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Published in:
Trade unions in the European Union. Picking up the pieces of the neoliberal challenge

2023

Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Chapter 28

Trade unions in Sweden: still high union density, but widening gaps by social category and national origin

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Swedish industrial relations are considered to be peaceful with a high membership density among both trade unions and employers' associations. Seven out of ten employees are union members, and nine out of ten employees work at employers affiliated to an employers' association. This high union density is promoted by several factors. First, as in Denmark and Finland, there is the presence of state-supported union unemployment funds, commonly known as the 'Ghent system'. Second, the partly centralized and partly decentralized industrial relations system prevents fragmentary collective bargaining coverage, while the extensive network of shop stewards and 'union clubs' facilitates recruitment. Sweden has a single-channel system of union representation that relies on industry agreements in a multi-tier bargaining system. Third, there is a high organizational rate among employers' associations, which conclude basic agreements and other compromises with the unions. Fourth, the socially segregated union structure, with separate national unions and confederations for blue-collar workers, academics and other white-collar workers, promote cohesion within each group. Fifth, the dominance of self-regulation via collective agreements over state regulation means that unions have a clear role (Kjellberg 2017). One prominent aspect of this self-regulation is that, despite the absence of extension mechanisms, 90 per cent of employees are covered by collective agreements. This is also facilitated by the high organizational rate of employers' associations, mentioned above (see Table 28.1). The closest Swedish equivalent to an extension mechanism is, as in Denmark, the permissibility of strikes and sympathy strikes against non-organized employers who refuse to conclude

a collective agreement. Another aspect of Swedish self-regulation is the absence of statutory minimum wages. Sixth, we might mention the relative absence of anti-union legislation, including on industrial action. And finally, long periods of social democratic government (1932–1976, 1982–1990, 1994–2006 and 2014–2022) have been driven the expansion of the welfare state, and the extensive pro-labour legislation introduced during the 1970s. Although breaking with the principle of self-regulation, the laws on codetermination and employment protection extended the area of workplace negotiations to new issues. Likewise, the law on shop stewards strengthened unions at workplace level.

Table 28.1 Principal characteristics of trade unionism in Sweden

	1980	**2000**	**2020**
Total trade union membership	3,512,600	3,846,700	3,713,600
Women as a proportion of active membership	46 %	52 %	53 %
Gross union density	83 %	88 %	68 %
Net union density	82 %	81 %	64 %
Net union density (labour force surveys)	81 % (1990)	81 %	69 %**
Number of confederations	3	3	3
Number of affiliated unions (federations)	71	61	48
Number of independent unions	7	7	5
Collective bargaining coverage	90 %	88 %	90 %
Principal level of collective bargaining	Cross-industry	Industry	Industry
Days not worked due to industrial action per 1,000 workers**	1,131	0	0

Note: *4.2 million days were not worked in the 'Great Conflict' of 1980. There was no large bargaining round in 2000. ** 70 % in 2021.

Source: Kjellberg (2022a, 2022b); Hällberg and Kjellström (2020).

Although union density is still among the highest in the world, based on the labour force surveys, it declined from 81 per cent in 2000 to 68 per cent in 2019, but turned upwards, for the first time since the mid-1990s, to 69 per cent in 2020 (Labour Force Surveys; Figure 28.2). As in Denmark and Finland, the remodelling of the Ghent system played a conspicuous role in the deterioration of union density, by considerably raising unemployment fund membership fees in Sweden in 2007–2013 when the centre-right government was in power. Because of the linkage of fees

to unemployment among the members of each fund, blue-collar workers were particularly hard hit as their unemployment levels tend to be higher than those of white-collar workers. The result was a growing gap between white-collar and blue-collar union density. A further contributory factor to the blue-collar/white-collar divergence is the higher frequency of supplementary union income insurance available to white-collar workers. This is particularly attractive because white-collar workers' incomes are generally higher. The declining share of blue-collar workers in the labour force, combined with the growing gap between white-collar and blue-collar union density, has resulted in a power shift within the union movement from blue-collar to white-collar unions. Another difference in union density rates has emerged since 2006: union density is higher among domestic-born workers (71 per cent) than foreign-born workers (59 per cent). Many of the latter arrived as refugees during the 2010s from non-European countries with weak union traditions and several have fixed-term jobs in low-density industries, such as cleaning and restaurants.

Historical background and principal features of the industrial relations system

Until the 1930s Sweden was among the countries with the highest frequency of strikes and lockouts in the world. This changed during that decade, when a long period of social democratic government began. State-supported union unemployment funds, known as the 'Ghent system', were introduced in 1935. Although it was not obligatory for members of the unemployment funds to join the 'corresponding' trade union, direct affiliation to the funds did not become common until the economic boom of the late 1980s. Then, white-collar workers opted for direct affiliation, a practice that later spread to blue-collar workers and public sector employees. The Saltsjöbaden Agreement was concluded in 1938 between the blue-collar Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO, *Landsorganisationen*, founded in 1898) and the Swedish Employers' Confederation (SAF, *Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen*, founded in 1902). The agreement radically improved relations between the two sides of industry, manifested in the 'spirit of Saltsjöbaden' and the considerably reduced frequency of strikes and lockouts. Confrontation was replaced by a cooperative relationship between unions and employers. The centralization of LO in 1941 abolished balloting, thereby making it more difficult to start strikes in an effort to restrain more militant members.

There was space only for *representative* union democracy from then on, as union executive committees made decisions on industrial action. Also, the Law on Rights of Association and Negotiation (*Lag om förenings- och förhandlingsrätt*) of 1936 paved the way for union rights among private sector white-collar workers.

On the initiative of the employers, collective agreements were concluded at peak level from the 1950s onwards, supplemented by agreements at industry and workplace levels. With the growth of trade unions in the public sector and white-collar cartels, collective bargaining from the 1970s became quite complicated and the LO-SAF axis lost its privileged position. That also prevented SAF from transforming the 'Great Conflict' of 1980 into an 'investment for the future' aimed at stopping the wage-price spiral. Ten years later SAF changed strategy, however, and refused to participate in centralized wage negotiations. The ambition was to achieve completely decentralized and individualized wage setting arrangements. To prevent such a profound shift the largest trade unions in manufacturing formed a common cross-collar and cross-confederal front. This was extended to 'Unions in Manufacturing' (FI, *Facken inom industrin*) in 1996.

Under threat of state intervention to scale down wage increases, before Sweden joined the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the 'Industry Agreement' (*Industriavtalet*) was signed in 1997. This agreement is the result of close cooperation between the blue-collar and white-collar unions in manufacturing and their negotiations with the employers. Sweden ultimately declined to join EMU, but a new form of coordinated bargaining was established. The 'Industry Agreement' involves blue-collar and white-collar unions cooperating closely when setting the benchmark for wage increases, known as the 'industry norm', in negotiations with employers at industry level. Under pressure from the Social Democratic government, the Industry Agreement was considered necessary, also by the labour market parties themselves, to maintain Swedish competitiveness by letting manufacturing set the 'industry norm' for the whole labour market (Kjellberg 2019). In this context, it is worth mentioning that large transnational companies, such as ABB, Electrolux, Ericsson and Volvo, dominate the Swedish economy. Another reason for agreeing to wage moderation was the unions' fear that the employers would accelerate the relocation of production to other countries.[1] All in

[1] In 2018, 84 per cent of the employees working for the 80 largest Swedish-owned manufacturing groups were employed abroad (Kjellberg 2021c).

all, the spirit of cooperation was restored after being eroded during the 1970s wave of union-friendly legislation.

Structure of trade unions and union democracy

Sweden has the most class-based union structure in the world. Common to other Nordic countries is the division into three confederations: the blue-collar LO, the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (TCO, *Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation*, founded in 1944) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Saco, *Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation*, founded in 1947).[2] The strong dominance of blue-collar unions in LO-Sweden is partly related to the broad Swedish definition of blue-collar workers or *arbetare* (Kjellberg 2014). For instance, practical nurses and health care assistants, organized in the LO-affiliated union Municipal Workers' Union (*Kommunal*), but also most restaurant employees and sales employees are, in official statistics, included under *arbetare*. TCO-affiliated unions represent 1.1 million active members, which is slightly fewer than the figure for LO affiliates (1.2 million). The most important independent union is the Association of Managerial and Professional Staff, *Ledarna* (managers and supervisors). *Ledarna* was expelled from TCO in 1997 as a result of a demarcation conflict arising from the union's ambition to recruit all managers. There are some other independent unions, although they are smaller, such as the Dock Workers' Union (*Hamnarbetarförbundet*), a breakaway from Transport (*Transportarbetareförbundet*), and the 'syndicalist' Swedish Central Organization of Workers (SAC, *Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation*), a general union founded after the LO defeat in the great 1909 strike/lockout. Both these unions consider ballots and local decision-making to be essential for union democracy.

Apart from the *Ledarna* case, because of the generally rising educational requirements, there is also intense membership competition between the large 'vertical' TCO unions (*Unionen*, *Vision* and *Fackförbundet ST* [Union of Civil Servants]), which organize all kinds of white-collar workers from the lowest to the highest grades, and the professional unions affiliated to Saco. *Unionen* has nevertheless expanded

[2] This pattern is most pronounced in Sweden, in particular since LO-Denmark merged with the white-collar confederation corresponding to TCO.

much more than any other union during the past ten years. Conflicts about membership domains between other unions are muted, however. In fact, several unions affiliated to different confederations cooperate for bargaining purposes in different 'constellations' or alliances. Thus, the constellation, 'Unions in Manufacturing' (FI, *Facken inom industrin*) comprises the LO affiliates IF Metall, *GS-Facket* (graphical and wood workers) and *Livs* (food workers). The '6F Alliance' consists of five LO affiliates organizing building workers (*Byggnads*), painters (*Målarna*), electricians (*Elektrikerna*), maintenance workers (*Fastighets*) and communication workers (*Seko*). The 'Academic Alliance' (*AkademikerAlliansen*) is the negotiation council for Saco unions in local government. Other constellations are the Teachers' Collaboration Council (LS, *Lärarnas Samverkansråd*), the Public Employees` Negotiation Council (OFR, *Offentliganställdas Förhandlingsråd*), the alliance of the private sector white-collar unions (PTK, *Förhandlings- och Samverkansrådet PTK*) and the bargaining cartel of central government Saco unions (Saco-S). Finally, also the Swedish Teachers' Union (*Lärarförbundet*), affiliated to TCO, and the National Union of Teachers in Sweden (LR, *Lärarnas Riksförbund*) cooperate in collective bargaining in the joint Teachers' Collaboration Council. Those unions merged in 1 January 2023 into the Swedish Teachers' Union (*Sveriges Lärare*) (Kjellberg 2021c).

LO has the authority to adjudicate on demarcation conflicts, but not to decide about mergers. Thus, all mergers were initiated by the trade unions concerned. Although no merger has taken place between a blue-collar and white-collar union, the number of LO unions has decreased from eighteen in 2000 to fourteen in 2021 (Kjellberg 2005, 2022b). Of them only three (electricians, painters, and musicians) are occupational unions, comprising just 3 per cent of LO represented members. The unions organizing electricians and painters, respectively, are the only craft unions in Sweden. Every third union member in 2020 was represented by an occupational or professional union compared with fewer than every fifth member in 1980 in Sweden. The growth of employees with a higher education is the main explanation of this. The increasing membership share of occupational and professional unions in TCO has turned into its opposite due to the rapid growth of *Unionen*. This union surpassed *Kommunal* (LO) as Sweden's largest union in 2015. Finally, all Saco affiliates are professional unions. Almost all of them can be considered 'multi-professional' because of mergers and the broader scope of

recruitment. In fact, one of them, SRAT, contains so many small professions that it might be labelled a 'general union of professions'.

Figure 28.1 provides an overview of union mergers in Sweden since 2000. The largest of them is the founding of *Unionen* in 2008 by a merger of the TCO union of white-collar workers in manufacturing (Sif, *Svenska Industritjänstemannaförbundet*) and that in commerce and other private services (HTF, *Handelstjänstemannaförbundet*). An important reason for this was to prevent the employers from playing off the members of the two unions against each other when jobs were outsourced from manufacturing to services. The decreasing number of manufacturing workers in the labour force in 2006 caused the LO unions *Metall* and *Industrifacket* (the Industrial Union) to merge into *Industrifacket Metall* (IF Metall). Instead of competing for the same category of members the Saco unions *Jusek* (recruiting lawyers, economists and other professions) and *Civilekonomerna* (economists) merged on 1 January 2020 to form *Akavia*, the eighth largest Swedish union. Mergers are often aimed at compensating for declining membership, making it possible to act more effectively with sparse resources, strengthen the ability to influence public opinion, increase visibility in media and avoid membership competition. Name changes are part of branding strategies. Unions have abandoned names containing *tjänstemän* (white-collar workers) and *arbetare* (blue-collar workers) and have adopted new names, such as *Unionen*, *Vision* and *IF Metall*. Lastly, since 2000 only one breakaway has occurred: maritime officers from *Ledarna* became a Saco union in 2016.

Figure 28.1 Mergers in Swedish unionism, 2000–2020



Note: * Acquisition.
Source: Kjellberg (2022b).

Table 28.2 lists the twenty largest unions based on their active membership. The table also provides information about their share of female members and organizing domain and constellation. The four largest LO unions – *Kommunal*, *IF Metall*, *Handels* and *Byggnads* – account for 78 per cent of all LO members. In 2020, the LO union *IF Metall* had 241,600 active members, and together with the other LO unions in the constellation 'FI', this makes up a quarter of LO-affiliated members. Although this is less than the half million *Kommunal* members (42 per cent), it is more than the '6F Alliance', which together represents 16 per cent. Among the remaining LO-affiliated unions *Handels* (commercial employees), *Transport*, HRF (hotel and restaurant workers) and *Pappers* (paper workers) account for another 18 per cent. To understand the strength of *IF Metall*, it should be observed that the cross-collar and cross-confederal Unions in Manufacturing, to which *IF Metall* belongs, includes Sweden's largest union, *Unionen* (596,100 members, TCO) and the largest Saco union, the Association of Graduate Engineers (*Sveriges Ingenjörer*, 132,000 members). That totals 1,029,500 members, or a third of Swedish unionists. All three unions were founded by mergers in the new millennium: *IF Metall* (2006), *Sveriges Ingenjörer* (2007) and *Unionen* (2008). *Unionen* organizes more than half of the TCO-affiliated membership. Together with *Lärarförbundet* (163,300 teachers), *Vision* (143,100 municipal employees) and *Vårdförbundet* (92,400 nurses), the four largest TCO unions comprise almost 90 per cent of all TCO-affiliated members. Within Saco (561,300 members) the four largest unions – *Sveriges Ingenjörer* (132,000 graduate engineers), *Akavia* (100,400 lawyers and economists), LR (64,600 teachers) and *Akademikerförbundet SSR* (59,400 social workers and the like) – represent two-thirds of all active Saco-affiliated members. Not even the large vertical and heterogeneous unions contain special sections or associations representing different groups, but the independent and multi-occupational union *Ledarna* functions similarly to the multi-professional Saco-affiliated union SRAT.

Table 28.2 The twenty largest national unions by confederation, 31 December 2020

Confederation	Union	Industry	Constellation	Active members	Female share (%)
LO	Kommunal	Municipal and private services	none	518,800	78
	IF Metall	Metal, chemical	FI	241,600	19
	Handels	Retail and wholesale	none	129,300	62
	Byggnads	Construction	6F	76,000	2
	Seko	Railways, post	6F	70,900	25
	Transport	Transport	none	48,800	17
	GS-facket	Graphics, wood	FI	37,000	18
	Hotell & Restaurang	Hospitality	None	26,500	57
TCO	Unionen	Manufacturing and services	FI, PTK	596,300	44
	Lärarförbundet	Teachers	OFR, PTK, LS	163,300	84
	Vision	Municipal and private services	OFR	143,100	72
	Vårdförbundet	Nurses, midwifes and biomedical analysts	OFR, PTK	92,400	89
	Fackförbundet ST	Civil servants	OFR	67,100	62
Saco	Sveriges Ingenjörer	Graduate engineers	FI, PTK, Akad., Saco-S	132,400	28
	Akavia	Lawyers, economists	PTK, Akad., Saco-S	100,400	58
	Lärarnas Riksförbund	Teachers	OFR, PTK, LS, Saco-S	64,600	70
	Akademikerförbundet SSR	Social workers, HR personnel	OFR, PTK, Saco-S	59,400	81
	Läkarförbundet	Swedish Medical Association	OFR, PTK, Saco-S	38,400	54
	Naturvetarna	University graduates in natural sciences	PTK, Saco-S, Akad.	31,500	64
Independent unions	Ledarna	Supervisors/ managers	PTK, OFR	95,800	33

Note: Unemployed included. Pensioners and students excluded.

Source: Kjellberg (2022b).

At large and middle-sized workplaces it is common that the union members are represented by a 'union club' (*fackklubb*, in engineering called a 'workshop club', *verkstadsklubb*), or more correctly, one club for each of the national unions with sufficient members willing to be elected club president, cashier or other posts. For example, at the Södertälje plant of the German-owned truck manufacturer Scania there is an *IF Metall* club, a *Unionen* club and a local Saco association for graduate engineers, economists and other university graduates. Also *Ledarna* has a local association at Scania. As the headquarters of the company and the research department are also located at Södertälje, there is a very large number of white-collar workers, which explains why the *Unionen* club has about eight full-time officials paid by the company. According to law, union representatives have the right to paid time off for union work at their workplace, the scope and timing of which are decided in local negotiations. At workplaces that do not meet the conditions for establishing union clubs (usually because of their small size and too few members) the union at best might have one or two workplace representatives (*arbetsplatsombud*), assisted by union officials (*ombudsmän*) from the regional union branch. The regional safety representatives obtain more than €10 million per year from the state for their work in small companies without their own safety representatives.

Representative democracy is a characteristic feature of the Swedish trade union movement. For example, LO's highest decision-making body is the Congress (*LO-kongressen*), which elects the Executive Council (*LOs styrelse*) and the general council (*Representantskapet*), the highest level decision-making body between Congresses. The 300 delegates to the LO Congress are appointed by the affiliated unions according to size. Similarly, the 300 delegates to the IF Metall Congress are elected by the local union branches, more precisely by their general councils, which, in turn, are elected by union clubs. No LO-affiliated union holds ballots among its members during the bargaining process. Assemblies of elected representatives take all decisions. The TCO unions of nurses and teachers sometimes arrange advisory ballots. In October 2021 a number of large journalists' clubs demanded in motions to the congress of the Union of Journalists (*Journalistförbundet*, also TCO) a ballot on whether the union should sign the new basic agreement between the Bargaining and Cooperation Council PTK, to which the union is affiliated, and the employer confederation SN. If at least 50 per cent of the members vote, then the ballot will be decision-making; otherwise, it is only advisory.

Finally, Saco unions elect delegates to the Saco congress, which appoints the executive council of the confederation.

Unionization

Swedish trade unions had 3.7 million members in 2020, including students and pensioners. This is a decrease of 3 per cent since 2000. Net union membership, excluding pensioners and students but including the unemployed, has declined from 3.2 million in 2000 to 3.1 million members in 2020. In contrast to non-Ghent countries members retain their membership in case of unemployment. Unions seldom provide information on how many of their members are unemployed, however. Membership development differs between union confederations, however (see Figure 28.2). Since 2000 LO affiliates have lost 511,000 active members, while TCO affiliates have increased by 98,600 and Saco

Figure 28.2 Total membership per union confederation, comparing 2000 with 2020



	2000	2020	2000	2020	2000	2020	2000	2020	2000	2020
	Total membership		Active membership		Unemployed		Students		Pensioners	
LO	2016200	1432900	1753100	1241800	94600	65700	1000	17000	262100	174100
TCO	1244600	1454700	1045500	1144100	35000	36800	66200	114200	132900	196400
Saco	492700	709400	386200	562700	10900	6300	76700	92900	29800	53800
Independent unions	93700	116600	78900	104300	4000	5400	100	1000	14700	11300

Note: Unemployed included in active members. Unemployed in LO, TCO and independent unions calculated from the rate of unemployment in their unemployment funds. Saco: statistics from the unemployment fund of academics.
Source: Data obtained from trade unions.

affiliates by 206,000. LO's 'market share' dropped from 54 per cent in 2000 to 41 per cent in 2020, while TCO increased its share from 32 to 37 per cent and Saco from 11 to 18 per cent in the same period. Two-thirds of employed union members were white-collar workers in 2020. The growing share of white-collar workers in the labour force, combined since 2007 with the larger drop in blue-collar union density, considerably reduced LO's share of active union members, including the unemployed, between 2000 and 2020.

TCO and Saco together exceeded LO in 2008. The total number of members represented by TCO for the first time surpassed that of LO in 2019, but LO affiliates still have more active members. In other words, TCO pensioners and students are together now more numerous than those in LO. Also, TCO-affiliated unions recruit more students than Saco affiliates today, reflecting the intense competition between the two white-collar confederations on university campuses. Lastly, although the independent unions have seen some growth in their active and passive memberships, their 'market share' has remained at around 3 per cent. In general, 40 per cent of union members were employed in the public sector in 2000 and 36 per cent in 2020. In Saco this accounts for as much as 54 per cent of its members, but in the independent unions (dominated by *Ledarna*) the figure is only 22 per cent (see Table 28.3). The decline is explained by the transformation of many public authorities into companies, privatizations and outsourcing. The growing share of union members represented by Saco affiliates has a positive impact on the average public sector share.

Table 28.3 Public sector share of active members per union confederation, 2000–2020

	LO (%)	TCO (%)	Saco (%)	Independent (%)	Total (%)
2000	33	48	65	7	40
2010	32	44	57	13	39
2020	30	35	54	22	36

Note: Employees in companies owned by central or local government are classified as private sector employees. Active members include unemployed. Saco excluding the union of military reserve officers. Saco excluding self-employed in 2000.

Source: Kjellberg (2022b).

Although union density is still high today, it has declined considerably since 2000: from 81 to 69 per cent in 2020 (see Figure 28.3). In

a 'Ghent' country such as Sweden, the number of union members and density usually increase in recessions, but the global financial crisis of 2007–2008 had no such effects as the crisis occurred during the period (2007–2013) in which the centre-right government substantially raised the membership fees for unemployment funds and abolished tax reductions for union fees (25 per cent) and fund fees (40 per cent) (Kjellberg 2011; Kjellberg and Ibsen 2016). During 2007 and 2008 the unions lost 245,000 active members (180,000 from LO affiliates) and the union unemployment funds about 400,000 members, in particular during 2007. Union density declined from 77 to 71 per cent in the short period from 2006 to 2008.

The fees for blue-collar workers were hardest hit; total fees for membership of both a trade union and the corresponding unemployment fund could be very high. This is the main explanation for the increasing divergence between blue-collar and white-collar union density during the period when fund contributions were hiked (2007–2013). Union density was 77 per cent among both blue-collar and white-collar workers in 2006, but by 2020 the respective figures were only 61 per cent among blue-collar workers and 73 per cent among white-collar workers. Furthermore, union insurance provide supplementary unemployment benefits in addition to those from unemployment funds. Access to these supplementary benefits presupposes membership of both a union and an unemployment fund, and also that the wage is above the ceiling of the fund insurance. The higher wage is, the more a union member will obtain from supplementary income insurance. Such union income insurance is more common among and more favourable for white-collar workers, which explains the exceptional membership growth in the private sector white-collar *Unionen*.

When unemployment rose rapidly during the Covid-19 pandemic and the government made unemployment insurance more generous, the Ghent effect broke through with great force: people joined unions and particularly unemployment funds on a massive scale. During March and April 2020, the number of active union members increased by about 58,000 (Kjellberg 2020). The union unemployment funds grew three times more or by 177,600 persons. In all, the number of union members grew by 69,900 in 2020, of which LO affiliates accounted for 19,000, TCO affiliates 34,300 and Saco affiliates 14,800. As a result of the changed mode of calculation in the Building Workers' Union, however, real union growth was 75,100, of which LO affiliates contributed 24,200. Union density among white-collar and blue-collar workers increased by 1 percentage point in 2020.

Figure 28.3 Net union density for all employees, blue-collar and white-collar workers, 2000–2020



Note: Employees aged 16– 64 years, excluding employed full- time students.
Source: Labour force surveys.

The overall female share of active members was about the same in 2000 and 2020 (52/53 per cent), but increased in Saco affiliates, from 48 to 56 per cent, reflecting the feminization of higher education, and decreased from 63 to 58 per cent in TCO; the percentage has remained stable in LO (48 per cent). Furthermore, young people are overrepresented among blue-collar workers and in the most insecure employment forms, such as hospitality. Half of employees aged 16–24 have a fix-termed job compared with about 33 per cent during the early 1990s as legislative amendments in the early 2000s made it easier for employers to hire workers on a fixed-time basis and in the most insecure forms. Seven out of ten employees in the same age group are blue-collar workers. Often in low-paid jobs in private sector services, they have a limited capacity to pay contributions to unions and unemployment funds. Therefore, the sharply raised contributions to unemployment funds from 2007 hit the youngest workers hardest. Between 2006 and 2008 their union density dropped from 46 to 36 per cent and has remained almost unchanged ever since.

Apart from young people, immigrants are also overrepresented among blue-collar workers. The overall share of foreign-born members increased

between 2003 and 2020 from 11 to 18 per cent. Growth in specific unions was as follows: from 14 to 26 per cent in LO (reflecting the growing share of blue-collar workers born abroad); from 7 to 15 per cent in TCO; from 8 to 15 per cent in Saco; and from 6 per cent in 2005 to 11 per cent in 2020 in the independent unions. While the unionization rate of domestic- and foreign-born blue-collar workers in 2006 was the same (77 per cent), this has changed today: 64 per cent of domestic-born blue-collar workers were unionized by 2020 but only 52 per cent of foreign-born blue-collar. Union density among foreign-born blue-collar workers has fallen twice as much as among native-born since 2006, and three times more between 2013 and 2018, when 375,000 refugees arrived in Sweden and increased their share of employees. In contrast to most other countries, asylum seekers have the right to work during the application process. Their low rate of unionization is also influenced by the fact that the large majority arriving in the past ten to fifteen years are from non-European countries with a limited knowledge of unions and collective agreements in general and of the Swedish labour market in particular. Furthermore, foreign-born blue-collar workers are overrepresented in private services such as hospitality and cleaning. These industries are characterized by small companies with no collective agreements and with a low union density in general (Frödin and Kjellberg 2018, 2020).

A range of strategies have been employed to address membership decline. Responding to sharp membership losses in 2007 and 2008, TCO launched the project 'The Value of Union Membership', which continued under the name 'The Union Is Changing Now'. The target group was the growing category of academics, whom TCO wanted to recruit as successfully as Saco. TCO also campaigned for 'the value of collective agreements'. Suffering even larger membership losses, before 2007 LO had implemented a strategy of contacting non-members at their workplaces and supported shop stewards in this task. For the LO unions recruitment is obstructed by the large proportion of blue-collar workers with fixed-term jobs (21 per cent in 2020), part-time employees (32 per cent in 2020), young workers or workers born abroad (29 per cent in 2020), or a combination of these structural features. Despite the recruitment of very large numbers of members, for example in restaurants, union density may remain the same or even decline because of high labour turnover. For many years representatives of LO-affiliated unions have visited schools to inform pupils about trade unions and collective agreements. These unions also offer student membership. During summers, unions support holiday-working young people. Within LO *Kommunal* prioritizes the recruitment of workplace

union representatives and offers them union education to teach them how to recruit new members. The Commercial Employees' Unions (also LO) in a campaign to persuade members to pay their fees by autogiro gave them a one-month free membership.

Saco unions have always recruited students at universities. Students pay a reduced membership fee. Young professionals dissatisfied with their employment conditions before the Second World War founded several Saco unions. Successfully competing at university campuses, TCO unions today have more student members than Saco unions. Nevertheless, because of the difficulties involved in recruiting students at campuses during the Covid-19 pandemic the number of student members decreased in 2020. Furthermore, particularly white-collar unions, not the least *Unionen*, have recruited a fair number of members by introducing union income insurance, providing additional unemployment benefits, often followed up by media campaigns. These are especially attractive to white-collar workers as their incomes are often considerably above the unemployment insurance ceiling. The fact that membership of both unions and unemployment funds is required to obtain entitlement to income insurance benefits has partly restored the Ghent system's weakened recruitment capacity. Unions also offer other types of insurance, such as accident insurance. Finally, unions also provide individual advice at easily accessible union call centres. LO and TCO have long had a common centre for legal aid.

Union resources and expenditure

Most union funding comes from membership fees but rising financial asset values also play an important role. This applies to both blue-collar and white-collar unions. Finances are controlled from headquarters in all trade unions. LO's confederal income was €95 million in 2018, of which affiliated unions contributed almost 28 per cent or €26 million. €68 million were state subsidies and revenues from an insurance company owned together with PTK and SN administering collectively agreed insurances. The cost of the 346 employees, 211 of whom are employed at hotel and conference facilities in Sweden and Italy (the latter to make it possible to meet in a non-Nordic climate), was €29 million. All in all, the costs were €94 million and the result was thus a €1 million surplus. Assets were valued at €425 million (in reality worth about €470 million). Including financial revenues and taxes in 2018 LO had a surplus of €27 million. An investigation of union finances in 2010–2015 shows that six of the ten largest trade unions had deficits in their operating activities, but that

these were covered by capital gains from financial assets (Arbetet 3/2 2017). Without rising stock prices, these unions would have overall deficits in their finances. Instead, they expanded their conflict funds. The ten largest unions did this, on average, by 5 per cent per year in 2010–2015. Fear of losing members explains why unions hesitate to raise membership contributions, but sometimes it is necessary. The Hotel & Restaurant Workers' Union (HRF, *Hotell- och Restauranganställdas Förbund*), for example, raised membership contributions in 2021 in response to membership losses and the increased need to support members during the pandemic. To avoid raising membership fees, since long before the year 2000, unions have cut staff at headquarters and merged regions into larger units. Most unions with special associations for sub-groups have abolished them. Saving money is a prominent motive for mergers. When *Unionen* was founded in 2008, its staff was supposed to be cut from 902 to 675 (Lag & Avtal 18 August 2008), but the real reduction was smaller as the number of employees was still around 750 at the end of 2009. At the same time, it was decided that at least 85 per of operating costs should be financed by membership fees and the remaining 15 per cent by capital revenues.

The fees of LO unions are higher than those of white-collar unions. This is partly because LO unions include more insurance in their fees, and in a few cases also the fees of the unemployment fund than white-collar unions do. For instance, *IF Metall* membership includes compulsory membership of the unemployment fund. Consequently, the fund fee is included in the union fee, which is calculated as a percentage of the monthly wage, ranging from about €23 to €63 in 2021. In 2019 *IF Metall* expenditure of €102 million included €54 million for union activities, €10 million for various forms of insurance, including income insurance introduced in July 2019, €31 million for the unemployment fund and the LO fee of €5 million. The €91 million revenues included €84 million in membership fees, €3 million in state subsidies and €5 million in revenues from services to related organizations. That means that expenditure exceeded revenue by about €10 million, a deficit covered by a €43 million surplus from financial assets. The value of the conflict fund was €1.1 billion. To attract more members from January 2015 *IF Metall* lowered the membership fee, but despite continued membership losses revenue increased because of rising wages: the fee is, on average, 1.56 per cent of the wage in 2021. *IF Metall* members who are sick, unemployed or pensioners pay a reduced fee. Student membership is free. Lastly, *IF Metall* headquarters employed 138

persons in 2019, while the thirty-five local branches employed 180 local union officers (*lokalombudsmän*) and another 250 office employees.

In *Unionen*, in 2020, the 596,000 active members, of whom 10,500 are self-employed, paid about €150 million in contributions (being non-active, students and pensioners pay a reduced fee). Other revenues amounted to €3 million. Total expenditure for the 1,050 employees at central and regional level – this number had grown by 300 (+40 per cent) since 2008 and the number of members by 48 per cent – union education, union magazine, fees to PTK and TCO, and other expenses (in total €205 million) exceeded income by more than €52 million. About a half of the 1,050 union officers and other personnel employed by *Unionen* worked at the headquarters in Stockholm and about the same number at the eighteen regional offices. A surplus in the conflict fund, invested in financial assets and real estate, covered the deficit arising from union activities and insurances. The nominal value of the conflict fund in 2020 was €900 million (according to a decision of the union congress), but total assets were much larger as the market value of the financial assets exceeded their nominal value by another €900 million (Annual Report 2020). In 2021 the *Unionen* membership fee, excluding the fee for the unemployment fund, varied from €5 to €25 a month, depending on the wage.

Collective bargaining and unions at the workplace

In contrast to Finland and Denmark, there is no tradition of tripartite wage agreements in Sweden. In some matters, however, there are tripartite deals: in 2020 there was an agreement on the system for short-term layoffs, based on a previous proposal on short-term jobs; and in 2018 there was a tripartite declaration of intent on the introduction of establishment jobs based on a previous agreement between LO, as the initiator, *Unionen* and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. The state subsidizes these jobs intended for newly arrived immigrants. The power shift between the union confederations, with a weaker LO, was clearly manifested in December 2020 when a new private-sector basic agreement on employment protection, skill development and conversion was signed by the white-collar Bargaining and Cooperation Council PTK (*Förhandlings- och samverkansrådet PTK* founded in 1973) and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (SN, *Svenskt Näringsliv*, the successor of SAF), but not by LO, because of internal disagreements (Kjellberg 2021b). Not until a year later, in November 2021, did LO, after many

internal discussions, sign the agreement. Like the traditional basic agreement, the 1938 Saltsjöbaden Agreement, the basic agreement of 2020 (finally signed in 2022) came about under threat of legislation from the Social Democratic-led government, although specifically under pressure from two neoliberal parties on which the government depended. The agreement will be followed up by a revised law on employment protection, unemployment funds regulated by collective agreement and considerably improved prospects for skill development and conversion. The outcome is considered a victory for the principle of self-regulation.

Union confederations do not negotiate wages, but they conclude agreements with the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise on conversion, pensions, insurance and agency workers.[3] Affiliated confederation unions are involved in bargaining councils or bargaining cartels. The PTK comprises private sector members of unions affiliated to TCO, Saco and *Ledarna*, and concludes agreements on conversion, pensions and insurances. The Public Employees' Negotiation Council (OFR, *Offentliganställdas Förhandlingsråd*) negotiates about pensions, insurance, conversion, working environment, wage statistics and development of the public sector, and represents fourteen white-collar unions with members in the public sector. Saco-S is a bargaining cartel (negotiations on wages) for 'Academics in the state'. The Alliance of Academics (*AkademikerAlliansen*) coordinates negotiations for sixteen Saco unions in municipalities, regions and municipal companies.

In contrast to TCO and Saco, LO coordinates its affiliates during bargaining rounds. In the 2020 round, *Kommunal* and some other unions left the internal LO coordination. There are tensions between *IF Metall*, representing the 'industry norm', the wage-leading role of export industry, and low-wage LO unions, such as *Kommunal*. The five, mainly male-dominated 'LO home market unions', among them the Building Workers' Union (*Byggnads*), constitute the 6F Alliance and are those most critical of the industry norm. The norm, also called the 'mark', is a specified wage increase set by the unions and employers' associations in manufacturing (Table 28.4), which guides wage formation for the entire Swedish labour market, regardless of industry and whether an agreement contains precise figures for wage increases or is 'figureless', like some white-collar agreements (Kjellberg 2019). 'Figureless' agreements contain no wage increase: instead, wage formation is decentralized to workplace level.

[3] LO negotiated wages up to 1990.

Table 28.4 Industry norm by bargaining round since 1998

Industry agreement by bargaining round	Duration	Industry norm or 'mark' (wage + other costs)	Average 'mark' by 12 months periods (not by calendar year)
March 1998–January 2001	35 months	6.9 %[4]	2.4 %
February 2001–March 2004	36–38 months	8.5 % (7.0 %), 7.3 % (5.8 %)[5]	ca 2.7 %, ca 2.3 %
April 2004–March 2007	Three years	7.3 % (6.9 %, 5.7 %)[6]	2.4 %
April 2007–March 2010	Three years	10.2 % (8.1 %)[7]	3.4 %
White-collar: April 2010–September 2011/January 2012	18 months	2.6 %	1.75 %
Blue-collar: April 2010–January 2012	22 months	3.2 %	1.75 %
February 2012–March 2013	14 months	3.0 %	2.6 %
April 2013–March 2016	Three years	6.8 %	2.3 %
April 2016–March 2017	One year	2.2 %	2.2 %
April 2017–March 2020	Three years	6.5 %	2.2 %
April 2020–October 2020	7 months*	0.0 %	–
November 2020–March 2023	29 months	5.4 %	2.2 %

Note: * Prolongation for seven months because of the Covid-19 pandemic *without wage compensation*.

Source: Yearbooks of the Swedish National Mediation Office, Danielsson Öberg and Öberg (2017: 154–155).

[4] The agreement Metall – Association of Engineering Employers (wage increase of 5.7 per cent, shortened working-time 1.2 per cent).

[5] Blue-collar 7.0 % wage increase (2.5 %+2.3 %+2.2 %) + 1.5 % shortened working-time (0.55 %+0.4 %+0.55 %) = 8.5 % cost increase (2.8 % per 12 months); white-collar 5.8 % wage increase (2.2 %+1.9 %+1.7 %) + 1,5 % shortened working-time (0.55 %+0.4 %+0.55 %) = 7.3 % cost increase (2,4 % per 12 months).

[6] Blue-collar 6.9 % wage increase + 0.5 % shortened working-time = 7.4 % cost increase; white-collar 5.7 % + 0.5 % shortened working-time = 6.2 % cost increase.

[7] Within the framework of wages in engineering rose by 8.1 per cent (2.8 per cent the first year, 2.5 per cent the second year and 2.8 per cent in the third year), on top of which came increased costs for pensions and other things.

Coordinated bargaining based on the industry norm is combined with different models of decentralized wage setting (Kjellberg 2019). While some industrial agreements are 'figureless' – most common in the public sector – others contain traditional wage scales or piece work. No blue-collar union has concluded a 'figureless' agreement, and to make the industry norm possible there is no such agreement in manufacturing, as the norm presupposes a specified wage increase. Some agreements guarantee individuals a fixed minimum wage increase, while the remaining pay increases agreed in industrial agreements are distributed at workplace level. Others have no such guarantees. In 2020, 28 per cent of all employees had some form of individual wage guarantee, to which can be added 8 per cent covered by general wage increases (Medlingsinstitutet 2021: 245).

When industrial agreements are implemented at workplace level, no or only small wage increases are added, with the result that wage drift has declined and is now almost non-existent (Kjellberg 2019). Local wage formation is above all an issue of distribution, but within fairly narrow limits. Groups with a strong market position may raise their wages relative to others. In 2019, for example, members of the TCO union, organizing nurses, midwifes and biomedical analysts, increased their wages by an average of 3.5 per cent and in 2020 by 4.1 per cent, well above the industry mark of 2.2 per cent (*Vårdförbundet* 2020, 2021). Although the more individually differentiated and performance-based wage setting entails, in a formal sense, increased employer discretion, the change in practice appears modest. The industry mark, translated into local budgets and wage frames, set rather narrow limits to workplace differentiation. Difficulties discerning substantial performance variations among most employees, normative expectations regarding continuously compressed wages and employee expectations also limit the space for wage differentiation (Ulfsdotter Eriksson et al. 2020).

The total coverage of collective agreements was 90 per cent in 2020 and in the private sector 85 per cent. In 2000 the corresponding shares were 88 and 81 per cent, respectively, and in 2010, 89 and 84 per cent (Kjellberg 2022a). Collective agreements cover both members and non-members at workplaces with agreements. Recruitment efforts and other union workplace activities are thus important for combating freeriding and establishing social norms that favour union membership. The latter are an additional explanation of high union density. At workplace level, particularly in the case of figureless industrial agreements, 'wage talks'

are often held between the individual employee and the manager, or the workplace union negotiates for each individual. In both cases, it works best if the union and the employer together construct a local wage system in which the criteria for wage setting by members are perceived as transparent and fair. In *IF Metall* about eight out of ten workers are covered by local wage systems negotiated by the union at workplaces where the 'union clubs' have at least fifty members. The union's aspiration is to link individual wage development to development at work by rewarding workers who acquire more skills. At workplace level, besides wage negotiations, union clubs also participate in negotiations on codetermination and layoffs. At workplaces without clubs, union representatives may do this instead, but if there is no collective agreement only union officers from the regional branch have the right to negotiate. Negotiations on pensions, conversion and more take place at peak level, involving LO and the white-collar cartel PTK.

A challenge for all workplace negotiations is the declining coverage of union clubs and of workplace representatives at workplaces without clubs. In 2019 the total number of elected union representatives was 254,000, of whom 115,000 were blue-collar and 137,000 white-collar (Larsson 2020). They made up 11 per cent of the unionized blue-collar workers and more than 8 per cent of the white-collar members. Although the number of elected representatives as a proportion of union members has been relatively constant, the absolute number decreased from 360,000 in 1995 to 254,000 in 2019 because of declining union density. The share of union representatives was somewhat higher among female members (10 per cent) than among males (8 per cent), in particular among white-collar workers (10 and 6 per cent, respectively).

For the first time in many years the number of workplace clubs in *Unionen* increased in 2019, to 2,710. That is considerably fewer than the 3,325 clubs in 2008, however. During the same period the number of active *Unionen* members increased by 162,000. The combination of a decline in the number of clubs and the growth in the number of members, many of whom were attracted by the union income insurance, has meant a dramatic decrease in club coverage as a proportion of members. At workplaces without clubs in 2019 there were 3,471 workplace representatives. Between 2013 and 2019 the share of members covered by a club or workplace representative decreased from 51 to 46 per cent. In all, *Unionen* had 30,551 elected representatives at workplace, region and central level (35,069 in 2008), of whom 7,853 were safety representatives.

In 2020 *IF Metall* had 1,348 workplace clubs and 3,664 representatives at workplaces without clubs, 26,299 elected representatives in all. In 2006, 69 per cent of the members had a workplace club, 16 per cent a workplace representative, and 14 per cent had neither. In 2020 the corresponding shares were 64, 16 and 19 per cent. *IF Metall* clubs with at least 180 members usually have at least one elected representative paid full-time by the company to perform union tasks. The same applies to large clubs in other unions.

Industrial conflict

There are very few restrictions on conflict rights in Sweden. According to the laws on collective agreements and the labour court introduced in 1928, conflicts are not allowed before agreements expire, but sympathy action is allowed, provided that the primary conflict is legal. This means that the latter might not take place during the contract period. Sympathy action is important in forcing unorganized employers to conclude subsidiary collective agreements. During bargaining rounds, trade unions can trigger sympathy strikes to support the demands of other unions. In 2014 all LO unions except one gave notice of sympathy measures (strikes and blockades against specified companies) in the conflict between the LO union Seko and the SN-affiliated *Almega Tjänsteförbunden* (Almega Service Associations), but an agreement was concluded before the measures came into force. In 2016, *Akademikerförbundet SSR* (Union for Professionals, Saco) gave notice of strike action and a blockade at a number of companies and workplaces in the conflict on flexible pensions between the SN association *IT & Telekomföretagen* (Swedish IT and Telecom Industries) and *Unionen* (TCO) and *Sveriges Ingenjörer* (Association of Graduate Engineers, Saco), respectively.

Although there are few restrictions the Swedish labour market is very peaceful (see Appendix A1). There are several reasons for this. First, the 1997 Industry Agreement re-established the spirit of cooperation in manufacturing. Second, rising Swedish real wages since then have also limited the incentive to strike. Third, there is the new Swedish National Mediation Office (MI, *Medlingsinstitutet*), established in 2000, which primarily covers other parts of the labour market than manufacturing and other industries with negotiation agreements. It is explicitly ordered to foster the wage-leading role of the export sector by mediating in case of conflict and actively promoting norms backing up this role. The MI may

resort to enforced mediation, but only in industries without negotiation agreements. The parties behind the Industry Agreement have their own mediation body, the group of 'impartial chairs' (OpO, *Opartiska ordföranden*). The MI, like the OpO, can postpone industrial action by up to fourteen days in an effort to prevent negotiations from descending into open conflict. Finally, strike notices are often sufficient to press employers' associations to make concessions in negotiations. A relative balance of power exists between unions and employers' associations equipped with large, centrally controlled strike and lockout funds. A tax-free benefit, equal to 80 per cent of the wage, is paid to striking or locked-out members, corresponding to their loss of income.

A power shift has occurred, however, at least since the 1990s or even earlier. The strong position of transnational companies in the Swedish economy means that trade unions in manufacturing risk production moving abroad (Kjellberg 2022c). Intensified international competition also discourages manufacturing unions from demanding too large wage increases. The exception is the 2010 paper workers' strike, whereby the Paper Workers' Union withdrew from the Industry Agreement and has remained outside since 2011. The predominantly home market 6F Alliance of LO unions do not feel such pressures and have criticized the industry norm. Consequently, all large strikes except the one mentioned previously have occurred in the home market sector since the 1997 Industry Agreement: the 1999 bus strike, the 2003 *Kommunal* public sector strike, the 2008 nurses' strike and the 2012 building workers' strike. Also, in recent years nurses and midwifes have resorted to spontaneous action in the form of collective job terminations, while student nurses have organized hiring blockades. Other forms of industrial action are overtime bans and physical blockades of workplaces. Blockades or notices of blockades against selected companies are common in case of sympathy conflicts (see above) and conflicts to force unorganized companies to accept collective agreements. They often occur during collective bargaining, such as when the Hotel and Restaurant Workers' Union in 2020 gave notice of a total blockade against the recruitment of new workers and hiring of staff from temporary agencies.

Political relations

High union density means that Swedish governments have to consider trade union views, whether they agree with it or not. Unions protested

in vain against the considerably raised unemployment fund fees imposed by the centre-right government in 2007, but they did not organize mass demonstrations against the state. Since the 1930s, when the long period of social democratic government began, there has been no such tradition, and scarcely before that, in contrast to states with a more repressive attitude towards unions. Swedish unions prefer to influence governments by other means (Kjellberg 2021a: 24–26, 41–42). There two main channels for this purpose: the referral system (*remissförfarande*) and the close contacts between LO and the Social Democratic Party (*Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetareparti*).

First, unions and employers' associations have access to the policy process via the referral system. Before laws are enacted, the government appoints a commission, which may ask both sides of industry for advice and information, for example on working environment issues. Sometimes the government invites the social partners to participate in reference groups assisting the commission. Lastly, the government sends the commission report to unions and other actors, who are invited to submit comments before the bill is presented to the parliament. But although unions were often directly represented in commissions dealing with labour market issues in the past century, this happens more seldom today. This diluted union representation in government commissions has weakened their political influence.[8] An exception is the present legal process to implement the 2020 basic agreement, which until 2022 requires a revised law on employment protection and legislation on economic support for competence development. The unions signing the agreement in 2020 (the bargaining cartel PTK, *Kommunal* and *IF Metall*) were represented in three government commissions, while others (e.g. LO) were offered the opportunity to submit their views via the referral system.

Second, the strong links between LO and the Social Democratic Party give the former easy access to the party and government. Collective affiliation of LO members to the Social Democratic Party was abolished in 1991, but LO is still represented on the party's board and executive committee and provides the party with financial resources and staff during election campaigns (Jansson 2017). Representatives of the party and LO

[8] Up to the early 1990s, trade unions and employers' associations were represented in the boards of government agencies, such as the Labour Market Board. On the initiative of the employers, 'corporatist' representation was abolished. Their motive was to weaken trade unions.

also meet in a number of permanent and temporary committees. During certain periods there were severe tensions between LO and the party, labelled 'the War of the Roses', above all when, during the deep economic crisis in the 1990s, the party abandoned Keynesianism in favour of fighting inflation. Nevertheless, the decoupling of the party and the union movement evident in many other countries is still not very apparent in Sweden (Magnusson 2018). It is telling that in the government, installed in 2014, the former *IF Metall* president was the Prime Minister until he resigned in November 2021, but the former TCO president was still the Labour Market Minister and a former Saco president continued as the Minister of Education. The former LO president now became the Minister for Business, Industry and Innovation and the former president of the TCO union *Vision* became the Minister for Climate and the Environment.

Also, the fact that the white-collar confederations TCO and Saco are politically independent does not prevent them from expressing their views on all matters of interest to their members, or from attempting to influence the government in the desired direction. The existence of separate white-collar unions and confederations without political links has promoted the high union density of white-collar workers by preventing this category of workers from feeling union 'homeless'. That might have happened if they had had no alternative to social democratic blue-collar unions. During the Covid-19 crisis all political parties, employers and unions agreed to introduce a system of short-term layoffs.

Societal power

Trade unions have invested in the development of websites and other digital media, such as YouTube (Jansson and Uba 2019). In recent years Swedish unions have in general increased their public confidence. In 2020 this confidence reached its highest level since the SOM Institute started its surveys in 1986. This year, confidence in trade unions was the same as for newspapers and higher than for political parties, but smaller than for the parliament or radio/TV (SOM 2021). To influence public opinion, unions have three think tanks: *Arena* (a number of LO, TCO and Saco unions), *Katalys* (6F Alliance) and *Futurion* (TCO). They publish reports and arrange seminars, *Arena* in addition provides schools with information on labour relations. *Arena* has an online magazine. The unions themselves also publish reports and journals, write debate articles, organize campaigns and

have communication departments with press officers to influence public opinion, the state and political parties. As already mentioned, LO has close links to the Social Democratic Party. They also act as lobby organizations in Sweden and towards the EU. The Covid-19 pandemic has also offered opportunities to influence public opinion. During its campaign against the use of precarious workers in elderly care and home care, *Kommunal* won the sympathy of the public. A growing proportion of health care assistants have the most insecure forms of temporary work, such as employment on a time or on-call basis. During the pandemic, it became obvious that their lack of training and insecure forms of employment facilitated the spread of the disease. Furthermore, if hourly paid workers have to stay at home because of sickness, they have no rights to sickness benefits and risk not being offered work again.

An example of NGOs fighting the exploitation of workers is Fair Play Bygg (founded by the Building Workers' Union and an association of building contractors), to which the public can report suspicions of fraud, 'black' labour and similar offences in construction. Others include the Union Centre for the Undocumented (founded by LO, TCO and a number of unions) and Fair Trade Sweden, all of which cooperate with Swedish unions.

Trade union policies towards the European Union

Sweden joined the EU in 1995 after a referendum (with a narrow majority of 52 per cent). The union rank and file opinion was so split that LO, TCO and Saco abstained from taking an official position. The unions in manufacturing and export trades, such as Metall, recommended that their members vote 'yes', however. The president of the LO Commercial Employees Union (Handels, *Handelsanställdas Förbund*) participated in the anti-EU campaign. In the 2003 referendum on whether Sweden should join EMU, 56 per cent voted 'no'. Again LO was split and had to take a neutral position. Metall campaigned for EMU, while Handels and Transport were against. Nevertheless, TCO, Saco and LO are all ETUC affiliates; they cooperate closely on several issues and take similar positions in relation to the government and the EU. They share an office in Brussels. They sometimes make great common efforts to influence the policy of the ETUC and the EU. While Swedish unions have traditionally been sceptical of EU labour market policies (Furåker and Bengtsson 2013), this sentiment has been strongly reinforced recently.

Two issues explain this: the *Laval* verdict of 2007 and, in 2020, the European Commission's proposal for a Directive on adequate minimum wages in the European Union. Both are considered to clash with the Swedish model of self-regulation, in which collective bargaining follows a voluntarist tradition without state intervention. Thus, in Sweden there is neither a statutory minimum wage nor an extension mechanism.

The *Laval* judgement seriously restricted the efforts of Swedish unions regarding posted workers. The judgement declared the actions of the Swedish Building Workers' Union in pursuit of a Swedish collective agreement for posted workers at a construction site of the Latvian building company Laval to be illegal (Thörnqvist and Woolfson 2012). Against the absence of national legislation on minimum wages and extension of collective agreements in Sweden can be set the right to start strikes and blockades against unorganized companies. Few workers posted to Sweden are union members. Because they are not nationally registered in Sweden, they are not included in the calculation of Swedish union density. Several hundred foreign construction companies employing posted workers have collective agreements, but no union members or union representatives. Consequently, it is hard for the Building Workers' Union to check whether the agreements are being applied. According to law, the regional safety representatives appointed by the unions have no access to workplaces without union members, even if there is a collective agreement. There is plenty of evidence suggesting a high prevalence of poor working conditions at many sites with posted workers. The Social Democratic Party-led government tried to change this in 2020, but the parliamentary majority of liberal and conservative parties rejected the proposal. After issuing a strike notice, however, the Building Workers' Union managed to obtain this right.

Consequently, the Swedish model of self-regulation via collective agreements paved the way for safety representatives' access to such workplaces (although only in construction) after the government failed to open the door for them by law. The leading employers' association, SN, however, would like to abolish regional safety representatives and replace them with local non-union safety representatives, assisted by officials from the Swedish Work Environment Authority (*Arbetsmiljöverket*). Obviously, the employers wish to exclude regional union safety representatives, who, with some authority, can demand improvements in the working environment in companies without local union safety representatives. Non-union safety representatives at such workplaces would hardly

be able to represent the workers effectively in relation to the employer, in particular because they are often afraid of being dismissed if they contact a union. This is a problem for Swedish unions trying to organize posted workers in construction, where most are from Poland and often not formally employed. In construction the growing 'grey area' of bogus self-employed workers dependent upon a single employer is closely related to 'the frequent use of long subcontracting chains in which self-employed migrant workers are often to be found at the end-point of these supply-chains' (Thörnquist 2015: 419). Many of these problems are frequent also in road haulage companies with foreign drivers.

Another controversial issue is the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages in the European Union (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2022), which was strongly opposed by Danish and Swedish unions. In Finland, where collective agreements are extended to whole industries, unions were less critical. The tensions caused by the Directive on adequate minimum wages were essentially based on different perceptions of the potential consequences for the Swedish model. In Sweden the Nordic model of collective agreements is widely considered to be superior to legislation as it allows greater flexibility, for example when implementing the EU working time directive. Above all, with an EU directive on minimum wages the labour market parties fear losing influence over wage formation to the state and the EU (Müller and Platzer 2020: 301). This perception has a long history. When Sweden joined the EU, the responsible commissioner at that time, Pádraig Flynn, promised that the Swedish labour market model would not be affected. This promise resulted in a letter, which in Sweden is known as the 'Flynn letter'. This letter was not legally binding, but in the introduction to the Directive on posted workers (point 22) it was asserted that 'this Directive is without prejudice to the law of the Member States concerning collective action to defend the interests of trades and professions'. The EU court, however, drew a different conclusion in the *Laval* case (Thörnqvist and Woolfson 2011: 16) and Swedish unions see a danger that it may do the same regarding minimum wages. Furthermore, the EU Directive on adequate minimum wages contains a provision that the adequacy of statutory minimum wages can be assessed in accordance with international standards, such as 60 per cent of the median and 50 per cent of the average wage. Even though Sweden has no statutory minimum wages, if applied, this could create downward pressure on minimum wages in Sweden for almost all employees because collectively negotiated minimum wages are,

as a rule, higher than the standards foreseen in the Directive (Hällberg and Kjellström 2020). Furthermore, today collective agreements have a strong normative influence on wages for the 450,000 or so employees without such agreements, but if lower wages are legitimized by the EU, Swedish unions fear that this might change. The favourability principle prevents only organized employers and those with substitute agreements from deviating downwards. Although legislated minimum wages may not 'end up being a ceiling for low wages, rather than a floor' (Lovén Seldén 2020: 335) every EU intervention into wage formation by the labour market parties and the state is considered a break with the Swedish principle of self-regulation. The different views on the Directive on adequate minimum wages on the part of the Swedish unions and the ETUC and the majority of its affiliates have led to tensions within the European trade union movement and ultimately, in December 2021, prompted LO-Sweden to temporarily suspend payment of its membership fees to the ETUC because it no longer felt appropriately represented by the ETUC (Arbetet 20/12 2021). Furthermore, Swedish unions, such as the Transport Workers' Union, have also been very active on the cabotage issue, namely domestic transport of goods by foreign drivers on Swedish roads. A satisfactory solution seems to be in sight after many years of effort. Regarding posted workers and cabotage, union efforts to improve EU regulations in recent years have had considerable success: conflict rights have been extended and misuse of cabotage restricted.

Swedish unions participate actively in the European social dialogue, at both confederal (LO, TCO and Saco) and sectoral level. Regarding the European Semester, only a minor part of the social dialogue, they give higher priority to national social dialogue than to European social dialogue. Contributing to this situation are the fact that Sweden is not a member of EMU and its relatively strong national economy compared with many other EU countries, not to mention the fact that the national dialogue on the European Semester functions well (Jansson et al. 2019). At national level there are tripartite consultations regarding the European semester. Each year the unions and employers' organizations, in an appendix to the National Reform Programme, present how their activities have contributed to attaining the targets of the Europe 2020 Strategy. In 2012 when the EC pointed out the relatively high wages at the bottom of the wage scale as an obstacle to fighting the high unemployment among newly arrived immigrants, it was generally perceived as an 'attack' on the social partners' autonomy and heavily criticized (Jansson et al.

2019: 15, 21–23). The introduction of establishment jobs in 2020, mentioned above, emerged from a Swedish debate and concerns rather than in response to EU recommendations on how to employ newly arrived immigrants (Jansson et al. 2019: 23). The long-term goal of the unions, but to some degree also of the employer confederation SN, is to protect the Swedish model of industrial relations (Jansson et al. 2019: 17, 19–20). Swedish unions prefer working within ETUC to being in direct contact with the Commission (Jansson et al. 2019: 18). But when LO and the Social Democrats published a report in 2014 on the need for a Pillar of Social Rights, the unions considered influence via the new social democratic government as more important to ensure that it was included in the European Semester than influence through ETUC or contacts with the Commission (Jansson et al. 2019: 19–21). One of the aims of the Pillar was to prevent a race to the bottom on social issues. SN objected that the inclusion of the Pillar might threaten social partner autonomy. In contrast to, for example, Southern European unions, their Swedish counterparts have no domestic tradition of participating in protest demonstrations and for this reason hardly do so at European level either (Bengtsson 2017: 165–166; Bengtsson and Vulkan 2018: 118).

There is a close cooperation between the Nordic confederations and unions to strengthen their voice in the world. The Council of Nordic Trade Unions (*Nordens Fackliga Samorganisation*) represents sixteen national trade union confederations, representing almost 9 million members. Founded in 1972, the main task of NFS is to 'coordinate and foster regional trade union cooperation in the Nordic countries, particularly with regard to employment, economic and social policy and in relation to ETUC, ITUC, TUAC, ILO and PERC',[9] and in relation to the Nordic Council of Ministers. NFS has close ties with the Baltic Sea Trade Union Network (BASTUN). In relation to the ETUC, Nordic affiliates emphasize their autonomy, while for example Southern members are prepared to give ETUC a stronger mandate (Furåker and Larsson 2020: 35; Larsson 2015: 115). The well-prepared and coordinated Nordic unions often speak with one voice in ETUC (Kjellberg 2000: 543–544; Larsson 2015: 42, 99). The existence of strong Nordic 'meta-organizations' at the sectoral and cross-sectoral levels makes it possible to 'lobby directly at EU institutions without having to take a detour via the ETUC or the ETUFs' (Lovén Selden 2020: 332). Consequently, Swedish unions have several

[9] NFS website: https://www.nfs.net/languages/english/about-nfs-9063699

options for influencing the EU, depending on the issue at stake and the current situation, including national dialogue, the ETUC and Nordic cooperation, among other things. Various combinations are also possible. In December 2021 LO-Sweden decided temporarily not to participate in ETUC meetings or pay contributions to 'an organisation that goes against us regarding European minimum wages' (Arbetet 20/12 2021).

Nordic cooperation is also strong at the industry level. *Nordiska Metall* (Nordic Metall), founded in the 1970s and focused on wage bargaining, merged in 2006 to form the cross-manufacturing *Industrianställda i Norden* (IN, Nordic Industrial Employees). IN has close contacts with German colleagues, which have a central position in cross-bargaining networks and transnational cooperation in general (Furåker and Larsson 2020: 45). Within the European Metalworkers' Federation, and later in its successor organization the European federation IndustriALL, the Nordic unions 'became a major actor through their joint strategies' (Larsson and Törnberg 2019: 4). In other European Trade Union Federations, the influence of Nordic unionists is strengthened by their strong joint preparations before meetings (Larsson and Törnberg 2019: 13). Metall played the role of forerunner because of its high exposure to competition, high transferability of production across borders and its resourceful unions (Larsson and Törnberg 2019: 5).

Because of the strong position of large transnational companies in Swedish economy (Kjellberg 2022c), unions work actively within European Works Councils (EWCs). The EWCs have proved to be useful bodies for the exchange of information with companies and offer opportunities to develop contacts between employees from different industrial relations systems. As transnational companies tend to play off the employees in different regions and countries against each other, the development of strong common norms and common positions among unionists from different parts of Europe is given high priority, for example by Unions in Manufacturing (FI, *Facken inom industrin*) (FI 2014). *IF Metall (*LO), *Unionen* (TCO) and the Association of Graduate Engineers are all affiliated to IndustriAll, which has developed binding guidelines for negotiating EWC agreements.

Conclusions

Sweden still belongs to a small group of countries with the highest union densities in the world. Almost seven out of ten employees are

union members. In the absence of extension mechanisms, the right to industrial action, including sympathy measures, against unorganized employers is important to maintain the high coverage of collective agreements. Furthermore, Swedish employers' organizations, compared with, for instance, their German colleagues, have been more successful in recruiting and retaining members. Nine out of ten employees work in companies or public authorities affiliated to employers' organizations. The coverage of collective agreements is at about the same high level although lower in the private sector: 85 per cent in 2020. The high density of both unions and employers' organizations is a prerequisite for the Swedish model of self-regulation, in contrast to, for example, the French model of state regulation in which the high coverage of collective agreements is achieved by the implementation of extension mechanisms.

The industry norm, set by the bargaining parties in manufacturing, has a strong influence on all industrial agreements and at the workplace level, despite the tendency towards more individualized wage setting. The increased exposure to international competition, also affecting Swedish construction companies, is among the circumstances explaining the almost complete absence of local wage drift. Relatively small nominal wage increases, together with expectations from the employees not to obtain less than 'the mark', limit the space of local managers to increase wage dispersion. Despite the moderate nominal wage increases associated with the industry norm, Swedish real wages have increased steadily in contrast to Germany, where for several years they have declined or remained unchanged.

The Swedish model of industrial relations, however, is not without challenges. The declining coverage of union clubs and union representatives at workplace level may in the future circumscribe the unions' capacity to negotiate local wage systems. Another challenge is the growing gap between the density of employers' associations and union density: from being the same in 2000, namely about 75 per cent in the private sector, union density among private sector employees had declined to 64 per cent by 2020, while employer density increased somewhat.

There are widening gaps among employees, too. Before the remaking of the Swedish Ghent system, blue-collar and white-collar union density was the same, but in 2020 the union density of blue-collar workers was 12 percentage points lower than that of white-collar workers. Part of this divergence is explained by a third growing gap, that between foreign-born and domestic-born blue-collar workers. The large number

of refugees from non-European countries entering the Swedish labour market in blue-collar jobs, often on fixed-term contracts in private sector services, makes recruitment more difficult. Compared with white-collar workers those with fixed-term jobs, employed part-time, young or born abroad are overrepresented among blue-collar workers. Other explanations of the growing white-collar/blue-collar divide are the considerably higher blue-collar fees to unemployment funds in the period 2007–2013 and the greater attractiveness and prevalence of union income insurance among white-collar workers than among blue-collar workers (Kjellberg and Nergaard 2022).

The declining union density of blue-collar workers, combined with their decreasing share of the labour force is changing the balance of power within the union movement. In December 2020 the white-collar private sector cartel PTK and the employer confederation SN concluded a new basic agreement (Kjellberg 2021b). The blue-collar confederation LO initiated negotiations in 2017, but because of internal tensions LO did not sign the agreement; the two largest LO unions, *Kommunal* and *IF Metall* signed it in the face of protests from the others. Almost a year later, in November 2021, after negotiations on conversion LO finally signed the agreement. Compared with the Danish LO, which in 2019 merged with the largest white-collar confederation, the Swedish LO has always included fewer white-collar workers. The strength of Swedish white-collar unions is shown by the fact that the 'industry norm' is set by *IF Metall* and two other LO manufacturing unions, but also by the white-collar *Unionen* (TCO) and the Association of Graduate Engineers (Saco). All five unions are members of Unions in Manufacturing. The two white-collar unions have together considerably more members than the three LO unions. In contrast, the Danish 'mark' is set only by former LO unions. The Danish equivalent of the Association of Graduate Engineers is not even recognized as a negotiating party by the Danish private sector employers' confederation.

In 2018 and 2019, average union density was unchanged (68 per cent). Blue-collar density did not decline any further. In the first two months of the Covid-19 pandemic (March and April 2020) the number of union members increased by almost 60,000, of whom about 20,000 were blue-collar. In 2020 union density was up to 69 per cent, while the number of active union members expanded by 75,000. It is hard to say whether this is a trend break reversing the longstanding decline. In 2021 union density reached 70 per cent.

Of the four scenarios presented by Visser (2019) regarding the future of the union movement – marginalization, dualization, substitution (with non-union arrangements), and revitalization – revitalization is the most likely outcome for Sweden. During the pandemic, Kommunal very actively fought to improve the poor conditions that many members experience in hospitals, elderly care and bus transport. That rewarded the union with substantial membership growth also during the second half of 2020, which most unions did not experience. Another example is the success of the unions at Volvo Cars engine plant in Skövde in persuading the company to invest €70 million in the production of electric engines. To address dualization tendencies revitalization efforts have to give high priority to foreign-born blue-collar workers. Both in 2019 and 2020 their union density increased, while that of the native-born was unchanged.

The Swedish model of self-regulation proved able to meet all challenges during the Covid-19 year of 2020. As in the 1930s, the labour market parties concluded a basic agreement, this time on employment protection, skills development and conversion. The aim was to keep the state out as much as possible. Nevertheless, the state assumed a larger role than in the 1930s as the law on employment protection had to be revised in accordance with the agreement. State financial support was necessary for implementing other parts of the agreement. That was also the case with the agreements on short-time working concluded by employers' associations and trade unions at industry level, rapidly followed by a very large number of local agreements. Companies without collective agreements, however, have to apply much more inflexible rules to obtain financial compensation from the state.

The future will show whether the EU directive on minimum wages will keep the Swedish labour market model intact. LO, TCO, Saco and all political parties fully agree on the desirability of this. Although the private sector TCO and Saco unions (the PTK unions), like the LO unions IF Metall and Kommunal, differed from the other LO unions regarding the 2020 basic agreement this will hardly affect the climate between the three confederations. The deep division instead occurred *within* LO, but it by no means paralysed the confederation. This was demonstrated in 2021, when almost all LO unions stood behind the decision resuming the negotiations with SN to obtain much more favourable conversion terms than those in the 2004 LO-SN agreement. It presupposed that LO would also sign the new basic agreement, which

indeed happened in November 2021. In June 2022 it was finally signed by LO, PTK and SN together.

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Abbreviations

6F *Fackförbund i samverkan* (Trade Unions in Cooperation; the LO unions of building workers, electricians, maintenance workers, painters and service & communication workers)

Akad *AkademikerAlliansen* (Alliance of Academics; negotiation council for Saco unions with members in local government)

EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
ETUF	European Trade Union Federation
EWC	European Works Councils
FI	*Facken inom industrin* (Unions in Manufacturing)
HRF	*Hotell- och Restauranganställdas Förbund* (Hotel and Restaurant Workers' Union)
IF Metall	*Industrifacket Metall* (Industrial Union Metall)
IN	*Industrianställda i Norden* (Nordic Industrial Employees)
ITUC	International Trade Union Confederation
Kommunal	*Svenska Kommunalarbetareförbundet* (Swedish Union of Municipal Workers)
LO	*Landsorganisationen i Sverige* (Swedish Trade Union Confederation)
LR	*Lärarnas Riksförbund* (National Union of Teachers in Sweden)
LS	*Lärarnas samverkansråd* (Teachers' Collaboration Council)
NFS	*Nordens Fackliga Samorganisation* (Council of Nordic Trade Unions)
OFR	*Offentliganställdas Förhandlingsråd* (Public Employees Negotiation Council)
PERC	Paneuropean regional council
PTK	*Förhandlings- och samverkansrådet PTK* (Bargaining and Cooperation Council), formerly *Privattjänstemannakartellen* (Bargaining Cartel of Private Sector White-collar Collar Workers)
SAC	Sveriges Arbetares Centralorganisation (Swedish Central Organization of Workers)
Saco	*Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation* (Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations)
Saco-S	Negotiation council for Saco unions with members in the state
SAF	*Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen* (Swedish Employers' Confederation)

SKR	*Sveriges Kommuner och Regioner* (Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions)
SLF	*Skogs- och Lantbrukstjänstemannaförbundet* (Association of Forestal and Agricultural Employees)
SN	*Svenskt Näringsliv* (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise)
ST	*Fackförbundet ST* (Union of Civil Servants)
TCO	*Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation* (Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees)
Transport	*Svenska Transportarbetareförbundet* (Swedish Transport Workers' Union)
TUAC	Trade Union Advisory Committee to the OECD

Appendix A1

Indicators relevant to trade unions in the European Union

The following tables comprise the raw data that are utilized in the graphs presented in Chapter 1 'Trade Unions in the European Union: identifying challenges'; they are referred to throughout the 27 country chapters. The 'standard' country acronyms set out in the table below are applied.

Country acronyms

Austria	AT	Italy	IT
Belgium	BE	Latvia	LV
Bulgaria	BG	Lithuania	LT
Croatia	HR	Luxembourg	LU
Cyprus	CY	Malta	MT
Czechia	CZ	Netherlands	NL
Denmark	DK	Poland	PL
Estonia	EE	Portugal	PT
Finland	FI	Romania	RO
France	FR	Slovakia	SK
Germany	DE	Slovenia	SI
Greece	GR	Spain	ES
Hungary	HU	Sweden	SE
Ireland	IE		

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Table A1.A Total trade union membership in the EU Member States in thousands, averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR*	CY*	CZ	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT*	NL	PL	PT*	RO*	SK*	SI	ES*	SE
1960s	*1,524*	*1,691*	-	-	-	-	*1,037*	-	*634*	*2,979*	*7,950*	-	-	*365*	*4,666*	-	-	-	-	*1,480*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2,216*
1970s	*1,581*	*2,298*	-	-	*113*	-	*1,412*	-	*1,326*	*3,843*	*8,920*	*980*	-	*466*	*7,341*	-	-	-	*38*	*1,662*	-	*1,502*	-	-	-	*2,732*	*3,011*
1980s	*1,663*	*2,655*	-	-	*124*	-	*1,961*	-	*1,771*	*2,779*	*9,576*	*728*	-	*507*	*9,105*	-	-	*75*	*53*	*1,566*	-	*1,225*	-	-	-	*1,104*	*3,720*
1990s	*1,569*	*2,913*	*1,580*	-	*161*	*2,225*	*2,144*	*296*	*2,067*	*2,088*	*11,546*	*730*	*2,132*	*515*	*10,589*	*425*	*407*	*87*	*77*	*1,824*	*4,238*	*857*	*3,651*	*1,024*	*391*	*1,842*	*3,905*
2000	1,442	3,096	652	-	170	1,200	2,155	88	2,132	2,212	10,001	-	-	549	10,985	-	-	-	86	1,913	2,480	-	-	660	333	2,263	3,847
2001	1,421	3,113	-	-	175	1,048	2,151	85	2,173	2,262	9,677	696	966	556	11,062	-	253	253	87	1,919	2,278	-	-	630	329	2,344	3,835
2002	1,407	3,130	-	-	181	985	2,130	85	2,177	2,302	9,494	-	-	569	11,170	-	-	-	86	1,923	2,254	800	-	583	361	2,430	3,831
2003	1,385	3,110	568	-	195	962	2,110	75	2,168	2,274	9,195	-	911	578	11,293	187	182	182	86	1,921	2,262	816	2,035	538	350	2,511	3,824
2004	1,358	3,169	-	457	198	893	2,120	67	2,178	2,201	8,849	740	-	573	11,482	-	-	-	86	1,910	2,313	836	-	483	296	2,552	3,806
2005	1,335	3,217	-	-	203	849	2,114	65	2,185	2,191	8,620	-	801	583	11,551	-	-	-	86	1,899	2,495	-	-	453	302	2,626	3,772
2006	1,272	3,294	-	-	206	815	2,078	60	2,197	2,203	8,423	-	-	603	11,647	173	150	150	87	1,866	1,970	840	2,210	412	259	2,741	3,739
2007	1,248	3,335	-	-	206	796	2,059	55	2,236	2,216	8,293	784	-	610	11,814	166	115	115	88	1,878	1,952	-	-	382	253	2,998	3,550
2008	1,239	3,367	476	437	206	787	2,051	53	2,241	2,258	8,197	-	761	614	11,922	152	120	120	84	1,898	1,914	837	2,246	353	254	3,153	3,478
2009	1,222	3,408	-	424	193	760	2,046	46	2,254	2,293	8,101	-	-	581	12,003	129	115	115	83	1,887	1,889	-	-	320	332	3,166	3,470
2010	1,211	3,438	-	-	186	720	2,026	46	2,241	2,326	8,012	786	-	609	12,020	120	113	113	85	1,870	2,069	739	-	319	260	3,115	3,449
2011	1,206	3,460	-	-	182	684	2,049	43	2,237	2,355	7,977	-	-	591	11,930	110	109	109	87	1,876	2,069	692	-	282	286	3,067	3,450
2012	1,203	3,478	420	341	180	656	1,810	41	2,254	2,366	7,977	-	563	584	11,926	109	102	102	89	1,849	2,001	-	1,432	285	207	2,910	3,484
2013	1,199	3,472	-	369	175	550	1,794	39	2,214	2,350	7,973	682	-	578	11,805	108	95	95	92	1,792	-	-	-	278	197	2,724	3,515
2014	1,198	3,487	-	350	171	524	1,796	38	2,197	2,342	7,950	-	531	564	11,645	106	94	94	93	1,762	2,060	-	-	268	219	2,596	3,553
2015	1,197	3,445	-	321	166	496	1,807	33	2,176	2,340	7,962	-	-	551	11,482	105	92	92	94	1,734	-	596	-	259	182	2,482	3,595
2016	1,201	3,403	407	-	168	507	1,814	31	2,133	2,355	7,935	612	396	538	11,361	102	92	92	96	1,718	1,806	579	1,340	249	-	2,499	3,624
2017	1,206	3,362	-	313	-	504	1,821	31	2,085	2,154	7,900	-	-	534	11,061	102	92	92	99	1,703	1,747	-	-	247	-	2,508	3,641
2018	1,211	3,339	-	302	-	500	1,861	30	2,045	2,151	7,908	-	367	543	11,016	98	87	87	101	1,693	-	-	1,390	247	-	2,506	3,646
2019	1,217	3,295	-	-	-	-	1,868	30	2,024	-	7,885	696	-	552	11,020	-	90	90	104	1,602	-	-	-	-	-	2,471	3,649

Note: Total trade union membership is defined as the '(t)otal sum of trade (labour) union members (including self-employed workers and non-active union members, i.e. students, retirees or unemployed) at national level' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 19). * One or more decade averages are calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.B Gross union density in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES*	SE
1960s	*65.0*	*61.5*	-	-	-	-	*62.0*	-	*43.0*	*21.4*	*38.2*	-	-	*53.7*	*38.1*	-	-	-	-	*43.1*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*70.6*
1970s	*60.2*	*76.1*	-	-	-	-	*73.0*	-	*75.1*	*23.1*	*40.0*	*42.6*	-	*61.2*	*53.9*	-	-	*49.3*	-	*41.6*	-	*61.3*	-	-	-	*15.1*	*82.6*
1980s	*59.7*	*90.5*	-	-	-	-	*89.5*	-	*87.7*	*15.6*	*41.1*	*41.6*	-	*60.3*	*62.8*	-	-	*49.3*	-	*33.8*	-	*44.2*	-	-	-	*13.4*	*94.5*
1990s	*50.5*	*94.9*	-	-	-	*53.2*	*90.6*	*34.6*	*111.8*	*11.0*	*36.6*	*35.3*	*59.4*	*51.8*	*71.9*	*28.0*	*34.0*	*43.8*	-	*30.3*	*39.3*	*27.5*	*45.4*	*43.8*	*53.9*	*18.7*	*106.9*
2000	44.8	89.9	27.3	-	76.2	30.2	87.0	16.5	105.8	10.8	31.0	-	-	39.9	72.7	-	-	-	68.3	27.4	23.5	-	-	34.2	44.2	18.3	103.1
2001	43.9	90.5	-	-	74.2	26.4	86.5	15.7	105.5	10.7	30.0	27.4	29.1	38.9	71.4	-	23.1	-	66.9	26.9	22.3	-	-	32.5	43.4	18.1	99.6
2002	43.7	90.9	-	-	74.5	24.8	86.2	15.6	105.3	10.8	29.7	-	-	39.0	70.5	-	-	-	67.7	26.7	22.8	21.4	-	30.1	47.1	17.8	99.2
2003	41.9	89.9	23.6	-	78.0	24.7	85.7	13.6	105.2	10.4	29.2	-	26.8	38.8	70.4	22.3	15.6	54.9	67.2	26.8	22.9	22.0	35.9	27.7	45.3	17.6	98.9
2004	42.2	90.1	-	38.1	77.0	22.9	85.1	12.3	105.6	10.1	28.3	26.5	-	37.3	71.3	-	-	54.5	68.8	26.8	22.9	22.5	-	25.4	37.1	17.2	99.3
2005	40.9	89.7	-	-	76.0	21.2	84.3	11.5	104.2	9.8	27.1	-	23.8	36.0	70.3	-	-	53.3	66.7	28.1	23.8	-	-	23.5	37.5	16.7	97.5
2006	38.2	91.0	-	-	73.3	20.2	81.5	10.0	103.2	9.9	25.8	-	-	35.2	69.6	19.0	12.6	51.8	66.9	27.3	17.9	22.0	36.0	20.6	32.2	16.7	94.5
2007	36.9	89.4	-	-	68.4	19.3	80.7	9.2	102.7	9.7	24.8	26.6	-	32.8	69.9	17.6	9.3	49.2	66.2	26.7	16.7	-	-	18.7	30.6	17.7	87.5
2008	35.9	88.4	16.2	31.2	67.1	18.8	80.5	8.8	101.5	9.7	24.1	-	22.5	33.6	69.3	16.1	9.5	47.0	61.3	26.5	15.7	21.6	35.6	16.9	29.7	18.7	84.5
2009	35.6	90.5	-	30.5	62.9	18.5	83.3	8.5	106.2	10.0	23.8	-	-	34.9	70.5	16.0	9.9	45.9	60.6	26.5	15.4	-	-	16.0	40.4	19.9	86.4
2010	35.0	89.6	-	-	57.8	17.9	83.8	8.8	105.7	10.2	23.9	27.8	-	38.2	71.4	15.9	10.2	45.1	61.2	26.6	17.4	19.6	-	16.4	32.5	20.0	85.6
2011	34.3	89.6	-	-	55.7	17.1	84.8	7.8	104.4	10.3	23.3	-	-	37.6	70.4	14.4	9.7	45.8	60.4	26.7	17.3	18.6	-	14.5	36.8	19.9	83.3
2012	33.9	89.8	16.2	27.1	56.1	16.5	75.4	7.3	105.0	10.4	23.1	-	16.7	37.3	70.4	14.0	9.0	44.1	59.3	26.2	16.6	-	25.0	14.5	26.7	20.0	83.5
2013	33.7	90.3	-	29.5	58.1	13.6	74.9	6.9	104.1	10.3	22.7	30.8	-	35.9	70.8	13.7	8.3	43.6	58.6	25.8	-	-	-	14.1	26.2	19.4	83.6
2014	33.6	89.9	-	26.5	57.4	12.9	74.1	6.7	104.4	10.3	22.4	-	14.6	34.1	69.4	13.6	8.1	42.9	56.4	25.7	16.5	-	-	13.4	29.4	18.2	83.0
2015	33.2	89.3	-	24.0	54.4	11.9	73.2	5.7	104.1	10.2	22.2	-	-	32.1	67.6	13.4	7.9	41.5	55.0	25.1	-	16.1	-	12.6	23.8	16.8	82.8
2016	32.6	87.2	15.3	-	54.0	11.9	72.0	5.3	101.3	10.3	21.5	25.3	10.2	30.1	65.7	13.1	7.7	40.2	53.6	24.5	14.1	15.3	21.6	11.8	-	16.4	82.0

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES*	SE
2017	32.3	84.6	-	22.0	-	11.7	71.2	5.2	97.1	9.3	21.2	-	-	28.8	62.6	13.0	7.7	40.1	52.7	23.8	13.4	-	-	11.5	-	16.0	80.4
2018	31.9	81.7	-	20.8	-	11.4	71.5	5.1	92.8	9.2	21.0	-	9.2	28.3	61.6	12.2	7.2	37.9	49.5	23.1	-	-	21.4	11.3	-	15.4	79.2
2019	31.8	79.6	-	-	-	-	70.8	5.0	91.2	-	20.6	-	-	27.8	61.1	-	7.4	35.2	48.4	21.4	-	-	-	-	-	14.8	78.9

Note: Gross union density is defined as the '(p)roportion of employees who are members of a trade union (…) among all employees (WSEE)', whereby WSEE is the '(t)otal number of employees mainly based on national labour force surveys and referring to all employees living in a particular country (national concept)' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 19). Trade union membership thus includes non-active union members, such as students, the unemployed, the early retired or pensioners, if trade union rules, regulations or the law allow this. This generally implies that gross trade union density is somewhat higher than net density for most countries. The 'Ghent countries' are exceptional as the differences are more pronounced, and gross density may artificially surpass 100 per cent given the different definitions between nominator and denominator. * One or more decade averages are calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.C Net trade union membership in the EU Member States in thousands, averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR	CY*	CZ	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT*	NL	PL	PT*	RO*	SK*	SI	ES*	SE
1960s	*1.377*	*1.114*	-	-	-	-	*997*	-	*561*	*2.824*	*6.889*	-	-	*328*	*3.671*	-	-	-	-	*1.377*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*2.054*
1970s	*1.394*	*1.489*	-	-	*113*	-	*1.304*	-	*1.106*	*3.622*	*7.543*	*749*	-	*420*	*6.159*	-	-	*59*	*38*	*1.496*	-	*1.602*	-	-	-	*2.732*	*2.643*
1980s	*1.417*	*1.494*	-	-	*124*	-	*1.682*	-	*1.411*	*2.605*	*7.973*	*661*	-	*456*	*6.349*	-	-	*72*	*53*	*1.334*	-	*1.225*	-	-	-	*1.053*	*3.205*
1990s	*1.302*	*1.659*	*1.580*	-	*137*	*1.820*	*1.793*	*294*	*1.443*	*1.851*	*9.421*	*665*	*1.965*	*463*	*5.536*	*225*	*311*	*87*	*73*	*1.491*	*4.238*	*842*	*3.651*	*1.024*	*391*	*1.774*	*3.080*
2000	1.190	1.951	652	-	145	1.080	1.845	75	1.496	1.942	7.928	-	775	494	5.262	-	-	-	79	1.554	2.480	-	-	660	333	2.168	3.022
2001	1.172	1.980	-	-	148	943	1.838	72	1.577	1.992	7.670	633	676	500	5.306	-	203	-	80	1.538	2.278	-	-	630	329	2.227	3.031
2002	1.160	1.958	-	-	154	887	1.818	72	1.565	2.032	7.520	-	-	512	5.339	-	-	-	79	1.544	2.254	768	-	583	361	2.296	3.013
2003	1.143	1.918	568	-	165	866	1.782	64	1.535	2.004	7.260	-	641	520	5.382	176	142	120	78	1.503	2.262	783	2.035	538	350	2.360	2.984
2004	1.120	1.946	-	457	168	804	1.786	57	1.517	1.951	6.936	673	600	516	5.470	-	-	121	78	1.518	2.313	802	-	483	296	2.386	2.930
2005	1.102	1.971	-	-	172	764	1.792	55	1.525	1.911	6.856	-	581	525	5.543	-	-	122	77	1.491	2.495	-	-	453	302	2.442	2.872
2006	1.049	1.946	-	-	175	734	1.778	51	1.531	1.923	6.720	-	-	543	5.624	164	116	124	78	1.465	1.970	806	2.210	412	259	2.550	2.858
2007	1.029	1.999	-	-	175	716	1.761	47	1.548	1.936	6.604	666	-	549	5.758	157	115	123	79	1.422	1.952	-	-	382	253	2.789	2.721
2008	1.022	2.035	476	437	175	708	1.753	45	1.542	1.978	6.476	-	516	553	5.841	144	112	123	75	1.436	1.914	803	2.246	353	254	2.933	2.659
2009	1.008	2.027	-	424	162	684	1.692	39	1.538	2.013	6.400	-	-	523	5.910	122	115	122	73	1.423	1.889	771	-	320	332	2.913	2.581
2010	999	2.035	-	-	155	648	1.647	39	1.513	2.046	6.330	628	-	548	5.945	114	113	122	75	1.370	2.069	739	-	319	260	2.834	2.558
2011	995	2.094	-	-	149	616	1.661	36	1.492	2.075	6.300	-	-	532	5.953	105	109	127	76	1.360	2.069	692	-	282	286	2.760	2.580
2012	993	2.095	420	341	146	590	1.656	35	1.485	2.086	6.310	-	423	526	6.009	103	102	126	78	1.330	2.001	-	1.432	285	207	2.590	2.601
2013	989	2.048	-	369	140	550	1.649	33	1.436	2.070	6.298	511	-	520	5.958	102	95	126	80	1.265	-	-	-	278	197	2.397	2.607
2014	988	2.050	-	350	137	524	1.660	32	1.426	2.062	6.281	-	401	508	5.939	100	94	127	81	1.244	2.060	-	-	268	219	2.258	2.643
2015	987	2.020	-	321	133	496	1.684	28	1.412	2.067	6.290	-	-	496	5.814	100	92	127	83	1.224	-	596	-	259	182	2.134	2.701
2016	991	2.014	407	-	135	507	1.696	27	1.382	2.075	6.268	459	356	484	5.811	97	92	127	85	1.213	1.806	579	1.340	249	-	2.124	2.727
2017	995	2.016	-	313	-	504	1.706	26	1.350	2.074	6.241	-	-	481	5.875	96	92	130	88	1.202	1.747	-	-	247	-	2.106	2.751

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR	CY*	CZ	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT*	NL	PL	PT*	RO*	SK*	SI	ES*	SE
2018	999	2.043	-	302	-	500	1.757	26	1.322	2.071	6.247	-	332	489	5.840	93	87	128	90	1.209	-	-	1.390	247	-	2.105	2.764
2019	1.004	2.034	-	-	-	-	1.767	25	1.306	-	6.229	-	-	497	5.865	-	90	123	92	1.152	-	-	-	-	-	2.075	2.757

Note: Net trade union membership is 'derived for the total (labour) union membership (…) and adjusted, if necessary, for trade (labour) union members outside the active, dependent and employed labour force (i.e. retired workers, self-employed workers, students, unemployed)' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 19). Net trade union membership is considered the nominator for calculating 'net union density'. * One or more decade averages are calculated based on incomplete data.

Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.D Net union density in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES*	SE
1960s	*58.7*	*40.5*	-	-	-	-	*59.6*	-	*38.0*	*20.3*	*33.1*	-	-	*48.3*	*30.0*	-	-	-	-	*40.1*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*65.5*
1970s	*53.1*	*49.3*	-	-	-	-	*67.5*	-	*62.8*	*21.7*	*33.8*	*48.2*	-	*55.1*	*45.2*	-	-	*46.4*	-	*37.5*	-	*64.7*	-	-	-	*31.3*	*72.5*
1980s	*50.9*	*50.9*	-	-	-	-	*76.7*	-	*69.9*	*14.6*	*34.2*	*37.8*	-	*54.2*	*43.8*	-	-	*50.5*	-	*28.8*	-	*44.2*	-	-	-	*12.8*	*81.4*
1990s	*41.9*	*54.0*	-	-	-	*43.6*	*75.8*	*45.9*	*77.8*	*9.8*	*29.9*	*32.1*	*53.9*	*46.6*	*37.5*	*28.0*	*26.0*	*43.8*	-	*24.7*	*39.3*	*27.0*	*45.4*	*43.8*	*53.9*	*18.1*	*84.1*
2000	36.9	56.6	27.3	-	65.1	27.2	74.5	14.0	74.2	9.5	24.6	-	23.8	35.9	34.8	-	-	-	63.1	22.3	23.5	-	-	34.2	44.2	17.5	81.0
2001	36.2	57.6	-	-	62.8	23.8	73.9	13.3	76.6	9.4	23.7	24.9	20.4	35.0	34.2	-	18.5	-	61.7	21.6	22.3	-	-	32.5	43.3	17.2	78.7
2002	36.0	56.9	-	-	63.3	22.4	73.6	13.3	75.7	9.5	23.5	-	-	35.1	33.7	-	-	-	61.9	21.4	22.8	20.5	-	30.1	47.1	16.8	78.0
2003	34.6	55.4	23.6	-	66.3	22.3	72.4	11.7	74.5	9.2	23.0	-	18.9	34.9	33.6	21.0	12.2	44.0	60.8	20.9	22.9	21.1	35.9	27.7	45.3	16.5	77.2
2004	34.8	55.3	-	38.0	65.5	20.6	71.7	10.5	73.5	8.9	22.2	24.1	17.9	33.6	34.0	-	-	43.4	61.9	21.3	22.9	21.6	-	25.4	37.1	16.0	76.4
2005	33.8	54.9	-	-	64.5	19.1	71.5	9.7	72.7	8.6	21.5	-	17.3	32.4	33.8	-	-	42.6	59.8	22.1	23.8	-	-	23.5	37.5	15.5	74.2
2006	31.6	53.8	-	-	62.4	18.1	69.7	8.5	71.9	8.6	20.6	-	-	31.7	33.6	18.0	9.8	41.4	60.3	21.4	17.9	21.1	36.0	20.6	32.2	15.6	72.3
2007	30.4	53.6	-	-	58.0	17.4	69.0	7.9	71.1	8.5	19.8	22.6	-	29.5	34.0	16.7	9.3	39.5	59.2	20.2	16.7	-	-	18.7	30.6	16.4	67.0
2008	29.6	53.4	16.2	31.2	57.2	16.9	68.8	7.4	69.9	8.5	19.0	-	15.3	30.2	33.9	15.2	8.9	37.6	54.6	20.0	15.7	20.7	35.6	16.8	29.7	17.4	64.6
2009	29.3	53.8	-	30.5	52.7	16.7	68.9	7.2	72.5	8.8	18.8	-	-	31.5	34.7	15.2	10.0	36.8	53.4	20.0	15.4	20.4	-	16.0	40.4	18.3	64.2
2010	28.9	53.0	-	-	48.0	16.1	68.1	7.5	71.4	9.0	18.9	22.2	-	34.4	35.3	15.1	10.1	36.1	53.8	19.5	17.4	19.6	-	16.4	32.6	18.2	63.5
2011	28.3	54.2	-	-	45.6	15.4	68.7	6.6	69.6	9.1	18.4	-	-	33.9	35.2	13.7	9.7	36.6	52.5	19.3	17.3	18.6	-	14.5	36.7	17.9	62.3
2012	28.0	54.1	16.2	27.1	45.3	14.8	69.0	6.2	69.2	9.1	18.3	-	12.5	33.6	35.5	13.2	9.0	35.3	52.1	18.8	16.6	-	25.0	14.5	26.8	17.8	62.4
2013	27.8	53.3	-	29.5	46.6	13.6	68.8	5.9	67.5	9.0	18.0	23.1	-	32.3	35.7	12.9	8.4	34.8	51.3	18.2	-	-	-	14.1	26.2	17.0	62.0
2014	27.7	52.9	-	26.5	45.8	12.9	68.5	5.6	67.8	9.0	17.7	-	11.0	30.7	35.4	12.8	8.1	34.1	49.3	18.1	16.5	-	-	13.4	29.4	15.8	61.8
2015	27.4	52.3	-	24.0	43.6	11.9	68.2	4.8	67.5	9.0	17.6	-	-	28.9	34.2	12.7	7.9	33.3	48.4	17.7	-	16.1	-	12.6	23.8	14.4	62.2
2016	26.9	51.6	15.3	-	43.3	11.9	67.4	4.5	65.7	9.0	17.0	19.0	9.2	27.1	33.6	12.4	7.7	32.3	47.5	17.3	14.1	15.3	21.6	11.8	-	13.9	61.7

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES*	SE
2017	26.7	50.7	-	22.0	-	11.7	66.7	4.4	62.9	8.9	16.7	-	-	25.9	33.2	12.3	7.7	32.1	46.7	16.8	13.4	-	-	11.5	-	13.4	60.8
2018	26.3	50.0	-	20.8	-	11.4	67.5	4.4	60.0	8.8	16.6	-	8.3	25.5	32.6	11.6	7.1	30.4	43.8	16.5	-	-	21.4	11.3	-	13.0	60.1
2019	26.3	49.1	-	-	-	-	67.0	4.2	58.8	-	16.3	-	-	25.0	32.5	-	7.4	28.2	42.9	15.4	-	-	-	-	-	12.5	59.6

Note: Net union density is defined as the '(p)roportion of employees who are members of a trade union (NUM) among all employees (WSEE)', whereby NUM is the 'union membership of employees derived for the total (labour) union membership (…) and adjusted, if necessary, for trade (labour) union members outside the active, dependent and employed labour force (i.e. retired workers, self-employed workers, students, unemployed)' and WSEE is the '(t)otal number of employees mainly based on national labour force surveys and referring to all employees living in a particular country (national concept)' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 19). * One or more decade averages are calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.E Share of women in union membership in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR*	CY*	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI*	FR*	DE	GR*	HU*	IE*	IT*	LV	LT*	LU*	MT*	NL	PL	PT*	RO*	SK*	SI*	ES*	SE*
1960s	*28.1*	-	-	-	-	-	*24.4*	-	-	-	*16.8*	-	-	*23.0*	-	-	-	-	-	*9.6*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*28.5*
1970s	*28.4*	-	-	-	-	-	*33.7*	-	*36.3*	*29.2*	*18.6*	-	-	*27.3*	-	-	-	-	-	*11.6*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*39.4*
1980s	*30.7*	-	-	-	-	-	*44.2*	-	*43.3*	-	*23.6*	-	-	*30.7*	*35.0*	-	-	-	-	*15.8*	-	-	-	-	-	-	*47.9*
1990s	*31.6*	-	-	-	35.4	-	*47.7*	-	*45.8*	-	*31.1*	-	-	*35.7*	-	*60.3*	-	*25.6*	-	*26.5*	-	-	*55.0*	-	-	*29.2*	*52.0*
2000	32.3	37.9	-	-	-	-	49.0	59.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31.1	-	-	-	-	-	35.8	51.9*
2001	32.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	59.5	-	-	31.6	-	-	43.4	-	-	-	-	-	30.5	51.7	-	-	-	-	-	52.1*
2002	32.8	39.1	-	-	36.3	46.7	49.2	64.3	-	-	-	23.3	-	44.6	38.3	-	-	-	-	30.9	-	41.5	-	-	51.3	-	52.2*
2003	33.1	-	49.7	-	-	-	-	67.7	53.1	44.0	31.9	-	-	45.0	-	58.9	57.1	-	27.3	31.3	-	-	57.9	42.1	49.7	36.9	51.9*
2004	33.2	-	-	-	-	-	51.1	67.6	-	-	-	26.3	18.5	46.8	-	-	-	34.4	-	33.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.2*
2005	33.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	67.1	-	-	32.5	-	-	48.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	52.0*
2006	33.3	40.8	-	-	-	-	-	64.7	-	-	-	-	-	47.6	-	-	-	-	-	34.2	-	41.4	-	-	-	42.3	51.7*
2007	34.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	64.8	-	-	34.0	-	-	48.7	-	68.0	-	-	-	34.1	59.2	-	-	-	-	-	51.6*
2008	34.0	41.0	46.9	-	37.3	45.9	50.5	61.5	-	46.1	34.7	33.8	-	50.2	-	-	56.3	36.7	30.5	35.2	-	-	-	41.9	49.9	-	51.4*
2009	34.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	63.7	54.7	-	35.5	-	12.9	53.1	-	-	-	-	-	36.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	51.7*
2010	34.6	-	-	-	-	-	51.3	59.5	-	47.3	35.8	31.7	-	54.6	-	-	-	-	-	37.4	-	-	-	-	50.2	40.7	51.4*
2011	34.7	-	-	-	-	-	51.8	60.5	-	-	37.5	-	-	56.0	-	-	-	-	-	38.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	51.5*
2012	34.9	42.2	-	-	-	-	51.0	59.1	-	-	37.6	32.4	-	56.1	43.2	-	-	-	31.4	37.9	-	-	-	-	51.9	-	51.7*
2013	35.1	-	-	59.9	-	-	51.4	61.2	54.8	46.5	38.0	-	-	56.5	-	-	-	36.9	-	38.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	51.8*
2014	35.3	-	-	60.1	39.5	49.0	51.1	59.4	-	-	38.1	-	-	57.1	-	-	-	-	-	39.6	59.0	42.2	-	-	-	43.0	51.7*
2015	35.5	44.0	-	60.0	-	-	51.1	56.7	-	-	38.5	-	9.3	55.6	-	65.2	53.6	-	-	40.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	51.8*
2016	35.8	-	-	59.9	-	-	51.3	-	-	45.5	38.6	-	-	56.5	-	-	-	-	-	41.5	-	-	-	46.2	-	-	-
2017	35.9	-	-	-	-	-	51.3	-	-	-	38.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR*	CY*	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI*	FR*	DE	GR*	HU*	IE*	IT*	LV	LT*	LU*	MT*	NL	PL	PT*	RO*	SK*	SI*	ES*	SE*
2018	36.1	45.6	-	-	-	-	51.1	-	-	-	38.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2019	36.4	-	-	-	-	-	51.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: Share of women in union membership is defined as the '(i)ncidence of women among total union membership of employees as derived from administrative data source' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 19). * Decade average is calculated based on incomplete data for the 1970s for France, for the 1980s for Italy and Sweden, and for the 1990s for Cyprus, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Romania and Spain.
Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a) except for * Visser (2019). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.F Union density of private sector workers in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1960s	-	35.8	-	-	-	-	56.5	-	-	-	26.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	32.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	61.7
1970s	47.4	42.4	-	-	-	-	64.8	-	59.7	-	25.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	62.5
1980s	42.9	49.0	-	-	-	-	71.2	-	63.5	-	28.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	43.3	-	23.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	73.6
1990s	32.3	53.2	-	-	-	-	66.7	-	71.6	-	24.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	64.4	-	64.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2002	-	53.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2003	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	-	-	-	-	-	-	59.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2005	26.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	24.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	17.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2007	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2008	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8.3	-	-	-	15.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2009	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2010	23.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2013	-	53.0	-	-	-	-	62.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2014	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44.0	-	-	-	-	-	-
2015	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
2016	-	51.0	-	-	-	-	59.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6.2	-	-	-	15.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2017	21.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2018	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2019	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: The union density of private sector workers is defined as the '[p]roportion of private-sector employees who are members of a trade union among private-sector employees as derived from administrative data source' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 20).
Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.G Union density of public sector workers in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1960s	-	60.3	-	-	-	-	74.3	-	-	-	79.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	73.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	75.1
1970s	92.1	64.7	-	-	-	-	83.0	-	98.9	-	63.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	89.7
1980s	84.6	60.6	-	-	-	-	99.8	-	99.5	-	56.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	74.3	-	66.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	92.0
1990s	72.1	62.4	-	-	-	-	92.0	-	99.5	-	51.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	38.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2000	-	-	-	-	-	-	96.4	-	98.4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2001	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	34.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2002	-	63.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	35.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2003	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	-	-	-	-	-	-	97.1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2005	58.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2006	55.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	29.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2007	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2008	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39.0	-	-	-	26.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2009	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2010	45.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2011	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2012	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2013	-	53.1	-	-	-	-	80.9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	22.2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2014	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
2015	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23.3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2016	-	52.6	-	-	-	-	81.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	31.5	-	-	-	21.5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
2017	42.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2018	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2019	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: The union density of public sector workers is defined as the '[p]roportion of public-sector employees who are members of a trade union among public-sector employees as derived from administrative data sources' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 20).
Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.H Collective bargaining coverage in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2019

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE*	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV*	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1960s	*95.0*	*80.0*	-	-	-	-	*79.5*	-	*67.3*	*50.0*	*85.0*	-	-	*70.0*	*100.0*	-	-	-	-	*82.6*	-		-	-	-	-	*75.0*
1970s	*95.0*	*87.5*	-	-	-	-	*80.5*	-	*74.3*	*70.0*	*85.0*	-	-	*70.0*	*100.0*	-	-	*60.0*	-	*81.4*	-	*68.5*	-	-	-	*54.0*	*81.5*
1980s	*95.0*	*96.0*	-	-	-	-	*82.5*	-	*77.3*	*87.1*	*85.0*	*85.0*	-	*70.0*	*100.0*	-	-	*60.0*	-	*82.7*	-	*72.7*	-	-	-	*89.1*	*89.5*
1990s	*98.0*	*96.0*	-	-	-	*44.6*	*84.0*	-	*83.0*	*94.0*	*76.8*	*100.0*	*41.8*	*60.3*	*100.0*	-	-	*60.0*	*59.7*	*81.5*	-	*78.4*	-	-	*100.0*	*92.9*	*90.7*
2000	98.0	96.0	-	-	65.1	42.4	85.1	-	85.0	-	67.8	100.0	38.4	44.2	100.0	-	12.5	60.0	-	81.7	25.0	78.3	100.0	52.0	100.0	84.8	87.7
2001	-	-	-	-	62.8	38.5	85.1	-	-	-	68.8	100.0	35.7	-	100.0	-	-	-	-	85.9	-		100.0	48.1	100.0	83.7	-
2002	-	-	36.4	-	63.3	38.5	84.9	-	91.0	-	67.8	100.0	33.8	-	100.0	-	-	-	56.6	92.7	-	77.7	100.0	-	100.0	80.6	-
2003	-	96.0	-	-	66.3	41.1	85.1	-	-	-	67.6	100.0	34.3	-	100.0	-	-	-	-	80.4	-	80.1	100.0	-	100.0	78.9	-
2004	-	96.0	-	-	65.5	40.4	85.1	-	91.4	97.7	65.8	100.0	34.5	-	100.0	-	-	-	-	84.9	-	80.3	100.0	40.0	100.0	77.7	-
2005	98.0	96.0	-	-	64.5	38.2	85.0	-	-	-	64.9	100.0	24.8	41.7	100.0	-	-	-	-	91.3	-	83.2	100.0	-	100.0	76.8	89.4
2006	98.0	96.0	29.3	-	62.4	37.0	85.0	14.5	87.7	-	63.4	100.0	22.7	-	100.0	34.2	10.4	-	-	70.3	-	80.4	100.0	-	100.0	76.5	88.7
2007	98.0	96.0	-	-	58.0	36.4	82.8	-	-	-	61.7	100.0	24.6	-	100.0	-	10.0	-	-	82.7	18.9	82.4	100.0	-	-	77.0	87.5
2008	98.0	96.0	-	-	57.2	38.2	82.6	-	87.5	-	61.3	100.0	22.8	-	100.0	-	9.5	59.0	52.4	81.8	18.7	82.6	100.0	40.0	-	80.3	88.9
2009	98.0	96.0	-	61.0	52.7	38.0	-	-	-	-	61.7	100.0	26.9	40.5	100.0	-	10.7	-	-	86.3	-	81.2	100.0	-	-	83.2	89.6
2010	98.0	96.0	26.8	-	48.0	36.0	-	15.7	-	98.0	59.8	100.0	27.3	-	100.0	32.9	10.9	-	-	90.6	18.6	77.8	100.0	-	70.0	79.4	88.7
2011	98.0	96.0	-	-	45.6	36.9	83.0	-	-	-	58.9	100.0	26.4	-	100.0	-	10.4	54.2	-	87.2	18.1	78.1	-	35.0	-	79.8	88.3
2012	98.0	96.0	-	55.1	45.3	36.7	83.7	-	-	-	58.3	51.5	26.9	-	100.0	-	9.6	-	-	85.1	17.7	75.5	-	-	-	80.1	88.8
2013	98.0	96.0	-	-	46.6	36.4	-	-	-	98.0	57.6	37.3	25.5	-	100.0	-	9.0	-	-	85.7	-	76.5	35.0	-	65.4	84.6	88.4
2014	98.0	96.0	25.7	52.7	45.8	34.3	-	14.1	91.9	-	57.8	29.2	25.4	-	100.0	32.4	8.7	-	-	85.9	-	74.0	-	-	69.2	83.4	88.6
2015	98.0	96.0	-	-	43.6	34.2	83.1	-	-	98.0	56.8	21.3	28.3	-	100.0	-	8.5	-	-	79.4	17.3	73.7	22.6	24.4	67.5	79.6	88.7
2016	98.0	96.0	-	-	43.3	32.9	-	-	-	-	56.0	14.3	28.1	-	100.0	-	8.3	-	50.1	79.3	-	74.1	-	-	70.9	80.8	88.6

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE*	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV*	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
2017	98.0	96.0	-	-	-	33.6	-	-	88.8	-	55.0	14.2	23.3	34.0	100.0	-	8.3	-	-	77.1	-	73.1	15.0	-	78.6	78.9	87.7
2018	98.0	96.0	23.4	-	-	34.2	82.0	6.1	-	98.0	54.0	-	21.1	-	100.0	27.1	7.6	-	-	76.7	-	73.6	-	-	-	80.1	88.0
2019	98.0	96.0	-	-	-	34.7	-	-	-	-	-	-	21.8	-	100.0	-	7.9	-	-	75.6	13.4	-	-	-	-	-	-

Note: Adjusted coverage is defined as the '(n)umber of employees covered by collective (wage) agreements in force as a proportion of all employees with the right to bargain defined as the proportion of employees who are not excluded from collective bargaining' (OECD/AIAS 2021b: 23). Decade averages are calculated based on incomplete data, except for Italy. * The adjusted coverage is derived from survey data except for the period 1960–1994 in Germany.

Source: OECD/AIAS (2021a). Last update: 21 September 2021.

Table A1.I Days not worked due to industrial action in the EU Member States, average 1990s and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE*	BG	HR	CY	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR*	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES	SE
1990s	4	95	-	-	138	1	170	0	170	77	11	2,075	20	120	158	11	-	29	44	22	43	30	63	1	149	313	49
2000	1	77	-	-	5	-	51	2	124	120	0	-	198	72	59	0	9	12	38	1	7	11	96	0	9	295	0
2001	0	135	-	-	20	-	23	0	29	86	1	-	4	82	67	0	2	0	22	6	0	11	0	0	33	150	3
2002	3	18	-	-	29	-	78	0	36	47	10	-	0	15	310	4	3	3	6	34	0	29	6	0	29	365	0
2003	402	70	-	-	28	-	23	38	32	202	5	-	0	26	123	0	0	16	26	2	1	15	2	37	22	56	162
2004	0	47	-	-	36	-	31	3	20	33	4	-	2	14	43	0	0	35	13	9	0	12	4	0	5	304	4
2005	0	187	-	-	58	-	21	0	322	187	6	-	0	17	55	0	1	5	10	6	0	7	2	0	46	61	0
2006	0	25	-	-	97	-	34	0	40	145	50	-	5	4	33	0	0	36	23	2	3	12	4	10	5	57	1
2007	0	34	-	-	34	-	36	0	44	140	22	-	9	3	55	0	8	151	43	4	16	8	80	0	0	70	3
2008	0	69	-	-	3	-	743	0	7	141	16	-	7	2	42	4	26	-	13	16	23	-	22	0	-	90	26
2009	0	43	-	-	6	-	6	0	44	167	12	-	2	200	-	0	0	-	56	1	1	-	-	0	-	82	0
2010	0	42	-	-	1	-	8	0	149	356	5	-	5	4	-	0	0	-	0	8	1	19	-	0	-	43	7
2011	16	99	-	-	15	-	6	0	60	97	9	-	-	2	-	0	0	-	4	3	2	17	-	0	-	32	0
2012	0	90	-	-	151	-	4	55	8	62	18	-	0	5	-	1	3	-	8	31	1	32	-	0	-	89	9
2013	1	60	-	-	2,024	-	397	0	12	80	16	-	-	9	-	0	0	-	1	3	1	23	-	0	-	78	2
2014	1	221	-	-	100	-	7	0	19	81	11	-	-	27	-	0	2	-	5	6	0	7	-	0	-	44	1
2015	0	67	-	-	44	-	4	0	53	76	57	-	-	19	-	29	2	-	20	7	9	5	-	0	-	34	0
2016	0	124	-	-	116	-	6	0	3	133	13	-	9	41	-	0	31	-	0	3	1	3	-	0	-	26	2
2017	0	63	-	-	12	-	11	0	11	76	6	-	1	27	-	0	0	-	0	43	3	8	-	0	-	38	1
2018	2	104	-	-	72	-	8	2	99	113	28	-	9	2	-	0	28	-	-	33	0	13	-	0	-	56	0
2019	1	107	-	-	-	-	3	-	173	203	10	-	13	18	-	0	2	-	-	53	142	14	-	0	-	52	2
2020	-	77	-	-	-	-	3	-	82	-	9	-	-	11	-	0	-	-	-	29	0	-	-	0	-	34	0

Note: *The 1990 average is calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: ETUI based on national statistical offices and ILOSTAT. Last update: 22 November 2021.

Table A1.J Unemployment rate in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1960s	*1.5*	*1.9*	-	-	-	-	*1.0*	-	*1.8*	*1.7*	-	-	-	*5.4*	*4.8*	-	-	*0.0*	-	*0.9*	-	*2.4*	-	-	-	*2.5*	*1.9*
1970s	*1.2*	*4.0*	-	-	-	-	*3.3*	-	*3.5*	*4.4*	-	-	-	*7.5*	*5.9*	-	-	*0.5*	-	*3.8*	-	*4.5*	-	-	-	*4.5*	*2.5*
1980s	*3.2*	*9.6*	-	-	-	-	*7.0*	-	*4.8*	*8.6*	-	-	-	*14.2*	*8.4*	-	-	*2.5*	-	*8.4*	-	*7.8*	-	-	-	*16.4*	*3.3*
1990s	*4.0*	*8.4*	*11.3*	-	*5.1*	*4.5*	*7.3*	*9.5*	*11.8*	*9.7*	-	*8.3*	*8.9*	*12.1*	*10.5*	*9.6*	*6.6*	*2.4*	*5.5*	*5.8*	*12.7*	*6.0*	*7.7*	*12.8*	*7.1*	*19.5*	*8.3*
2000	3.5	7.0	16.9	15.6	4.9	8.8	4.6	14.6	9.8	8.6	7.9	11.4	6.4	4.5	10.6	14.3	16.4	2.4	6.6	2.9	16.2	4.1	7.3	18.8	6.8	13.9	6.7
2001	3.6	6.6	20.3	16.0	3.9	8.2	4.6	13.0	9.1	7.8	8.0	10.8	5.7	4.2	9.6	13.7	17.3	2.3	6.9	2.3	18.3	4.1	6.8	19.3	6.2	10.6	4.9
2002	4.0	7.5	18.2	15.0	3.6	7.3	4.6	11.2	9.1	7.9	8.8	10.4	5.8	4.7	9.0	12.5	13.7	2.9	6.9	2.8	20.0	5.1	8.6	18.7	6.3	11.5	5.1
2003	4.3	8.2	13.7	14.2	4.3	7.8	5.4	10.3	9.0	8.5	9.9	9.8	5.9	4.8	8.7	11.6	12.5	3.7	7.6	3.7	19.7	6.4	7.0	17.6	6.7	11.5	5.7
2004	5.5	8.4	12.1	13.7	4.7	8.3	5.5	10.1	8.8	8.9	10.9	10.6	6.1	4.7	8.0	11.7	10.9	5.1	7.2	4.6	19.0	6.7	8.1	18.2	6.3	11.0	6.5
2005	5.6	8.5	10.1	12.8	5.3	7.9	4.8	8.0	8.4	8.9	11.2	10.0	7.2	4.6	7.7	10.0	8.3	4.5	6.9	5.9	17.8	7.7	7.2	16.3	6.5	9.2	7.5
2006	5.3	8.3	9.0	11.3	4.6	7.2	3.9	5.9	7.7	8.8	10.3	9.0	7.5	4.8	6.8	7.0	5.8	4.7	6.8	5.0	13.9	7.8	7.3	13.4	6.0	8.5	7.1
2007	4.9	7.5	6.9	9.9	3.9	5.3	3.8	4.6	6.9	8.0	8.7	8.4	7.4	5.0	6.1	6.1	4.3	4.1	6.5	4.2	9.6	8.1	6.4	11.1	4.9	8.2	6.2
2008	4.1	7.0	5.6	8.6	3.7	4.4	3.7	5.5	6.4	7.4	7.5	7.8	7.8	6.8	6.7	7.7	5.8	5.1	6.0	3.7	7.1	7.7	5.8	9.5	4.4	11.3	6.2
2009	5.3	7.9	6.8	9.2	5.4	6.7	6.4	13.5	8.2	9.1	7.8	9.6	10.0	12.6	7.8	17.5	13.8	5.1	6.9	4.4	8.2	9.6	6.9	12.0	5.9	17.9	8.4
2010	4.8	8.3	10.3	11.7	6.3	7.3	7.7	16.7	8.4	9.3	7.0	12.7	11.2	14.6	8.4	19.5	17.8	4.4	6.9	5.0	9.7	11.0	7.0	14.4	7.3	19.9	8.6
2011	4.6	7.2	11.3	13.7	7.9	6.7	7.8	12.3	7.8	9.2	5.8	17.9	11.0	15.4	8.4	16.2	15.4	4.9	6.4	5.0	9.7	12.9	7.2	13.6	8.2	21.4	7.8
2012	4.9	7.6	12.3	16.0	11.9	7.0	7.8	10.0	7.7	9.8	5.4	24.5	11.0	15.5	10.7	15.0	13.4	5.1	6.2	5.8	10.1	15.8	6.8	14.0	8.9	24.8	8.0
2013	5.4	8.4	13.0	17.3	15.9	7.0	7.4	8.6	8.2	10.3	5.2	27.5	10.2	13.8	12.2	11.9	11.8	5.9	6.1	7.3	10.3	16.4	7.1	14.2	10.1	26.1	8.1
2014	5.6	8.5	11.4	17.3	16.1	6.1	6.9	7.4	8.7	10.3	5.0	26.5	7.7	11.9	12.7	10.8	10.7	5.9	5.7	7.4	9.0	14.1	6.8	13.2	9.7	24.5	8.0
2015	5.7	8.5	9.2	16.2	15.0	5.1	6.3	6.2	9.4	10.4	4.6	24.9	6.8	10.0	11.9	9.9	9.1	6.7	5.4	6.9	7.5	12.6	6.8	11.5	9.0	22.1	7.4
2016	6.0	7.8	7.6	13.1	13.0	4.0	6.0	6.8	8.8	10.1	4.1	23.6	5.1	8.4	11.7	9.6	7.9	6.3	4.7	6.0	6.2	11.2	5.9	9.7	8.0	19.6	7.0
2017	5.5	7.1	6.2	11.2	11.1	2.9	5.8	5.8	8.6	9.4	3.8	21.5	4.2	6.7	11.2	8.7	7.1	5.5	4.0	4.9	4.9	9.0	4.9	8.1	6.6	17.2	6.7

(*Continued*)

Table A1.J Continued

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
2018	4.9	6.0	5.2	8.5	8.4	2.2	5.1	5.4	7.4	9.0	3.4	19.3	3.7	5.8	10.6	7.4	6.2	5.6	3.7	3.8	3.9	7.1	4.2	6.5	5.1	15.3	6.4
2019	4.5	5.4	4.2	6.6	7.1	2.0	5.0	4.4	6.7	8.4	3.1	17.3	3.4	5.0	10.0	6.3	6.3	5.6	3.6	3.4	3.3	6.5	3.9	5.8	4.5	14.1	6.8
2020	5.4	5.6	5.1	7.5	7.6	2.6	5.6	6.8	7.8	8.0	3.8	16.3	4.3	5.7	9.2	8.1	8.5	6.8	4.3	3.8	3.2	6.9	5.0	6.7	5.0	15.5	8.3

Note: Unemployed persons from 15 to 74 years of age as a proportion of the labour force.
Source: Eurostat (UNE_RT_A_H). Last update: 3 November 2021.

Table A1.K Employment rate in the EU Member States (%), average (1992-1999) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1990s	*70.7*	*62.2*	-	-	*71.2*	*72.5*	*75.7*	*70.1*	*67.8*	*65.8*	*67.4*	*60.1*	*59.1*	*63.0*	*55.7*	*65.1*	*68.1*	*64.4*	*57.5*	*69.0*	*64.1*	*69.8*	*69.9*	*66.7*	*68.5*	*53.6*	*74.6*
2000	71.4	65.8	55.3	58.3	72.2	71.0	78.0	66.6	71.6	68.1	68.7	61.9	61.2	71.8	57.4	63.6	65.5	67.0	57.4	74.3	61.0	73.5	69.1	63.5	68.5	60.7	76.8
2001	71.3	65.0	54.8	56.9	73.9	71.2	78.3	67.4	72.6	68.8	68.9	61.5	61.3	72.4	58.5	64.5	64.2	67.5	57.4	75.4	59.4	74.0	68.3	63.5	69.4	62.1	78.7
2002	71.8	65.0	55.8	58.1	74.9	71.6	77.7	68.0	72.6	69.3	68.7	62.5	61.4	72.1	59.4	66.5	67.2	67.8	57.7	75.8	57.4	73.6	63.3	63.6	69.0	63.1	78.5
2003	72.0	64.7	58.0	58.4	75.2	70.7	77.3	69.6	72.2	69.8	68.3	63.6	62.4	72.0	60.0	67.8	68.9	67.2	57.8	75.2	57.1	72.9	63.7	64.8	68.1	64.3	77.9
2004	69.5	65.6	60.1	59.5	75.1	70.1	77.6	70.3	72.2	69.6	68.2	63.9	62.1	72.9	61.6	67.9	69.3	67.7	57.9	74.9	57.3	72.5	63.5	63.7	70.4	65.4	77.4
2005	70.4	66.5	61.9	59.9	74.4	70.7	78.0	72.0	73.0	69.4	69.4	64.4	62.2	74.0	61.5	69.1	70.7	69.0	57.4	72.7	58.3	72.2	63.6	64.5	71.1	67.5	77.9
2006	71.6	66.5	65.1	60.6	75.8	71.2	79.4	75.9	73.9	69.4	71.1	65.6	62.6	74.7	62.4	73.2	71.3	69.1	57.9	73.7	60.1	72.6	64.8	66.0	71.5	69.0	78.8
2007	72.8	67.7	68.4	63.9	76.8	72.0	79.0	76.9	74.8	69.9	72.9	65.8	62.3	75.1	62.7	75.2	72.7	69.6	58.6	75.5	62.7	72.5	64.4	67.2	72.4	69.7	80.1
2008	73.8	68.0	70.7	64.9	76.5	72.4	78.7	77.1	75.8	70.5	74.0	66.3	61.5	73.5	62.9	75.4	72.0	68.8	59.2	76.9	65.0	73.1	64.4	68.8	73.0	68.5	80.4
2009	73.4	67.1	68.8	64.2	75.3	70.9	76.1	70.0	73.5	69.5	74.2	65.6	60.1	68.0	61.6	66.6	67.0	70.4	59.0	76.8	64.9	71.1	63.5	66.4	71.9	64.0	78.3
2010	73.9	67.6	64.7	62.1	75.0	70.4	74.9	66.8	73.0	69.3	75.0	63.8	59.9	65.5	61.0	64.3	64.3	70.7	60.1	76.2	64.3	70.3	64.8	64.6	70.3	62.8	78.1
2011	74.2	67.3	62.9	59.8	73.4	70.9	74.8	70.6	73.8	69.2	76.5	59.6	60.4	64.6	61.0	66.3	66.9	70.1	61.6	76.4	64.5	68.8	63.8	65.0	68.4	62.0	79.4
2012	74.4	67.2	63.0	58.1	70.2	71.5	74.3	72.2	74.0	69.4	76.9	55.0	61.6	64.5	60.9	68.1	68.5	71.4	63.9	76.6	64.7	66.3	64.8	65.1	68.3	59.6	79.4
2013	74.6	67.2	63.5	57.2	67.2	72.5	74.3	73.3	73.3	69.5	77.3	52.9	63.0	66.5	59.7	69.7	69.9	71.1	66.2	75.9	64.9	65.4	64.7	65.0	67.2	58.6	79.8
2014	74.2	67.3	65.1	59.2	67.6	73.5	74.7	74.3	73.1	69.7	77.7	53.3	66.7	68.1	59.9	70.7	71.8	72.1	67.9	75.4	66.5	67.6	65.7	65.9	67.7	59.9	80.0
2015	74.3	67.2	67.1	60.6	67.9	74.8	75.4	76.0	72.9	70.0	78.0	54.9	68.9	69.9	60.5	72.5	73.3	70.9	69.0	76.4	67.8	69.1	66.0	67.7	69.1	62.0	80.5
2016	74.8	67.7	67.7	61.4	68.7	76.7	76.0	76.4	73.4	70.4	78.6	56.2	71.5	71.4	61.6	73.2	75.2	70.7	71.1	77.1	69.3	70.6	66.3	69.8	70.1	63.9	81.2
2017	75.4	68.5	71.3	63.6	70.8	78.5	76.6	78.3	74.2	71.1	79.2	57.8	73.3	73.0	62.3	74.8	76.0	71.5	73.0	78.0	70.9	73.4	68.8	71.1	73.4	65.5	81.8
2018	76.2	69.7	72.4	65.2	73.9	79.9	77.5	79.1	76.3	71.8	79.9	59.5	74.4	74.1	63.0	76.8	77.8	72.1	75.5	79.2	72.2	75.4	69.9	72.4	75.4	67.0	82.4
2019	76.8	70.5	75.0	66.7	75.7	80.3	78.3	79.7	77.2	72.1	80.6	61.2	75.3	75.1	63.5	77.4	78.2	72.8	76.8	80.1	73.0	76.1	70.9	73.4	76.4	68.0	82.1
2020	75.5	70.0	73.4	66.9	74.9	79.7	77.8	78.2	76.5	71.9	80.0	61.1	75.0	73.4	62.6	77.0	76.7	72.1	77.3	80.0	73.6	74.7	70.8	72.5	75.6	65.7	80.8

Note: The employment rate is defined as the number of persons in the labour force measured as a percentage of the total population from 20 to 64 years of age. The 1992–1999 average is calculated based on incomplete data, except for France.
Source: Eurostat (LFSI_EMP_A_H). Last update: 15 March 2022.

Table A1.L Employment rate of women in the EU Member States (%), average (1993-1999) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1990s	*61.2*	*50.9*	-	-	*56.6*	*63.1*	*69.7*	*65.2*	*64.7*	*57.5*	*58.0*	*42.3*	*51.5*	*49.1*	*39.2*	*60.0*	*64.4*	*48.2*	*33.4*	*57.4*	*56.9*	*60.4*	*63.5*	*58.7*	*63.7*	*36.8*	*72.5*
2000	62.3	56.0	50.7	51.7	59.1	61.9	72.9	62.8	68.2	60.5	60.8	45.5	53.9	59.2	42.2	59.3	63.9	53.1	33.2	64.1	54.2	65.1	63.0	57.2	63.6	44.5	74.6
2001	62.8	55.3	51.5	49.6	62.4	62.2	73.7	63.5	69.5	61.3	61.5	45.2	54.1	60.4	43.8	60.6	62.6	54.1	33.0	65.7	53.0	65.8	62.3	57.5	64.1	46.3	76.4
2002	64.1	55.8	52.3	50.7	64.6	62.3	73.1	64.3	70.4	62.6	61.8	46.8	54.3	61.0	44.9	62.3	63.9	55.0	34.4	66.8	51.4	65.7	56.8	57.2	63.8	48.3	76.6
2003	64.5	56.2	54.0	51.1	65.4	61.4	72.4	66.0	70.0	63.6	61.9	48.1	55.5	61.1	45.6	63.2	65.6	55.1	34.9	66.9	51.2	65.8	57.0	58.4	62.8	50.2	76.0
2004	62.7	57.2	56.0	52.0	64.6	61.1	73.0	67.3	69.7	63.6	62.0	49.0	55.3	62.2	48.5	63.5	65.3	56.2	34.3	66.9	51.2	65.9	57.4	56.7	65.4	52.1	75.3
2005	64.0	58.6	57.1	52.8	63.8	61.3	73.7	69.7	70.8	63.7	63.1	49.7	55.6	63.7	48.5	64.5	66.6	58.4	34.8	64.4	51.7	66.0	56.9	56.7	66.2	55.1	75.2
2006	65.2	58.8	60.4	53.6	65.9	61.8	74.8	72.5	71.5	63.9	65.0	51.3	55.6	64.6	49.6	68.4	68.0	59.4	35.7	65.7	53.1	66.3	58.5	57.5	66.5	57.1	75.8
2007	66.2	60.3	63.5	55.9	67.7	62.4	74.7	72.6	72.5	64.9	66.7	51.7	55.2	65.8	49.9	70.3	69.1	61.0	37.7	67.7	55.5	66.3	57.9	58.7	67.1	58.6	77.1
2008	67.6	61.3	65.4	57.0	68.2	62.5	74.3	72.9	73.1	65.5	67.8	52.6	54.8	65.4	50.6	71.9	68.7	60.1	39.4	69.4	57.3	67.1	57.3	60.3	68.5	58.9	77.2
2009	68.2	61.0	64.0	58.0	68.3	61.4	73.1	69.0	72.4	65.0	68.7	52.9	54.0	62.9	49.7	66.5	67.2	61.5	40.0	69.9	57.6	66.1	56.3	58.2	67.9	56.8	75.7
2010	68.8	61.6	60.8	56.4	68.8	60.9	72.0	65.9	71.5	64.9	69.7	51.8	54.6	61.1	49.5	64.5	65.0	62.0	41.6	69.8	57.3	65.6	56.5	57.4	66.5	56.3	75.0
2011	69.2	61.5	59.8	53.6	67.7	61.7	71.4	67.8	71.9	64.7	71.3	48.7	54.7	60.2	49.9	65.3	66.6	61.9	43.8	70.4	57.2	64.6	56.2	57.4	64.8	56.1	76.5
2012	69.6	61.7	60.2	52.6	64.8	62.5	71.1	69.4	72.5	65.1	71.6	45.2	56.2	60.2	50.5	66.4	67.9	64.1	48.0	71.0	57.5	63.0	56.7	57.3	64.6	54.6	76.8
2013	70.0	62.1	60.7	52.8	62.2	63.8	71.2	70.1	71.9	65.5	72.5	43.3	56.9	61.3	49.9	67.7	68.6	63.9	51.7	70.6	57.6	62.3	56.5	57.8	63.0	53.8	77.2
2014	70.1	62.9	62.0	54.2	63.9	64.7	71.0	70.6	72.1	66.1	73.1	44.3	60.2	62.3	50.3	68.5	70.6	65.5	54.3	69.7	59.4	64.2	57.3	58.6	63.6	54.8	77.6
2015	70.2	63.0	63.8	55.9	64.0	66.4	71.5	72.2	71.8	66.5	73.6	46.0	62.1	63.8	50.6	70.5	72.2	65.0	55.3	70.8	60.9	65.9	57.2	60.3	64.7	56.4	78.3
2016	70.9	63.0	64.0	56.6	64.1	68.6	72.5	72.4	71.7	66.8	74.5	46.8	64.6	65.4	51.6	71.8	74.3	65.1	58.0	71.6	62.2	67.4	57.4	62.7	66.7	58.1	79.2
2017	71.4	63.6	67.3	58.3	66.2	70.5	73.2	75.1	72.4	67.3	75.2	48.0	65.7	67.0	52.5	72.7	75.5	67.5	60.6	72.8	63.6	69.8	60.2	64.7	69.7	59.6	79.8
2018	71.7	65.5	68.3	60.1	68.9	72.2	73.9	75.5	74.5	68.1	75.8	49.1	66.8	68.1	53.1	74.8	76.7	68.0	64.1	74.2	65.0	72.1	60.6	65.5	71.7	61.0	80.2
2019	72.4	66.5	70.7	61.5	70.1	72.7	74.7	76.0	75.8	68.7	76.6	51.3	67.6	69.0	53.8	75.5	77.4	68.1	65.8	75.5	65.3	72.7	61.3	66.9	72.9	62.1	79.7
2020	71.5	65.9	68.9	61.3	69.1	71.9	74.3	75.2	75.0	68.5	76.9	51.8	67.0	67.4	52.7	75.2	75.8	68.5	67.8	75.5	65.7	71.9	61.0	66.1	72.4	60.0	78.3

Note: The employment rate of women is defined as the number of women in the labour force measured as a percentage of the total population of women from 20 to 64 years of age. The 1992–1999 average is calculated based on incomplete data, except for France.
Source: Eurostat (LFSI_EMP_A_H). Last update: 15 March 2022.

Table A1.M Proportion of the workforce in industry in the EU Member States (%), 1999-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1999	32.5	27.8	-	-	25.2	41.7	27.1	33.1	29.1	27.1	35.5	28.1	36.0	30.4	35.2	29.7	32.4	22.8	-	22.2	-	39.6	46.8	38.8	42.6	33.2	25.7
2000	32.7	27.8	37.1	-	23.8	41.3	25.6	36.6	29.2	27.0	35.1	27.6	35.5	30.1	34.5	29.9	32.2	22.1	33.0	21.2	38.8	39.5	46.1	37.6	41.4	33.0	25.0
2001	31.9	26.9	36.5	-	24.2	41.8	25.6	34.8	28.2	26.7	34.3	27.6	36.1	30.4	34.0	28.9	32.3	22.2	31.7	21.3	38.8	38.5	45.8	37.1	42.4	33.6	24.2
2002	31.5	27.7	36.4	35.1	23.9	41.3	23.9	30.7	28.2	26.0	33.9	27.4	35.8	28.5	33.8	28.1	33.3	20.8	31.8	19.8	36.3	38.1	47.0	38.4	42.3	32.8	23.3
2003	31.4	26.3	36.3	36.4	23.7	41.0	23.8	31.8	27.6	24.5	32.8	26.6	34.8	28.3	33.9	29.7	32.8	20.0	30.5	19.9	35.7	37.3	45.7	38.1	40.2	32.2	22.9
2004	28.6	26.2	37.3	35.7	23.9	40.6	24.2	34.8	27.2	24.6	32.8	25.6	34.3	28.3	33.3	29.4	33.2	19.3	30.1	19.8	36.1	34.9	45.4	39.5	39.4	31.5	22.6
2005	29.8	26.0	38.0	34.5	23.7	40.3	24.1	34.6	26.6	24.1	31.3	25.5	33.8	28.2	33.0	28.3	33.2	18.0	30.3	20.7	35.9	34.3	44.4	39.0	40.2	30.5	22.1
2006	30.4	25.8	37.9	34.0	22.4	41.0	23.5	34.0	26.3	24.2	31.0	24.9	33.4	27.7	32.2	29.2	33.4	17.5	28.6	20.4	35.9	34.1	43.6	39.1	38.7	30.2	21.9
2007	29.6	25.4	38.7	34.8	22.1	41.2	23.8	35.6	26.4	23.7	31.3	25.3	33.7	25.9	32.1	30.1	33.2	17.5	26.2	19.6	36.5	33.9	44.1	39.3	38.1	29.9	21.7
2008	28.2	25.4	38.5	34.3	22.5	40.2	23.3	35.2	25.5	23.4	30.4	24.9	33.3	22.4	31.7	30.1	31.3	15.3	25.2	18.5	35.8	32.3	41.7	39.3	37.5	28.2	21.1
2009	26.9	23.9	37.0	32.6	21.2	38.1	20.5	31.0	24.2	22.7	29.9	23.6	32.2	19.2	30.9	24.9	28.2	12.8	24.8	17.3	34.6	30.8	39.5	36.8	35.5	24.5	19.9
2010	26.9	23.8	34.5	30.9	19.6	37.8	19.8	29.8	23.5	22.3	29.3	21.7	31.5	17.6	30.2	23.7	26.0	13.1	24.4	16.2	33.4	30.2	38.0	35.4	34.9	22.8	19.6
2011	27.9	23.5	33.0	31.6	20.3	38.6	20.0	32.2	23.1	22.3	29.3	19.5	31.8	17.5	29.9	23.4	25.8	13.3	23.9	15.6	33.8	29.1	37.6	36.0	33.7	21.7	19.5
2012	27.9	22.0	32.6	31.1	19.7	38.5	19.7	31.0	22.9	21.8	29.2	17.8	30.8	16.9	29.2	23.9	26.5	12.9	21.3	15.7	33.2	27.4	37.6	36.3	32.8	20.5	19.2
2013	27.8	21.9	31.5	30.1	16.9	37.7	19.5	30.1	22.9	21.3	28.7	16.7	30.9	17.0	28.7	24.5	26.8	12.2	21.2	15.2	32.9	25.9	37.3	34.6	33.3	19.7	18.7
2014	27.7	21.7	31.4	28.5	16.0	38.5	19.2	30.1	21.9	20.4	28.9	16.4	31.4	17.0	28.5	24.3	26.0	11.3	20.2	15.1	32.8	25.6	37.7	34.6	33.8	19.4	18.1
2015	27.5	21.5	30.8	28.6	16.0	38.8	19.3	30.7	21.7	20.2	28.6	16.4	31.2	17.7	28.3	24.0	26.2	11.8	19.3	15.4	33.1	25.8	35.5	35.1	33.8	19.8	17.9
2016	27.3	21.3	30.8	28.4	16.7	38.8	18.9	29.3	22.0	20.2	28.2	16.8	31.3	18.3	27.9	24.5	25.8	11.2	18.9	15.5	33.7	25.8	36.0	35.9	34.6	19.6	17.7
2017	26.6	20.9	30.7	27.4	17.1	38.9	18.6	29.8	22.1	20.4	28.2	17.2	32.3	18.4	27.7	23.6	25.8	9.2	18.7	15.2	33.8	25.9	36.1	36.2	35.2	20.1	17.7
2018	27.1	21.2	30.9	28.5	16.9	38.2	18.8	29.2	22.4	20.2	28.1	16.9	33.2	18.3	27.9	24.0	26.3	11.2	17.1	14.9	34.0	26.0	35.8	35.5	35.2	20.4	17.7
2019	26.9	20.9	30.4	28.8	18.7	38.0	18.4	28.4	21.7	20.3	27.9	17.0	33.0	18.3	27.9	23.9	25.9	10.3	17.9	14.6	34.1	25.8	35.5	35.2	35.5	20.6	17.9
2020	26.7	20.4	30.8	29.1	19.4	38.1	18.6	28.7	22.0	19.8	28.1	16.4	32.9	18.7	28.3	24.2	25.7	10.1	17.4	14.4	33.5	26.0	34.6	35.6	35.2	20.8	17.7

Note: 1999–2007 and 2008–2020: industries C–F. From 15 to 74 years of age.
Source: 1999–2007: Eurostat (LFSA_EEGANA); 2008–2020: Eurostat (LFSA_EEGAN2). NACE Rev. 2. Last update: 18 November 2021.

Table A1.N Proportion of the workforce in the private service sector in the EU Member States (%), 1999-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1999	39.6	33.4	-	-	45.2	29.4	33.8	32.8	34.0	35.0	32.4	35.7	30.6	39.7	27.8	32.5	28.9	40.8	-	39.0	-	27.9	25.3	26.9	30.8	34.3	33.3
2000	39.3	33.3	29.8	-	44.5	28.7	35.1	33.3	34.3	35.1	33.0	36.4	31.5	40.5	28.9	34.1	28.9	40.4	36.0	40.0	29.6	28.5	25.8	27.7	32.1	35.6	34.1
2001	39.9	34.5	30.7	-	44.2	28.2	35.4	33.8	35.2	35.7	33.6	37.3	31.7	40.4	29.1	33.9	27.8	42.9	38.1	39.6	30.7	29.5	25.7	28.0	31.0	35.1	35.1
2002	39.7	34.7	31.6	34.4	43.5	28.7	34.9	37.6	35.4	36.0	33.6	37.0	31.9	40.2	29.9	31.9	29.0	41.5	36.7	38.1	31.5	29.9	24.6	28.0	31.2	35.5	35.4
2003	40.1	34.8	31.1	34.6	43.1	29.3	35.5	34.3	35.3	35.8	34.3	37.4	31.8	40.4	30.1	35.2	30.9	41.8	37.4	40.9	31.3	30.1	25.4	28.4	33.1	35.6	35.0
2004	42.0	33.5	31.0	35.0	42.6	29.7	35.1	32.5	35.4	35.9	34.0	36.6	31.9	40.0	32.3	35.1	31.2	40.2	37.1	39.9	31.5	31.6	27.2	27.8	32.2	36.4	35.3
2005	40.9	33.8	31.3	35.8	41.6	29.6	35.5	34.1	36.2	36.0	35.1	37.6	33.4	40.0	32.9	35.1	31.2	40.4	37.1	39.4	32.1	31.5	28.0	28.7	31.9	36.5	35.5
2006	40.1	34.2	32.1	37.1	41.4	29.7	36.1	34.7	36.4	36.4	35.4	37.1	34.1	40.2	33.4	37.3	33.0	41.4	38.1	39.6	32.2	32.0	29.5	29.7	32.3	37.3	35.9
2007	41.0	34.6	32.5	37.8	43.1	29.9	35.9	34.6	37.0	36.7	35.6	37.0	34.6	42.5	34.0	37.5	33.4	41.3	40.7	40.2	33.4	32.7	30.5	30.5	33.0	38.0	36.7
2008	47.0	40.0	36.7	42.4	54.1	34.4	41.9	39.7	43.1	43.3	42.2	44.0	39.1	49.9	40.8	42.8	39.7	52.4	45.2	43.6	36.3	40.4	34.7	33.9	38.4	47.6	42.5
2009	46.9	40.3	37.8	42.5	56.3	35.8	42.6	40.5	43.2	43.9	42.2	44.6	38.8	50.8	41.4	45.3	41.0	53.2	45.3	42.4	37.1	40.7	36.1	35.6	39.8	48.6	43.3
2010	46.5	40.6	40.1	43.2	57.3	35.4	42.3	40.9	43.5	43.9	42.3	45.1	38.6	50.7	42.1	45.6	42.7	51.7	44.8	41.1	37.6	40.9	37.2	35.6	39.5	48.9	43.6
2011	46.4	41.0	41.2	43.4	56.7	35.4	42.4	40.1	43.4	44.2	42.4	46.1	38.3	50.9	42.1	45.6	43.5	52.7	45.1	40.9	37.5	41.3	37.8	35.5	39.7	49.3	43.5
2012	46.3	41.7	41.6	43.5	58.6	35.0	42.5	40.5	43.5	44.1	42.3	46.4	39.2	51.7	42.9	45.4	43.4	53.2	46.7	41.8	38.0	41.7	38.3	35.5	40.0	50.1	43.6
2013	46.1	43.0	42.3	43.2	59.5	35.7	42.2	41.8	43.7	44.0	43.0	47.0	39.2	51.9	43.7	44.9	43.7	53.6	48.3	43.7	37.8	42.8	39.3	36.0	39.9	51.1	43.9
2014	45.7	42.4	42.0	42.7	58.4	35.0	42.6	41.8	44.3	43.7	42.6	48.2	38.3	52.1	43.8	46.1	44.2	54.6	49.4	44.2	38.1	43.4	39.9	35.5	38.9	51.3	44.1
2015	45.5	42.5	42.8	43.3	58.7	35.0	43.8	41.4	44.5	43.6	42.9	49.2	38.3	51.8	44.2	46.3	43.3	50.3	49.7	44.3	38.4	43.2	41.0	35.4	38.3	51.3	44.1
2016	45.9	42.1	43.5	45.2	58.2	34.7	44.2	43.9	44.3	43.7	43.2	48.7	38.0	51.9	44.6	45.7	43.8	50.1	51.8	44.3	38.2	43.6	41.1	35.4	38.0	51.6	44.3
2017	46.1	42.4	44.2	46.0	59.7	34.6	44.3	44.0	44.5	44.0	43.2	48.8	37.5	51.7	44.9	46.9	44.2	48.0	52.0	43.7	38.3	43.9	41.4	34.7	37.7	51.3	44.5
2018	46.0	42.9	43.7	44.9	60.1	35.4	45.0	44.4	44.5	44.3	43.1	49.1	36.9	51.8	45.1	47.2	44.3	51.8	53.2	44.0	38.2	42.9	42.1	35.3	38.2	50.9	44.5
2019	46.1	43.8	44.1	43.3	58.8	35.6	45.7	44.8	45.2	43.7	43.1	49.4	37.6	51.4	45.2	45.8	44.5	54.1	52.7	43.6	38.2	43.6	42.5	35.5	38.3	51.0	44.1
2020	45.8	42.6	43.0	42.6	57.2	34.7	44.8	43.7	44.5	43.7	41.7	49.2	37.6	50.1	44.2	45.4	45.0	53.5	52.8	42.4	38.3	42.9	43.1	35.0	37.8	49.7	44.0

Note: 1999–2007: Industries G–K; 2008–2020: industries G–N and R–U. From 15 to 74 years of age.
Source: 1999–2007: Eurostat (LFSA_EEGANA). NACE Rev. 1.1; 2008-2020: Eurostat (LFSA_EEGAN2). NACE Rev. 2. Last update: 18 November 2021.

Table A1.O Proportion of part-time employment in the EU Member States (%), average (1993-1999) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT*	BE	BG	HR	CY*	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI*	FR*	DE	GR	HU*	IE*	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT*	NL	PL*	PT	RO*	SK*	SI*	ES	SE*
1990s	14.9	14.6	-	-	5.9	5.1	21.5	7.5	11.4	16.9	16.6	4.7	3.2	15.8	6.6	11.6	9.0	9.4	6.2	37.3	8.6	7.4	13.4	2.1	6.2	7.3	23.0
2000	16.4	17.5	-	-	7.5	4.7	21.0	7.6	11.9	16.5	19.2	4.3	3.0	16.9	8.3	10.6	9.9	11.0	6.5	41.2	9.3	8.2	14.0	1.8	5.6	7.8	21.0
2001	17.3	18.4	2.8	-	7.3	4.3	19.6	7.8	11.8	16.1	19.9	3.8	3.1	16.9	8.3	9.8	9.7	11.4	7.0	41.9	9.2	8.0	14.1	2.2	5.4	7.9	19.7
2002	18.2	19.0	2.2	-	6.8	4.3	19.4	7.2	12.4	16.2	20.5	4.2	3.1	16.9	8.5	9.2	10.6	12.0	7.9	43.6	9.6	8.3	10.1	1.8	5.4	7.9	20.0
2003	18.4	20.3	1.9	6.9	7.6	4.5	20.7	7.4	12.6	16,7	21.3	4.1	3.7	17.2	8.4	9.6	9.2	13.4	8.8	44.6	9.4	8.8	10.2	2.2	5.5	8.1	22.0
2004	19.4	21.2	2.0	6.6	7.5	4.3	21.5	7.2	13.2	16.9	22.2	4.4	4.4	17.2	12.5	9.9	8.4	16.3	8.3	45.1	9.8	8.3	9.5	2.5	7.9	8.6	22.8
2005	21.0	21.7	1.8	7.6	7.6	4.4	21.5	6.8	13.2	17.1	23.4	4.8	3.9	17.6	12.7	7.6	6.9	17.4	9.0	45.1	9.8	8.2	9.2	2.4	7.8	12.0	23.5
2006	21.5	22.0	1.7	7.1	6.6	4.4	22.9	6.8	13.5	17.1	25.2	5.5	3.7	17.4	13.1	5.9	10.0	17.1	9.7	45.0	8.9	8.2	8.6	2.7	8.0	11.6	23.6
2007	22.0	21.9	1.4	6.1	6.4	4.4	23.0	7.1	13.4	17.2	25.4	5.4	3.9	17.9	13.4	5.6	8.6	17.8	10.6	45.7	8.5	8.9	8.6	2.5	8.1	11.4	23.5
2008	22.7	22.4	2.0	6.5	6.8	4.3	23.1	6.4	12.7	16.8	25.1	5.4	4.3	18.7	14.1	5.9	6.5	17.9	11.1	46.1	7.7	8.8	8.6	2.5	8.1	11.6	25.7
2009	23.9	23.2	2.1	6.5	7.5	4.8	24.6	9.4	13.3	17.2	25.3	5.9	5.2	21.3	14.1	8.2	7.9	17.6	11.0	47.0	7.7	8.5	8.5	3.4	9.5	12.4	26.0
2010	24.4	23.7	2.2	7.0	8.3	5.1	24.8	9.8	13.8	17.6	25.6	6.3	5.5	22.4	14.8	9.3	7.8	17.4	11.6	48.1	7.7	8.5	9.9	3.8	10.3	12.9	25.8
2011	24.5	24.7	2.2	7.2	9.0	4.7	24.3	9.3	14.1	17.6	25.9	6.7	6.4	23.3	15.2	8.8	8.3	18.0	12.6	48.3	7.3	10.3	9.5	4.0	9.5	13.5	25.2
2012	25.2	24.7	2.2	5.6	9.7	5.0	24.1	9.2	14.1	17.7	25.8	7.7	6.7	23.7	16.8	8.9	8.9	18.5	13.2	49.0	7.2	11.2	9.3	4.0	9.0	14.4	25.0
2013	26.0	24.3	2.5	5.4	11.9	5.8	24.0	8.9	14.0	18.1	26.6	8.4	6.4	23.7	17.6	7.5	8.4	18.7	14.0	49.8	7.1	11.1	9.0	4.5	9.3	15.7	24.7
2014	26.9	23.7	2.5	5.3	13.5	5.5	23.9	8.3	14.1	18.5	26.5	9.3	6.0	23.0	18.1	6.8	8.6	18.4	15.3	49.6	7.1	10.1	8.7	5.1	10.0	15.8	24.5
2015	27.3	24.3	2.2	6.0	13.0	5.3	23.8	9.5	14.1	18,3	26.8	9.4	5.7	22.2	18.3	7.2	7.6	18.4	14.3	50.0	6.8	9.8	8.8	5.8	10.1	15.6	24.3
2016	27.8	24.7	2.0	5.6	13.4	5.7	25.0	9.9	14.9	18.2	26.7	9.8	4.8	21.9	18.5	8.5	7.1	19.2	13.9	49.7	6.4	9.5	7.4	5.8	9.3	15.1	23.9
2017	27.9	24.5	2.2	4.8	12.2	6.2	24.7	9.5	15.0	18.2	26.9	9.7	4.3	20.1	18.5	7.7	7.6	19.5	13.7	49.8	6.6	8.9	6.8	5.8	10.3	14.9	23.3
2018	27.3	24.5	1.8	5.2	10.8	6.3	23.9	11.1	15.1	17.9	26.8	9.1	4.2	19.5	18.4	7.2	7.1	17.7	13.2	50.1	6.4	8.1	6.5	4.9	9.7	14.5	22.6

(*Continued*)

Table A1.O Continued

Year	AT*	BE	BG	HR	CY*	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI*	FR*	DE	GR	HU*	IE*	IT	LV*	LT*	LU*	MT*	NL	PL*	PT	RO*	SK*	SI*	ES	SE*
2019	27.2	24.9	1.9	4.8	10.2	6.3	24.2	11.3	15.5	17.4	27.2	9.1	4.4	19.7	18.7	8.3	6.4	16.9	12.2	50.2	6.1	8.1	6.1	4.5	8.4	14.5	22.5
2020	27.2	24.4	1.8	4.5	10.0	5.7	23.4	12.3	14.8	17.0	22.5	8.6	4.8	18.2	18.2	8.9	6.1	18.0	11.2	50.8	5.9	7.5	5.9	4.5	8.3	13.9	22.3

Note: Part-time employment is defined as 'employed persons not working full time. The distinction between full-time and part-time work is generally based on a spontaneous response by the respondent. The main exceptions are the Netherlands (…) where a 35 hours threshold is applied, Sweden where a threshold is applied to the self-employed (…)' (Eurostat, Metadata). Measured as a percentage of total employment from 15 to 64 years of age. * 1993–1999 average is calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: Eurostat (LFSI_PT_A_H). Last update 4 November 2021.

Table A1.P Proportion of employees on temporary contracts in the EU Member States (%), average (1993-1999) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE
1990s	6.7	5.6	-	-	7.9	5.3	9.7	2.0	14.5	12.6	10.4	6.2	5.2	8.4	5.6	6.6	4.8	2.7	3.5	10.0	3.6	9.5	1.9	3.7	9.5	25.5	10.8
2000	6.7	7.7	-	-	8.1	6.2	8.9	2.7	14.1	13.8	11.6	8.0	6.0	8.2	7.3	6.0	3.9	3.1	3.5	11.9	4.1	15.2	1.7	4.4	11.7	25.8	12.8
2001	6.9	7.5	4.8	-	8.0	6.1	8.3	2.5	14.3	13.3	11.3	8.1	6.4	7.5	7.1	6.6	4.8	3.5	3.7	12.6	8.5	15.6	1.8	4.4	10.9	25.9	13.4
2002	6.5	6.9	4.0	-	7.6	6.1	8.2	2.6	14.1	12.6	11.1	7.2	6.2	7.7	7.2	11.6	5.9	3.5	3.6	12.6	11.2	16.6	0.7	4.3	12.1	26.1	13.4
2003	6.1	7.2	5.0	8.9	9.6	7.0	8.4	2.4	14.3	11.9	11.2	6.9	6.5	7.9	7.3	9.7	5.8	2.9	3.1	12.7	14.3	15.8	1.3	4.3	11.9	26.2	13.4
2004	7.8	7.4	5.8	9.6	9.9	7.0	8.6	2.4	14.1	11.9	11.6	7.8	5.8	7.9	8.6	8.6	5.0	4.4	3.3	12.8	16.8	15.3	1.7	4.7	15.2	26.8	13.8
2005	7.9	7.5	5.1	9.6	11.0	6.7	9.0	2.5	14.4	12.4	12.6	7.8	6.1	8.1	9.1	7.7	4.5	4.9	3.7	13.3	19.3	15.3	1.6	4.2	14.9	27.5	14.1
2006	7.8	7.4	5.1	10.1	10.6	6.7	8.1	2.4	14.3	13.1	12.9	7.0	6.0	7.7	9.8	6.4	3.8	5.6	3.2	14.2	20.8	16.3	1.2	4.3	14.6	28.1	15.3
2007	7.7	7.4	4.4	10.7	10.8	6.6	8.2	2.0	14.0	13.4	13.0	7.2	6.4	7.8	9.9	3.7	3.2	6.3	4.4	15.3	21.8	17.8	1.1	4.3	15.8	26.2	15.5
2008	7.8	7.1	4.3	10.0	11.4	6.1	7.6	2.3	13.1	13.5	13.1	7.7	6.9	7.8	10.0	3.0	2.1	5.8	3.6	15.4	20.9	18.3	0.9	3.9	15.1	24.1	14.3
2009	7.9	7.0	4.0	9.7	11.3	6.3	7.8	2.2	12.6	12.9	13.0	8.1	7.4	7.9	9.5	3.8	2.0	6.6	4.2	15.5	20.6	17.7	0.7	3.6	13.9	21.1	13.5
2010	8.2	7.0	3.9	10.2	11.7	6.7	7.5	3.4	13.4	13.4	13.0	8.3	8.5	8.5	9.6	6.3	2.2	6.5	4.5	15.4	21.1	18.6	0.7	4.7	14.5	20.7	14.4
2011	8.4	7.7	3.6	10.8	11.9	6.5	7.8	4.1	13.6	13.6	13.0	7.6	8.0	9.1	10.1	5.9	2.4	6.5	5.7	15.4	20.9	18.2	1.0	5.5	15.2	21.1	14.9
2012	8.2	7.0	3.9	10.9	12.9	6.8	7.7	3.2	13.5	13.5	12.3	6.5	8.5	9.1	10.5	4.2	2.3	6.9	6.0	16.2	20.9	16.9	1.1	5.7	14.4	19.5	14.4
2013	8.1	6.9	4.9	12.1	14.7	7.5	7.8	3.2	13.4	13.7	12.0	6.5	9.7	9.0	10.1	3.8	2.4	6.4	6.6	17.0	21.1	17.6	1.0	5.8	13.8	19.1	14.7
2014	8.1	7.4	4.6	14.4	15.8	8.0	7.6	2.8	13.4	13.4	11.8	7.5	9.6	8.6	10.4	2.9	2.4	7.3	6.7	17.7	22.4	18.0	1.1	7.4	13.7	19.9	15.2
2015	8.0	7.7	3.9	17.2	15.9	8.3	7.7	3.1	13.1	14.1	11.8	7.9	10.1	8.1	10.8	3.3	1.8	9.1	6.5	16.7	22.2	18.7	1.0	8.9	15.1	20.9	15.1
2016	7.9	7.8	3.6	19.3	14.4	8.1	11.8	3.4	13.6	14.2	11.9	7.5	8.7	7.6	10.9	3.2	1.7	7.9	6.6	17.2	21.9	19.1	1.0	8.4	14.6	21.8	14.7
2017	8.1	9.0	3.9	18.2	13.5	8.0	11.3	2.8	13.9	14.8	11.7	7.6	7.9	7.8	12.1	2.6	1.5	8.1	5.1	18.1	20.9	19.0	0.9	8.0	15.2	22.4	14.7
2018	8.1	9.3	3.6	17.6	12.2	7.0	9.9	3.1	14.2	14.7	11.5	7.6	6.5	8.6	13.4	2.4	1.4	8.9	6.8	17.8	19.5	19.0	0.9	6.9	13.5	22.7	14.5
2019	7.7	9.4	3.9	16.0	12.0	6.5	9.9	2.8	13.6	14.3	11.0	8.7	5.9	8.4	13.4	2.8	1.3	8.3	7.8	16.9	17.4	17.9	1.1	6.6	11.5	22.3	14.3
2020	7.3	8.7	3.2	13.4	11.7	5.8	10.0	2.5	12.8	13.4	9.8	7.0	5.2	7.7	11.9	2.4	1.1	6.9	6.7	14.9	14.7	15.3	1.0	5.5	9.5	20.4	13.5

Note: Temporary contracts are defined as 'employees with a limited duration job/contract or employees whose main job will terminate either after a period fixed in advance, or after a period not known in advance, but nevertheless defined by objective criteria, such as the completion of an assignment or the period of absence of an employee temporarily replaced. The concept of fixed-term contract is only applicable to employees, not to self-employed' (Eurostat, Metadata). Measured as a percentage of total employment from 15 to 64 years of age.

Source: Eurostat (LFSI_PT_A_H). Last update: 4 November 2021.

Table A1.Q Real wage growth in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR*	CY*	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU	MT*	NL	PL*	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES	SE
1960s	*5.0*	*4.4*	-	-	-	-	*5.2*	-	*4.6*	*5.4*	*5.1*	*7.1*	-	*4.5*	*6.0*	-	-	*3.5*	-	*6.1*	-	*7.5*	-	-	-	*8.3*	*4.5*
1970s	*4.0*	*5.4*	-	-	-	-	*2.0*	-	*4.1*	*3.9*	*4.2*	*5.0*	-	*4.2*	*3.8*	-	-	*4.7*	-	*4.1*	-	*4.7*	-	-	-	*4.9*	*2.1*
1980s	*1.2*	*1.1*	-	-	-	-	*1.0*	-	*3.3*	*0.5*	*0.5*	*0.2*	-	*2.0*	*1.1*	-	-	*1.1*	-	*-0.2*	-	*2.0*	-	-	-	*0.9*	*0.3*
1990s	*1.6*	*2.2*	*-0.4*	*7.6*	*2.9*	*5.1*	*1.5*	*9.2*	*1.3*	*1.4*	*1.4*	*0.6*	*0.8*	*2.3*	*0.4*	*4.4*	*9.5*	*1.1*	*2.6*	*1.0*	*5.0*	*3.9*	*-1.2*	*5.2*	*2.4*	*1.2*	*1.3*
2000	0.2	-1.4	4.4	2.5	4.4	4.1	0.4	8.4	0.8	0.0	0.6	2.0	4.5	3.0	-0.8	6.2	1.4	2.5	4.9	2.8	0.4	2.2	23.6	4.6	2.5	-0.8	6.1
2001	-0.9	1.3	7.4	-2.6	2.0	4.7	1.5	3.3	0.9	0.4	-0.1	2.7	5.9	3.5	0.3	1.8	4.6	0.7	2.8	0.1	6.2	0.4	15.4	0.1	3.8	-0.6	2.3
2002	1.0	3.1	2.5	8.4	3.7	6.3	1.9	6.5	0.0	2.2	0.0	8.3	5.0	-0.1	0.4	-1.2	5.3	2.5	1.8	1.6	-0.5	0.0	-3.2	5.7	0.7	0.9	1.4
2003	0.2	0.4	3.4	5.4	5.6	7.7	2.4	9.5	1.1	1.1	0.2	5.0	5.8	2.5	1.1	6.6	10.7	-1.1	6.0	1.7	1.0	-0.4	9.8	1.2	2.4	-0.5	1.7
2004	0.3	-0.6	2.8	3.0	0.5	4.4	1.9	8.3	3.2	1.2	-0.7	1.0	6.1	3.4	1.1	7.9	12.3	1.3	-1.3	1.3	-2.2	1.0	4.1	0.7	4.6	0.3	3.7
2005	-0.4	-1.0	2.2	2.3	3.4	2.7	1.7	6.7	2.2	1.1	-0.7	5.4	4.5	3.7	0.9	15.1	11.5	0.9	-1.0	-0.1	-0.1	0.9	18.8	5.8	3.7	0.0	2.6
2006	1.0	0.7	4.0	-0.5	0.6	4.0	1.3	8.7	1.9	0.7	-0.2	-0.2	1.9	1.9	-0.2	11.1	15.3	1.6	2.4	-1.2	0.6	-1.7	7.3	3.0	3.0	0.6	2.3
2007	0.4	0.8	3.5	2.4	-1.8	3.2	1.9	16.5	1.2	0.2	-0.8	0.9	-0.3	2.6	0.2	20.7	7.8	1.9	2.0	1.1	3.5	0.1	0.4	6.0	1.9	0.8	4.1
2008	1.1	0.4	10.0	-0.9	-1.5	-0.2	0.9	2.1	0.8	0.0	0.2	-0.6	1.8	2.3	0.5	3.7	2.5	-0.4	0.1	1.8	4.1	-0.2	23.3	2.1	1.6	3.5	1.1
2009	1.3	2.0	7.4	-3.1	5.3	-1.5	1.6	-2.7	0.3	3.1	0.3	2.1	-7.3	5.8	2.7	-7.6	-13.1	2.5	0.9	4.4	0.7	4.4	-7.1	2.6	1.0	4.9	0.2
2010	-0.6	-0.4	7.9	0.7	-1.9	3.4	0.7	-1.1	0.6	1.8	1.0	-3.2	-2.1	-1.2	1.2	-4.2	-1.5	-0.1	0.4	-0.8	6.3	0.2	4.6	4.4	2.4	0.2	1.3
2011	-1.1	0.3	3.1	1.6	-0.6	1.1	-0.9	-3.0	0.1	0.7	1.2	-6.2	0.8	-0.7	-1.7	-3.4	1.7	0.8	1.0	0.3	0.2	-3.5	-6.6	-1.8	-0.3	-2.0	1.7
2012	0.3	1.0	4.7	-3.1	-0.8	-0.2	-0.5	1.8	-0.1	0.9	1.2	-4.8	-2.6	0.4	-2.3	4.1	0.9	-0.8	0.6	1.0	0.1	-4.8	-1.0	-1.0	-2.6	-2.4	2.5
2013	0.1	1.4	10.3	-2.8	-5.1	-0.7	0.7	2.6	-1.0	0.9	0.5	-6.7	-1.5	-2.5	0.1	5.2	4.6	1.6	0.7	-0.2	1.2	2.6	2.0	1.2	-1.6	0.3	1.4
2014	-0.2	0.2	4.2	-4.8	-2.9	1.9	0.9	5.7	-0.4	1.2	2.0	-2.1	-0.5	0.2	-0.2	6.8	4.6	1.3	0.3	0.8	2.4	-1.9	4.9	2.1	1.7	0.1	1.2
2015	0.5	-0.7	3.2	1.0	1.1	3.1	1.3	4.1	1.0	0.7	2.2	0.7	1.4	1.3	0.8	8.2	6.8	0.7	4.5	-0.4	3.2	-0.6	0.6	3.8	2.1	0.7	1.6
2016	0.9	-0.9	4.0	1.5	1.0	3.6	1.2	5.1	0.7	1.1	1.6	-2.8	1.4	2.1	0.0	6.0	5.4	-0.1	4.6	0.7	5.2	0.2	14.7	2.6	3.5	-0.8	1.7
2017	-0.2	0.0	5.7	-0.7	0.5	4.7	0.6	2.6	-2.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	3.6	2.0	-0.5	4.2	5.8	0.9	1.3	-0.4	3.7	0.7	11.8	3.6	1.4	-0.7	0.3

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR*	CY*	CZ*	DK	EE*	FI	FR	DE	GR	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU	MT*	NL	PL*	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES	SE
2018	0.9	-0.2	7.1	2.5	0.3	5.4	1.0	4.7	0.0	0.1	1.5	-3.9	3.0	0.6	1.1	4.9	5.1	0.9	2.8	-0.3	6.3	2.3	8.8	3.6	1.9	-0.3	1.3
2019	1.1	0.6	4.8	-0.8	3.2	4.2	1.2	5.8	0.2	-1.1	2.0	0.6	2.3	1.2	1.2	4.7	8.3	0.3	1.6	0.3	4.8	4.0	5.2	4.0	3.6	1.7	0.9
2020	0.3	-2.0	7.8	1.9	-2.2	0.4	1.9	6.1	0.3	-3.7	-0.3	0.3	-1.1	2.0	3.1	4.7	6.4	-0.3	-1.4	3.1	0.5	1.2	4.5	1.4	4.0	1.3	1.4

Note: Real compensation per employee, total economy. Deflator private consumption. * 1990s average is calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: AMECO (RWCDC). Last update: 18 November 2021.

Table A1.R Productivity growth in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR*	CY	CZ	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE*	GR	HU*	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT*	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK*	SI	ES	SE
1960s	*3.9*	*4.2*	-	-	-	-	*4.4*	-	*4.1*	*4.5*	-	*7.9*	-	*4.0*	*5.7*	-	-	*3.0*	-	*3.7*	-	*5.7*	-	-	-	*6.6*	*3.7*
1970s	*4.0*	*3.4*	-	-	-	-	*1.9*	-	*3.9*	*3.4*	-	*4.7*	-	*3.2*	*3.3*	-	-	*2.5*	-	*2.5*	-	*4.5*	-	-	-	*2.7*	*2.1*
1980s	*1.9*	*2.0*	-	-	-	-	*1.9*	-	*3.2*	*1.8*	-	*0.2*	-	*2.7*	*2.3*	-	-	*4.2*	-	*1.4*	-	*3.0*	-	-	-	*2.3*	*2.1*
1990s	*2.2*	*1.9*	*-1.6*	*4.0*	*2.7*	*0.3*	*2.1*	*5.7*	*1.5*	*1.6*	*1.2*	*1.4*	*1.7*	*6.2*	*1.4*	*-2.6*	*-2.8*	*3.3*	*3.9*	*2.7*	*3.6*	*3.2*	*-1.0*	*4.8*	*1.7*	*2.3*	*1.3*
2000	3.2	3.5	6.5	8.1	5.2	4.1	3.4	7.2	5.6	3.4	3.0	3.7	4.8	7.8	3.9	7.0	5.5	5.6	5.4	3.7	4.5	3.0	2.2	1.3	2.8	4.9	4.6
2001	0.9	0.6	6.1	2.9	2.5	3.5	0.5	6.7	2.6	1.3	1.6	3.6	4.3	3.7	1.7	6.6	6.9	1.9	-1.9	1.4	1.4	1.2	5.5	3.8	3.4	3.2	1.2
2002	1.1	1.2	7.1	5.7	2.9	1.8	0.1	8.4	1.4	0.3	-0.3	3.4	5.0	4.1	0.0	9.2	8.1	2.1	2.0	-0.3	2.1	0.6	9.4	4.8	3.3	1.3	1.9
2003	0.6	0.6	5.3	5.4	1.4	3.6	0.1	7.8	1.7	0.0	-0.6	5.6	4.4	1.2	-0.3	8.5	11.9	1.3	3.2	-0.3	3.5	-1.2	2.9	5.7	2.6	0.9	1.9
2004	2.2	3.0	7.6	4.2	3.7	4.8	2.4	7.2	3.6	2.3	1.3	4.7	5.2	5.1	0.7	10.4	6.7	2.8	-0.6	1.6	5.1	1.2	11.1	4.3	4.4	1.8	4.0
2005	1.4	1.8	7.1	4.3	3.1	6.3	2.0	10.1	2.4	0.6	0.9	0.5	4.5	3.2	0.3	11.8	10.0	0.9	2.5	1.6	3.5	0.6	5.0	7.3	3.6	1.7	2.4
2006	3.0	2.0	7.7	4.9	3.0	6.4	3.6	10.7	3.7	1.9	4.0	5.5	4.1	2.2	1.3	12.6	9.1	4.4	2.5	3.4	6.2	1.7	8.7	7.8	5.8	2.1	4.1
2007	3.4	2.8	7.1	4.9	2.9	5.0	0.5	8.3	5.0	1.9	3.0	2.8	0.4	2.2	1.0	11.2	12.5	6.4	4.2	3.6	7.3	2.3	8.8	10.8	6.0	1.7	2.7
2008	1.3	-0.3	6.7	2.0	0.8	1.6	-1.1	-4.5	0.2	-0.3	1.4	-0.5	1.2	-6.5	-2.0	-2.5	3.7	-2.1	3.4	1.7	4.1	0.0	11.4	5.7	3.6	-0.8	-1.2
2009	-4.0	-2.8	-2.7	-7.2	-4.5	-5.2	-5.4	-14.7	-8.6	-3.4	-5.4	-4.6	-6.5	-6.0	-5.7	-12.9	-14.3	-4.9	-2.2	-4.1	1.8	-3.3	-4.8	-5.4	-8.5	-4.5	-5.2
2010	1.6	2.0	1.8	-1.0	-0.4	2.2	1.4	2.3	2.9	1.3	4.5	-5.8	1.3	1.2	1.1	-2.0	4.2	1.8	5.1	0.8	3.6	1.7	-3.5	5.7	1.1	0.0	5.0
2011	2.6	0.3	5.4	0.1	-2.1	2.0	0.9	7.6	2.0	1.9	3.7	-9.8	2.2	0.7	0.3	4.0	9.0	-1.3	0.0	1.0	4.7	-1.1	2.6	3.1	0.5	-1.3	2.4
2012	0.2	0.0	0.9	-1.9	-5.2	-0.9	-0.1	3.5	-2.0	-0.3	0.3	-6.9	-0.7	-0.5	-3.1	8.7	4.6	-0.6	3.2	-1.2	1.4	-4.0	2.6	1.5	-2.7	-3.1	-1.3
2013	-0.7	0.0	0.0	-0.1	-6.4	-0.1	0.5	2.1	-1.3	0.0	0.3	-1.8	2.1	0.7	-2.2	2.7	5.3	0.5	4.2	-0.5	1.2	0.0	4.0	0.7	-1.1	-0.9	0.3
2014	0.0	1.1	1.7	0.1	-0.5	2.1	1.1	3.4	-0.8	0.6	1.7	1.3	4.5	7.9	0.0	3.5	4.2	0.2	5.5	1.0	3.5	1.2	3.9	2.2	2.2	1.4	1.6
2015	0.0	1.6	4.2	3.3	3.9	5.2	1.6	1.9	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.6	3.9	24.2	1.1	4.2	3.2	0.3	6.7	1.5	4.2	2.4	3.5	5.0	2.2	4.0	3.4
2016	0.8	0.5	4.0	4.4	6.2	2.3	2.4	3.2	2.3	0.9	1.6	0.0	2.5	0.9	1.5	3.2	3.1	2.3	1.8	1.7	3.2	2.3	5.3	2.0	3.2	3.0	0.8
2017	1.5	1.3	3.1	4.4	4.5	4.9	2.2	5.6	3.0	1.8	2.1	1.2	4.5	7.6	1.8	4.7	6.0	-0.8	7.9	2.4	5.0	3.4	7.9	2.7	4.6	2.9	1.2
2018	2.0	1.3	3.7	3.9	4.7	2.8	1.5	4.1	1.0	1.5	0.8	1.8	5.5	7.7	1.1	4.5	5.0	0.0	2.4	1.7	5.3	3.3	5.1	3.9	4.4	1.6	0.8
2019	1.2	1.6	4.3	4.0	3.7	2.6	1.7	3.4	1.2	1.5	1.0	1.8	4.6	3.5	0.7	3.6	4.7	1.1	1.6	1.4	4.9	2.6	4.7	2.5	2.4	1.2	1.0
2020	-7.1	-5.9	-3.4	-7.7	-6.3	-6.1	-2.3	-3.3	-2.9	-8.3	-4.9	-8.8	-4.5	4.7	-8.3	-3.4	0.0	-3.3	-10.2	-4.3	-2.5	-8.7	-3.3	-4.9	-5.1	-11.1	-3.5

Note: Gross domestic product at constant prices per head of population. * Decade average is calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: AMECO (RVGDP). Last update: 17 November 2021.

Table A1.S Wage share in the EU Member States (%), averages (1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG*	HR*	CY*	CZ*	DK	EE	FI	FR	DE*	GR	HU*	IE	IT	LV*	LT*	LU	MT	NL	PL*	PT	RO	SK*	SI*	ES	SE
1960s	*63.7*	*55.8*	-	-	-	-	*59.5*	-	*66.6*	*63.1*	-	*65.3*	-	*64.9*	*64.5*	-	-	*51.2*	-	*62.5*	-	*67.2*	-	-	-	*63.5*	*66.6*
1970s	*63.1*	*61.7*	-	-	-	-	*61.1*	-	*64.4*	*64.1*	-	*53.2*	-	*64.3*	*64.3*	-	-	*55.5*	-	*68.0*	-	*76.9*	-	-	-	*65.8*	*64.4*
1980s	*61.2*	*63.4*	-	-	-	-	*58.8*	-	*62.4*	*62.9*	-	*55.3*	-	*61.6*	*61.4*	-	-	*56.4*	-	*64.9*	-	*60.8*	-	-	-	*62.2*	*62.4*
1990s	*58.7*	*61.9*	*44.0*	*62.7*	*53.4*	*45.2*	*55.9*	*52.4*	*58.3*	*57.3*	*59.0*	*49.6*	*49.6*	*54.5*	*55.2*	*49.6*	*47.6*	*52.2*	*51.3*	*61.5*	*58.9*	*59.2*	*66.2*	*44.6*	*63.5*	*60.5*	*58.3*
2000	56.0	60.5	49.4	67.2	51.7	45.9	53.9	49.4	52.9	55.9	59.0	49.5	49.7	47.4	50.9	48.7	48.7	49.8	49.1	59.3	56.7	60.2	72.2	44.7	61.8	58.8	52.9
2001	55.5	61.6	50.4	63.3	50.9	45.9	54.8	48.3	52.5	56.0	58.3	48.7	50.0	46.9	51.0	47.4	47.2	52.3	51.0	58.4	58.4	60.4	76.4	43.8	61.9	57.7	52.5
2002	55.0	62.2	48.7	64.4	52.3	47.7	55.3	47.5	52.6	56.5	58.0	51.4	49.2	44.9	51.3	44.6	47.9	53.4	50.3	58.9	55.9	59.8	61.6	43.9	61.1	57.2	52.6
2003	55.1	61.6	48.6	64.6	54.1	48.6	55.7	48.3	52.7	56.6	58.1	51.2	50.4	45.6	51.9	44.2	48.7	52.6	50.5	59.1	53.8	59.6	62.3	43.1	60.4	56.2	52.7
2004	54.1	60.0	47.0	63.4	53.3	48.1	54.5	48.3	52.4	56.1	57.1	50.6	50.6	46.2	51.8	43.9	49.3	51.9	50.4	58.3	50.5	58.7	55.1	41.6	60.5	55.9	52.4
2005	53.3	59.3	46.3	62.8	55.0	47.7	54.3	47.1	53.0	56.2	56.6	53.9	50.9	46.8	52.0	45.4	49.2	51.7	49.3	57.0	49.6	58.7	59.4	42.1	60.6	55.3	53.0
2006	53.0	59.2	44.6	61.2	54.1	47.7	54.2	47.4	53.2	56.0	55.3	51.7	50.1	47.1	52.1	46.7	51.7	49.5	50.2	55.7	48.4	57.3	57.1	41.6	60.0	55.1	53.2
2007	52.4	59.0	43.8	60.7	52.6	47.2	55.6	49.3	51.8	55.4	54.2	51.3	50.0	48.7	51.9	49.6	49.9	48.9	49.5	55.6	48.2	56.1	50.0	41.2	59.0	55.2	51.8
2008	53.4	60.8	45.6	60.2	51.8	48.1	56.4	53.6	53.2	55.7	55.2	51.8	50.0	52.9	52.7	53.5	49.8	49.4	49.2	56.3	50.0	56.6	53.1	41.8	60.0	57.2	53.2
2009	55.0	62.3	48.2	62.6	55.7	48.0	58.8	54.5	56.6	57.5	57.7	54.1	48.7	53.3	54.1	52.7	50.6	51.9	50.1	59.2	48.6	57.6	50.1	44.9	62.9	57.8	56.6
2010	54.6	60.7	49.8	61.7	54.3	48.8	56.4	50.9	55.4	57.5	56.7	53.8	47.2	50.4	53.8	48.3	45.9	49.6	48.1	57.9	48.9	56.6	54.1	43.7	63.8	57.2	55.4
2011	53.9	61.3	48.0	60.5	54.6	49.2	56.0	49.0	55.4	57.5	56.2	54.9	47.4	48.2	53.3	46.0	43.8	50.7	50.5	58.4	47.8	55.5	48.5	43.4	62.5	56.2	55.4
2012	54.5	61.8	49.5	58.9	54.6	50.1	55.2	49.1	56.5	58.1	57.3	54.7	48.5	47.6	53.2	45.2	43.6	50.1	50.4	59.2	47.8	54.0	47.9	43.4	62.7	54.9	56.5
2013	55.0	62.0	53.8	56.4	52.7	49.5	55.1	49.8	55.9	58.4	57.5	52.2	47.0	47.3	53.1	47.1	44.4	49.9	49.8	58.9	47.8	53.6	46.3	43.6	61.9	54.1	55.9
2014	55.0	61.3	55.8	55.0	51.4	48.8	54.9	50.4	55.5	58.5	57.3	52.4	45.8	45.1	52.7	48.5	45.4	49.4	48.3	58.8	47.9	52.6	47.0	44.0	61.0	54.2	55.5
2015	54.5	59.9	55.5	54.7	50.2	48.0	55.1	52.2	55.1	58.0	57.5	50.8	44.8	35.4	52.7	50.8	47.7	49.3	46.6	57.6	47.2	51.5	44.5	44.4	60.7	53.8	55.1
2016	54.5	59.1	55.5	53.2	49.1	48.8	54.8	52.8	54.3	58.1	57.5	51.2	46.0	36.6	52.3	52.6	49.8	49.2	48.8	57.9	48.1	51.0	47.3	45.8	61.3	53.2	54.3
2017	54.5	59.1	57.9	52.2	49.2	49.9	54.4	52.9	52.1	58.2	57.4	51.0	46.2	35.3	51.9	53.2	49.9	50.8	47.6	57.5	48.3	51.3	49.5	47.2	61.1	52.7	52.1
2018	54.6	59.1	59.3	53.0	49.2	51.6	54.6	53.6	52.4	58.1	58.1	50.5	45.5	34.0	52.4	54.0	50.7	52.1	48.1	57.4	49.3	52.1	50.5	48.2	61.5	52.8	52.4
2019	55.1	58.9	58.1	52.0	50.1	51.8	54.8	54.7	52.6	57.0	58.7	50.3	45.0	33.0	52.6	55.4	52.5	52.9	48.7	57.3	48.9	52.7	50.4	49.4	62.6	53.7	52.6
2020	57.7	60.7	61.0	57.2	51.6	53.5	55.4	57.9	52.7	58.1	60.3	54.6	45.0	31.9	53.1	59.2	54.7	52.9	53.7	60.7	49.9	56.5	53.1	51.3	66.5	56.4	52.7

Note: Total economy, percentage of GDP at current market prices. * 1990s average is calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: AMECO. Last update: 12 November 2021.

Table A1.T Gini coefficients in the EU Member States (%), average (1995-1999) and annual data, 2000-2020

Year	AT	BE	BG	HR	CY*	CZ	DK*	EE	FI*	FR	DE	GR	HU	IE	IT	LV	LT	LU	MT*	NL	PL	PT	RO	SK	SI	ES	SE*
1990s	25.6	28.0	-	-	29.0	-	20.3	-	22.5	28.8	26.2	34.6	-	33.0	31.4	-	-	27.0	-	27.0	-	36.4	-	-	-	34.0	21.5
2000	24.0	30.0	25.0	-	-	-	-	36.0	24.0	28.0	25.0	33.0	26.0	30.0	29.0	34.0	31.0	30.0	29.0	29.0	30.0	36.0	29.0	-	22.0	32.0	-
2001	24.0	28.0	26.0	-	-	25.0	22.0	35.0	27.0	27.0	25.0	33.0	25.0	29.0	29.0	-	31.0	29.0	29.0	27.0	30.0	37.0	30.0	-	22.0	33.0	24.0
2002	-	-	26.0	-	-	-	-	35.0	26.0	27.0	-	-	24.0	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.0	-	-	30.0	-	22.0	31.0	23.0
2003	27.4	28.3	-	-	-	-	24.8	-	-	-	-	34.7	-	30.6	-	-	-	30.6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2004	25.8	26.1	-	-	-	-	23.9	37.4	25.5	28.2	-	33.0	-	31.5	32.9	-	-	31.5	32.9	-	-	37.8	-	-	-	31.0	23.0
2005	26.3	28.0	-	-	28.7	26.0	23.9	34.1	26.0	27.7	26.1	33.2	27.6	31.9	32.7	36.2	36.3	31.9	32.7	26.9	35.6	38.1	-	26.2	23.8	32.2	23.4
2006	25.3	27.8	31.2	-	28.8	25.3	23.7	33.1	25.9	27.3	26.8	34.3	33.3	31.9	32.1	38.9	35.0	31.9	32.1	26.4	33.3	37.7	-	28.1	23.7	31.9	24.0
2007	26.2	26.3	35.3	-	29.8	25.3	25.2	33.4	26.2	26.6	30.4	34.3	25.6	31.3	32.0	35.4	33.8	31.3	32.0	27.6	32.2	36.8	38.3	24.5	23.2	31.9	23.4
2008	27.7	27.5	35.9	-	29.0	24.7	25.1	30.9	26.3	29.8	30.2	33.4	25.2	29.9	31.2	37.5	34.5	29.9	31.2	27.6	32.0	35.8	35.9	23.7	23.4	32.4	25.1
2009	27.5	26.4	33.4	-	29.5	25.1	26.9	31.4	25.9	29.9	29.1	33.1	24.7	28.8	31.8	37.5	35.9	28.8	31.8	27.2	31.4	35.4	34.5	24.8	22.7	32.9	26.3
2010	28.3	26.6	33.2	31.6	30.1	24.9	26.9	31.3	25.4	29.8	29.3	32.9	24.1	30.7	31.7	35.9	37.0	30.7	31.7	25.5	31.1	33.7	33.5	25.9	23.8	33.5	25.5
2011	27.4	26.3	35.0	31.2	29.2	25.2	26.6	31.9	25.8	30.8	29.0	33.5	26.9	29.8	32.5	35.1	33.0	29.8	32.5	25.8	31.1	34.2	33.5	25.7	23.8	34.0	26.0
2012	27.6	26.5	33.6	30.9	31.0	24.9	26.5	32.5	25.9	30.5	28.3	34.3	27.2	30.4	32.4	35.7	32.0	30.4	32.4	25.4	30.9	34.5	34.0	25.3	23.7	34.2	26.0
2013	27.0	25.9	35.4	30.9	32.4	24.6	26.8	32.9	25.4	30.1	29.7	34.4	28.3	30.7	32.8	35.2	34.6	30.7	32.8	25.1	30.7	34.2	34.6	24.2	24.4	33.7	26.0
2014	27.6	25.9	35.4	30.2	34.8	25.1	27.7	35.6	25.6	29.2	30.7	34.5	28.6	31.0	32.4	35.5	35.0	31.0	32.4	26.2	30.8	34.5	35.0	26.1	25.0	34.7	26.9
2015	27.2	26.2	37.0	30.4	33.6	25.0	27.4	34.8	25.2	29.2	30.1	34.2	28.2	29.7	32.4	35.4	37.9	29.7	32.4	26.7	30.6	34.0	37.4	23.7	24.5	34.6	26.7
2016	27.2	26.3	37.7	29.8	32.1	25.1	27.7	32.7	25.4	29.3	29.5	34.3	28.2	29.6	33.1	34.5	37.0	29.6	33.1	26.9	29.8	33.9	34.7	24.3	24.4	34.5	27.6
2017	27.9	26.1	40.2	29.9	30.8	24.5	27.6	31.6	25.3	28.8	29.1	33.4	28.1	30.6	32.7	34.5	37.6	30.6	32.7	27.1	29.2	33.5	33.1	23.2	23.7	34.1	28.0
2018	26.8	25.7	39.6	29.7	29.1	24.0	27.8	30.6	25.9	28.5	31.1	32.3	28.7	28.9	33.4	35.6	36.9	28.9	33.4	27.4	27.8	32.1	35.1	20.9	23.4	33.2	27.0
2019	27.5	25.1	40.8	29.2	31.1	24.0	27.5	30.5	26.2	29.2	29.7	31.0	28.0	28.3	32.8	35.2	35.4	28.3	32.8	26.8	28.5	31.9	34.8	22.8	23.9	33.0	27.6
2020	27.0	25.4	40.0	28.3	29.3	-	27.3	30.5	26.5	29.3	34.4	31.1	28.3	-	-	-	35.1	-	-	27.5	27.2	31.2	33.8	20.9	23.5	32.1	26.9

Note: Gini coefficient of equivalized disposable income – EU-SILC survey. * 1995–1999 average is calculated based on incomplete data.
Source: Eurostat (ILC_DI12). Last update: 4 November 2021.

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Picking up the pieces of the neoliberal challenge

PETER LANG

Trade unions have repeatedly been challenged by neoliberal programmes implemented within Member States of the European Union (EU) and at the European level. The twenty-seven country chapters at the core of this book chart the features of the neoliberal challenge in the EU Member States and the measures implemented by unions in their attempts to adapt to changed circumstances since 2000. It is clear that union activity, either independently or in conjunction with allies, will be at the centre of revitalization campaigns if the pieces left from the neoliberal challenges are to be picked up and wielded into a coherent response.

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Jeremy Waddington is Emeritus Professor of Industrial Relations, University of Manchester

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Collection « Travail et société » No.86

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Work & Society
Vol. 86

This book offers a comprehensive comparative overview of the development, structure, and policies of trade unions in all the 27 Member States of the EU from 2000 to 2020. It presents an in-depth analysis of the neoliberal challenges facing these organizations and their strategic and policy responses.

This publication has been peer-reviewed.

The European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) is financially supported by the European Union.

Published by Peter Lang Éditions scientifiques internationales - P.I.E. SA
1 avenue Maurice, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium
www.peterlang.com; info@peterlang.com

ISSN 1376-0955
ISBN 978-2-87574-634-4
ePDF 978-2-87574-635-1
ePub 978-2-87574-636-8
DOI 10.3726/b20254
D/2022/5678/60

Peter Lang Group AG
International Academic Publishers
Bern

Foreword

More than twenty years ago I edited a book entitled *Trade Unions in Europe* with Jeremy Waddington. That book identified the challenges facing trade unions as a result of the implementation of neoliberal policies within nation states and the European Union. This volume is a timely update on developments since the millennium. Based around twenty-seven country chapters the book highlights both the challenges posed by neoliberalism to trade unions and the wide range of policy responses implemented by unions to adapt to new circumstances. It demonstrates the dangers to European social models arising from neoliberal policies and identifies what needs to be done if this model is to be protected. I recommend the book to all those interested in ensuring that the unique features of Europe's social models can be retained in a viable form.

Reiner Hoffmann
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Preface

In 2000 the European Trade Union Institute published its initial volume on trade unions in Europe (Waddington and Hoffmann 2000), which identified elements of the then nascent neoliberal challenge to trade unions. Since the publication of that volume unions have repeatedly been challenged by neoliberal programmes implemented within Member States of the European Union (EU) and at European level. At the heart of this challenge is the neoliberal assumption that trade unions, collective bargaining and other forms of regulation set by collective actors constitute 'labour market rigidities', the effects of which must be removed or minimized if economies are to thrive. This book charts the impact of the neoliberal challenge on trade unionism and the measures implemented by trade unionists in their attempts to adapt to changed circumstances. This book also takes into account the successive enlargements of the EU that have taken place since 2000. Central to the book are thus twenty-seven chapters, each of which examines trade unionism in a Member State of the EU.

The neoliberal agenda pursued by employers and policymakers at national and European levels is a macroeconomic policy comprising trade liberalization, fiscal discipline and prioritization of the control of inflation at the expense of full employment. In addition, the neoliberal programme includes wide-ranging political initiatives designed to free markets from bureaucratic or corporatist control. As trade unions were integral to these forms of control within the EU Member States, they were subject to challenge. Within Member States the liberalization and privatization of public services led to reduced public sector employment, which traditionally is densely unionized; labour market reforms reduced employment protections and accelerated low wage and atypical employment; collective bargaining was decentralized and, in some instances, de-unionized; and the state and political parties 'distanced' unions from involvement in policy formulation. There is no uniformity to these features of the neoliberal challenge between Member States, nor is there uniformity in the unions' capacity to respond and the form of their

responses to these challenges. The twenty-seven country chapters at the core of this book chart the features of the national neoliberal challenge and the various trade union responses. The main analysis in each chapter covers the two decades from 2000. The cut-off point of the analysis is early 2021, which means that any post-Covid dynamics and trends could only be touched upon.

Four interrelated arguments resonate throughout the book. First, the neoliberal programmes pursued within the Member States are uneven and vary by degrees. The direction of travel within Member States may be similar, but the distance covered differs markedly. Second, the impact of the neoliberal challenge is influenced by this unevenness and by the state of trade unions at the time the different elements of the neoliberal challenge were implemented. Third, trade unions in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) were not as embedded in social market–style industrial relations systems as their counterparts elsewhere in the EU when neoliberal programmes were enacted. Furthermore, trade unions in CEE had to adapt to enlargement and, in general, had access to fewer material and political resources. As a consequence, the impact of the neoliberal challenge has been harder felt by trade unions in CEE than elsewhere. Fourth, the impact of the EU has not always been benign. To the contrary the EU has distanced itself in practice, if not rhetorically, from the promotion of a European social dimension, especially between 1999 and 2014; the social policy measures that were adopted comprised many soft law elements, weak minimum standards and no attempt to upwardly harmonize social policy. Furthermore, a series of decisions made by the European Court of Justice have downgraded the rights of labour in relation to the operation of the single market.

In developing the different variants of these arguments each of the country chapters comprises material grouped under the same nine headings: the historical background and principal features of the system of industrial relations; the structure of trade unions and union democracy; unionization; union resources and expenditure; collective bargaining and unions at the workplace; industrial conflict; political relations; societal power; and trade union policies towards the EU. This framework accentuates the analytical similarities between chapters, while also facilitating the identification of different developments in the various Member States. The authors of each chapter determined the order in which the material is presented according to specific country characteristics. To further encourage consistency in analytical practice, the authors of each country

chapter reviewed, via Zoom and physical meetings, drafts of other country chapters. Together with the reviewing conducted by the editors this approach ensured that each country chapter was peer reviewed by a minimum of six people.

The scale of this publication has necessitated the involvement of a wide range of people in addition to the editors and authors of the country chapters. The editors express their heartfelt thanks to these contributors. The ETUI acted as the hub of the research and funded the numerous meetings of authors and editors over the three years of production. Initially, Kristel Vergeylen and latterly Angélique Vanhoutte organized the workshops and convened the meetings with quiet efficiency. Specific responsibilities were distributed throughout the networks operated by the ETUI. In particular, James Patterson was responsible for the English editing of the country chapters and some of the pre-publication layout. Birgit Buggel-Asmus also assisted with the layout, while Giovanna Corda worked through the bibliography of each chapter. Needless to say, responsibility for the final manuscript rests with the editors.

Jeremy Waddington
Torsten Müller
Kurt Vandaele

Brussels, May 2022

Reference

Waddington, J. and Hoffmann, R. 2000. (eds). *Trade Unions in Europe*. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute.