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Sampson, Steven

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221 00 Lund
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Integrity Warriors: Global Morality and the Anticorruption Movement in the Balkans¹

Steven Sampson, Dept of Social Anthropology, Lund University, e-mail: steven.sampson@soc.lu.se

Introduction: the anthropology of virtue

There is something going on out there. It is a movement toward increasing morality, ethics and simply 'doing the right thing' in human affairs. This movement goes under several labels: 'global governance', 'oversight', 'accountability', 'transparency', or what Mary Robinson has termed 'ethical globalization'. The loudest voice in this accountability movement appears to come from 'global civil society', the conglomerate of non-governmental interest groups and organizations who exert pressure on governments and transnational corporations to change policies or reveal their true motives. This voice often invokes its grass-roots character, yet it would be misleading to think that the impetus towards accountability comes solely from below. Governments, large international organizations and transnational corporations are not simply *reacting* to pressure or trying to save face. Among these organs of global elite power as well, we see a newly found interest in doing good, or at least doing better. We see it among governments, in the corporations, within the World Bank, and in the programs of the Davos crowd. Both from below (global civil society) and from above ('them'), there seems to be a wave of virtue out there.

Evidence for this can be seen in governments making public promises to do good, in the international organizations' efforts for oversight, in private companies talking about integrity and ethics, and in the success of civil society networks who successfully push and prod these actors via their awareness-raising activities, lobbying, advocacy, whistle-blowing and public demonstrations.

One part of this move toward governance, accountability and transparency is the fight against corruption. The struggle against corruption is now transnational in two respects. First, it is springing up all over, from finance ministries in Belgium to aid offices in Kenya to city government in Colombia. Second, it is now the object of global coordination. Ethical globalization and ethics management are now at the forefront of corporate activity. The high level publicity given to recent business scandals such as Enron, Arthur Andersen, Worldcom and Halliburton in Iraq, indicate that the ethical issue is not simply window dressing. Every major government now has a high level anticorruption unit, an action plan, and various campaigns in the works.

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Anticorruption activities, I would argue, are part of a general trend toward global ethics and moral justification in human affairs. We see this trend in various spheres of political and social life, from the development of codes of conduct to courses in corporate ethics. We also see it in the increasing dominance of human rights programs in foreign policy, in the establishment of reconciliation and truth commissions, and in efforts to construct national integrity systems as part of anticorruption. Why is this happening? Why, in the midst of no holds barred neoliberal efficiency and organizational downsizing, do we also find more institutions consciously trying to 'do the right thing'? Why is everyone trying to act so honestly? What has happened that social relations should now be so transparent and accountable?

One could account for this trend by asserting that there has been some kind general progress in human affairs. In a post-holocaust, post-totalitarian world, we can certainly observe the influence of human rights practices. Efforts to ensure dignity, democracy and equality have made even the most marginal groups aware of their rights and the most powerful corporations and governments responsive to them. This argument would assume that we are in some kind of new era, an era of dignity, and that progress has forced the privileged classes, ruthless corporations and unresponsive governments to ensure these rights by treating people in a dignified fashion.

The problem with this kind of argument, that things are getting better, is that it coexists with manifest evidence that things are also getting worse. Along with struggles for human rights and dignity for minority or marginal groups, we thus see ever more vicious examples of human neglect and human misery: the so-called 'new wars' targeting civilian populations, ethnic cleansing and genocide, trafficking of women, children and refugees, new forms of slavery, child abuse, unscrupulous terrorist attacks, the ruthless sale of human organs, 'the politics of the belly' among venal African dictators, transnational organized crime networks, diamond wars using child soldiers, unabashed corporate embezzlement and innumerable other examples of debasement of moral standards and human dignity.

In this latter group of negative phenomena lies 'the rise' in global corruption. Whether corruption has in fact increased is difficult to discern, since measures of corruption are notoriously difficult to validate. There is certainly a rise in the issue of corruption as a topic of public concern. Integrity, ethics and responsibility have become integral parts of public policy. The 'C-word', as it was once called at the World Bank, is now up front. The Bank itself is at the forefront of anticorruption efforts (Stapenhurst and Kpundeh 1999). Governments, corporations, and aid organizations are all being held accountable. Open tendering procedures, open financial accounts, open recruitment are all the order of the day. The key to integrity is accountability.

The anticorruption movement has now entered this sphere of integrity and accountability. Anticorruption is not just a set of policy measures enacted by governments to prevent bribery and punish nepotism. It is also a moral force, reflecting the indignation among ordinary people and among articulate elites that things are not right. Anticorruption entails not only making governments or aid programs more effective, but also making people more honest, raising people's consciousness to a new level. Anticorruption is thus a moral, even religious force. This is why some activists within Transparency International, the leading anticorruption organization, see themselves as 'integrity warriors'. Responding to unscrupulous transnational forces of immorality and profiteering, the struggle against corruption is an effort to restore standards that were lost, the standards of morality and responsibility which connote what we call 'community'. There is now an emergent 'anticorruption community', acting on behalf of 'global civil society'. The anticorruption community struggles for accountability from faceless bureaucracies and secretive corporations. It is now so extensive that it includes groups normally at odds with each other: grass-roots activists pursuing social justice, enlightened

corporations who believe that ethics is good business, neo-liberal governments who see corruption as a brake on trade, and international aid organizations who want their donor funds to be more effective. The fight against corruption is thus more than just the 'tactics' of governments or corporations who want to look good: It is a moral crusade.

This paper deals largely with the civil society actors behind the anticorruption movement. The idea of 'a global civil society' or 'a global community' as a social actor is not unproblematic. These terms take on a rhetorical form which makes them little more than wishful thinking. How can there be a global civil society without a global state? Where is the global citizenship consisting of clear rights and enforceable obligations? To what unit do these global citizens belong? Who, or what is their point of reference? If global citizenship consists only of marching in demonstrations or being connected to the Internet, what happens to citizenship if I can just remove my name from the e-mail list? Where are my obligations then?

Nevertheless, some social movements have the power to mobilize large numbers of people from diverse social classes to achieve common goals. This mobilization takes place as a reaction to specific events in specific places, but it also takes place in transnational forums unbounded by place. In this sense, such 'movements' create a quasi-form of community solidarity. Anticorruption is becoming one of these movements. Even more than women's rights, environmental protection, or the rights of the child, to name three such global movements with varying local dynamics, the movement for anticorruption is one of the few platforms which can bring virtually all of us together. After all, who can be *for* corruption?

Anticorruption goes global

Corruption is conventionally defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (though recent definitions, stimulated by the Enron and Wall Street scandals, now extend corruption to be the abuse of any sort of 'entrusted authority', as would occur by a board chairman). Corruption is a complex social practice with its own specific local variations. An understanding of corruption entails an understanding of the social contexts that produce and sustain it, such that the change of these contexts would also cause changes in patterns of corruption. Corruption, in other words, has a history. To this history must be added a discursive element: the rhetoric of corruption, accusations of corruption, claims of 'endemic corruption', and now, the discourse centered upon the 'struggle against corruption.'

The struggle against corruption also has a history, both rhetorically and in terms of action plans. In the late 1970s, states as diverse as China and Mexico had anticorruption campaigns and anticorruption offices. The US Government enacted the world's first strict anticorruption act in foreign trade in 1977, penalizing companies who gave bribes. These campaigns, however, had little effect until the late 1990s, when corruption suddenly became a major issue.

In the last 5-6 years, anticorruption practice have diffused transnationally and have become organized globally. We have seen the emergence of a *world of anticorruption* with its own actors, strategies, resources and practices, with its heroes, victims and villains. Unlike corruption, which is locally grounded and moves internationally, this new world of anticorruption seems to be more globalized and coordinated from its inception. Whereas corruption begins locally and spreads, anticorruption begins at the top and then penetrates locally. The particular problem I will deal with in this paper is why this struggle against corruption has become so prominent, becoming even a cornerstone of international development initiatives and United States foreign policy. After all, corruption has been around since the very beginning of the public sphere, and philosophers, citizens and leaders have always complained about corruption (Hindess 2001:5, citing Aristotle). For decades we have known that billions of dollars have been diverted by various corrupt practices, including bribery of judges, false contracts, padded development projects, dishonest officials and nepotistic arrangements. Why have anticorruption initiatives

become so prominent in the last few years? What is it that took so long for anticorruption to 'arrive' as a global accountability issue?

Two possible explanations come to mind: one centered on moral progress, the other on system rationality. The moral explanation is that anticorruption is just the next step in a project to make the world a better, more just place. This is the rhetoric of 'ethical globalization'. The fight against corruption is virtuous, and those who form part of the 'anticorruption community' are thus 'integrity warriors'. The second explanation focuses on the need to increase system rationality: fighting corruption, it is argued, will make market economies more efficient, state administration more effective, and development resources more accessible. Let us for the moment assume that both these imperatives, the moral and the rational, are operating. If this is the case, we might say that we find ourselves in a conjuncture of anticorruption. Such conjunctures provide interesting 'windows' for understanding how global and local processes intersect, be they processes of global economic restructuring or processes of accountability linked to respect for human rights and global justice.

Since anticorruption has become globalized, I will explore the issue of corruption and anticorruption in terms of globalization. Here globalization is understood as a dual process that entails first transnational economic exchange, and second the cultural process in which certain discourses, symbols, practices, and understanding of the world seem to diffuse, and are thereupon manipulated by local actors in pursuit of specific projects. The 'anticorruption movement' is one such project. It can thus be both a goal, something to be achieved in moral or systemic terms, and a means of pursuing one's own private strategies or those of one's group. Anticorruption is thus an objective and a tactic.

Studying anticorruption: global and local scenes

In the past decade, I have been involved in both research and consulting on various aspects of democracy assistance in Southeast Europe. In these dual capacities, I have observed how the rhetoric of 'anticorruption', what I will call 'anticorruptionism', is now penetrating the Balkan aid practices and local political life. In focusing on global anticorruption and how it operates in the Balkans, I will describe the nature of the global anticorruption activity, centering on international meetings, conventions, agreements and on one particularly successful anticorruption organization, Transparency International (TI). TI has been at the forefront of anticorruption initiatives, though it is only beginning its activities in Southeast Europe. TI is interesting because of its seemingly unparalleled success in making an impact on the major public actors and in dominating the anticorruption discourse. How and why was TI so successful and what does this say about the global anticorruption movement? This research is only in its initial stage, and my data will be based partly on a perusal of the massive anticorruption literature, attendance at the world anticorruption conferences in Prague in October 2001, and Seoul in May 2003, where I interviewed many anticorruption activists, and a brief visit to TI's London office for research and documentation. I have also participated in other anticorruption forums in Latvia, Sweden and Denmark. With these data, I attempt to present some aspects of the global anticorruption scene, including the anticorruption landscape in Romania, where I worked recently. Like other parts of Southeast Europe, Romania has been notorious for corrupt practices spanning various political regimes. Today it is experiencing an upsurge of anticorruption initiatives emanating from both government and non-governmental actors. This upsurge comes as a result of public outcry against corrupt officials, pressure from international donors for accountability, and the demands of EU association/membership. Pursuing anticorruption has led to a whole set of practices revolving around the formulation and implementation of national and regional anticorruption programs.

This combination of public, private, international and civil society actors makes the world of anticorruption into a complex social force of its own, and worth understanding

anthropologically. On the basis of the documentation and field study, my preliminary conclusion is that an understanding of the anticorruption 'industry' can help us understand how knowledge and practice are produced in a globalized setting. This production has a moral aspect: it is about virtue and efficiency in the same 'package'. Moreover, an understanding of anticorruption can help us to understand the emerging dynamics of global citizenship. This global citizenship is founded upon an imagined global moral order. It is about doing what is necessary and what is good. Understanding anticorruption as a global morality discourse linked to neoliberal rationality can help us understand why anticorruption has emerged on the scene in the past 5-7 years, together with other movements for global justice, governance, and accountability. Anthropology is about studying how people engage with the world. In this sense, 'doing good' comes in waves. There are conjunctures of virtue, and perhaps we are now in one such conjuncture. Hence, this paper is a step toward outlining a general anthropology of virtue.

Anticorruption as a grant category

Virtue is not just about ideas. It is about obtaining the resources to struggle for one's ideas. 'Civil society development' and 'democracy promotion' are very much tied to 'Funding Virtue', to use the title of a recent book (Ottaway and Carothers 2000). Anticorruption is therefore an interesting case of this production of virtue, of good will, of the struggle for integrity in human affairs which characterizes other global movements for rights, environment and justice. This movement attempts to establish and enforce ethical codes, to regulate virtue (Brien 2001).

In pursuing virtue, this struggle for resources is relentless. Organisations are constantly attempting to procure money for projects, and hence developing funding strategies. Anticorruption is now at the stage where what were once moral campaigns and virtuous ideas must now be converted into grant categories and technical assistance contracts. This trend is hardly new. We have seen the way in which struggles for human dignity and mobilizing grass roots movements to achieve change have now evolved into programme areas and budget lines for 'Human Rights' and 'Civil Society'. Similar trends are occurring with anticorruption, especially in the Balkans, where international donors bring their own agendas and priorities, where there are foreign aid organizations, humanitarian NGOs, training needs assessments, political foundations and private consulting companies all specializing in governance and anticorruption.

This trend is what I call the *projectization* of anticorruption. Projectization is not necessarily to be condemned, but it does put a new light on how we should understand the pursuit of virtue. Virtue, like morality, can thus be viewed as specific kind of social process. Anthropologists who study NGOs, for example, are often members or supporters of the goals of these organizations. They may therefore overlook (or even refuse to acknowledge) more unpleasant phenomena of power and manipulation behind them. It is in this sense that we should also examine other movements for global morality and virtue, including the anticorruption movement. We need to examine Global Morality not just as an ideological stream but as a social process. It is a process by which virtue is transformed into a specific activity called a project - one that includes formulating a funding strategy, approaching donors, analyzing stakeholders, hiring consultants, developing NGOs, conducting project appraisals, making evaluations... and yes, on to the next project. Anticorruption activities can therefore lead to and reinforce an entire complex of discursive practices which may have little to do with fighting corruption as such. Anticorruptionism, as I will show here, is a stage in which moral projects are intertwined with money and power. This is the world of anticorruption.

Anticorruption as a world

As part of the general wave of openness, struggle for dignity, transparency and accountability, anticorruption has developed its own discourse, actors, and sets of practices. That anticorruption has arrived is evidenced by its 400,000 hits on Google (up from 115,000 in early

2003, and far below the 6.4 million hits if one searches for 'human rights'. Nevertheless, there now exist several 'anticorruption gateways' run by well-funded NGOs and companies. There are inter-governmental organizations, world conferences, anticorruption web portals, World Bank offices, government reports and NGO projects dedicated to corruption. There are "aid memoirs" written by development agencies, anticorruption training courses for government officials, and in the U.K. one can now obtain an M.A. in 'Fraud Studies'. In sum, one can conclude that anticorruption has become 'a world'.

A 'world', as anthropologists might define it, could be equated with Bourdieu's 'field'. It involves a set of actors whose practices are carried out under various structural constraints. These actors attempt to control or channel resources to achieve their strategies. The world has its own special terminology, jargon and rhetoric, and it bases its appeal on adherence to certain legal, economic and moral norms. The world of anticorruption has its own ritual events, its foundation myths and its own folklore, a kind of mirror image of Myrdal's 'folklore of corruption' from 35 years ago (1968:355-77).

Anticorruption is more than just high-sounding talk and World Bank aid projects. It can also constitute a political platform for ambitious politicians or ex-military officers who want to 'clean up' government. Anticorruption is invariably a part of most military coups, and as part of the good governance rhetoric, an obligatory anticorruption program is now one of the conditions written into most foreign aid cooperation agreements.

In the world of anticorruption, diverse actors normally at odds with each other can come together in the same moral crusade. There are anticorruption campaigns conducted among large private companies and government agencies, anticorruption conferences bringing together activists and world leaders, and there is a growing anticorruption 'movement' led by Transparency International, whose international lobbying is backed by nearly a hundred local branches and dedicated local activists. It is significant that anticorruption measures can make headlines, and that every corruption scandal not only fills newspapers but places pressure on politicians 'to do something'.

As anticorruption has become a 'world', it also becomes amenable to cross-national comparison using presumably objective measures. There is thus an emerging industry of corruption measurement, bribe payers indices, opacity indices, indices of 'state capture', all of which pale in importance to Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.

Since corruption is tied not only to individual strategies and opportunities, but also to manipulation of value systems and legal norms, the anticorruption discourse also revolves around a moral-legal nexus. Combating corruption is thus viewed as a multipronged effort of government, the private sector and civil society to change institutions, pass new laws, crack down on dishonest officials and raise awareness of citizens. Anticorruption is economic openness, political will, and moral commitment. Just as we can compare the various forms of corruption in different societies, we can also compare the forms of anticorruption.

In the morally charged atmosphere of anticorruption, there are heroes, villains and innocent victims. The heroes are the 'integrity warriors' who expose corruption or fight abuse; they may be journalists, lawyers and community leaders. One such hero is the Norwegian prosecutor Eva Jolie, who helped expose the massive French corruption scandals by officials in Paris. Another such hero is Peter Eigen, the most prominent among the founders of Transparency International (TI). A former World Bank expert in Africa, Eigen has tirelessly worked to build up TI as the leading non-governmental anticorruption player. Mr. Eigen is in no way a grass roots activist, but by traveling around the world to spread his message of anticorruption, he has encouraged local activists to expose government or police abuse while helping to build the global anticorruption community.

The villains in this anticorruption narrative are the corrupt officials or venal government leaders, especially in the developing world, who not only take the occasional bribe but who systematically plunder their treasuries. These grand villains are assisted by the lackadaisical officials who refuse to enact or enforce anticorruption legislation. In consort with them are the bureaucrats and the foreign donor agencies who are not forceful enough in their demands for honesty, or not effective enough in monitoring their donated funds. As Transparency International activists are fond of pointing out, discussion of corruption used to be taboo in development discourse (Galtung 2000; see also the TI website). Donor accusations that third world regimes were pilfering aid were considered interference in these countries' internal affairs, even racism.

Finally, the anticorruption drama has its hapless victims: the ordinary citizens confronting unresponsive bureaucrats, the legal clients who must bribe a lawyer or judge, the hospital patients who must pay off a nurse, the students who must bribe their teachers, the women and children who are unprotected by corrupt police, etc. In the eyes of the anticorruption community, corruption is a 'violation of human rights', corruption is 'the opposite of democracy', 'corruption is a tax on the poor', etc.

One might on first sight see the anticorruption discourse as similar to the other global discourses on human rights, women's rights, democracy, environmental protection, cultural self-determination, etc. Yet in all these latter projects, there are legal, political and philosophical issues in which there are clearly demarcated interests: Women's rights advocates, for example, must struggle against 'cultural traditions' by which women are subjected to family or male dominance. The universal aspects of human rights have had to struggle with doctrines of non-interference in a nation's internal affairs or cultural understandings of the individual and the collective. Environmental protection policies must continually deal with legitimate interests of fostering economic growth to the detriment of natural resources. Corruption and anticorruption have no such 'balance'. There is no 'corruption lobby' against which anticorruption advocates mobilize. There are no openly identified vested interests which can be fought. There are no "procorruption forces". While there is considerable research being carried out on the causes and consequences of corruption (see Andvig and Fjeldstad 2001), there is little reflection on how one might research anticorruption.

A anticorruption *research* agenda differs from descriptions of anticorruption strategies or measures. Anticorruption research might include the following questions: what groups/institutions occupy themselves with the 'struggle against corruption'? To what extent is corruption viewed as a legal, economic, moral and/or political issue? Which definitions are dominant in the public and policy discourse? To what extent is anticorruption implemented as effective actions, i.e., doing right, versus simply façade measures, i.e., feeling good about doing right? Which groups in society mobilize against corruption, both informally and as interest organizations? Which political formations use anticorruption as part of their platforms and how do they do this? Who accuses whom of corruption? What is the effect of such accusations on the parties involved and on society as a whole? When is it taboo to talk about corruption and when is it nearly a duty? And to what extent is anticorruptionism a genuine crusade, versus an instrument by which actors compete for organizational resources, international donor grants, etc.? In short, what does all this anticorruption activity 'mean'?

The world of anticorruption is not self-contained. It is a world where players struggle to influence others. These others are the large international donor institutions such as the World Bank or UNDP, the international business community, acting under such rubrics as the Global Compact, and the local politicians who are pressured to enact stricter laws and regulations on the private sector and on civil servants. The goal of anticorruption activity is to get these various institutions 'on board', so that the corrupt politicians or unaccountable companies can

be isolated or shamed into better governance. In the terms used by global civil society, which are also the terms used by the anticorruption movement, placing pressure on powerful institutions involves ‘coalition building’. One of the most successful of these coalition builders is Transparency International (TI). The success of TI has been its ability to mobilize these players into a common mission, despite the obvious differences of interests between them. They have done this by both challenging and accommodating themselves to the other players.

Three Anti-corruption sites

In the remainder of this paper I outline three sites on which the anticorruption world unfolds. First, the international anticorruption meetings, in which activists, donors and officials exchange ideas and decide priorities. Second, the global NGO Transparency International which, with headquarters in Berlin and nearly 100 branches, attempts to set the agenda for anticorruption activism. Third, an example from Romania will serve to illustrate the complexities of the anticorruption world so that we can see how global virtue and anticorruption interact.

Site 1. ‘Together against corruption’: The International Anticorruption Conference

Every two years, two major anticorruption events are held. One is the Global Forum on Anticorruption, a meeting of governmental representatives, delegations and experts which discuss anticorruption policy. The Global Forum is a closed gathering only for government delegates and other invitees. The second event is the International Anticorruption Conference, which is open to all those interested in fighting cooperation, including grass roots organizations.

The Tenth International Anticorruption Congress was held in October 2001 in Prague, some 5 months after the Global Forum (see Transparency International 2002). The IACC was billed as a grass-roots conference, with TI playing the secretariat role. Among the IACC’s 1300 paying participants were representatives from 133 countries, and more importantly, from all the major international players, including ‘the Bank’, the UNDP, major development aid organizations, Interpol, local government officials and a diverse group of Northern and Southern NGOs. The theme of the conference was “Together Against Corruption: Designing Strategies, Assessing Impact, Reforming Corrupt Institutions.

The conference was a major event, with Vaclav Havel giving the opening address in the Prague Castle, with invitations, security checks and black tied waiters. At the International Conference Center were exhibition stands of major international institutions and publishers in the world of development economics and statistics. Celebrity speeches were given by the Mexican prime minister Vincente Fox, the financier George Soros, the French prosecutor Eva Jolie (who received an award) and innumerable government ministers and officials, even from the People’s Republic of China. Underlining the importance of this event were the access conditions: the participation fee for the three days was no less than 890 US dollars. Being used to academic conference fees, I uttered my dissatisfaction to one of my fellow participants, an Interpol delegate. Nonchalantly, he remarked: ‘this is nothing, at police conferences you pay 500 dollars per day’. So much for the grassroots element.

Our conference packets, along with a program of 200 presentations, contained a ticket to the ‘Art Against Corruption’ exhibition in Prague and a plastic whistle to symbolize one of the conference themes: protection of ‘whistleblowers’ who expose corruption. At the panels, government officials, aid experts, lawyers and activists presented papers on topics as diverse as corruption in aid programs, corruption in health, corruption in education, corruption among NGOs, anticorruption legislation, parliamentary oversight, the role of the media, and ethics in the private sector. With the Enron/Arthur Andersen scandal just breaking, private sector oversight was a major topic of discussion. There were a variety of area presentations focusing

on corruption and anticorruption in post-communist Europe, Latin America, Asia and Africa. There were a few presentations on corruption research in which World Bank experts operationalised the concept of 'state capture', and in which TI staff members gave details about the Corruption Perception Index.

Among the activist-oriented panels in the conference, a major theme was 'coalition building', here understood as the pragmatic cooperation with the powers that be. Coalition building is conceived as the opposite of confrontation. Corruption may be related to market reforms, but anticorruption activity should not be linked to anti-globalization demonstrations. Anticorruption NGOs had to become more professional. Hence, the Conference statement explains:

Ours is a powerful coalition which has grown increasingly in size and strength over the course of past Conferences. We are committed to building global standards of transparency and accountability not only for governments but also for the private sector, civil society and international institutions alike. We do this in the belief that we are contributing to improving the welfare of people throughout the world, particularly the poor, and see these standards as fundamental to achieving acceptable levels of social justice buttressed by the Rule of Law. We must encourage others to embrace transparency and accountability, but we ourselves must ensure that our own practices also meet these standards (www.10iacc.org and Transparency International 2002a).

The tendency toward professionalism over activism was evidenced at one session, when one of the panelists, from an ecological policy group, mentioned how successful they had been in their periodic meetings with 'Jim' at 'the Bank' and how Jim had given assurances that anticorruption was placed at the top of the bank's agenda. For the uninitiated, Jim is James Wolfensohn, the affable chairman of the World Bank. One can speculate how far from grass roots such organizations have come when they are on a first name basis with one of the major personages representing the icon of global capitalism.

One of my most striking impressions of the conference was its moral atmosphere. Most of the participants were in Prague not only because they wanted to acquire knowledge about anticorruption strategies or learn about projects but because they were genuinely committed to wiping out corruption. The latter was especially true of certain North American delegates (American and Canadian) who had anticorruption activity as an avocation. The moral aspects were present in some of the surprising mixture of panels which brought together such diverse actors as the 'ethics officer' of the mining company Rio Tinto, a vice-president from Royal Dutch Shell, an activist from the NGO Global Witness who has successfully fought to enforce a ban on 'conflict diamonds', the financier George Soros, and Mexican President Vicente Fox. All are against corruption not only because it hurts people or is bad for business, but because it is 'bad', period.

The Prague Anticorruption Conference was a tremendous public relations success for Transparency International. TI chairman Peter Eigen was cordially thanked and enthusiastically applauded by all the delegates during each plenary session. Like other plenary speakers, Eigen was emphatic in saying that coalition building was essential, that fighting corruption is not just a government activity but demands cooperation from international institutions to fight corruption's global nature; it demands the support of the international business community; anticorruption requires that development assistance agencies and development NGOs maintain standards in order to keep third world leaders honest; and finally, support for civil society is also necessary. Anticorruption has thus become everyone's responsibility.

The conference was not without tensions, centered largely on the discussion of 'conditionality' in aid to third world countries and how to enforce this. Anticorruption was viewed by some third world delegates as a political tactic to keep third world recipient countries in line, as the

latest incarnation of the Bank's structural adjustment program. As in so many gatherings where development is discussed, much of the discussion centered on what 'the donors' should do, that corruption started with them, and that the local third world politician who pocketed a contract was but a symptom of a larger problem.

The Tenth International Anticorruption Conference was followed 19 months later by the Eleventh Congress, a four-day gathering held in Seoul. South Korea had been undergoing a major corruption cleanup over the past years, and the conference was clearly meant to reveal the new face of the country, including its anticorruption initiatives. The conference was marketed as a grass roots gathering, but it was not without its exorbitant participation fee of 800 dollars. As a result of prohibitive travel costs, and due to restrictions connected with SARS, many delegates from East Asia and third world countries did not attend. There were about 1000 delegates, 200 of them from Korea itself, and a disproportionately large number of Anglo-Americans and West Europeans (though no French).

Nevertheless, the Seoul gathering was a milestone because it was directly followed by the more established Global Forum in which only government delegates and experts could attend. Just prior to this gathering was Transparency International's General Assembly, attended by about 120 delegates. The vast majority of the nongovernmental participants were somehow connected to TI.

As in Prague, participants in Seoul were treated to an elaborate opening ceremony in a grand conference center under government patronage and a cultural evening sponsored by the Ministry of Justice and the City of Seoul. The theme of the Eleventh Congress was 'Different Cultures, Common Values' and the focus was again on themes such as private sector governance, public sector management, the role of civil society, international corruption, measuring corruption, and building ethics. To symbolize the ethical aspect, the opening address was given by theologian Hans Kung, one of the foremost leaders in the global ethics movement. The South Korean prime minister, a former activist in Transparency International, also spoke. As in Prague, the core of the anticorruption activists are British, American, Canadian and European. On the heels of the Enron scandal, the conference contained renewed emphasis on controlling corporate corruption. Whereas corruption used to be about corrupt public servants, it was now a question of controlling any kind of abuse of 'entrusted authority', including that of a corporate board room.

Like Prague, the conference was an organizational triumph for Transparency International and for its director Peter Eigen, who was celebrated at every turn. TI had a large booth at the conference to exhibit its CORIS, its anticorruption portal and data base. TI's presence was embodied in the many staff members from the Berlin and London offices, and additional heads of national affiliates who had received some travel funds via TI. Peter Eigen was present at all the major ceremonies on the podium.

International conferences function as channels of information, forums for network building and sites of rites of solidarity. Some of these anticorruption conferences, such as the Global Forum and the Anticorruption Summit (held in 2000 in Arlington) are closed affairs. Others, such as the IACCs are issue centered and open to all, thus bringing together a varied group of specialists, bureaucrats and activists. Unlike traditional academic conferences, there is no specific experience among the participants that marks them as members. They have paid (or their governments have paid) a fee and they attend. The conferences are not the high points of an organization, but the venue for a 'movement'. In this case, donors, activists and officials are brought together. At the helm of the 'movement', however, remains Transparency International.

Site 2. Global Civil Society: Transparency International

Transparency International is a Berlin-based NGO with 85 independent national affiliates. TI's Berlin office has 40 staff members, and administers 6 million euros of project funds raised largely from European governments and development agencies and from private foundations. TI provides information, training, support and strategy for its affiliates while it attends international anticorruption forums. TI was founded in 1993 by a small group led by former World Bank official Peter Eigen. Eigen had been disturbed by the widespread bureaucratic corruption in Kenya development projects and the failure of the development agencies to remedy the situation (for more on TI's early history see Galtung 2000 and TI's own site). The core founders of TI were a small group of disgruntled lawyers, diplomats and development experts who were critical of shady international business transactions and corrupt development projects. Today, TI has now achieved a near monopoly position among nongovernmental groups in the global struggle against corruption. From its core of founders and its original chapters (in Kenya, Bangladesh, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Ecuador), TI has become a global organization, with national affiliates on every continent, and a key player within the NGO sector in the field of anticorruption and public sector accountability. TI is often the only representative of civil society to participate in governmental or inter-governmental forums on cooperation. It is the primary reference point for corruption research and training for the World Bank and other development agencies.

Over the years, and under the influence of its board, which contains lawyers, former diplomats, journalists and aid officials, TI has launched a variety of initiatives to promote anticorruption campaigns, has supported its branch offices in their own projects by distributing literature and providing translations, and has participated with various development agencies in formulating anticorruption policies.

Major projects promoted by TI include: the Source Book on Corruption, a description of corrupt practices and measures to fight them (Pope 2000, see also <http://www.transparency.org/sourcebook/index.html>); the *Global Corruption Report*, an annual report on corrupt practices and sectors around the world (Transparency International 2001, 2003, 2004 and <http://www.transparency.org/toolkits/index.html>); the Corruption Fighters' Tool Kit, a catalogue of methods used by NGOs to fight corruption in various countries (<http://www.transparency.org/toolkits/index.html>); an anticorruption data base containing articles and a daily news bulletin about corruption around the world, regional reports and strategy papers; and the development and promotion of a National Integrity System for fighting corruption.

The National Integrity System, developed chiefly by Jeremy Pope in the London Office, approaches corruption as a systemic problem of inadequate laws, inefficient institutions, lack of monitoring and control, and shortcomings in public attitudes (see for example Pope 1997 and 1999 and Langseth, Stapenhurst and Pope 1999). As such, building an integrity strategy means attacking on all these fronts: new laws, accountable institutions, civil servant training, building 'islands of integrity' within government, establishing 'integrity pacts' between government ministries to ensure proper conduct in procurement and administration, developing codes of conduct for the private sector, and conducting campaigns to build a public culture of honesty (on integrity pacts see www.transparency.org). Civil society, rule of law and a free press are prerequisites for the success of such a strategy, the result of which is the signing of Integrity Pacts with certain ministries or government organs to act honestly. With TI providing expertise, governments are encouraged to develop anticorruption strategies and action plans and to involve all relevant actors in the struggle against corruption.

While TI's mandate is to help fight corruption, its most successful PR tool, its 'brand', is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI). Appearing each fall, the CPI ranks countries according to their level of corruption using a variety of indices and public opinion surveys. Generally, the Scandinavian countries, northwest Europe, New Zealand, Australia and Singapore are ranked

as the least corrupt, followed by certain Far Eastern Countries and Central Europe and then a mix of richer or poorer countries in Latin America, Asia, Central Asia, Africa. At the bottom of the list are West Africa, Central Asia, Nigeria, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Since corruption as such is difficult to measure, and since the CPI is a *perception* index, the CPI data base endeavors to provide detailed explanations for the way in which corruption perception actually reflects corruption; this is done by using the comparison between countries and comparing rankings from year to year. In this way one can conclude that the corruption situation is improving or declining in certain countries or regions. Release of the CPI is a major news event in most countries, and politicians in lower ranking countries may cite the CPI as proof that the current political party should be replaced. The success of the CPI has now spawned new indices, such as the Bribe Payers Index or BPI.

TI has up to 100 national affiliates (full, probationary, focal points). The local units, in order to avoid becoming embroiled in local politics, are not supposed to engage themselves in local corruption cases but are rather supposed to influence policy making. In this way they differ from the more activist Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch groups, which are often high profile and confrontation in their strategy. Moreover, local TI affiliates are not permitted to engage in consulting activities or bid for contracts. They can cooperate with other organizations in developing programs, but unlike other professional NGOs, they do not bid on contracts or offer services for fees. This latter policy is a problem for many local branches who exist under uncertain financial conditions

TI's staff in Berlin provide their branch affiliates with materials and capacity building. They organize the biannual Anticorruption Conference and also take on various consulting tasks for governments or foundations (though TI resolutely refused to bid on consulting contracts). In TI's own understanding, the national chapters (NCs) 'are the owners of the organizations; the Secretariat its 'servant' (www.transparency.org/about_ti/history.html). The NCs tackle bribery, graft and other abuses of power, with each Chapter adapting to the specific conditions of their country of location. 'What had begun as an organization has quickly flowered into a powerful global movement'

The success of TI lies in its so-called 'coalition strategy'. Here TI has straddled the line between interest organization and global movement. Few NGOs can boast having trained the World Bank at all-day conferences, but TI has. The challenge for TI is thus matching the global project of its elite founders with the concrete needs of the local organizations. Moreover, TI's fund raising has not always met the more acute needs of its affiliates, with funding having declined in 2003 for various reasons.

With limited funds, there is the dilemma of the local organizations scrambling for support and a relatively expensive central office unable to support the national affiliates, but which at the same time does not permit them to pursue lucrative consulting contracts.

TI has now had its growing pains and has also developed its own strategic planning culture, complete with weekend retreats and scenario planning. At the annual meeting, held in Seoul just prior to the International Anticorruption Conference, the 120 TI members in attendance were divided into groups to conduct scenario planning. The issue was whether TI should develop as a consulting group, as an activist organization, or as a network of interest groups.

A second conflict, which occurred at the annual meeting, had to do with the role of the original active members, versus the emerging national chapters. After a major controversy, the statutes have now been revised, and it is the affiliates who have control.

A third major change has been the split between TI's Berlin office, under the tutelage of Peter Eigen, and Jeremy Pope, who headed TI's Center for Research and Innovation in London. Pope, a TI co-founder, had developed one of TI's major project tools, the National Integrity System.

Following the split, the London office remained, but Pope and his colleague Frederik Galtung left to form TIRI, an independent NGO whose mission is 'to help counter corruption by assisting in the building and remodelling of institutions and practices' (www.tiri.org). TIRI argues that corruption fighting must now go beyond lobbying for conventions and protocols. Now is the time for action, programs, and tools. Galtung, who had been with TI since its founding and who started TI's research unit, has thus issued a critique of the Corruption Perceptions Index (<http://www.tiri.org/documents/CPI-questions.pdf>).

TI is an international NGO with excellent relations with all major international donors and organizations. Even the World Bank, whom Eigen had quit in disgust for their refusal to engage corruption, became a patron, employing Eigen and Pope as consultants to develop an anticorruption strategy. Today TI focuses on ensuring that anticorruption provisions are part of every international aid document or protocol on organized crime. TI's mark is visible on several anticorruption documents, and no major governmental or intergovernmental initiatives take place without in some way involving TI. This is truly a unique achievement. At present, a major initiative of TI is developing codes of conduct for international business and for the private sector in Western countries. Having focused on corruption in international aid and the third world, TI had tended to overlook the corruption going on its very back yard (of which recent corruption scandals in German, French and Belgian political life have figured prominently). Following the Enron scandal, TI has now tried to broaden its working definition of corruption from 'abuse by public officials for private gain' to 'the abuse of *entrusted power* for private gain'. This expanded definition makes it more necessary to form the broad based coalitions of government, civil society and private sector which TI has pursued. The definition of corruption has now expanded in local affiliates as well. The TI chapter in Denmark, for instance, has recently removed the definition of corruption from its statutes, concluding that it constituted an impediment to its work. Corruption is now whatever TI defines it to be.

TI's various activities are carried out using funds donated by others. In this sense, TI is a sophisticated project unit. Project culture takes its point of departure in international priorities and major donors. TI itself is a link between the priorities of donors and the local organizations. In this sense, anticorruption is but the latest manifestation of project life, and TI-Berlin is a clearing house for that traffic in resources which is project life.

TI's strategy is implemented through large-scale and short-term projects. Like other projects, anticorruption entails the transfer of resources – money and ideas -- to other countries that need them. When issues become attached to activities and money, we have projectization, and projectization is a common activity in all kinds of international democracy promotion. In the Balkans, corrupt societies recovering from communism and/or civil war, there are massive inputs of Western/EU assistance. Here as in other development situations, project society takes on a special significance. Anticorruptionism is but the latest influence in this process by which project society embeds itself. What, then, is this project society?

Project society entails a special kind of activity: short term activities with a budget and a time schedule. Projects always end, ostensibly to be replaced by policy, but normally to be replaced by yet another project. Project society entails a special kind of structure, beginning with the donor, the project identification mission, the appraisal, the selection of an implementing partner, the disbursement of funds, the monitoring, the evaluation, and of course, the next project. Project society is about the allocation of resources in an organized, at times bureaucratic, fashion. There is no project without a project application, a waiting period, a preliminary assessment, and the monitoring and accounting procedures that follow. The practices of project society demand a special kind of language, functioning almost like the wooden language of Stalinism. Passing on knowledge is called 'training'. Passing on knowledge to selected cadres is called 'training of trainers' or TOT. Getting better at something is called 'capacity building'. Being able to say what you want to do is a 'mission statement'. When we

understand what's going on we speak of 'transparency'. Trying to find out what's going on is called 'networking'. Figuring out who will benefit is 'stakeholder analysis'. Finding the money is called 'fund raising'. Making sure you don't waste it is called 'donor coordination'. Surviving after the money runs out is called 'sustainability'. People with money who don't see results are suffering from 'donor fatigue'. Taking your money somewhere else is an 'exit strategy'. Failure to find a recipient is called 'absorption problems'. And when there are too many donors and not enough recipients, you have 'donor constipation'. Participation in this world of projects requires understanding what are the latest key words and concepts which can magically generate money: this year its 'empowerment', then 'good governance', now 'income generation', but don't forget 'trafficking' and now, 'anticorruption'. Behind this is the ubiquitous 'partnership', in which cooperation can be commenced, or just as quickly stopped if partners do not fulfill their obligations. In anticorruption projects, the goal is to mobilize civil society for 'awareness raising' or strengthening the organizational effectiveness via 'capacity building'. Capacity building can involve humans, organizations or institutions. In capacity building for anticorruption, the ultimate goal is to create NGOs which are not only service providers but can also carry out 'advocacy', i.e., influence decision-makers. In trying to help people in the Balkans get rid of corruption, it has now created a new funding category 'Anticorruption'. The triumph of global virtue is the existence of an anticorruption budget line in virtually every major aid project. This budget is so recent that in Kosovo during 2003, one NGO anticorruption project did not even receive enough project applications to fill it, while in other areas there was bitter competition.

Project society, here in its anticorruption variant, is about traffic in scarce resources: traffic in money, knowledge, people, and ideas. Project life is about what people do with these resources. It is a world with a premium on the most abstract of knowledge. Hence, those who manipulate symbols and concepts can occupy strategic positions in the chain of resource allocations; they become as important as those donors and programs which actually help people with concrete problems. Project managers are entrepreneurs in launching and using concepts, including concepts such as 'governance', 'transparency', and 'accountability'. The role of TI Berlin in this network is thus crucial. They can both discover, mediate and transform concepts.

It is this world of projects which 'the anticorruption community' is bringing to the Balkans, and it is the ideas and practices of this world which permeate down to a specific group of Balkan project managers and staff, their 'local partners' or 'counterpart organizations'. This is the process by which a global 'anticorruption community' is created.

As anticorruption penetrates the Balkans, there will also be resource opportunism. There will be a lot of anticorruption projects. The question remains, however, whether these projects will actually reduce the amount of corruption.

Projects are part of the activity of global movements. But they are also a means by which NGOs can show that they are professional, and earn the respect, and resources, of major donors. TI has certainly succeeded here. Its experts and lobbyists seeking influence the major development organizations, governments and private sector actors. At the same time they cooperate with them in coalition building. At any TI gathering, there will be the customary mantras warning of the danger of neoliberalism and unrestricted corporate power, but representatives of these same corporations will be present to talk about business ethics and codes of conduct. This rather relationship with the global capitalist elite tends to be limited to the central office in Berlin and can bring benefits to these companies in the form of PR. Conversely, private corporations and development agencies see no benefits in dealing with tiny chapters of TI in the third world or Eastern Europe.

An example: Romania's anticorruption scene.

Southeast Europe has been known for endemic corruption long before the communist period. Under the Ottoman Empire, various corrupt practices flourished, and it was widely considered that holding public office was simply a means for Balkan officials to enrich themselves. Throughout Southeast Europe, the weak state apparatus allowed for the mobilization of family, political and ethnic ties in the informal sector (Sampson 1983, 1986). The communist period was plagued by widespread nepotism, bribery, and the accompanying political abuse. These practices continued, and even in some ways worsened, with the demise of the communist state, the subsequent privatization process and the input of Western aid and business investments. In Romania, privatization and democratization was delayed, the bureaucracy was moribund and many politicians were former officials of the communist regime. This has led to a continuing stream of petty and grand corruption scandals in which politicians became wealthy, ministries gave out contracts without tender, goods were smuggled through the airport, and factories were plundered at rock bottom prices. Petty corruption became grand corruption. Comparing various Balkan countries, the structure of these corrupt networks might differ due to ethnic, regional or political alliances; clan groups might overshadow networks; and some officials might be more venal than others; but in general the processes and accompanying social pathologies were quite similar across the region. Corrupt practices and accusations of corruption are now part of the political scene in every Southeast European country. Here use Romania as an example of what such an anticorruption scene might look like.

Ordinary Romanians need only glance at newspapers to become livid about corruption. Their experiences of corruption involve the use of bribes to obtain services, or recalling instances of nepotism and favoritism. 'Everyone is corrupt' explains a retired lawyer, 'We are not in a normal world', says another. 'The system has no mechanism to promote good people' so that 'everyone is out for their own interests'. Corruption exists in Romania because of 'lack of political will'. By not prosecuting anyone it 'sends a signal'. It is these frustrations that are mobilized by various actors in the anticorruption landscape that is Romania.

Public voices against corruption can come through various channels, including NGOs, websites, print media, and various anticorruption events. Romania has an internet *anticoruptie* site in which individuals can submit complaints. Most of these concern abuse by police or local bureaucrats regarding land or property disputes. The *anticoruptie* portal even contains a list where one can cast a vote for the top 10 most corrupt Romanians. Typical of the messages on the list is the following, by a man from the town of Buzau speaking in the capacity of 'a free citizen, without political affiliation'. 'In Buzau county', he says, 'there exists a heavy and opaque administrative system, corrupt functionaries and much bureaucracy'. He describes how demonstrators came to the town hall holding placards and shouting slogans: 'We have a corrupt prefect', 'We have a corrupt mayor'. 'Down with corruption in Buzau', 'Down with Bureaucracy', 'We want reform not theft', 'Romania: the most corrupt country in Europe', 'Shame on the corrupt ones', 'We elected you and we voted for you, but you cheated us'. 'We want democracy not bureaucracy'. The author then details his arrest by Buzau police for disturbing public order, his harassment and warnings during interrogations, and formally makes a claim for 10 million lei (280 USD) compensatory damages. Such protests, appearing daily in all Romanian media, touch on all the main themes of the anticorruption scene in Southeastern Europe. Not only has corruption become more brazen in the new era, but the government is complicit. But for Romanians, waiting in line to 'enter Europe', corruption is also an international issue; the whole world is watching.

In Romania as well as elsewhere in Southeastern Europe, surveys of corruption show high levels of abuse within the state property fund, in the administration of Western aid, in tax assessment and in the customs service. For ordinary citizens, particularly the health system and

the court system are notorious for the solicitation of bribes and for sustaining people's perception that only by paying can one receive effective services. Doctors and nurses, police and judges, teachers and rectors, bureaucrats and customs officers all seem to be taking bribes. In politics and the media, and within ministries of foreign trade, corruption is said to be rampant. As a result, Romanians seem to expect that these payments take place, than that any advantageous treatment must be due to a payment or favour rather than to respect for abstract principles. Data from World Bank and Transparency International surveys place Romania at among the most corruption countries in Europe.

Given the prevalence and high perception of corruption, it is not surprising to see many actors operating on the Romanian anticorruption stage, including the media, the government, the opposition parties, international actors, local anticorruption agencies and that all-embracing category now called 'civil society'. With their various resources, the media or some NGOs may struggle to uncover corruption; anti-corruption agencies or NGOs may try to raise public awareness; while certain politicians may even criticize those who expose corruption as politically motivated or uninformed. On the anti-corruption stage, the various actors try to point out the guilty, propose measures to fight corruption, and pronounce on the effectiveness of these measures as well.

The world of Romanian anticorruption thus contains various groups of actors: aside from the political institutions are the disgruntled citizens who come together into groups, networks and coalitions; and the media which focuses on uncovering scandal, personifying the guilty, and drawing conclusions as to Romanians fate in Europe. In Romania as elsewhere, corruption and anticorruption are intimately tied with accusations of corruption, and even more importantly, counter accusations. There are governmental and 'independent' agencies actors assigned to fight corruption. There are political competitors who use corruption accusations as a platform. There are foreign donors and financial institutions who decide to prioritize corruption or transparency, who castigate the Romanian government for not doing enough, and who dispense funds among NGOs to combat corruption; this struggle for funds which is not without its own intrigues. As 'extras' on this stage, ordinary Romanians are using the discourse of corruption as a lament about their own experience and their inability to deal with it. Corruption is thus a particular form of talk (Ries 1998, Zerilli this volume), an all-embracing trope, like Transition, Mafia, Globalization. Corruption, or accusations of corruption, have become a narrative about social decay and citizens lack of confidence in their public institutions and political leaders. In this sense, corruption resembles witchcraft; it explains forces over which we have no control and can become a vehicle for social conflict through accusations or rooting out evil. Like witchcraft, corruption is latent within each institution and individual.

In this scene of corruption, the various actors in the anticorruption landscape each have their sets of resources. The resources of these actors include money, rhetoric, public knowledge, secret knowledge and political parties and parliamentarians. Access to international discourses, donors, networks and conferences is part of this scene, such that there is a traffic in these resources across borders. The anticorruption scene involves various theories of what corruption is, how and why it is sustained, and how it should be combated. Not to be forgotten are the various anticorruption rituals, sponsored by both government and society. These would include the various press conferences, the statistical presentations of hardworking campaigns, the public events such as the opening of anticorruption units, the demonstrations against them, the individual appeals of frustrated citizens, the televised debates, etc. Corruption arrests are not just law enforcement. They are 'signals' to be sent by the authorities that certain kinds of behavior will not be tolerated. Through the sensation-hungry media, the signals are sent to the political opposition, to the public, and to the international actors who can decide on

aid priorities and even credit ratings. The Romanian world of anticorruption is thus a complex intersection of moral intrigues, citizen desires for justice, and political jockeying for power. It is a world - both transparent and opaque - of citizen laments, high profile actions and of government declarations. .

Conclusions: the anthropology of anticorruption

Lessons from the anticorruption scene in Romania could certainly be extended to other Balkan countries. Some of the actors would change, some laments would have a different style, some interaction between actors would differ and the leitmotifs of declining trust, that 'everyone is doing it', that 'outsiders are watching us', etc. might differ. Nevertheless, there is an uncanny resemblance between anticorruption scenes across Southeastern Europe, especially in the way in which anticorruption enters through outside project and interacts with local laments and political intrigues. I would therefore postulate that it is through corruption and anticorruption where we might find certain similarities in understanding how the people of Southeast Europe relate to their formal institutions, on the one hand trying to get around them, on the other insisting that these institutions function properly so as to control unchecked personal aggrandizement by those in power.

The local experiences of corruption and anticorruption, however, are intimately tied to the various international actors and their desire for a more effective global economy, for the enforcement of legal sanctions across borders, and to the general climate of pursuing global justice and integrity in human affairs. Hence, the anticorruption conferences, the lobbying activities of organizations like Transparency International, and the various international anticorruption treaties all have an influence on how a local anticorruption scene unfolds.

In this sense, let me conclude this description by raising not 'lessons learned' but 'questions raised'.

First, *what does it mean to say that anticorruption is a 'world'*? It is only to say that we must understand anticorruption in terms of local human experience together with external inputs and practices. Global civil society and global morality are not just 'outside forces' or 'flows of meaning' somehow penetrating stable societies. The global is also a set of concrete practices. Global anticorruption is embodied by its world congresses, donor meetings, coalition building activities press releases etc. . This world of anticorruption includes, as we saw in Romania, a variety of domestic and external actors, each with their own sets of social networks and institutional resources.

Second, *anticorruption is not innocent*. Insofar as anticorruption is one tool for controlling resources and maintaining control over others, we should expect that even the most unscrupulous regimes and leaders will develop anticorruption agencies and strategies to please donors and obtain funds, just as they have developed façade environmental agencies, façade NGOs, and 'conveyor belt' organizations of women, youth and peace. One should assume that anticorruption agencies can themselves be corrupt, just as we find that those organs fighting what is called 'organized crime' can themselves be linked to organized crime. Anticorruption is not innocent.

Third, *how can we integrate moral projects with political strategies?* The rise of global ethics, accountability and practices of virtue, is in itself an interesting social process. It may even constitute a historical turning point, as with the rise of human rights as a force in foreign policy, used to save lives in some situations, and used cynically in others to pursue more dubious military projects. It is thus incumbent upon anticorruption research to examine anticorruption in a benign, critical and reflective manner. This means asking some very simple questions: Who are the players? What do they want? Why do they want it? Who wins and who loses in this game? To quote a much maligned specialist in political dynamics, V. I. Lenin: Kto?

Kovo?, "Who? To whom?". The instruments of anticorruption are not just morally charged concepts, but concrete resources of aid programs and political patronage. Should we conclude that the anticorruption actors are simply manipulating a concept? Of course! Are there any exceptions to this 'rule'? No. All concepts with any moral content are manipulated by their proponents and by their opponents. Yet this does not rule out morality and integrity as driving forces in human affairs.

Fourth, *How do we do research with morally valued projects?* It is a common problem for those doing research on politically correct issues (civil society, anti-racism, indigenous people's rights, anticorruption) to let down their critical guard. Those who research NGOs, for example, find themselves becoming involved with their organization, with whom they might have the same goals, and this may prevent them from seeing the full dynamics of the organization. Civil society may talk about grass roots and horizontal structures, but the dynamics from the inside may be something quite different. For those researching anticorruption activities, we must be clear about the conflicts between global elites and grass roots, between the moral imperatives of fighting against corruption and the grant-getting intrigues involved in procuring funds for projects. Such conflicts may be pushed under the rug by 'the anticorruption community.' Anticorruption, like other communities, has its taboos.

This last problem is particularly pertinent for Transparency International, which openly expresses its willingness for critique, but like any organization, also has its own internal conflicts and differences. These came out clearly during the most recent general assembly as a controversy over the role of the individual founding members versus that of the national chapters. It also emerged in the split between the main office in Berlin and the research unit in London, where the two leading staff eventually formed a competing NGO. The question, perhaps, is not why these conflicts took place, but rather, why they took so long to emerge.

Fifth, *Anticorruption research is a reflective project.* Anticorruption is a practice, i.e., people doing things in the world. But anticorruption is also anticorruptionism, an ideology grounded on an understanding of ethics, integrity, justice, morality, and accountability. As rhetoric, people will use anticorruption to pursue their own interests just as the most corrupt leaders have used the most morally correct phrases to pursue theirs: who has not been exposed to the chatter about 'decentralization', 'public access', 'local democracy', 'coordination', 'empowerment', 'human rights', and before that 'socialism'. Anticorruption, too, is not innocent. It can be manipulated to serve the interest of even the most unscrupulous actors. An anthropology of anticorruption needs to sketch out these interests, especially those which highlight a phenomenon which was once kept hidden. Our task as academics is to reveal the interests at stake, to show how people articulate their interest and how people pursue them. Discourse analysis, of whatever variety, is a handy tool, but it is clearly not enough. We not only need to understand what kind of signals are being sent, but how they are received. We need not only to understand corruption laments and anticorruption rhetoric, i.e., anticorruptionism, but anticorruption practices.

Finally, *Donors and projects.* The need to understand anticorruption is intimately tied to the need to better understand how donors operate. How do priorities become priorities, how are budget lines established, what do donors want, and what kinds of projectization processes take place (Sampson 2003a, 2003b). Being a donor is about giving gifts. Surely anthropologists can make a contribution here (Sampson 2002). Most important, we need a fuller understanding of this anticorruption community in its moral, political and economic aspects.

Social science has always operated from the axiom that things are not what they seem. This is particularly true for the world of anticorruption, where the ethical mission may blind us from understanding more concrete, everyday dynamics. An anthropology of virtue, of which anticorruption is but one example, requires us to understand that 'accountability' and 'civil society' may operate simultaneously as ethical ballasts and as tactical slogans. In the world of

anticorruption, one can pursue virtue and integrity while being ruthless and partisan. The world of anticorruption, for all its transparency thus remains opaque. It is a world which anthropologists can elucidate.

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