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Semantic Games for Algorithmic Players

Emmanuel J. Genot · Justine Jacot

This paper is dedicated to the memory of Horacio Arló-Costa.

the date of receipt and acceptance should be inserted later

Abstract We describe a class of semantic *extensive entailment game* (EEG) with algorithmic players, related to game-theoretic semantics (GTS), and generalized to classical first-order semantic entailment. Players have preferences for parsimonious spending of computational resources, and compute partial strategies, under qualitative uncertainty about future histories. We prove the existence of local preferences for moves, and strategic fixpoints, that allow to map EEG game-tree to the building rules and closure rules of Smullyan’s *semantic tableaux* (ST). We also exhibit a strategy profile that solves the fixpoint selection problem, and can be mapped to systematic constructions of semantic trees, yielding a completeness result by translation. We conclude on possible generalizations of our games.

1 Introduction

For some first-order language $\mathcal{L}$, $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ and $\phi \in \mathcal{L}$, Γ *semantically entails* ϕ (noted $\Gamma \models \phi$) iff all models of Γ are also models of ϕ , noted $Mod(\Gamma) \subseteq Mod(\phi)$. Proving that entailment holds can be modeled as a two-player *extensive entailment game* (hereafter EEG), where *Abelard* chooses a model for Γ , and *Eloise* must then show it to be a model of ϕ . If she has a winning strategy (w.s.) exactly when $\Gamma \models \phi$, winning conditions for *Eloise* coincide with semantic entailment.

Choice of a model can be substituted with selection of truth conditions for Γ and ϕ , and models are ‘read off’ from branches. A game where *Eloise* has a w.s. exactly when each of *Abelard*’s possible selection of truth conditions either satisfies ϕ or is inconsistent, captures equally entailment. If two structures $\mathfrak{M}_1$ and $\mathfrak{M}_2$ are *isomorphic* (noted $\mathfrak{M}_1 \cong \mathfrak{M}_2$), and if two interpretations of $\mathcal{L}$ $I_{\mathfrak{M}_1}$ and $I_{\mathfrak{M}_2}$ preserve isomorphism, then $\mathfrak{M}_1$ and $\mathfrak{M}_2$ satisfy the same formulas (Manzano, 1999, Th. 2.46); in particular they have the same *complete*

diagram (description through atoms of $\mathcal{L}$ and their negations). Hence, a semantic entailment game where each run concludes with each player being committed to a complete diagram, offers an in-game syntactic test for comparison of models.

More formally, an attempt to prove $\Gamma \models \phi$ can be modeled as an *extensive entailment game* between *Abelard* (**A**) and *Eloise* (**E**), where: **A** (**E**) can ask **E** (**A**) to commit to subformulas of ϕ (resp.: of some $\gamma \in \Gamma$); and **A**'s (**E**'s) commitments can (in the limit) yield a *complete diagrams* for some $\mathfrak{A} \in \text{Mod}(\Gamma)$ ($\mathfrak{E} \in \text{Mod}(\phi)$). **E** must show that $\mathfrak{A} \in \text{Mod}(\phi)$ —or, more generally, that there is a $\mathfrak{E} \in \text{Mod}(\phi)$ such that $\mathfrak{A} \cong \mathfrak{E}$. Therefore, a game where **E** has a w.s. exactly whenever she can match **A**'s possible selections of literal either satisfies ϕ , or is inconsistent, captures entailment from Γ to ϕ .

In this paper, we describe a class of semantic *extensive entailment game*, related to game-theoretic semantics that capture first-order classical first-order semantic entailment in the above sense. Players of these games are *algorithmic*: they compute only partial representations of the game, and partial strategies. In section 2, we first motivates our algorithmic approach (2.1), then define the game (2.2) and the strategic preferences of algorithmic players (2.3); from the latter two, local preferences for moves are obtained (2.4).

Section 3 details players' reasoning: we define strategic fixpoints that both players aim at (3.1); and their best responses when reaching them (3.2). From this, we obtain a translation scheme w.r.t. *signed semantic trees* (3.3) and exhibit a strategic profile that generates a closed game-trees iff **E** has a w.s., which entails their completeness for classical first-order entailment (3.4).

Section 4 discusses extensions to model abilities of semantically sophisticated players (4.1), connections with standard game-theoretic semantics (4.2), and learning-theoretic aspects of our games, and their extension to other consequence relations (4.3). We conclude on the relation between our model, game-theoretic models of communication, and the problem of understanding human linguistic and logical competence.

2 Semantic entailment games

2.1 Motivations

When logical consequence can be analyzed with games, logical reasoning can be accounted for as reasoning about games. In particular, one can employ the method of *epistemic game theory*, which studies how players solve games reasoning from assumptions about the game setting (in particular, other players' preferences). Classical EGT explains strategy selection as a 'top-down' process, from a *complete representation* of the game. Therefore, classical

EGT applies to entailment games only if players have a representation of all possible models Γ and ϕ —or all possible ways to obtain their diagrams.

Game-theoretic semantics (GTS) and *dialogical semantics* (DS), as exposed resp. by Hintikka and Sandu (1997) and Rahman and Keiff (2005), both study semantic games where attacks and defenses are based on semantic clauses. These games capture *material* truth (GTS) or *logical* truth (DS), through existence of w.s. in extensive games. Both proceed ‘bottom up,’ explaining players’ strategies as gradual analysis of truth conditions, and impose restrictions on players’ strategies, so that DS games yield game trees that correspond to *semantic trees* (ST) developed by Smullyan (1968) as do GTS games, when extended to entailment (see e.g. Harris, 1994).

In ST, branches generated by semantic clauses select truth conditions verifying Γ and falsifying ϕ . When a branch reaches a contradictory assignment, the branch is *closed* after finitely many steps. Systematic constructions yield trees with finitely many closed branches iff Γ entails ϕ . Both DS and (extended) GTS explain strategically selection of options that generate trees similar to those systematic constructions of ST through strategic considerations, without appeal to a complete representation of the game. However, in the absence of well-defined preferences, restrictions to recover closure rules, or obtain finite games whenever possible, etc. remain *ad hoc*.

A systematic correspondence between EEG and ST must be grounded in preferences of players and explain their ‘bottom-up’ reasoning. It has to map *symmetric* semantic clauses of EEG to *asymmetric* tree-building rules of ST, as well as closure rules of the latter, to strategic fixpoints in the former, by *in-game inferences*, in the fashion of EGT. Finally, it must exhibit a strategy profile (a pair of strategies) that solve the fixpoints selection problem.

2.2 Definition

Following Halpern and Rego (2006), partial anticipations can be modeled with (player-indexed) *awareness function* mapping positions to representations of the game. *Partial strategies* are *partial* functions from the set of positions the game may reach, recommending actions for positions they consider. Players will typically need several runs to assess entailment: outcomes of pairs of strategies will be *game trees* rather than single history. The definition of the EEG is as follows:

Definition 1. An EEG is a pair: $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi) = \langle U(\Gamma, \phi), (A_i) \rangle$ where $\Gamma \subseteq \mathcal{L}$ and $\phi \in \mathcal{L}$; and:




Fig. 1

• $U(\Gamma, \phi) = \langle N, H, P, (\succsim_i) \rangle$ is the *underlying* classical game, where: (a) $N = \{\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}\}$ is the set of players; (b) H is a set of *histories*, i.e. sequences of actions,¹ with $Z \subset H$ including *terminal histories*—with either $\mathbf{X}$ -stop as last position of h , or infinite; (c) $P : H \rightarrow N$ is a *player function* s.t. if $P(h) = \mathbf{X}$, then $\mathbf{X}$ moves after h ; (d) $(\succsim_i) = \{\succsim_{\mathbf{A}}, \succsim_{\mathbf{E}}\}$ are preferences over Z .

• $(A_i) = \{A_{\mathbf{A}}, A_{\mathbf{E}}\}$ are *awareness functions* s.t. $A_{\mathbf{X}} : H \mapsto 2^H$ and for all h, h' , if $h = (h'|m)$, $A_{\mathbf{X}}(h) \subseteq A_{\mathbf{X}}(h')$ (*perfect recall*). $\square$

We denote $M_{\mathbf{X}}(h)$ the actions available to $\mathbf{X}$ at h ($M_{\mathbf{X}}(h) = \emptyset$ whenever $P(h) = \mathbf{Y}$). For every h s.t. $P(h) = \mathbf{X}$, $M_{\mathbf{X}}(h)$ includes *analytic* and *nonanalytic* queries. By the first, based on semantic clauses (displayed Fig. 1), $\mathbf{X}$ can $\mathbf{Y}$ to commit to subformulas of $\mathbf{Y}$'s former statements. The second, denoted $\mathbf{X}?(\psi \vee \neg\psi)$, is equivalent to addressing a ‘yes-no’ question to $\mathbf{Y}$ (introducing its presupposition). Given classical meanings of connectives, $\mathbf{Y}$ must eventually answer—but may delay the answer indefinitely. Following Hintikka (1986), we call the set of yes-no questions $\mathbf{X}$ is ready to ask in a EEG the *range of attention* of $\mathbf{X}$.

Players can in principle play until complete diagrams are obtained. With $h, h' \in Z$ two such histories, and assuming a map sending h and h' to pairs $\langle \mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{E} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathfrak{A}', \mathfrak{E}' \rangle$, where $\mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{A}' \in (\Gamma)$ and $\mathfrak{E}, \mathfrak{E}' \in (\phi)$, $(\succsim_i)$ capture classical entailment if whenever h and h' are mapped (resp.) to $\langle \mathfrak{A}, \mathfrak{E} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathfrak{A}', \mathfrak{E}' \rangle$, then if $\mathfrak{A} \cong \mathfrak{E}$ and $\mathfrak{A}' \not\cong \mathfrak{E}'$ then $h >_{\mathbf{E}} h'$ and $h' >_{\mathbf{A}} h$. Partial representation and anticipations prevent elimination of strategies that lead to *inconsistent* diagrams. However, an inconsistent diagram resulting from $\mathbf{X}$'s choices can be mapped to a

¹ Technically, H is s.t. the empty sequence is in H ; if $h \in H$ is of length n , then for all $m \leq n$, $(h|m)$, the initial segment of length m of h , is in H too; and an infinite h^ω is in H if $(h|m) \in H$ for every finite m .

‘pseudo structure’ $\mathfrak{X}_\perp$, and the definition of $\succsim_{\mathbf{X}}$ extended as follows: for any two $\mathfrak{X}$ and $\mathfrak{Y}$, if h and h' are mapped (resp.) to $\langle \mathfrak{X}_\perp, \mathfrak{Y} \rangle$ and $\langle \mathfrak{X}', \mathfrak{Y}' \rangle$, $h \succ_{\mathbf{Y}} h'$ and $h' \succ_{\mathbf{X}} h$; and if h and h' are mapped (resp.) to $\langle \mathfrak{X}_\perp, \mathfrak{Y}_\perp \rangle$ and $\langle \mathfrak{X}'_\perp, \mathfrak{Y}'_\perp \rangle$, $h \sim_{\mathbf{Y}} h'$ and $h' \sim_{\mathbf{X}} h$. Finally, if $\mathbf{X}$ plays **X-stop**, $\mathbf{Y}$ loses by default: Formally, if the last position of h is **X-stop** then $h \succsim_{\mathbf{Y}} h'$ and $h' \succsim_{\mathbf{X}} h$ for any terminal history h' .

2.3 Strategic Preferences

Our aim being to model players whose use of computational resources (when e.g. computing strategies) is as limited as possible, we need some assumptions about their limitations. And since EEG are games, we need also assumptions as to what is common knowledge between players in them.

Assumption 1. *Between two (partial) strategies leading to the same expected result w.r.t. $\succsim_{\mathbf{A}}$ or $\succsim_{\mathbf{E}}$, both $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{E}$ will favor the one with fewer moves than the other.*

Assumption 2. *Both players understand that: (a) the outcome of each run of the game should be decided by a comparison of models w.r.t. their preferences; (b) in order to have a w.s., $\mathbf{A}$ needs to win only one run, while $\mathbf{E}$ has to win all possible runs.*

Assumption 3. *Both $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{E}$ give logical constants their classical first-order meaning.*

Assumption 4. *Player’s ranges of attention are not in general common knowledge.*

Ass. 1 makes moves akin to *steps in a program*, requiring resources to run on hardware. It should be read *ceteris paribus*, because redundancies may prevent ‘back-tracking’ and reduce the overall cost of storing and accessing a representation, and **Ass. 1** may therefore be locally violated. The assumption embodies a reasonable understanding of quantitative ‘resource-consciousness’ (spending as little as possible), while the *ceteris paribus* allows for qualitative modulation. As such, it is justified in the context of EEG.

Ass. 2 and **Ass. 3** guarantee the classical interpretation of the consequence relation in the game. Since $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{E}$ may be unable to carry a comparison in finite time, they will need to rely on estimates. Together, they define implicitly the ‘semantic competence’ required to play for classical entailment.

Ass. 4 stems from the fact that assuming classical meaning (and the excluded middle) nonanalytic queries are equivalent *Cut rule*, which can shorten proofs (see Boolos, 1984), whose ‘best’ use is uncomputable. Therefore, algorithmic players (who compute strategies) cannot anticipate each other’s questions in general.

Because of **Ass. 1**, players should expect each other to attempt to use shortcuts, but without possibility to anticipate them, the following ‘strategic principle’ will apply:

S.P. 1 (From Harsanyi (1977)). *If $\mathbf{X}$ cannot rationally expect $\mathbf{Y}$ to play any strategy other than the most harmful for $\mathbf{X}$, then $\mathbf{X}$ should play the strategy that is $\mathbf{X}$'s best response to $\mathbf{Y}$'s most harmful strategy.*

Ass. 2 and **3** suffice to **A** and **E** to understand each others' preferences and understand what the 'most harmful' strategy, and the best response to it, are. Assuming that it is common knowledge that players follow **S.P. 1**, is tantamount to assume them to be competent players. Given **Ass. 2–3** players can also be assumed to obey the following principle (where $(\neg)P\bar{a}$ is a *literal* $P\bar{a}$ or $\neg P\bar{a}$):²

S.P. 2. *$\mathbf{E}$ should not reply to any query with $\mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a}$, unless she can also use a query (or sequence thereof) to obtain $\mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a}$. Equivalently: $\mathbf{A}$ should compel $\mathbf{E}$ to reply $\mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ to some query, for some $(\neg)P\bar{a}$ s.t. she cannot obtain from $\mathbf{A}$.*

Diagram identity provides a syntactic of test for isomorphism, provided that players agree on how to apply nonlogical vocabulary to individuals (we will make this assumption in what follows). The best way for $\mathbf{E}$ to enforce **S.P. 2**, is to *never state a literal unless $\mathbf{A}$ has stated it first*; and conversely, the best way for $\mathbf{A}$ to comply with it, is to state new literals whenever possible. We will take it to be the strategic content of **S.P. 2** for $\mathbf{E}$ and $\mathbf{A}$, respectively.

Finally, provided that *the prospect of loosing is never infinite*, it follows from **Ass. 1** that:

S.P. 3. *If for some $h \in H$ s.t. $P(h) = \mathbf{X}$, (a) $\mathbf{X}$ can choose between two strategies s and s' s.t. s and s' resp. extend h finitely and indefinitely; and: (b) $\mathbf{X}$ cannot expect to be better off following s' rather than s ; then $\mathbf{X}$ should prefer s .*

S.P. 3 is justified if **A** and **E** are realized by agents who play multiple EEG (either in sequence, or in parallel), and prefer not to get stuck playing indefinitely in one game.

2.4 Preferences over moves

Ass. 2, together with **S.P. 2**, induce an asymmetry between players, **A**'s choices determine gradually a diagram, while **E** merely has to match **A**'s choices. This asymmetry defines a partial preference ordering for **A** and **E** at their turns, which yields the following (proof in Appendix A).

Observation 2. ***Ass. 1–4** and **S.P. 1–3** induce preferences for queries and replies as displayed **Fig. 2***

As a consequence of **Obs. 2**, the game *as played by algorithmic players* is *finite*, although the underlying game is not in general (when $\mathcal{L}$ has countably many names).

² P is a n -ary predicate, and $\bar{a}$ a sequence of n individual terms




Fig. 2

3 Epistemic Game Theory for eeg

3.1 Socratic positions and fixpoints

Let us define *Socratic positions*—after Socrates, who used only concessions from his opponents as arguments—abbreviated Σ .P. (to avoid the confusion with **S.P.**), as follows:

Definition 3. A *Socratic Position* in some $h \in H$ is a position m s.t.: (a) at $m' < m$, **A** has already targeted every **E**-labeled statement at least once; and: (b) at m , **E** has answered all of **A**'s queries complying with **S.P. 2**.

If Σ .P. are stable over extensions, **E** is guaranteed to always match **A**'s choices of literals, until a diagram is obtained. The following shows that they are:

Observation 4. For any history h of $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ s.t. $P(h) = \mathbf{A}$ and the last position m of h is a Σ .P., there is a recursive strategy for **E** such that, if **A** extends h , and **E** follows that strategy, if **E** is eventually committed to a full diagram in some extension h' of h , then it is identical to a full diagram **A** is also committed to in h' .

(Proof in appendix.) In any given run, **E** is aiming at reaching a Σ .P., since it allows her to assess with certainty that her strategy will be successful in that run. Once the first Σ .P. of the run has been reached, **Obs. 4** allows her to base her current estimate, and any future one, on the configuration at that position. Socratic positions are therefore *strategic fixpoints*.³

³ This can be explicated defining partial *estimate functions* $\text{Est}_{\mathbf{X}}$ indexed on players, sending each position m of some history h to a position $m' \in h'$, where either $h' = h$ or $h = h|m''$ for some m'' , such that $\text{Est}_{\mathbf{X}}(m)$ (when defined) is the closest position from $h|0$ where **X** can estimate who will win the current run. A Σ .P. m is therefore always mapped to itself by that type of function. More simply, but also more indirectly, is also a fixpoint for a learning function parasitic on the game discussed § 4.3.

E cannot alone force the game to reach such a $\Sigma.P.$ —**A** can in principle prevent the game to reach any. The next section shows that **A**'s best interest is also to aim for $\Sigma.P.$, albeit for different reasons as **E**'s.

3.2 Reasoning from fixpoints

By **Ass. 2b**, players understand that **A**'s loosing a run is no indication that **E** has a w.s. for the game. Halting a run that **A** would loose, as soon as possible, and move to another, is therefore a sound strategy for **A** that additionally complies with **Ass. 1**. The connection with $\Sigma.P.$ is as follows:

Observation 5. *If, for some history h of $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ such that $P(h) = \mathbf{A}$, the last position m of h is a $\Sigma.P.$; and if the prospect of loosing a run of $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ is not infinitely negative; then **A**'s best strategy is to extend h to $h' = (h, \mathbf{A-stop})$.*

(Proof in appendix.) **A** may be lead to state an inconsistent diagram—**E** will not, unless **A** has, because of **S.P. 2**. Moreover **E** can always avoid being asked a contradiction by restating some reply in h , unless ϕ has no models.⁴

Positions at which **A** do so are also fixpoints, as established by the following:

Observation 6. *If, for some history h of $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ such that $P(h) = \mathbf{A}$ and: (a) $P\bar{a}$ —or $\neg P\bar{a}$ —occurs in h ; and: (b) $\mathbf{E}(\psi, \neg P\bar{a})$ —resp. $\mathbf{E}(\psi, P\bar{a})$ —also occurs at the last position of h ; then **A**'s best option is to extend h in $h' = (h, \mathbf{A-stop})$.*

(Proof in appendix.) **Obs. 4** shows what **E**'s (local) strategy should be when a $\Sigma.P.$ is reached, and that planning it depends only on the past history. **Obs. 5** and **6** show how **A**'s (local) reasoning determines his strategy when $\Sigma.P.$ are encountered.

3.3 A Translation Scheme

Partial strategies of players of an EEG generate gradually a partial representation of $\mathcal{U}(\Gamma, \phi)$ —or, equivalently, a subset of H . **Obs. 2** shows a local topology that is reminiscent of *signed semantic trees* (ST) of Smullyan (1968), where the premises and conclusion are prefixed (resp.) with T (for true) and F (for false), and where the tree formalizes the attempt to

⁴ If in some h , **E** cannot adjust past choices to avoid being demanded a pair of inconsistent literals, then **A** can always force such a position in h . Since only **A**'s moves generate histories, **A** can also always force the game to h , and (eventually) any diagram for **E** to be inconsistent. Hence, there is no set of consistent literals compatible with ϕ , and ϕ has no model. Contraposing, if ϕ is consistent, **E** can adjust past her choices to avoid being demanded a contradiction.

obtain a proof by *reductio* that the premises entail the conclusion. **Fig. 1** translates in ST-*building rules* by **Obs. 2** if: (a) **A** and **E** are substituted with **T** and **F**, respectively; and (b) queries are omitted. Nonanalytic queries are equivalent to the *Cut* rule in tableau proof (see Boolos, 1984).

Given **Obs. 5** and **6**, **A-stop** is equivalent of *closure rules* of ST for the case where (resp.) both $T(\neg)P\bar{a}$ and $F(\neg)P\bar{a}$ occur in the same branch, or both $TP\bar{a}$ and $T\neg P\bar{a}$ do. Since **Ass. 2** requires **E** to win every play where *diagrams* are compared, one can allow **E** to play **E-stop** when asked a contradiction in some history h (indicating that she must backtrack her choices). Although h is ‘neutralized’ for the application of **Ass. 2**, this allows to complete the correspondence with ST: **E-stop** is then equivalent to the closure that applies when both $FP\bar{a}$ and $F\neg P\bar{a}$ occur in the same branch. Therefore, every game-tree for some EEG can be mapped to some ST (with the *Cut* rule, if nonanalytic moves are played).

Conversely, for every ST $\mathcal{T}$: (a) $\mathcal{T}$ can be extended to ST $\mathcal{T}'$ where rules are applied until literals are reached; and: (b) $\mathcal{T}_1$ can be a ‘pruned’ into $\mathcal{T}''$ where no building rule is applied after the first application of a closure rule, without effect for the assessment of whether $\Gamma \models \phi$; and: (c) omitting F-labeled nodes that would correspond to **E**-labeled moves not complying with **S.P. 2**, without effect for the assessment of whether $\Gamma \models \phi$ either (see (Rahman and Keiff, 2005, § 2.5); their result assumes a restriction equivalent **S.P. 2**, although not derived from players’ preferences). Hence, every ST $\mathcal{T}$ is (partially) realized by an EEG game-tree (with only analytic moves, if the ST is *Cut*-free).⁵

The above argument can be summed up in the following lemma:

Lemma 7. *Given **Ass. 1–4** and **S.P. 1–3**, there is a one-one correspondence between local strategies for selection moves in extensive entailment games, and building and closure rules of signed semantic trees.*

3.4 Existence of a solution

By **Lem. 7**, exhibiting a strategy profile that solves the Σ .P. selection problem whenever Γ entails ϕ is sufficient to prove that EEG capture first-order entailment, because it amounts to solving a building scheme for ST that closes whenever $\Gamma \models \phi$. A simple solution is to ‘rear-engineer’ such a profile from systematic constructions of ST used to prove their completeness for first order entailment, which is exactly characterized by the existence of a closed ST with

⁵ The realization is partial, because branches of an EEG are built sequentially, while ST are built in parallel: an ST with one open infinite branch can be realized by an EEG game-tree with only one (infinite) branch, if the infinite branch is the first to be explored by the players. However, a ST is realized by (the union of) a family of EEG.

premises Γ and conclusion ϕ . If this is possible, **Lem. 7** guarantees that the profile will match **A**'s and **E**'s local preferences for moves.

Reaching a Σ .P. whenever possible, and as quickly as possible, in each run, is in both players interest (see § 3.2). For **A**, it prevents long explorations of run he would eventually loose, and he can let **E** play (e.g. repetitions or nonanalytic moves) if none is reached. For **E**, it makes for faster exploration of histories, because **A**'s best response is to move to explore another branch.

Let $\mathcal{O}(s_a, s_e)$ denote the the game-tree explored when **A** and **E** implement (resp.) strategies s_a and s_e . A strategy profile can be obtained, through **Lem. 7**, from systematic ST, defining a pair of *systematic strategies*, which are partial, and can be expressed as sets of instructions for using queries and reply (Q/R), halting (H), and ‘switching’ histories (S) when playing a new run is necessary.⁶ A *systematic strategy* s_a^* for **A** in $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ is any (partial) strategy for **A**, s.t.:

- Q/R (a) s_a^* uses *analytic queries* against ϕ (and its subformulas), until queries for literals are exhausted (without repetition), and in case of ‘branching’ explores the leftmost history first; (b) s_a^* *replies without delay*, and in case of ‘branching’ explores the leftmost history first; (c) s_a^* uses *nonanalytic queries* to obtain a complete diagram only, and never introduces new individuals that way.
- H s_a^* selects **A-stop** as soon as: (a) a Σ .P. is reached; or (b) a query from **E** asks **A** for a statement that contradicts a previous (**A**-labeled) one;
- S after any terminal history h , s_a^* repeats (if possible) the same offensive sequence as in h until the *lowest* ‘branching’ with an unexplored branch in h is reached, and then explore it.

Guidelines (Q/R) aim at reaching a position of comparison as quickly as possible; (H) follows to the letter the ‘best response’ of **Obs. 5** and **Obs. 6**, and (S) is a ‘backtracking’ scheme to explore systematically alternative histories, if possible (i.e. depending on **E**'s moves). In short, s_a^* simply adds to **Ass. 1–4**, and **S.P. 1–3**, a scheme for systematic exploration of the games, that will be successful if **E** follows some systematic strategy as well.

A good systematic strategy for **E** lets **A** target ϕ to know which literal(s) are to be obtained, then works towards obtaining it (them) as quickly as possible. However, this may requires insights about the premises, or some estimate of possible lemmas (see § 4.1). The

⁶ When several moves are compatible with instructions of **X**'s strategy, **X** can be for all practical purposes thought to choose at random within admissible moves (i.e. to adopt a behavioral extension of the partial strategy).

following strategy s_e^* for **E** in $\mathcal{G}(I, \phi)$ presupposes no such insight, and is advisable for a clueless **E**. It includes some redundancies, that are discussed after the definition.

Q/R (a) s_e^* lets **A** target ϕ , until a literal is requested; (b) s_e^* replies to *analytic queries* as soon as possible, and makes adjustments later, *unless the reply is a literal*; (c) if **A** uses a *nonanalytic query*, s_e^* recommends a ‘copycat’ strategy;⁷ and: (d) once a literal is asked, it proceeds (recursively) as follows:

Initial Stage s_e^* orders the premises, and targets the first premise $\gamma_1 \in I$ in the ordering; this completes the first stage;

Stage n Assume that the stage $n - 1$ has been completed; either all the needed literals are obtained, or not; then:

1. if a Σ .P. has been reached, then s_e^* picks an arbitrary query, and repeats it until **A** plays **A-stop**;
2. if not, in the current history h , s_e^* targets the *highest* position m featuring some **A** ψ *not yet* targeted; then:
 - (a) if **A** ψ is *not* of the form **A** $\neg\exists x\psi(x)$, s_e^* plays **E** $\langle \mathbf{A}\psi, \Psi \rangle$, where Ψ is chosen (when nonempty) according to preferences in **Fig. 2**;
 - (b) if **A** $\psi = \mathbf{A}\neg\exists x\psi(x)$, then: (i) s_e^* picks the constant k_i occurring at the ‘highest’ earlier position in h (*including* as an argument in a query), s.t. **A** $\neg\psi(x/k_i)$ does not occur in h prior to m ; and s_e^* plays **E** $(\neg\exists x\psi(x), \psi(x/k_i))$; and: (ii) at **E**’s next move, s_e^* plays **E** $?(\mathbf{A}\neg\exists x\psi(x) \vee \neg\mathbf{A}\neg\exists x\psi(x))$.
3. At **E**’s next move, s_e^* plays **E** $?(\gamma_n \vee \neg\gamma_n)$, and never targets m again. This completes the n th stage.

H s_e^* selects **E-stop** iff a query from **A** asks **E** for a statement that contradicts a previous (**E**-labeled) one.

Redundancies in s_e^* result from the systematic inductive scheme of (Q/Rd), which may ask for literals **E** may not need (and multiple occurrences); and uses redundant nonanalytic queries to make ‘backtracking’ easier. Although these features mimic systematic ST, they can be optimal for some player types: the first, as a way to obtain *systematically* literals with constants introduced in h , with a simple search algorithm; and the second, as a way to reduce working memory load (when ‘scanning’ upward for possible moves).

The strategy profile $\mathcal{O}(s_a^*, s_e^*)$ is therefore well-motivated when: (i) **A** lacks insights to select countermodels to ϕ ; and: (ii) **E** lacks insights on how to obtain literals requested from her. Both are systematic, if unsophisticated, schemes to demand as many literals as possible,

⁷ Explicitly, if **A** uses **A** $? \psi \vee \neg\psi$ at m s_e^* plays **E** $? \psi \vee \neg\psi$ at $m + 1$, and waits for **A**’s reply, and copies it if it occurs, and leaves the query without answer if it does not.

that still avoid extension past fixpoints. Notice that **E** is led to contradict herself, this will always occur prior s_e^* takes the offensive. Hence, once s_e^* has taken the offensive, it will play until a Σ .P. is reached, or runs out of **A**-labeled moves to target. The outcome of $\mathcal{O}(s_a^*, s_e^*)$ is a ‘sequential’ version of the systematic ST called *completed tableaux* (see Smullyan, 1968, p. 63). It generates a *finite game* with *finite horizon* when $\Gamma \models \phi$, or when all ‘open’ branches are finite; or a *finite game* with one *infinite history* when the first infinite ‘open’ branch is reached. The proof is a technical exercise (left to the reader) which yields a completeness result by translation.⁸ A game-theoretic formulation of this completeness result is:

Observation 8. *For any EEG $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$, there is a strategy profile (s_a^*, s_e^*) , where s_a^* and s_e^* are (resp.) **A**’s and **E**’s strategies, s.t. s_e^* is a winning strategy for **E** iff $\Gamma \models \phi$.*

4 Discussion

4.1 Sophisticated players

Although both s_a^* and s_e^* give guidelines to use nonanalytic moves, none is played in $\mathcal{O}(s_a^*, s_e^*)$. Nonanalytic queries are equivalent to the *Cut* rule, and it is well-known since (Boolos, 1984) that cut-free proofs can be dramatically long. If **E** anticipates that some ψ follows from Γ , and that $\{\psi\}$ entails ϕ , she can introduce as her first move **E**? $(\psi \vee \neg\psi)$. If she is correct, and **A** replies with **A** ψ , she will be to win the (shorter) subgame $\mathcal{G}(\{\psi\}, \phi)$; and if he replies with **A** $\neg\psi$, she can force him to a contradiction, and to eventually explore histories where ψ holds.⁹ Without nonanalytic queries, i.e. without ‘cut’ or lemmas, there is

⁸ The proof in Smullyan (1968) shows that there exists at least one completed tableau, for any pair $\langle \Gamma, \phi \rangle$ (Theorem 5, p. 64; from this, one obtains that a systematic tableau $\mathcal{T}(\Gamma, \phi)$ closes iff Γ entails ϕ , from the proof that $\mathcal{T}(\emptyset, \phi)$ closes iff ϕ is valid (Theorem 3, p. 60). Translating the proof amounts to show that **E** will either manage, by systematically exploiting Γ , to obtain the literal(s) requested in one history, or lead **A** to contradict himself, or will keep on playing if she cannot. In the first case, **A** will move ‘up’ in the tree until he can move ‘down’ again, and **E** will let him do so in a way that sequentially mimic systematic completed ST.

⁹ Notice however that attempted to use nonanalytic queries to reply **A**’s demands for literals is in general dominated by the strategic option of using analytic means (or lemmas). If **A** answers with the literal demanded, he facilitates **E**’s compliance with **S.P. 2**; if he answers with its negation, he does not, and oblige her to use analytic means, only now to force him into a contradiction. By **S.P. 1**, she should act as if expecting the latter, and therefore, that the nonanalytic strategy will merely delay the completion of the history by one exchange. By **Ass. 1**, she should in general favor the analytic one. However, obtaining a contradiction through a literal can sometimes minimize the number of future runs (because **A** will be aware of the consequences of this move, and won’t consider it as an option), hence may still be used in a way analogous to lemmas.

no guaranty that the game will be completed in some reasonable time (where ‘reasonable’ is a free parameter) when finite, which makes $\mathcal{O}(s_a^*, s_e^*)$ a very inefficient strategy profile.

There is no mechanical procedure to find the ‘best’ lemma, unless entailment is already known to hold, hence the proof-theoretic importance of cut elimination. Lack of sophistication translates in lack of efficiency. Greater sophistication depends on procedures which address the problem of finding the ‘best’ lemmas, although they cannot solve it in general. Redundancies built in strategies in $\mathcal{O}(s_a^*, s_e^*)$ suit players so unsophisticated that they cannot assign any resource to some such procedures. Humans computers are more sophisticated, and use cues—looking a variable-sharing, surface logical form, etc.—to obtain shortcuts.

4.2 EEG and GTS

A ‘bottom-up’ variant of GTS games can be obtained as a special case of EEG for some formula ϕ of $\mathcal{L}$, when $\Gamma = \emptyset$. First, one add an initial move from *Nature*, who chooses a model $\mathfrak{M}$. One also assumes that ranges of attention at a position, for both players, include any $(P\bar{a} \vee \neg P\bar{a})$ s.t. $(\neg)P\bar{a}$ has occurred at an earlier position in h (in either a query or a defense). Informally, GTS is recovered in the special case when *every atomic nonanalytic query* is in player’s range of attention. The strategy profile that solves the game is as follows: **A** plays an analytic strategy until either a literal is demanded from **E**. Then, **E** sends a nonanalytic query to *Nature*. **E** wins a run whenever Nature answers with the literal stated by **E** at the end of that run, and she has a w.s. if she can do so in every history.

This is tantamount to capture GTS games as a special case of Hintikka’s *interrogative--deductive* games (see Hintikka et al., 1999). Games of ‘pure discovery’ can also be captured, when the initial assumption that Γ holds in the state of nature is correct, and when every answer is indeed true in the underlying state of Nature. Although in Hintikka’s model, **A** and Nature are identical, the discrepancy is easily remedied by interpreting **A** as playing Nature’s role ‘by proxy,’ i.e. choosing answers whenever Nature does not provide one. Hence, a conclusion will be established as the outcome of the game if it holds in every situation that is indiscernible, from the players’ standpoint, from the state of Nature, given the information they have about it.

4.3 Learning entailment, and other relations

Although EEG do not decide first-order entailment, players can actually *learn* it, in the sense of *formal learning theory* (see e.g. Kelly, 2004). Even as unsophisticated player types those who find no better strategy than s_a^* and s_e^* , can learn efficiently whether Γ entails ϕ .

Consider e.g. a learning method that: (i) conjectures at h_0 that $\Gamma \neq \phi$; and: (ii) changes its assessment iff the game is lost by **A**. Such a method clearly learns whether $\Gamma \models \phi$ or not with at most one retraction. Minimizing retractions is of particular importance since stabilization in the limit is compatible with erratic local behavior. More sophisticated players will learn quickly, but not more efficiently.¹⁰

Modeling other entailment relation may require restrictions on **E**'s strategies (see e.g. n. 12). But it is also possible to model consequence relations where **A** selects only within *preferred subset* of $Mod(\Gamma)$. The restriction on **A**'s strategy correspond in this case to strict preferences for choices of (at least some) choices of disjuncts or existential instantiations. These relations are typically non-monotonic, when the preferences express 'default' values, that can later be revised, allowing for representation of non-monotonic reasoning, provided that some device is added to represent this revision.¹¹ If new values become available, new branches (runs) may become necessary, and whether such relations can be learned, depend on the one hand, on the stability of $\Sigma.P.$ in runs, and of the overall game tree.

5 Conclusion

Our account of entailment games maps standard ST building and closure rules, to (resp.) to local and global strategies of algorithmic players, playing under qualitative uncertainty, and with limited strategic insights. One systematic construction for ST (complete for first-order entailment) is also characterized as the output of a strategy profile possibly selected by unsophisticated players. Unlike previous attempts in semantics inspired by game-theoretic notions, like DS or extensions of GTS, the correspondence does not rely on *ad hoc* restrictions on players' strategies. Moreover, our game-theoretic approach is versatile enough to capture (through adjustments in semantic clauses and the preference relations) other consequence relations than classical. It also generalizes and unifies the semantic models proposed by Hintikka for semantic and inquiry games, and captures formally algorithmic of what Hintikka's informal 'strategic principles.'

The main difference with Hintikka's models is conspicuous when one tries to obtain from interrogative games a game-theoretic model of *communication*. In such a model, (i) Inquirer is a hearer (in a given context) attempting to interpret a speaker's utterances; (ii)

¹⁰ Notice that the above learning method is guaranteed to stabilize on the correct hypothesis provided that it is finite, or is carried indefinitely (in case of countermodels with infinite domains): it may output an incorrect estimate if 'put on hold' indefinitely, as may some inquiry games.

¹¹ Hintikka et al. (1999) introduces 'brackets' to that effect, but does not discuss their strategic use. Genot (2009) presents a strategy that satisfies some of the Alchourrón-Gärdenf axioms for contraction.

Γ is a ‘stock’ of speaker’s already interpreted past utterances; and: (iii) ϕ is the postulated meaning of the current utterance. Interrogative moves provide feedback from speaker, rather than Nature, i.e. from a *strategic* player. In the absence of such feedback, Inquirer may be thought of as playing *both* **A**’s and **E**’s roles, relying on ‘preferred’ interpretations of (elements of) Γ : unless the model makes unrealistic idealizations, Inquirer should not be construed as ‘cycling through’ possible interpretations, but rather stick with one—just as she currently test one candidate meaning ϕ .

A second difference is that feedback from speaker (answers) may be cooperative or not, depending on e.g. the motives of agents in the context of communication. On the one hand, in cooperative contexts, replies may go past the requested answers, if the speaker anticipates some further demands for information, or attempts to prevent misunderstandings, e.g. by explicit disambiguations. This may also trigger adjustments in Γ , operating substitutions (revisions) or additions (expansions). On the other hand, in competitive argumentation, speaker’s position may be reinforced by maintaining ambiguity. In that case, hearer will be forced to consider more possible scenarios compatible with Γ , but also multiple candidate interpretations $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n$. Also, she must be ready to revise Γ , but sometimes with the only option to remove what was taken for granted (contractions).

Clearly, the stronger the background assumptions, the least number of scenarios are to be considered. Given that, the EEG model is compatible with two interpretations. The first views logical reasoning as the *basis* of language interpretation, where stronger assumptions or habits lead to inductive reasoning by assuming ‘default’ meanings—assumptions which can be revised, making reasoning nonmonotonic. The second interpretation views logical reasoning as a *cautious extension* of linguistic interpretative practices. The first interpretation may appeal to logicians and rationalist philosophers, while the second is closer to evolutionary understanding of language.

We lean towards the latter interpretation, following e.g. Brinck and Gärdenfors (2003), who have argued that cognitive needs of cooperative communication have been a driving force behind the evolution of complex semantic representations. Logical reasoning through EEG is made possible by rather sophisticated manipulations of semantic representations: fix-points are defined w.r.t. to regular extensions of semantic structures. We consider our model to be an abstract expression of the thesis that logical reasoning supervenes on language understanding; and we view generalizations of our games to nonclassical (and in particular, nonmonotonic) inference relations, as a step towards a semantic model of real-life interpretative practices.

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A Proofs

For **Obs. 2**, we leave implicit clauses other than for disjunction and existential quantifiers (and their negations)—and neglect double negation which has no optional argument under a classical reading.

Proof of Observation 2. Disjunction. A-case: By **S.P. 2**, **A** should avoid conceding many sentences **E** my obtain literals from as often as possible. By **Ass. 2**, one history may suffice for him. For those to reasons (in the later case, together with **Ass. 1**), **A** should not reply with both disjuncts. If the first run explored is not a win, **A** can try the other later (by **Ass. 2** again). In the absence of particular insight, there is no reason for **A** to favor one disjunct over the other. *E-case:* When lacking insights about which option would best match **A**’s moves, **E** can assert both disjuncts, possibly ‘opting out’ one of them later, when information (given by **A**’s choices) increases. Clause (A_2) of **Def. 1** guarantees that **E** can retrace the past history, while **Ass. 3** guarantees that she can retract one past choice.

Negated disjunction. A symmetric argument as for disjunction: **A** should attempt to minimize length of runs, and demand only one disjunct (possibly asking the other later); **E** should try to obtain as much explicit information as possible, and ask for both.

Existential quantifier. A-case: If $\mathcal{L}$ has infinitely many individual names, options for existential instantiation are nondenumerable (see **Fig. 1**). By **S.P. 2**, **A** should prefer introduction of new names (new individuals) in order to make harder **E**’s task to match literals he states. To avoid conflict with **Ass. 1**, **A** can introduce individual terms one at a time—AssAss:MeaningLog guarantees the possibility to introduce another later to expand his reply, if needed. *E-case:* By **S.P. 2** **E** should prefer using ‘old’ names, previously introduced by **A**, and by **Ass. 1**, no more than necessary (which also makes ‘matching’ easier). **Ass. 3** guarantees that she can rephrase or expand her reply at later stages, to match **A**’s choices. Hence, she should also reply with one instantiation at a time.¹²

Negated existential. A-case: One ‘new’ individual may suffice to prevent **E** from matching **A**’s choices (by **S.P. 2**), and avoids delaying runs unnecessarily (complying with **Ass. 1**; moreover, **Ass. 3** guarantees **A** later ask for additional instantiations—in particular, if the only countermodels have infinite domains, **A** is

¹² Multiple instantiations may be preferred when **A** or **E** has some particular insight, but a unique one is their best option when uncertainty precludes anticipations. **E** can introduce an individual name arbitrarily chosen, and later rephrase. Otherwise, she needs a ‘witness individual.’ Prohibiting ‘rephrasing’ replies for disjunctions and existential instantiation is one way to obtain *intuitionistic* logic (see Rahman and Keiff, 2005). This restriction can be derived from appropriate preferences (see also sec. 5).

still able to force an infinite play. **E-case:** By **S.P. 2**, **E** should prefer using ‘old’ names; and just as **A** in the existential case, by **Ass. 1**, should prefer to introduce them one at a time.¹³ $\square$

For the proof of **Obs. 4**, we establish three lemmas, that show $\Sigma.P.$ to be stable over the three types of queries **A** can address without repeating one past move, i.e.: (a) rephrase a past reply with a new argument; (b) repeat a former (analytic) query with a new argument; or: (c) use a nonanalytic query.¹⁴ In the first two cases, **A** can rephrase earlier replies or queries, w.r.t. to disjunctions and existential statements; changes in disjunct generate distinct histories, so we need only establish that $\Sigma.P.$ are stable *in a given history* over changes w.r.t. existential statement (negated or not).

Lemma A.1 (Stability I). *If, for some history h of $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ such that $P(h) = \mathbf{A}$ the last position m of h is a $\Sigma.P.$, and if **A** retracts some past moves so that **S.P. 2** is no longer satisfied at m , then **E** can modify her past moves as well, so that m will be a $\Sigma.P.$ again.*

Proof of Lemma A.1. If **A** can affect **E**’s compliance with **S.P. 2** at m by changing one of his past moves, then: (a) there is be some literal $(\neg)P\bar{a}$ (where k_i occurs in $\bar{a}$) s.t. $\mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ occurs at $(h|m_1)$ for $m_1 \leq m$, and $\mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ occurs $(h|m_2)$ for $m_2 < m_1$; and: (b) **A** has substituted $\mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a}'$ to $\mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ at m_2 , with $\bar{a}' = \bar{a}[k_i/k_j]$, where k_j is new. *Ex hypothesis*, **A** has played according to his best strategy when introducing k_i , hence k_i was new at m_2 . Moreover, $\mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ cannot result from **A**’s imposing the use of k_i (otherwise, he would have used k_i twice, contrary to assumption that he conforms to preferences of **Obs. 2**). Hence, **E** needs simply to rephrase her instantiation with k_i with k_j , and she will comply with **S.P. 2** again. Then, both conditions of **Def. 3** are met at m , which is a $\Sigma.P.$, as desired. $\square$

Lemma A.2 (Stability II). *If, for some history h of $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ such that $P(h) = \mathbf{A}$, the last position m of h is a $\Sigma.P.$, and if **A** repeats some past query with a new argument, so that h is extended into h_1 , and some position n_1 of h_1 is no longer a $\Sigma.P.$, then **E** has a local strategy to extend h_1 to h_2 so that some position n_2 of h_2 is, again, a $\Sigma.P.$.*

Proof of Lemma A.2. If **A** can affect **E**’s compliance with **S.P. 2** at m , by reiterating a query with a different argument, then: (a) there are some positions m_1, m_2 and m_3 , with $m_1 < m_2 \leq m_3 < m_4 < m_5 \leq m$ s.t. $\mathbf{E}\neg\exists x\psi(x)$ occurs at m_1 ; $\mathbf{A}(\neg\exists x\psi(x), x/k_i)$ occurs at m_2 ; $\mathbf{A}(\chi, (\neg)P\bar{a})$ (where χ is a subformula of $\psi[x/k_i]$, i.e. k_i occurs in $\bar{a}$) occurs at m_3 ;¹⁵ $\mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ occurs at m_4 ; and finally $\mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ occurs at m_5 . **A**’s reiteration consists in targeting m_1 with a new query $\mathbf{A}(\neg\exists x\psi(x), x/k_j)$ (where, according to his preferences, k_j is new); then repeating the sequence until position n_1 is reached, where he repeats the query made at m_3 , but this time with $(\neg)P\bar{a}'$, where $\bar{a}' = \bar{a}[k_i/k_j]$. At this position, the condition of **Def. 3.b** is no longer satisfied, and n_1 is no longer a $\Sigma.P.$. Let us call h_1 the history extending h with this sequence of moves, with n_1 being the last position of h_1 . $\mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ (at m_4) must be the result of some sequence of moves from **E**, including at least one query $\mathbf{E}(\neg\exists x\psi(x), x/k_i)$ (for if not, k_i is used twice by **A**, contrary to assumption that

¹³ Again, **E** may realize, merely considering the past history, the need for multiple instantiations; still, they but they will be bounded by the number of names introduced by **A**. She can use queries over negated existential to force **A** to reply with names *she* has introduced, but such strategies necessary only if **E** does not choose her best option for existential instantiation. If rules are modified to allow for a single query to target n nested quantifiers, the number of options admissible for **E** will be the cardinal of the n th Cartesian product of the set of already introduced individuals, and therefore will remain finite.

¹⁴ Repetitions of queries with identical arguments are ruled out by **Ass. 1** and **S.P. 1**: **A** should expect **E** to repeat her strategy, and such moves will delay the game unnecessarily.

¹⁵ When $m_2 = m_3$, $\neg\exists x\psi(x) = \chi = \neg\exists P\bar{a}'$, where $\bar{a}' = \bar{a}[k_i/x]$.

he plays according to preferences); and also one query $\mathbf{E}(\sigma, (-)P\bar{a})$, where σ is a subformula of $\theta[x/k_i]$, for if not, she cannot obtain $\mathbf{A}(-)P\bar{a}$, since $\mathbf{A}$ would not assert it as the result of one of his choices (if he does, he does not comply with **S.P. 2**, contrary to assumption). All $\mathbf{E}$ has to do is to extend h_1 by appending to it a sequence of moves, starting with $\mathbf{E}(\neg\exists x\theta(x), x/k_j)$, until she can address the query $\mathbf{E}(\sigma', (-)P\bar{a}')$ (where $\sigma' = \sigma[k_i/k_j]$). $\mathbf{A}$ will eventually reply with $\mathbf{A}(-)P\bar{a}'$ (by assumption, $\mathbf{A}$ follows his best strategy; hence, replying at m_4 was his best option at the time; and therefore, since the situation is identical save for the introduction of a new individual, replying must be his best option as well). And finally, $\mathbf{E}$ can reply to $\mathbf{A}$'s query at n_1 with $\mathbf{E}(-)P\bar{a}'$, in compliance with **S.P. 2**.

Let h_2 be the extension of h_1 obtained by appending the sequence of $\mathbf{E}$'s moves (and $\mathbf{A}$'s replies), and let n_2 denote the last position of h_2 . Clearly, both conditions of **Def. 3** hold at n_2 , hence n_2 is also a Σ .P., as desired. $\square$

The last lemma covers the use of *nonanalytic* queries after a Σ .P. has been reached. It follows from our assumptions, that $\mathbf{A}$ should be ready to answer a nonanalytic query that is ‘turned back’ against him, after finitely many steps; and is always indifferent between doing it immediately, or later.¹⁶

Lemma A.3 (Stability III). *If, for some history h of $\mathcal{G}(\Gamma, \phi)$ such that $P(h) = \mathbf{A}$, the last position m of h is a Σ .P., and if $\mathbf{A}$ extends h with some nonanalytic query and eventually to h_1 where some position n_1 is not a Σ .P., then $\mathbf{E}$ can extend h_1 to h_2 so that some position n_2 of h_2 is, again, a Σ .P..*

For simplicity the proof assumes that $\mathbf{A}$ answers immediately a nonanalytic query ‘turned back’ at him; extension to cases where he uses several in a row before he answers is left to the reader.

Proof of Lemma A.3. Assume that $\mathbf{A}$ extends h into $h_1 = (h, \mathbf{A}?\psi \vee \neg\psi)$. The proof is then by cases. *Case 1:* $\mathbf{A}(-)\psi$ occurs at some position of h . $\mathbf{E}$'s best response, given **S.P. 2**, is to extend h_1 into $h_{1.1} = (h_1, \mathbf{E}(-)\psi)$ (because it guarantees her choice to match $\mathbf{A}$'s). If ψ is a literal, the last position of $h_{1.1}$ is, again, a Σ .P.. If it is not, given that the last position of h is a Σ .P. and that repetitions would only induce a new Σ .P. (by **Lem. A.1** and **A.2**), $\mathbf{A}$'s best response is to use $\mathbf{A}((-)\psi, \Psi)$ (where Ψ is a nonempty argument when $\mathbf{A}$ can constrain the reply). But again, $\mathbf{E}$'s best response is $\mathbf{E}((-)\psi, \Psi)$, then to wait for $\mathbf{A}$'s reply. Given that the ‘copycat’ strategy is $\mathbf{E}$'s best response, the exchange is bound to proceed until a literal subformula $(-)\bar{P}\bar{a}$ of $(-)\psi$ is reached—which, by $\mathbf{E}$'s strategy, is then ‘copied’ from $\mathbf{A}$.¹⁷ *Case 2:* $\mathbf{A}(-)\psi$ does not occur at some position of h . $\mathbf{E}$ can extend h_1 into $h_{1.2} = (h_1, \mathbf{E}?\psi \vee \neg\psi)$. By the same reasoning as in Case 1,

¹⁶ By **Ass. 1**, $\mathbf{A}$ should use $\mathbf{A}?(\psi_1 \vee \neg\psi_1)$ at the last position of h (when $P(h) = \mathbf{A}$) when it offers a prospect of reaching a Σ .P. faster (given $\mathbf{A}$'s insight at h). Therefore, if $\mathbf{E}$ plays $\mathbf{E}?(\psi_1 \vee \neg\psi_1)$, $\mathbf{A}$ will typically not use *all* moves available prior to $\mathbf{A}?(\psi_1 \vee \neg\psi_1)$ to delay a reply to $\mathbf{E}?(\psi_1 \vee \neg\psi_1)$. Even if he does, the number of such moves *without repetition* is finite, and repetitions are useless to reach a Σ .P. faster: they either delay it, or induce no change, by **Lem. A.1** and **A.2**, and in both cases are ruled out by which is **Ass. 1**. Once the relevant moves are all spent, $\mathbf{A}$ can delay the reply to $\mathbf{E}?(\psi_1 \vee \neg\psi_1)$ by using *finitely* many nonanalytic queries $\mathbf{A}?(\psi_2 \vee \neg\psi_2), \dots, \mathbf{A}?(\psi_n \vee \neg\psi_n)$. Doing so indefinitely would contradict **S.P. 3** for sure, while a finite strategy may still be available; and every finite strategy requires him to be ready to answer any $\mathbf{E}?(\psi_i \vee \neg\psi_i)$ if asked to (by **Ass. 3**). Moreover, the prospect is no better to answer right away to $\mathbf{E}?(\psi_1 \vee \neg\psi_1)$, or to line up $\mathbf{A}?(\psi_2 \vee \neg\psi_2), \dots, \mathbf{A}?(\psi_n \vee \neg\psi_n)$ before (eventually) replying to any one $\mathbf{E}?(\psi_1 \vee \neg\psi_1)$.

¹⁷ If $\mathbf{A}$ has played more than one nonanalytic query, $\mathbf{E}$ can iterate the copycat strategy, until a Σ .P. is reached. Notice also that $\mathbf{E}$ departs from preferences of **Fig. 2** (replying with both disjunct, and retracting one later) because uncertainty about $\mathbf{A}$ future choices is not relevant.

A will eventually reply, and **E**'s best response will then be to copy his reply. If ψ is a literal, the resulting position will be a Σ .P. (unless **A** has played more several queries, in which case **E** can iterate the copycat strategy, until a Σ .P. is reached); if not, as in Case 1, **E** has a (recursive) copycat strategy to reach a literal, and copy it. Let h_2 be the history whose last position is $\mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a}$, and let n_2 denote that position. $\mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ is copied on $\mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a}$ occurring before n_2 , which and complies with **S.P. 2**, which satisfied **Def. 3b**. Moreover, every new **E**-labeled statements occurring between the last position m of h and n_2 has been targeted once, and *ex hypothesis* **Def. 3a** were satisfied at m , it is also at n_2 . Hence, n_2 is a Σ .P., as desired. $\square$

Obs. 4 follows from **Lem. A.1–A.3**, as follows:

Proof of Observation 4. Let $|P\bar{a}|_h^{\mathbf{A}} = \{P\bar{a} : \mathbf{A}(\neg)P\bar{a} \text{ occurs in } h\}$ and $|P\bar{a}|_h^{\mathbf{E}} = \{P\bar{a} : \mathbf{E}(\neg)P\bar{a} \text{ occurs in } h\}$; let also m be the last position of h , and assume that it is a Σ .P.. *Ex hypothesis* (by **Def. 3b**) $|P\bar{a}|_h^{\mathbf{E}} \subseteq |P\bar{a}|_h^{\mathbf{A}}$. Either $|P\bar{a}|_h^{\mathbf{E}}$ is a complete diagram for some model of Γ , and identical with $|P\bar{a}|_h^{\mathbf{A}}$, or not. In the first case, there is nothing to prove. In the second, **A** has to compel **E** to commit to a complete diagram $|P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{E}}$ for some extension h' of h . But **A** can obtain some $(\neg)P\bar{a} \in |P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{E}} \setminus |P\bar{a}|_h^{\mathbf{E}}$ only by repetition of some (sequence of) analytic query (queries) with the appropriate individual names; or by a nonanalytic query $\mathbf{A}?P\bar{a} \vee \neg P\bar{a}$. It follows from (resp.) the proofs of **Lem. A.2** and **Lem. A.3**, that in either case **E** has a recursive strategy that guarantees that she will obtain $(\neg)P\bar{a}$ from **A**, and therefore that, for any h' s.t. $|P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{E}}$ is a complete diagram, $|P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{E}} = |P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{A}}$, as desired. $\square$

Proofs of **Obs. 5** and **6** are direct consequences of **Obs. 4** and **S.P. 1–3**.

Proof of Observation 5. Assume that the last position m of h is a Σ .P.. By **Obs. 4**, there is a recursive (partial) strategy s_e s.t., in any extension h' of h that is generated by s_e (whatever **A**'s strategy s_a is) where $|P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{E}}$ is a diagram, then $|P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{E}} = |P\bar{a}|_{h'}^{\mathbf{A}}$. By definition of $(\succsim_i)$, $h' \succsim_{\mathbf{E}} h''$ and $h'' \succsim_{\mathbf{A}} h'$ (where h'' is an extension of h where **E** plays some other strategy s'_e). By **S.P. 1**, **A** should act as if expecting **E** will implement s_e from m on. **A**'s only remaining strategy is to postpone indefinitely a comparison. Unless loosing incurs for **A** an infinite loss, **S.P. 3** applies, and **A** should prefer finite strategies to infinite ones. Since he looses in all the finite strategies that extend h , he should prefer the shortest (by **Ass. 1**), so that **A**'s best option is to extend h to $h' = (h, \mathbf{A}\text{-stop})$, as desired. $\square$

Proof of Observation 6. We prove the case where $P\bar{a} = Pk_i$, and leave the others as an exercise to the reader. Assume (without loss of generality) that $\mathbf{A}Pk_i$ has occurred in h ; and that the last position of h is $\mathbf{E}(\Psi, \neg Pk_i)$. **E** has obtained $\mathbf{A}Pk_i$, through a sequence of moves, as a subformula of either some $\mathbf{A}\exists x\Psi'(x)$, in which case k_i was 'new'; or of $\mathbf{A}\neg\exists x\Psi'(x)$, in which case k_i was not. In both cases, the only way for **A** to retract Pk_i is to substitute the first occurrence of k_i with some k_j . But, by the same reasoning as in the proof of **Lem. A.1**, **E** can restate her queries with k_j as well. Moreover, by **S.P. 1**, **A** should expect **E** to play the most harmful strategy for him, namely to repeat $\mathbf{E}(\Psi, \neg Pk_i)$, until he answers. Unless the prospect of loosing is infinite, **S.P. 3** applies, and **A** should prefer a finite strategy. Since in every finite strategy, he either plays eventually $\mathbf{A}\neg Pk_i$ or $\mathbf{A}\text{-stop}$, they all have the same prospect, and by **Ass. 1**, he should prefer the shortest. Hence, **A**'s best strategy is to extend h to $h' = (h, \mathbf{A}\text{-stop})$, as desired. $\square$