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2026

Document Version:
Other version

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Arregui Alegria, I. (2026). *Renaming the Past: Identity, Memory, and Electoral Backlash in Spain*. (Working Papers; No. 2026:6).

Total number of authors:

1

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Working Paper 2026:6

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Renaming the Past: Identity, Memory, and Electoral Backlash in Spain

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May 2026



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Renaming the Past: Identity, Memory, and Electoral Backlash in Spain*

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Abstract

Public spaces are increasingly becoming battlegrounds over collective identity, as societies revisit which figures deserve commemoration. The removal of statues and street names has become a powerful symbolic act, as for those attached to these legacies, such changes may be seen as denying their group identity. This paper examines the political consequences of such symbolic changes in the context of Spain, focusing on the recent renaming of streets honoring figures from the dictatorship. Using three complementary empirical strategies and drawing on both observational and survey evidence, I find that removing Francoist streets leads to a significant increase in support for far right parties in the affected areas, particularly when the names held high salience. I further implement a novel individual level survey and show that this response is driven by identity-based concerns rather than practical objections, shedding light on the political consequences of contested memory in democratic societies.

Keywords: Voting, Identity, Spain, Renaming, Far-Right.

JEL classification codes: D72, N44, Z13.

*I thank Desiree Desierto, Gunes Gokmen, Zohal Hessami, Mark Koyama, Andreas Madestam, Teppo Lindfors, Christian Ochsner, Jonathan Schulz, Roel van Velduijzen, Felipe Valencia Caicedo, seminar and conference participants at Lund, George Mason, UPNA, Universidad de Navarra, Stockholm University, PEDD, EPCS, ASREC America, TUM-CEEH, ASREC Europe, and the Arne Ryde Workshop on Culture, Institutions, and Development for useful comments and suggestion.

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“... in Madrid and throughout Spain, an ideological cleansing of public spaces is underway, with no respect for history, the allocation of public resources, and the opinions of residents ...”

*Fundación Nacional Francisco Franco
Madrid, July 26, 2017*

1 Introduction

Public spaces are increasingly at the center of debates over collective identity, as communities revisit which figures deserve commemoration (Oto-Peralías, 2018; Caballero-Cordero et al., 2025). The removal of street names, statues, and other symbols tied to controversial pasts is often framed as a step toward reckoning with history (Aguilar et al., 2011; Gensburger and Wüstenberg, 2023). Examples include the removal of Confederate monuments in the United States and colonial-era statues across the Americas. Yet for those who identify with the legacy these symbols represent, such changes can feel like an erasure of their group’s place in the national narrative and a rejection of their values.¹ When symbolic policies are perceived in this way, they may provoke social backlash (Villamil and Balcells, 2021; Rozenas and Vlasenko, 2022; Zabolotskiy, 2022; Taylor, 2025). Despite growing attention to these dynamics, causal evidence on how perceived identity threats influence political behavior remains limited (Norris and Inglehart, 2019; Guriev and Papaioannou, 2022). This paper addresses that gap by leveraging a quasi-natural experiment in Spain, where many municipalities renamed streets commemorating figures from the military dictatorship. Using administrative and survey data, and three complementary empirical strategies, I estimate the causal effect of these symbolic removals on electoral outcomes, shedding light on the political consequences of contested memory.

The Spanish case provides a particularly compelling context to examine how symbolic policies may be perceived as threats to identity. Spain was ruled by a right-wing military dictatorship under General Franco from 1939 to 1975. While many reject this legacy, parts of the right still identify with it, and street names honoring dictatorship figures remain visible symbols of continuity. Their removal in the democratic period may therefore be perceived not simply as an administrative act, but as a symbolic repudiation of political and historical identity. Anecdotal evidence supports this interpretation: several

¹Cultural traits often have deep historical roots and exhibit strong spatial persistence, with values and behaviors transmitted across generations (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Becker et al., 2016; Guiso et al., 2016; Cantoni et al., 2020). These legacies are frequently embodied in public symbols such as statues, monuments, or street names, that reflect and reinforce shared historical narratives (Oto-Peralías, 2018). While such symbols represent the past, they can become politically salient in the present, especially when reactivated by contemporary events or policies (Ochsner and Roesel, 2024).

right-wing Francoist-affiliated organizations, including the Francisco Franco Foundation, publicly opposed renaming initiatives and filed legal appeals against them.² While Spain offers a historically specific setting, similar political reactions aiming for the removal of contested symbols have emerged in other contexts. These include movements to dismantle Confederate monuments in the United States, the removal of Soviet-era statues in Eastern Europe, and campaigns targeting colonial-era figures in the Americas and Western Europe (Gensburger and Wüstenberg, 2023). These cases anecdotally suggest that symbolic interventions can trigger political responses by being perceived as threats to group identity.

In this paper, I use the removal of Francoist street names as a proxy for perceived identity threat and estimate its causal effect on electoral outcomes through three complementary empirical strategies. First, I use national-level data from 2001 to 2021 to study how staggered exposure to renamed streets affected vote for far right parties across neighborhoods in Spain. Second, I complement this with evidence from Madrid, where centralized and detailed records allow for more precise measurement of exposure to street renamings. Madrid’s 2017 campaign was a one-time, citywide policy carried out within a single year, offering a cleaner and more controlled setting to analyze electoral effects. The results indicate that neighborhoods where at least one Francoist street was renamed experienced an increase in far-right vote share of about 5–8% of the mean.³ Third, I conduct an online survey in Madrid to capture individual-level attitudes and perceived motivations related to the renamings, offering evidence that complements the behavioral patterns observed in electoral data. The survey results align with the national and Madrid analyses, showing that individuals are more likely to report shifting their support toward far right parties as a consequence of the renamings.

To explain the motivations behind the political consequences of symbolic policies, it is necessary to identify what drives the results, distinguishing between reactions grounded in identity concerns and those arising from other considerations. The removal of Francoist street names may be seen by some as an attack on historical memory and group identity, but others might object for different reasons—such as the inconvenience of updating

²Other groups such as the Hermandad de Defensores de Oviedo and Plataforma Patriótica Millán Astray similarly pursued legal challenges.

³The effect size is based on the average far-right vote share during their peak election period, and the national-level analyses are robust to the exclusion of Madrid. Although the treatment variable is defined as renaming at least one Francoist street, most neighborhoods contained only a single such street, making it unlikely that more than one was removed.

personal documents, dissatisfaction with public spending priorities, or as a sign that politicians are prioritizing symbolic issues over more pressing concerns. To assess which of these mechanisms is most influential, I examine three complementary scenarios with the case of Madrid:

First, I analyze adjacent neighborhoods that were not directly affected by street renamings but are similar in socioeconomic composition and political orientation. These neighborhoods exhibit voting shifts comparable to those in treated areas, suggesting that practical inconveniences such as address changes or administrative updates are not the primary driver of far right voting. Second, I exploit variation in the symbolic salience of the renamed streets and find that electoral responses are concentrated in neighborhoods where highly recognizable Francoist figures—such as General Franco—were removed. In contrast, no effect is observed in areas where less prominent names were changed. This divergence suggests that the backlash is not driven by a general aversion to renaming, but rather by the symbolic weight of the figures being removed; if discontent were unrelated to salience, similar reactions would be expected across all renamed streets. Third, I use survey data to explore the mechanisms behind the electoral response. While both practical and identity-based concerns are correlated with Francoist attachment, only identity-related motives are consistently associated with negative emotional responses towards the renamings and self-reported changes in voting behavior. Together, these findings indicate that perceived identity threat, rather than administrative inconvenience or general discontent, may be the main driver of the observed electoral backlash.

Additionally, to ensure that the observed electoral response is not simply a function of street prominence or the political interpretation of the new names, I explore two additional possibilities. First, it is plausible that Francoist names were disproportionately assigned to highly visible streets—such as main avenues or central squares—that may carry political salience on their own. In that case, voters might be responding in part to the alteration of a prominent urban landmark rather than solely to the symbolic removal of the name. To address this, I compare voting responses across different types of streets and find no meaningful differences, suggesting that the street’s visibility or centrality does not explain the effects. Second, voters might object not to the removal of Francoist names *per se*, but to the political message conveyed by their replacements. If the new names are seen as controversial—perhaps honoring contemporary figures associated with polarizing

movements—this could drive electoral backlash independent of the Francoist symbolism. To assess this, I use survey data in which respondents were asked to evaluate the controversy of replacement names. The results show no correlation between the salience of the removed Francoist name and the perceived controversy of the new one, implying that the observed voting shifts are not driven by reactions to the replacements. These findings help rule out alternative mechanisms and reinforce the interpretation that the backlash is a response to the symbolic removal itself.

This paper contributes to the growing literature on how cultural and identity persistence shapes social and political behavior (Voigtländer and Voth, 2012; Fisman et al., 2014; Belmonte and Rochlitz, 2019; Becker et al., 2016; Guiso et al., 2016; Cantoni et al., 2020; Fouka and Voth, 2023), where a substantial body of research emphasizes the role of public symbols and monuments in preserving historical narratives and influencing present-day attitudes. In particular, Ochsner and Roesel (2024) show that areas with historical monuments and coats of arms commemorating 16th- and 17th-century Turkish invasions in Austrian villages preserved latent anti-Muslim attitudes, which were reactivated when Muslim immigration became politically salient. Similarly, Zabolotskiy (2022) finds that areas with Soviet-era plaques commemorating political arrests reflect enduring collective memories, which manifest in weaker pro-social behavior among current residents. In the U.S. context, Taylor (2025) provide evidence that the historical construction of Confederate monuments led to persistent increases in racial conservatism and lower Black voter registration rates in the American South. I extend this line of research by estimating the causal impact of symbolic policies targeting collective memory—specifically, the renaming of Francoist streets—on electoral outcomes, providing evidence that identity-based mechanisms linked to perceived attacks on collective memory are key drivers of the resulting political backlash.

Second, my study contributes to the literature studying the roots of populism and far-right voting. A large body of research has focused on economic explanations, such as financial crises (De Bromhead et al., 2013; Algan et al., 2017), automation (Frey et al., 2018; Anelli et al., 2019; Petrova et al., 2024), and trade shocks (Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Autor et al., 2020), but less is known about the causal role of cultural factors, including identity, fairness, morality, and status. Much of this literature remains descriptive or theoretical (Cantoni et al., 2020; Guriev and

Papaioannou, 2022). For example, Villamil and Balcells (2021) document a correlation between the removal of Francoist street names and increased support for the far right. Relatively few studies establish clear causal mechanisms. Among these, Ochsner and Roesel (2024) show that preexisting cultural divides in political speeches, in this case Turkish pillaging and plundering of villages in Austria during the 16th and 17th centuries, fueled support for populism. Similarly, Ochsner and Roesel (2020) demonstrate that post-WWII Nazi resettlement patterns in Germany help explain contemporary variation in far-right support. In the Spanish context, Tur-Prats and Valencia Caicedo (2020) document that the executions carried out by Francoist forces during the Spanish Civil War had long-lasting effects reflected on voting behavior through decreased trust. My study adds to this literature by providing causal evidence that symbolic attacks to collective identity can mobilize support for far-right parties.

Third, I contribute to the body of research using street names as carriers of identities. This aligns with extensive work by Gonzalez-Faraco and Dean-Murphy (1997), Palonen (2008), Rose-Redwood et al. (2010), and Drozdowski (2014), mainly in the geography literature, which delve into the symbolism embedded in street names and their ability to represent social and cultural values. Not until recently street names have been used in the field of economics. A key paper in this is Oto-Peralías (2018), which uses the frequency of religious street names as a proxy for local religious identity. Another significant study, Gutierrez-Mora and Oto-Peralías (2022), uses the frequency of female street names as a proxy for gender equality, finding that a higher number of female names correlates with a smaller gender wage gap. Caballero-Cordero et al. (2025) study the impact of the gender and ideology of town mayors on decisions to commemorate women in the street map. Similarly, Tur-Prats and Valencia Caicedo (2020) show that Francoist street names are more prevalent near exhumed mass graves—areas that experienced the most intense repression during the Civil War—highlighting the symbolic weight these names carry. My study builds on this emerging literature by providing evidence that street names can have a strong symbolic meaning, thereby reinforcing their role as powerful indicators of group identity.

Fourth, an extensive body of literature in history and political science has examined the Spanish Civil War, the Francoist Dictatorship, and the long-term processes of memory and justice in democratic Spain. Foundational studies on the Civil War include Beevor

(1982, 2012), Preston (1996, 2007, 2012), Thomas (2001), and La Parra-Pérez (2020). More concretely, Balcells (2011, 2012) focus on patterns of repression and victimization during and after the conflict. The dictatorship itself is the focus of Saz (2004) and Casanova (2015). This historical and political scholarship is complemented by studies on the recovery of historical memory in post-Franco Spain, including Aguilar (1996, 2008); Aguilar et al. (2011), Biesca (2006), Muro and Alonso (2010), Arnabat Mata (2013) and Bevernage and Colaert (2014). Hence, this paper contributes to the broader literature on the Spanish Civil War and the Francoist dictatorship by examining how historical memory is shaped through symbolic policies, specifically the renaming of Francoist street names as part of efforts to reckon with the past.

This paper is presented as follows. In section 2, I provide background information on the history of Spain and the framework involved in explaining the link between street renamings and electoral reactions. In section 3, I describe the data used in this paper. In section 4, I show the results, and in section 5 I present the discussion. Finally, section 6 provides the concluding remarks.

2 Background

2.1 Francoist Dictatorship and Street Names

The Spanish Civil War took place from July 18, 1936, to April 1, 1939, between the Republican faction (associated with the political left) and the Nationalist faction (associated with the right). The war emerged from a period of deep political, economic, and social instability during the Spanish Second Republic. This instability heightened ideological polarization in a broader international context marked by rising extremism. The immediate trigger for the conflict was a failed coup d'état led by Francisco Franco and other military leaders, which resulted in a divided country and the onset of civil war. The Nationalists ultimately prevailed in 1939, leading to the establishment of a military dictatorship under Franco. This regime lasted until his death in 1975, after which Spain transitioned to a democratic system that continues to the present day.

After the Civil War, the Francoist regime began symbolically asserting its power Aguilar (1996, 2008). One of the most efficient and rapid methods was by renaming public spaces, streets, and towns (de Andres-Sanz, 2006). Some changes honored Franco,

generals from the Civil War, Francoist myths (e.g., July 18, the Alcázar of Toledo), the memory of “the Fallen” (e.g., the Civil War, the Blue Division), early Francoist and Falangist martyrs (e.g., Calvo Sotelo, José Antonio, Matías Montero), or their slogans (e.g., Arriba España, Cristo Rey).

The first democratic municipal elections in Spain were held in 1979, but Francoist symbols—such as street names, monuments, and other forms of public toponymy—remained largely untouched. In many major cities, including Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia, and Seville, newly elected Socialist mayors from the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) began to initiate changes, such as renaming streets and removing Francoist monuments. However, these efforts were carried out in a decentralized and unsystematic manner, without national guidelines or coordination, leaving decisions entirely at the discretion of municipal authorities. Over the following four decades of democracy, this institutional setup remained in place, resulting in significant variation across municipalities in the extent to which Francoist symbols were removed or retained.

2.2 Reactions to Symbolic Street Renamings

The decision to rename Francoist streets reflects broader shifts in local political and cultural identities. I argue that those who identify with the values embedded in Francoist symbolism, such removals can be experienced as a threat to their collective identity. This perceived threat may provoke a backlash, fostering increased support for far right-wing parties that oppose these symbolic changes.

This backlash can be interpreted as a response to tipping points in cultural change, where social dynamics are shaped by the relative size and influence of competing groups within a society (Schelling, 1969). In the Spanish context, this can play out between two broad identity camps: those who align with the Francoist legacy (Pro-Francoists), and those who view the dictatorship and its symbols as incompatible with democratic values (Anti-Francoists). Building on Norris and Inglehart (2019), I argue that the renaming of Francoist streets acts as a highly visible signal that long-standing cultural norms—closely tied to the Francoist past—are being actively dismantled. Symbolic policies framed as a step toward reckoning with history such as street renamings may thus be perceived by Pro-Francoist individuals as an erosion of their historical and cultural dominance, and as a sign that the formerly marginalized (e.g., Republicans or the political left) are

gaining visibility and institutional ground. When this group perceives that its identity, beliefs, or symbolic legacy is under threat, it may respond by shifting support toward far right-wing parties that claim to protect traditional values and cultural heritage. In this way, Francoist street renamings can contribute to political realignments by activating identity-based grievances rooted in perceived status loss and cultural displacement.

3 Data

3.1 Register Data

The main data sources come from the Ministry of the Interior and the Electoral Census Street Map provided by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) of Spain. Spain is administratively divided into more than 8,000 municipalities, which together comprise over 8,700 districts and 23,000 neighborhoods (*secciones censales*).⁴ These neighborhoods are designed to contain between 500 and 2,000 inhabitants—averaging around 1,000—and when population growth exceeds these thresholds, new neighborhoods are created by subdividing existing ones, while the original boundaries remain constant. The datasets provide detailed information on electoral outcomes and the composition of street names for each neighborhood over time. Electoral results are available for the period 1999–2019 at four-year intervals, corresponding to municipal elections, while street-level data is provided annually from 2001 to 2022.

The electoral datasets include detailed information for each neighborhood, such as the number of votes received by each party, total votes cast, valid and null votes, as well as the population size and the number of eligible voters. The street census datasets provide information on the name of each street, the neighborhoods it intersects, and the type of street (e.g., street, avenue, square). I merge the street name data with the electoral outcome data to construct a panel dataset at the neighborhood level. This combined dataset tracks both voting behavior and the composition of street names over time.

Party Vote Variable: I construct a variable that captures the political ideology of each party by grouping them into three main blocs: right-wing, left-wing, and indepen-

⁴In Spain, the local administrative hierarchy consists of municipalities divided into districts, and districts subdivided into neighborhoods.

dent.⁵ Additionally, I identify two ideological subgroups—far right and far left. The classification relies on multiple sources and methods. First, I classify party ideology following the categorization provided by *Historia Electoral*.⁶ For national parties not covered by this source, I rely on survey data from the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), where respondents place parties on a 0–10 ideological scale ranging from the far left (0) to the far right (10). For smaller or local parties, I conduct a content analysis of party names: parties are coded as left-wing if their names include terms such as “communist,” “socialist,” or “left”; as right-wing if they contain terms like “liberal” or “right”; and as independent if they reference “independent group” or “neighborhood association.”

Francoist Street Variable: To construct the binary variable indicating whether a neighborhood contained a Francoist street—which is later used to identify whether that street was renamed—I first compile a dictionary of Francoist names drawing on multiple sources. The first source is the list of Francoist street names compiled by [Oto-Peralías \(2018\)](#). In addition, I collect further names from official lists published by various municipal governments across Spain, as well as from news articles documenting street name changes. The final consolidated list of names, together with their sources, is presented in Table O11 in the [Online Appendix](#). I then match this dictionary to the dataset containing the complete set of street names for each neighborhood to define whether a neighborhood contained a Francoist street. Most neighborhoods contain at most one such street. A single street, however, can extend across multiple neighborhoods.

Sample Restriction: To construct a consistent panel of neighborhoods over time, I restrict the sample to units whose administrative boundaries remain stable throughout the study period. This addresses issues arising from neighborhood subdivision as urban populations grow. Because Francoist street names were concentrated in historic city centers—areas typically unaffected by such reclassification—this restriction does not limit the representativeness of the sample.

I further restrict the sample by excluding municipalities with two or fewer districts. This ensures that the analysis focuses on municipalities with multiple districts, providing

⁵Parties are labeled as independent when they do not have a clear ideological orientation. This is common in smaller towns and municipalities, where groups of neighbors form electoral lists to contest local elections without aligning along the traditional left-right spectrum.

⁶Available at <http://www.historiaelectoral.com/calcul.html>

within-municipality and within-district variation in exposure to street renamings. Such variation allows me to isolate the effect of these changes from district-specific and election-period-specific factors. In single-district municipalities, by contrast, it is more difficult to disentangle the impact of renamings from broader district and municipal dynamics. Summary statistics for both the full and restricted samples are presented in Table [A1](#).

3.2 Survey Data

Part of the main analysis are based on the data from a survey I conducted to elicit individuals' attitudes, emotional reactions, and perceptions of Francoist symbolic changes. The survey offers a direct way to complement the observational analysis by providing the motives that may drive the response to the renamings.

The survey was conducted in November 2024 with the company SAGO. Participants were paid around €2.75 for the completion of the survey. The survey includes a representative sample of 500 Spanish nationals living in Madrid, balanced by gender, age, and education. Table [A2](#) in Appendix [A](#) presents a comparison between the survey sample and the broader Madrid population. Focusing on Spanish nationals ensures that all respondents are eligible to vote in municipal elections and are likely to be familiar with the historical context of Francoism. The survey design and analysis plan were pre-registered on AsPredicted under registration numbers #195566 and #195574.

The survey, which can be found in the [Online Appendix](#), begins by eliciting individual attitudes toward Francoism. Respondents are then asked about the relevance and importance they assign to the renaming of Francoist streets, as well as their general opinions on the policy. The questionnaire also includes items that capture emotional reactions—such as anger, pride, annoyance, or satisfaction—prompted by the renamings. In addition, it collects self-reported voting behavior and intentions, as well as respondents' views on the motivations behind their reactions, including identity-related concerns, practical objections, and perceptions of social polarization.

Francoism Variable: To examine how attitudes toward Francoism relate to perceptions and reactions to street renamings, I construct a Francoist orientation index. This index combines responses to several survey items that reflect support for or affinity with the Francoist regime. It is designed to capture how likely an individual is to interpret the

removal of Francoist street names as a symbolic threat to their group identity. Higher values on the index indicate stronger Francoist alignment and, by extension, a greater propensity to perceive renamings as identity-threatening.⁷

To complement these measures, the survey also asks respondents whether they recognize a selection of historical Francoist figures and lemmas. In addition, participants are asked to evaluate how controversial they find the new names that replaced the Francoist street names.

4 Results

4.1 What is in a Francoist Street?

In this section, I examine whether streets named after figures from the dictatorship can serve as sources of conflict and political backlash due to their symbolic significance. To do so, I analyze where such streets are located, which actors oppose their removal, and which political groups advocate for their change.

Francoist Attitudes and Prevalence of Francoist Streets— I first demonstrate that areas where individuals exhibit stronger Francoist attitudes are more likely to have maintained a greater share of Francoist street names. To do so, I use data from the survey *Memories of the Civil War and Francoism* provided by the CIS and information on the share of Francoist street names at the provincial level in 2001.⁸ The results from Table A3 in Appendix A examine the relationship between support for Francoist values and the presence of Francoist street names. The analysis controls for GDP per capita in 2001, the geographic location of the province (latitude and longitude), and the presence of a regional language, as these factors may correlate with survey responses. The survey questions are selected to capture key dimensions of Francoist ideology. Across all specifications, the findings indicate a positive relationship between aggregated Francoist attitudes at the provincial level and the proportion of Francoist street names. This suggests that provinces with stronger Francoist sentiments tend to preserve more Francoist streets.

⁷For details on the construction of the index see the [Online Appendix](#).

⁸The share of Francoist streets is calculated as $ShFrancoSt = \frac{NbFrancoSt}{N}$ where the numerator $NbFrancoSt$ refers to the number of Francoist streets, and the denominator N to the total number of streets. This measure is constructed at the province level. Figure A2 in Appendix A shows the evolution of the indicator by province over the period 2001-2022.

Opposition to Francoist Street Name Changes— I further provide evidence that individuals with Francoist attitudes strongly oppose the removal of Francoist street names.⁹ Figure A1 in Appendix A shows that individuals that express feelings of nostalgia, patriotism, or pride toward Francoism are less likely to support the removal of Francoist symbols. In addition, provinces with a higher prevalence of Francoist streets also display significantly lower support for the removal of Francoist symbols from public spaces—patterns that are particularly pronounced in provinces with stronger right-wing ideological orientations closely aligned with Francoist values. These patterns indicate that opposition to the removal of Francoist street names is closely tied to ideological identification and affective attachment to the Francoist past.

The Politics of Renaming Francoist Streets— These preferences are not only reflected in individual attitudes but also in local political decisions. Using municipal-level data from Spain, I examine whether the ongoing removal of Francoist street names, as shown in Figures A2 and A3 in Appendix A, depend on the political orientation of the governing party. Given Spain’s historical left-right cleavage, this context provides a compelling setting to assess whether the renaming of Francoist streets is also a politically contested issue.

To explore this, I analyze whether municipalities governed by left-wing parties are more likely to remove Francoist street names. OLS estimates in Table A4 in Appendix A show that left-wing mayors initiate substantially more renamings than their right-wing counterparts. To strengthen causal interpretation, I implement a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design that compares municipalities where left-, right- and independent-wing blocs narrowly won or lost local elections, providing quasi-random variation in municipal governance. The results, presented in Table A5 and Figure A4 in Appendix A, confirm that the mayor’s political orientation has a significant effect on the likelihood of renaming Francoist streets. This effect is especially pronounced in swing municipalities where control shifts from right to left, suggesting that such decisions reflect ideological implications (for more details about the Fuzzy RDD method refer to the the [Online Appendix](#)). These findings show that decisions about Francoist street names are strongly shaped by political control, underscoring their symbolic importance.

⁹This analysis also uses data from the survey *Memories of the Civil War and Francoism*.

4.2 Main Results

This section employs three distinct analysis to show that the renaming of Francoist streets leads to a significant increase in support for far right-wing parties.

4.2.1 National Level Analysis

The gradual removal of Francoist streets adopted by different municipalities over the last 20 years generated variation in exposure to renaming of Francoist streets across neighborhoods in Spain. For example, some municipalities like Barcelona decided to start renaming Francoist streets decades before others did, such as Madrid.

To determine whether the renaming of Francoist street names affects support for far right parties, I estimate a staggered Differences-in-Differences (DiD) model. Given the variation in treatment timing across neighborhoods, I follow the approach proposed by [Callaway and Sant’Anna \(2021\)](#), which compares changes in voting behavior between neighborhoods that experienced a renaming and those that did not, over time. This method overcomes potential concerns coming from methods using variation in treatment timing, such as the two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimator as documented by [Goodman-Bacon \(2021\)](#). Here, I consider the treatment period to be the electoral period following the renaming of a Francoist street. The treatment group is defined as neighborhoods where at least one such street was renamed, and the control group as all other neighborhoods. In practice, it is uncommon for a neighborhood to contain more than one Francoist street, hence, each neighborhood can only be treated once, as a renaming cannot occur more than once within the same location. The specification is as follows:

$$FarRight_{nt} = \sum_{t=-q}^m \beta_t Rename_{nt} + \lambda_t + \theta_n + \gamma_{dt} + \sum_k \alpha_k X_{nt}^k + \epsilon_{nt} \quad (1)$$

where $FarRight_{nt}$ denotes the far right vote share in neighborhood n at time t . The key explanatory variable, $Rename_{nt}$, is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if a neighborhood $n(i)$ had a Francoist street renamed at election period t . I allow for q leads, $(\beta_{-1}, \beta_{-2}, \dots, \beta_{-q})$, representing pre-treatment effects, and m lags, $(\beta_{+1}, \beta_{+2}, \dots, \beta_{+m})$, representing post-treatment effects. λ_t and θ_n denote election-period and neighborhood fixed effects, respectively, which control for time- and location-specific unobservables. γ_{dt}

represents district-by-election-period fixed effects,¹⁰ which account for time-varying factors at the district level that may be correlated with both the renaming of streets and electoral outcomes. For instance, if a district experiences an inflow of immigrants during the same electoral cycle in which Francoist streets are removed, any observed increase in support for the far right may reflect a reaction by residents to immigration, rather than to the symbolic policy itself. By including these fixed effects, I account for such confounding dynamics and more credibly isolate the effect of street renaming on voting behavior. X_{nt}^k is a k -dimensional vector of controls for neighborhood n at time t (these controls include neighborhood turnout and population size). ϵ_{nt} is the error term, clustered at the neighborhood level.

The main results presented in Table 1 and Figure 1 display the estimates following the latest staggered Differences-in-Differences literature (Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021). Column 1 indicates that renaming at least one Francoist streets led to an immediate 0.22pp increase in the far-right vote share in treated neighborhoods compared to untreated ones in the following election period (t)¹¹. This immediate effect represents a 5% increase from the mean, based on the average far-right vote share during their peak election period. In the medium and long run ($t+1$ to $t+3$), the effects appear to dissipate, suggesting that the reaction from residents is short-lived. This pattern may reflect that the initial response to the renaming fades over time as the change becomes normalized and salience declines.


One necessary condition for the causal interpretation of the results is that the timing of the renaming for different neighborhoods is not related to trends in far right voting. To explore more generally whether this assumption holds, I test for differential trends in far right vote for neighborhoods having a street renamed at different times. As shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 prior to the renamings, from $t-6$ to $t-1$, I see no sizable differences in far right voting across neighborhoods before the renaming of Francoist streets, suggesting that both groups exhibited similar voting patterns prior to the renaming of Francoist streets.

Origin of the Votes— Columns 2 to 5 report the effects of Francoist street renamings on right-wing, left-wing, far-left voting, and voter turnout. The Left and Right blocs do

¹⁰A district is a geographic unit that is larger than a neighborhood but smaller than a municipality.

¹¹Each election period corresponds to a four-year interval: e.g. $t-6$ refers to 24 years before the post-renaming election year.

Figure 1: Effect of renaming Francoist streets on far right vote share



Notes: This figure presents coefficients as well as the 95% confidence intervals of the event study estimates (Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2021) of the far right vote share with respect to the first exposure of a neighborhood to the renaming of a Francoist street. Each period corresponds to an election year, reflecting four-year intervals. Period 0 indicates the election period posterior to the renaming of Francoist streets.

not include parties labeled as far right or far left. The results suggest that the removal of Francoist street names did not produce clear or statistically significant changes in the overall composition of the left- or right-wing voting blocs, nor in voter turnout in the affected neighborhoods. Hence, it remains uncertain whether the observed increase in support for the extreme right reflects a shift from the mainstream right or an expansion in voter participation. Although these estimates are not statistically significant, the negative coefficient for the mainstream right and the positive coefficient for turnout—of a magnitude similar to the increase in extreme-right support—hint that both mechanisms could contribute to the observed pattern, though this interpretation should be viewed as tentative.

Although the point estimates in Columns 2 to 5 are larger than those in Column 1, they are estimated with less precision. This difference reflects the underlying distribution of the vote shares. The far right has historically received relatively few votes, so even a small absolute change represents a large relative shift, which tends to produce more precisely estimated effects. In contrast, vote shares for the broader ideological blocs—such as the left, right, and far-left—are larger and more dispersed, generating greater variability and wider standard errors. Therefore, despite the larger point estimates in Columns 2 to 5, their interpretation should take into account the relative scale of the outcomes and the associated uncertainty.

Table 1: Effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behavior

	Dep Var: Party bloc vote share				Dep Var: Turnout rate
	Far right	Right	Left	Far left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	0.0000 (0.0002)	-0.0087*** (0.0029)	0.0067** (0.0032)	-0.0006 (0.0015)	-0.0004 (0.0028)
t-5	-0.0003* (0.0002)	-0.0025 (0.0019)	0.0004 (0.0023)	0.0022 (0.0017)	0.0001 (0.0023)
t-4	-0.0005*** (0.0002)	0.0019 (0.0023)	-0.0016 (0.0024)	0.0013 (0.0012)	-0.0022 (0.0020)
t-3	-0.0003* (0.0002)	0.0009 (0.0022)	-0.0036 (0.0023)	0.0012 (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0017)
t-2	-0.0004* (0.0002)	0.0001 (0.0017)	0.0019 (0.0017)	-0.0005 (0.0009)	0.0004 (0.0015)
t-1	0.0002 (0.0003)	0.0012 (0.0017)	0.0019 (0.0019)	-0.0020 (0.0015)	-0.0007 (0.0017)
t	0.0022*** (0.0006)	-0.0007 (0.0022)	-0.0012 (0.0022)	-0.0013 (0.0011)	0.0021 (0.0020)
t+1	0.0000 (0.0006)	0.0015 (0.0038)	-0.0031 (0.0039)	-0.0006 (0.0017)	0.0015 (0.0038)
t+2	0.0009 (0.0007)	0.0042 (0.0043)	-0.0007 (0.0046)	-0.0006 (0.0019)	0.0038 (0.0039)
t+3	-0.0004 (0.0017)	0.0018 (0.0053)	0.0004 (0.0058)	-0.0019 (0.0026)	0.0026 (0.0060)
Mean dep. var	0.011	0.415	0.406	0.092	0.614
No. of observations	103,041	103,041	103,041	103,041	103,056
No. of neighborhoods	13,256	13,256	13,256	13,256	13,256
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table reports estimates from [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#), measuring the effect of Francoist street renamings on voting behavior. The dependent variables are vote shares for the Left, Right, Far Left, and Far Right blocs. The Left and Right blocs do not include parties labeled as far right or far left. Neighborhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighborhood $n(i)$ had a Francoist street renamed. All regressions control for neighborhood turnout and population size. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Robustness Checks— As a robustness check, I first replicate the main analysis using a two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimator. Although this method relies on stronger assumptions—particularly the absence of treatment-induced changes in outcome trends—it remains useful when such assumptions are approximately satisfied. The results, shown in Table O1 in the [Online Appendix](#), indicate that the results are also robust to using standard two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimator.


Second, I re-estimate the main specification excluding the city of Madrid to ensure that the national-level effects are not driven solely by dynamics unique to the capital. The results, presented in Table O2 in the [Online Appendix](#), confirm the same pattern: neighborhoods that experienced a Francoist street renaming exhibit an increase in support for far-right parties in the subsequent election. Although the estimated effect is somewhat smaller it remains consistent in sign and interpretation.

4.2.2 Local Level Analysis

For most Spanish municipalities, the absence of a comprehensive register of Francoist street names means that numerous renamings remain undocumented, introducing poten-

tial measurement error that complicates any systematic assessment of nationwide patterns. Madrid constitutes an exception. After more than three decades of inactivity, the municipal government conducted an extensive, single-year initiative in 2017 that replaced most of the remaining Francoist street names (see Figure 2). The city also published a complete list of the streets it renamed (see the [Online Appendix](#)), making the timing, location, and Francoist character of every change fully transparent. This well-documented, one-time intervention provides a unique opportunity to delve deeper into the mechanism than the national data.

Figure 2: Francoist street names in the City of Madrid




To assess whether the 2017 renaming campaign in Madrid increased electoral support for far-right parties, I employ a two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences model. The intervention occurred simultaneously across all treated neighbourhoods, so the design features a single treatment cohort rather than staggered adoption; nevertheless, the estimating equation corresponds to specification (2). Figures A5 and A6 in Appendix A show an illustration of the neighborhoods with Francoist street names before and after their renaming in Madrid.

Figure 3 and Table 2, column 1, show that the 2017 renaming initiative in Madrid generated a statistically significant increase in the far-right vote share within treated neighborhoods. The TWFE estimated coefficient implies a 0.74-percentage-point increase in far-right vote share—about 8 percent the mean, based on the average far-right vote

share during their peak election period. The magnitude of this effect exceeds that obtained in the nationwide analysis. Two considerations may explain the disparity. First, as Spain’s capital, Madrid attracted extensive media coverage and public debate, likely heightening the local salience of the renamings and thus intensifying electoral responses. Second, the national estimates are attenuated by measurement error: outside Madrid, the lack of a systematic register means that many Francoist renamings are unobserved, underestimating country-level effects.

Following the national-level analysis, I examine whether neighborhoods that experience a street-name change display any pre-treatment differences in far-right voting relative to neighborhoods that never receive such changes. Table 2 and Figure 3 show that treated and control neighborhoods seem to follow parallel trend in far-right support before the Francoist street names were removed.¹²

Figure 3: Effect of renaming Francoist streets on far right vote share in Madrid



Notes: This figure presents two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimates as well as the 95% confidence intervals of the impact of renaming Francoist streets on far-right voting. Each period corresponds to an election year, with four-year intervals. Period 0 refers to the election immediately following the renaming of Francoist streets.

Origin of the Votes— Columns 2–5 of Table 2 report the effects on the mainstream right, mainstream left, far left, and overall turnout. Although the coefficients at the treatment period (t) display a noticeable pattern across blocs, similar and statistically significant fluctuations are also present in the pre-treatment periods. The presence of these pre-trends indicates that the observed post-treatment variation cannot be straight-

¹²In the TWFE event-study, one pre-treatment period is omitted for identification, so coefficients are expressed relative to that baseline. In contrast, the Callaway and Sant’Anna (2021) estimator identifies each event-time effect independently, without imposing a reference period.

Table 2: Effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behavior in Madrid

	Dep Var: Party bloc vote share				Dep Var: Turnout rate
	Far right	Right	Left	Far left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	0.0009 (0.0005)* [0.0007]	-0.0114 (0.0029)*** [0.0044]**	0.0110 (0.0033)*** [0.0059]*	-0.0013 (0.0028) [0.0065]	-0.0026 (0.0033) [0.0029]
t-5	0.0010 (0.0005)** [0.0006]*	-0.0096 (0.0034)*** [0.0043]**	0.0066 (0.0035)* [0.0047]	0.0015 (0.0023) [0.0039]	0.0002 (0.0034) [0.0029]
t-4	0.0007 (0.0004) [0.0007]	-0.0093 (0.0060) [0.0069]	0.0053 (0.0058) [0.0040]	0.0028 (0.0022) [0.0064]	-0.0026 (0.0030) [0.0035]
t-3	0.0002 (0.0006) [0.0012]	-0.0057 (0.0045) [0.0065]	-0.0014 (0.0028) [0.0044]	0.0041 (0.0020)** [0.0095]	0.0008 (0.0025) [0.0033]
t-2 (<i>Reference</i>)					
t-1	0.0010 (0.0007) [0.0013]	0.0148 (0.0048)*** [0.0072]**	-0.0061 (0.0038) [0.0049]	-0.0105 (0.0060)* [0.0107]	0.0004 (0.0035) [0.0039]
t	0.0074 (0.0022)*** [0.0022]***	0.0155 (0.0055)*** [0.0079]**	-0.0076 (0.0043)* [0.0049]	-0.0153 (0.0061)** [0.0108]	0.0085 (0.0043)** [0.0041]**
Mean dep. var	0.013	0.509	0.296	0.174	0.652
No. of observations	16,167	16,167	16,167	16,167	16,167
No. of neighborhoods	2,046	2,046	2,046	2,046	2,046
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behaviour. The dependent variables are vote shares for the Left, Right, Far Left, and Far Right blocs. The Left and Right blocs do not include parties labeled as far right or far left. Neighborhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighborhood $n(i)$ had a Francoist street renamed. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighborhood. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level, and spatially adjusted standard errors (2 km cutoff) are reported in square brackets. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

forwardly interpreted as evidence of causal vote reallocation. Turnout, however, rises significantly after the renamings—a clearer effect in Madrid but noisy in the national results. Because this turnout increase closely tracks the timing and magnitude of the far-right surge, the evidence points to greater electoral mobilization.

4.2.3 Survey Analysis

To complement the observational evidence, I conducted an original survey to capture attitudes toward Francoism and reactions to the removal of Francoist street names. The survey measures each respondent’s attachment to Francoism and relates it to their stated voting responses to recent renamings. By linking personal attitudes with self-reported behavior, the analysis illuminates how symbolic policies can shape electoral choices.

Attitudes Toward Francoist Streets— Table A6 (and Figure O1 in the [Online Appendix](#)) show that attitudes toward Madrid’s 2017 street-name changes are strongly polarized along Francoist lines. Respondents with very pro- or anti-Francoist views rate

the issue as significantly more important than the average respondent (Columns 1–2), and express sharply divergent opinions about what should be done with the old names (Columns 3–6). The perceived local impact also reflects this divide: Francoist individuals tend to view the renamings as harmful to their neighbors, while anti-Francoists see them as beneficial (Columns 7–8). The survey also captures emotional reactions to the policy summarized in Figure A7 (for more details refer to Tables O3 and O4 in the [Online Appendix](#)). Francoist respondents report markedly higher levels of anger, annoyance, and hate—around twice the average level—while anti-Francoists express more pride and satisfaction, and less indifference. These results underscore that Francoist street names remain a symbolic flashpoint, with both attitudes and emotional responses dividing cleanly along ideological lines. For more details refer to the [Online Appendix](#).

Reactions to Renaming Streets— To test whether these attitudes also explain political behavior, I link respondents’ Francoist orientation to their self-reported electoral intentions. Table 3 and Figure A8 in Appendix A show that, in response to a Francoist street name change, individuals on the anti-Francoist or left-wing side display little to no change in their reported voting behavior or political engagement. By contrast, respondents at the pro-Francoist extreme are substantially more likely to reconsider their vote choice, increase their likelihood of turning out, participate in protests, or switch party support. These results indicate that the renaming of Francoist streets primarily activates or shifts behavior among pro-Francoist individuals. Consistent with the aggregate voting evidence presented earlier, the survey implies that mobilization is concentrated among the most Francoist citizens—helping to explain the observed rise in turnout (in Madrid) and potential changes in voting behavior in neighborhoods where the street names were changed.

Figure 4 arranges parties from left to right on the ideological scale (see Figure O2 in the [Online Appendix](#)). In this heat map, darker shading marks a larger share of respondents who say they would switch from the row party to the column party. The upper-right triangle shows moves to the left, whereas the lower-left triangle captures moves to the right. The darkest cell shows a change from PP (conservative) to VOX (far right), indicating that hypothetical changes run mainly from the mainstream conservative party toward the far right. Table A7 in Appendix A confirms that these shifts come almost exclusively from the most Francoist respondents, who report abandoning the center-right

Table 3: Voting behavior responses to the renaming of Francoist streets

	Dependent Variables							
	Reconsider vote change		Change vote		Go to vote		Protest	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Francoist indicator	0.3893*** (0.0632)		0.3591*** (0.0610)		0.5725*** (0.0659)		0.4011*** (0.0563)	
Francoist level 1		-0.3677** (0.1837)		-0.5094*** (0.1760)		-0.3321 (0.2068)		-0.5690*** (0.1734)
Francoist level 2		-0.2070 (0.2002)		-0.4423** (0.1843)		-0.3115 (0.2094)		-0.3775* (0.1978)
Francoist level 3		-0.2037 (0.1867)		-0.2998 (0.1920)		-0.2489 (0.2104)		-0.2335 (0.2004)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)								
Francoist level 5		0.3508* (0.2078)		0.0340 (0.1962)		0.2974 (0.2131)		0.2048 (0.2130)
Francoist level 6		0.4954** (0.2055)		0.2453 (0.2073)		0.4860** (0.2269)		0.4223** (0.2099)
Francoist level 7		0.7747*** (0.2320)		0.5709** (0.2234)		1.4931*** (0.2399)		0.6502*** (0.2234)
Constant	2.1540*** (0.0532)	2.0348*** (0.1391)	2.0220*** (0.0509)	2.0805*** (0.1373)	2.3160*** (0.0578)	2.1200*** (0.1483)	2.0580*** (0.0512)	2.0454*** (0.1458)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables measure respondents' behavioral intentions in response to Francoist street name changes: "reconsider vote", "change vote", "go to vote", and "protest". Each variable is measured on a scale from 1 ("nothing") to 5 ("a lot"), indicating the intensity of the behavioral response. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.


in favor of the far right. Although pro- and anti-Francoist individuals disagree strongly over the renamings, only those with pro-Francoist views indicate that these changes would affect their vote. This pattern suggests an uneven reaction, where only one side of the ideological spectrum responds politically. This result aligns with the rightward shifts observed in both the national and local-level analyses.

5 Discussion

5.1 Renaming Streets: Identity Threat or Policy Discontent?

When examining the effect of Francoist street renamings on support for the far right, it is important to consider that factors beyond ideology or identity might also contribute to this response. For example, some voters may view the renaming process as a misuse of public funds or as a sign that politicians are prioritizing symbolic issues over more pressing concerns. Additionally, the practical inconvenience of changing official documents such as identification cards or driving licenses, or adjusting to new street names, may also generate frustration among residents. These non-ideological factors could plausibly contribute to the observed increase in far right vote share in neighborhoods where streets were renamed. To assess whether the observed increase in far right support is driven by identity concerns

Figure 4: Vote change responses to the renaming of Francoist streets



or by non-ideological factors, I analyze several cases within the context of Madrid.

Adjacent Neighborhoods— The first case examines whether the effect of renaming Francoist streets extends to areas adjacent to those where Francoist street names were changed in 2017. These neighboring areas are likely to be similar in socioeconomic characteristics, political preferences, and attachment to Francoist values. If identity-based reactions are the primary mechanism, one would expect a comparable electoral response in adjacent neighborhoods, as residents may perceive the nearby renamings as a broader symbolic threat. In contrast, if the increase in far right support is driven by administrative inconvenience—such as updating official documents or adjusting to new street names—then adjacent areas, which are not directly affected, should exhibit no significant change in voting behavior.

The results shown in Table 4 (columns 1 and 2) demonstrate that the renaming of Francoist street names led to a similar increase in the far right vote share in the adjacent neighborhoods. Figures A5 and A6 in Appendix A show an illustration of the sample of adjacent neighborhoods. The effect of street renamings on far right vote share is 0.52% (8% of the average far right vote share). Hence, these findings suggest that the inconveniences caused by the street names changes do not seem to be the only driver of

far right votes share.

Table 4: Electoral response in adjacent neighborhoods and by salience of renamed Francoist streets

	Dep var: Far Right Voting			
	Main	Adjacent	Salient	Not salient
	specification	neighbourhoods		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
t-6	0.0009 (0.0005)* [0.0007]	0.0018 (0.0015) [0.0011]*	0.0006 (0.0009) [0.0006]	0.0011 (0.0005)** [0.0005]**
t-5	0.0010 (0.0005)** [0.0006]*	0.0003 (0.0006) [0.0006]	0.0009 (0.0010) [0.0005]*	0.0010 (0.0005)** [0.0005]**
t-4	0.0007 (0.0004) [0.0007]	0.0005 (0.0005) [0.0006]	-0.0004 (0.0008) [0.0007]	0.0011 (0.0005)** [0.0005]**
t-3	0.0002 (0.0006) [0.0012]	0.0007 (0.0004) [0.0007]	-0.0020 (0.0011)* [0.0013]	0.0010 (0.0006) [0.0008]
t-2 (<i>Reference</i>)				
t-1	0.0010 (0.0007) [0.0013]	0.0005 (0.0006) [0.0010]	0.0017 (0.0016) [0.0010]	0.0007 (0.0008) [0.0011]
t	0.0074 (0.0022)*** [0.0022]***	0.0052 (0.0020)*** [0.0015]***	0.0161 (0.0044)*** [0.0018]***	0.0028 (0.0024) [0.0016]*
Mean dep. var	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013
No. of observations	16,167	15,272	15,567	15,944
No. of neighborhoods	2,046	1,933	1,970	2,018
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes


Notes: The dependent variable is the vote share for the Far-Right bloc. In Column 1 (*Main specification*), the treatment variable equals 1 if neighborhood (*i*) experienced the renaming of at least one Francoist street. In Column 2 (*Adjacent neighborhoods*), the treatment variable equals 1 if a bordering neighborhood was affected by a Francoist renaming; neighborhoods directly affected by a renaming are excluded from this specification. In column 3 (*Salient*) the treatment variable includes the neighborhoods where a salient Francoist street was renamed, while Column 4 (*Non-Salient*) includes only neighborhoods where a non-salient Francoist street was renamed. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 exclude neighborhoods affected by non-salient and salient renamings respectively. All regressions control for neighborhood turnout rate and population size. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level, and spatially adjusted standard errors (2 km cutoff) are reported in square brackets. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Salient Streets— The second case evaluates whether the observed effect can be explained by other concerns such as the misuse of public funds. For this analysis, I categorize the renamed streets according to their symbolic salience. If concerns over public spending were the driving force, one would expect the voting response to be unrelated to the symbolic weight of the renamed street. However, a stronger response to more salient names would indicate that the effect is driven by perceived threats to Francoist identity rather than by administrative burdens. This categorization is only feasible in the case of Madrid, which provides a complete and well-documented list of Francoist street names renamed in 2017 (see the [Online Appendix](#)). Unlike in other parts of Spain, where the historical relevance of Francoist figures may vary geographically, Madrid offers a more

uniform interpretive context. This allows for a clearer distinction between highly salient names (e.g., “Francisco Franco”) and less recognizable ones (e.g., “Torpedero Tucumán”), based on survey results shown in Figure 6.

Table 4 (columns 3 and 4) and Figure 5 delve into this hypothesis. The results show a clear pattern: far right support increased significantly in neighborhoods where highly prominent Francoist streets were renamed, while no meaningful change occurred in areas where the renamed streets had weaker symbolic associations. Renaming streets with well-known Francoist references produced an effect roughly three times larger than the baseline estimate, resulting in a 1.7 percentage point increase in far right vote share—equivalent to about 25% of the average support for far right parties. This contrast suggests that the intensity of the electoral response is strongly linked to the symbolic weight of the street names targeted. These results are robust to the use of spatially autocorrelated standard errors. I also test the robustness of the results using alternative thresholds for defining salient streets (see Figure A9 in Appendix A)

Figure 5: Far right votes by salience of Francoist street names



Notes: This figure presents two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimates as well as the 95% confidence intervals of the impact of renaming Francoist streets on far-right voting in Madrid. The left panel shows estimates for neighborhoods where “salient” Francoist street names were renamed, while the right panel shows estimates for neighborhoods with “non-salient” renamings. See Figure 6 for information on how “salient” and “non-salient” Francoist streets are determined. Each period corresponds to an election year, with four-year intervals. Period 0 refers to the election immediately following the renaming of Francoist streets.

Survey Evidence— To explore these mechanisms in greater detail than voting data alone allows, I draw on original survey data to examine whether other channels help explain the observed effects.

The results summarized in Figure A10 in Appendix A (for more details refer to Tables O5 to O8 in the Online Appendix) show that the more Francoist a respondent is, the more likely they are to agree with statements such as “Francoist streets are a source of pride” or “Renaming them goes against my values.” This pattern also appears in responses to social and practical concerns. Francoist individuals are more likely to see these policies as polarizing or misguided, agreeing with statements like “There are more urgent matters to address” or “Renaming streets causes confusion and wastes money.” They also report feeling more comfortable expressing their opinions on the issue, whether in private or public settings.

However, the expressed concerns about practicality or social division may not reflect neutral or standalone considerations. Instead, these responses could themselves be shaped by deeper ideological attachments. Individuals with strong Francoist views may frame their opposition in terms of cost or social cohesion, while their true motivation lies in resisting the symbolic removal of something they see as part of their identity. In other words, what appears as a practical or social objection may in fact be a reflection of underlying identity-based resistance to the policy.

To assess this, I analyze how each of the three channels—identity, practical, and social—relates to two key outcomes: changes in voting behavior and negative emotional responses, such as anger, annoyance, and hate. The results, presented in Table 5, show that the identity channel is strongly and consistently associated with both outcomes, indicating a clear link between symbolic attachment and political or emotional reaction. In contrast, the practical and social channels display weak or inconsistent correlations, suggesting that these concerns are unlikely to be the primary drivers of the observed effects. Taken together, these findings reinforce the interpretation that identity-based motives lie at the core of the response to Francoist street renamings.

5.2 Street Types and New Naming Choices

Street naming is often a deliberate process that reflects a society’s cultural values and historical narratives. Major streets and public squares are frequently named after influential

Table 5: Voting behavior and feelings: identity, social and practical concerns

	Dependent variables					
	Voting behavior			Feelings		
	Change to the right (1)	Change vote (2)	Go to vote (3)	Annoyance (4)	Hate (5)	Anger (6)
Identity channel	0.1043*** (0.0311)	0.4014*** (0.0773)	0.5980*** (0.0833)	0.6287*** (0.0752)	0.5733*** (0.0696)	0.6393*** (0.0679)
Social channel	0.0365 (0.0366)	-0.0523 (0.0952)	-0.2250** (0.1041)	-0.0769 (0.0867)	-0.2346*** (0.0785)	-0.2074** (0.0810)
Practical channel	-0.0300 (0.0372)	-0.0639 (0.0939)	0.0447 (0.0992)	0.0918 (0.0932)	0.0097 (0.0783)	0.0982 (0.0808)
Constant	0.1775** (0.0875)	1.3567*** (0.2090)	1.3729*** (0.2373)	0.5557** (0.2173)	1.1913*** (0.1903)	0.7837*** (0.1943)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The voting behavior dependent variables measure respondents' behavioral intentions in response to Francoist street name changes: "change to the right", "change vote" and "go to vote". The dependent variables measuring emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names are: "annoyance", "hate", and "anger". Each variable ranges from 1 ("nothing") to 5 ("a lot"). I aggregate the different indicators for each of the channels. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

figures or important national events, giving symbolic meaning to everyday urban spaces. In this way, street names function not only as navigational tools but also as markers of collective memory and identity.

Type of Street Renamed— Given this context, it is likely that Francoist street names were also chosen with clear intent, often assigned to streets seen as important or highly visible. As a result, the effects found in the main analysis may be partly related to the type of streets that were renamed, which could help explain some of the political responses observed today. For example, if the biggest and most well-known streets had famous Francoist names, changing them might lead to a voting reaction not just because of the name, but because those streets are important parts of the city that people notice and use every day.

To address this possibility, I examine whether the effect of renaming Francoist streets differs by the type of street—such as a regular street, an avenue, a square, or another category. This analysis allows me to test whether the results are mainly driven by changes to more prominent or visible streets, like main avenues, rather than smaller or less central ones.¹³ By comparing the impact across different street types, I assess whether the street's importance influences the electoral response. The results, presented in Table A8 in Appendix A, show that the estimated effects are similar for regular streets and squares but are absent for avenues. This pattern suggests that the results are not driven by the

¹³In the Spanish urban context, avenues are typically wider, more central, and carry heavier traffic than regular streets, which are generally narrower and less prominent.

prominence or visibility of the renamed location: if symbolic salience were the main channel, one would expect the renaming of avenues to have generated stronger effects, which is not the case.


New Names— Similarly, it is possible that voters are not reacting to the removal of a Francoist street name itself, but to the political message they associate with the new name. For example, if a street previously named after General Franco is renamed after a figure linked to a controversial cause—such as Jordi Pujol, who is associated with Catalan nationalism—residents may interpret the change as a political statement. In that case, the voting response could be driven by disagreement with the ideology of the new name, rather than by attachment to the Francoist past.

To assess this alternative explanation, I conducted an online survey in which respondents were presented with the full new names of streets that had previously carried Francoist references. They were then asked whether they found each new name controversial. The results, shown in red in the right panel of Figure 6, reveal no clear correlation between the salience of the original Francoist name and the perceived controversial nature of its replacement. In other words, even when highly recognizable Francoist names were removed, their replacements were not seen as especially controversial by the public. This suggests that the observed increase in far right vote share is not being driven by opposition to the specific figures or ideas represented in the new names, but rather by the symbolic removal of Francoist references themselves.

5.3 The Far Right Wave

Spain’s political landscape has shifted significantly over the past decade, moving from a stable two-party system to a more fragmented one with the rise of new parties such as VOX. As shown in Figure O3 in the [Online Appendix](#), VOX saw a sharp increase in support during the 2019 elections, multiplying its vote share more than sevenfold. Because this surge coincided with the renaming of Francoist streets in Madrid, it raises the concern that the observed increase in far right voting in treated neighborhoods may reflect broader national trends rather than a response to the renamings. It is possible that these neighborhoods were already more receptive to VOX’s message and would have shown similar voting behavior even without the street name changes. To test this, I

Figure 6: Familiarity with Francoist figures and perception of controversy in replacement names



Note: This figure shows the familiarity of the 500 survey respondents in the City of Madrid with the different Francoist street names (left) and their replacements (right). On the left, respondents were asked to select the Francoist figures and slogans they recognized (they were not told that these were street names). I label the top 9 streets as salient and the rest as non salient. On the right, they identified street names they considered controversial. This comparison aims to determine whether voting behavior is influenced by reactions to the original Francoist names rather than the new ones. These list also falsely contain the name of Jordi Pujol (a leader of the Catalan independence movement) as a decoy.

conduct a placebo analysis.

Table A9 in Appendix A examines voting behavior in control-group neighborhoods that fell within the top quintiles of far right support prior to the 2019 election. If these neighborhoods had exhibited voting patterns similar to those observed in the treated areas, it would suggest that the main results might be driven by a general shift toward VOX rather than by the renaming of Francoist streets. However, the two-way fixed effects estimates reported in columns 1 to 5 show no evidence that high-support control neighborhoods behaved differently from other control areas. These results are consistent across different quintiles, supporting the interpretation that the observed voting effects are indeed linked to the renaming intervention.

Propaganda from parties like VOX may play a crucial role in amplifying perceived identity threats. Populist and far right-wing parties, aware of the symbolic weight carried by Francoist street names, may strategically intensify their campaigning efforts in neighborhoods affected by renamings to mobilize support. Research shows that individuals are especially responsive to salient and accessible information ([Kahneman et al., 1982](#); [Genaioli and Shleifer, 2010](#); [Mullainathan, 2002](#); [Ochsner and Roesel, 2024](#)), suggesting that symbolic policies like street renamings are particularly susceptible to political framing. In this context, the renaming of Francoist streets may trigger identity-based reactions not only intrinsically but also through strategic amplification by political actors. Rather than undermining the identity-based interpretation, this highlights propaganda as a reinforcing mechanism through which perceived symbolic threats are translated into electoral outcomes.

6 Conclusion

This paper shows that the renaming of Francoist street names in Spain triggered a measurable rise in far-right electoral support. Evidence from three complementary empirical strategies indicates that this reaction is not due to administrative inconvenience or dissatisfaction with local policy, but to a perceived symbolic threat to Francoist identity. The results demonstrate that symbolic acts of historical reckoning can produce significant political repercussions when they are perceived as threats to collective identity.

To understand the mechanisms driving the response, I conduct several complementary analyses. First, I find similar increases in far right support in adjacent neighborhoods that did not experience renamings, suggesting that practical inconveniences are unlikely to explain the effect. Second, backlash is concentrated in areas where highly recognizable Francoist figures were removed, with no effect for less prominent names. Third, survey data show that concerns about cost or priorities are voiced mainly by those with strong Francoist attachments. Only identity-based motives are consistently linked to both emotional reactions—such as anger and annoyance—and voting behavior, pointing to identity threat as the primary driver.

I also test two alternative explanations. One is that central or prominent streets were more likely to be renamed, attracting attention regardless of symbolism. However, voting

patterns do not vary across street types. The second is that voters reacted to the political orientation of the new names, but survey data show no correlation between the salience of the removed name and the perceived controversy of its replacement. Together, these findings reinforce the conclusion that electoral backlash stems from the symbolic loss itself.

These findings have broader implications for both policy and future research. First, they underscore the political sensitivity of symbolic policies and the extent to which efforts to reshape public memory can mobilize electoral responses rooted in identity. Policymakers engaged in processes of historical reckoning should recognize that these initiatives may carry political costs. Second, the study highlights the importance of understanding identity not as a static attribute but as a politically activated construct that can influence voting behavior in response to seemingly symbolic changes. This opens avenues for future research on how political actors frame or amplify symbolic policies to mobilize support. Finally, these findings contribute to a growing literature on the intersection of cultural conflict and political behavior, suggesting that symbolic politics are not peripheral but central to contemporary electoral dynamics.

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
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A Appendix


A.1 Figures

Figure A1: Francoist symbology and identity



Notes: The top row reports province-level regressions; the bottom row reports individual-level regressions. Each plot shows the partial relationship between two predictors—(i) self-reported left-right ideology and (ii) the share of respondents agreeing that “Francoist symbology should be removed from public spaces”—and two outcomes—(a) the provincial share of Francoist street names and (b) reported feelings of nostalgia, patriotism, and pride in Francoism. All specifications control for GDP per capita in 2001, geographic coordinates (latitude and longitude), and regional-language indicators (Basque, Catalan, Galician); in the individual-level specifications, municipality fixed effects are additionally included. Standard errors are clustered at the province level.


Figure A2: Share of Francoist streets per region




Notes: This figure displays the regional share of Francoist street names from 2001 onward. The year 2001 serves as the baseline for calculating the proportion of Francoist streets in each region.

Figure A3: The evolution of Francoist streets over the years

(a) Share of Municipalities with Francoist Streets




(b) Number of Francoist Streets




Notes: The figure in the left shows the share of municipalities having at least one Francoist street over the period 2001 - 2022. The figure to the right shows the evolution of the total number of Francoist streets (solid line) and the yearly number of Francoist street renamed (blue bars) over the period 2001 - 2022

Figure A4: First stage and reduced form effects




Notes: The figure in the left shows First-Stage effect, that is, the average vote share obtained by the left-wing bloc and the probability of the mayor being from the left-wing bloc. The figure to the right shows the Reduced Form effect, that is, the average vote share obtained by the left-wing bloc and the number of Francoist streets renamed. Additionally, the right-hand panel plots the baseline (2001) share of Francoist street names against binned averages of the Left bloc's vote share in elections after 2001.

Figure A5: Geographic distribution of Francoist streets in Madrid




Notes: This figure displays maps of neighborhoods in the City of Madrid. The left panel shows the distribution of Francoist street names before the 2017 renaming campaign, and the right panel shows the situation after the changes. Neighborhoods shaded in blue contain at least one Francoist street, while those in white do not have any Francoist street.

Figure A6: Geographic distribution of Francoist streets and adjacent neighborhoods in Madrid




Notes: This figure shows the map of neighborhoods in the City of Madrid prior to the 2017 street renaming campaign. Neighborhoods shaded in dark blue contain at least one Francoist street, while those in white do not have any. Neighborhoods in light blue are adjacent to those with Francoist street names.

Figure A7: What feelings did the renaming of Francoist streets generate?




Notes: This figure shows self-reported emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names: “anger”, “annoyance”, and “hate” on the left and “indifference”, “pride”, and “satisfaction” on the right. Each variable ranges from 1 (“nothing”) to 5 (“a lot”), indicating the intensity of the feeling. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. The figure shows the coefficients reported in Table O4 and the 95% confidence intervals

Figure A8: Did the Francoist street renamings affect behavior?




Notes: The dependent variables measure respondents’ behavioral intentions in response to Francoist street name changes. Each variable is measured on a scale from 1 (“nothing”) to 5 (“a lot”), indicating the intensity of the behavioral response. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4.

Figure A9: Alternative thresholds for defining salient streets



Notes: This figure presents two-way fixed-effects difference-in-differences estimates as well as the 95% confidence intervals of the impact of renaming Francoist streets on far-right voting in Madrid for the period following the renaming. The graph displays estimates across alternative thresholds used to define salient Francoist streets

Figure A10: Channels



Notes: This figure illustrates how Francoist attitudes shape the motivations behind reactions to the renaming of Francoist street names. The identity channel assesses: (1) whether Francoist streets are seen as a source of pride, (2) whether they are considered part of the city's identity, and (3) whether the renamings are perceived as going against the respondent's values. The social channel captures: (1) whether the renamings are viewed as polarizing society, (2) whether respondents agree there are more urgent matters to address, and (3) whether such policies are seen as futile because everyone will eventually be offended. The practical channel examines: (1) whether the renamings are perceived as creating confusion, and (2) whether they are regarded as an unnecessary expense. Finally, the comfort channel reflects how comfortable respondents feel discussing the renaming of Francoist street names, both (1) with family and friends and (2) with strangers. Each variable ranges from 1 ("completely against the statement") to 5 ("completely in favor of the statement"). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4.

A.2 Tables

Table A1: Summary statistics

	All Spain		All Spain <i>Restricted</i>		Madrid	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Municipal characteristics						
Municipal population	5,947.94	(44,106.27)	48,250.12	(146,337.72)	2,429,154.50	(.)
Districts per municipality	1.27	(1.00)	4.49	(2.19)	21.00	(.)
Neighborhoods per municipality	3.33	(28.34)	32.46	(111.80)	2,046.00	(.)
Neighborhood characteristics						
Neighborhood population	1,008.68	(360.68)	1,070.53	(292.47)	1,021.19	(301.07)
Valid votes	645.35	(231.04)	653.94	(185.04)	659.34	(190.01)
Turnout	0.65	(0.10)	0.62	(0.08)	0.65	(0.06)
Right-wing vote share	0.41	(0.18)	0.42	(0.17)	0.52	(0.16)
Left-wing vote share	0.49	(0.17)	0.50	(0.15)	0.47	(0.15)
Independent vote share	0.10	(0.15)	0.08	(0.08)	0.01	(0.00)
Has Francoist street	0.10	(0.28)	0.06	(0.22)	0.05	(0.21)
No. of neighborhoods	23,411		13,635		2,046	

Notes: This table presents means and standard deviations of key variables. The restricted sample is limited to municipalities comprising at least three district units

Table A2: Sample characteristics

	Survey Sample (1)	Population (2)
Male	0.48	0.48
Age 18 to 24 years	0.12	0.12
Age 25 to 34 years	0.21	0.22
Age 35 to 44 years	0.22	0.22
Age 45 to 54 years	0.24	0.23
Age 55 to 65 years	0.21	0.21
University studies	0.39	0.39
Sample size	500	—

Notes: This table presents summary statistics for the survey sample (column 1) along with the statistics of Madrid (column 2). The source for the data on gender, age distribution and educational attainment are obtained from the Padrón. 4 respondents are missing their age, hence the age categories are calculated out of a total of 496 participants.

Table A3

	Dependent Variable: Share of Francoist Streets						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Pride/Nostalgia/Patriotism	0.0118 (0.0079)						
National Unity		0.0088*** (0.0027)					
No HR Violations			0.0170*** (0.0042)				
Perceived Peace				0.0075*** (0.0027)			
Expression Freedom					0.0093 (0.0087)		
Mixed Aspects						0.0066** (0.0032)	
HR Violations Inquiry							-0.0092* (0.0052)
Constant	-0.0771*** (0.0239)	-0.0663** (0.0267)	-0.0916*** (0.0221)	-0.0789*** (0.0263)	-0.0806*** (0.0240)	-0.0834*** (0.0279)	-0.0569** (0.0265)
No. of observations	48	48	48	48	48	48	48

Notes: The dependent variable measures the share of Francoist streets at the provincial level. The independent variables are defined as follows: (1) 'Pride/Nostalgia/Patriotism' measures the percentage of respondents who feel proud, nostalgic, or patriotic about Francoism; (2) 'National Unity' gauges perceptions of unity as an achievement of Francoism; (3) 'No HR Violations' indicates the percentage of respondents denying HR violations during the dictatorship; (4) 'Perceived Peace' reflects opinions on whether there was more order and peace during the dictatorship; (5) 'Expression Freedom' captures perceptions about freedom of expression under the dictatorship; (6) 'Mixed Aspects' assesses acknowledgment of both positive and negative aspects of the dictatorship; (7) 'HR Violations Inquiry' measures support for investigating HR abuses. Controls include GDP per capita in 2001, latitude, longitude, and a regional language dummy. Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A4: OLS: mayor party and Francoist street renamings by election type

	Dep var: # of Francoist streets renamed								
	Whole sample			Not swing elections			Swing elections		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Left wing Mayor	0.1344*** (0.0169)			0.0845*** (0.0214)			0.1681*** (0.0241)		
Right wing Mayor		-0.1513*** (0.0180)			-0.0681*** (0.0226)			-0.2050*** (0.0244)	
Independent Mayor			0.0115 (0.0216)			-0.0361 (0.0343)			0.0098 (0.0305)
No. of observations	32,643	32,643	32,643	19,307	19,307	19,307	13,336	13,336	13,336
No. of municipalities	5,774	5,774	5,774	5,577	5,577	5,577	5,754	5,754	5,754
R-squared	0.014	0.015	0.010	0.009	0.009	0.008	0.030	0.032	0.022
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Municipality FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Linear trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays OLS estimates of the effect of having a Left/Right/Ind mayor on the number of Francoist streets renamed. Francoist street names are defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. I control for the total number of streets in the municipality. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Fuzzy RDD - IV: mayor party and Francoist street renamings by election type

	Panel A: Standard Fuzzy RDD (IV)					Panel B: Data-driven Fuzzy RDD (IV)		
	All elections					All elections	Swing elections	Non-swing elections
	25%-75%	37.5%-62.5%	40%-60%	44%-56%	48%-52%	Data-driven bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Left wing mayor	0.2772*** (0.0591)	0.3731*** (0.1036)	0.4203*** (0.1407)	0.6257** (0.2753)	0.6184 (0.4116)	0.3697*** (0.1100)	0.6221*** (0.2170)	-0.0360 (0.1264)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.143	0.117	0.089
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.143	0.117	0.089
Obs on the Left	12590	7524	6135	3769	1242	8460	3324	2885
Obs on the Right	10949	6889	5692	3615	1267	7692	3105	2631
Polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2	2	2
KP rk Wald F (First Stage)	2228.46	783.24	522.45	174.47	24.02			
Mean of Y	0.105	0.119	0.128	0.137	0.145	0.116	0.147	0.101
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Right wing mayor	-0.3147*** (0.0569)	-0.4075*** (0.0978)	-0.4131*** (0.1347)	-0.4245 (0.2774)	-0.2883 (0.3498)	-0.3581*** (0.1332)	-0.5571*** (0.2055)	-0.0254 (0.1742)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.098	0.086	0.083
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.098	0.086	0.083
Obs on the Left	14186	8213	6697	4077	1337	6576	3192	2543
Obs on the Right	10374	6966	5823	3721	1344	5740	2214	2815
Polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2	2	2
KP rk Wald F (First Stage)	2324.48	828.10	512.37	156.62	21.28			
Mean of Y	0.105	0.121	0.131	0.127	0.123	0.132	0.155	0.111
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Independent wing mayor	0.3325 (0.2117)	0.4350 (0.2811)	0.9041 (0.7135)	2.1094 (4.7179)	0.5460 (0.5436)	0.2305 (0.2516)	0.8232 (0.7715)	-0.3236 (0.3689)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.137	0.117	0.097
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.137	0.117	0.097
Obs on the Left	3443	1449	1130	614	190	1619	792	428
Obs on the Right	1361	901	771	506	185	960	537	276
Polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2	2	2
KP rk Wald F (First Stage)	21.20	10.36	2.83	0.22	1.67			
Mean of Y	0.067	0.052	0.046	0.046	0.056	0.055	0.058	0.050
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			

Notes: This table reports *fuzzy* RDD (IV) estimates of the effect of obtaining an absolute majority in vote share on the number of Francoist Streets changed. *Panel A* implements a standard Fuzzy RDD using fixed, symmetric windows around the 50% threshold ($\pm 0.25, \pm 0.125, \pm 0.10, \pm 0.06, \pm 0.02$); estimates are clustered by municipality, and I report the Kleibergen–Paap rk Wald F from the first stage in each column. *Panel B* implements local-polynomial *fuzzy* RD with data-driven bandwidth selection (Calonico–Cattaneo–Titiunik); I report bias-corrected LATEs with CCT robust standard errors (clustered by municipality), along with side-specific bandwidths h_ℓ, h_r , effective sample sizes N_ℓ, N_r , and polynomial orders p (estimation) and q (bias correction). All specifications control for the total number of streets and election-year fixed effects (2003–2019). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table A6: Perceptions about Francoist street names

	Dependent Variables							
	Care about changes		Support changes		What should be done?		Positive for neighbours	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Francoist indicator	0.0181 (0.1341)		-0.7511*** (0.0514)		-0.6894*** (0.0366)		-0.3825*** (0.0491)	
Francoist level 1		1.8353*** (0.4862)		1.2008*** (0.1658)		1.3952*** (0.1447)		0.6443*** (0.1660)
Francoist level 2		0.7730* (0.4609)		0.5303*** (0.1903)		0.7767*** (0.1703)		0.2007 (0.1523)
Francoist level 3		0.6503 (0.4295)		0.3594** (0.1693)		0.5877*** (0.1586)		0.0308 (0.1551)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)								
Francoist level 5		0.3958 (0.4420)		-0.1650 (0.1775)		-0.1336 (0.1507)		0.0687 (0.1527)
Francoist level 6		0.3715 (0.4617)		-0.2795 (0.1821)		-0.2290 (0.1534)		0.1115 (0.1402)
Francoist level 7		1.6740*** (0.4560)		-1.3362*** (0.1845)		-0.9110*** (0.1347)		-0.7662*** (0.1685)
Constant	6.2080*** (0.1121)	5.3929*** (0.3164)	3.4560*** (0.0452)	3.4092*** (0.1160)	2.4340*** (0.0385)	2.2193*** (0.1107)	3.2300*** (0.0428)	3.1874*** (0.1001)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variable “care about changes” is an indicator ranging from 1 (respondents do not care at all) to 10 (respondents totally care). The dependent variable “support changes” ranges from 1 (totally against) to 5 (totally in favor). The dependent variable “what should be done?” takes the following values: 1 = street names should be left as they are; 2 = left as they are, but with contextual information added next to the street name plate; 3 = renamed, with the plate removed and placed in a museum; 4 = renamed, with the plate removed and destroyed. The dependent variable “positive for neighbours” ranges from 1 (very negative impact) to 5 (very positive impact). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A7: Vote change responses to the renaming of Francoist streets

	Change vote to the right	
	(1)	(2)
Francoist indicator	0.1448*** (0.0211)	
Francoist level 1		-0.1613* (0.0843)
Francoist level 2		-0.1624* (0.0867)
Francoist level 3		-0.0672 (0.0880)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)		
Francoist level 5		0.1070 (0.0866)
Francoist level 6		0.1508* (0.0857)
Francoist level 7		0.2481*** (0.0838)
Constant	0.4800*** (0.0215)	0.4639*** (0.0631)
No. of observations	500	500

Notes: The dependent variable is a binary indicator that equals 1 if a respondent changes their vote towards the right, and 0 otherwise. All specifications include controls for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A8: Type of street renamed

	Dep var: Far Right Voting			
	Avenue	Street	Square	Other
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
t-6	0.0003 (0.0008)	0.0012** (0.0006)	0.0018 (0.0013)	0.0002 (0.0007)
t-5	0.0005 (0.0009)	0.0012** (0.0005)	0.0021* (0.0012)	0.0005 (0.0007)
t-4	-0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0008 (0.0005)	0.0035*** (0.0010)	0.0008 (0.0008)
t-3	-0.0006 (0.0012)	0.0000 (0.0006)	0.0055*** (0.0016)	0.0009 (0.0013)
t-2 (<i>Reference</i>)				
t-1	0.0002 (0.0020)	0.0015* (0.0008)	0.0008 (0.0022)	-0.0002 (0.0016)
t	0.0024 (0.0037)	0.0092*** (0.0025)	0.0082* (0.0045)	0.0029 (0.0029)
No. of observations	15,318	15,977	15,248	15,390
No. of neighborhoods	1,939	2,022	1,930	1,948
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behavior. The dependent variable reflects the vote share for the Far Right bloc. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighborhood. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A9: The rise of VOX and far right leaning neighbourhoods

	Dep var: Far Right Voting				
	Top 5%	Top 10%	Top 15%	Top 20%	Top 25%
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	-0.0226*** (0.0069)	-0.0122*** (0.0036)	-0.0090*** (0.0026)	-0.0071*** (0.0020)	-0.0057*** (0.0015)
t-5	-0.0228*** (0.0055)	-0.0123*** (0.0030)	-0.0091*** (0.0021)	-0.0072*** (0.0016)	-0.0059*** (0.0013)
t-4	-0.0191*** (0.0055)	-0.0110*** (0.0029)	-0.0081*** (0.0020)	-0.0066*** (0.0016)	-0.0056*** (0.0012)
t-3	-0.0139** (0.0062)	-0.0064* (0.0033)	-0.0038* (0.0023)	-0.0027 (0.0017)	-0.0020 (0.0014)
t-2 (<i>Reference</i>)					
t-1	-0.0134 (0.0092)	-0.0080* (0.0048)	-0.0065* (0.0033)	-0.0054** (0.0025)	-0.0050** (0.0020)
t	-0.0025 (0.0115)	0.0035 (0.0062)	0.0026 (0.0043)	0.0029 (0.0034)	0.0029 (0.0028)
No. of observations	12,978	12,978	12,978	12,978	12,978
No. of neighborhoods	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644	1,644
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes


Notes: This table displays TWFE estimates of the effect of the irruption of VOX in far right-leaning neighborhoods on far right voting. Far right-leaning neighborhoods are defined as the neighborhoods in the top quantiles of far-right voting before the irruption of VOX in the 2019 elections. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. I control for the turnout rate and population size of the neighborhood. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Online Appendix


O.1 Figures Online Appendix

Figure O1: Perceptions about Francoist street names


(a) Was the renaming of Francoist streets relevant to you?




(b) Do you support the change of Francoist streets?



(c) What should be done with Francoist streets?




(d) How do you think the renaming of the streets has affected the residents of those neighborhoods?




Notes: All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4.

Figure O2: Ideological position of political parties




Notes: This figure displays the left-right ideological placement of political parties based on survey respondents' evaluations. Respondents rated each party on a scale from 1 (far left) to 10 (far right).

Figure O3: Vote share by bloc: 1991-2019 elections




Notes: This figure displays the vote share of each party bloc in municipal elections from 1991 to 2019 in the city of Madrid. Treated refers to neighborhoods with Francoist streets; Control refers to neighborhoods without Francoist streets.

Figure O4: First Stage: Votes share and mayor election




Notes: This figure shows the first-stage effect for each party bloc. It plots the average vote share obtained by the party bloc (running variable) against the probability that the elected mayor belongs to that bloc (treatment variable).

Figure O5: Reduced Form: Votes share and Francoist street names changes



Notes: This figure displays the reduced-form relationship for each party bloc. It plots the average vote share obtained by the party bloc (running variable) against the number of Francoist streets renamed in each municipality (outcome variable). Additionally, It plots the baseline (2001) share of Francoist street names against the average vote share obtained by each party bloc.


Figure O6: Discontinuities in Covariates




Notes: This figure displays RDD estimates as well as 95% CIs for each party bloc (Left, Right, Independent), testing for discontinuities in covariates at the 50% absolute-majority threshold. The independent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if the bloc obtained at least 50% of the vote (absolute majority) and 0 otherwise. Outcomes are *Municipal Council Seats*, *Turnout*, and *Municipal Population*, each standardized to SD units. Points are bias-corrected local-polynomial estimates with 95% confidence intervals using *Calonico–Cattaneo–Titiunik* robust inference and MSE-optimal, data-driven bandwidth selection for the running variable; standard errors are clustered by municipality.

Figure O7: Density of vote share by party bloc


(a) Left wing bloc



(b) Right wing bloc




(c) Independent wing bloc



Notes: This figure plots the density distribution of vote share for each party bloc.

Figure O8: Correlation matrix: channels



O.2 Tables Online Appendix

Table O1: Voting behavior by election period to first exposure to street renaming – TWFE

	Dep Var: Party bloc vote share				Dep Var: Turnout rate
	Far right	Right	Left	Far left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	0.0005 (0.0004)	-0.0083** (0.0035)	0.0067* (0.0038)	-0.0018 (0.0018)	0.0011 (0.0035)
t-5	0.0003 (0.0003)	-0.0101*** (0.0033)	0.0063* (0.0034)	0.0010 (0.0018)	0.0007 (0.0033)
t-4	-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0061* (0.0036)	0.0036 (0.0036)	0.0018 (0.0016)	-0.0015 (0.0028)
t-3	-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0030 (0.0025)	-0.0013 (0.0023)	0.0022* (0.0013)	-0.0012 (0.0021)
t-2 (<i>Reference</i>)					
t-1	0.0003 (0.0006)	0.0024 (0.0027)	0.0029 (0.0029)	-0.0030 (0.0025)	-0.0006 (0.0027)
t	0.0035*** (0.0012)	0.0035 (0.0040)	0.0007 (0.0041)	-0.0058** (0.0028)	0.0027 (0.0036)
t+1	0.0016 (0.0016)	0.0053 (0.0060)	-0.0006 (0.0065)	-0.0054 (0.0037)	0.0043 (0.0056)
t+2	0.0031 (0.0023)	0.0127* (0.0076)	0.0023 (0.0090)	-0.0069 (0.0047)	0.0088 (0.0068)
t+3	0.0019 (0.0047)	0.0109 (0.0155)	0.0069 (0.0131)	-0.0108* (0.0059)	0.0097 (0.0085)
No. of observations	103,041	103,041	103,041	103,041	103,056
No. of neighborhoods	13,256	13,256	13,256	13,256	13,256
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table displays two-way fixed effects difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of renaming Francoist streets on voting behavior. The dependent variables are vote shares for the Left, Right, Far Left, and Far Right blocs. The Left and Right blocs do not include parties labeled as far right or far left. Neighborhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighborhood $n(i)$ had a Francoist street renamed. Period t-2 is defined as the baseline. All regressions control for neighborhood turnout and population size. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table O2: Voting behavior by election period to first exposure to street renaming – excluding Madrid

	Dep Var: Party bloc vote share				Dep Var: Turnout rate
	Far right	Right	Left	Far left	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
t-6	-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0052 (0.0045)	0.0028 (0.0051)	-0.0015 (0.0018)	0.0010 (0.0043)
t-5	-0.0003 (0.0002)	-0.0034 (0.0026)	0.0019 (0.0029)	0.0013 (0.0017)	-0.0007 (0.0032)
t-4	-0.0004** (0.0002)	0.0040* (0.0022)	-0.0026 (0.0026)	0.0007 (0.0014)	-0.0010 (0.0027)
t-3	-0.0001 (0.0002)	0.0010 (0.0020)	-0.0034 (0.0024)	0.0007 (0.0010)	-0.0012 (0.0021)
t-2	-0.0004 (0.0003)	-0.0007 (0.0019)	0.0016 (0.0021)	0.0001 (0.0010)	0.0010 (0.0019)
t-1	0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0017 (0.0019)	0.0038 (0.0023)	-0.0004 (0.0013)	-0.0010 (0.0022)
t	0.0012** (0.0006)	-0.0002 (0.0028)	-0.0018 (0.0028)	-0.0011 (0.0011)	0.0009 (0.0025)
t+1	-0.0000 (0.0006)	0.0014 (0.0039)	-0.0031 (0.0039)	-0.0006 (0.0017)	0.0018 (0.0039)
t+2	0.0009 (0.0008)	0.0044 (0.0043)	-0.0009 (0.0047)	-0.0004 (0.0019)	0.0041 (0.0041)
t+3	-0.0002 (0.0017)	0.0016 (0.0054)	-0.0001 (0.0059)	-0.0015 (0.0026)	0.0026 (0.0061)
Mean dep. var	0.010	0.398	0.426	0.076	0.607
No. of observations	86,874	86,874	86,874	86,874	86,889
No. of neighborhoods	11,210	11,210	11,210	11,210	11,210
Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
District x Time FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Neighborhood time trend	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes

Notes: This table reports estimates from [Callaway and Sant'Anna \(2021\)](#), measuring the effect of Francoist street renamings on voting behavior. The dependent variables are vote shares for the Left, Right, Far Left, and Far Right blocs. The Left and Right blocs do not include parties labeled as far right or far left. Neighborhoods affected by a Francoist street renaming are defined by a dummy variable that equals 1 if a neighborhood $n(i)$ had a Francoist street renamed. All regressions control for neighborhood turnout and population size. Standard errors are clustered at the neighborhood level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table O3: What feelings did the renaming of Francoist streets generate in you? (negative feelings)

	Dependent Variables					
	Anger		Annoyance		Hate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.5567*** (0.0552)		0.6087*** (0.0571)		0.4130*** (0.0557)	
Francoist level 1		-0.7583*** (0.1578)		-0.8107*** (0.1709)		-0.6624*** (0.1598)
Francoist level 2		-0.2828 (0.1891)		-0.2886 (0.1896)		-0.2359 (0.1772)
Francoist level 3		-0.3224* (0.1747)		-0.1853 (0.1952)		-0.2416 (0.1762)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)						
Francoist level 5		0.2062 (0.1787)		0.1395 (0.1914)		0.0684 (0.1933)
Francoist level 6		0.2675 (0.1916)		0.3390* (0.1933)		0.1765 (0.2010)
Francoist level 7		1.0494*** (0.2139)		1.2659*** (0.2264)		0.7606*** (0.2099)
Constant	2.0740*** (0.0483)	2.0531*** (0.1249)	2.2500*** (0.0504)	2.1864*** (0.1354)	1.9200*** (0.0486)	1.9408*** (0.1305)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables measure emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names: “anger”, “annoyance”, and “hate”. Each variable ranges from 1 (“nothing”) to 5 (“a lot”), indicating the intensity of the feeling. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table O4: What feelings did the renaming of Francoist streets generate in you? (positive feelings)

	Dependent Variables					
	Indifference		Pride		Satisfaction	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.1054 (0.0694)		-0.3269*** (0.0659)		-0.4903*** (0.0608)	
Francoist level 1		-0.8780*** (0.2047)		1.0191*** (0.2247)		1.4484*** (0.2202)
Francoist level 2		-0.1396 (0.2012)		0.3232 (0.2121)		0.5663*** (0.2090)
Francoist level 3		-0.4137** (0.1988)		0.1380 (0.1981)		0.3119 (0.2170)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)						
Francoist level 5		-0.0526 (0.1877)		0.0066 (0.1909)		0.1532 (0.1982)
Francoist level 6		0.0569 (0.1955)		0.0716 (0.2143)		0.1974 (0.2065)
Francoist level 7		-0.4038* (0.2299)		-0.1557 (0.2120)		-0.3243 (0.2051)
Constant	2.8540*** (0.0548)	3.1167*** (0.1385)	2.3720*** (0.0566)	2.1705*** (0.1397)	2.5280*** (0.0563)	2.1900*** (0.1404)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables measure emotional responses to the renaming of Francoist street names: “indifference”, “pride”, and “satisfaction”. Each variable ranges from 1 (“nothing”) to 5 (“a lot”), indicating the intensity of the feeling. All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table O5: Identity channel

	Identity channel					
	Francoist streets motive of pride		Part of identity		Renamings against own values	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.7298*** (0.0429)		0.8125*** (0.0456)		0.6264*** (0.0493)	
Francoist level 1		-1.1129*** (0.1407)		-1.5840*** (0.1709)		-1.0659*** (0.1742)
Francoist level 2		-0.4903*** (0.1741)		-0.7680*** (0.1718)		-0.5798*** (0.1702)
Francoist level 3		-0.3337** (0.1631)		-0.5836*** (0.1706)		-0.1128 (0.1733)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)						
Francoist level 5		0.2318 (0.1547)		0.1658 (0.1522)		0.1225 (0.1515)
Francoist level 6		0.5789*** (0.1493)		0.3387** (0.1658)		0.3179* (0.1642)
Francoist level 7		1.1940*** (0.1731)		1.1641*** (0.1633)		1.0133*** (0.1743)
Constant	2.3500*** (0.0413)	2.3428*** (0.1056)	2.9840*** (0.0430)	3.1679*** (0.1161)	2.5780*** (0.0452)	2.6234*** (0.1116)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables capture identity components present in Francoist street names: (1) whether Francoist streets are a source of pride, (2) whether they are considered part of the city’s identity, and (3) whether the renamings are perceived as going against the respondent’s values. Each variable ranges from 1 (“completely against the statement”) to 5 (“completely in favor of the statement”). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.

Table O6: Social channel

	Social channel					
	Renamings polarize society		More urgent things to do		Everyone will get offended	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Francoist indicator	0.4787*** (0.0569)		0.4538*** (0.0519)		0.4475*** (0.0593)	
Francoist level 1		-1.0095*** (0.1911)		-0.8193*** (0.2040)		-0.9700*** (0.1877)
Francoist level 2		-0.2366 (0.1772)		-0.2701 (0.2026)		-0.2621 (0.1789)
Francoist level 3		-0.2169 (0.1847)		-0.4020* (0.2142)		-0.4293** (0.1932)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)						
Francoist level 5		0.2395 (0.1725)		-0.0818 (0.1993)		-0.0396 (0.1842)
Francoist level 6		0.4376*** (0.1684)		0.2729 (0.1858)		0.2419 (0.1720)
Francoist level 7		0.6130*** (0.1906)		0.7676*** (0.1727)		0.5505*** (0.1997)
Constant	3.4260*** (0.0476)	3.4525*** (0.1242)	3.7460*** (0.0515)	3.8243*** (0.1377)	3.2580*** (0.0493)	3.3899*** (0.1257)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables capture social perspectives regarding the renaming of Francoist street names: (1) whether the renamings are perceived as polarizing society, (2) whether respondents agree that there are more urgent matters to address, and (3) whether they believe such policies are futile because everyone will eventually be offended. Each variable ranges from 1 (“completely against the statement”) to 5 (“completely in favor of the statement”). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table O7: Practical channel

	Practical channel			
	Renamings create confusion		Unnecessary expense	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Francoist indicator	0.5714*** (0.0523)		0.6937*** (0.0485)	
Francoist level 1		-1.0392*** (0.1872)		-1.4657*** (0.1943)
Francoist level 2		-0.3964** (0.1908)		-0.5426*** (0.1911)
Francoist level 3		-0.3974** (0.1997)		-0.5500*** (0.1934)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)				
Francoist level 5		0.1876 (0.1718)		0.0692 (0.1695)
Francoist level 6		0.3116* (0.1777)		0.2118 (0.1869)
Francoist level 7		0.8961*** (0.1879)		0.8989*** (0.1695)
Constant	3.2520*** (0.0493)	3.3167*** (0.1272)	3.3680*** (0.0489)	3.5676*** (0.1258)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables capture practical concerns regarding the renaming of Francoist street names: (1) whether the renamings are perceived as creating confusion, and (2) whether they are viewed as an unnecessary expense. Each variable ranges from 1 (“completely against the statement”) to 5 (“completely in favor of the statement”). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table O8: Comfort channel

	Comfort channel			
	Speaking with family or friends		Speaking with strangers	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Francoist indicator	0.0395 (0.0601)		0.1410** (0.0592)	
Francoist level 1		0.6385*** (0.1954)		0.4854*** (0.1735)
Francoist level 2		0.0931 (0.1805)		-0.0358 (0.1645)
Francoist level 3		-0.0799 (0.1870)		0.0536 (0.1691)
Francoist level 4 (<i>Reference</i>)				
Francoist level 5		0.0918 (0.1704)		0.1316 (0.1675)
Francoist level 6		0.1766 (0.1808)		0.2667 (0.1674)
Francoist level 7		0.6090*** (0.1936)		0.8104*** (0.1787)
Constant	3.4180*** (0.0496)	3.1996*** (0.1264)	3.1440*** (0.0475)	2.8996*** (0.1105)
No. of observations	500	500	500	500

Notes: The dependent variables capture how comfortable respondents feel when discussing the renaming of Francoist street names: (1) sharing their opinions with family and friends, and (2) sharing their opinions with strangers. Each variable ranges from 1 (“completely comfortable”) to 5 (“completely uncomfortable”). All specifications control for age, gender, education level, household income, and whether respondents live in a neighborhood where street names were changed. The baseline level of Francoism is 4. Robust standard errors are used. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table O9: Fuzzy RDD - First Stage: absolute majority in votes and mayor election

	Panel A: Standard RDD					Panel B: Data-driven RDD
	25%-75%	37.5%-62.5%	40%-60%	44%-56%	48%-52%	Data-driven bandwidth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Left wing majority	0.5165*** (0.0109)	0.4378*** (0.0156)	0.4138*** (0.0181)	0.3442*** (0.0261)	0.3178*** (0.0647)	0.2825*** (0.0301)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.1	0.06	0.02	0.041
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.1	0.06	0.02	0.041
Obs on the Left	12590	7524	6135	3769	1242	2586
Obs on the Right	10949	6889	5692	3615	1267	2522
polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Right wing majority	0.4958*** (0.0103)	0.4157*** (0.0144)	0.3768*** (0.0166)	0.2957*** (0.0236)	0.2539*** (0.0549)	0.2952*** (0.0263)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.1	0.06	0.02	0.043
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.1	0.06	0.02	0.043
Obs on the Left	14186	8213	6697	4077	1337	2916
Obs on the Right	10374	6966	5823	3721	1344	2778
polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Independent wing majority	0.1632*** (0.0354)	0.1783*** (0.0553)	0.1083* (0.0642)	0.0450 (0.0960)	0.3521 (0.2627)	0.1567*** (0.0427)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.1	0.06	0.02	0.165
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.1	0.06	0.02	0.165
Obs on the Left	3443	1449	1130	614	190	2025
Obs on the Right	1361	901	771	506	185	1081
polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	

Notes: This table reports the effect of obtaining an absolute majority in vote share on whether the mayor belongs to the same bloc (Left/Right/Independent). *Panel A* implements a standard RDD specification using fixed, symmetric windows around the 50% threshold ($\pm 0.25, \pm 0.125, \pm 0.10, \pm 0.06, \pm 0.02$) with municipality fixed effects. *Panel B* implements a local-polynomial RDD with data-driven bandwidth selection (Calonico–Cattaneo–Titiunik). Panel A reports coefficients with municipality-clustered standard errors; Panel B reports bias-corrected point estimates with CCT robust standard errors (clustered by municipality). For each specification we also report the side-specific bandwidths h_ℓ, h_r , effective sample sizes N_ℓ, N_r , and the polynomial orders p (estimation) and q (bias correction), which are common across sides. All specifications control for the total number of streets and election-year fixed effects (2003–2019). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

Table O10: Fuzzy RDD - Reduced form effect: absolute majority in votes and Francoist street renamings by election type

	Panel A: Standard RDD					Panel B: Data-driven RDD		
	All elections					All elections	Swing elections	Non-swing elections
	25%-75%	37.5%-62.5%	40%-60%	44%-56%	48%-52%	Data-driven Bandwidth		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Left wing majority	0.1431*** (0.0306)	0.1633*** (0.0455)	0.1739*** (0.0584)	0.2154** (0.0949)	0.1965 (0.1292)	0.1413*** (0.0417)	0.2411*** (0.0878)	-0.0108 (0.0418)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.168	0.117	0.088
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.168	0.117	0.088
Obs on the Left	12590	7524	6135	3769	1242	9549	3322	2857
Obs on the Right	10949	6889	5692	3615	1267	8576	3104	2603
Polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2	2	2
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Right wing majority	-0.1560*** (0.0283)	-0.1694*** (0.0408)	-0.1557*** (0.0509)	-0.1255 (0.0823)	-0.0732 (0.0881)	-0.1131*** (0.0414)	-0.2056*** (0.0727)	-0.0057 (0.0410)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.121	0.106	0.090
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.121	0.106	0.090
Obs on the Left	14186	8213	6697	4077	1337	8007	3794	2789
Obs on the Right	10374	6966	5823	3721	1344	6798	2525	3085
Polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2	2	2
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
Independent wing majority	0.0543* (0.0324)	0.0776* (0.0446)	0.0979* (0.0547)	0.0950 (0.0841)	0.1922 (0.1966)	0.0439 (0.0344)	0.0787 (0.0500)	-0.0577 (0.0546)
Bandwidth on the Left	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.173	0.133	0.116
Bandwidth on the Right	0.25	0.125	0.10	0.06	0.02	0.173	0.133	0.116
Obs on the Left	3443	1449	1130	614	190	2127	909	537
Obs on the Right	1361	901	771	506	185	1118	573	322
Polynomial (order)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
q (bias order)						2	2	2
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Time FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Municipality FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			

Notes: This table reports the reduced-form effect of obtaining an absolute majority in vote share on the number of Francoist Streets changed. *Panel A* implements a standard RDD using fixed, symmetric windows around the 50% threshold ($\pm 0.25, \pm 0.125, \pm 0.10, \pm 0.06, \pm 0.02$) with municipality fixed effects and clustered standard errors. *Panel B* implements local-polynomial RDD with data-driven bandwidth selection (Calonico–Cattaneo–Titiunik); we report bias-corrected point estimates with CCT robust standard errors (clustered by municipality). Under Panel B we also display side-specific bandwidths h_ℓ, h_r , effective sample sizes N_ℓ, N_r , and polynomial orders p (estimation) and q (bias correction). All specifications control for the total number of streets and election-year fixed effects (2003–2019).


*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$.

O.3 Francoism Level Indicator

The index is constructed using several dimensions of respondents' answers. First, it includes emotional reactions to the Francoist dictatorship: reporting feelings of nostalgia, patriotism, or pride is interpreted as an indication of Francoist alignment. Second, it incorporates self-reported ideological identification, with individuals who describe themselves as Francoist, Falangist, or Nationalist receiving higher scores. Third, it draws on responses to evaluative statements about the regime—for example, agreement with the claim “During the dictatorship, there were no Human Rights violations” is taken to reflect a favorable view of Francoism. Finally, the index includes each respondent's position on a 10-point left-right ideological scale, where higher values are associated with stronger Francoist orientation.¹⁴

These components are combined into a single measure of Francoist orientation, which is standardized and divided into septiles for ease of interpretation (see Figure O9). Individuals are categorized from 1 (very anti-Francoist) to 7 (very Francoist), with level 4 serving as the reference group, representing the average respondent. This classification provides a structured way to examine how variation in Francoist attitudes relates to perceptions and reactions to the renaming of Francoist streets.

Figure O9: Francoist index distribution



The figure displays the distribution of the Francoist orientation index.

O.4 Municipal Governments and the Politics of Francoist Street Renamings

This section provides a more detailed analysis of the results presented earlier in the paper by examining the role of local political leadership in the decision to rename Francoist street names. Specifically, I test whether the political affiliation of the mayor—categorized as

¹⁴The index is based on responses to questions Q11, Q12, Q13, Q15, Q16, and Q17, listed in the appendix.

left-wing, right-wing, or independent—affects the likelihood of removing Francoist street names. If the presence of a left-wing mayor significantly increases the number of renamed streets, it would suggest that symbolic urban policies are influenced by partisan ideological commitments.

Table A4 presents OLS estimates of the effect of mayoral political orientation on the number of Francoist street renamings. The results indicate that municipalities governed by left-wing mayors rename, on average, 0.14 more streets per electoral period compared to those governed by right- or independent-bloc mayors. Given that the average number of renamings per municipality and period is 0.11, this difference represents a substantial increase in renaming activity under left-wing leadership.

However, these estimates may be biased if unobserved factors jointly influence both the election of left-wing mayors and the decision to rename streets. To address this concern and strengthen causal identification, I implement a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD), leveraging close electoral races around the majority threshold. This approach instruments the mayor’s political orientation using whether a party bloc (left, right, or independent) narrowly obtained an absolute majority of votes. Formally, I estimate the following Fuzzy RDD equation:

$$Renamings_{mt} = \alpha + \beta \text{PartyMayor}_{mt} + \theta \text{PartyVoteShare}_{mt} + \sum_k \alpha_k X_{mt}^k + \lambda_t + \lambda_m + \epsilon_{mt} \quad (2)$$

where PartyMayor_{mt} is instrumented by using the following regression:

$$\text{PartyMayor}_{mt} = \alpha + \beta \text{PartyMaj}_{mt} + \theta \text{PartyVoteShare}_{mt} + \sum_k \alpha_k X_{mt}^k + \lambda_t + \lambda_m + \epsilon_{mt} \quad (3)$$

Here, $Renamings_{mt}$ denotes the number of Francoist streets renamed in municipality m during electoral period t , PartyMayor_{mt} is an indicator for whether the mayor belongs to a given party bloc, and PartyMaj_{mt} indicates whether the bloc obtained a majority of votes. $\text{PartyVoteShare}_{mt}$ controls for continuous party support, X_{mt}^k includes time-varying municipal controls, and λ_t and λ_m are period and municipal fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level.

The results, presented in Table A5 and visualized in Figure A4, show that having a left-wing mayor causally increases the number of Francoist streets renamed. These estimates are larger than the OLS coefficients, suggesting that selection bias may attenuate the OLS estimates. The effect remains stable across different bandwidths, lending robustness to the findings.

In addition, Panel B of Figure A4 plots the baseline share of Francoist street names in 2001 against binned averages of the Left bloc’s vote share in elections after 2001. Municipalities that are, on average, more left-leaning exhibit a markedly lower baseline share of Francoist streets than places where the Left is weak. This cross-sectional pattern is

unsurprising: places that are more left-leaning in the post-2001 period were likely more left-leaning beforehand as well, so they plausibly entered the sample with fewer Francoist streets already, generating the negative association away from the cutoff. Taken together with the RDD results, this indicates that baseline differences do not drive the discontinuity: despite similar 2001 shares around the cutoff, we observe a sharp jump at the threshold, consistent with causal effects from marginal Left victories. Moreover, farther from 50%, the total number of renamings comoves with the 2001 Francoist share—areas that began with fewer Francoist streets can remove fewer overall, while places with higher baseline prevalence see more renamings—aligning with the cross-sectional skew but distinct from the local discontinuity.

To assess whether these renamings are politically motivated strategies rather than ideologically driven policies, I investigate whether left-wing mayors who narrowly retained office after previously holding it also engage in renaming. If symbolic changes were used to mobilize support for re-election, we would expect renamings in such cases as well. However, results in Panels 2 and 3 of Table A5 suggest that renamings primarily occur in municipalities where left-wing mayors replaced right-wing incumbents in close elections. This pattern reinforces the interpretation that these decisions reflect ideological commitments rather than electoral tactics.

The validity of the Fuzzy RDD relies on two sets of assumptions. First, the instrumental variable must satisfy the relevance (strong first stage) and exclusion restrictions. Second, standard RDD conditions must hold, including the continuity of potential outcomes and covariates at the threshold and the absence of manipulation of the running variable (vote share).

Instrumental Variable Assumptions— To support the validity of the instrumental variable strategy, I examine the key assumptions required for causal identification. First, I assess the relevance condition, which requires that the instrument—whether a party bloc obtains an absolute majority of the vote (i.e., at least 50%)—substantially increases the likelihood of that bloc appointing the mayor. Table O9 confirms this condition: crossing the 50% threshold significantly increases the probability that the corresponding party bloc assumes control of the mayor’s office. Second, the exclusion restriction requires that crossing the 50% vote threshold affects Francoist street renamings only through its impact on the political composition of the municipal government. Given the institutional framework in Spain, where street naming decisions fall entirely under municipal jurisdiction and are typically enacted at the discretion of the mayor, this assumption appears plausible. Third, the monotonicity assumption implies that obtaining an absolute majority cannot decrease the likelihood of renaming Francoist streets. In other words, it rules out the existence of municipalities where a left-wing party would rename Francoist streets only if

it did not obtain an absolute majority. Given the nature of political incentives and policy autonomy, such behavior would be highly implausible, suggesting that monotonicity is likely satisfied. Finally, I address the independence assumption, which requires that treatment assignment—crossing the 50% vote share threshold—is as good as random in a neighborhood around the cutoff. While vote shares are not randomly assigned in general, close electoral races are widely considered to approximate random assignment due to the inherent unpredictability of marginal electoral outcomes. The regression discontinuity design (RDD) framework used here ensures that comparisons are limited to municipalities narrowly above and below the threshold, thereby supporting this assumption.

Balance at the Threshold. To validate the use of a Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design, I examine whether key identifying assumptions hold at the 50% vote share cutoff. First, Figure A4 shows a clear discontinuity in the outcome variable at the threshold, indicating that narrowly obtaining an absolute majority substantially increases the likelihood that the corresponding party bloc assumes the mayoralty (first stage) and also leads to a higher number of Francoist street renamings (reduced form). Additional visual and tabular evidence is presented in Figures O4 and O5, and Tables O10 and A5. Second, I verify that covariates remain balanced around the threshold. Figure O6 shows no significant discontinuities in observable characteristics at the cutoff, supporting the validity of the conditional independence assumption. Third, I test for manipulation of the running variable by inspecting the density of the vote share distribution. Figure O7 plots the density and implements a McCrary test, which finds no evidence of discontinuity at the threshold. This suggests that strategic sorting around the cutoff is unlikely. Together, these diagnostics support the credibility of the design and confirm that the key assumptions required for a valid Fuzzy RDD are satisfied.

O.5 Reported Feelings

Can political behavior also be understood through emotional responses? This question is particularly relevant in the context of symbolic policies which may elicit strong affective reactions. To explore this possibility, I examine self-reported emotions associated with the 2017 renaming campaign, investigating whether these responses serve as a mechanism through which perceived identity threats translate into shifts in voting behavior.

Figure A7 summarizes the findings presented in Tables O3 and O4. The results reveal sharp emotional cleavages across ideological groups. Respondents with strong Francoist orientations report substantially higher levels of anger, annoyance, and hate—approximately 50% above the sample average—suggesting that the renamings elicited disproportionately intense negative emotions among those who identify with Francoist values.

By contrast, strongly anti-Francoist individuals report significantly lower levels of these negative emotions, along with markedly higher levels of pride and satisfaction in response to the policy. They also display lower levels of indifference, reinforcing the interpretation that the issue holds symbolic salience for both sides. Meanwhile, Francoist respondents tend to express less pride and satisfaction than the average participant, although these differences are not statistically significant. Taken together, the findings highlight the extent to which the renaming of Francoist streets functions as a highly emotive and divisive issue, with emotional responses mirroring broader ideological alignments.

O.6 Francoist Street Names in Madrid

List of Francoist streets renamed by the municipality of Madrid in the year 2017:

- General Franco
- Caudillo
- Arriba Espana
- Caidos De La Division Azul
- General Mola
- General Moscardo
- General Yagüe
- General Millan Astray
- Capitan Haya
- General Varela
- Capitan Cortes
- General Aranda
- General Davila
- General Rodrigo
- Carlos Ruiz
- General Garcia De La Herranz
- Batalla De Belchite
- Crucero Baleares
- Veintiocho De Marzo
- Comandante Zorita
- General Romero Basart
- Cirilo Martin Martin
- General Sagardia Ramos
- General Saliquet
- Arco De La Victoria
- Alcalde Conde De Mayalde
- Puerto De Los Leones
- Munoz Grandes
- Juan Pujol
- El Algabeno
- General Orgaz
- Hermanos Garcia Noblejas
- Heroes Del Alcazar
- Hermanos Falco Y Alvarez De Toledo
- General Fanjul
- Angel Del Alcazar
- Manuel Sarrion
- Aunos
- Juan Vigon
- Eduardo Aunos
- Doctor Vallejo Nagera
- General Kirkpatrick
- Fernandez Ladreda
- Jose Luis De Arrese
- Emilio Jimenez Millas
- Primero De Octubre
- Gobernador Carlos Ruiz
- General Asensio Cabanilla
- Cerro De Garabitas
- Jose Luis De Arrese
- General Garcia Escamez
- Almirante Francisco Moreno

O.7 List of Francoist Streets in Spain

Francoist street names	Source
6 de octubre	Toledo Diario (2023)
Agustín Flamarique	20minutos (2008)
Amadeo Marco	Nabarralde (2009)
Alcalde Conde de Mayalde	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Alferez Provisional	La Razón (2022)
Almirante Francisco Moreno	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Alfonso Churruca	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Almirante Vierna	El Diario (2022)
Alvarez Entrena	Ayuntamiento de Callosa de Segura (2018)
Alzamiento	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Ángel María Pascual	Naiz (2016)
Angel de Alcazar	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Arco de la Victoria	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Arriba España	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Arrese	Noticias de Navarra (2021a)
Aunós	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Barrie de la Maza	La Voz de Galicia (2021)
Batalla de Belchite	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Benjumea	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Bermudez de Castro	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Blanco Rajoy	El Español (2019)
Brunete	Lanza Digital (2023)
Canalejo	El Español (2019)
Canovas Lacruz	La Región (2016)
Capitán Cortés	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Capitán Garcia Galego	La Razón (2022)
Capitán Haya	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Carlos Pinilla	El Diario (2020)
Carmen Polo	Noticias de Navarra (2021a)
Carrero Blanco	El Diario Cantabria (2022)
Cecilio Lopez	Mi Ciudad Real (2016)
Cerro Garabitas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Cirilo Martín	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Comandante Barja	El Español (2019)
Comandante Zorita	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Conde Rodezno	Noticias de Navarra (2021b)
Coronele Beorlegui	20minutos (2008)
Crucero Baleares	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Delicado Maraño	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Dieciocho de julio	Oto-Peralías (2018)
División Azul	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Doctor Vallejo-Nájera	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
El Algabeño	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Engelhardt	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Estanislao Gomez	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Falange	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Farina Ferreno	El Español (2019)

Francoist street names	Source
Faustino Garralda	Nabarralde (2009)
Federico Mayo	Naiz (2016)
Federico Servet	La Razón (2022)
Felipe Sánchez	VigoÉ (2018)
Fernández Ladreda	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Franco	Oto-Peralías (2018)
García Herranz	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
García Morato	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
García Escámez	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
García Valiño	La Tinta de Almansa (2020)
General Aranda	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Asensio	Toledo Diario (2023)
General Cabanillas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Davila	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Fanjul	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Kirkpatrick	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Lafuente	El Diario (2020)
General Mola	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Moral	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Moscardo	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Orgaz	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Queipo de Llano	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Ramiro Ledesma	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Rodrigo	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Romero Basart	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Sagardía Ramos	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Sanjurjo	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Saliquet	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Torres	La Razón (2022)
General Varela	Oto-Peralías (2018)
General Vigon	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
General Yague	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Generalísimo	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Gobernador Carlos Ruiz	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Gómez Zamalloa	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Héroes del Alcázar	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Hermanos García Noblejas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Hermanos Imaz	Noticias de Navarra (2021b)
Jose Calvo Sotelo	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Jose Diaz de Mendivil	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Jose Luis Arrese	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
José Díaz de Mendivil	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
José Lejarreta	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
José Mina	Nabarralde (2009)
Juan Pujol	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Los Caidos	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Lucio Arrieta	20minutos (2008)
Luis María Uriarte	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Luis Valero	Government of Navarre (2019)
Manuel Fraga	El Mundo (2011)

Francoist street names	Source
Manuel Sagastizábal	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Manuel Sarrión	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Mártires	de Maturana (2015)
Mariano Mota	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Millan Astray	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Molina Brandao	La Voz de Galicia (2021)
Mora-Figueroa	La Razón (2022)
Morales León	Ayuntamiento de Sevilla (2017)
Onesimo Redondo	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Ozores Arraiz	El Español (2019)
Paso Duende	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Pedro Asua	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Pedro Orbea	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Pepín Rivero	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Plácido Careaga	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Planells Riera	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Plaza de Emilio Jiménez Millas	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Pío Loperena	Nabarralde (2009)
Ponte Anido	El Español (2019)
Primero de Octubre	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Primo de Ribera	Oto-Peralías (2018)
Puerto de los Leones	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Ramiro de Maeztu	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Rafael Sánchez Mazas	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Ruiz de Alda	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Salas Pombo	Salamanca RTV al Día (2019)
Salgado Torres	El Español (2019)
Salvador y Merino	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Santiago Gómez	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Solchaga	Government of Navarre (2019)
Teijeiro	El Español (2019)
Torpedero Tucumán	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Plus Ultra	Toledo Diario (2023)
Ventiocho de Marzo	Ayuntamiento de Madrid (2017)
Victor Pradera	Naiz (2016)
Vicente Abreu	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Vicente Manterola	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)
Vilela Garate	La Voz de Galicia (2009)
Zumalacarregui	González de Langarica Mendizábal and López de Maturana Diéguez (2018)

Table O11: Francoist street names and sources

O.8 Online Survey

The questionnaire of the online survey is the following (translated from Spanish):

Q1: Do you have:

- Spanish nationality
- Spanish and another nationality
- Another nationality

Q2: How old are you?

Q3: Gender

- Male
- Female

Q4: In which province were you born?

Q5: Income

Q6: Education

Q7: Occupation

Q8: Do you live in Madrid (capital)?

Q9: In which district and neighborhood?

Q10: On which street? (please note that we do not ask for your address, only the street name)

Q11: To what extent would you say you feel proud to be Spanish: very, quite, little, or not at all proud?

- Very proud
- Quite proud
- Little proud
- Not at all proud

Q12: How would you define yourself politically according to the following classification? (Multiple choice)

- | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------|
| • Conservative | • Nationalist |
| • Christian Democrat | • Feminist |
| • Liberal | • Environmentalist |
| • Social Democrat | • Francoist |
| • Socialist | • Falangist |
| • Communist | • Other, please specify |

Q13: When people talk about politics, the terms left and right are often used. On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means 'far left' and 10 means 'far right,' where would you place yourself?

Q14: Which political party do you consider closest to your own ideas?

- List of parties

Q15: From the following political parties, on a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 means 'far left' and 10 means 'far right,' where would you place them?

- List of parties

Q16: Who do you think was primarily responsible for the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War?

- The left
- The right
- Both the left and the right

Q17: What feelings does thinking about Francoism provoke in you? Select up to 3

- Sadness
- Discomfort
- Patriotism
- Anger
- Indifference
- Pride
- Fear
- Nostalgia
- Incomprehension
- Other feeling, please specify

Q18: Please tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with the following statements:

1. One of Francoism's achievements was maintaining the unity of Spain
2. Basic human rights were violated during Francoism
3. There was more order and peace during Francoism than there is now
4. While Francisco Franco was alive, people did not express their opinions for fear of what might happen
5. Francoism contributed to Spain's economic modernization
6. Francoism had both good and bad aspects

Q19: Could you tell me if you tend to agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

1. Symbols that glorify the Spanish Civil War should be removed from public places
2. There should be a monument dedicated to all victims of the Spanish Civil War
3. Symbols that honor Franco and Francoism should be removed from public places
4. There should be a monument dedicated to all victims of Francoism

Q20: Do you think that in Madrid...

- There are still Francoist streets today
- There used to be Francoist streets, but not anymore
- There have never been Francoist streets

Q21: In 2017, the Madrid City Council changed several Francoist street names. Can you tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with the renaming of these streets?

- Totally agree
- Tend to agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Tend to disagree
- Totally disagree

Q22: Do you think other people tend to agree or disagree with the renaming of these streets?

- Totally agree
- Tend to agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Tend to disagree
- Totally disagree

Q23: How much did the renaming of the Francoist streets matter to you? On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means 'not at all' and 10 means 'a lot,' where would you place yourself?

Q24: Do you currently live or did you live in one of those neighborhoods?

Q25: In your opinion, what should have been done with the Francoist streets?

- Keep them as they are/were
- Keep them but add information about the history of Francoism next to the street plate
- Rename them, remove the street plates and put them in a museum
- Rename them, remove the street plates and destroy them

Q26: How do you think the renaming of the streets has affected the residents of those neighborhoods?

- Very positive
- Somewhat positive
- Not at all
- Somewhat negative
- Very negative

Q27: In your opinion, what do you think was the main reason for the street name changes?

- To repair the damage done to Francoist victims
- Demand from local residents
- Partisan reasons

Q28: Which sector of society do you think is most likely to have viewed these changes negatively?

- Far-left voters
- Left-wing voters

- Right-wing voters
- Far-right voters

Q29: Can you tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

1. Francoist streets are a source of pride
2. Francoist streets are/were part of the city's identity
3. Renaming Francoist streets reflected a threat to my values
4. These types of policies polarize society
5. There are more urgent things to do before renaming streets
6. Regarding the streets, everyone will eventually be offended at some point; it's pointless to try to please everyone
7. Republicans are against these changes (attention check)
8. Francoists are in favor of these changes (attention check)
9. Renaming streets creates confusion
10. The money spent on renaming the streets was an unnecessary expense
11. I feel comfortable talking to my family or friends about my views with respect to the renaming of Francoist streets
12. I feel comfortable talking to strangers about my views with respect to the renaming of Francoist streets

Q30: Can you tell me to what extent the street name changes generated the following feelings in you?

- Anger
- Annoyance
- Indifference
- Pride
- Satisfaction
- Hatred

Q31: To what extent do you believe that the street name changes caused you to...

- Reconsider your vote in the next elections
- Change your vote in the next elections
- Go out to vote
- Go out and protest

Q32: If you had reconsidered or changed your vote, which of the following options would reflect your change?

From / To	PP	PSOE	VOX	Podemos	Cs	Other
PP						
PSOE						
VOX						
Podemos						
Cs						
Other						

Q33: From the following list, which Franco-era names, figures, or slogans do you recognize? If none strike you as Francoist, you may leave them all unselected (Randomize order)

- | | |
|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| • General Franco | • El Algabeno |
| • General Millan Astray | • General Orgaz |
| • Caudillo | • Capitan Haya |
| • General Varela | • Hermanos Garcia Noblejas |
| • General Moscardo | • Heroes Del Alcazar |
| • General Mola | • Hermanos Falco Y Alvarez De Toledo |
| • General Yagüe | • General Fanjul |
| • Caidos De La Division Azul | • Angel Del Alcazar |
| • Capitan Cortes | • Manuel Sarrion |
| • General Aranda | • Aunos |
| • General Davila | • Juan Vigon |
| • General Rodrigo | • Eduardo Aunos |
| • Carlos Ruiz | • Doctor Vallejo Nagera |
| • General Garcia De La Herranz | • General Kirkpatrick |
| • Batalla De Belchite | • Arriba Espana |
| • Crucero Baleares | • Fernandez Ladreda |
| • Veintiocho De Marzo | • Jose Luis De Arrese |
| • Comandante Zorita | • Emilio Jimenez Millas |
| • General Romero Basart | • Primero De Octubre |
| • Cirilo Martin Martin | • Gobernador Carlos Ruiz |
| • General Sagardia Ramos | • General Asensio Cabanilla |
| • General Saliquet | • Cerro De Garabitas |
| • Arco De La Victoria | • Jose Luis De Arrese |
| • Alcalde Conde De Mayalde | • General Garcia Escamez |
| • Puerto De Los Leones | • Almirante Francisco Moreno |
| • Munoz Grandes | • Jordi Pujol |
| • Juan Pujol | |

Q34: From the following list, which street names do you find most controversial? If none seem controversial, you may leave them all unselected. (Randomize order)

- | | |
|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| • Ingeniero Emilio Herrera | • Pintora Ángeles Santos |
| • Arquitecto Sánchez Arcas | • Ramón Gaya |
| • Guillermo Roviroa | • Aviador Zorita |
| • Memoria. | • Barco Sinaia |
| • Charca Verde | • Juan Antonio Vallejo-Nájera Botas |
| • José Castillejo | • Mercedes Fórmica |
| • Calle de Juana Doña | • José Rizal |
| • Memorial 11 de marzo de 2004 | • José Moreno Villa |
| • Manuel Chaves Nogales | • Elíptica. |
| • Poeta Joan Maragall. | • Matilde Landa |
| • Gerda Taro | • Poeta Ángela Figuera |
| • El Pardo | • Max Aub |

- Las Águilas
- Diego Torres Villarroel
- Cooperación
- Anselmo Lorenzo
- Carlota O'Neill
- Maestra Justa Freire
- Enrique Ruano
- Edgar Neville
- Fortunata y Jacinta
- Maestro Ángel Llorca
- Blas Cabrera
- Maestra María Sánchez Arbós
- Soledad Cazorla
- Julián Besteiro
- San Germán
- Corpus Barga
- Mayor de Barajas
- Institución Libre de Enseñanza
- Filósofa Simone Weil
- Poeta Blas de Otero
- Rastrillo
- Melquíades Álvarez
- Julián Zugazagoitia
- Marcelino Camacho
- Carlos Morla Lynch
- Melchor Rodríguez
- Baile
- Robert Capa
- Jordi Pujol

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