constructed, Burlöv would risk seeing “noise pollution covering the entire area of the municipality”, a substantially increased risk from transport of dangerous goods, and negative barrier effects within the municipality’s towns from expanded railway tracks. Wishing for another routing of the motorway, Burlöv went so far as to appeal the planned motorway through the municipality. The expected increase of goods traffic on various parts of the railway tracks also worried some municipalities, including Malmö, Lund, Burlöv and Lomma.

While the Malmöhus agreement and the long-term plan both favored investments in the western parts of the county over the central and southeastern, the intermunicipal competition for resources between the two largest cities in Skåne – Malmö and Helsingborg – also became evident. Several municipalities argued for the need for a swift decision regarding the proposed tunnel through Malmö (unsurprisingly, Malmö municipality itself was the most fervent proponent for this). And while they supported Citytunneln, Lund stressed that it was “important that a future solution for the financing regarding the City tunnel does not encroach upon other necessary infrastructure investments in the region.” Apparently fearing such results, Höganäs and Helsingborg municipalities both expressed concern over a risk of ‘drainage’ of resources from their part of the county toward the southwest. Helsingborg stated that the Malmöhus agreement “is based on the creation of an Öresund bridge. This means worsened possibilities for, e.g., the city’s transport companies and an expected


551 Länsstyrelsen i Malmöhus län bilaga 1, 3.

552 Länsstyrelsen i Malmöhus län bilaga 1, 4.

553 Länsstyrelsen i Malmöhus län bilaga 1, 4–7

554 Länsstyrelsen i Malmöhus län bilaga 1, 3.
stagnation of population growth”. This critique is telling as it reveals the dynamics of a regional spatial hierarchy that all municipalities – no matter how small or big – fear slipping down on. As we saw in previous chapters, rural municipalities feared the effects of a concentration of resources to the western municipalities. However, reactions from Helsingborg municipality to the Malmöhus agreement showed that also the larger municipalities with more resources also worried about a drainage of resources from them toward the southwest.

8.3 Summary

The processes analyzed in this chapter had long-term significance for public transport for three reasons: one discursive, the other institutional, and the third economic.

First, it was through the development of the long-term plan and the Metropolitan agreement and the Malmöhus agreement that the rationalities of transit corridors and their associated planning principles was thoroughly inscribed into the goals for public transport in the region, intended to increase speed and connectivity between the different parts of the county. This rationality was spatially extended through the Metropolitan Agreement and the decision by the Swedish and Danish governments to build the Öresund bridge, through which public transport in Malmöhus became firmly attached to a long-term, strategic purpose of expanding the region and spreading economic development in the name of sustainable mobility. These processes provided specific impetus for investments in train infrastructure, which would secure the regional expansion that was sought. Complementing this, express bus networks in high-demand corridors would tie smaller towns to the urban cores. To enable this, goals and planning guidelines were adapted to foster investment in such corridors and the physical infrastructure needed to realize their potential.

Coupled to this was also a focus on international competitiveness and integration into the rapidly altering European market, both of which relied on increased and improved mobility – and the infrastructure needed to secure this. This was closely tied to the expanding ‘new regionalism’ discourse at the time, that focused on regions’ role in fostering development strategies for economic competitiveness on the international economy. Importantly, it was the construction of a nexus of ideas and values together


with policy tools and planning principles to realize them that signify these processes’ importance. This meant that cost-efficiency took the upper hand over equalization (which was exempted from the new goals for public transport), but also that the new goals for public transport not only stated what was to be achieved by public transport, but also how it was to be achieved: through transit corridors and a market and customer orientation.

Second, these processes ensured the establishment of a public transport authority with a distinct regional focus and mandate. Until this point it had not been possible to agree on an institutional arrangement that allowed for a distinct transit corridor-orientation to form the basis for public transport planning. Here, the long-term plan acquired the formalization of transit corridors as an explicit goal for public transport development, and, most important, the Metropolitan agreement ensured the reorganization of the public transport authority to match these goals. By decoupling the municipalities (except for Malmö) from formal influence over public transport policy and planning, a PTA with a mandate to plan and develop public transport in transit corridors was secured. This ensured a more thoroughly regional perspective, in which transit corridors became the central figure for spatial development. The long-term plan and the Malmöhus Agreement should not be interpreted as the origins of this development, since an ongoing regionalization of public transport governance had been discussed already since the inception of the regional PTA in 1981. But it was first through the Metropolitan agreement that the PTA in Malmöhus county became a powerful stakeholder influencing the directions of infrastructure investments and transport development in Malmöhus Län. In a retrospect at the end of the 1990’s, the PTA singled out having a unified authority in the negotiations and subsequent implementation of the Malmöhus Agreement as a central reason as to why the Malmöhus agreement eventually was a political and infrastructural success, as opposed to the similar agreements in Stockholm and Gothenburg which crumbled under political conflict toward the end on the decade.557

Finally, the Malmöhus agreement secured the financial backing needed to turn the visions presented in the long-term plan and the Metropolitan agreement into material form. By injecting large resources in the form of infrastructure investments in regional public transport (but also new roads), the Malmöhus agreement presented the new PTA with economic muscles which would prove to be important for the institutionalization of and realization of the rationalities of transit corridors.

Having covered the establishment of a new regional rationality for public transport through these policy processes as well as an institutional and financial base through which to implement it, in the next chapter we shall turn to an analysis of how this was carried out.
9 Implementing transit corridors  

The 1990’s was by all accounts a decade that turned the situation around for public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne. As told in the previous chapters, the decade started with a bleak outlook for public transport with rising deficits and economic crises washing in from the 1980’s, culminating in 1991. However, following the Malmöhus agreement and subsequent investments in the public transport system, by the end of the decade a vastly expanded public transport system was taking shape. But it was not only infrastructure that was altered during the 1990’s; new ways of organizing planning, and new policies and tools for steering the system also contributed to the development of the system. Central to this were different ways of refining and strengthening various of the market-aspect of public transport in relation to other transport modes. This chapter sets out to analyze the combination of changes in organization, planning practices and system developments that took place during the last decade of the 20th century.

The chapter begins by a description of how the decision-making frameworks were reorganized in the wake of the agreement to reform the PTA. After this I discuss the process of designing a new economic steering system for public transport governance, and the resistance to this from the municipalities. I also discuss the development of policy and planning practices, geared toward a reduction of the deficit in public transport and the creation of a more market-oriented public transport system. Finally, the chapter ends with a description of developments in the transport system during the 1990’s.

9.1 Reorganizing the PTA

Through the Metropolitan agreement the municipalities and the County Council in Malmöhus had agreed to reform the public transport authority at the hands of Malmöhus Läns Landsting and Malmö municipality (see the previous chapter). Equipped with a list of infrastructure projects to implement and a newly adopted long-
term plan to guide the development of the public transport system in the county, conditions for implementing the transit corridors strategy were beginning to ripen. It was however necessary to define how to organize and steer the implementation of the new strategy while simultaneously staying attentive to the financial conditions for public transport that still haunted the organization. A group called Trafik 91 was responsible for suggesting a new organizational form for public transport in the county.\textsuperscript{558} In a memo the group stated there was a need for a platform for political debate where traffic political goals could have an impact. At the same time there was also “an operative side where the demands for efficiency are entirely decisive”.\textsuperscript{559} The existing PTA – that had changed name from Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB to Länstrafiken i Malmöhus län AB (LMAB) in 1990 – was ultimately governed by politicians through the shareholder assembly, but according to the proposal by Trafik 91, the political and operational functions were to be organizationally separated in the new setup. The political platform and strategic policymaking would be filled by a political assembly and operations and detail planning by a public transport company. By separating the organization of political and strategic policy making from the organization of detailed planning and operations, there was an ambition to highlight the politicians’ role in public transport, at the same time as they were to be kept from muddling in the economic and technical planning and execution of operations, which was considered a key issue in the existing PTA.

According to this logic the governance of public transport was split in two distinct organizations. A municipal association named Kommunalförbundet för Malmöhus kollektivtrafik (usually referred to in short as Malmöhus Trafik, the name that will be used from here on), owned by Malmö municipality and the County Council, was created to take over responsibility for regional public transport on January 1, 1992. Malmöhus Trafik assumed ownership over the public transport company, LMAB. The municipalities in the Municipal Association of Malmöhus sold their shares in the public transport company for 1 SEK each to Malmöhus Trafik, and a tax reform was carried out.\textsuperscript{560} To secure municipal influence over public transport planning the agreement to

\textsuperscript{558} Samarbetskommittén Trafik 91, Nytt huvudmannaskap kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län. Förslag 1991-09-02. The report was written by Stig Håkansson, Ulf Jakobsson and Rune Nyman.

\textsuperscript{559} Samarbetskommittén Trafik 91, 4.

\textsuperscript{560} Samarbetskommittén Trafik 91, Överenskommelse med anledning av ändrat huvudmannaskap för kollektivtrafiken i malmöhus län. The tax reform meant that the municipalities lowered their taxation levels by 0.18 SEK and the County Council raised their taxation by the same amount, whereas the municipal subsidy meant that each municipality contributed to the PTA with the difference between the cost of traffic and the value of the taxation shift. The taxation shift did not cover all operations, so for six years the municipalities also paid the difference to uphold traffic supply.
Figure 9.1 Organizational chart with authority over and operation of public transport in Malmöhus County from 1992. ¹ Helsingborg and Lund still retained authority over local public transport. ² Municipal influence over low-demand services (from 1995).
reorganize the PTA stated that the traffic supply plan and the long-term plan were to be developed “in consultation with the municipalities”, and projects that impacted particular municipalities, were to be developed in participation with them.561 However, the subregional traffic committees were dismantled and replaced by traffic groups organized by the Municipal Association for Malmöhus Län. The new traffic groups were thus, unlike the traffic committees, not an integrated part of the formal governance structure of the new PTA.

The central elements of change from this restructuring of public transport governance were thus twofold: first, the municipalities (except Malmö) from now were outside of the formal authority over public transport. As mentioned earlier, this had important institutional implications since the authority over land use planning and public transport planning were separated on different scales. Second, whereas under MLT’s authority the public transport company had simultaneously been the political authority and the executor of traffic planning, and the public bodies exerted direct influence over the company as shareholders, the municipal association Malmöhus Trafik was now the formal Public Transport Authority, who in turn delegated operational and detail planning duties to the public transport company Länstrafiken i Malmöhus AB.

9.2 Steering public transport toward the market

9.2.1 Introducing a new steering system

The economic incentives for traffic production and the deficit distribution model had been a source of discussion since the mid 1980’s, but effectuating change had been all but impossible under the old regime. Empowered by the new governance setup, along with the organizational changes sketched above, the PTA wanted to establish new ways to finance and govern the development of the public transport system and immediately set out to plan and implement a new steering system. In April 1992, Gunnar Hermansson, the director of Malmöhus Trafik, and Björn Falk, the chairman of Malmöhus Trafik, wrote a memo proposing an investigation for the development of a new governance system.562 In the memo they stated that,

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561 Samarbetskommittén Trafik 91, 3.
Given what is now happening in the public sector, with cutbacks and a general economic austerity, it may be hard to motivate growing subsidies for public transport. The development and level of the deficit makes it urgent to, if possible, to find another system for financing [public transport] and covering the deficit.  

The politics of austerity called for new ways of governing and steering the development of the public transport system. Therefore, they argued, “another system should be developed so that it gives conditions for Länstrafikens AB [the public transport company] to work more market oriented and business oriented.”

A decision to develop a proposal for a new steering system was taken in June 1992, with the aim to implement the new steering system by January 1, 1994. A consultant was hired to analyze travel flows and the economic results on a service-by-service basis, and in February 1993 a first proposal was presented. The current system, where surpluses and deficits were regulated in retrospect between the public transport company and its owners, was deemed problematic due to a number of weaknesses: weak signals from the market to the owners of traffic; long planning cycles and slow reaction to changes in demand; unclear goals for public transport; weak incentives for increasing efficiency in traffic, and a rapid increase of the deficit. According to the new model, the public transport company was to receive increased freedom to operate on commercial conditions as well as a greater responsibility for its own finances. An essential feature of the new governance system was that “public transport as far as possible shall be formed on the market, i.e., based on the conditions offered by people’s travel needs, willingness to pay, time use and other priorities, the cost of producing traffic, as well as competing transport modes and what these offer in terms of benefits and drawbacks.”

To ensure that both political responsibility and operational efficiency were to be maintained and promoted, a five-step process of setting and agreeing upon goals and operations for public transport was proposed: 1) the politically governed Municipal Association would set political goals and strategic development targets for public transport; 2) the municipal association was to decide on the subsidy level according to a model that rewarded ridership (one krona in subsidy for every earned krona in income) and included a cap on subsidies; 3) the public transport company would plan traffic in the most business economically optimal way according to the set budget

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563 Malmöhus Trafik, 1.
564 Malmöhus Trafik, 1.
566 Malmöhus Trafik, Styrelseprotokoll 1993-02-02.
568 Malmöhus Trafik, 2.
frames; 4) the municipal association would buy politically motivated traffic that the company would not perform on a business economic basis; 5) a contract would be signed between the municipal association and the public transport company. This contract would be revised each consecutive year.\textsuperscript{569} It was stated that the subsidy system “is a way to, in the municipal association’s governance of the public transport company, enhance the economy and ridership and simultaneously provide increased freedom for business economic considerations within the company.”\textsuperscript{570} The prestation-based subsidy was called the ‘general subsidy’ for public transport, and the subsidy for unprofitable services was called a ‘specific subsidy’.\textsuperscript{571}

Based on the frames set by the PTA, the transport company was from now on expected to operate on profit maximizing grounds. Importantly, since subsidies were tied to incomes, the model was intended to incentivize investments toward those services that generated the most revenue for the company. As a balancing measure and to ensure that the transport company would not simply discontinue all unprofitable services, the PTA could buy ‘politically motivated’ traffic. As was stated in a small report on the development of Malmöhus Trafik during the 1990’s, the new model for financing turned the old model on its head: the previous deficit distribution model had practically worked so that the lower the cost-coverage, the higher the subsidy, whereas the new model rewarded higher cost-coverage (i.e., more passengers) with more subsidies.\textsuperscript{572} Based on a purchaser-provider model, Malmöhus Trafik’s role would be to buy and finance traffic from the traffic company (that was owned by Malmöhus Trafik) who would plan and carry out traffic through procurement.

9.2.2 Pushbacks against the steering system

A crucial rationale for centralizing and regionalizing the PTA was to create a more unified governance system by concentrating formal authority at the hands of fewer stakeholders and with more regional scope. Still, the municipalities’ collaboration was crucial, not least because of the influence over traffic conditions wielded through the municipal planning monopoly. The proposal for a new steering system was framed as a wholly internal affair between the PTA and its subsidiary public transport company. In a memo to the board of Malmöhus Trafik, Gunnar Hermansson wrote that the new steering system “does not primarily affect the relation to the association’s members or

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\textsuperscript{569} Malmöhus Trafik, Nytt system för samhällets bidrag till kollektivtrafiken. PM 1993-01-20.
\textsuperscript{570} Malmöhus Trafik, Kollektivtrafikens kostnader - principer för subventionering. PM 1993-01-15.
\textsuperscript{571} Malmöhus Trafik, Som på räls: historien om hur kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län effektiverades och hur en negativ ekonomisk trend kunde brytas, 18.
\textsuperscript{572} Malmöhus Trafik, 18.
\end{flushleft}
the county’s municipalities.” Still, the system was intended to “elucidate the need for reprioritizations and efficiency improvements which will have consequences for the traffic supply in the county,” and the proponents of the new system likely underestimated the extent to which a new subsidy system could be kept separate from the relations between the PTA and the municipalities.573

While the initial intention was that the new system be implemented by January 1994, the process was met with opposition from the social democratic group at the board, but even more so from the municipalities.574 In a comment to Malmöhus Trafik, the Municipal association for Malmöhus Län575 expressed concerns about the effects of the new subsidy system and stressed the need for the municipalities to be included in consultations before any radical changes to the subsidy system were implemented. Minutes from discussions between Malmöhus Trafik and the new traffic groups about the proposal show a great deal of resistance from the municipalities.576

Two related and, by now, familiar aspects stand out in the critique of the new steering system: municipal influence over traffic political decisions and how to define and ensure basic traffic supply. As a countermeasure in the agreement to hand over authority over public transport the municipalities were guaranteed that no major alterations to the traffic system were going to be made. A footnote to the reform agreement stated that the traffic level in 1991 (the time of the agreement) “is deemed to fulfil reasonable demands on a satisfying traffic supply. The criteria in place for current traffic shall also be guiding for the traffic run by the Municipal association.”577 As a regional counterbalancing measure, the reform agreement also included a 5 MSEK yearly subsidy for three years for rural traffic in Hörby, Höör and Sjöbo municipalities to be distributed in consultation with the recipient municipalities.578 Faced with the prospects of a new steering and subsidy system that was explicitly geared toward an increased market adjustment and further redistributions toward services with better revenue and growth potential, many municipalities worried that this would incur losses of existing traffic supply. Therefore, they chose to interpret the promise in the reform agreement to uphold a basic traffic supply as a legal obligation to at a minimum

574 Malmöhus Trafik, Styrelseprotokoll 1993-02-02, §12, resevation. The social democratic group in the municipal association’s board opposed the subsidy system, arguing that there were major changes to the traffic system expected but that these consequences had not been disclosed. At the same time, the social democrats saw no ‘fundamental flaws’ in the public transport company working on ‘stricter business economic conditions’.
575 Kommunalförbundet Malmöhus Län
576 Malmöhus Trafik, Förbundsstyrelse protokoll 1993-08-09. bilaga §40.
577 Samarbetskommittén Trafik 91, Överenskommelse med anledning av ändrat huvudmannaskap för kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län, 2.
578 Samarbetskommittén Trafik 91, 2.
maintain traffic supply at the 1991 levels for each municipality. Kävlinge municipality commented that “the point of departure must be that already existing agreements about base services shall remain, and that possible deviations ought to be mutual. Elsewise, Kävlinge municipality claims the right to protest and at the last instance withhold parts of their financial commitment.” Sjöbo municipality, who had been critical of the reorganization of the PTA, was also sharp in their critique and expressions of worry about the effects of the new system, especially for rural transport services. There were also complaints over the lack of transparency and collaboration between the new PTA and municipalities: in a biting remark, Per-Olof Ågren, representing Höör municipality, suggested that Malmöhus Trafik “needs to learn how the consultation process should be done.”

In an interview, Mats Améen, who worked at the public transport company, recalled that there was a severe distrust from the municipalities toward the new organization: “they didn’t believe any good about the [PTA]. They were scared that this would lead to cutbacks, as municipalities got less say about things.” Clearly provoked by the proposal for a new steering system, the traffic groups voted to support pressuring Malmöhus Trafik to improve the municipalities’ influence over traffic planning through consultation, or they would consider annuling the agreement that was only just 18 months in the making.

Faced with this barrage of critique and threats from the municipalities, and recognizing that “good contacts with the municipalities in the county is of great importance” for Malmöhus Trafik, in August 1993 the chairman Björn Falk suggested that the implementation of the new steering system should be postponed to accommodate new rounds of negotiations and input from municipalities regarding their influence over public transport governance. Since an obligation to maintain traffic supply at 1991 year’s levels obviously interfered with the ambition to create a more flexible and market adjusted system, Malmöhus Trafik was eager to avoid rigid legal interpretations of basic traffic supply in the agreement. Instead, they hoped that

581 Interview with Mats Améen, 2020-09-11
583 Malmöhus Trafik, Förbundsfullmäktige protokoll 1993-09-29; Malmöhus Trafik, Förbundsstyrelse protokoll 1993-08-09.
by “developing the forms for deciding the orientation of traffic [supply], a locking to older traffic production may be avoided.”

The suggestion to postpone the implementation of the new steering system was supported by the council. After another half year of discussions and negotiations, an amendment to the PTA agreement was presented that included alterations and clarifications in two regards: first, a new form for coordination between the county’s municipalities and the PTA, and second a clarification of the economic commitment from municipalities. Concerning coordination, it was admitted that, due to their informal and external status, the new traffic groups that had been formed within the Municipal association of Malmöhus had a very limited influence over transport politics. Recognizing that the development of regional public transport needed to be based on a “trustful collaboration between the principal and the municipalities”, the establishment of three ‘advisory traffic groups’ with representatives from each municipality was proposed to improve the ‘contact surfaces’ between the stakeholders. The new advisory traffic groups were organized according to the municipalities’ relations to the three major nodes in the traffic system: Malmö, Helsingborg and Lund. This groups were thus organized based on the functional relationships within and between the major nodes in the transport system, rather than preexisting municipal associations. As a further benefit, the groups’ constitution further disassociated public transport planning from old administrative lines drawn in Malmöhus. The advisory groups’ primary task would be to “judge the need for traffic supply for the population living and working within each group’s geographical area of interest. Furthermore, the group is a body for communication and information in traffic political issues between local and regional levels.” Coupled to this, the advisory groups did also get actual influence over parts of the financial contribution to traffic from Malmöhus Trafik by being able to direct how the ‘specific subsidy’ to unprofitable traffic was to be distributed within each groups’ region.

Concerning economic responsibilities, a second aspect of the amendment clarified the economic consequences of reduced traffic supply. It was stated that if traffic was

584 Malmöhus Trafik, Komplettering av överenskommelse ang kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus Län. Förslag 1994-03-10, 1; see also Malmöhus Trafik, Förbundsstyrelse protokoll 1994-03-23, §25.
585 Malmöhus Trafik, Förbundsfullmäktige protokoll 1993-09-29; Malmöhus Trafik, Förbundsstyrelse protokoll 1993-08-09.
586 Malmöhus Trafik, Komplettering av överenskommelse ang kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län. Förslag 1994-03-10, 1.
587 Malmöhus Trafik, Komplettering av överenskommelse ang kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län. Förslag 1994-03-10.
588 Malmöhus Trafik, Som på räls: Historien om hur kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus Län effektiverades och hur en negativ ekonomisk trend kunde brytas, 20.
reduced and induced lowered net costs for the traffic company, the municipal subsidy for regional traffic was to be reduced with the same amount. This was supposed to ensure that there were no economic incentives for the traffic company to improve its own results by slashing unprofitable services. However, lowered net costs due to “rationalizations, better contracts with entrepreneurs and increased ticket sales” would not induce repayments to municipalities, which meant that such economic efficiency improvements would accrue to the company. Eventually, amidst remaining but softer critique from some representatives at the board and the executive council, the revised proposal was approved by Malmöhus Trafik’s board in April and by the council a few weeks later.

The process of implementing the new steering system elucidates the connection between ideas/values, planning practices and spatial developments of public transport very well. The values of efficiency and market orientation that was placed at center of the new PTA’s policy motivated and justified the implementation of a new system for steering the public transport system. This system included new ways of deciding about and planning routes and services in the systems, with the concrete ambition to reshape the public transport network spatially according to those ideas and values. This spatial rationality was however met with resistance from municipalities who feared they were to lose out from such a solution. The results of the negotiations, both in terms of consultation and economic regulation, was a political compromise on behalf of both parties: the municipalities regained influence over parts of the traffic planning process, without hampering the PTA’s formal control over traffic planning. Importantly, the PTA retained control over the planning of high-demand services and the transit corridors. While unable to rewind the implementation of the new governance model and the transit corridors it promoted, the episode showed that despite being left out of formal public transport governance, the municipalities still carried political weight and would not accept being overridden entirely by the new PTA.

9.2.3 Processes to lower the deficit

As we saw in the previous section, the economic situation for running operations remained strained and from the very start the new owners provided the company with ‘narrower economic frames’. This was aided by the production of steering documents


with a near-term economic planning for three years ahead, which included the economic frameworks given to the company by its owner (the PTA), and the prognosticated need for travel increases to meet these targets. The economic steering set by the owners demanded that deficits were to decrease each year: for example, in the preparation for the three-year plan for 1996 to 1998 the economic frame was nominally unchanged contributions from the owners, which meant that savings had to match inflation, at the time calculated to 3 %. To achieve such steep decreases in deficits a range of measures were mobilized, including a continued spatial redistribution toward high-demand services; new procurement practices; austerity and privatization in local traffic; and price increases.

First, the redistribution toward more profitable and high-demand traffic continued apace. In the traffic plan for 1994 it was stated that “with the purpose of developing bus traffic, there is an ongoing review of new traffic solutions. One of our main tasks is to continue the effectivization of bus traffic. Effectivization is by its very nature something of a Columbii egg. It presses costs and improves incomes, the latter thanks to faster traffic being more attractive in many of our relations.” The designation of efficiency measures as a Columbii (or Columbus’) Egg – a solution to a seemingly insoluble problem that appears as self-evident once you find it – is telling, as it indicates that the solution of speeding up traffic was considered as something novel and previously unachievable. And given the previous decade’s struggles over deficits and traffic production, that must have felt like the case. Echoing this sentiment, when reflecting on the development of the focus on developing public transport in corridors, Gunnar Davidsson, at the time strategic planner at Malmöhus Trafik, stated in an interview that “I was probably not fully aware of this from the start, that has to be admitted. After the fact it has become all the clearer.” The developments in the train and bus system during the 1990’s will be further developed in section 9.3.

A second crucial factor to improve the results was the opportunities made available through the free procurement of contracts for operators. Following the changes in the PTA legislation in 1985 (see chapter five) all route concessions in local and regional public transport were annulled from July 1989, and the PTAs were thus in full control of most of the public transport system within their jurisdiction (SJ still had a monopoly on the trunk railroads). The PTAs could utilize the monopoly either by running traffic in-house or purchase the services from private operators through public procurement.

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594 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, *Trafikförsörjningsplan 1994A*., 3. The Columbus’ Egg has its etymology from a story about Cristopher Columbus, in attempting to prove that finding a new trade route to the Indies would be a revolutionary moment, solving the puzzle of how to make an egg stand by lightly cracking its bottom and create a flat part for the egg to stand on.
595 Interview with Gunnar Davidsson, 2020-08-17
Like most other PTAs, Länstrafiken Malmöhus opted for the latter and in 1989 a plan for exposing all regional bus services for procured competition over a timespan of seven years was presented, with 1/7 of traffic to be procured each year and running on seven-year contracts. At the time of the annulment of concessions SJ’s bus company, SJ Buss, held around 85% of the regional bus traffic. The first procurement procedure in 1989 included six traffic bundles (collections of services that made up a functional unit) that had hitherto all been run by SJ Buss but were now won by four different companies.596 In 1993, the private operator AB Linjebuss won a contract to run 53 buses that was expected to lower costs by 18%.597 Over time, AB Linjebuss and the state-owned Swebus AB won both the most and largest contracts, but smaller contracts were also won by minor companies.598 While the procurement practices had commenced before the new PTA was in place, the impact from procurement on the economic results was shown primarily during the 1990’s. Over the course of the 1990’s procurement practices in local and regional public transport were gradually institutionalized and spread across the country. In 2003 it was estimated that on a national level 90% of all local and regional public transport was procured in competition, a process that rendered a lowering of the total cost of operations between ten to fifteen percent.599

A third factor in the economic restructuring of regional public transport were the austerity measures and privatizations imposed onto local traffic in Malmö municipality. The deficits in local public transport Malmö had ballooned throughout the 1980’s and since the PTA covered 20% of the deficit from local traffic this heavily affected the PTA’s budget and results.600 As part of the takeover of Malmö’s local traffic by the PTA organization from 1991, a program to lower the deficit combining cuts in traffic supply with sharp ticket price increases was implemented, as well as a corporatization of Malmöhus Lokaltrafik, the public transport council in Malmö municipality.601 Between 1992 and 1994 the deficits in local bus services in Malmö was


597 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, *Styrelseprotokoll 1993-12-17*, §139.

598 The smaller bus companies included Ödåkra Buss, Linjetaxi i Skåne AB, Mårtenssons Buss, as well as a Danish company, Bus Danmark A/S. Several of the smaller contracts were for high school buses or demand-responsive taxi buses. See: Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, *Styrelseprotokoll 1994-02-25*, §24; *Styrelseprotokoll 1995-03-17*, §6; *Styrelseprotokoll 1995-06-02*, §45; *Styrelseprotokoll 1995-08-25*, §59; *Styrelseprotokoll 1996-04-26*, §22; *Styrelseprotokoll 1996-11-15*, §79; *Styrelseprotokoll 1997-11-28*, §90.


600 In MLT’s annual report for 1987, the CEO Nils Wahlberg associated the larger-than-expected deficit with the subsidies to local traffic, and lamented that “the size of this subsidy cannot, under current agreements, be affected by the company.” Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, *Årsberättelse 1987*, 1988, 1.

to be reduced from 206 to 179 MSEK, ca 15%.\textsuperscript{602} This was to be achieved by hiking prices by 36\% and cutting traffic production by 4\%.\textsuperscript{603} In 1993 the liberal coalition governing Malmö since the elections in 1991 also voted to sell the local public transport company (that had been corporatized as part of the takeover by the regional PTA) to the public transport company, LMAB. In turn, and against protests both from the social democratic opposition from Malmö at the board and employees at Malmö Lokaltrafik, the public transport company directly sold it to Linjebuss AB for 80 MSEK.\textsuperscript{604} The cutbacks and privatization of Malmö Lokaltrafik were apparently unpopular among citizens too. The measures were expected to incur a ‘marginal drop’ in ridership, but from 1990 to 1994 the number of trips made in Malmö local traffic dropped from almost 28 million passengers per year to 20 million per year, a loss of almost 33\% of passengers.\textsuperscript{605}

Fourth and finally, there were measures to achieve deficit reductions through raising ticket prices in regional public transport. In 1992 prices were raised on average 9\%, in 1993 a VAT increase from 18 to 21\% caused an average ticket adjustment of 8\%, and when VAT on travels was lowered from 21\% to 12\% in 1993 only the price of high school season cards was lowered.\textsuperscript{606} Ticket prices were raised again in 1994 and November 1996.\textsuperscript{607} Through an upward adjustment of ticket and travel card prices, the public transport company secured a further reduction of the deficit.

Whether popular or not, this combination of efforts had its intended effects on the balance sheets. The deficit in the public transport company peaked in 1991, but from 1992 to 1997 the deficit shrank for each consecutive year. In 1997 the deficit was 258 MSEK, less than half of what it was in 1991. At the same time incomes from ticket sales grew from 330 MSEK to 466 MSEK, while total costs shrank from 855 MSEK to 769 MSEK during the same period (see Figure 9.2). So, while total costs saw a 10\% decrease over six years the deficit shrank by more than half. The cure against the deficit was a diet of austerity, but in the end the PTA managed to achieve its economic targets.

\textsuperscript{602} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1992/93}, 1992, section 5.2.

\textsuperscript{603} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 1993/94}, 27.


\textsuperscript{605} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, \textit{Översyn av Malmöhus Trafik. PM 1995-08-31}.

\textsuperscript{606} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, \textit{Styrelseprotokoll 1993-06-18}. §73 The social democratic leader, Sten Norin, suggested a general price reduction of 5\% on all tickets, but the board voted that only the student travel cards were to become cheaper.

and saved money that would later come to be used as regional co-financing for the construction of the City Tunnel under Malmö.608

9.2.4 New tools of analysis

Along with the development of a new steering system and more market-oriented mindset in public transport, the ways of grasping and analyzing the public transport system were adapted and updated. For example, in a small but discursively significant shift, to emphasize the orientation toward market adjustment what had formerly been named the planning division was renamed the ‘market and planning division’, highlighting the market aspect of the public transport company. As the quest for rising passenger levels was framed as a competition for customers, an increasing focus on quality as an important complement to quantitative aspects of the public transport system developed. In the annual report for 1992, the CEO Björn Jonsson stated that “our customers are becoming more aware. Rightly, they demand fast, safe, and reliable communications at reasonable prices. They want trips with quality.”609 Whereas the main analytical and evaluative tools had hitherto been focused on quantitative traffic standards – departure frequency, ridership levels, and traffic volumes – this was now being complemented with qualitative surveys indicating people’s subjective perceptions of the different parts of the transport system.610 While surveys of travelers’ satisfaction services had been conducted earlier too, the novelty was the intimate connection between quality surveys and the institutionalization of procurement of traffic contracts. Quality surveys were employed as a tool to improve the contract requirements from the PTA to the operators: they were carried out to identify which factors passengers valued most and how they ranked in importance, results which in turn informed “the qualitative demands the company puts on the ‘software’ in the operators’ performance, i.e. the quality that we buy.”611 This shows how the same knowledge was used for new purposes under a different institutional regime.

608 Interviews with Mats Améen, 2019-10-29 and Ingemar Bryman, 2020-09-23. (While ultimately a success, one may presume that this economic redistribution of savings in other parts of the transport system toward Citytunneln, was the kind of ‘drainage of resources’ that Helsingborg, Lund and other municipalities had worried about in their critique of the Malmöhus Agreement.)

609 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Årsberättelse 1992, 1.


Another aspect that affected how the public transport system was understood and valued was the expanded *environmental discourse*. The wider environmental impacts of the transport system had become increasingly important policy aspect toward the end
of 1980’s, as was shown not least in the metropolitan negotiations and the Malmöhus Agreement.\footnote{Local programs environmental such as Miljödelegationen i Västra Skåne also contributed to highlighting the situation, not least with regards to the role of traffic in environmental degradation. See e.g. appendix 9 to Styrelseprotokoll 1990-02-14.} As we saw in the previous chapter, the Malmöhus agreement had a focus on improving the environmental performance of the transport system, which translated into a focus on train services, investments in natural gas buses and infrastructure, and increasing the speed of public transport to improve competitiveness. However, it was also noted that in the long-term plan the environmental performance of buses was not construed as a reason to reduce rural services. In the process of implementing the new steering system the trade-offs between accessibility and environmental performance came into the spotlight, however. In a Q&A pamphlet about the new steering system published by Malmöhus Trafik the hypothetical question “will traffic in rural areas with low ridership be cut on behalf of the heavy services in the most populous parts of the region?” was asked. The equally hypothetical answer provided was:

No, if there is a political majority that for e.g., social, regional political or market reasons it is [considered] urgent to uphold traffic, despite low ridership. But if there is a political majority [for the position] that it is first and foremost public transport’s effects on environment, traffic safety and availability that are to be prioritized, the answer may be yes.\footnote{malmöhus trafik, förslag till en ny modell för planering, finansiering och beslut, 1994 see Styrelseprotoll 1994-03-24, appendices to §25 .}

By the mid-90’s the latter position seemed to have won out. The transport goals for 1996 – 1998 stated that that “traffic planning, vehicle size, fuel, technical vehicle design, driving style, shall be designed so that energy consumption and admissions per person kilometer is lower in public transport than car traffic.”\footnote{Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafiksökringsplan 1996, 1995.} Such reasoning held direct consequences for the spatial configuration of the system: “the environmental targets mean, among other things, that traditional public transport is not always the most environmentally friendly alternative. If demand is low, assessments should be made over possible alternatives.”\footnote{Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB.} The increasingly important aspect of environmental efficiency and performance thus further strengthened the turn toward transit corridors.

Other changes in the planning practices of the PTA related to the development of \textit{new analytical models} that would allow for a better and more accurate transport planning. In 1991, a new proposal for quantifying and calculating basic traffic supply was developed. The benefit of such a measure was that it could be scaled to fit any unit of analysis, from municipalities to the subregions or the whole county. With the aim
to base it on data that was objectively measurable, updated yearly and had an impact on transport demand, two parameters were singled out: population density and age distribution within a given municipality or area. Population density was a relatively straightforward measure whereas the population was divided into three age groups with different travel characteristics: 16 – 19 years, 20 – 65 years, and 65+, denoting high school trips, work commuting and service trips. The elderly population was weighted lower than the other two groups, highlighting the tilting of public transport policy toward more attractive traveler groups.\(^{616}\)

Another analytical model was introduced in 1994 when the regional bus system was differentiated into four categories: a trunk network, a base network, demand-responsive traffic, and high school buses. The stated purpose of this categorization was to “structure the internal administration and performance monitoring” and “to strategically adjust traffic and vehicles to the specific customer group.”\(^{617}\) Coupled to this network structure, a new way of establishing a graded base level traffic supply within the region was introduced (see Figure 9.3 for a visualization of how this system worked). The division of travel relations was based on the number of work commuters – excluding school students and special transportation services – between different origins and destinations. For regional traffic, relations with at least 500 work commuters the traffic supply should be at least ten return trips each weekday, with services also on weekends and holidays, whereas relations with at least 100 work commuters should have at least five return trips each weekday. Relations with at least ten high school students should have at least one (1) departure in the morning, and a return departure in the afternoon. And as a floor level all inhabitants should, within two kilometers walking distance, have the possibility to make at least three trips per week to a municipal center.\(^{618}\) As we can see, new institutional situation of procurement between operators and PTAs together with intensified rationalities of customer orientation and environmental qualities gave birth to new ways of analyzing and

\(^{616}\) Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, *Modell för fördelning av bastrafik. PM 1991-01-14.*

\(^{617}\) Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, *Trafikförsörjningsplan 1994A.*

\(^{618}\) Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, *Trafikförsörjningsplan 1995, 1994 bilaga 5.* This system can be interpreted as a response to the criticism raised about the vagueness of what the basic service level that was supposed to be upheld meant in practice. Of course, the goals only stipulated that each relation should have a *minimum* number of departures; as long as the base service was delivered, great differences between varying origins and destinations was technically not a divergence from policy. At the same time, we can note that in 1987, when the regional PTA took over responsibility for complementary traffic, the distance to the nearest service was set at 1 kilometer. Just like the minimum ridership coverage that was gradually raised to allow for a quantified justification for reducing weak services, these sliding scales in relation to minimum standards are indicative of the rationalization process that was simultaneously a precondition for and a result of the primacy of transit corridors in Malmöhus.
evaluating the public transport system and constructed novel policy knowledges that were then employed in the spatial visions for the public transport system.

Figure 9.3 Map showing traffic supply frequency in Malmöhus in 1998. Solid lines are relations with 10 return trips daily, broken lines show relations with 5 return trips. Source: Malmöhus Trafik: Som på räls. 1998, 17

9.3 Materializing the Malmöhus Agreement

Ultimately, the changes in organization and steering were materialized in the spatial and technological configuration of the public transport system. Grasping the impact of the transit corridor paradigm is difficult without understanding the many developments during the ‘decade of infrastructure’ for Malmöhus county. The public transport system in Malmöhus saw a flurry of activity inside and outside of the county during the 1990’s, much of which was discussed in the Malmöhus agreement though
not nearly all of it was included in the agreement. In the following section I will describe some developments in the transport system during this time.

9.3.1 Expanding the rail system

As was intended in the negotiations between the government and representatives from Malmöhus, the Öresund connection motivated a rapid and geographically extensive integration of public transport systems, primarily trains. This included planning and preparations for a new regional train system across Öresund and the integration of regional trains from Kristianstad Län, Citytunneln, the expansion of the West coast railway, electrifying parts of the railway, and upgrading parts of the local and regional bus system. Following the Malmöhus agreement and the transfer of the authority over local trains from the State railway company to regional public transport authorities, the train system in Malmöhus and Skåne increased in regional strategic importance. The developments of the train system required an extensive collaboration with organizations and authorities outside the geographical and judicial boundary of Malmöhus Län, not least with the Swedish Rail Administration and SJ. Coordination with other PTAs were also important to the creation of a coherent interregional transport system. To accommodate an increased integration and expansion of the public transport systems, in 1992 the presiding committees of the Malmöhus Trafik and Kristianstads Läns Trafik AB, initiated a partnership to improve coordination of train and bus services between the two counties.619 The PTAs of Malmöhus, Kristianstad, Halland and Västra Götaland also created a project group together with SJ to investigate the needs and possibilities in the planning of the West Coast Railway.620

Three train systems dominated the planning processes for the regional public transport system: the West Coast Railway, Öresundstågen, Citytunneln and Pågatågen. During the 1990’s the West Coast Railway was being planned for expansion. Double tracks between Lund and Kävlinge were financed by the Malmöhus agreement but this was only a short (albeit important) part of the larger plan, which covered a double track expansion all the way from Malmö to Gothenburg, including the construction of a (soon to be both infamous and scandalous) tunnel underneath the Hallandsås ridge separating Skåne and Hallands län.621 Helsingborg’s new central station, Knutpunkten,  

619 Länstrafiken Kristianstad, Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, and Malmöhus Trafik, Samverkan kring tåg och bus.
620 Malmöhus Trafik, Strategi för Västkustbanans utbyggnad. PM 1994-03-08.
621 The Roca-Gil scandal associated with the Hallandsås tunnel, where highly toxic sealant leaked into and contaminated the groundwater, killing cattle and fish, is among the largest environmental disasters in Swedish history. See e.g. Erland Mårald, Svenska miljöbrott och miljöskandaler 1960-2000 (Hedemora: Gidlund, 2007).
was inaugurated in 1991 and with a subterranean train tunnel under Helsingborg it connected the West coast railway north and south of the city in a continuous line. The primary purpose of the railway was to accommodate the coming high-speed train system, and the question of whether to build new train stations inside or close to the cities along the way or to place stations in more peripheral locations (for purposes of engineering as well as cost-efficiency) was a point of contestation between the national and regional authorities. In a response to Banverket during the planning process, the four PTAs wrote that the agency needed to consider the regional traffic economic conditions and attractiveness, which would be severely lower if peripheral station locations were chosen in all the smaller stops along the way. They stated that “our view on the West Coast Railway is that demands on travel time, where the whole trip is included, is more relevant as a guide for planning than minimum requirements on track geometry.”

In an interview, Mats Améen recalled that Malmöhus Trafik “fought tooth and nail […] so that the tracks would be built to work for Pågatåg traffic as well. In Rydebäck for example, the tracks bend in toward the conurbation [and] the tracks come pretty close to Landskrona, [whereas] initially the plan was to build it closer to the motorway.”

The first part of the new west coast railway in Skåne was opened in 2001, between Landskrona and Helsingborg. The double track extension between Lund and Kävlinge that was part of the Malmöhus Agreement was planned to open the same year – however protests from a group of ‘learned and active people’, as it was diplomatically put by Malmöhus Trafik, delayed it by several years.

The Malmöhus agreement also laid the groundwork for a new train system across Öresund, a core part of the vision for an interregional transport system across southern Sweden. This was tightly coupled to the rationality of regional expansion was by now central to the public transport discourse in Malmöhus. In May 1993, a conference called ‘Udvikling i Øresundsregionen’ was held in Denmark with strong representation from transport organizations from both countries. The same year a letter of intent between Malmöhus Trafik, SJ and DSB (the Danish State Railway company) was signed with the purpose to develop the service concept for trains across Öresund. The traffic across the bridge was initially planned by SJ and DSB without Malmöhus Trafik but in 1998, shortly before the traffic was supposed to start, Malmöhus Trafik

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623 Interview with Mats Améen, 2019-01-23.

624 Malmöhus Trafik, Som på räls: historien om hur kollektivtrafiken i Malmöhus län effektiviserades och hur en negativ ekonomisk trend kunde brytas, 3.


626 Malmöhus Trafik, Interregional järnvägstrafik, förslag till samarbete ang Øresundståg och västtrafiken på västkustbanan. PM 1993-10-22. see also; Malmöhus Trafik, Förbundsstyrelse protokoll 1993-11-05.
was offered the possibility to take over the Swedish part of the authority over Öresundstågen. After negotiations with the Ministry of Enterprise, an agreement between Malmöhus Trafik and SJ was signed with in early 2000. Importantly, the PTA and the Swedish government also agreed that the government would pay the Swedish part of the so-called bridge fee (amounting to 150 million DEK per year). The removed bridge fee ensured higher revenues from the cross-border traffic than would have been the case otherwise, revenues that were used to expand the Pågatåg system further in Skåne toward its neighboring counties, according to Mats Améen.

In 1992, SJ also started a new train service called Kustpilen (‘the coastal arrow’) between Karlskrona in Blekinge län and Malmö, running through Kristianstads län, that would later come to be integrated into the Öresund train system.

Citytunneln. As mentioned previously, Citytunneln was part of the discussions surrounding the Malmöhus negotiations but was left out of the final agreement due to difficulties with agreeing over the financing of the construction. The connection under Malmö, which would turn Malmö central station from a terminus station into a through station, was referred to as the most central piece infrastructure to realize the regional benefits of the Öresund bridge. After further negotiations over financing (led by Bengt Dennis, the former chair of the Swedish Bank who had also led the metropolitan negotiations in Stockholm) and several geotechnical, environmental and engineering reports, the parliament approved extended state financing of the project through the national infrastructure plan for 1998-2007. A City tunnel consortium was created between Banverket, SJ, Malmö municipality and Region Skåne and according to the initial plan the tunnel was to be ready by 2005 (initially, the necessity for the tunnel to be ready by the opening of the Öresund bridge was stressed by several actors, but that vision soon had to be adjusted). However, complications in the project organization caused delay and exceeded budgets, and in 2001 it was agreed that the project would be led solely by the national Rail administration, Banverket.

627 Skånetrafiken, Trafikförsörjningsplan 2001., 27.
628 Several interview respondents highlighted the importance of this agreement. The interview respondents differed slightly in their account of who was the driving force of this agreement.
629 Interview with Mats Améen 2019-01-23.
Besides intense planning for and development of the various interregional train systems, the Pågatåg system also expanded following the Malmöhus agreement. Aided by the subsidies to rural areas that was included in the PTA reform agreement in 1991, Pågatågen departures between Höör and Eslöv were expanded. As part of the Malmöhus agreement, the Malmö–Ystad Railway was electrified and reinaugurated on June 10, 1996, cutting travel time between Malmö and Ystad to 45 minutes at the same time as two new stations in the towns of Oxie and Svarte were added. In 1998 train services between Helsingborg and Ängelholm commenced, and in 1999 the stretch Helsingborg – Ängelholm was added to the network. The train capacity was steadily expanded: in 1999 there were 29 local train stations, compared to 12 when Pågatågen started in 1983.

9.3.2 Upgrading the bus system

The implementation of the Malmöhus agreement included a large number of projects and investments (see Table 9.1). The project varied in size and scope – from new park-and-ride facilities next to train stations at a cost of 400 thousand SEK, to the double track expansion between Lund and Kävlinge with a budget of 400 million kronor – as well as the primary affected and responsible parties, including individual municipalities, Statens Järnvägar and Banverket. The measures were financed through the Malmöhus agreement, with Malmöhus Trafik and the municipalities each contributing a share, but most of the funding came from various state funding, including regional public transport grants and regional infrastructure grants. To accommodate a smooth process of surveys and preparations, Gunnar Hermansson, director of Malmöhus Trafik, had authority delegated to him by the board to enter into agreements with relevant counterparts.\(^633\)

These investments assisted a rapid technical and physical reconfiguration of the bus system in Malmöhus. It included investments in facilities to support high-quality public transport both within and between the larger cities and towns, as well as the shift to natural gas bus systems in large sections of the system. Just shy of half of the total investments in the bus system went to measures in the regional bus system, almost one third to investments in Malmö, and the remainder was shared between Helsingborg and Lund. In the cities, the projects led a reconstruction of street spaces, signal priority systems in street crossings, and upgrades of bus stops and terminals, in accordance with the kind of planning measures identified in the long-term plan and action program.

Following the adopted strategy to speed up regional bus services, in 1992, the public transport company, Länstrafiken Malmöhus, launched a project called Pågatåg på

\(^{633}\) Malmöhus Trafik, Styrelsepunktolk 1993-02-02.
landsväg (Pågatåg on country roads), with the buses to be called ‘Gåsapåg’, clearly alluding to a link between the train system and the new express bus concept. Through this strategic project the PTA was, in the coming years to, “be able to better challenge the private car as a means of transport, especially when it comes to regular travel, e.g., commuting. The product […] is a concept that will give the car competition, but also, note this, invite it to cooperation.”\textsuperscript{634} As the quote states, a central purpose of the express buses was to compete with the car by complementing the car. By improving travel speeds buses would become more competitive with the car, and by building park-and-ride facilities buses would complement it. To prepare for new regional express services route changes, reduced stops and more direct connections, “all with the purpose of

Table 9.1 bus projects in the malmöhus agreement. Source: Malmöhus Trafik, Malmöhusavtalet - objektsförteckning. PM 1992-11-16.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>No. measures</th>
<th>Cost (M SEK)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Measures in regional bus services</td>
<td>(64)</td>
<td>(150.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B1. Park-and-ride facilities, walk and bike accessways to local trains</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B2 Express bus Höganäs – Helsingborg Landskrona</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B3 Express buses Malmö – Trelleborg – Falsterbo</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B4 Express buses Lund – Hörby</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B5 Express buses Sjöbo-Lund</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B6 Other infrastructure measures for regional bus traffic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B7 Facilities for natural gas fuel in regional bus traffic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B8 Vehicle measures in regional bus traffic</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B10 Measures in Malmö local traffic</td>
<td>(14)</td>
<td>(98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B11 Stops and terminals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B12 Bus lanes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B13 Signal priority measures</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B14 Facilities for natural gas fuel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B15 Vehicle measures</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B20 Measures in Helsingborg local traffic</td>
<td>(7)</td>
<td>(33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B21 Stops and terminals</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B22 Bus lanes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B23 Signal priority measures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B30 Measures in Lund local traffic</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(27.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B31 Stops and terminals</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B32 Bus lanes</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B33 Signal priority</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B34 Facilities for natural gas fuel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B35 Vehicle measures</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>309.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{634} Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1992/93.
increasing travel speeds” were introduced. Initially, two services were considered in the Gåsapåg concept: between Lund – Hörby, and Malmö – Sjöbo. In the traffic plan for 1994 the planning for express buses was expanded to include six more services, between Trelleborg – Malmö, Falsterbo – Malmö, Lund – Sjöbo, Landskrona – Helsingborg and Mölle – Helsingborg.

The new orientation toward express services that were central to the strategic plan and the Malmöhus Agreement was met with mixed responses from municipalities. As we saw with the ongoing conflicts over traffic supply between the regional authorities and municipalities in mind there was a mistrust for the new PTA from many of the municipalities. And while the strategic plan had been accepted and MLT had more power through the regionalization of the PTA, the implementation of the new transit corridor strategy was, just like with the rationalization measures during the 1980’s, uneasily embraced by many municipalities. Plans and proposals to reroute traffic to the main roads and reduce stops along the way frequently provoked angry responses from local politicians and inhabitants who complained both over worsened accessibility and traffic safety. Höganäs municipality’s response to the proposal to concentrate traffic between Helsingborg and Höganäs to road 111 in the first express bus service to be rolled out reveals the ambivalence that many municipalities felt in facing the new strategy. Stating that they would not accept the proposal out of hand, the municipality stated that:

the proposal gives the impression of prioritizing speed and comfort at the expense of local service levels. The PTA clearly aims to compete with the car and the proposition implies a ‘trainification’ of bus traffic, where part of the transport work is transferred to the passengers.

This critique is interesting as it points to the trade-off between the travel time for buses versus the travel time for the individuals utilizing it. While the bus service was sped up, inhabitants in several areas would have longer travel times to the bus stops, with the risk of eradicating the gains of faster buses for them. This tension was also discussed in the long-term plan and was used as an argument to speed up traffic. In fact, the PTA was frank about some inhabitants being prioritized at the expense of others: in a news piece reporting on the reduction of local stops, Gert Anderberg from the transport

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635 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, chapter 3
636 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1994A.
638 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1993/94 ch. 12.
company clearly stated that “smaller stops with low boarding frequency will disappear. Instead, long-distance travelers are favored by higher speeds.”639 This relates back to the policy knowledge that was presented in the process to develop the strategic plan that was the policy foundation for the transit corridor strategy, where it was argued that people benefited from longer walking distances due to shorter travel times on the bus. The truth-claim of this statement clearly depended on from where in the public transport system you were looking at it. However, Höganäs municipality still stated that “the principal transformation with express bus as a trunk service is interesting, but can only be accepted with modifications”.640 Generally, in comments from municipalities, it was not at all uncommon to embrace the ideas of speeding up services and making them ‘more attractive’, at the same time as they rejected the concrete effects of that very principle. In some respects, it seemed that municipalities wanted to have the cake and eating it too.

Despite these and similar critiques and a general suspicion from municipalities, the investments and measures inscribed in the Malmöhus agreement continued apace. One fundamental difference at this time compared to the situation before the reform agreement was of course that the municipalities stood with no formal control over traffic supply. Still, they were instrumental for the implementation of the Malmöhus agreement in their role as landowner and land use planner. Here, the function bestowed upon the PTA through the Malmöhus agreement was crucial, as the PTA was designated as the recipient of state infrastructure subsidies, which it would use to co-finance parts of the infrastructure investments. This invested considerable economic power with the PTA, who could offer to co-finance municipal infrastructure upgrades as long as they were in line with the Malmöhus agreement. An important difference compared to the end of the 1980’s was that at that time municipalities were paying more and more and still had to face cutbacks and a shuffling of resources from the weaker to the stronger parts of the county. In the 1990’s, while the rationalization process definitely continued apace, as the fiscal responsibility rested with the County Council and Malmö municipality, it did not affect municipal budgets in the same way, and they were to a larger extent compensated with improved infrastructure in other relations.

640 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförsörjningsplan 1993/94 ch. 12.
Over time, this ensured a broader political support for public transport between municipalities and the regional PTA. As the traffic strategist Mats Améen noted, the new organization,

could prioritize and make investments, they invested the money where they made the most impact, so the critique [from municipalities] was thrown off rather quickly I would say, thanks to being able to simultaneously expand traffic and gain control over the finances, and it didn’t cost the municipalities anything.641

Thus, through the investments made possible through the Malmöhus agreement the public transport network could be improved and expanded with the support of government funding, making possible a shrinking deficit at the same time as the system infrastructure was improved.

The regional bus system also saw large passenger increases, especially with the express services (which in the end was dubbed X-buses instead of Gåsapåg services). Passenger numbers on regional buses increased 9 % in 1995 and 7.6 % in 1996, with express services increasing 19 % in 1996 and the X100 between Falsterbo – Malmö growing by an impressive 40 %.642 In accordance the with the Malmöhus Agreement, the regional bus network was also complemented with investments in park and ride facilities, highway bus stops and modernized bus stops. 7

Simultaneously reductions and rationalizations were made in other parts of the system, especially by removing stops and transferring regular services to complementary traffic. By 1995 the number of regional bus services had been reduced to around 100 from 167 in 1982, amounting to a reduction in the number of services by 40 %.643 While this does not mean that the public transport system had shrunk terms of traffic volumes or patronage, it indicates the effect of the continuous concentration of resources toward the high-demand transit corridors: traffic production was gathered in some corridors, while low-demand regular services were replaced with demand responsive services. At the end of the 1990’s the regional bus system attracted more passengers with fewer services, at the trade-off of lower coverage for those towns and areas outside of the corridors.

641 Interview with Mats Améen, 2020-09-11
642 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Årsberättelse 1995; Årsberättelse 1996.
643 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Årsberättelse 1995.
9.4 Summary

In this chapter I have described how the rationalities of transit corridors that were established through the strategic plan and the Malmöhus agreement was institutionalized and materialized through interlinked processes. First, the reorganization of decision-making frameworks ensured that there was a single, and stronger, actor governing public transport in the county, Malmöhus Trafik with its subsidiary company Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB. This division of public transport governance in one political and one operative organization, and practice of signing yearly contracts regarding traffic supply between them, was motivated on both democratic and market-oriented grounds and is a good example of the penetration of the rationalities of New Public Management ideology in the public sector. However, the new PTA was not strong enough to completely override the municipalities, who pushed back against the new steering system, which resulted in new forms of collaboration and cooperation between the stakeholders with increased influence from the municipal levels.

The implementation of a more business-oriented perspective on public transport governance also spurred the development and adoption of new tools for analyzing and planning the public transport system. The new steering system was by far the most important aspect of this, but also new ways of analyzing the qualitative aspects of the system, to turn public transport planning from a system based on production of traffic to one based on consumption of journeys and the need to evaluate the procurement contracts contributed to new policy knowledges and tools. Finally, the environmental discourse served to bring new aspects into the way that the utility of public transport was understood.

Aided by the investment financing secured through the Malmöhus agreement, these decision-making frameworks, policy tools and planning instruments ensured that the rationalities of transit corridors were materialized in the spatial and technological configuration of the system. The central element here was the expansion of various train systems that laid the groundwork for the patronage increases that were to come, but also the investments in regional express buses and accessibility measures for local and regional bus networks within the major cities played their part.

The combination of these policies and planning measures turned the bleak economic outlook for public transport in Malmöhus in the beginning of the 1990’s into a development-oriented policy arena through which an expanded high-capacity public transport system was built-up. In the next and final empirical chapter, I shall briefly sketch the developments of transit corridors and public transport governance from the creation of Region Skåne in 1999 until today.
10 Bringing it all back home: public transport in Region Skåne (1999 – 2020)

This chapter will return the narrative to the present day. As I have covered in the previous chapters, the rationalities and practices of transit corridor planning was developed prior to the formation of Region Skåne, why I will not go into great detail covering it here. However, the creation of a unified region, and the role of public transport policy in the construction of a regional identity and regional expansion is an important part of the narrative of the success of the development of public transport in Skåne. I will therefore briefly cover the process leading up to the creation of Region Skåne, of which transport infrastructure, together with health and hospital administration, was an integral part. After this I will chart how the transit corridor planning has continued to impact and develop Skåne.

Through the unification of Skåne the potential and functions that rest with the transit corridor orientation that was formulated in the long-term plan and the Malmöhus agreement could be realized and led the way for the creation of a regional public transport system in the same way that the Öresund bridge led the way to an interregional public transport system.

10.1 The creation of Region Skåne

As presented in chapter 5, regional policy in Sweden developed from the ‘localization policy’ discourse in the 1940’s. In parallel with this, a process of spatial reorganization of local and regional authority has developed: the 1950’s, 1960’s and 1970’s saw a fusions of municipalities into larger units, and in the 1960’s a government inquiry into the division between local, regional and national administrations suggested widened
authority for the county councils.\textsuperscript{644} The creation of regional public transport authorities and the subsequent transferring of further authority for local and regional public transport should be placed in this context, driven equally by a search for more ‘rational’ forms of public administration, increased democratization and subsidiarity, and an unburdening of the state budget.

Another step on the path to increased regionalization of the political landscape in Sweden was the trials of increased regional self-governance of the 1990’s. Toward the end of the 1980’s a renewed discussion about the division of responsibilities between national, regional and local political levels emerged. This was, much like the argumentation for transport infrastructure in the Malmöhus agreement (see chapter 9), motivated not least by the changing situation in the surrounding world, with the reorganization of regional relations in Europe and the integration of the European market. There were, as was stated in a government inquiry to analyze the need for new regional roles, a “conception that Sweden needs to create new regions that can change in a European context and not only in the Swedish environment.”\textsuperscript{645} The analysis concluded that a new regional political order with strengthened direct democratic control over regional development affairs was mandated due to an increased international integration, a business politics based on sustainable development, and changes in state administration, and changes among municipalities and regions that required increased border-crossing collaborations.\textsuperscript{646}

Such sentiments were stirring not least among public organs in Skåne, which had an intense international contact network.\textsuperscript{647} In 1992, the so-called “Five-party group” (sv: Fempartsgruppen) consisting of the Municipal associations of Malmöhus and Kristianstads län, the county councils of the same, and Malmö municipality, sent a request to the Ministry of Civil Affairs to be allowed to try a new regional administration, where the two counties would join into a single regional parliament and administration. There were other county councils who also sought a new regional organization and a government commission into trial periods for new regional administrations in Skåne, Västra Götaland, Gotland and Kalmar was initiated.\textsuperscript{648}

The Five-party group argued that in order to improve regional development, rationalizations and problem solving, the former county border should be abandoned.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{646} Regionutredningen, 11.
\textsuperscript{647} Regionberedningen, “Västsverige och Skåne - regioner i Förändring (SOU 1993:97)” 47.
\textsuperscript{648} Regionberedningen, “Västsverige och Skåne - regioner i Förändring (SOU 1993:97)”
\end{flushright}
in favor of a unified governance of Skåne. The government inquiry concluded that there were five central issues at hand for the politicians in Skåne: development coordination; improved efficiency and democratic rule; improved integration and autonomy; the need for a single spokesman for Skåne in relation to the government; and rationalization opportunities for health care services.

Regional infrastructure planning was considered as an important aspect of a future regional self-governance, and in this, public transport infrastructure and planning was integral. In an interview study by Patrik Lind on the process of region building in Skåne, Västra Götaland and Svealand, respondents claim that it was out of the situation for the public transport and health care sectors that a growing sense of need for a new regional organization grew. As was also recounted in chapters eight and nine, in the process of regionalization of public transport in Malmöhus as a consequence of the Malmöhus agreement a unified regional public transport authority for all of Skåne was envisioned. The wish to overcome the barriers for travel between the counties of Malmöhus and Kristianstad had been a longstanding issue where solutions had been sought since the 1970’s. However, just as then, there were interests in Kristianstad County who were less enthusiastic about a proposed unification; for example, the center party in Kristianstad län declined to sign a petition for regional trial period.

In 1996, the parliament passed a bill to allow for a trial period for the formation of regions in the aforementioned counties, who would wield a larger autonomy over regional development policy (which had hitherto rested with the county administrations). This included decision making authority over strategic planning on the regional level, regional transport infrastructure planning, regional cultural institutions, and other regional development resources. The trial was organized in a stepwise process, where functions were to be taken over starting from July 1, 1997.

For Skåne, this meant a fusion of Malmöhus and Kristianstad counties, along with their political and administrative organizations. For public transport it meant that the PTAs in each county would be merged. A temporary organization called Skånestyrelsen (Eng.: the Skåne Board) was set up to prepare the transition of political and administrative functions, and a political committee for public transport and infrastructure was formed within the organization. Three civil servants, Anders

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650 Regionberedningen, 50–55.
651 Patrik Lind, “Regionbildning i Skåne , Västra Götaland och i Svealand - ledande politiker och tjänstemäns syn på tre regionbildningar” (Uppsala, 2010), 7.
653 SFS, “Lag 1996:1414 Om försöksverksamhet med ändrad regional ansvarsfördelning”.
Tingvar, Sven Tufvesson and Gunnar Davidsson were appointed to investigate the issues of spatial planning, environment, public transport and infrastructure and come up with suggestions for how these could be organized in the new organization.\textsuperscript{655} In a report they concluded that two organizational setups were possible: first, that all policy areas would be placed under the same political body, or that public transport would have its own council. Whichever solution was chosen, the report authors stressed that a ‘consistent coordination’ between all four policy areas would be required.\textsuperscript{656} In the end, the political committee for public transport and infrastructure opted for the second option.\textsuperscript{657}

On January 1, 1998, \textit{Regionförbundet Skåne}, a transitionary body formed between the municipalities and the two county councils took over the formal authority for public transport, while operational duties remained with the two traffic companies in each county, Länstrafiken i Malmöhus län AB and Kristianstad läns trafik AB. A year later, on January 1, 1999, the new regional body, \textit{Region Skåne}, took the reins from Regionförbundet Skåne, and the PTAs and traffic companies were dissolved and merged into \textit{Skånetrafiken}, an organization that has remained since. The organizational solution that was chosen was to keep public transport governance in a separate political council and administration from the other policy areas, called the Public transport council. The policy areas of spatial planning, environment and infrastructure has resided with the Regional development council (depending on the political majority in the Region it has sometimes also been called the Regional growth council). Public transport governance was, like it had been in Malmöhus since the reformation of the PTA in 1992, organized at two levels. The public transport council held the political responsibility for public transport, whereas Skånetrafiken handled planning and operations. This was motivated on both of democracy and efficiency:

\begin{quote}
A division of the organization in this way gives preconditions for a cultivation of the political role. The general demand we place on public operations in Sweden is transparency, a broad political debate and clear responsibility. At the same time, we demand that the carrying out of political decisions shall be permeated by efficiency and flexibility. The organization that has the responsibility for operations should have simple/singular goals to work for and maximal freedom to act within the frames and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{655} Malmöhus Trafik, \textit{Styrelseprotokoll 1996-11-22}.


\textsuperscript{657} Skånestyrelsen, \textit{Minnesanteckningar från Skånestyrelsens sammanträde 1997-01-03 § 4}.
Figure 10.1 Governance structure for public transport in Skåne, after Lund municipality handed over authority for local public transport to the PTA in 2013.
guidelines that the political organ specifies. Ways of measuring the operative organization’s performance and degree of goal fulfilment can then also be simplified.658

Mats Améen, who continued working as a strategic traffic planner in the new organization, recalls an at times chaotic and laborious process to combine the two former PTAs into one, and it took several years before a new organization culture could settle. In the end, however, he argued, they managed to take the best parts from each organization, for example the zone and pricing system from Kristianstads Läns Trafik, and the branding of local and regional buses from Malmöhus. It was stated that the organizations should merge on equal terms but given the difference in size both in terms of traffic production and organization, the process was anything but. There was also a worry from municipalities in former Kristianstad län that the merger would result in a tilting of resources toward the western parts of the new region (much like smaller municipalities in Malmöhus worried about the same when the long-term plan was developed around 1990, see chapter 8). As a measure to ensure a regional balance, Skånetrafiken was given new head offices in Hässleholm.659

10.2 Public transport as a tool for regional integration and expansion in Region Skåne

The focus on transit corridors as a means for improved circulation was carried into the new organization: the opening sentence of the first transport supply plan for Skånetrafiken states that “[t]raffic has the role of a blood stream”, and continues: “The conditions for travel and transport belong to the foundational factors for how society organizes itself and develops economically and politically.” Furthermore, “traffic has no value in itself, but a working traffic system for people, goods and messages is necessary for a society with the high degree of organization that we have in Skåne, Sweden, and other parts of the industrialized world.660

With the incorporation of two counties into one, the notion of regional expansion also grew even more pertinent in the transport supply plan: “in the existing expectations for future public transport in Skåne lies large hopes that it shall contribute to that Skåne to an even larger degree shall be able to function as a common region in important

659 Communication with Mats Améen, 2021-11-10
660 Skånetrafiken, Trafiksöörjningsplan 1999.
The new region was responsible for regional development, and the regional development plan centered around four goals: growth, attractivity, sustainability, balance. Public transport’s role in the new region was to ‘bind it together’ and contribute to a ‘rounder Skåne’, with a well-connected and accessible public transport for the travelers. In the public transport strategies that were developed around the turn of the 1990’s there were aims to structure land use planning along Transit-oriented development (TOD) principles (see chapter 8). However, as was stated in the inquiry preceding the trial period for the new regions, regional planning – in the judicial sense of the plan and building act –had never occurred in Skåne. With an overarching authority over both public transport and regional development planning, the development-oriented transit that was the transit corridor policy could be incorporated with a mandate to steer other aspects of spatial planning toward a TOD perspective. However, large investments in improving highways and roads have continued, and as Mattias Qviström and Jens Bengtsson note in a case study of land use and transport planning in Skurup municipality, TOD seems to remain as a complement to car-oriented modernistic planning ideal in parts of Skåne.

The direction of economic management established by Malmöhus Trafik during the 1990’s that had efficiently lowered the deficit in public transport was also carried over to the new organization. It was declared that public transport cannot be operated fully on business economic considerations, but that a wider economic perspective was needed. (Although the conservative party members of the public transport council in Regionförbundet Skåne filed a reservation against what that they saw as inhibiting the formation of a free public transport market.) Public transport should be developed where the customer base was best, specifically around the major cities. Due to the concentration of public transport flows toward the larger cities, the needs for infrastructure measures were concentrated toward a number of ‘heavy corridors’ leading toward the larger cities, especially during peak rush hours. Traffic in the rural and ‘weaker’ parts of the region was to be improved through improved coordination between special transport services and healthcare transport, school buses, and demand-
responsive transport, in line with the aims of the reformed public transport law from 1997 that sought improved resource efficiency through coordination (see chapter 5). Through improved accessibility measures on trains and buses, there was hopes of transferring 50% of service transport trips to regular public transport by 2003, a goal that had to be pushed to 2010, due to both a lag between the goals and the actual modification of vehicles and stops, and the divided responsibility between regular public transport and special transport services and healthcare transport. Improved coordination in 'weak' traffic areas remains the central strategy for development traffic in these locations today.

An important aspect of the new regional governance was also that Region Skåne was responsible for planning the investments the regional traffic system together with the Swedish Rail and Road Agencies. Region Skåne also took over all existing infrastructure commitments inscribed in for example the Malmöhus agreement and Citytunneln. Together this gave substantial influence over investments in public transport as well as road infrastructure. In 2006 and 2008, Skånetrafiken also published two long-term strategic plans, one for developments in the bus system and one for future train traffic. The train strategy, which ran until 2037, projected visions of a greatly expanded railway system, including four-track railways stretching from Malmö to Helsingborg and Hässleholm and possibly also across the bridge to Denmark, light rail traffic around the largest cities, and a bridge or tunnel between Helsingborg and Helsingör in the northern part of Öresund. The bus strategy outlined a target for the coming 15-25 years, and divided the regional bus network into strong, medium-strong and weak corridors – a categorization that has remained since. The bus strategy reiterated a focus on transit corridors, and qualitative requirements on facilities and infrastructure to achieve the goal of increasing ridership levels by 3% per year. The train and bus strategies can in some sense be seen as updated and developed versions of the long-term plan that was developed at the turn of the 1990’s.

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670 Skånetrafiken, Trafikförsörjningsprogram 2020-2030., 42.
672 Skånetrafiken, Tågstrategi 2037.
673 Skånetrafiken, Med buss i Skåne: Strategi för busstrafiken.
10.3 Infrastructure developments in Skåne

10.3.1 Bus traffic

Regional bus traffic. The administrations of Region Skåne was split between Malmö and Kristianstad, with the parliament seated in Kristianstad. In June 1999, a new express bus service was started that connected the two former residence cities, providing a symbolic and physical link between the two seats of power.674 SkåneExpressen, the name that Kristianstads län had used for their express bus network, was transferred to designate the express buses in the whole region.675 The measures outlined in the Malmöhus agreement were finalized by 2003.676 Since then, there have been continued measures to improve bus accessibility and speeds in the cities as well as on the countryside, of which accessibility measures for disabled persons was an important measure. Toward the end of the 2000’s, the bus fleet was expanded by between 30 and 40 buses per year to compensate for lacking accessibility, mostly in and around Malmö, Lund and Helsingborg.677

During the last decade, another project to improve express bus services was launched, called a ‘regional super bus’ concept. The central idea is to develop existing express services to an even higher standard in terms of speed, comfort, and capacity. The regional super bus concept aims to emulate Bus Rapid Transit systems on a regional scale where railways are lacking.678 The slogan for super buses is ‘think rail, drive bus’ – carrying a distinct similarity to the ‘Pågatåg on country roads’ that defined the express bus strategy in Malmöhus in the early 1990’s.679 However, just as then, the proposed super buses require faster and more direct routes, which means that the conflict between coverage and patronage has been rekindled in various places across Skåne where plans for super buses have been proposed.680

Local traffic. Local traffic has also been subject to gradual developments since 1999. Besides major investments in natural gas buses, an electric trolley bus between central Landskrona and the remotely located train station was inaugurated in 2003, as was the bus corridor called Lundalänken, connecting Lund central station to the expanding

674 Skånetrafiken, Trafikförsörjningsplan 2000/01, 26.
675 Skånetrafiken, 27.
676 Skånetrafiken, Trafikförsörjningsplan 2003/04., 35.
677 Skånetrafiken, Trafikförsörjningsplan 2009., 42.
678 Joel Hansson et al., “Guidelines för attraktiv regional busstrafik — regional BRT” (Lund, 2016).
679 Skånetrafiken, Med buss i Skåne : Strategi för busstrafiken (Helsingborg: Skånetrafiken, 2006);
area northeast toward the hospital, the university campus, and the Ideon science park. In 2009, the idea of light rail development in the region that had been floated in the long-term plan (see chapter 8) reemerged, this time as a development project called ‘spårväg i Skåne’ (SPiS). The vision was to develop urban light rail in the three major cities of Malmö, Helsingborg and Lund. The project spurred several reports and inquiries into the feasibility of building light rail in all three cities, but thus far, Malmö and Helsingborg have opted for bus rapid transit corridors instead. Lund, however, who had already built a dedicated bus corridor in 2003 chose to proceed with the light rail development. As the idea turned into a political reality a local opposition emerged, which led to the formation of a new political party whose primary goals was to stop the light rail development. The main question was not whether more and better public transport was needed, but how best to provide it. Therefore, the conflict came to center on the technoeconomic characteristics of trams versus buses: their capacity, cost-efficiency, and flexibility. To draw a parallel to Tomas Ekman’s analysis of the tramway politics in Stockholm during the 20th century, the perception of whether rigidity and flexibility of different transport technologies is good or bad (and for what?), resurfaced at the center of political contestation over tramways in Lund. In the end, the tramway proposal was pushed through and Lundalänken was transformed into a tramway line, constituting the backbone of what is today branded as Lund’s ‘knowledge corridor’, opening in 2020.

10.3.2 Train traffic

The opening of the Öresund Bridge on July 2, 2000, marked a pivotal event in the history of Skåne. Although the Öresundståg traffic got off to a rocky start due to a combination of delays in the delivery of the new trains, and signal errors, the process of regional expansion through public transport got a strong boost through the infrastructural linking of Malmö and Copenhagen. And despite the issues mentioned, the number of travelers exceeded expectations by 40\% for the first six months.
During the first seven months 2.4 million trips were made over Öresund, growing to 4.8 million in 2002 and then increasing about half a million trips per year over the coming years.\textsuperscript{688} The Öresund connection caused an increased flow of commuters between the Danish and Swedish sides and hopes were high for the future seamless international labor market region. However, these hopes have been stymied by a succession of political-economic shocks to liberal capitalism over the last decade. The global financial crisis at the end of the 2000’s slowed down the labor market development. But public transport has been especially hard hit first by the border controls imposed as a measure to stop non-EU migrants beginning at the end of 2015 and then the covid-19 crisis that put international mobility to a screeching halt.

If the Öresund connection was an immediate success, other heavy train infrastructure saw more delay. The city tunnel through Malmö, the Hallandsås tunnel connecting the West coast trunk rail between Skåne and Halland with double tracks, and the double track expansion between Kävlinge and Lund were all delayed, for different reasons. The construction of the Citytunneln commenced in 2005 and was opened in 2010, a decade after the original plan, and Hallandsåstunneln opened in 2015. The opening of the Citytunnel allowed for the extension of Pågatåg services to Trelleborg (2015) and Lomma (2020), and a ‘circle line’ was opened in Malmö in (2018).

Train traffic has developed outside of the most densely populated areas of Skåne as well. In an interview, Mats Améen claimed that the agreement that the government would cover the bridge fee for Öresundstågen (see section 9.1.3) ensured higher revenues from the cross-border traffic than would have been the case otherwise, revenues that were used to expand the Pågatåg system further in Skåne toward its neighboring counties, according to Mats Améen.\textsuperscript{689} The railway between Ystad and Simrishamn was electrified in 2003, providing direct services to between the southeastern and western parts of the region, and the coastal railway in Blekinge was fully electrified in 2007, making possible an integration of the Öresundståg system to Karlskrona, Blekinge’s regional center.\textsuperscript{690} Also, as a response to perceived regional imbalances between the western and northeastern parts of the region and the importance of train services for regional development, 11 municipalities in northeast Skåne, southern Kronoberg and western Blekinge joined together in a collaborative effort called “Pågatåg Nordost”, with the ambition to improve train infrastructure in the region.\textsuperscript{691} Over the last decade, the region has also seen investments in train

\textsuperscript{688} Skånetrafiken, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplaner 2001 – 2007.}

\textsuperscript{689} Interview with Mats Améen 2019-01-23.

\textsuperscript{690} Skånetrafiken, \textit{Trafikförsörjningsplan 2005}, 29.

\textsuperscript{691} \url{http://pagatagnordost.se/}. Accessed 2021-11-22
infrastructure in the region, and several projects are included in the national infrastructure plan by the Swedish Transport Administration.\textsuperscript{692}

Another important change in train services was the right to operate Öresund traffic in other counties along the West coast railway, the Southern trunk railway and Blekinge coast railway, that were given to Skånetrafiken and the PTAs in the adjacent counties in 2006 and 2007.\textsuperscript{693} This opened for the extension of the Öresund trains to Gothenburg, Växjö, Kalmar, Karlskrona and other cities along the way and improved their capacity to steer and plan traffic according to regional development strategies.\textsuperscript{694} In effect, the extension of the Öresund trains meant the realization of the coherent traffic system for southern Sweden that was envisioned in the Metropolitan negotiations 15 years earlier. Figure 10.2 shows the public transport system in Skåne in 2020, and Figure 10.3 shows the development in ridership levels between 1999 and 2014.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig10_2.png}
\caption{Ridership developments in Skånetrafiken 1999 - 2014. Trips per year (million) Source: Skånetrafiken, Trafikkförsörkningsprogram 2016, 13}
\end{figure}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{fig10_3.png}
\caption{Ridership developments in Skånetrafiken 1999 - 2014. Trips per year (million) Source: Skånetrafiken, Trafikkförsörkningsprogram 2016, 13}
\end{figure}


\textsuperscript{693} Skånetrafiken, Trafikkförsörjningsplan 2010., 40.

\textsuperscript{694} Skånetrafiken, Trafikkförsörjningsplan 2009, 40–41.
10.4 The current situation

As can be seen from what I have covered in this chapter, the public transport system in Skåne has continued to be developed and expanded since the creation of Region Skåne. The Malmöhus Agreement laid the foundation for an offensive expansion and improvement of public transport in the county, which has carried over into the new organization. Public transport policy and planning after the formation of Region Skåne and the new PTA, Skånetrafiken, has followed along the same path laid out during the
1990’s. In terms of authority as well as operations, public transport has become ever more concentrated.

The organization, strategies and planning practices that define the transit corridor strategy in transit corridors have been developed and deepened, with a continued focus on speeding up the public transport system in pursuit of a competitive and sustainable alternative to the car as a driver of regional economic growth and expansion. With the opening of the Öresund Bridge and the introduction of Öresundstågen, the expansion of the West coast railway, the construction of Citytunneln and the Hallandsås tunnel, and large investments in local and regional bus infrastructure, the projects begun during the 1990’s to a certain extent realized the potentials for an expanded regional economy on both sides of Öresund and throughout southern Sweden.

However, after long period of political calm and positive developments, the situation today is more strained. The impressive expansion of the public transport system has also driven costs, and although cost-coverage is still higher today than what it was in the beginning of the 1990’s, it has dropped significantly since 2010, while subsidies from Region Skåne has risen almost fivefold since 2000 (see Figure 10.4). Much of the economic gains from the introduction of public procurement during the 1990’s have been lost in the new millennium, and the rising costs for traffic contracts has become a topic for public transport research.695 The decreasing lower cost coverage is partly explained by growing patronage (which requires investments and, thus, incur costs), but a renewed focus on cost-reductions has signaled the return of economic austerity, which in turn has reignited the political and geographical tensions over how investments and cutbacks are distributed. The political conflict around 2018-2019 that was accounted for in the prologue, where the budget was drastically reduced and caused a conflict between local and regional interests thus bears distinct similarities the crisis that beset public transport in Malmöhus in the early 1990’s, with the important difference that municipalities now lack formal authority over the PTA. Add to this the impacts of covid-19 and the cutbacks and concentration of traffic toward the services and relations with higher demand, and we may well see another surge of increasing acceleration of a geographical concentration of public transport resources. What the outcomes of this will eventually be is of course unknown, but that public transport in Skåne is at another crossroad where the rationalities of public transport are up for debate, seems increasingly likely.

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Figure 10.4 Economic development for public transport in Skåne 2000 - 2017. Light green shows the subsidy level, clear green net incomes and the grey line shows cost-coverate. Source: Skånetrafiken. Trafikförsörjningsprogram 2020-2030, 56.
Part III
11 Discussion and conclusions

The aim of this thesis has been to contribute to a deeper understanding of the politics of public transport through analyzing the development of rationalities in regional public transport policy and planning.

To do so, a single case study of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne from 1970 and 2020 was carried out. In this final chapter I will draw out a number of reflections and conclusions from the empirical narrative that I have presented in and relate back to previous research and theoretical perspectives I developed in chapter three. To lay up for my theoretical reflections, I will first briefly recount the story of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne over the timespan that I have analyzed in the empirical chapters. After this, I engage in theoretical reflections around what I see as the most relevant aspects of my analysis. These center on four topics: 1) the construction of a regional rationality for public transport, 2) the development of policy and planning practices, 3) public transport and sustainable mobility, and 4) the role of crises for the development of public transport policy. I end the chapter and the book with some reflections on what I consider to be the thesis’ central contributions to the literature on public transport policy and planning.

11.1 A brief recap of the developments in public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne

In this thesis, I have covered the larger trends in national public transport policy (chapter five) and conducted an in-depth analysis of the developments of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus county and Region Skåne (chapters six to ten). The developments in national public transport policy and the policy and planning practices in Malmöhus and Skåne clearly mirror each other in many ways. However, it is by looking closer at the politics ‘on the ground’ that we can gain an understanding of what such changes have entailed in practice. By studying the politics of regional public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne, I have analyzed how
overarching policy discourses are filled with substance and become expressed in a local context. This combined analysis allows the reader to grasp how national and local policy contexts interact with and impact one another. A timeline over the central events during the period is shown in Figure 11.1 below.

When Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB was established and assumed authority over public transport in Malmöhus in 1981, it was inserted into an existing political ecosystem where the municipalities had gradually begun to take over more authority and responsibility for regional public transport during the 1970’s, especially the municipal associations of SSK and NSK. Through the consortium agreement and the traffic agreement that established the goals and procedures of the PTA, public transport policy and planning was therefore intentionally distributed from the PTA to the municipal associations, who initially controlled most of the planning process, formally as well as informally. Public transport policy in Malmöhus in the beginning thus came to be defined by a municipal perspective, and with the help of policies such as increased state subsidies to unprofitable local and regional public transport and a deficit distribution model that ensured regional balancing between municipalities, the spatial configuration of public transport was directed toward spreading public transport supply across the county.

Soon after the establishment of the PTA, around 1985, the rapidly growing deficits were framed as a central policy problem on both the national and regional levels. This informed a shift in policy that entailed a pivot in the values in public transport policy from an emphasis on equalization and expansion toward cost-efficiency and redistribution. The practical solution in Malmöhus became to implement policy and planning tools to combat the deficit, including raising the minimum occupancy criterion in low-demand traffic, imposing zero-growth in vehicle kilometer production and other means to control the traffic development. While acknowledging the problem with rising deficits, municipalities (primarily in the central and south-eastern part of the county with larger shares of services with low occupancy) consistently questioned or resisted measures imposed on the transport network, often on the grounds of regional equity. Out of the policies and planning nurtured by the deficit management, a conflict grew both over which values to pursue in public transport and the policies and planning instruments employed to realize these values.

During the latter part of the 1980’s, the conflict between the PTA and the municipalities intensified, and while the PTA was gradually handed increasing control over traffic, it remained hard to keep traffic volumes down. This coincided with a stagnation in ridership levels, leading the PTA’s economy in a downward spiral. The crisis culminated in the early 1990’s, when a large austerity package was presented to the PTA by its shareholders. While never fully implemented, this crisis was an important tipping point for regional public transport governance in Malmöhus.
In parallel with, and partly due to, the growing conflicts over deficit management, processes were initiated to reorganize and develop the PTA. A renegotiation of the deficit distribution model was set in motion, as well as a process to develop a long-term strategic plan for public transport. In this plan, transit corridors were formulated as a strategic development goal for public transport in Malmöhus for the first time, together with policy tools and planning principles to implement it. Through this process, transit corridor planning was turned from a business-economic necessity into a strategic vision for regional development and through the process of developing a regional strategy for public transport, the regional perspective on public transport was formulated as the dominant knowledge and policy perspective from which public transport was to be planned and designed.

The twin processes of the Metropolitan Agreement and the Malmöhus Agreement proved to be another decisive development in regional public transport governance. First, the intervention by the state through the Metropolitan agreement prompted the reorganization of the PTA at the hands of the County Council and Malmö municipality in 1992, without the other municipalities in the county. Second, this process also expanded spatially the emphasis on regional development and expansion through the vision of creating an integrated transport system throughout southern Sweden and across Öresund. Third, the decision to build the Öresund bridge and the Malmöhus Agreement that followed on this decision secured infrastructure investments from the government, and provided Malmöhus Trafik, the new PTA, with economic resources and planning power to realize the materialization of transit corridors through extensive train systems and express bus networks.

The development of transit corridors was implemented during the 1990’s under the auspices of the new PTA and their subsidiary public transport company, Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Läns AB. They implemented a new steering system for public transport to improve public transport’s market-orientation (after initial protests from the municipalities) and set in motion a process to decrease the deficit in the PTA through a range of measures, including austerity and privatization, procurement of traffic contracts and a development of more qualitative evaluations of traffic, and large investments in profitable services along the corridors of the county.

Public transport policy and planning in the new millennium after the formation of Region Skåne and Skånetrafiken in 1999, has followed along the path laid out during the 1990’s. With the opening of the Öresund Bridge and the introduction of Öresundstågen, the expansion of the West coast railway, the construction of the City-tunnel and the Hallandsås tunnel, as well as large investments in local and regional bus infrastructure, the projects initiated during the 1990’s to realized much of the potentials for an expanded regional economy on both sides of Öresund and throughout southern Sweden. However, over the last couple of years, old conflicts over the spatial and
Figure 11.1 Timeline over developments in public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne.
technological configuration of the public transport system have flared up. This has been shown not least in local resistance to recent cutbacks in low-demand bus services and opposition to proposals for withdrawn bus stops in plans for a new regional ‘superbus’ system.

11.2 Reflections on the construction of rationalities in public transport

After this brief recap of the developments of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus, in this section I will discuss a few reflections and conclusions to be drawn from the empirical chapters and relate these back to previous research and my theoretical perspectives. These are: 1) the construction of a regional rationality for public transport, 2) the development of policy and planning practices, 3) public transport and sustainable mobility, and 4) the role of crises for the development of public transport policy. Table 11.1 provides an overview of different aspects of the rationalities, institutional practices, and material configurations of public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne that will be discussed below.

11.2.1 The construction of a ‘regional rationality’ in public transport discourse

A central aspect of my analysis of the empirical material highlights the gradual transition in the public transport discourse in Malmöhus toward what I call a regional rationality for public transport. Recalling the discussion based on Jonas Anshelm’s definitions of actors speaking from different positions of centrality or periphery with regards to discourses in chapter three, and adding a spatial lens to this, we can conclude that over time the spatial locus of public transport discourse has transitioned from a local to a regional level. By this I do not mean that the public transport discourse is attached to distinct actors, merely that there is a spatial aspect to the center and periphery of discourses. Evidently, a regional perspective was in many respects presupposed in the regional travel card inquiry and the subsequent public transport authority reform of 1978. However, when national policy was translated into the regional context of Malmöhus, it was the local perspective that became dominant. I interpret this as an effect of power relations in the region at the time, where municipal


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<td><strong>Central values</strong></td>
<td>Equity &gt; cost-efficiency</td>
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<td><strong>Central policy knowledge</strong></td>
<td>Production-oriented, quantitative data</td>
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<td>Expanded subsidies</td>
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<td>Infrastructure investments</td>
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<td><strong>Decision-making frameworks</strong></td>
<td>Municipal dominance (subregional traffic committees)</td>
<td>Transitional / conflictual</td>
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<td><strong>Dominant economic philosophy (see chapter 5)</strong></td>
<td>Keynesian</td>
<td>Transitional / conflictual</td>
<td>Neoliberal / NPM</td>
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<td><strong>Spatial planning paradigm</strong></td>
<td>Equalization</td>
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<td><strong>Spatial configuration</strong></td>
<td>Overall expansion of services</td>
<td>Redistribution from low toward high-demand services</td>
<td>Expansion in high-demand services</td>
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<td>Spatial distribution</td>
<td>Spatial concentration</td>
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<td>Redistribution and coordination of low-demand services</td>
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<td><strong>Technological configuration</strong></td>
<td>Investments in bus services</td>
<td>Revival of trains (Pågatågen)</td>
<td>Investments in railway and express bus systems</td>
<td>Large infrastructure projects finished</td>
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actors could consolidate their position vis-à-vis a more disengaged County Council.

The gradual construction of a public transport discourse imbued with a regional rationality Malmöhus can, based on my material, be further explained by drawing on what Linda Nyberg calls the ‘moral dimension’ of rationality, i.e., claims about ‘what should be done and who should make it so’.697 I will discuss these aspects in turn, by focusing on three interrelated aspects: First, The formulation of a ‘positive’ rationality for regional public transport, second, and related to the first point, understanding public transport policy as a means of societal acceleration, and third, a shift in the role and functions of stakeholders in the public transport sector.

Transit corridors as a ‘positive’ rationality for regional public transport

In chapter seven I identified the policies and planning practices related to deficit management from the mid-1980’s onward as the beginning of a turn toward orienting public transport planning toward more profitable routes in the public transport system. However, this was first and foremost a ‘negative’ rationality for public transport, i.e., redistribution toward high-demand corridors was justified entirely from the need to control the deficit. In fact, one may argue that the primary justification of public transport at the time (an inheritance from the public transport discourse of the 1960’s and 1970’s) was a negation of the destructive effects of automobility: providing accessibility to those without a car and reducing local emissions and congestion arising from cars. Especially the first aspect translated into the design of the public transport system which was built up around a fine-grained network of already existing rural bus services, at a time when it was considered reasonable and justified to equalize transport opportunities between populations and areas.

To become a viable alternative, public transport policy in general, and the practices of transit corridor planning specifically, had to be imbued with a more positive connotation than just decreasing deficits and offering mobility for those without a car. For Malmöhus, the policy processes of producing a long-term plan for public transport between 1987 and 1991, and the twin processes of government-led infrastructure investments, the Metropolitan negotiations, and the Malmöhus Agreement, did just that (see chapter eight). It was by connecting public transport to the nascent ‘new regionalism’ discourse that this was achieved.698 Through the long-term plan the central values and justifications for regional public transport were thus reformulated and a concentration of resources toward the heavy commuter corridors became a strategic goal for regional development, not just a tool of business-economic necessity. The long-term plan and the associated action program also codified concrete policy tools and

697 Nyberg, “Market Bureaucracy - Neoliberalism, Competition, and EU State Aid Policy,” 47.
698 Fernández, Regionalisering och regionalism: idé, ideologi och politisk verklighet.
planning instruments to realize these values, indicating a shift in the dominant policy knowledge and perspective from which public transport was to be planned and designed. The Metropolitan and Malmöhus Agreements infused the public transport system in Malmöhus County with an even grander spatial vision built on rationalities of international competitiveness, European integration, and distribution of economic growth across southern Sweden. Public transport, and especially trains (but also to some extent express buses) was motivated as central to these processes on the grounds of being able to contribute to spreading economic development through regional expansion and, importantly, doing so *more efficiently* than the car. As railways were the fastest land-based transport mode, they provided larger benefits at longer distances and fostered an economic integration and expansion of labor markets. Combining economic growth with public transport’s other advantage, its on average lower environmental impact, the policy processes of the long-term plan and the Metropolitan and Malmöhus Agreements loaded public transport with a discourse of environmental modernization (which will be discussed further below).

Taking the long perspective, there has been a shift from values of equalization and a balancing of regional development through public transport authorities, travel cards and increased subsidies during the 1970’s, via a focus on cost-efficiency, competitiveness and rationalization during the 1980’s to a focus on promoting regional growth from the 1990’s and onward. We can understand the unfolding spatial strategies as a shifting ‘spatialization of reason’ regarding regional public transport.699 To tie back to the discussion at the end of chapter five, on a political-economic level a transition from Keynesian strategies of equalization and balanced development toward a neoliberal strategy of global competitiveness and regional growth can be discerned.700 However, we should not see it as simply a replacement of one spatial rationality by another, but rather that Keynesian and neoliberal spatial strategies have become layered on top of each other in a form of sedimentation of policy objectives and ideological currents. The never-ending political question is how to balance these differing goals and ambitions.

*Accessibility and acceleration in the public transport system*

The shifting spatialization of reason and the focus on public transport’s role in regional development brings me to the next point: the coevolution of the transport system in relation to the general structure of society. Discussing changes in travel behavior it was stated in the transport supply program for 1999 that “all public transport is a

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compromise between demands for speed and accessibility. For several years the tendency has been that speed has increased in importance. While there certainly exists a compromise between different parts of the transport system I, however, believe construing an opposition between speed and accessibility is misguided. Speed does not stand in opposition to accessibility, but speed alters accessibility. The opposition is rather between what I would call intensive versus extensive accessibility. Intensive accessibility denotes a higher degree of local accessibility, usually performed at lower speeds, whereas extensive accessibility employs speed to improve accessibility between destinations at a farther distance from each other. In public transport network design this is expressed in the logics of patronage versus coverage discussed by Walker. The primary focus of accessibility in local and regional public transport has over time shifted from local services to long-distance connections (not least improving the access to the international airport hub Kastrup in Denmark). The development of transit corridors, and its associated policies and planning practices, is thus the story of a gradual reorientation from intensive to extensive spatial relations based on rationalities of cost-efficiency and economic development through labor market expansion. If these values are prioritized, then increasing extensive accessibility at the expense of intensive accessibility is a logical outcome.

What we can read from the evolution of public transport governance in Malmöhus and Skåne is a continuous development and repositioning of spatial connections and form in the public transport system. The general formula of this process is acceleration, in that there is a continuous drive to speed up connections and compress distances. As noted above, a crucial rationality for public transport lies in its competitiveness with the car and the relative speed through which destinations can be reached. Higher speeds in public transport, especially for buses, translates both to higher attractiveness and lower production costs, creating a positive feedback loop and what was called the Columbus’ egg of public transport planning in the public transport company’s traffic supply plans for 1994. The strive for higher speeds and higher profitability in public transport was, and remains, the main reason for the removal of intermediate bus stops on express service routes.

While the investments, reorganization and developments of a public transport system premised on extensive accessibility has certainly improved public transport for the vast majority of the population in Malmöhus and Skåne, it is not only a benevolent

701 Skånetrafiken, Trafikförörjningsplan 1999, 11.
702 Walker, “Purpose-Driven Public Transport: Creating a Clear Conversation about Public Transport Goals.”
704 Länstrafiken i Malmöhus Län AB, Trafikförörjningsplan 1994A, 3.
gesture from public transport policymakers to planners. The logic of acceleration is simultaneously a systemic parameter in the dynamics of capitalism. The essence of capitalism is motion and circulation: more specifically, the dynamics of capitalism rests on the perpetual acceleration of motion and circulation. As transport systems are an integral part of the production and exchange process by facilitating what Karl Marx called the ‘annihilation of space by time’, and David Harvey terms ‘time-space compression’. From a Marxian perspective, the transit corridor paradigm entails a constant, and ultimately necessary, reconfiguration of (public) transport systems to fit the current needs of capital. In the current configuration of global capitalism, railways and other means of public transport are simply more efficient modes of transport to connect people to urban centers and airport hubs.

The transit corridor paradigm, with its focus on extensive accessibility and acceleration, also entails the formation of increasingly mobile subjects: the need for mobile subject is an integral part of discourses of urbanization and regional development. A central logic that motivated the infrastructure investments in the Malmöhus agreement was to increase geographical mobility to hedge against radical shifts in the labor market. The transport policy discourse at the time was one where the vision of a high-mobile society was described as the only path toward success. In fact, the improvement of mobility and labor market expansion has been an imperative since the public transport authority reform in 1978, which also sought to improve labor market connectivity. Tying back the Lefebvrian conception of space as both a product and determinant of social relations, the orientation toward transit corridors in public transport is simultaneously the spatial and socio-technical answer to and enabler of a constantly accelerating economic system.

**Shifts in the role and function of stakeholders**

Turning to the third and final point, the shifts in values and justifications for regional public transport also entailed a repositioning the role and functions of the stakeholders involved in public transport governance and operations. When the national public

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708 Lefebvre, *The Production of Space.*
transport authority (PTA) reform was legislated (1978) and implemented in Malmöhus (1981) there was already a governance arena filled with actors and stakeholders that had gradually expanded their engagement in regional public transport. This was especially so in the case of local train services, where the two municipal associations SSK and NSK struck agreements with the state railway company (SJ) to continue running local train services and develop the Pågatåg system. Although the PTA was the formal authority, it was intentionally organized with little mandate and actual power to govern traffic planning, which was instead distributed to the municipalities via subregional traffic committees.

As I have stated above, my analysis suggests that it was the politics of deficit management that was the igniting factor for a shift in the roles and responsibilities of municipal and regional stakeholders. For the PTA, controlling the deficit development required a different decision-making framework and gaining control over the planning apparatus. Over time, amidst great struggles, the PTA managed to wrest control over decision-making, knowledge production and planning processes endow public transport in Malmöhus with a main purpose to contribute to regional development and expansion, a central aspect of bestowing transit corridors with a purpose beyond reducing the deficit in public transport.

The regionalization of control over planning was however met with hesitance and resistance from many municipalities, and the efforts to reduce the deficit through an orientation toward profitable services in high-demand corridors was undermined by municipal demands for a reasonable equalization of traffic supply. While gradually granting the PTA more control over planning matters, municipalities were unwilling to cede authority over public transport entirely, for example it was not until they were forced to do so by law that authority over the local train service Pågatågen was transferred from the municipal associations of SSK and NSK to the PTA in 1989.

Likewise, while problems in public transport governance were acknowledged by most parties and different inquiries into how to better manage public transport through a reorganization of deficit-distribution models and a reorganized PTA were initiated toward the latter part of the 1980’s, a long-term solution to these issues would not be found without outside influence. By forcing the creation of a new PTA that was owned only by the County Council and Malmö municipality, the Metropolitan agreement also tipped the institutional balance toward the regional political scale, reducing the municipalities as stakeholders for coordination of planning rather than direct owners of the PTA. This signaled the formation of a new regional planning regime where it was the regional perspective that dominated public transport policy and municipalities had to accept a subordinated role. And through the Malmöhus Agreement a financial and political commitment from the government toward investing in transit corridors...
was ensured, that was likely essential to their successful institutionalization and materialization.

It should be stressed that the processes described above ought not to be interpreted as a chronologically linear development. Rather, they were premised on each other in a mutually reinforcing process: through the processes of deficit management, the PTA and the County Council gradually gained more control over public transport planning, which was then employed to define which the central aims and goals for public transport should be. This in turn further shifted the centrality of the public transport discourse toward the regional level, and so on.

Another important shift in perspectives on the role and function of actors in public transport relates to the role of private operators in the planning and execution of public transport. As I discussed in chapter five, the market has been awarded an increasingly central role in public transport governance. In the public transport authority reform, for example, the discussion centered almost exclusively on public sector organizations. Since the introduction of competitive tendering and in 1989 and the gradual consolidation of operators into larger and international conglomerates, operators have become increasingly important as collaboration partners in the planning process. This is reflected in, for example, the partnership for doubling public transport that has gathered both public and private actors, and the requirements on public transport operators and business associations in consultation processes. In Malmöhus and Skåne, the privatization of Malmöhus local traffic company in 1993 is a good example of how private operators were construed as better caretakers of public transport services than the public sector. The role of the private sector in public transport governance will be discussed further in the section on New Public Management.

To summarize this exposé over the construction of a regional rationality for public transport in Malmöhus, I view it as an outcome of shifting power relations between actors both between the local and regional authorities, and the public and private sectors. This repositioning has coincided with larger economic and ideological currents where the spatially and administratively nebulous concept of ‘regions’ have been positioned as the locus of economic development in the global economy. At the same time, this is not something that just happens on its own, and as I have shown, the creation of a regional rationality for public transport in Malmöhus involved a long and at times inflamed conflict over control over the goals, aims and practices of public transport, whose outcome was never certain before it was realized.

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11.2.2 The development of policy tools and planning instruments

The next reflection relates to the relation between rationalities, policy tools and planning instruments. Based on a Foucauldian theorizing around the concept of rationality, in chapter three I stressed the reciprocal relation between thought and practice, where rationalities and policy and planning practices shape each other. The following discussion aims to highlight this relationship in the case of public transport policy and planning.

When Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB, the first PTA in Malmöhus County, took over responsibility for local and regional public transport in 1981, the policy tools that existed were designed to support a spatial expansion of public transport in all areas of the counties of Sweden (although there was an emphasis on work commuting as well). In the case of Malmöhus, as I showed in chapter six, in the debate over the establishment of the PTA at the County Council in 1980, there was broad agreement that the new PTA should create better accessibility not only between the larger population centers, but also for citizens who lived more remotely. With the help of increased state subsidies to unprofitable public transport, the first years of the PTAs saw the introduction of new and improved bus services, which together with a deficit distribution model that ensured regional balancing between municipalities spread public transport supply across the county.

It only took a few years after the establishment of the PTA for the growing deficits in regional public transport to be turned into the central policy issue in Malmöhus as well as on the national level. In Malmöhus, the solution to the deficit was to implement a set of policy tools and planning instruments, including raising the minimum occupancy criterion, imposing zero-growth in vehicle kilometer production and other means to control the traffic development. Specific knowledge production and analyses, for example more exact travel surveys, were employed by the PTA to justify the rationalization and sanitization of weak services and a redistribution toward more profitable links in the transport network. This policy knowledge shaped planning practices, actor dynamics and power relations. While acknowledging the problem with rising deficits, municipalities (primarily in the central and south-eastern part of the county with a higher share of low-occupancy services) consistently resisted or questioned measures imposed on the transport network. In doing so, they stressed values of equalization over efficiency and questioned the policy knowledge used to justify rationalizations, for example the accurateness of travel surveys. The conflict over rationalities was thus one that related both to which values to pursue and the policies and planning instruments employed to pursue it. Questioning the quality of travel surveys was an important tactic in the struggle over traffic supply (and similar critiques were voiced during the conflict over cutbacks in 2019). Still, it is worth noting that
there was a general agreement over the kinds of knowledge production that underpinned public transport planning: the different attitudes to the knowledge were one of degree, not kind, so to speak.

In terms of policy knowledges and the analytical tools employed to foster them, one can discern a transition from a production-oriented to a consumption-oriented perspective on public transport. When the PTA in Malmöhus was established, the main analytical focus lay with traffic production, journey statistics, and economic parameters that took the public transport company as its point of departure. When the long-term plan was developed, however, more qualitative aspects of the public transport system came to the fore, and with the introduction of procured traffic the qualitative experiences of customers became increasingly important to control that operators delivered in accordance with their contracts. Over time this has led to a general transition from production-based contracts to incentive-based contracts, where the operators are economically rewarded if they attract more passengers. Of course, this does not mean that 'traditional' quantitative analyses of traffic production in terms of vehicle kilometers and ridership levels have become unimportant, merely that they have been complemented with other ways of understanding and evaluating public transport systems.

To reiterate, a central argument of this thesis is that it was the policies and planning practices associated with limiting the deficit that sowed the seeds of the rationalities of transit corridors in Malmöhus County, not the other way around. It was over the policies and planning practices designed to manage the deficit that the conflict over traffic supply during the 1980’s centered, and their implications for the differing values that different stakeholders pursued. In turn, this institutional gridlock contributed to shaping the perception that decision-making frameworks needed to be reformed in favor of centralization at the regional level. While the policymakers and planners at the County Council and Malmöhus Läns Trafik were not able to achieve this transformation on their own accord, the policy and planning practices of the deficit began tipping the scales toward a more centralized and regionalized control over public transport, and was therefore a precondition for the formulation of transit corridors as a regional development goal for public transport in Malmöhus.

In the next section I will discuss the influences of New Public Management on the policies and planning of public transport in Malmöhus and Skåne after the reorganization of the PTA in 1992.

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The policies and practices of New Public Management

The rationalities of the transit corridor paradigm formalized in the long-term plan and the Metropolitan and Malmöhus agreements were turned into institutional practices and material configurations during the 1990’s. With it, a breakthrough of a New Public Management-oriented (NPM) governance model for public transport in Malmöhus can be discerned. NPM is not a concept that I discussed in the chapters on previous research or theory, but an aspect that was discovered through the empirical material and analysis. However, when analyzing the development of rationalities of public transport, it is hard to avoid NPM as a crucial aspect of the implementation of policies and planning instruments associated with the transit corridor paradigm. NPM is here understood as the shift in public administration gaining speed toward the end of the 1970’s, focusing, among other things, slowing down or reversing the growth in government spending. Christopher Hood suggests a number of ‘doctrines’ that define NPM: Hands-on professional management; explicit standards and measures of performance; greater emphasis on output control; a disaggregation of units in the public sector; a shift toward greater competition in the public sector; stressing private-sector styles of management; and a stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use.711 As I am about to show, many of these doctrines have permeated public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus since the 1990’s.

If we start with the process of developing the long-term plan (see chapter 8.1), it stressed explicit standards and measures of performance by introducing a hierarchy of strategic, tactical, and operational goals, where especially the latter were to be concrete and measurable for better follow-up of goal-achievement. In the reformation of the PTA organization in the wake of the Metropolitan agreement, a politically governed Municipal association and a planning-oriented public transport company entailed a redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of politicians and planners, and stressed both a disaggregation of units in the public sector, and a hands-on professional management. In the early phase of the public transport authority politicians had been deeply involved in the details of transport planning, which produced a planning system dominated by political actors, not planners. The new PTA entailed the establishment of a planning system oriented toward a with a stricter separation between politicians and planners: from the early 1990’s there was one organization in which politicians debated policy goals and set the economic frames of operations, and a public transport company with a cadre of powerful planners who executed the concrete planning with more freedom from political intervention than what has previously been the case. Theoretically, this

can be interpreted as the creation of a policy and planning context defined by rationalistic planning ideals, in which the ends and the means of policy and planning were to be kept apart. Politics and planning were considered as two distinct activities, a perspective that has been carried into the new PTA organization with the formation of Region Skåne, with a political council and an operative administration in Skånetrafiken, and the discursive separation between politics and planning remains strong. For example, the cutbacks in 2019 that were covered in the prologue were defended by Carina Zachau, chairperson of Region Skåne’s public transport council, in her statement that “the civil servants must decide where there is substance [for traffic], that is not the role of politics.”

The public transport company was designed to act in a more business-like manner, and the recruitment of a CEO from the business sector signaled a private-sector style of management. The continuation of austerity measures and a stronger emphasis on cost-efficiency as the central value in policymaking and planning also induced a stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. Lastly, the establishment of the new PTA also beckoned a shift toward greater competition in the public sector. A harnessing of competition in public transport was emphasized procurement reform in national public transport legislation of 1985 (entering into force in 1989), but it was during the 1990’s that it became properly institutionalized in Malmöhus. The policy tools and planning instruments employed by the new PTA were geared toward encouraging a more market-oriented planning practice that remains a central aspect in the transit corridor paradigm. Most importantly, the new steering system implemented in 1995 provided stronger incentives for the public transport company to invest in high-demand traffic, as it rewarded the public transport company for growing ridership levels. As can be seen, NPM reforms had a large impact on public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and has continued to do so under Skånetrafiken and Region Skåne.

Given the diffusion of NPM-style reforms in public transport and that the transport sector was in many regards a forerunner of such reforms in Sweden, it is notable that the amount of research explicitly analyzing the interface of NPM and public transport governance is remarkably small. This especially so compared with the amount of

712 Zillén, “Skånska kommuner vill inte betala för hotade busslinjer.”

literature on NPM reforms in the public sector overall.\textsuperscript{714} This suggests that there is ample room to develop more analyses and insights into New Public Management in the public transport sector, and how they shape the rationalities that define the transit corridor paradigm.

11.2.3 Public transport and sustainable mobility

Another crucial aspect of the rationalities of public transport is the question of sustainability and sustainable mobility. As mentioned in chapters 5 and 6, public transport’s contribution to a lower environmental burden has been part of the national and regional public transport discourse since at least the 1970’s. Until the early 1990’s the main motivation lay with local pollution and was therefore primarily a concern in urban environments. For example, the long-term plan above all focused on nitrogen oxide emissions and paid little attention to greenhouse gas emissions. Through the decision to build the Öresund Bridge the transport system in Malmöhus and Skåne became a focal point for environmental policy issues.\textsuperscript{715} In these discussions, public transport became a ‘way out’ in being able to provide regional expansion, economic growth, and increased mobility while at the same improving the environmental performance – in terms of local pollution as well as global emissions – of the transport system. As such, public transport became tied to a discourse of environmental modernization. At its core, ecological modernization rests on a policy foundation that recognizes and seeks to address environmental problems, at the same time as a solution of these is perceived to be reconcilable with a growth in mobility as well economic activity.\textsuperscript{716} This development is not unique to the Malmöhus or Öresund region: in her analysis of the discourses of space and environment in the debate over the Metropolitan Agreement in Stockholm that took place during the 1990’s, Karolina Isaksson also identifies an strong current of ecological modernization.\textsuperscript{717} As Hannah Dekker Linnros discusses in her study of the environmental discourses surrounding the construction of


\textsuperscript{714} For an extensive review of NPM-literature, see Funck and Karlsson, “Twenty-Five Years of Studying New Public Management in Public Administration: Accomplishments and Limitations.”

\textsuperscript{715} Dekker Linnros, \textit{Naturen, betongen och den goda jorden : Öresundbron och motsändets diskurser}.

\textsuperscript{716} Hajer, \textit{The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process}.

\textsuperscript{717} Isaksson, \textit{Framtidens trafiksystem? : maktutövningen i konflikterna om rummet och miljön i Dennispaketets vägfrågor}.

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the Öresund Bridge, the development of an environmental modernization discourse stunted more critical environmental discourses, which means invoking ‘the environment’ no longer functions as a counter-discourse to growth-oriented policy discourses in and of itself.718

The reconciliation of growth, mobility and sustainability is also closely related to what Maja Essebo in her analysis of transport infrastructure planning in Malmö and Öresund has called ‘the myth of sustainable mobility.’719 A ‘myth’ is in vernacular often thought of as similar to a ‘lie’, but shall in this instance rather be interpreted as those fundamental stories and narratives that make our worldviews and social systems possible although they may be incorporate contradictory elements. With the systemic necessity to spur economic growth through increased mobility at the same time as increased mobility in its current form is a chief contributor to local and global environmental degradation, the idea of sustainable mobility is a vital trope for contemporary politics. The role of the myth of sustainable mobility in the rationality of public transport is evident in the relation between public transport and road infrastructure in the Malmöhus Agreement: public transport, especially rail-bound, was put at the center of infrastructure development as the backbone of regional mobility with the ambition to compete with the car in the regional modal split to promote sustainable mobility. At the same time, large road investments were needed to fully realize the potential of the bridge, why the central role of the car in regional mobility wasn’t, and could never really be, up for question.

Transit corridors and environmental justice in the sustainability transition

The relation between public transport and the car, brings me to the topic of transit corridor planning and environmental justice. As the climate crisis worsens and car society is becoming increasingly disputed, public transport gains ground in transport policies (although the car-orientation remains strong in central parts of the transport planning complex).720 The point here is not that public transport – or transit corridors – isn’t or won’t be an integral part of the transition toward a sustainable mobility system. The question is rather whether perpetually increasing mobility is reconcilable with a sustainable transport society? As the transport sector is the policy area where least progress has been made in the low-carbon transition, the empirical evidence for this is scant. However, historical data cannot be used singlehandedly to predict the future and

720 Witzell, Approaching Transformative Futures : Discourse and Practice in Swedish National Transport Policy and Planning.
public transport will most likely need to play a larger role in future sustainable transport systems than what is currently the case.

However, what the public transport systems of the future should look like remains uncertain. The rationalities and practices of transit corridor planning in Malmöhus and Skåne have been effective in contributing to higher public transport shares, and as such they must be considered as successful. At the same time, transit corridors also pose important questions of social and environmental justice in the transition toward sustainable mobility systems. The central question then becomes who can access sustainable transportation, economically as well as geographically. 721 As public transport has gradually become more spatially concentrated to transit corridors, there is a risk for a growing gap between those groups and areas who have easy access to high-class public transport and those who don’t. In an interview with Carl Björklund, a strategic planner working at Skånetrafiken, he recounted a story about a small village in Skåne that had its bus stops removed and the bus rerouted outside the village due to low ridership and a desire from planners to speed up the bus service. After many discussions back and forth between the local village council and the planners, where a planner explained that it simply was not possible to reinstate the bus stops, the village council chairman exclaimed, “but you don’t have to stop! We just want to see the bus pass by.” 722 While anecdotal, it is a powerful reflection of the general trend of withdrawal of public services in rural areas, of which public transport is often the last to leave. Björklund reflected on this:

Public transport is the last living sign that [the rural population] get anything for their tax money and then that becomes what you hold on to. […] So, it is not so much their travel needs as them still being a part of society. And then we come and point to our excel sheets and say that there aren’t many travelers here and the cost is high, so we’re going to remove it. Of course, there will be reactions. 723

The decline of public transport in rural areas is of course not simply an outcome of planners ignoring the accessibility needs of rural populations; rather it is a systemic effect of citizens choosing to use cars over public transport, and policymakers and planners aiming to improve the economic efficiency of public transport. Given the current state of things it is not possible or even desirable to supply everyone, everywhere with high-quality public transport. This is not to say that public transport policymakers


722 Interview with Carl Björklund, 2019-09-26

723 Interview with Carl Björklund.
and planners aren’t aware of this tension. The idea of park-and-ride facilities aim to provide connection points between car-dependent parts of the region and the high-demand corridors of the public transport network, and recent research points to that the higher-speed modes improve patronage along the smaller station towns in Skåne.\textsuperscript{724} Still, as the pace of change toward sustainable mobility increases, there will be an increased need to ensure that everyone is part of that transition. But if public transport is not made available to substantial parts of the population, other policy measures need to be taken to ensure that sustainable mobility is available to those who cannot access decent public transport options. An issue here is that, since cost-efficiency is typically invoked as the keyword to the sustainability transition, there is a risk that other measures are also implemented where it is most cost-efficient further exacerbate the gap between those who have access to sustainable mobility, and those who do not. To paraphrase Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin, there is an imminent risk that the sustainable mobility transition will deepen the ‘regional splintering’ between urban and rural areas because, as we have seen throughout this thesis, there is an inevitable tension between (economic) efficiency and equity.\textsuperscript{725} And as has been shown repeatedly over the last year, policies that overstate requirements on efficiency in the sustainability transition at the expense of equity often meet popular resistance.\textsuperscript{726} Therefore, efficiency and equity need to be constantly weighed against each other. This moves the discussion beyond the public transport system itself, but as Ulf Nymark noted in the political debate at the County Council before the establishment of the PTA, “we have to decide: shall we have a public transport system as the dominant societal traffic system, or shall automobility be dominant?”\textsuperscript{727}

11.2.4 The role of crises in the development of public transport

The final point I want to make in this analysis is the role of crises in altering and driving changes in public transport policy, a question that has become explicit as public transport authorities around the world has struggled to grapple with the covid-19 pandemic.\textsuperscript{728} The fact that crises impact societies is hardly a revolutionary realization.


\textsuperscript{728} John Hultén et al., \textit{Public Transport Funding under Pressure}, 2021.
However, I argue that my narrative of the long-term developments of public transport policy and planning in Malmöhus and Skåne provides a good empirical analysis of how the rationalities of public transport have been defined and coevolved with internal as well as external crises on different sorts which impact the structural economic and institutional conditions for public transport.

If we begin with the formation of the public transport authorities, these were motivated not only by the large structural shifts in industry and demographics after the Second World War, but also by the energy politics following the oil crises of the 1970’s. These global political events drove a rapid increase in gasoline and transport costs and prompted political responses through expanded subsidies and improved public transport systems, which led to rapidly growing patronage in public transport during the late 1970’s and early 1980’s. This crisis thus served to temporarily improve the demand for and the political willingness to invest in public transport.

The next crisis spelled doom for public transport. As people turned back to their cars when gasoline prices dropped in the mid 1980’s and the willingness from policymakers to expand budget deficits waned, a negative spiral of decreasing public transport patronage and a scaling back of state subsidies to public transport was set in motion. Simultaneously, the state also shifted more authority for public transport to the public transport authorities, which improved the conditions for coordination but also weighed down on their finances. The ballooning deficits in Malmöhus, coupled with an untidy political situation between the stakeholders of the PTA, peaked with the cutbacks in the transport plan for 1991/92. This event can with the benefit of hindsight can be seen as the straw the broke the back of the existing governance order in the county.

The creeping crisis of the late 1980’s was resolved by a combination of factors. First and foremost, the Metropolitan Agreement and the Malmöhus Agreements forced the regionalization of public transport governance and provided financing for investments to help drag public transport in Malmöhus out of the negative spiral. Second, the possibility to procure traffic in competition, the new steering systems that incentivized an economic rationality in the planning, and the austerity measures (primarily in local traffic in Malmö) added to an overall improvement of the PTA’s finances. Together, these elements all steered public transport planning toward the institutionalization and materialization of transit corridors.

Over the last years, the exponential growth of public transport patronage has slowed down and the relative and both relative and absolute costs of public transport have risen again. Renewed conflicts over old issues concerning public transport supply have broken out as funds dried up and the PTA has again turned toward a concentration of resources to the profitable travel relations. An even greater crisis that public transport is currently living through is the covid-19 pandemic. The important question for public transport here is whether it can weather the storm and come out in the other side even
remotely intact? And, importantly, what will the spatial configuration of public transport look like post-covid, and what will it do to the outlook for sustainable mobility?

The sum of this crisis management boils down to what may be called the ‘Janus face’ of transit corridors. By this I mean that the orientation toward transit corridors has gained currency both in times of expansion and times of crisis. On one of the faces there is a progressive character in transit corridors that builds on positive visions and well-founded knowledge about how to create attractive public transport, which couples to ideas of public transport as a structuring force for spatial development. On the other face, a negative side that also strengthens the focus on transit corridors is the fiscal austerity that reappear in times of economic crisis. When the public sector economy spirals downward the focus turns to transit corridors not as a development strategy, but for its economic performance vis-à-vis other, weaker, parts of the system. Through this ‘double motion’ of investments and austerity, transit corridors are bestowed with what appears as an almost unsurmountable power to direct public transport planning.

11.3 Main contributions

After having discussed a set of theoretically and empirically motivated conclusions, to wrap up I will engage in some final reflections to take away from this thesis with regards to the main contribution I make to the public transport literature and possible future orientations for research.

On a general level, one contribution to the existing literature lies in the ways in which the thesis highlights the dynamics of power in public transport policy and planning. The rationalities of public transport are essential to how power is and can be exercised by actors through institutional practices and spatial and technological configurations of public transport. The domination of certain rationalities over others shapes which practices are deemed justified and worthwhile, therefore the struggles over which rationalities ought to define policy and planning is crucial to understand power.

The point of putting a lot of focus on the conflicts and disparities between actors in the formation of transit corridors in regional public transport policy is not to claim that it has been a plot from certain actors at the expense of others. Over the course of several decades, the public transport system in Skåne has helped integrate the region and extend its reach across southern Sweden and Denmark, in line with the intentions of the metropolitan agreement. The public transport system has been vastly improved and it is highly unlikely that very many would want to return to the situation of the 1980’s.
However, this does not mean that the corridor paradigm was in any sense inevitable, rather as I have shown, it was the outcome of intense ideological and political struggles for influence over what public transport is and ought to be. The point is rather that what in hindsight seems like a rational and perhaps even inevitable development is neither. The transit corridor paradigm, and its associated rationalities, was not a political program that could just be rolled out, but one that had to be constructed, shaped, and molded at the intersection of intense conflicts over power, influence, and control over resources.

A specific contribution to the public transport literature is a critical engagement with existing literature. Based on my analysis, the conclusion can be drawn that current ideas about ‘best practices’ in public transport planning that inform public transport discourses and their expression in the transit corridor paradigm are deeply embedded within an ideological framework of neoliberal and New Public Management rationalities of competition, market-orientation and ideas about the separation between politics and planning. This is not very surprising in and of itself, as the rationalities of public transport policy and planning are dependent on the surrounding societal context in which they operate. What is more notable is that public transport research seems to be engaging in relatively little self-reflection with regards to which values and ideologies permeate its policy proposals, especially since analyses of neoliberalism abound in the wider field of spatial planning.729

One possible diagnosis from this reflection is that public transport policy and planning and its knowledge foundation constitutes a ‘post-political’ order.730 By this I mean that the ideological and political conflicts in public transport policy is by and large foreclosed. In many respects, transit corridors and the best practices espoused by them are treated as ‘the only way’ forward for the public transport sector. A potential explanation for this condition is that public transport researchers through their research often engage in radical critiques of the automobility-dominated transport policies that continue to define transport politics in most countries. Especially as the climate crisis worsens, the successful rollout of public transport is rightfully considered an imperative task for researchers and policymakers alike. However, such a position perhaps also blinds public transport research to its own position of power and the ideologies that it espouses, whether intently or unknowingly. And if a transition to sustainable mobility is to be successful and just, I believe that it is necessary to further develop more self-

awareness and better analyses of power in public transport research. By looking inward at the internal power dynamics of public transport policy and planning, my hope is that this thesis, to some degree, has contributed to this.
Appendix

1. Map of Skåne
2. List of organizations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central organizations</th>
<th>Translation / abbreviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malmöhus Läns Trafik AB</td>
<td>MLT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmöhus Läns Landsting</td>
<td>Malmöhus County Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommunförbundet Malmöhus Län</td>
<td>Municipal association of Malmöhus County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malmö Stad</td>
<td>Malmö Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafikutskott</td>
<td>Traffic committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mellersta Skånes kommunalförbund</td>
<td>MSK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordvästra Skånes kommunalförbund</td>
<td>NSK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydvästra Skånes kommunalförbund</td>
<td>SSK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sydöstra Skånes samarbetskommitté</td>
<td>SÖSK</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommunalförbundet för Malmöhus läns kollektivtrafik</td>
<td>Malmöhus Trafik</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Länstrafiken i Malmöhus län AB</td>
<td>LMAB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Länsstyrelsen Malmöhus Län</td>
<td>Malmöhus County Administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region Skåne</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skånetrafiken</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Statens Järnvägar (SJ)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTA in Malmöhus</td>
<td>1981 – 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Association representing all municipalities in the County (not incl. Malmö)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of the PTA</td>
<td>1981 – 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subregional committee representing municipal associations in traffic planning</td>
<td>1981 – 1991</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subregional municipal association</td>
<td>1981 – 1991</td>
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<td>Subregional municipal association</td>
<td>1981 – 1991</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTA in Malmöhus</td>
<td>1992 – 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional government administration</td>
<td>1719 – 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional political administration in Skåne; Formal PTA in Skåne</td>
<td>1999 – current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public transport administration in Skåne</td>
<td>1999 – current</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operator of Swedish rail traffic</td>
<td>1856 – current</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Maps over investments in the transport system from the Malmöhus Agreement

Figure A.1 Agreed investments in public transport infrastructure in the Malmöhus Agreement. Thick solid lines indicate rail investments covered in the agreement. Dotted lines indicate expected investments that were not financed by the agreement. Small squares and thin solid lines indicate investments in the bus system covered in the agreement. Large squares indicate investments in city bus systems. Source: SOU 1992:114, 19. Adapted by the author
Figure A.2 road investments in the Malmöhus Agreement. The thick solid line indicates the ring road around Malmö, that was the only part financed in the Agreement. Dotted lines indicate projects not included in the agreement to be prioritized in coming road plans. Source: SOU 1992:114, 20.
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