



LUND UNIVERSITY

Why Sweden Suspended Military Service

The Policy Process from 1990 to 2009

Lindberg, Mårten

2019

Document Version:

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

[Link to publication](#)

Citation for published version (APA):

Lindberg, M. (2019). *Why Sweden Suspended Military Service: The Policy Process from 1990 to 2009*. [Doctoral Thesis (monograph), Department of Political Science]. Lund University.

Total number of authors:

1

General rights

Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply:

Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.

- Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
- You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
- You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal

Read more about Creative commons licenses: <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/>

Take down policy

If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.

LUND UNIVERSITY

PO Box 117
221 00 Lund
+46 46-222 00 00

Why Sweden Suspended Military Service

The Policy Process from 1990 to 2009

MÄRTEN T. LINDBERG

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | LUND UNIVERSITY



Why Sweden suspended military service

The policy process from 1990 to 2009

by

Mårten Torson Lindberg



LUND
UNIVERSITY

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

by due permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University, Sweden. To be defended at Eden's Auditorium, 7/6 2019.

Faculty opponent


Professor Kjell Engelbrekt

The Swedish Defence university

Organization LUND UNIVERSITY Author(s)	Document name DOCTORAL DISSERTATION	
	Date of issue 2019-06-07	
	Sponsoring organization FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES	
Title and subtitle WHY SWEDEN SUSPENDED MILITARY SERVICE: THE POLICY PROCESS FROM 1990 TO 2009		
Abstract: <p>For little more than a century military service enacted Swedish values of equality, solidarity and doing one's part for the public good. What started out as mere military recruitment policy in 1901 developed into an institutional feature of Swedish society: appreciated by society, the conscripts, the Armed Forces and by political parties to the left and the right. In a pursuit to preserve military service in the post-cold war period, governments to the left and the right initiated a reform in the early 1990s. In contrast to the political objective it leads parliament to suspend military service in 2009. This is surprising, given that the literature suggests that well-entrenched institutions are change-resistant. Other countries in Europe had already swapped from conscripted to professional armies. The explanatory concepts in this literature do however not apply to the Swedish case. Why, then, did Sweden suspend military service in 2009? This dissertation introduces two concepts that help us understand the Swedish outcome. First, the reform sets in motion a <i>deinstitutionalisation</i> of military service. This is a process where the features that had institutionalised military service in the 1900s are taken away in the 1990s and early 2000s. This process is driven by strategic adjustments in Sweden's two largest political parties: the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Moderate Party. In the post-cold war period both have <i>issue-reputations</i> in defence policy that enable and constrain them in a new governing context. In a struggle to reinvent themselves both parties adjust their issue-reputations by: (a) disassociating themselves from reputations that constrain them; (b) elevating reputations that enable them; and (c) adopting the enabling reputations of the opposing party. After two decades of this behaviour military service have none of the features that once enabled its institutional reproduction and effective functioning. This is why military service was suspended in 2009.</p>		
Key words conscripted army, professional army, deinstitutionalisation, issue-reputation, SAP, Moderate Party,		
Classification system and/or index terms (if any)		
Supplementary bibliographical information		Language English
ISSN and key title 0460-0037		ISBN 978-91-7895-101-7 (print) 978-91-7895-102-4 (pdf)
Recipient's notes	Number of pages 206	Price
	Security classification	

I, the undersigned, being the copyright owner of the abstract of the above-mentioned dissertation, hereby grant to all reference sources permission to publish and disseminate the abstract of the above-mentioned dissertation.

Signature



Date 2019-04-24



LUND
UNIVERSITY

WHY SWEDEN SUSPENDED MILITARY SERVICE
THE POLICY PROCESS FROM 1990 TO 2009

Mårten T. Lindberg

DOCTORAL DISSERTATION

by due permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Lund University,
Sweden. To be defended at Eden's Auditorium, 7/6 2019.

Faculty opponent:

Professor Kjell Engelbrekt, The Swedish Defence University

Copyright Mårten Lindberg
Faculty of Social Sciences
ISBN 978-91-7895-101-7
ISSN 0460-0037

Printed in Sweden by Media-Tryck, Lund University Lund 2019



Media-Tryck is an environmentally certified and ISO 14001:2015 certified provider of printed material. Read more about our environmental work at www.mediatryck.lu.se

MADE IN SWEDEN 

TILL P OCH N.

Abstract

For little more than a century military service enacted Swedish values of equality, solidarity and doing one's part for the public good. What started out at as mere military recruitment policy in 1901 developed into an institutional feature of Swedish society: appreciated by society, the conscripts, the Armed Forces and by political parties to the left and the right. In a pursuit to preserve military service in the post-cold war period, governments to the left and the right initiated a reform in the early 1990s. In contrast to the political objective it leads parliament to suspend military service in 2009. This is surprising, given that the literature suggests that well-entrenched institutions are change-resistant. Other countries in Europe had already swapped from conscripted to professional armies. The explanatory concepts in this literature do however not apply to the Swedish case. Why, then, did Sweden suspend military service in 2009? This dissertation introduces two concepts that help us understand the Swedish outcome. First, the reform sets in motion a *deinstitutionalisation* of military service. This is a process where the features that had institutionalised military service in the 1900s are taken away in the 1990s and early 2000s. This process is driven by strategic adjustments in Sweden's two largest political parties: the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Moderate Party. In the post-cold war period both have *issue-reputations* in defence policy that enable and constrain them in a new governing context. In a struggle to reinvent themselves both parties adjust their issue-reputations by: (a) disassociating themselves from reputations that constrain them; (b) elevating reputations that enable them; and (c) adopting the enabling reputations of the opposing party.

After two decades of this behaviour military service has none of the features that once enabled its institutional reproduction and effective functioning. This is why military service was suspended in 2009.

Acknowledgements

Allra högst vill jag tacka min familj — min fru och son — för er ovillkorliga kärlek under den tid som jag skrivit min avhandling. För de många kvällar och helger som jag har skrivit istället för att tillbringa min tid med er. Min fru för att du utmanar mig och alltid stöttar mig. Min son för dina ständiga påhitt och hyss. Tack för att ni påminner mig om vad som är viktigast av allt. Jag är så stolt över er båda. Utan er — ingenting.

I would also like to thank my father and mother for encouraging me to pursue a PhD, and giving me the abilities to pull this through while also raising a family, and everything that comes with it. Thank you.

I want to give a special thanks to my supervisor Jan Teorell for always being kind and supportive. For reading my manuscript carefully, even when it was long and unstructured, for keeping me on track, on topic, and motivated. Thank you.

Finally, I would like to thank all of you — colleagues and friends — who have read and commented on my manuscript in any of its many drafts. You have greatly improved the end product. A special thank you to Douglas Brommesson, Erik Ringmar, Johannes Lindwall and Jens Bartelson.

Writing this dissertation has always been fun and something I did with pleasure. It is something I will miss.

Contents

I	Theory, Problem, Argument	13
1	AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE	15
1.1	Two Kinds of Armies	19
1.2	Two Kinds of Institutions	23
1.3	Military Service in Sweden	29
1.4	The Problem	40
2	TWO MECHANISMS	51
2.1	Deinstitutionalisation	52
2.2	Issue Reputation	54
2.3	Method and Research Design	59
2.4	Objectives, Contributions and Limitations	62
II	Process: 1990 to 2009	65
3	DISRUPTION	67
3.1	A System in Imbalance	70
3.2	New Wars	79
3.3	Back to Universality?	91
4	CONVERSION	99
4.1	A New Military Service?	100
4.2	Converting Military Service	112
5	DISPLACEMENT	125
5.1	A Reinvented Moderate Party	128
5.2	Completing the Reform	135
5.3	Toward Suspension	141

III CONCLUSION 163

6 WHY SWEDEN SUSPENDED MILITARY SERVICE 165

6.1 Disruption 169

6.2 Conversion 171

6.3 Displacement 174

6.4 Pragmatism Trumped Principles 178

6.5 Contributions 179

IV BIBLIOGRAPHY 185

List of Figures

3.1	Normal distribution of servicemen	74
5.1	The first advertisement by the Armed Forces, May 2006.	134

List of Tables

1.1	Taxonomy of explanatory concepts	42
5.1	Interest for deployment among conscripts (%)	145
5.2	The vote, June 16 2009	162
6.1	Three sub-mechanisms of deinstitutionalisation	169
6.2	From institutional to occupational, 1990 to 2009	175

Part I

Theory, Problem, Argument

Chapter 1

AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE

March, 2009. In a couple of months, parliament will vote on a bill just presented by the centre-right government. It recommends that Sweden swaps from a conscripted to a professional army. Instead of enlisting citizens to give them basic military training, the Armed Forces should recruit soldiers on full time contractual employments. The social democratic opposition opposes the bill. A poll reveals that a majority of the public supports military service. The Supreme Commander is equally hesitant and so is his equal in Finland, advising Sweden not to pull through. Reports from other European countries and a special report by the Nato have pointed out great problems with a professional army — both in recruiting and retaining soldiers. Less than a year earlier Russia had unlawfully invaded Georgia, putting a question-mark on the idea that national wars were “a thing of the past” and that conscripted armies would not be needed in the future.

What the government wants to do is to end a policy dating back to 1901. From that year and throughout the 1900s, military service had matured from a military recruitment policy to an institutional feature of Swedish society. It was a policy that had enjoyed strong support in parties across the political spectrum, in the Armed Forces, in the public and even in the conscripts. One part of what made military service so special was that it enacted cherished Swedish values of collective responsibility, duty, equality, solidarity and “doing one’s part”. Another part was that it was a necessary element of Sweden’s equally cherished neutrality policy in its foreign affairs, dating back even longer, to 1814.¹

¹Sweden adopted a form of neutrality policy in 1814 when King Charles XIV

Neutrality demanded a strong and unilateral defence and military service was the most natural way of achieving this. The centre-right government nonetheless pulls through. In June 2009, parliament decides that Sweden will swap from a conscripted to a professional army.

Some public policies take on a life of their own. They become entrenched in society to such a degree that their functional purpose becomes less important than what the policy symbolises or “does” to society. Such developments can become a double edged sword for policy makers. On the one hand it means that the policy enjoys public support and legitimacy which makes it easier to devote energy, time and money for pursuing the policy. On the other hand it makes it more difficult to change the policy if change becomes necessary for purely functional reasons. Social welfare in Sweden is a well studied example of this. When governments in the early 1990s embarked on a series of entrenchment reforms of the Swedish welfare-system, it was painful both for the governments and for society. Another less studied example of changing highly institutionalised policies is Sweden’s reform to military service in the 1990s and early 00s. During the 1900s military service took on a life of its own, quite a part from its purely military function. It matured into an “institution” with formal and informal rules — stipulating that doing one’s service marked not only entrance into adult life but into Swedish society and its norms and expectations of what it meant to be a member of society. Even if the service was only for men it developed into an institutional feature of Swedish society.

This dissertation is an attempt at answering why Sweden suspended military service. According to a large body of literature, deeply entrenched institutions such as military service in Sweden become “sticky” and difficult to change. Even if military service fits the description of a sticky institution the Swedish outcome violates the theoretical prediction from the literature. It should however be noted that in the 1990s a number of European states swapped from conscripted to professional armies. The explanatory concepts in this literature, for instance membership in Nato or criticism against military service from society, do not apply to the Swedish case. This gives the research question for this dissertation: Given that military service was a “sticky” institution in Sweden, and given that Sweden shows an uneasy fit with the scholarship on why European states shifted from conscripted to professional armies, why did Sweden suspend military service in 2009?

To answer this question this dissertation takes an “institutional perspective”. An institutional perspective regards long-standing institu-

issued a state maxim declaring that Sweden would become an “insular power” and “would abandon all illusions which might endanger the calm she enjoyed of her existence as a state” (Agius 2012: 61).

tional frameworks as “the building blocks of social and political life” (Krasner 1988: 67). It believes that political outcomes are not so much the result of individual choice, or the aggregations of individual actions, as they are the result of enduring institutions that constrain and enable opportunities for action. It holds that earlier institutional choices put a heavy hand on the manoeuvring capability of policy makers. At any given time, policy makers operate within an institutional framework with formal and informal rules, inherited from earlier generations, and this framework limits their menu of choice. Institutions create behavioural regularities and patterns. Institutionalists will take special care to understand the conditions and/or mechanisms that produce these, and what makes them endure over time, even in the absence of “repeated collective mobilisation or authoritative intervention” (Jepperson 1991: 145). For explaining outcomes, institutionalists will first examine the contents of the institution (its formal and informal rules), what kind of circumstances that transformed a policy into an institution and what enabled the institution to survive over time. With this information, they will then try to identify internal or external changes that can account for why an institution changes or is replaced all together. Typical to an institutional perspective is thus to look for explanations at a “higher level to explain something at a lower level” (Amenta & Ramsey 2010: 15; Clemens & Cook 1999: 444).² This being said, an institutionalist analysis begins by searching for information on the institution’s origins, then teasing out factors that can account for its endurance, and with this information identify changes in these factors to bring forth hypotheses and explanations for why the institution changed or was replaced (Krasner 1988: 66-73; Huntington 1968: 12).

Structure

This dissertation has three sections and is divided into six chapters. The *first* section provides the theoretical framework of the dissertation, presents the problem and introduces two social mechanisms that will be used as analytical tools to answer the research question. It starts by explaining the theoretical foundation of the dissertation, suggesting that we should understand the conscripted and professional army as two recruitment models that have two different “institutional logics”. It also presents a short historical overview of how military service developed in Sweden and why it matured from a military recruitment model into an

²The literature is rich and and a non-exhaustive list of higher-order effects are: culture, ideas, macro-politics, macro-economics, political/party systems, path-dependence — or a mixture of them. For a review of the different “institutionalisms” see for instance Hall & Taylor, 1996.

institutionalised feature of Swedish society. It then introduces the idea that we should understand military service as a “sticky” institution and explains what this means. It also visits the literature on why European countries have swapped from conscripted to professional armies, and asks whether the Swedish outcome can be explained with this literature. Finding the causal concepts in that literature unsatisfactory for explaining the Swedish outcome, the section ends with introducing two alternative concepts, derived from institutional theory and partisan theory.

The *second* section applies the two concepts to the empirical material. In three chapters, we follow the policy process from 1990 to 2009. The focus is on policy formation, why the two largest parties in Sweden at the time behaved the way they did and what consequences their policies had on the institutional development of military service.

The *third* and concluding section gives a theoretical summary of the main findings of the dissertation. It also attempts to address the dissertation’s contribution, if any, to policies on military recruitment.

1.1 Two Kinds of Armies

Recruiting soldiers to the military is one of the most important functions of the state. Without soldiers there is no defence and without this the state fails to uphold its part of the social contract. Recruiting soldiers is normally executed by the Armed Forces or a closely associated government agency and the challenges are plenty. One is attracting civilians to a life in the military. Another is having them stay there. A third is recruiting civilians in sufficient numbers. A fourth is recruiting civilians of the right quality.

What recruitment model the Armed Forces use varies on functional and social imperatives (Huntington 1957: 2). The functional imperative asks: which recruitment model produces the best defence? Functional variations ideally dovetail changes in war. Recruitment is inescapably coupled to social context, or the “social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within society” (Ibid). The social imperative asks: which recruitment model best reflects the values in society? Functional and social imperatives interact. Variations in war *and* variations in society have historically shaped and shoved the choices that states make in their recruitment policies. The decision is important because it will affect *quantitative* issues of force size, the supply of the military forces, and the proportion of state resources devoted to military needs, as well as *qualitative* issues of organisation, composition, equipment, deployment of the military forces, the locations of bases, types of weapons, as well as arrangements with allies, and so on (Huntington 1957: 1).

Two important concepts in this dissertation are *organisational purpose* and *organisational design*. The former refers to policies on the deployment of military forces: when and under what conditions should force is brought into action. In other words, what is the purpose of the Armed Forces and what should it be doing? The second concept, organisational design, refers to policies on how the Armed Forces should be designed to achieve its purpose. Policies on design are normally and ideally a product of (earlier) decisions on the purpose of the Armed Forces. In most liberal democracies decisions on purpose and design are ultimately political decisions. Even if the Armed Forces can advise with its expertise on what the purpose should be and which design best suits the purpose, the ultimate decisions come down to policy makers, what suggestions that are presented to parliament and how parliament votes.

Two kinds of recruitment models — two kinds of armies — have dominated in Western history: professional armies and conscripted armies. As we will see, they differ in both organisational purpose and organisational design. As we also will see, questions of organisational design and organisational purpose hang together. By “professional” armies this

dissertation refers to armies that *employ* their rank and file soldiers and where these soldiers are “career soldiers”. By “conscripted” armies it refers to armies where the rank and file are conscripted, without pay, and only serve for a short period, often less than two years. Professional armies have four distinguishing traits (Ingesson et al. 2018). *Occupational*: Soldiers serve voluntarily in exchange for financial compensation. *Experts on the application of force*: The soldiers are experts on using violence to achieve political goals. *Low rank*: They are employed primarily to serve as rank-and-file, not for creating the next generation of commanders. *Expeditionary capability*: Employed soldiers can be used to serve on and beyond national territory. For our purposes, it can be argued that the organisational purpose of a professional army typically emphasises the capability to act outside of the national territory and to conduct expeditionary missions. The organisational design equally and typically stresses different efficiency enhancing solutions, such as organisational output, value for money, keeping costs down and placing a premium on quality over quantity. Professional armies are thus marked by a policy dyad of expeditionary capability and efficiency/quality. These kind of armies pre-figured modernity but experienced a rebirth in the last two decades, when it replaced conscripted armies and military service (Huntington 1957; Moskos *et al.* 2000; King 2011; Tresch 2014). Conscripted armies figured already in Ancient Greece and Rome, then disappeared for many centuries, only to reappear and have its acme between the early 19th to late 20th century (Finer [1962] 2017).

Conscripted armies have four distinguishing traits (Ingesson et al. 2018).³ *Compulsory service*: The law provides that military service is a duty. All male citizens have mandatory enlistment tests and if enlisted they must serve. Refusal is penalised. *Temporary citizen service*: Conscript armies are citizen armies. Only citizens, or prospective citizens, serve. The conscript leaves his current vocation for a period of service. *No compensation*: The citizen serves regardless of compensation. *National orientation*: The law permits conscripts only to be used on national territory. As we can see, conscripted armies differ from professional armies in organisational purpose and organisational design. The organisational purpose is territorial, typically to defend the national territory against violations by the Armed Forces of another country. In terms of organisational design, it is an Armed Forces with roots in the concept of a “nation-in-arms” or “citizen army” where (all) eligible male citizens serve. As a consequence of limits on how much the state can

³Another useful list of criteria, though partly different because it defines “mass armies”, is offered by Haltiner 1998.

spend on defence this policy often produces an organisational design with a premium on quantity over quality of soldiers. In contrast to professional armies, conscripted armies are “amateur armies”, though made up of a professional core of officers. Conscripted armies are thus marked by a policy dyad of territoriality and universal service.

Sweden introduced a limited form of military service in 1901, expanded the scope of it in the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s, and suspended it in 2009. During this period it included the above listed traits. During the cold war, all men between the ages of 18 and 47 had a duty to do military service. The length of basic training varied between half a year to two years and was rounded off with a Basic Combat Unit Exercise. One year after basic training the servicemen were normally called to their first refresher training. Every year about 50,000 servicemen served while about 60,000 to 120,000 took part in refresher trainings. Each serviceman would take part in about five refresher exercises before he turned 47. The purpose of the service was to build a large and resilient armed force that could deter adversaries from exploiting Swedish territory. Every serviceman received a war placement order, telling him where to report in the event of mobilisation. For several decades the Swedish military was the fourth largest in the world: Roughly equal in size to that of Britain, France or West Germany (Agrell 2000: 129–32). It should be mentioned that military service was bound up in a greater defence structure of Sweden. Another critical component was the mobilisation of combat units on home leave, the so-called “Home Guard”. It counted to about 125,000 soldiers. The Home Guard had weapons and other equipment at home and could be in place quickly after the mobilisation alarm had been activated. In addition, Sweden could mobilise nearly 150,000 civilian conscripts and approximately one million citizens who voluntarily enlisted to perform civilian functions in the event of war (including control of coordination, supply, psychological defence, health and medical care and other community functions). An estimated half a million of Swedes took part in some form of voluntary defence activity. Some 65,000 volunteers, mainly women, enlisted for service in the total defence in the event of an emergency or war. Over 65,000 were members in the FBU movement (a voluntary officer training directed to teens). Approximately 250,000 people were members of so-called “contract organisations”, responsible for arranging training leading to a contract for voluntary service in war. Other examples include the highly active Swedish Women’s Voluntary Defence Service (*Lottakåren*), and the 400,000 strong voluntary rifle club. The voluntary organisations were self-governed but enjoyed substantial government funding.

Most European states swapped from professional to conscripted armies somewhere between the late 1700s to the early 1900s (Palmer 1986: 119;

Rothenberg 1994: 86; Black 1994; Keegan 1993). The shift was gradual but decisive. In a span of a few decades “mercenaries went out of style” (Avant 2000: 41). Sociologists and realists have identified the shift to functional demands placed by the outside environment. For realists the move was necessary to increase the chance of winning wars (Cohen 1985; Gooch 1980; and Posen 1993). Sociological accounts on the other hand stress emerging ideas on citizenship, national identity and democracy (Hintze 1975; Thomson 1994; Janowitz, 1983: 31; Paret 1992a; 1992b; Kestnbaum 2000). In most accounts, however, both explanatory concepts are present. Functional and social imperatives have interacted and reinforced one another (Paret 1986; Tilly 1990; Keegan 1993; Huntington 1957). We can see this by visiting Carl von Clausewitz’s “trinity” of war ([1832] 1989). In the nineteenth century the purpose of conscripted armies was to conduct “trinitarian wars”, being wars that are: (a) fought between states; (b) by armies organised and financed by governments; and (c) with extensive engagement of the warring societies (Summers 1982; Howard 1983; van Creveld 1991: ch. 2).⁴ In trinitarian wars soldiers were pulled from the citizenry and engaged entire societies. The French decree from August 1793 illustrates the nexus between the social and functional imperative:

From this moment until the enemy is driven from the territory of the Republic, all the French people are permanently requisitioned for the armies. The young men will go to the front, married men will forge arms and carry supplies, women will make tents and clothing, children will divide old linen into bandages, old men will be carried into the squares to rouse the courage of soldiers, to teach hatred of kings and the unity of the republic (quoted in Townsend 2005: 6).

The effect of the trinitarian kind of war was that across Europe life homogenised within states and heterogenised among states (Tilly 1990: 116). It made citizens of individuals and spawned a willingness to take part in creating public goods for the society they lived in. Once the trinitarian war was born it became a self-reinforcing logic. The mass armed force that military service made possible forced states that before

⁴This interpretation of Clausewitz’s trinity has been criticised by many for being misguided (e.g. Villacres & Bradford 1995). As interpreted by Villacres and Bradford, Clausewitz’s trinity is composed of: “(1) primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; (2) the play of chance and probability; and (3) war’s element of subordination to rational policy” (Ibid: 9). In spite of this the division into “people, army, and government” offered by Summers, Howard and van Creveld and others is useful for our purposes since it illustrates how warfare from the point of the French Revolution up until recently, through public policy, engaged entire peoples and had certain nation-building qualities.

employed their soldiers to swap to military service or face defeat at the battlefield. As conscripted armies became the norm, this whipped up sentiments of national union. The functional imperative for military service thus co-evolved with a social context, and so military service and conscripted armies spread throughout Europe. As it did war and preparation for war became a “normal social activity” (Tilly 1990: 107-113; Paret 1992a: 65-66; Mann 2003: 16-17; Burk 2006). European states became “warrior societies” in which war and preparation for war became part of the modern political culture and military service a “rite de passage”, an “important cultural form” and through its universality a “ready acceptance by electorates as a social norm” (Keegan 1993: 21). This dynamic reached its peak with the First and Second World Wars, and was not broken with the development of nuclear weapons during the cold war. In the event of nuclear war, the purpose of the conscript shifted from being one of fighting and winning battles to one of deterring hostile states and preventing conflicts from escalating into nuclear war (Brodie et al. 1946: 76; 1978: 66; Downes 1985: 156).

1.2 Two Kinds of Institutions

Beyond functional differences, what sets the conscripted and the professional army apart are the means by which they move the individual into action. They are different in the “internal mechanisms by which organisations coerce or persuade members to act” (Hodgson 2006: 10).⁵ What is more, this dissertation supports the view that “to be institutional, structure must generate action” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996: 179). An institution is a structure that creates a presence of certain normative elements that are internalised in its members and move them into action (Scott 2004). A structure that does not generate action in its members is not institutional. Finally, a structure that no longer moves members into the desired course of action is no an institution. A useful way to distinguish how the two armies differ in their internal mechanisms of moving their members into action is by using James March and Johan Olsen’s two logics of human action: the “logic of appropriateness” and

⁵This is an important, though often, neglected difference between conscripted and professional armies. As an example, in their discussions on demise of conscripted armies in Europe, Haltiner and van Doorn (in two influential studies) omit the institutional perspective on armed forces. They, as Haltiner argue, “do not consider the important sociopolitical attributes of mass armies, especially those that correlate with the features of social mobilization” (Haltiner 1998: 10). Instead they focus only on “military structural variables” such as size and the level of military technology. This, I believe, is an important deficiency since the conscripted and professional armed forces are two different kind of institutions, with different social rules, norms and values.

the “logic of consequences” (1995: 30-31). Both logics are present in both armies, but they are so to different degrees. They have different “master logics”. In short, in the conscripted army the logic of appropriateness is the master logic, whereas in the professional army the logic of consequences is the master logic. To understand the meaning of this I will briefly explain the basics of these concepts.

In the logic of appropriateness, action is rule-governed. We follow rules not because we expect anything in return, but because we see them as “natural, rightful, expected, and legitimate” (March & Olsen 2008: 689). When actors act “appropriately”, they do so to fulfil an obligation encapsulated in a “role” or “identity”, often for the purpose of making social belonging easier (Checkel 2005: 810). In the conscripted army, servicemen comply with the laws on serving as part of social norms and expectations from others, often coupled to notions of civic duty, national belonging and solidarity (Paret 1992: 55).

In a logic of consequences, however, action is the result of rational evaluations of how an action serves the individual’s preference and interest. On this view, political organisations are not so much the result of citizens led by social rules as they are a collection of “contracts negotiated among actors with conflicting interests and varying resources” (March & Olsen 2008: 949). Whether there is coordination or not depends on the “bargaining positions” between the state and the citizen. As in any business, thus, in a professional army the soldier serves as a consequence of personal interest, working conditions and financial offers.

In military sociology, Charles Moskos among others similarly describe the distinctions by calling the professional army “occupational” and the conscripted army “institutional” (1977a: 44; 1977b; 1986; 1988; Segal 1983; 1986; Segal & Hee-Yoon 1984). A conscripted army is *institutional* because the loyalty is not to the individual-self, but to the institution and the values it embodies. Action in an institutional setting is directed toward a “presumed higher good” (Moskos 1977a; 1977b: 24). Elsewhere, Moskos has argued that the institutional model is based on a “calling”, which the individual willingly acts on because he wants to belong to a social group.⁶ The professional army is *occupational* since it appeals to “marketplace values” (see also Huntington 1957: 19-59). The soldiers enjoy influence in determining their salaries and working conditions in exchange of meeting the, contractually defined, obligations of

⁶“A calling usually enjoys high esteem from the larger community because it is associated with notions of self-sacrifice and complete dedication to one’s role. ...One thinks of the... fixed terms of enlistment, liability for 24-hour service availability... subjection to military discipline and law, and inability to resign, strike, or negotiate over working conditions... [and] compensation received in non-cash form” (Moskos 1977b: 24; 1977a: 42).

their employment (1977: 43). The point with introducing the two different logics is to highlight that the two armies *differ* in how they persuade their members to act. In the conscripted army, soldiers are persuaded to serve because they fulfil a socially defined role. In the professional army, soldiers are persuaded by the conditions of their employment contract. Importantly (and in spite of Moskos' slightly confusing terminology), both kinds of armies are nonetheless inculcated with social codes on how or how not to act. That is, in both armies action takes place within an institutional framework, only different ones.⁷

Institutions are generally described as “the prescriptions that humans use to organise all forms of repetitive and structured interactions” (Ostrom 2005: 3). They govern action by *informal* rules, such as “sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct” and *formal* rules such as “constitutions, laws, property rights” (North 1991: 97).⁸ It is when a behaviour recurs over time that it settles into an institutionalised form. Samuel Huntington denotes this process as “institutionalisation”, the “process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability” (1968: 12). The more institutionalised a practice is the more resilient and effective it will be in achieving its purpose, simply because the behaviours become more stable, predictable and certain. In Sweden, military service included both formal and informal rules. Its formal rules denote those that can be found in the laws or policies that stipulate, for instance, a universal duty for all 18 year olds to take an enlistment test and for all that are enlisted to proceed with basic training. Informal rules are by definition more fluid. Normally, informal rules are distinguished from formal rules by the *location* of enforcement. Formal rules are enforced at the state level and informal rules at the level of society. On this view, the informal rules of military service can be found only in society. They structure behaviour through norms, traditions and expectations on what to do and not to do. Although this dissertation supports this distinction, for our purposes the “location” differentiation has an important analytical drawback since it tells us little about how informal rules are created, and therefore limits our estimations of how, when and why they change.

This is especially important when it comes to analysing change in military service because the informal rules of military service were a product of formal policies and policy makers who acted as norm entrepreneurs, transforming formal rules into norms and moral expectations

⁷Geoffrey Hodgson among others has argued that most organisations are also institutions (2006: 10).

⁸Douglass North's definition of institutions is roughly similar to Elinor Ostrom's, namely the “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction” (North 1991: 97).

in society. In contrast to what one can believe when one considers the positive and stable support of military service in Swedish society, the policy on military service was in the early 1900s not a response to “bottom up” pressures from society, nor was its spreading in society during the 1900s (as we will see later, antimilitarism was among the working class widespread in the early 1900s). The institutionalisation of military service was an entirely “top down” process; The result of policies by the highest political authority: the state. Helmke and Levitsky have distinguished between “reactive” and “spontaneous” informal institutions (2003: 17). Spontaneous informal institutions “emerge independently of (and frequently pre-date) formal institutional structures”, whereas reactive informal institutions:

are established in direct response to incentives created by the formal rules. Whether they are created to “fill in the gaps” of, mitigate the effects of, substitute for, or subvert the formal rules, these informal institutions are created by actors who are motivated by an expected outcome associated with the relevant formal structures. A variety of bureaucratic, legislative, judicial, intra-party, and other organisational norms fall into this category, as do many of the informal power-sharing arrangements that govern elite behaviour within democratic regimes (Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 17).⁹

The informal institution that developed around military service was a reactive one. Even though military service, as I have argued, developed “a life of its own”, it did this as a consequence of a stable and predictable legal framework and set of policies that supported military service in different ways (social policy and macroeconomic policy included). By working with formal policies (or formal rules), policy makers signalled to society what it expected as appropriate behaviours, norms and attitudes, not only with regard to military service but with regard to the citizen’s responsibility for the collective good writ large. Military service was one example of signalling what was expected concerning the individual citizen’s part in the common defence. Paying (comparatively

⁹It should also be noted that when it comes to explaining changes to informal reactive or spontaneous institutions, Helmke and Levitsky believe, as does this dissertation, the functionalist approach is insufficient: “A key challenge for informal institutional analysis... lies in avoiding accounts that either take informal institutions as historical givens or explain them in functionalist terms. To do this, we must move beyond the what and the why of informal institutions to identify the who and the how. An important first step in explaining the emergence of any informal institution is to identify the relevant actors, coalitions, and interests behind it” (Ibid: 18).

speaking) high income taxes was another way of signalling what was expected of the individual in contributing to common welfare. The policy on a universal duty to serve signalled that the citizen had a (moral) responsibility to do his part in creating the military defence of the nation. These policies created certain norms and, in the same way, removing the duty to serve weakens the norm and can even set in process a development of a new norm where military service is not something you have to do. This is how policies create and change norms and expectations on individual behaviour in society.

The meaning of this is that although informal rules “live” and “grow up” at the level of society, they are born with policies crafted by policy makers and their narratives. In his doctoral dissertation on the swap in Sweden from full employment policy — a distinctive mark of the so called Swedish Model — to disinflation policies, Johannes Lindwall has argued similarly on the role that policies have in shaping norms in society and what it means for public policy (Lindwall 2004). He argues that in policy areas with far reaching consequences for the development of society: “the state’s involvement in social life also produces expectations, norms, regarding the state’s role and purpose” and that policies are instrumental in shaping the norms that govern not only the relation between the state and society, but also in shaping the development of public policy (2004: 149). This is especially true for Sweden, he argues, because “the objective of full employment became linked to the very idea of the modern state” and when the state decided to abandon full employment policies in favour of disinflation this “was a process intimately linked to developments on the level of norms: just as full employment had led to new ways of thinking about the state, giving up that objective required a break with these norms” (2004: 150). The point is that policies are sometimes used to create norms and when policies change so do the norms in society, and in ways that will affect future policy. I agree with this view and argue it applies equally to our study of military service: what policies the state decides on in recruitment also affect the norms on serving. The argument that Lindwall presents can even be expected to apply even more strongly to our case of military service. Military service only engages half of the population for a brief period of time, and it does not affect the private affairs of people (the way full employment policies do). Further, the possibility for creating these norms are primarily through physical engagement in the institution (basic training) which is limited to a brief period of time. But to function effectively military service nonetheless depends on a stable presence of supportive norms from all society (not only the servicemen) and over time. This places certain demands on the recruitment policy in the sense that it must be designed in ways so that it engages the entire pop-

ulation, if not physically then at least morally and socially. Changes in the formal policies of military service can therefore be expected to have significant effects on the informal institution of military service. In sum: policy formation in a policy area such as recruitment policy must take into account the norms it creates and weakens in society, especially if norms are an important part for the policy to function as intended.

That policies shape norms have further consequences for the research design in this dissertation. For us to understand and analyse change we must direct our analytical focus to how the formal rules develop during the studied period, and with this information estimate what kinds of informal rules policy makers encourage and/or discourage with their policies. The basic theoretical assumption in this dissertation is that the formal rules of military service are not only important for setting the “formal” structure of military service, they are essential for providing the informal “social” structure of military service, too.¹⁰

Now then, if both kind of armies have institutional frameworks, then why do military sociologists describe the conscripted army as “institutional” and the professional army as “occupational”? The crucial point of difference is that the conscripted army depends on the presence of a logic of appropriateness. It is part of the model that there are no financial inducements and that you are compelled by law to serve. A conscripted army would not be possible if there was not some basic level of willing compliance to obey the law. It *depends* on its members to act “appropriately”.¹¹ It is not possible, or at least not desirable, to coerce tens of thousands of 18 year old men to serve. As a growing strand of literature in institutional theory has identified, informal institutions have an important problem-solving and supportive role for “formal institutions”. They are potent in solving problems of social interaction and coordination as well as enhancing the efficiency and performance of public policies (Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 11). This is also why, historically, states that have used conscripted armies have also stressed to the public the importance of “collective responsibility”, “national union”, “civic duty”, “solidarity” and similar. By opting for a conscripted army there is, in other words, a *functional* imperative for creating and maintaining certain *social* imperatives. In contrast, the professional army is at much greater freedom to engage in both a logic of appropriateness (e.g. patriotism, sense of civic duty) and a logic consequences (attract-

¹⁰It is on this assumption that we will examine informal rules by looking at how the formal rules develop, and not examine what society thinks at any given moment during the period from 1990 to 2009.

¹¹It should be noted that there is, to be sure, a logic of consequences in play also in the institutional model. Just consider the brute fact that if a serviceman fails to comply with the law he risks penalisation.

ive working conditions and financial compensation). Where the two armies differ, from an institutional perspective, is the *relative standing* of the two logics in the organisation. In the professional army the logic of consequences is master (without attractive pay it will be hard to recruit soldiers), in the conscripted army the logic of appropriateness is master (without laws on serving, penalty for not serving, and without a collective ethos of serving and social sanctions for not serving, it will be difficult to enlist servicemen without falling back on pure coercion). You can hardly add financial inducements to military service without at the same time compromising the basic institutional logic of the recruitment policy (that serving in the military is a legal duty without pay).

The basic conclusion from this exercise is that: to function effectively a conscripted army must be designed, with policies, so that it spawns a logic of appropriateness for serving in the Armed Forces.

1.3 Military Service in Sweden

The Swedish experience of military service is a successful example of how policy makers created a reactive informal institution and how a set of formal and informal rules over time become nested within a network of other institutions and became institutionalised in society. Military service survived more than forty governments and enjoyed support from both the Armed Forces and the public. During the cold war the Swedish Armed Forces conscripted as much as 80 percent of the male cohort of 18 year olds. Achieving this without greater ordeal suggests a logic of appropriateness has been alive in society. One token of this is that the defence willingness in society has been exceptionally high, between 66 and 84 percent (with the odd exception of 55 percent in 1955), placing Sweden among the countries with the highest defence willingness in the world (Borell 1983: 45; SPF 1973-1990).¹² The polling also shows that the defence willingness among the young have been exceptionally high, ranging between 61 and 88 percent (SPF 1992). When measures on military service began in 1973, those in favour ranged between 81 and 90 percent in the general population, and between 73 and 89 percent

¹²The Board for Psychological Defence (SPF) did not measure support for military service until 1973. Before that it measured the defence willingness as a proxy for support of military service. It did this with a yes or no question: "Assume that Sweden is under attack, would you defend the country even if the outcome is unknown?" This measure was in particular used as a proxy for the support for military service among the young, given that about half of the eighteen to twenty-four year olds just had served or was about to serve.

among 18 to 24 year olds (*Ibid*).¹³

It was the then Conservative Party that in the late 1800s suggested that Sweden follow the European trend and switch to a conscripted army (Ericson 1999; Leander 2005). The semi-professional army that Sweden used at the time limited how large the Armed Forces could grow since it was sensitive to costs and also dependent on the ups and downs of the labour market.¹⁴ With a legal duty to serve the Armed Forces could achieve better stability and allow for (rapid) quantitative growth, should this be needed. During the cold war the party's support for military service solidified. One reason for this was that half of the territorial border between the "East" and the "West" ran through Scandinavia. For the Moderate Party, Swedish security did not begin or end with the territorial border. It had to be understood in the Nordic context.¹⁵ Norway was a member of the Nato, but not Sweden and Finland. If Sweden joined the Nato, the Western border would move from the eastern border of Norway to the east-coast of Sweden, which could escalate a aggression toward Finland from the Soviet Union. In such a case, the buffer zone between the two superpowers' sphere of interests would shrink and Sweden would share borders with the Soviet Union. For this reason the Moderate Party believed that Sweden had a moral obligation to remain nonaligned and not join Nato. It had to "go for it alone" and assume the role of a regional power in Scandinavia. To do this military service was essential since only it could create a sufficiently large army to defend a large country such as Sweden. The party's solidarity with Finland was especially important in reaching this conclusion. To the Moderate Party, Finland was both the political and the, possibly, military scene of action in the battle between democracy and socialism. Because Finland provided a buffer zone for Sweden, Sweden also had a moral obligation to share the costs for preserving the status quo in the region. It did so by remaining nonaligned and building a unilateral defence capability — thus shouldering the financial, social, political and military responsibility for geopolitical stability in Scand-

¹³The SPF polled on a yearly basis between 1975 and 1991. The support for military service was measured with a "yes" or "no" question: "Do you think it is right that the country's male population do military service for our military defence?"

¹⁴The recruitment benefited from high unemployment and suffered in low unemployment.

¹⁵One of the Soviet Union's most important military bases was located in Murmansk, only three hundred kilometres from Swedish territory. It harboured most of the Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and submarines, and more than half of the Soviet shipyard was in the Baltic. Access to and from these bases was of great significance to both power blocs in the event of a conflict in Europe. The easiest way from the Atlantic to Murmansk was by road across northern Norway, Sweden and Finland. For Swedish decision makers the implication was clear: a conflict between the power blocs would inevitably involve Sweden, maybe by using Sweden as a forward base.

inavia (Dahl 2014: 75-82; Moderate Party 1972, 1978). This was the organisational purpose of the Armed Forces, and it reduced the menu of choice when it came to choosing between a conscripted and professional army. With a purpose to unilaterally defend the entire territory and deter a militarily superior Russia there was no other option than building a large conscripted army.¹⁶ As the party put it in a motion from 1972, the decision on having a universal military service is not one reached by politicians, “but by the outside world” (Moderate Party 1972: 54). It should also be mentioned that for the Moderate Party the geopolitical situation during the cold war was one that it believed would persist for a long time. The need for a strong national defence would thus stretch far into the future, which made generous financial and political investments in the Armed Forces worthwhile.¹⁷

Notwithstanding the party’s financial and political support of conscription, aiming for great quantity of soldiers, it was equally important that the Armed Forces always strived toward efficiency and quality. Quality and efficiency was not only important for making the possible use “of the taxpayer’s money”, but also because the defence willingness of the people was dependent on their faith that the Armed Forces were capable of achieving their organisational purpose of defending Sweden (Moderate Party 1973a; Moderate Party 1973b: 39). “To maintain our country’s defence willingness”, it often repeated, “the servicemen must perceive their service as meaningful and feel that their interests are met” (Moderate Party 1973b: 40). Even though the room for modernisation during the cold war was limited because of the financial costs of conscripting nearly all men in a cohort, the Moderate Party normally suggested ways of modernising the organisation and improving its quality, without doing away with universality. One example is in 1978 when

¹⁶Sweden is a territorially large country. As large as Germany, Switzerland, Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium combined. But only with a twelfth of their population.

¹⁷One illustrative example of the party’s skepticism is the its analysis of the SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Terms) treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. For the SAP the treaty signalled the beginning of detente in Europe. For the Moderate Party, however, there was “a risk of taking the present hopes as cues for our next defence decision.” Against the SAP it stressed that the treaty “should not be allowed to influence the long term development of our defence policy.” The defence policy must take a perspective of at least ten to twenty years, and this meant there were few “possibilities for revising” the need for a strong national defence (Moderate Party 1972: 52). In 1981, it argues similarly that “the basic elements of our geopolitical situation will hardly change. Our country is placed in a vast territory of immediate significance to the [Soviet Union]. There are no signs that this will change. To the contrary, ...the strategic importance of our location will increase” (Moderate Party 1981). Only with universal conscription army could the “Armed Forces use the totality of our society’s combined defence capability” (Moderate Party 1981).

it suggested a division of the cohort in two. One part would be trained only for a few months in the basics and then serve in a local defence. The other would train for a longer period, with more sophisticated training and equipment and be used nationally. By dividing the conscripts in this way the cost of the defence would not go down, “but the training will doubtlessly become more effective” (Moderate Party 1978: 18). The Moderate Party’s approach to what determined society’s “defence willingness” was equally very different from the SAP’s, who believed that defence willingness was more likely the effect of how many that were conscripted and the equality of conscription. The two most important policies for the Moderate Party have thus been a strong national defence that is efficient in its use of resources — on the principle that it is the functional purpose of the Armed Forces that should guide any decisions on organisational design.

In political debates, the SAP has as a rule tried to stress the military worth of military service. Military service insures that the Armed Forces is understood and known by the people, which in turn make the citizens more inclined to participate in the Armed Forces, accept their demands and paying taxes for defence expenditure. Serving together in close quarters also fashions solidarity between citizens and a spirit of civic mindedness, which the Armed Forces benefit from by making it easier to recruit future conscripts and students to the military academies. The bond between the Armed Forces and society is captured with the Swedish term *folkförankring*, loosely translated as “public anchoring”. To ensure public anchoring the Armed Forces must be structured in ways that invites citizens to participate in the military. The Swedish military is for this reason referred to as *Folkförsvaret*, which in English translates into the “People’s Defence”.

Even if the military worth of military service has been important to the SAP, as an account of the party’s bond to the recruitment model it is incomplete. It is a perspective where the influence of SAP ideology is acknowledged (collective participation and social integration), but kept at arm’s length. Stopping with the functional worth we miss an important story for how military service connects with the SAP at a deeper level. We are also left with no real answer for why military service matured from a mere recruitment model in the early 1900s to an appreciated and politically untouchable institution, by the right and the left, from the 1930s to the early 2000s. The SAP’s support for the conscripted army derives from two higher-order objectives: (a) it was a vehicle for promoting social democratic values; and, (b) a conscripted army was a necessity because of the policy of neutrality, which enabled Sweden (and the party) a strong role on the international scene as norm-entrepreneur for peace and solidarity (Bjereld et al. ch. 4, 312). The

most interesting part of the SAP's support of military service is how it continuously nested it to the party's advancement of political and social rights during the 1900s. By serving in the military you must get welfare in return, and an expansive welfare system depends on solidarity, which military service helped bring into being.

This reasoning first took off with the first chairman of the party, Hjalmar Branting. In exchange for introducing military service he demanded that the Conservative opposition had to introduce suffrage to all men. As he put it in 1901: "For the civic spirit, that will give our national defence its strength, there will have to be social reform policies that lift the now neglected classes and give the step-children a place next to the privileged. ... This is why we may again repeat, that a right to vote is our first defence policy" (Branting 1900/1901). Extending the suffrage was strategically important for the SAP since this would further the possibilities to mobilise the working class politically; what Esping-Andersen has called the "power-resource theory" or "social class as agent for mobilisation" theory (Esping-Andersen 1991: 16). In the first two decades of the 1900s, the SAP's slogan was "one man, one vote, one rifle". The second chairman of the party, Per-Albin Hansson, similarly used military service as a means for integrating the working class in mainstream society.¹⁸ To this end he wanted to transform the military from a tool by the ruling class to an "ally of the working classes and its aspirations", emphasising that "the young men in the working class owe themselves and their social class this sacrifice" (Isaksson 1990: 75). In the 1920s he began describing the SAP as a party for the "people" with his speech on the "People's Home" (*folkhemmet*).¹⁹ With it, he aspired to bring into life a certain "spirit" in society where all citizens participated, did their duty, "felt obliged to pay", and was in turn duly rewarded (Isaksson 2000: 126; Esping-Andersen 1985: 28). The People's Home was fully consistent with the People's Defence and the universal military service "became one of the sites where it could be promoted, actively constructed and of course defended" (Leander 2005: 17; Molin 1991:

¹⁸Neither Branting nor Hansson believed socialist change could be brought by revolution (Berman 2006: 152-176). Socialism was an evolutionary process that had to work from within the bourgeois hegemony, through reforms (Ibid: 154-158; Karlsson 2001: 460, 498).

¹⁹The most cited part of the speech is this: "The basis of the home is community and togetherness. The good home does not recognise any privileged or neglected members, nor any favourite or stepchildren. In the good home there is equality, consideration, co-operation, and helpfulness. Applied to the great people's and citizens' home this would mean the breaking down of all the social and economic barriers that now separate citizens into the privileged and the neglected, into the rulers and the dependents, into the rich and the poor, the propertied and the impoverished, the plunderers and the plundered" (quoted in Berman 2006: 163).

389).²⁰

When the service was extended during the cold war the party also expanded the welfare. The quid-pro-quo argument that began in 1901 by Branting is visible in a 1975 report by the party's Defence Committee:

The will to defend the country is strongly rooted among the people. Our defence willingness is of course dependent on the extent to which the citizens feel solidarity and community with society. Defence policies can for this reason not be isolated to debates on weapons and expenditure. It is intimately connected to investments in the welfare of citizens, eradicating class differences and social and economic injustices (SAP 1975: 11).

An earlier example of the same nexus between social policy and defence policy reads as follows:

A positive evaluation of what the Swedish democracy can offer its citizens is the foundation for the willingness to defend the country. From this follows an obvious connection to the social, cultural and social development within the country. The experiences in the last few decades shows that in a democratic society with high employment, social security, levelling out economic differences, increasing material and cultural standard and freedom for the citizens the defence willingness will naturally follow (SAP 1960: 14).

The extension of social reforms in the 1950s, 60s and 70s had "increased the spirit of community in society" and therefore created "more and more to defend", demanding a strong defence, which only was possible by "continuing the progressive reforms", for they had become "a necessary condition for a strong national defence, which means a high willingness to defend the country... without which an effective defence is impossible" (SAP 1975: 20). This is why military service was first and foremost an "an ideological question" where issues on organisational design and purpose had "to be fitted to universal military service" because it had "in itself, always, an intrinsic worth" (Ibid: 37).

A conscripted army was also an essential part for realising the SAP's preferred foreign policy of neutrality, also it with ties to advancing political and social rights. In 1960, the SAP explicitly spells out that a large

²⁰Using military service in this way was not unique to the SAP. As Ronald Krebs have explained, using military service as a "school of the nation" was widespread in Europe and North America during the 19th and 20th century (2004; see also Hacker 1993).

conscripted army “is in the current world necessary to support our foreign policy” but that “it has been political considerations, not military, that in the end has determined a foreign policy of nonalignment... any military demands are and will be subordinate to foreign policy” (SAP 1960: 15). The preference for neutrality not only had to do with geopolitics, as in the Moderate Party. Neutrality and the large conscripted army that it required was justified by the good that Sweden could do as a neutral state. By remaining outside of the alliances in the East and the West, Sweden could position itself as an “impartial observer” on the world stage, “hold views” and “take stands” and act as a “norm-entrepreneur”, especially to promote global disarmament (Palme 1970: 1-2; Ingebritsen 2002: 11). “Having a relatively strong defence and work for peace and disarmament are two sides of the same coin” as Olof Palme once put it (1976: 17).²¹ The party (and others) believed Sweden was well positioned to assume this role given its long period of uninterrupted peace and advanced social welfare system (Bjereld 1992; Lödén 1999). Indeed, the preference for neutrality has by others been understood as an extension of the party’s welfare policies (Ruth 1984; Kuisma 2007; Bergman 2007; Trägårdh 2002). Lars Trägårdh has for instance described Sweden’s international activism during the cold war as being about “spread[ing] the Good Message of social democracy” (Trägårdh 2002: 132). Neutrality and social welfare both had the same goal of improving justice in the world and ultimately rested on a similar moral argument. They were, as one scholar has put it “two different colour threads that are sewed into the same socio-political fabric” (Ruth 1984: 71; Kuisma 2007: 13). Welfare investments at home provided a moral imperative of doing the same abroad, and helping distant strangers placed a moral imperative of doing the same at home. As Palme used to emphasise: “we cannot speak about solidarity across borders if we forget those who are poor within our own borders” (quoted in Bergman 2007: 85-86). As part of this narrative Sweden was an eager participant in UN-led peace-building missions and “bridge-building” in conflicts (Bjereld 1995). The two most important policies for the SAP were thus a universal military service that encapsulated as many servicemen as possible, and a foreign policy of neutrality that enabled Sweden a progressive role on the international scene.

It is important to underscore that the SAP’s preference for an encompassing military service and building an extensive military defence of Sweden was by no means certain. The SAP were strongly antimilitarist in its early years (1900-1930). The dominant mode of thought was

²¹A battery of studies have examined the SAP’s preference for neutrality with focus on its ethics (Brommesson 2007; Nilsson 1991; Bjereld et al. 2008; Möller & Bjereld 2010; Möller 2011).

that the Armed Forces were a bulwark of capitalist society and inimical to the interests of the working class (Ericson 1999: 106; Granström 2002: 32). The Armed Forces posed an “internal threat” to the working class because it was considered an instrument by those in power. To be sure, at the time the “aristocracy” – some 0.25 percent of the Swedish population – made up a full 38 percent of the officer corps (Borell 1989: 32). When military service was introduced in 1901 it was consequently opposed by large portions of the SAP, especially its more left leaning segments. These segments urged the party leadership for a policy either of complete disarmament or, alternatively, a militia similar to the Swiss model with “the rifle on the kitchen wall”. The views of chairman Branting and Hansson must therefore be considered a minority view.

Why, then, did they prefer military service? Their analysis was that Sweden was governed by a small ruling class, but the ambition of Branting and Hansson was to tilt the balance of power in favour of the considerably larger working class. One way to do this was through revolution, as the left-leaning segments in the party suggested. Another, however, was to work through strategic reforms. The latter was the view supported by Branting and Hansson, and military service was one way of achieving this. For them and for their successors throughout the 1900s, the “socialist revolution” was an *evolutionary* process. It had to develop by democratic procedures and reform, working from *within* the existing bourgeois hegemony, not outside of it (Karlsson 2001: 460, 498). For Branting, military service could help in this regard. As an example, Branting believed the working class was in need of a “deproletarianisation.”²² The weak position of the working class had to do with a lack of political power which led them inactive, compliant and disinterested in society. The “social isolation” of the working class was “the central problem of proletarianisation” as one of his closest advisors put it (Ibid). Defeating it meant devising political strategies which “humanised” the working class. Military service yielded such humanising effects since it forced the working class to participate in society. He reveals the connection between evolutionary socialism and military service in his speech on the International Workers’ Day in 1901:

Pure defence-nihilism is sectarianism. Least of all if fits, more deeply, a social class with great aspirations in society, which feels that the future is ahead of her, and which prepares herself to recapture her own and too long withheld inheritance (Branting 1900/01).

By participating in society the working class would be invigorated and

²²Branting’s was heavily influenced by professor of sociology Mr. Gustav Steffen (Karlsson 2001; Isaksson 2002).

stand a chance of shaping society to work in its favour (Karlsson 2001: 362). Hansson was of a similar mind.²³ By contributing in equal part to society the working class would free themselves of their “slavementality” (*slavsinnne*) (Karlsson 2001: 463-470). This mentality led the working class to be indifferent on social affairs and was a cultural legacy of capitalism in which the working class had been lulled into servility and reduced to second class citizens “deprived of its basic humanity” (Ibid). It was the slave mentality that nurtured the revolutionary minded socialists to advocate antimilitarism and more generally to see the political landscape as one marked by class struggle. For the radicals, the only way to advance the interests of the working class was to redistribute income and upend the power of the wealthy by revolutionising against it. For Hansson it was a policy bound to fail since it violated democratic principles, would isolate the working class even further and would fail in bringing about the socio-psychological change he saw as necessary for long-term political change in favour of the working class (captured in the speech on the People’s Home). Above all, it was a policy that never would take the SAP to government. For Hansson, socialism was a dynamic process with giving and taking, always conditioned on the working class being prepared to engage and take responsibility for society. Politically, this led him to believe that “the working class’ full participation in society” had to be “the goal of all social democratic efforts” (Ibid).

What is more, although the SAP was divided on the issue of military service for the first decades of the 1900s, the case for military service was strengthened by the “Ådalen shootings” in 1931. In the small town of Ådalen, a group of workers took to the streets to demonstrate against their working conditions. The demonstration got out of hand and the local police called in military reinforcements. These were employed soldiers and when they arrived on the scene tumult broke out and five of the demonstrating workers were shot dead. Even if military service was introduced in 1901, by the 1930s there were still considerable parts of the military with only employed soldiers and many in the working class viewed the military as an oppressive tool of the ruling class. The Ådalen event seemed to give evidence to this view. For our purposes, the event meant that within the SAP the case for military service was strengthened. Military service was now increasingly believed to be of immediate interest to the working class since it would help them protect themselves against the risk of “internal threats”. If the working class made up the bulk of the Armed Forces it would be an ally to them, and

²³Mr. Hansson was heavily influenced by the reformist socialism of the contemporary ideologue Mr. Nils Karleby (Isaksson 1996; 2000).

no longer to the ruling class. From the days of the Ådalen-event, the SAP has held a deeply rooted antagonism against the idea of employed soldiers. If the working class wanted to voice their concerns, criticism and demand their rights, the Armed Forces had to protect Sweden not only from external but also from internal threats. The Ådalen-event has thus been a memory alive in the SAP for many years later. In 1976, Prime Minister Olof Palme argued in a speech, with direct reference to Ådalen, that: “It should be obvious for every democrat that Sweden must have a People’s Defence standing on a universal military service, not a military that could be used against its own people” (1976: 5).

Back to the institutionalisation of military service, it is no understatement that by nesting foreign-, defence- and social policy the SAP created an institutional framework that functioned as a political instrument in favour of the party’s long-term and strategic interests. The three policy areas supported one another and rested on a similar and consistent political foundation, with visible social democratic values. That the SAP successfully developed such a strategy of mutually supportive policies has been noted by others as a characteristic trait of the party (Berman 2011). Indeed, the relative power of the party in Sweden during the 1900s has by others been explained with its proficiency in “institutionalising” social democracy:

[the SAP] inculcated an ethos of the public interest and championed institutions that promoted and solidified that ethos. These norms and institutions played a critical role in creating the public-spirited Swedish citizenry... The SAP did this not only because it believed that such societal values were desirable in themselves, but also because it recognised that such values were necessary to support the welfare state and other policies to which it was committed (Ibid: 241, 251).

Military service was for many decades one of the sharpest tools by the party to entrench that “ethos” which Berman refers to. Esping-Andersen has similarly argued that the “beauty of the social democratic strategy” in Scandinavian countries rests not in taxing, welfare spending or mobilisation of the working class, but in building an institutionalised base that supports the welfare state (1991: 32; 1985).²⁴ The SAP successfully cultivated a “collective identity” for these groups and “tied them to the fate of the labour movement generally” (1985: 32). This is partly also

²⁴This is part of what is often referred to as the “power resource theory”. Social welfare is a function of social democratic parties’ skill in mobilising its resources, including institutional design (Esping-Andersen 1985; Korpi 1988).

why opinion polls show that the SAP constituency is highly supportive of military service but have a marginal interest in defence policy generally (SPF 1993: 92, 100). In sum, the SAP's approach to military service has been one where military service has been viewed as great tool for national integration, and what Ronald Krebs has called a "school of the nation", especially shoring up the national construct in social democratic values such as equality, solidarity and doing one's part for the common good at home and abroad (Krebs 2004). This is nothing unique to the SAP, as Krebs argue: "This view of the military as a key institution for the labelling and transmission of social values has roots stretching back to ancient Greece, but the armed forces first achieved great popularity as a nation builder toward the end of the nineteenth century" (Ibid: 85).

The nexus between social- and defence policy was supported in the top segment of the Armed Forces. In 1947, the Supreme Commander Helge Jung proposed an organisational expansion capable of fostering national union and solidarity between citizens (Jung 1947; see also Sköld 1974). Paraphrasing prime minister Hansson's speech on the People's Home, Jung suggests that Sweden's defence willingness can be damaged if social inequality is allowed to increase: "Just like in social policies, national defence is concerned about security, without which there can be no real freedom. The two are inseparable" (Jung 1947: 14). Further, he points out the connection between a strong defence and a strong welfare system on the argument that "national security is an indispensable condition for social security, but inner freedom and inner security is just as important for building a strong national defence" (Ibid: 18).

The Armed Forces' possible support of the interdependence between social- and defence policy has been noted elsewhere. In one study, Gunnar Åselius has traced the relative success of two "competing visions of national defence" (2005: 28). One is the People's Defence and the other is the High-Tech Defence. The People's Defence has been "the logical way to defend the Swedish People's Home" whereas the High-Tech Defence emphasises military professionalism and modernisation as conditions for a democratically legitimate military. The two emphasises different versions of modernity: If "modernity is to form the basis for the nation's identity, what part of that modernity should be reflected in the country's Armed Forces? ...should it be informed by the democratic and egalitarian ideals that pervade Swedish society, or by notions of technical effectiveness and rational management?" (Ibid: 29). In this dissertation I believe that the SAP have strived to the former, and developed an issue-reputation for this, and that the Moderate Party have developed an issue reputation for the latter, even if it for purely functional reasons have accepted the organisational design that follows

from the former. In any case, and as Åselius also concludes, during the cold war the People's Defence and its version of modernity has more or less consistently (exception 1958) trumped the High Tech Defence (Ibid: 35-36).

The People's Defence was not a view that the SAP "forced upon reluctant military professionals", but one which the military has willingly accepted (Ibid: 29). Whenever economic cuts have been necessary, military service has been spared (and maybe unwisely so). As a rule, cuts have targeted the Air Force and the Navy, more than the Army where the majority of officers and conscripts served. When cuts to the Army have been inevitable, as in the 1970s, the damage was limited to postponing or even cancelling the modernisation of equipment.

1.4 The Problem

One consequence of conceptualising the conscripted army as an institution, and observing that military service over the 1900s developed into an institutional feature of Swedish society, is that it leads to the expectation that it *should* persist over time. According to a large body of literature, "institutions are sticky; that is, they persist over time and are only changed with great difficulty" (Fukuyama 2011: 17, 450; see also Ikenberry 1998-1999: 45). Once an institution has formed, it tends to reinforce itself, creating "positive feedbacks", leading to "path dependence" and inertia (2008: 167-169; see also Krasner 1988: 83; Goodin 1996: 23).

There are several reasons for this. One is *unpredictability*. Given the complexity of social systems it is difficult to predict ahead of time the possible end-states of new solutions. Another is the large *set up costs* of new practices. Changing an institutional set-up is costly both in terms of bringing "in" the new but also in "doing away" with the old. An institution is usually nested within a network of other institutions and rules, making change costly. If the benefits of change cannot be precisely known organisations tend to avoid change. It will be less costly to proceed on the same path than going on a new (Levi 1997: 28). There are "increasing returns" for staying with the existing path (Pierson 2000: 252). One increasing return has to do with *learning*. With recurrent use, repetition and experience of a practice this reduces uncertainty and lower the transaction costs for achieving the organisational ends. We form expectations around rules and changing them makes predictability harder. Returns also increase as a consequence of *coordination effects*. We shape our behaviour in light of the social expectations we have of others. The benefits that the individual receives

from conforming to a practice is higher if others act in the same way. This logic is well documented in the social sciences, as Alexander Wendt has noted: “identities and interests are not only learned in interaction, but sustained by it” (1999: 331). With long standing public policies, a standard of appropriateness develops, which produces a collective and self-reinforcing process (Hall 1993; Blyth 2002). Taken together, institutions tend to be conservative because human behaviour tend to be conservative.

In the literature on military organisations it is especially assumed that military organisations *qua* military organisations are reluctant in taking on new practices, and have very high thresholds for doing away with already developed practices (e.g. Lang 2013 [1965]; Allison 1999; Kier 1997; Rosen 1991; Posen 1984; 2015; Avant 1993). This literature does not ask why militaries change. It asks why it is that militaries are *reluctant* to change. As Janine Davidson puts it: “In contrast to Clausewitz, modern theories of military change suggest that militaries will have a difficult time innovating at all. ...The critical point of agreement among scholars is that if left alone, the military would be unlikely to change” (2010: 10). Barry Posen has argued that military organisations are risk-averse because of the uncertain conditions in which they operate (1984; 2015). There is uncertainty from the international environment, from domestic politics, from changes in defence budget, from society on which it depends for personnel, and from the fact that Armed Forces rarely (and luckily) get to practice what they train for. This means that the possibility for acting “rationally” is bounded. They therefore develop practices to control as many sources of uncertainty as possible. They create a “fictive certainty”, or what James March and Herbert Simon once called “bounded rationality”, based on “institutionalised principles”, “standard operating procedures”, tradition, routines and habits — all to heighten the sense of control and certainty (March & Simon 1958; Allison 1999). The fictive reality is what makes up the military “doctrine” (Posen 1984; 2015). The doctrine helps the Armed Forces direct their efforts, send messages to militaries in other countries, speak to society on what it must provide in terms of people and money, inform what the Armed Forces are doing and enables organisational coordination and cooperation, not the least on the battlefield. This is why Armed Forces favour the known over the unknown and why change and experimentation only are accepted if they minimise disruption.

When military service was suspended in 2009, the centre-right government thus violated the expectation of institutional theory. Yet it should also be noted that with the decision the government at the same time joined Sweden to a European trend where a growing number of states since the 1990s already had swapped from conscripted to profes-

sional armies. This trend had led some to talk of a “transformation of Europe’s armed forces” or the “definite end of the mass army” (King 2011; Dandeker 1994; Haltiner 1998). The transformation was one where the former policy-dyad of territoriality-universality was replaced by a more fluid dyad of expeditionary missions and a “concentration” of military capability that placed a premium on efficiency and quality (King 2011: 32). Even if Sweden was among the last countries in Europe to swap recruitment policy the speed of change from 1990 to 2009 was still fast. As Kjell Engelbrekt has noted:

Seen over a twenty-year period the transition has been radical. ...a civil servant at the ministry for foreign affairs or the Armed Forces who had been in coma the last twenty years would have a very hard time recognising himself. To be sure, the changes have been underway in two decades, but are nonetheless dramatic in their character and [and have altered] the basic premises [of Sweden’s defence policy] (2010: 10).

The question, then, is whether the Swedish outcome can be explained with reference to the rich literature on the European transformation? The explanatory concepts in this literature have been dominated by rational-functional arguments: pointing to deficiencies in the conscripted army and that these were solved by swapping to a professional army. This, in short, was why European states swapped. Three explanatory categories can be identified in the plethora of studies over the European transformation: Evolution-Chock, Nato, and Social Critique.

Table 1.1: Taxonomy of explanatory concepts

	<i>Agent to agent</i>	<i>Structure to agent</i>	<i>Agent to structure</i>	<i>Structure to structure</i>
<i>Social Power Material Power</i>		Social Critique		
<i>Functionalism</i>	Nato	Evolution-Chock		
<i>Levels of analysis:</i>	<i>Individual</i>	<i>Systemic</i>	<i>Individual</i>	<i>System-to-system</i>

In Table 1.1 both “Nato” and “Evolution-Chock” are categorised as func-

tional.²⁵ It should however be noted that the mechanism behind “Social Critique” also has functional properties. The problem to be solved is not a military one, as in Nato and Evolution-Chock, but a social one of criticism from society. All categories are similar in that they perceive the change to be driven by an “outside” structure that compels the agent, in this case the Armed Forces, to change. Nato is slightly different in this sense since this explanation points to the leverage that one agent (Nato) has over another (the government or Armed Forces in a country). Though it should be pointed out that changes in the Nato in turn are, possibly, the result of structural changes.

Evolution-Chock. “If, in warfare, a certain means turns out to be highly effective, it will be used again; it will be copied by others and become fashionable; and so, backed by experience, it passes into general use and is included in theory” (Clausewitz 1976 [1832]: 125). In this passage Carl von Clausewitz spells out the “mimetic principle” of war. In a struggle for survival, states adapt to the evolving demands of the international system (Waltz 1979: 76-77; Resende-Santos 2007: 7; Hobson 2003: 26). As they do they abandon outdated practices and adopt new alternatives. If an organisation has failed to evolve it can experience a “punctuated equilibrium” (Krasner 1984). “Equilibria are upset, norms break down, and new institutions are generated” (Orren & Skowronek 1994: 316). With the end of the cold war “new wars” replaced “old wars” (Krause & Williams 1996: 229; Buzan 1991; Crawford 1991; Kaldor 1998; 1999; 2013; Duffield 2001). These were “non-trinitarian” and rendered Armed Forces structured along the “Clausewitzian lines” obsolete (Kaldor 2013: 12, 138; Creveld 1991: 49).²⁶

Another chock-theory can be found in the literature on the “revolution in military affairs” (RMA) (Snow 1991; Toffler and Toffler 1993; Jablonsky 1994; Cohen 1996; Biddle 1996). The RMA replaced mass armed force with special forces on the ground, supported by aerial bombardment from the sky. Essential to the new doctrine was that new technology enabled better communication between soldiers on the ground and the central command. In Sweden, it has been argued that this revolution prompted the “military elite” to favour a military strategy that, in the long run, rendered a conscripted army obsolete (Agrell 2011: 51, 103-109, 199). Even if the other factors also contributed to the decision, such as the focus on expeditionary missions and budget cuts, the RMA-

²⁵In spite of the fact that there is no, or only marginal, literature written with reference to for instance “structure to structure” I keep these boxes to point out where the literature has developed and where it has not.

²⁶It should be mentioned that this perspective has been contested by others. James Burk and Karl Haltiner has argued that the priority to out-of-area operations by no means prevented using military service (Burk 1992: 56; Haltiner 2006: 370).

debate has a special role in phasing out military service in Sweden. As Agrell puts it:

The big change of the Swedish military did not take place in a closed system. The American RMA-debate played a critical role, both as a source of inspiration in the question of technological possibilities and by presenting a threat against which the People's Defence with its orientation toward strategic defence and large organisation was portrayed not only as inferior but also as hopelessly old-fashioned (2011: 151).

Eva Haldén has also studied the Swedish defence reform, and offers a slightly different account, but also based on a rational-functional argument. In her doctoral dissertation she sets out to give an account of the "circumstances that affected the possibility of radical transformation" to the Swedish Armed Forces in the post-cold war period (Haldén 2007: 4). She does not treat military service specifically, though like Agrell she points out that the reform was transformative in scope with an ambition of replacing the "People's Defence" with a "High-tech Defence". Whereas Agrell seems to point out the personal interests of certain high-ranking officers in the Armed Forces, for Haldén the transformation was a more straightforward matter of civil servants (the high-ranking officers) acting rationally to external changes and on political instructions. Throughout the process the "reformers" in the Headquarters remained committed to what she calls the "instrumentalist perspective" (Ibid: 5, 211).

From an instrumentalist perspective public organisations are viewed as more or less neutral tools or instruments in service of society. The purpose of these organisations or authorities is to the best of their abilities, and within existing laws and rules, execute legitimately decided political decisions (Ibid: 7).

Armed with this perspective, Haldén portrays the reform as a rational process that was disrupted by unwelcome interruptions, chiefly cuts in the defence budget and lack of time for the Armed Forces to conduct a careful analysis of how to conduct an orderly change (Ibid: 4, 98-100, Ch. 6). It is however difficult to tell Haldén's views of how these two factors affected the end-result of the reform since she deliberately avoids any such judgements (Ibid: 28).

Neither Agrell nor Haldén examine recruitment policy specifically, but they agree that an important backdrop to the reform was the lack of modernisation during the cold war. To be sure, the Armed Forces struggled to keep up a sufficient pace of modernisation during the cold

war. What is more, from the 1960s and onward the size of the conscripted cohort was not in balance with the size of the military expenditure, which created a system imbalance in quantity and quality. Together with a growing demographic size of available servicemen, the universality principle led to delayed, postponed or even cancelled modernisations.

When political decisions in favour of modernisation and quality began in the 1990s, the purpose was however not to change the recruitment model or move away from a conscripted army. On the contrary, the arguments from both the SAP, the Moderate Party and the Supreme Commanders (except from 2007 and onward) was that adjustments were necessary to *preserve* the legitimacy and effective functioning of military service in a new governing context. The argument from evolution and new wars draw on the same mechanism as the chock-based theories. Armed Forces that fail to evolve will sooner or later suffer from an external chock, and with this follows an immediate need for draconic change. In our case, the evolvment in question mainly has to do with the Armed Forces' expeditionary capability. Armed Forces with little or no experience of doing this and with a conscripted army will be more likely to shift to a professional army when they also adjust their organisational purpose. When the cold war ended, overseas operations were organisationally understood in the Swedish Armed Forces. Since 1956, it had regularly participated in overseas operations and had in this process developed organisational procedures and practices to that end (Ydén 2008). In the period between 1956 and 1995 Sweden deployed an average of 2099 soldiers per year, with an average of 2 casualties per year (Armed Forces 2017). From 1995 to 2014 Sweden deployed an average of 913 soldiers per year, with an average casualty rate of less than one per year (Ibid). The movement toward expeditionary capabilities cannot be said to have "chocked" the Swedish Armed Forces or caused a punctuated equilibrium. To the contrary, a list of defence ministers and supreme commanders stressed the importance of military service as a consequence of the changed environment and the resulting new (political) commitment to expeditionary missions. Soldiers with civil backgrounds — as conscripts had — were believed to be a valuable asset in conflict-resolution. In addition, when Sweden responded to the European trend of a modern Armed Forces capable of expeditionary missions, this happened in the years between 1999 and 2001, though the whole point of this change was to keep military service. Finally, when Sweden suspended military service in 2009 it was many years after most European states. By then it was visible that the swap from a conscripted to a professional army was also marred by severe problems in recruitment and retention of soldiers, giving rise to volumes with titles such as *Europe without soldiers?* (Trech & Leuprecht 2010). That the pro-

fessional army had severe recruitment and retention difficulties across Europe was information that was fully available and presented to the responsible policy makers in 2008 and 2009 (Tolgfors 2017; Svård 2017). Thus, whereas there are several possible answers to the development of the Swedish defence reform in general, this does not automatically mean that these answers also apply to the 2009 decision.

Nato. The transformation evolved together with the enlargement of Nato in eastern Europe. Nato uses “standardisation agreements” for all members. The purpose is to ensure that all members can operate together on, for instance, expeditionary missions. Conscripts cannot be used abroad and expeditionary forces are expensive. For this reason many new members have reshaped their organisations in the process of becoming members of the Nato (Donnelly 2000; Edmunds 2003: 157). Sweden was not a member of the Nato and had no plans of joining. Although Sweden became a partner in the Nato-led *Partnership for Peace* in 1994, together with Finland, this did not compel Sweden to change its policy for recruiting soldiers. Nato explicitly abstains from meddling with the internal affairs of its member- and partner states.²⁷

Social Critique. In military sociology, the swap from conscripting to employing soldiers is believed to be a bottom-up social mechanism. Armed Forces are vulnerable to social pressures because they are “open-ended systems” (Feld 1977). It has been argued that with the end of the cold war European societies wanted to move away from the “draft ideology” where the master values were nationalism, honour, obedience, solidarity and civic duty, to instead champion individualism, contractual obligations, freedom and norm critique (Burk 1992: 47; Dandeker 1994; 2006; Van der Meulen & Manigart 1997; Haltiner 1998; Moskos 2000; Manigart 2003: 331). The causal mechanism suggested is that is that change is rooted in pressures from society and their preferences for a professional over a conscripted army, and that policy makers as well as the Armed Forces have merely responded to this by replacing the conscripted with a professional army.

In Sweden, military service enjoyed a high level of social, political and military support. A poll in 2009, a few months before the decision to suspend military service, showed that 63 percent of the population supported military service (Sifo 2009). Incidentally, the largest support could be found among young men. This poll followed a fairly stable trend that could be observed throughout the 1990s and into the first decade of the 00s. Between 1992 and 1994, the *Board for Psychological Defence* (SPF) polled the attitude toward the serviceman’s

²⁷It should be mentioned that Nato members such as Norway and Denmark developed expeditionary capabilities by a mix-system of conscripts and professionals.

duty to immediately mobilise if called on by the military. The support ranged between 87 and 91 percent in the general population, and between 88 and 90 percent among 18-24 year olds. In 1995 to 2000, the SPF asked whether conscripts should or should not be financially compensated. One third believed military service is a duty without pay, whereas two thirds believed conscripts should be compensated (SPF 1995-2000). Does this tell anything about the support for military service? Both yes and no. The issue is the fairness of the system, given that some serve while others are exempted. Yet it involved no debate on the desirability of the model. In 2000 to 2009, the SPF polled the level of support for three alternative models: voluntary military service (whether doing the service should be based on voluntary interest), military service (traditionally understood) and employed soldiers (voluntary soldiers on employment contracts). It is only the last alternative that departs from the idea of military service. The support for the traditional military service ranged between 30 and 52 percent, a voluntary military service between 16 and 29 percent, and employed soldiers between 14 and 43 percent (SPF 2000-2009).

In sum: up until the late 1990s the public was highly supportive of military service. In 2000 the support for military service dropped by more than twenty percent compared to 1991, and continued to fall in the following years without regaining its historical popularity. In spite of this military service was still by far the most popular model and there is no public criticism or “bottom-up pressure” to swap to a professional army. Military service did not suffer from social critique, even if the support was weaker in the 2000s compared to the 1960s, 70s and 80s.

Shortcomings

If we permit a contingent generalisation of the European causal path it would look something like this. A state has no hostile border, is a member of the Nato (or will soon be), has a presence of social criticism and the Armed Forces are insufficiently prepared for new wars and lags behind in military technology.²⁸ Hence the state decides to abolish military service.

The Swedish experience deviates from this path. On the explanatory concepts the Swedish values point in favour of preserving military service or have only weak values for suspension. Sweden should theoretically behave as an “easiest test case” (George & Bennett 2005: 122).

²⁸States that would fall into this category include: Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium.

Its weak or negative values on the explanatory concepts suggests a likelihood for preserving military service. However, the actual outcome in Sweden means that instead of being an easy test case, Sweden is a “deviant case”. It deviates from the expectations we have from existing explanatory concepts (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 302). It is beyond doubt that new conditions raised issues of prudent adjustments of the Swedish Armed Forces. It is less obvious how or in what way the explanatory factors (listed above) compelled a Swedish decision to swap to a professional army. In general, it is not possible to convincingly show that military service was suspended in Sweden for the same reasons that it was suspended in other European countries. Nor is it possible to argue that the main ideas of the Swedish defence reform also prompted the 2009 decision. The main issues of the existing literature are the following: (a) Sweden suffered from no social criticism against military service; (b) Sweden’s response to new wars and the RMA was different from that of many other European states, not only in kind but also in time. Sweden responded to new wars and RMA with a political commitment to preserve by modernising military service, which happened in 2000/01, and later in 2004; (c) When Sweden suspended military service in 2009 it was many years after other European states had already done this and by then the case for suspension had changed in a negative direction, advising *not* to change to a professional army. The experiences from other countries pointed to serious problems in recruitment and retention of soldiers in a professional army, in such a way that the swap hampered instead of facilitated expeditionary missions. In summary, the literature offers no convincing account that can explain why Sweden suspended military service in 2009.

A general weakness in the literature on the European transformation is that it has predominantly offered functionalist arguments.²⁹ Explaining change has been a relatively straightforward task of examining the Armed Forces’ functioning, on the presumption that if there is a deficiency in the organisation it will automatically change. From this perspective the analytical task has been to *ex post factum* identify possible factors that can rationalise decisions by looking into deficiencies in conscripted armies in relation to new organisational purposes, and then comparing these weaknesses to the strengths of professional armies. With this approach the explanations omit the widely shared assumption that the conscripted army in Europe was an institutional feature of the modern welfare state, was nested into other institutions and policies, and that change in the Armed Forces has historically been

²⁹For a full criticism of functionalism in institutional change see Paul Pierson (2000).

a product of changes in both social and functional imperatives and these interact. By focusing only on military variables, the existing literature has shut out the relevance of other contextual factors, such as partisan effects, who is in government (and their political ideology), other relevant trends (for instance in public administration or the emergence of the European Union), organisational culture and institutional theory.

Military service was an institution in Sweden (and in many other European countries) and a convincing theory of institutional change must in some way specify: “*what kinds* of institutional changes [are] propelled by *what kinds* of social processes [and how these] are most likely under *what kinds* of political configurations” (Hacker et al. 2015: 180). Equally, the functional view ignores that conscripted armies are institutions in their own right, with entrenched social rules norms and expectations that are, according to the literature, change resistant. The literature on the European transformation reveals a theoretical assumption where institutional change is explained by tracing why the advocates for change were successful in pressing their demands. It is a view where everything in society can be explained by asking “who wanted it?” (see Popper 1963: 124-124). But for change to occur in highly institutionalised policies it is not enough to explain why advocates for change were successful in pressing their demands, as is popular in the literature. A full account must equally trace the *weakening* of the elements that earlier had worked to enforce the status quo. As Paul Pierson has argued: “The successful generation of grievances against particular arrangements must be understood as partly a breakdown in the factors reinforcing the status quo. An adequate theory of institutional development must pay sustained attention to the issue of institutional resilience” (2004: 142). To explain change we must therefore not only bring politics back in, we must also take an interest in the mechanisms that account for both the *retrenchment* of already existing practices and the *emergence* of new ones. This is the purpose of the following chapter.

Chapter 2

TWO MECHANISMS

In this chapter I will introduce two causal concepts, and their connected mechanisms, that I believe can help us account for the 2009 outcome in Sweden: deinstitutionalisation and issue-reputation. Both concepts are part of analysing the 2009 outcome from an institutional perspective.

Military service was not just a recruitment model in Sweden. To account for the 2009 outcome we must treat military service as an *institution* and study it from an institutional perspective. The argument in this dissertation is that with the end of the cold war, military service is thrown into a process of *deinstitutionalisation*. This was an unintended process that followed from strategic policy changes in Sweden's then two largest parties, the SAP and the Moderate Party. The concept of *issue reputation*, borrowed from the literature on partisan theory, best explains these strategic changes. In the studied period, both parties selectively championed policies which they had a developed reputation of defending and which suited the new governing context. Both parties similarly abandoned policies which they had a reputation for defending but which did *not* suit the new governing context. Both parties also adopted the enabling issue reputations of the opposing party. Their decisions on which policies to champion, which to abandon and which to steal was what initiated the deinstitutionalisation process and kept it alive for two decades. This was a process that gradually dismantled the formal and informal institutional framework of military service, reduced its functioning and efficiency, and ultimately led to the 2009 outcome. This dissertation therefore identifies two mechanisms that account for the 2009 outcome: (a) Deinstitutionalisation explains how the institutional framework of military service was dismantled; (b) Issue reputation explains why deinstitutionalisation emerged and was left uninterrupted for two decades.

2.1 Deinstitutionalisation

Between 1990 and 2009, military service is in a process of “deinstitutionalisation”. In deinstitutionalisation “once-stable institutional arrangements are challenged, undermined, and, gradually, replaced with different beliefs, rules, and models” (Scott 2004: 22; see also 2008: 196). It is a reverse process of institutionalisation, pointing as it does to an erosion-process where the institution gradually loses its means for reproducing itself. As Oliver puts it, the institution loses its means for reproducing “previously taken-for-granted organisational actions” (Oliver 1992: 564; see also Scott 2004; 2008; Zucker 1988; Tolbert and Zucker 1996). “Deinstitutionalisation” is fairly uncommon in the literature on institutions, but it is however widely believed that the endurance of institutions depend on whether they are reinforced through interaction, socialisation and legitimation while at the same time working to holding other behavioural prescriptions, or “scripts”, “unimaginable” (Clemens & Cook 1999: 446). Indeed, from the institutional literature one can extract something of a basic condition for institutional survival: for institutions to thrive and survive it is necessary that the institution is “implanted in individuals or organisations, and that they continue to tie up resources” (Ibid: 445). This is how institutions are able to reproduce themselves. Failure in this results in deinstitutionalisation. Further, just as institutionalisation is a process where a policy area acquires value and stability, as Huntington described it, deinstitutionalisation is a process where the value becomes differentiated, where stability is offset and the functioning and efficiency of the institution plummets (1968: 12). The informal institution to a formal set up is a problem solving device that provides coordination and lowers transaction costs. Failure to uphold such a structure invites problems in functioning and efficiency. The end point of deinstitutionalisation, I argue, can be said to exist when the structure in question no longer have the normative elements to generate action in its members or would be members (Tolbert & Zucker 1996: 179).

In this dissertation, deinstitutionalisation is understood as one single mechanism that stretches from 1990 to 2009. It is however a mechanism that changes in its dynamics over time and should therefore be divided into three (sequential) stages or “sub-mechanisms”. It is the sequential ordering of these that, I argue, produce a complete deinstitutionalisation. The sub-mechanisms are: *disruption*, *conversion* and *displacement*. While there may be other ways of breaking down this period in an analytically useful taxonomy, I believe these three sub-mechanisms sufficiently capture the basic elements of the different stages in the reform and how these are connected.

Disruption. When something happens is as important as what hap-

pens. If we wish to understand outcomes we should be interested in *timing* (Pierson 2004: 54).¹ Interaction effects, conjunctures, overlaps and intersections means the result will be different from when events happen in temporal separation (Ibid: 55). In the early 1990s, several events strike Swedish defence policy at the same time, and combined, these produce a critical juncture where policy axioms in both purpose and design become open for contestation and redefinition. This does not necessarily result in a “punctuated equilibrium” (where equilibria is “upset, norms break down, and new institutions are generated”), but it does mean that previously unchallenged policies are now debated, contested and redefined (Orren & Skowronek 1994: 316). The first sub-mechanism thus works to destabilise a formerly stable policy area.

Conversion. Disruption of previously taken for granted policies sets the door ajar for the next sub-mechanism, conversion. When an institution is converted it means that it “remains” in place but is altered in its internal structure for the purpose of serving new ends (Streeck & Thelen 2005; Thelen 2002, 2004; Hacker et al. 2015). Conversion is widely described as a method for adjusting old, and possibly archaic, institutions to a new environment without having to upend the institution all together (Hacker et al. 2015: 181). This is a solution that might come in handy in policy areas that have high public support but must nevertheless still be changed for purely functional reasons. This is what the SAP-government does to military service in the late 2000s. Generally, conversion is described as an important tool for policy makers that wish, or are forced to, keep an institutional set-up but must also adjust to a changing governing context (it allows policy makers to escape the double edged sword of popular policies).

Displacement. As with disruption to conversion, conversion sets the door ajar for a process of displacement which is the final sub-mechanism of deinstitutionalisation. As can be seen in in Sweden from 2001 and onward, displacement is a process when established rules, norms and expectations are pushed aside to *alternative* institutional forms, which grow from within an already existing institution and produces path-altering dynamics and “differential growth” between “old” and the “new” formal and informal rules (Thelen 2004: 34; Streeck & Thelen 2005: 23).² It is a process that takes away the chances for interaction, so-

¹As the historical sociologist Charles Tilly once put it: “When things happen within a sequence affects how they happen” (Tilly quoted in Pierson 2004: 54).

²Other possible concepts are what Steinling and Trampusch refers to as “institutional shrinkage,” a scaling back of the main institutional dimensions (2012: 256). This concept omits the importance of differential growth. Military service not only shrinks as an institution, at the same time new practices develop and the organisation takes on a new development.

cialisation and legitimation. As this process gains momentum, old way becomes redundant, unwanted, discredited and even viewed as obstacles. It is especially in this sub-mechanism that the institution is deprived of its means for reproduction, creating decreasing instead of increasing returns. The longer this process is permitted to continue, the more weakened the (original) institution becomes.

2.2 Issue Reputation

In addition to deinstitutionalisation, this dissertation employs three concepts borrowed from partisan theory to explain why military service is thrown into deinstitutionalisation. Before introducing these, I want to stress three things.

First, deinstitutionalisation was not the consequence of or in any way *driven* by the Armed Forces (Haldén 2007; cf. Dandeker 1994; Agrell 2011). It was a consequence of new policies, invented, designed and pushed by policy makers, and these policies had an *unintended* effect of deinstitutionalising military service. All along, the purpose of the policies was to preserve military service. Equally, the officers that pushed for change also, in general, did so with an eye to preserving military service. Second, the changes that took place in defence policy in the studied period are in their *kind* not limited to defence policy. In fact, a more appropriate picture is that the kind of changes that took place in defence policy were fairly typical to the period and could be seen especially in changes to welfare policy. The changes in defence policy are in other words part of a larger political movement during the same period. Third, even though they are derived from partisan theory and the agenda-setting literature, the concepts below should not be understood as a deviation from the institutional perspective. By contrast, they help showcasing how institutions enable and constrain policy makers in a way that is central to explaining the development of an institution since they give us a window for seeing how an institution is affected by the broader governing context and changes in it, and how policy makers deal with this in different ways and in connection to other policy areas. This, I believe, is essential information for understanding institutional development because institutional change does not take place in isolation to developments in other policy areas. As the earlier chapter suggested, this is especially the case for military service which in Sweden was tied up with both foreign- and social policy.

Issue-reputation. Parties “own” different issues (Budge & Farlie 1983a; Petrocik 1996; Lefevere et al. 2015). John Petrocik defines issue-ownership as the party’s “reputation for policy... produced by a

history of attention, initiative and innovation toward problems, which leads voters to believe that one of the parties is more sincere and committed to do something” (Petrocik 1996: 826). Issue-ownership does not mean that parties have “opposing preferences”. Ownership is marked by “selective emphasising”, where parties stress different perspectives on a policy, and do what they can to make their perspective the most salient (Budge & Farlie 1983b). Ownership works for good and for bad, and this depends on the governing context (Baumgartner & Jones 1993). It can *enable* the party in the sense that its association with the issue suits the demands in an already existing or emerging context. In such cases the party is furnished with great policy capability because it (perceives) its ideas, taste and perceptions — its “policy paradigm” — to be “aligned” with the prevailing mode of thought in society (Sheingate 2000: 336).³ In the same way, issue-ownership can constrain the party if it is, or is perceived to be, outmoded and unsuitable in an existing or emerging context. To take the example of social welfare, issue-ownership is enabling for a party that is pro-welfare if the governing context is one where social welfare is popular, but if not ownership of social welfare can instead be a disadvantage.

Strategic adjustment. Social welfare is a useful example for bringing in the next concept — *strategic adjustment* by a party as a response to changes in the governing context, manifest by a new ideological direction (Kitschelt 1994; Green-Pedersen et al. 2001; Green-Pedersen & Blomqvist 2004; Nygård 2006).⁴ Parties are problem solvers and are sensitive to contextual cues. As the governing context changes so will the policy makers’ conceptions of what constitutes “viable policy options” (Jones 1995). The starting point for this concept is that the prevailing ideas and perceptions in society structure how policymakers define problems and identify solutions (Skogstad 1998). When the governing context changes in ways that are discrediting to the party, it is compelled to adjustments to ensure that the party realigns to the prevailing mode of thought in society. This to ensure that the party stays relevant in the short and long term perspective — hence we are talking about a “strategic” adjustment and not just a minor adjustment on a single policy issue. One well-studied example of this is that in the early 1990s, social democratic parties in Europe, Sweden included, began a process of retrenching the welfare state and moving rightward (Gamble & Wright

³The purpose of this dissertation is to explain the causes for policy change, which is why real or perceived alignment with the electorate are just as important. Whether the policy maker is correct in his analysis is of less importance.

⁴It should be added that the lion’s share of the massive literature on “new social democracy” that have emerged in the post-cold war period take this assumption as the point of departure.

1999; Green-Pedersen et al. 2001; Ryner 2002; Belfrage & Ryner 2009; Forssell & Jansson 2000; Lindbom 2002; Svensson 2001; Blomqvist & Rothstein 2000).⁵ As Jochen Clasen puts it:

social democratic parties... have not departed... or reverse[ed] policies implemented by previous governments. ...[I]t might even be argued that, within a relatively short period of time, traditional pro-welfare social democrats have introduced more radical, and in some ways more restrictive, measures than their conservative or liberal predecessors (2002: 67).

Social democratic parties adjusted social welfare by cutting benefits and by introducing market-accommodating reforms in a wide spectre of welfare, ranging from primary schools, health care and pensions. In this process they follow what some have called “new public management” (Premfors 1998: 142; Hood 1991; 1995; Denhardt & Denhardt 2000). The purpose of the “new” public management was to correct perceived shortcomings in the “old” public management as a way of improving the efficiency in delivering public services. This could be achieved by introducing market norms and “business-like” managerial techniques, including: discipline in resource use (“do more with less”); explicit standards and measures of performance; greater usage of rewards and incentives; branding and marketing; focusing on goals, objectives and results more than procedures and traditions (Hood 1991: 4-5; 1995). It is widely believed that these changes were strategic and a consequence of changes in the governing context brought about by earlier, centre-right governments.⁶ An often cited example of strategic adjustment by the left to the centre is the Labour Party in Great Britain, and its strategy of a “Third Way” between the “left” and the “right.”⁷ As one of its architects, Anthony Giddens, have put it:

The advent of new markets, and the knowledge economy, coupled with the ending of the Cold War, have affected the

⁵The literature on the turn to the right by (Western European) social democratic parties is immense. This is just a few examples of the studies that have been produced over the years.

⁶Some point to changes in the fiscal possibilities of the state — meaning that welfare became too expensive (Pierson 1996; 2001). Others point to sociological changes in society, both with a liberalisation of values and the role of the market vis-à-vis the state, and a movement from “class based” to “issue-based” voting (Kitschelt 1993; 1994; 1999).

⁷“Third Way” social democracy was also popular in Scandinavia, France and Germany. With reference to the issue of issue-ownership, social democratic parties, perceived their association to the “old” welfare state (“a highly statist brand of social democracy”) as becoming constraining instead of enabling (Blair 1998).

capability of national governments to manage economic life and provide an ever-expanding range of social benefits. *We need to introduce a different framework, one that avoids both the bureaucratic, top-down government favoured by the old left and the aspiration of the right to dismantle government altogether. ...Some neoliberal reforms were 'necessary acts of modernisation'* (Giddens 2001: 2, 4 [emphasis added]).

Policy reversal. Strategic adjustment points to *larger* ideological redirections by a party. These can lead to, and often involve, unexpected changes in single policies, so called “policy-reversals”. Movements to the centre by parties to the left and (later) by parties to the right have only been possible by policy reversals. The frequency of these in the 1990s have led some to ask if the “old” conceptualisations of the “left” and “right” still matter or if “parties still matter” (Pierson 1994; 1996; Huber & Stephens 2001). This dissertation argue they do, but *how* they do has changed in the sense that party preferences take new expressions, largely as a consequence of issue ownership (Cukierman & Tommasi 1998; Ross 2000; Nygård 2006; Green-Pedersen 2002; Jensen 2011: 127). In changing governing contexts, the probability for substantial policy change is higher for parties that are the *most unlikely* to reverse their stance on a given policy issue (Nygård 2006: 360). Parties (or individual politicians) whose traditional position was to defend a policy and reject its alternative solution are more likely to revise their standpoint and introduce the alternative solution if the context calls for it, than parties with an ideology that predictably would suggest the alternative solution (Cukierman & Tommasi 1998: 180). Policy change is, in other words, driven by the “wrong” parties. Such “inverse” party effects are sometimes called the “Nixon-goes-to-China” dynamic.⁸ The reason why parties act in this way has to do with *accountability* and whether a party will be subjected to accountability pressures. In short, a party with a historical commitment to an issue can “afford” reversal. To explain why it was the left, and not the right, that pushed the welfare entrenchments in Scandinavia, Fiona Ross hence suggests that:

cuts imposed by the left may be viewed as “trade-offs” for increased spending in other areas, absolute essentials, strategic necessities, or, at minimum, lower than those that would be experienced under parties of the right (2000a: 165).

⁸During his presidency, Nixon branded himself as an anti-Communist, but yet he visited and took part in the international legitimisation of the People’s Republic of China in 1972. It would have amounted to political suicide for a Democratic president to attempt such a trip; exposing the party to the “soft on communism” charge. Given Nixon’s reputation as an anti-Communist he immunised himself against such criticism.

The possibility for welfare retrenchment by rightist parties are more slim: “Voters do not trust rightist parties to reform the welfare state whereas they assume that leftist parties will engage in genuine reform rather than indiscriminate and harsh retrenchment” (Ross 2000b: 174). The reason for this is that the public believes the reversal by the left to be “objectively motivated”, and not the consequence of right-wing ideology. When strategic adjustment is deemed necessary, parties will in other words not refrain from reversing their stance on issues that they previously and historically have defended. It is also more likely that the party that owns the issue will initiate the reversal, since it is afforded with the greatest possibility for leadership in the change. Thus, and as a number of accounts of the welfare retrenchment reforms in Sweden have shown, the SAP cut back *more* on social welfare in the 1990s than the Moderate-led government did in the period between 1991 to 1994 (Balslev 2002). As Anders Lindbom among others have noted, this illustrates how structurally (or “institutionally”) limited especially liberal governments are in their policy formation when there is institutionalised support for “social democratic” policies (Lindbom 2010: 146).

Policy-reversal is often coupled with “blame avoidance”. When policy makers impose substantial change, they have strategies for minimising criticism. Typically by defending the change as a necessary course of action for preserving the endurance or legitimacy of an existing system — turning vice into virtue (Levy 1999; Giger & Nelson 2010; Pierson 1996). This makes perfect sense, since the objective in politics usually is the actual *outcome* of a policy, not how the outcome is produced. Blame avoidance coupled to a focus on outcome, and hence the legitimacy of the policy, is something that Michael Klitgaard believes explains why Scandinavian social democratic parties turned to the centre in the 1990s:

[S]ocial democratic governments decide upon reforms when the party elite perceive policy problems as a threat to the legitimacy of the universal welfare state. Political institutions, i.e. welfare policies, functioning as power resources, need to be legitimate otherwise they may work against basic political interests (2007: 172).

Presented in this way, policy reversals are something rational that parties do and which policy makers expect they will be rewarded for. What is more, policy reversal gives us an idea for understanding how policy makers deal with issue-reputations in connection to institutions and changes in the governing context.

The two concepts and their mechanisms — deinstitutionalisation and issue reputations — explain different things but are equally important for accounting for the 2009 outcome and the process leading up to it.

It gives us the tools to address the questions that Hacker identified as necessary for explaining institutional change: “*what kinds* of institutional changes [are] propelled by *what kinds* of social processes [and] are most likely under *what kinds* of political configurations” (Hacker et al. 2015: 180). The mechanism of deinstitutionalisation and its three sub-mechanisms of disruption, conversion and displacement are driven by specific party behaviours which this dissertation believes are captured in the three concepts of: issue-ownership, strategic adjustment and policy-reversal.

2.3 Method and Research Design

To explain the 2009 outcome and apply our analytical tools we must trace and analyse the processes leading up to the 2009 decision.

“Process-tracing” is a common methodological approach in qualitatively oriented single case studies, where the focus is on accounting for a single political outcome. It has been defined as an “analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case” (Bennett & Checkel 2015: 7; see also Bennett & George 2005; Bennett 2006, 2008). Process tracing is especially useful when the outcome deviates from theoretical expectations since it helps gauge new explanatory models. In such cases, as ours, it invites to identify yet undiscovered causal paths and/or explanatory concepts (Seawright & Gerring 2008: 302). In process tracing there is a strong assumption about linearity (A causes B, B causes C, C causes D, and so on). The task is to identify the step between A and B and so on, what produces these steps — the “causal chain” —, and tracing their effect down to the outcome. It assumes there is no immediate relation between the first cause and the final outcome. Instead, the outcome is perceived as the result of the intermediate steps. If the researcher is successful in identifying these, he reduces the “distance” between cause and effect and helps us see the number of events and decisions that, when combined, gauged the final outcome (Checkel 2006: 363; Bennett & George 2005: 147).⁹ Process-tracing in this sense retells the story by reversing the tape.

Process tracing is a methodological approach with a heavy dependence on qualitative material. This dissertation makes use of archival

⁹Another term is “causal mechanisms” or what Collier calls “causal-process observations” (CPOs) (2011: 12). One way of minimising the lag between cause and effect is by proposing a set of possible social mechanisms to be in play and examining the presence or absence of the mechanism through a fine grained analysis.

documents, elite interviews, diaries, e-mail correspondence, comments and articles in media by policymakers and senior officers, formal reports by the government, parliament, governmental and parliamentary committees, reports and memos by the military Headquarters as well as earlier research. The official reports and memos from government and the military have been used to trace the chronology of the decision-making process and the major political events and developments. Comments and appearances in the media by key actors have been used to get an idea of the social and political climate as the decision-making process proceeded. Archival research has been limited to the military's own analyses of key decisions, as well as to the parliamentary committees that have examined the development of Sweden's recruitment models.

An important part of the sources in this dissertation is semi-structured elite interviews. The interviews have almost exclusively been with senior decision makers including the defence ministers (with one exception), the supreme commanders, director generals of the National Recruitment Agency, members of parliament and committees. The interviews have been semistructured, recorded and transcribed. In every interview, the respondent has later read and approved the transcript. The point with the interviews has mainly been to cover gaps in the policy process by obtaining information that could not be gathered in any other way. They have played an important part for retelling the story, and have added a sense of social context, but have not been instrumental in accounting for the outcome. If anything, they have added confidence to conclusions that could, theoretically but with less confidence, otherwise also be drawn from the other sources of information.

Two challenges, validity and reliability, should be mentioned when it comes to interviewing. Validity points to the possible problem on whether the interview, with the information coming from the respondent, actually gauges the properties it is supposed to measure. Validity can be offset by asking the wrong questions or if the respondent answers in deceiving ways. This dissertation has tried to overcome this obstacle by gaining as much knowledge as possible about the topic for the interview beforehand (reading research by others, looking into media appearances from the time, and using the information from other interviews). This has enabled a careful and informed use of the interview material. Another and maybe more important approach is that the interviews have focused on "what-" questions rather than "why-" questions. That is, asking what happened, (focusing on behaviours) at a specific juncture, instead of asking why something happened (probing for explanations) (Mosley 2013: 21). The why-questions are ultimately up for the combined analysis to come down to, even though it must

be mentioned that the respondent's "why" view is a valuable piece of information for getting an idea of his view at things. Moreover, the respondents are asked to remember things that happened between one and two decades ago and may choose either to revise their accounts to their favour or, less sinfully, for remembering things in the wrong way. That is, can we be confident that the information gathered from the interviews are accurate? First off, most of the respondents had few problems of retelling their accounts even in detailed ways. Maybe because most of the respondents were at the top of their careers and the subject was an important one in their portfolio. This speaks in favour of their ability to remember things correctly. Moreover, in using the interview material the dissertation has made use of triangulation with other sources of information to guard against potential reliability problems. Cross-checking and triangulating with other sources of information (e.g. journalistic accounts and earlier research) is widely believed to be an important and useful way of guarding against reliability problems (King et al. 1994).

Triangulating has been especially important in certain parts of the policy process, to make sure that the account given is balanced and correct. Such parts especially include the years between 1998 and 2001 and the years between 2007 and 2009. In these parts I have as far as possible tried to cross check the data with several sources and kinds of information, including interview accounts from different persons, media, official documents and, if possible, secondary literature. To take one example, the conflict between the Headquarters and the Defence Ministry on the organisational purpose of the Armed Forces has been corroborated by interview accounts of the three main involved actors, media, official documents and secondary literature. The work of the 2007 Committee on Military Service was similarly cross checked with different sources of information. When sensitive information has been provided about on a certain situation, for instance in an interview, but that information could later not be corroborated in other sources I have opted for rejecting the information. While this sometimes can mean that an important piece of information is excluded, it however ensures that the argument given in this dissertation is as valid as empirically possible given the available data.

That being said about validity, there is also a reliability problem that points in the other direction. Namely whether the researcher used interview material selectively to support the argument. This is especially important to highlight since thus dissertation makes extensive use of quotations from interviews conducted recently, but the period under study occurred several years ago. On a general note I have as far as possible extracted the main points of information given by each interview

subject. This means that I have extracted quotations that capture the general picture provided to me by the person being interviewed. What is more, the arguments presented in this dissertation have only been formed after the interviews have been conducted. That is to say, the theoretical arguments have not been developed before the interviews. I have first gathered the empirics, and then developed my theoretical account. This I believe minimises the risk of using the data selectively, even unintentionally. In addition, when there is a quote the date for that is explicitly stated — which indicates to the reader that it is temporally separated from the other text. The tense also changes in these quotes, from present to past tense. All transcriptions from the interviews have been read and approved by the interview subjects. Finally, in general, the interviews have offered few surprises when it concerns the big picture of the account given in this dissertation. The accounts offered by the respondents have most of the time not departed from the ones that transpire in comments to media and other sources of publicly available information.¹⁰

2.4 Objectives, Contributions and Limitations

This dissertation has two objectives. The *first* is to offer a theoretical and empirical account of how and why a deeply institutionalised feature of Swedish politics could be deinstitutionalised in less than two decades. The *second* is to offer a so far missing institutional perspective in the literature on the transformation of the European Armed Forces, including the Swedish, from conscripted to professional armies.

The dissertation engages three kinds of literatures: institutional theory, partisan theory, and the literature on the change of Europe's Armed Forces from the 1990s and onward. It offers four contributions to what we already know. *First*, it offers a study that focuses exclusively on why military service was suspended in Sweden. Other similar studies have been put forth before, but these focus on the transformation of Sweden's Armed Forces in general and therefore omit details that are necessary to fully understanding why military service, a substantial element in the Swedish Armed Forces, was abandoned (Agrell 2011; Haldén 2007). Earlier studies have also failed to include the politics of the transformation, including partisan effects. Something this dissertation does. *Second*, it offers a contribution to the literature on institutional change,

¹⁰This being said, the questions posed in the interviews complement the already existing account in that they have been asked in different ways (in a research context) and with a different purpose (answering the research question).

pointing out the possible hazards involved in change through “conversion”. In the existing literature, conversion (and displacement) is usually used to explain why institutions *change*, in the meaning that they persist but take on a new format (Thelen 2004; Streeck and Thelen 2005: 19-31; Hacker et al. 2015). Indeed, it is explicitly argued that both change and displacement are concepts that explain “transformation of existing institutions rather than institutional replacement” (Hacker et al. 2015: 181). This dissertation however shows that conversion and displacement can be part of deinstitutionalisation. What is more, in a typical study only one “change concept” is used to explain change. In this study, three concepts (our three sub-mechanisms) are used to explain deinstitutionalisation, because the deinstitutionalisation process includes three specific sub-mechanisms. Any one single concept fails to explain the entire process.¹¹

Third, the literature on institutional change has paid attention to internal and external sources of change, often by pointing to major but single events. It has paid less attention to how politics, and especially partisan effects, affect such events over time. This study shows that deinstitutionalisation was a function of partisan effects. By combining partisan theory with the literature on deinstitutionalisation (and disruption, conversion and displacement) we get an idea of the political and institutional mechanisms behind institutional change. *Fourth*, the study contributes to the literature on the European transformation of the Armed Forces by identifying a deviant case and offers an explanation to it. It also offers a non-functional account to the literature and one that challenges the conventional bottom-up theory on the European transformation.

The dissertation has four limitations. The *first* relates to the time frame of the study, 1990 to 2009. The starting year is primarily motivated by the fact that the cold war had just ended and with it a new geopolitical landscape in Europe, affecting Swedish defence policies as much as the defence policies across Europe. The end year reflects the year when parliament suspended military service. Arguably, the study could have travelled further back in time — maybe to the early 1980s when the organisational purpose of the Armed Forces was slightly adjusted. Though, I believe that my account of the institutionalisation of military service in the previous chapter gives the reader a sufficient

¹¹More recent research have moved in a similar direction. In later publications Hacker, Pierson and Thelen have reached the conclusion that the separate concepts are “related to each other” (Hacker et al. 2015: 181). “In prior writings we have explored drift... and conversion... largely as separate processes. In our collaboration here, we present a unified perspective that shows how drift and conversion, seen alongside each other, enhance our understanding of institutional change...” (Ibid).

account of the development of Swedish defence politics during the cold war. What is more, I do not believe that travelling further back in time would affect the argument in this dissertation in any substantial way. *Second*, the dissertation has a limit in its choice on which actors to include and which to exclude. It includes, mainly, the defence ministers, supreme commanders and the special defence committee (SDC). These are the key actors in formulating and executing defence policy in Sweden. The dissertation could have benefited from including the prime ministers and the parliamentary defence committee (PDC). It passes on these actors because they would, to my belief, not add anything of substantial value. Including them would not have changed the argument in this dissertation in any significant ways. The defence minister should be understood to act on directives from the prime minister, and the PDC is in Sweden a less important actor in shaping the defence policy and staking out its direction. What the SDC decides generally trumps the PDC, which is often in agreement with the SDC. Finally, the dissertation takes the Social Democratic Party (SAP) and the Moderate Party as the central political actors. The reason is that they were the largest parties of the right and the left, respectively, during the time and that they have held the governments during the studied period, including the defence ministry.

Third, the dissertation does not dig into defence budgets in any greater detail, they way for instance Wilhelm Agrell does in his study (2011). The reason is that this dissertation is primarily interested in tracing the development of the formal and informal rules of military service. Defence budgets take a part but are not understood as the most important element. It is an element where changes in its values affects both organisational purpose and design, but the important perspective in this dissertation is why reductions have been carried out and how the actors have dealt with the consequences, for instance by adjusting the design of the Armed Forces.

Fourth, and finally, this dissertation does not engage in the policies surrounding the Swedish deployment to Afghanistan from 2002 and onward. The reason is that this policy-area is too extensive to cover in this dissertation. Suffice to notice that the willingness to create a greater expeditionary capability in the first decade of the 2000s was in large part coupled to the ongoing Swedish deployment to Afghanistan. A detailed study of this commitment in Sweden can be found in Wilhelm Agrell's book *Ett Krig här och nu* (2013).

Part II

Process: 1990 to 2009

Chapter 3

DISRUPTION

During the cold war Swedish defence policy sorted more or less itself, as a consequence of the fixed geopolitical situation. The stability ends in early 1990s and Sweden's defence policy is swung into a historically unusual period of disruption where decades of standard operating procedures become open to contestation and redefinition. To understand the situation of the 1990s we must go back several decades. It is no exaggeration that the disruption of the early 1990s was a consequence of a persistent political failure to revise and update Swedish defence policy during the 1960s, 70s and 80s. During this period, policy makers follow the defence decision that was put into place in 1948. It spelled out that:

...a Swedish defence must have the capacity to express the entire people's defence willingness. Every Swede, who are not already committed to a defence duty must, in one way or another, participate in the struggle for the country's independence. The Armed Forces must be designed so that an aggressor to the furthest possible degree is prevented from entering Swedish territory and so that no part of the country is surrendered without tough resistance (quoted in Sköld 1989: 9).

The 1948 decision sets out a number of principles for the future development of the Armed Forces. The most important, for our purposes, was that the Armed Forces had to enlist all legible servicemen, the so called "universality policy".¹ This policy meant that the most capable would be enlisted as elite soldiers and the least capable to rudimentary tasks and

¹Enlisting all legible servicemen was something new. Before, the intake was more selective (Government 1984: 21).

the bulk in between would make up the backbone of the Armed Forces — the infantry. From the 50s and onward the universality policy was engraved with “an independent ideational value” (Hedin 2011: 64). As Sweden’s demography swelled the Armed Forces had to keep up with training more and more servicemen, place them in refresher exercises and expand the organisation so that it could mobilise the servicemen if this would be needed. In reality, this meant employing more officers to train the conscripts, building more regiments and relocating resources from other parts of the organisation to training servicemen. The universality policy could only be achieved with maintained quality in the soldiers if the quantitative growth was matched with an expenditure that could finance the growth and enable necessary modernisations.² Until the late 1960s the Armed Forces were ensured an annual economic compensation to pay for the increasing costs of military technology and salaries (of 2,5 per cent). In 1968 the compensation is removed and with this the organisation will in the following decades face a growing disparity between quantity and quality of its soldiers. The quantity of soldiers increases, but their quality decreases. More and more soldiers have to share a limited pool of increasingly out-of-date equipment.³ To deal with the situation the Army in the 1970s begin to cancel refresher exercises. In the choice between keeping the skills of the servicemen up to date and reducing the intake of conscripts, the government opts for the latter. Thus from training 100,000 ex-conscripts a year in the 1970s, the number falls to 40,000 in the 1980s whereas the intake of new servicemen still increases (Government 1995a: 36, 74). The universality policy also meant that substantial parts of the army had not been modernised since the early 1950s. Nine of the Army’s 29 brigades had not been modernised in this span of time. Only five of the remaining

²The defence expenditure increased throughout the cold war, with peaks in 1955 and 1961 to 1966. Also in the 1970s the expenditure increased, but less than in the 1960s. In 1989, the defence budget was the largest in the 1900s (Bergstrand 2007: 52). As part of BNP, the defence expenditure was around four percent in the years after the Second World War. It decreased, though slowly, to 2,5 percent in 1989.

³The Army was especially damaged by the imbalance, since it received the lion’s share of the conscripts. The Army typically conscripted six to seven times more servicemen than the Navy and the Air Force. When the Army conscripted 37 600 servicemen in 1987, the Airforce and Navy conscripted 5300 and 5500 each (Parliament 1992: 83). It could be argued that the disparity between quantity and quality offset the possibilities of the organisation to achieve its objective. Curiously, this sentiment was however uncommon in the Army. Throughout the cold war the sense in the Army was that quantity was more important than quality (Åselius 2005). The Army could compensate for the lack of modern technology with a combination of tactical and strategic innovation and high defence willingness. The Head of Army, General Nils Sköld famously wrote a short suggestion on the development of the Army in which it would become nothing short of a guerilla-like organisation (Sköld 1974).

20 brigades were armoured and mechanised. The remaining 15 were partly modernised but lacked armoured transportation vehicles, which severely reduced their mobility and resilience against a technologically superior adversary.

It was not until 1985 that the “system imbalance” was recognised as a threat to Sweden’s defence capability, why the Supreme Commander demanded political action. In that year, the Supreme Commander Ljung argued that the Armed Forces had reached its limit and could no longer deal with the problem. The room for “rationalisations and reductions” had been exhausted and these had resulted in a “great weakness in the organisation”(Headquarters 1985: 3). The system imbalance had to find a political, solution.⁴ By breaking the silence others soon followed in talking about the politically sensitive issue on how many servicemen Sweden should enlist in its Armed Forces. One was Ljung’s successor, Bengt Gustavsson, who similarly pointed out that the responsible policy makers had to take bold decisions, and that there was no way out of the imbalance than by reducing the size of the Armed Forces and adjusting the universality policy:

It is unavoidable that, with the current defence economy, the number of brigades must decrease. Parts of the organisation are experienced as far too unmodern. The servicemen are experiencing a cultural chock when they are enrolled for their training (Headquarters 1988: 7).

Gustavsson’ warning leads to political adjustments. In the last years of the 1980s the size of Armed Forces is reduced for the first time in a long time. The reduction is however only marginal, scrapping the infantry brigades that had not been modernised since the 1960s and would anyway be too costly to modernise (Headquarters 1988: 7). Ljung is not content. Deeper reductions would be necessary or, which was the alternative, parliament would have to substantially increase the defence budget.

⁴Up to this point criticisms of this sort were highly uncommon. For the better part of the cold war statements about the state of the organisation had been sugar coated. Possibly in order to avoid sending signals to the Soviet Union about the poor state of Sweden’s Army capabilities.

3.1 A System in Imbalance

As the 1980s becomes the 1990s it is becoming obvious to policy makers that there looms a complicated tradeoff between preserving the integrity of the universality policy and having a modern Armed Forces capable of realising its organisational purpose. The SAP, in government at the time, is sceptical to both alternatives. Defence minister Roine Carlsson instead believes that there is a possibility to avoiding the issue by splitting the conscripted cohort in two groups (Carlsson 1990). One group will do a shorter service (five months) and the other the normal service of seven and more months. The Moderate Party as well as the Supreme Commander dismisses the proposal since it would produce soldiers of worth to the Armed Forces (Gustavsson 1990a). If the government insisted, Gustavsson agreed that he could reduce the training to two and a half months, to make sure that these soldiers had no function at all to the Armed Forces. Since it amounted to virtually no training at all Carlsson rejects because it would come to close to tampering with the universality policy (Government 1990a). The Head of the Army, Åke Sagrén, sides with the government and denounces the proposal as “outrageous and a disgrace for the military” (Sagrén 1990). Military service is a “privilege” for the nation’s young men, he argues, and something that Sweden cannot afford to do away with. Gustavsson charges again, arguing that without change, thousands of conscripts will every year be enrolled and meet insufficient training and equipment (Gustavsson 1990b). His final offer is that the conscripted cohort can be reduced by creating a “reserve” or a “civil defence.” “If the defence budget remains at today’s level of 32 billion... it will not fit both universal conscription and a modernisation of the Armed Forces” (Gustavsson 1990c). This is why “at least a third of the cohort [12 000] should be placed in a reserve and only receive military training if necessary” (Gustavsson 1990d).

Also this is received with great criticism from the defence ministry. In a personal letter to the Supreme Commander, Carlsson writes that: “I want to underscore that the government expects that all proposals that comes from the Headquarters only considers the directions recommended by the government” (Carlsson 1991a). Adding that “the government has not asked of any suggestions of this sort, which is why it will not be discussed by us” (Ibid).

However, the failure to solve the issue is becoming more complicated for the SAP since it is facing an Armed Forces that repeatedly refers to the solutions by the Moderate Party as the only feasible ones, of reducing the cohort and doing away with unnecessary and unmodern deadweight in the Armed Forces. This is important because the SAP fears that the Moderate Party will use the conflict in the upcoming

election campaign that is just being started. In the spring of 1991, the government therefore puts in place a committee that will examine how to deal with the criticised system imbalance (Dir. 1991:40). Specifically, the committee is asked to identify ways in which the organisation can become more “rational” in its design by looking into the universality policy. This is the first formal step toward adjusting the universality policy that had been in place more or less without change since 1948. The purpose is to:

create common points of departure in the recruitment to the military and civil defence, and ensure a rational usage of the personnel resources to thereby create a more efficient Armed Forces. To this end the Committee should thoroughly map and analyse the personnel policies and duty of serving in the total defence (Government 1991a: 29).

The directive to the committee is analytically important because in it is visible that the government has adopted the policy objectives of the Moderate Party, namely stressing an efficient and rational Armed Forces where the focus is on realising the organisational purpose of the Armed Forces. The focus now is on output, efficiency, rational designs and streamlining. The committee is therefore asked to examine the “best and most effective way” of “enlisting, training and placing servicemen in the war time organisation” (Ibid). Instead of the finding ways of keeping the universality policy, the government wants the committee to work with the ambition that the Armed Forces must itself determine how many servicemen it needs in order to achieve its objective, just as the Moderate Party and the Supreme Commander had asked for. The aim, however, is still that as many servicemen as possible should serve, but that this cannot be the only objective. This is what I have called a “policy reversal” in the sense that the party changes the course of a policy that it “owns” by directing it toward a new path. The reason why the party behaves in this way is as a consequence of the changing conditions of the governing context. The universality policy was no longer an asset to the party. Left unadjusted, it could risk becoming constraining instead of enabling to the party since conscripts enrolled to pointless duties without sufficient equipment would turn against the universality policy and what it stood for more generally, as a collective responsibility. This could damage an important strategic and political tool in the SAP, why the adjustment was deemed acceptable. It is however too early to argue that the policy reversal is part of a larger strategic adjustment in the party, since there are still few signs that this change is part of a wholesale rethinking of its policy doctrine. Instead, that the SAP yields to the criticism by appointing the committee should

be understood as a minor strategic manoeuvre supposed to protect an important tool for the party.

Systemic Shift

In the autumn of 1991, a centre-right government led by the Moderate Party replaces the SAP-government. With the change in government there is an entirely new view on the role of the state in society. This puts the directive and committee put in place in the spring in new light. Was its emphasis on rationality, efficiency and output part of a strategic adjustment to a changing governing context that placed a higher premium on these values? The priorities of the new government suggests it was. The new government promises a “systemic shift” in the design of the Swedish public sector, with a series of reforms that adjust the state-market relations in favour of the market. Since the 1970s, the Moderate Party has criticised the SAP for creating a large and inefficient state (Blomqvist and Rothstein 2000; Ljunggren 1992; Larsson et al. 2010). In government, it now sets out to liberalise the pensions systems, public companies and services (including education, healthcare, and social services) and deregulate the labour market (Blyth 2001). The purpose is far from upending the welfare state, it is more accurately described as about reducing the size of the state and ensuring that the delivery of welfare becomes more efficient and cost effective. These priorities do not stop with welfare. It also brings in rationalisations of the Armed Forces. When the Prime Minister, Carl Bildt, opens parliament in the autumn he stress that the Armed Forces are in immediate need of a “structural reform” for the purpose of doing away with the system imbalance and become more efficient in achieving its purpose of defending national territory (Bildt 1991a). For this reason the defence budget must increase *at the same time* as the Armed Forces are reduced from 21 to 16 (army) brigades, *and* that the universality policy is adjusted so that the Armed Forces only enlist as many servicemen as it needs to achieve its organisational purpose. To achieve all this, Bildt argues, it is necessary that parliament accepts a new defence decision in 1992.

What the Moderate Party does in government is not a strategic adjustment, nor is it a policy reversal. Instead, their suggested policies should be understood as capitalising on their issue-reputation of efficiency and a functional Armed Forces in a time when there are widely known efficiency problems in the organisation. Importantly, as it rolls forward the new policies the government simultaneously engages in a blame avoidance. The changes are necessary for preserving the legitimacy of the Armed Forces, and especially the legitimacy of military service. Having a convincing blame avoidance strategy was especially

important given that the new policies interfere with the universality policy which is “owned” by the SAP. As the new defence minister, Anders Björck, takes office one of his first comments to the media was therefore that the new policies were necessary for precisely this purpose. If left unattended, the system imbalance could risk an internal collapse of the Armed Forces and indefinitely damage the public’s acceptance of the military service (Björck 1991a; 1991b; 1991c). The Moderate Party in this way disarm objections from the SAP by redefining the policy issue from being one of being “for” or “against” military service to one of being for or against a sustainable military service policy; One that ensures a long term prospect for its survival in the post-cold war period.⁵ Redefining the issue in this way would turn out to be of tremendous importance further down the policy process because it created a new narrative that would last well into the early 2000s. Surprisingly, it would find its most ardent defender in the two SAP governments from 1998 to 2006.

One reason for why the new narrative became successful was that evidence on the ground pointed in favour of the new government’s way at looking at the problem. For several years the Armed Forces had conscripted more servicemen than it could manage. Many of them were not even placed in the peace-time organisation after completing their service.⁶ In addition, the number of drop-outs were increasing, partly because of the poor conditions of the basic training.⁷ Drop-outs produced unnecessary costs for the Armed Forces and gave military service a bad reputation. Both because they disrupt the training for other conscripts (rearranging the groups) and, maybe more importantly, because they undercut the morale for serving among other conscripts which, if left unattended, could undercut the morale for military service generally. One reason for the negative development was, as already mentioned, the low standard of the training and the equipment. In the existing system, the lowest tier of the servicemen, the so called “F” and “G”conscripts (on a scale from A to G), in 1992 practiced combat without ammunition in their rifles (and had for several years), and this group was, incidentally,


⁵This is a strategy that has been noted elsewhere in partisan theory as a typical outcome when parties want to change a policy issue that is owned by another party. In his study on American agricultural politics, Riker has noted that the party interested in changing a policy will redefine the issue dimensions of the policy for the purpose of dividing the opposition and gather support for its policy change (1986).

⁶In 1988, the share of conscripts who were not placed in the peace-time organisation is 21 percent. In 1990, it had increased to 34 percent and the statistics pointed out that the trend would continue (Parliament 1992).

⁷Between 1987 and 1991 an unprecedented share of 13 to 14 percent drop out from their service (Parliament 1992: 84).

also the one with the highest share of drop-outs (Parliament 1992: 85).⁸ This was just one indication of how the universality policy was doing more damage than good to the legitimacy of military service. Second, a growing share of the servicemen also showed deficiencies in their health conditions (National Service Administration 1998). In a normal cohort the servicemen are predictably distributed along the logic of the bell curve (Figure 3.1). In any given year, the largest group (Group Three) amounts to roughly 68 percent of the cohort. They are the backbone, the “rank-and-file” of the organisation — especially the Army — and are enlisted as privates. The group to the right (Group Two) makes up about 13 percent of the cohort and are enlisted as squad leaders. Furthest to the right (Group One) is the two percent that are enlisted as platoon leaders and will become conscript-officers in the event of war. The two groups furthest to the left (Group Four and Five), are enlisted for simple duties, or will not be conscripted at all.

Figure 3.1: Normal distribution of servicemen



Between the 1960s and the 1990s the quality of Group Three soldiers are however deteriorating. A growing share of “average boys” no longer live up to the (physical, socio-psychological, and medical) requirements for serving as “rank-and-file” (Körlof 2016; Degerlund 2017). The average weight increases by several kilos, their backs and joints become weaker and they become more allergic and have weaker mental abilities than what historically had been the case (Körlof 2016). At the same

⁸These conscripts are not essential for the organisation, and are therefore not prioritised in the battle over scarce resources.

time, the most skilled score even higher than before. The result in the early 1990s is thus that the worst and the average score worse than before, whereas the most capable score better (Lövgren 1993). As it was formulated in the early 1990s, the universality policy took no notice of this and would — without adjustment — anyway enlist all servicemen and therefore add burdens to an already overstretched Armed Forces.⁹ This was another example of how the universality principle weakened instead strengthened the legitimacy and effective functioning of military service, and why it had to be adjusted with new policies. Importantly, the proposed adjustment to the universality policy was applauded by the bulk of the officers in the Armed Forces. Military service could only be preserved if it was prevented from becoming a burden to the individual and to the Armed Forces: “No one, not in the Headquarters and definitely not in the Army, wanted any other system than military service, and absolutely not employed soldiers, but it was widely believed that it was in need of prudent adjustments” (Degerlund 2017).¹⁰

Ending the “Draft Ideology”

With this in target the defence minister Anders Björck is set on elevating the Moderate Party’s reputation for a well-functioning and efficient Armed Forces. One of the first things he does is to pull off the experiment with the short-term service, initiated by former defence minister Carlsson. With immediate notice, more than 2,500 conscripts enlisted in short training are sent home and 4,000 servicemen planned to serve in the short service in the following year are relieved of their duty. The decision is met by criticism from the SAP, and Björck refers to the Head of Army, Åke Sagrén, who had informed him that the policy has become a burden to the Armed Forces in the sense that the Armed Forces do not have the means to give the conscripts meaningful training, why it would be “immoral for me to let conscripts waste their time in useless training” and why “it was important to take action and abandon the experiment” (Björck 1991d; 1991e; Sagrén 1991a).

In 1991, the Supreme Commander had asked for an additional twenty billion for the period between 1992 and 1997. The money would partly be used to finance a full enlistment of the cohort, as instructed by the SAP-government. Björck only meets him half way, with 9,5 billion.

⁹Between 1987 and 1991 the share of exemptions increases from 19 % to 26 % (Parliament 1992: 81). As Lövgren puts it: “I will not enlist a guy to service if I am not sure that he will pull through. It is better that he is exempted from service, and cheaper for the organisation since it avoids the problem of drop-outs” (Lövgren 1993).

¹⁰Major general Paul Degerlund was Inspector of the Army (1998-2000) and expert in the Committee on Military Service that the SAP put in place in 1990.

The reason is that he wants the Armed Forces to conscript only as many servicemen as necessary and this will lead to a reduction in the enlistments. In addition, the Army will shrink from 21 to 16 brigades, creating an immediate reduction of at least 6,000 servicemen. Björck however emphasises that further reductions will not be possible, since this would have the counterproductive effect of doing damage instead of strengthening the legitimacy of military service: “we have decided that a reduction of six thousand conscripts is necessary to free up new resources. But this is as far as we can go if we still want to claim that we have a system based on a universal duty to do military service,” and “[w]e are in a position where we have to pay for many years of neglect and of doing nothing about the military’s structural problems” (Defence Ministry 1991a; Björck 1992a). What is more, even if the actions reduces the number of servicemen who actually serve, the legal duty of serving will remain intact and the sanctions of not serving will become more important to use with the reduction (Ibid).

Four months after assuming office Björck presents a bill to parliament, suggesting changes to the 1941 law on military service (Government 1992: 1). Its suggestion is that the Armed Forces should only enlist as many servicemen as it judges as necessary, and only those with satisfying results in the enlistment tests should be enlisted (Government 1992: 1-5, 7). The Armed Forces in 1992 had an annual need of around 35,000 to 37,000 conscripts. Though, between 1986 and 1991 the number of servicemen varied between 50,000 and 55,000 — meaning a surplus of between 10,000 to 17,000. More importantly, between 1994 and 1999, the surplus would remain at the same level and slightly increase in the 2000s (Parliament 1992: 156). As before, he emphasises that the adjustments are necessary in order to preserve the health and legitimacy of military service. It is a mistake to imbue universal service with “intrinsic value” since it can do more damage than good to the overriding objective of keeping a conscripted army in Sweden (Ibid: 6).

Björck also argues that with the reductions it will become ever more important that the sanctions against those who refuse to serve are put into greater use than before. The sanctions are:

...necessary to preserve the respect for the universal duty, especially for those conscripts who loyally and many times with great sacrifices complete their military service. If we do not have tough sanctions this means that military service will be essentially voluntary. Those who want can do their duty, those who do not want will be granted their freedom. I do not believe this is a realistic alternative, with these principles it means we in the long run will have to use a

system with employed soldiers (Björck 1992b).

With this defence of the government's new policies, the Moderate Party definitely redefines the universality policy and sets the debate into a new trajectory. Pointing to the need for cuts to preserve the legitimacy of military service, the government stresses outcomes that the SAP historically have defended. But with the new governing context the conditions for producing the outcome had changed and so had the need for new policies materialised, which the centre-right government had taken responsibility for. The new political situation is possibly why the SAP in their motion to the bill raise the stakes by, surprisingly, arguing that the government is not bold enough when it comes to greater quality, efficiency and rationalisation:

In order to create a more effective use of resources and achieve a long-term balance it is necessary that the organisation shrinks from today's levels. ...We share the government's view that material renewal and higher quality in the training will be achieved by restructuring the Armed Forces. The government's proposal is, however, not enough. More comprehensive interventions will become necessary (SAP 1992a).

The motion is a second piece of evidence (in addition to the directive from the spring of 1991) that the foundation of military service is changing. With the motion, the SAP seems to abandon many years of close association to a large Armed Forces carried by the public. With the motion the SAP however pushes further than the government, criticising it for not doing enough in terms of rationalisations and efficiency enhancing methods. What is needed, they argue, is a "slim" organisation that is reduced not from 21 to 16 brigades, but from 21 to 13. The post-cold war order meant that the Armed Forces can be greatly reduced to only a "core" of highly trained, capable and motivated soldiers and that the Armed Forces can swell *if* necessary — but that for the foreseeable future a large defence of the "old" kind will not be necessary. In other words, what the SAP does in the bill is expressing a desire to do what other European states are doing, namely "cashing in" the so called "peace dividend".

Considering the [new geopolitical situation] and the economic climate... we do not consider it justifiable to increase the defence budget or introduce an automatic increase of the defence budget. The state of the public finances demands financial restraint in all public sectors (SAP 1992a).

In this way, the SAP accepts the Moderate Party's redefinition of the policy problem and uses the same principle on efficiency by linking it

to a policy that allows the Armed Forces to adjust its size (and costs) with the new geopolitical development. What is more, it offers a policy that depends on a smart use of taxpayers' money by suggesting that in "good" times the Armed Forces are reduced and in "bad" times they are increased. Such up- and downsizing could be achieved by putting into place smart policies. That increasing the efficiency of the Armed Forces is suggested by both the government and the SAP is not surprising, considering that the so called NPM-style of governance (with its premium on discipline in resource use, smart solutions and output) influenced also other public domains at the time and was at the heart of the new government's idea of governance. In other fields of the social sciences, a battery of literature has similarly described the early 1990s as a period of sweeping revision in social- and economic policy in favour NPM-style solutions. These became "well established" during this period (Boréus 1994; Ryner 2002).¹¹ In the debate in 1992, it is manifest in the centre-right government's faith in output and efficiency and in the SAP it is visible in its willingness to "streamline" the Armed Forces and designing "smart" policies that allow the Armed Forces to adjust its size and keeping costs down.

When the committee presents its result in the end of the year it similarly suggests a move in design toward efficiency, rationality and quality in the military service (Parliament 1992). It however also believed that military service should be kept, but adjusted. "For a country of the size such as Sweden with a small population we need a relatively numerically large Army. This speaks in favour of a defence based on military service, with soldiers that can be mobilised in the event of war. ... It is the committee's strongest opinion that Sweden should keep the system with military service" (1992: 98). The most important recommendation by the committee is that the decision on enlisting servicemen must be based on the needs of the Armed Forces and the qualities of the individual serviceman. This (parliamentarian) recommendation puts a definite end to the universality policy as conventionally understood (Ibid: 18).¹² There is, in addition, a visible movement toward efficiency as an important objective. Only those skilled and motivated enough to make a contribution to the Armed Forces should be enlisted, suggesting a new norm of "the right man in the right place":

The right man in the right place must be the goal. A high

¹¹See also Belfrage and Ryner 2009; Forsell and Jansson 2000; Svensson 2001.

¹²"The needs of the civil and the military defence in peace and war should... be met in a way so that it guarantees that different objectives of the Armed Forces can be achieved in an effective way. The objectives in war and peace should govern the design of the organisation, how many servicemen that are conscripted and the length of their training" (Ibid: 18).

effectiveness in the outtake of conscripts contributes to security and stability in the efforts and keeps down the costs of military service (Ibid: 96).

The committee believes it is possible to improve the efficiency of the Armed Forces by taking away the three bottom categories of conscripts, reducing the categories from seven to four. It also takes up on Supreme Commander Gustavsson's idea of creating a "reserve" where servicemen who are qualified but not enlisted should be placed in reserve units. If the serviceman qualifies for a position that is already full, he is placed in the reserve and should not be redirected to another position, as before.¹³ For the same reason, it proposes a "radical new idea" where the service must end as soon as the training is completed (Frid 1992). With these changes, only half of the cohort will serve in the future at the same time as the Armed Forces are allowed to improve its quality and make more efficient use of its resources.

3.2 New Wars

In the early 1990s there was a parallel debate on the changing nature of the security environment and what this meant for the organisational purpose of the Armed Forces. When the cold war ended, the ideas of what this would mean for Europe could be sorted into three camps. One believed that nothing had changed; another that Europe was on a path toward greater peace and prosperity; a third believed that the world had become more complex and that the Armed Forces had to do more of everything. We can call the first camp "realist" in the sense that it pointed to the continued relevance of "hard" (military) power. As long as there was (in the human condition) a will to dominate others there was also a risk of war between states (Waltz 1979). The absence of military capabilities (in Russia) is less important in this view, since military power can easily be developed. The supposed demilitarisation of Russia or the collapse of the Soviet union was therefore of little strategic significance for European states. The disappearance of the stable bi-polar order was also estimated to increase the risk for war in Europe, and not be a sign of more peaceful times ahead (Mearsheimer 1990). The "liberal" camp believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union had showcased the triumph of liberal democracy. It marked nothing less

¹³The reserve is an invention that aids the goal of rationality and efficiency in two ways. It as a way of preserving the universality principle simultaneously with reductions in number of conscripts — being placed in the reserves still signals to the serviceman that you can be called upon— and, second, it enables the goal of having the right man in the right place.

than the “End of History” and the beginning of “warless society” and a “New World Order” (Fukuyama 1989; Moskos 1992; Freedman 1991). It was not pacifistic as much as it pointed to the soft power of liberal democracy and capitalism, which were political and economic systems that history had proven superior to any other system. In this view, soft power would replace hard power and the objective was to spread democracy and in this way spread security, since democracies never fight each other — the so called “democratic peace” theory (Luttwak 1990; Kennedy 1993: 122-34; Doyle 2005). In the third group none of the two ideal types are easily accepted even if it borrows substantially from the liberal group. Instead, the truth can be found somewhere in between. Old “national” wars were becoming less relevant, and would eventually be replaced not by perpetual peace, but by New Wars that are waged within and above state borders. These will be about resource scarcity, religion, ethnicity, and environmental stress and will raise new kinds of risks and uncertainties that states will have to deal with, for instance by expeditionary missions to conflict areas (Dandeker 1993; Van Creveld 1992; Kaldor 1999). If failed states could become democracies, the chances for security would increase, thus echoing the belief in the liberal camp of democratic peace.

In which camps should we place the SAP and the Moderate Party? That is to say, what organisational purpose do the SAP and the Moderate Party want the Armed Forces to have in the post-cold war period? With risk of oversimplification, throughout the 1990s the Moderate Party took a realist perspective whereas the SAP moved from the realist perspective in the first years of the 1990s toward a growing and selective emphasis on New Wars — which becomes more pronounced towards the end of the decade, though seeds of it starting already in 1992. One reason for why the SAP moved the New Wars perspective into policy can be traced to its complicated relation to the EC/EU. As the 1980s becomes the 1990s the SAP finds itself divided on what its policies toward deepening political cooperation in Europe should be. In the 1980s, the party perceived the EC as a neoliberal project with values diametrically opposed to the ones that made up the so called “Swedish model”, including its welfare policies and neutrality policy. In debates about the EC, Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson could as late as 1988 argue that:

Our neutrality policy is of great benefit to our country, and to the whole of Europe. With the division in Europe between East and West, Sweden’s neutrality contributes with security, detente and stability. No country would benefit from a different Swedish position (Carlsson 1988: 225-226).

Similarly, the party’s spokesperson on international affairs, Pierre Schori,

denounced the EC on arguments that:

Our neutrality policy is no commodity to be *traded* with.
...The SAP has enabled [the neutrality] policy thanks to our
long time in government. It is possible to talk about a SAP
hegemony in security policy ([my emphasis] Schori 1988: 21).

When the prime minister opens parliament in 1989 he restates that Sweden's nonalignment policy is more important than joining the EU, and that the end of the cold war had little geopolitical significance when it came to Sweden's security-, defence-, and foreign policy (Carlsson 1989). In 1989 Schori even argues that the two superpowers (the US and Russia) still keep a large armed presence in Europe, which is why it is unwise for Sweden to adjust its defence and foreign policies, even if the cold war has ended (thus suggesting a realist perspective) (Schori 1989).

Then things change and as a consequence of a number of simultaneous events, pointing to the issue of timing in policy development. When Sweden's public finances heads into severe difficulties in the late 1980s the SAP leadership begins adjusting its EU policy, believing maybe a Swedish membership could offer a way to alleviate the problem, recognising that Sweden could not solve the problems by going alone and that Sweden's economy had become deeply nested with the ones in Europe (Lindbom 2001; Gustavsson 1998: ch 8-9). As Jakob Gustavsson has put it, between 1988 and 1990 Carlsson gradually "adopted a new set of beliefs regarding the international political situation, the Swedish relationship to the EC and domestic developments, all of which pointed in the direction of membership in the EC" (Ibid: 141). In addition to this, the unification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact meant that the dividing elements that had made Swedish neutrality important had disappeared, which at least could be provided as a rational ground for revising Sweden's foreign policy. It looked as "history had ended" and it was time to work fully towards liberal democracy in Europe. With these developments in Europe the argumentation for not joining were no longer as convincing as it had been only a few years before. Another important factor was that the Moderate Party pushed in favour of a Sweden that was more open, positive and welcoming to the new Europe that was forming and argued strongly in favour of a Sweden politically and economically integrated in the so far still evolving but promising European cooperation between liberal democratic states.

In September 1990, Carlsson informs his party that the changes in Europe have greatly reduced the risks of war, meaning that Sweden no

longer will “have to carry the heavy burden of strict neutrality” (Carlsson 1990: 79). What the SAP, or at least its elite segments, is in the beginning of with this statement is a strategic adjustment of its foreign policy. It stakes out a new ideological development in its foreign policy where neutrality gets a new, and less sharp meaning, denoting more “military nonalignment” than, as before, standing on the sidelines of regional politics as an “impartial” bystander or “observer”. The strategic adjustment is jump-started with a policy reversal — in this case the party’s policy on the EU and the revised meaning of “neutrality”. The party believes it can afford the reversal given that it has high credibility in defending the value of neutrality, pointing out that Sweden have no reason to worry that the change will be a slippery slope into joining a defence alliance such as Nato, since the meaning of neutrality is, according to Carlsson, deeply seated in Swedish culture and in the SAP (Carlsson 2003: 403). The party also refers to the necessity of change with the argument that the world is changing and Swedish policies cannot remain “static” or foreclose the possibility of prudently adjusting its policies in order to secure that the political outcomes remain the same (Andersson 1990). Schori reasons similarly, arguing that it is important that Sweden not cements the policy of neutrality, but that Sweden remains “open and flexible when it comes to building security for us and the world around us” (Schori 1992a; 1992: 398). As is expected, policy reversal is coupled to blame avoidance and in this situation the strategy is pointing out that the importance of neutrality has always been its *outcome* — building peace and security in the region — but that this policy no longer was the most effective way for achieving this. In a changing world, the best way to achieve peace and security was to engage in cooperation and relax the neutrality policy.

In 1991, Carlsson hence files a request for joining the EU arguing that “a Swedish membership in the EG is in our national interest,” pointing in this case to the nation’s economic interest (Carlsson 1991a). Although the SAP elite was comfortable with the policy change, grassroots in the party were deeply worried. As one example, the argument that Sweden would benefit economically was contested by segments in the party, who saw the risk that membership would dissemble the “Swedish model” (Parliament Protocol 1991a; 1991b; 1991c).

A heated intra-political debate erupts in the party and one example of the feelings among the most aggrieved is Sten Johansson, social democratic intellectual and CEO of the SCB:

We will not only abandon 175 years of freedom from alliances, the foundation of our national survival. Sweden will also more or less cease to exist as an independent nation with its own voice and identity in international society (Johansson 1992a).

Parts of the SAP believed the EU challenged the party's belief in neutrality, the EU was by many viewed as a "neoliberal project" and it challenged the moral foundation of the "Swedish model", with its distinct national character (Ryner 2002; Wæver 1992; Isaksson 2010: 55; Trägårdh 2002). This reaction is hardly surprising. For decades, the SAP had championed the distinctive national character of its policies resting, as it did, on a strong state and national sovereignty — a form of "welfare nationalism" as some have described it (Trägårdh 2002). Seymour Martin Lipset has famously denoted this kind of socialism as "working class authoritarianism" ([1960] 1981). His concept points to the cross-pressure effect where workers who support Left-wing economic policies typically also favour Right-wing policies on socio-cultural issues, including national community, sovereignty, law and order, migration, tradition, and so on. Joining the EU, what was now what the SAP suggested, risked upending all this since the union arguably represented globalisation, marketisation and supra-national authority. For the centre-right government, this was partly why it believed joining was important. The EU could offer a way of breaking into SAP's political hegemony by exposing it to entirely different values that would flow into Swedish society (Dahl 2014).

When the centre-right government enters office in 1991 this issue becomes even more difficult for the SAP to manage. When Carl Bildt opened parliament in the autumn of 1991, he not only promised structural reform of the state-market relations and the Armed Forces, he also listed EU-membership as his government's top priority (Bildt 1991a). Membership would not only help put Sweden's economy back on its feet, he believed, it would also serve as an outlet for liberalising the welfare system (by exposing it to the more liberal European tradition) and renewing the country's foreign policy. Bildt therefore begins to act as a norm-entrepreneur for a new foreign policy, less attached to neutrality. Among other things, he debunks prevailing myths about Swedish "neutrality" during the cold war by, for instance, opening an inquiry on Sweden's alleged cooperation with the United States and Great Britain during the cold war (*Neutralitetskommissionen*) (see also Dalsjö 2006;

Holmström 2011).¹⁴ He pushes for a national referendum on EU membership.¹⁵ By joining the EU, the meaning of neutrality would have to be dressed down, to mean only military *nonalignment*:

Out of necessity our foreign policy will have to be adjusted to the new realities in Europe. It is obvious that the term “neutrality” no longer can be used as an adequate description of our foreign- and security policy. We will have a policy with a clear European identity (Bildt 1991b).

In a unified Europe, Sweden must take an active part and build the political union as envisioned in the Maastricht Treaty (Bildt 1991c). If the purpose of neutrality during the cold war was to ensure long lasting peace, then the post-cold war context requires updated policies. The cold war is over, now we have to come to new decisions, he argued (Bildt 1991c; 1991d). The thinner version of neutrality as “nonalignment” is also blurred by Bildt. It is no longer possible, he argues:

to talk about rivalry superpowers in Europe. It is against this background that the term “neutrality” no longer fits with our foreign- and security policy. If the conflict between the East and West no longer defines Europe, toward who are we neutral? The moon? We do not know what the future has in store for us. For this reason we have an obligation to remain open and to preserve our freedom of action. We are committed to participate in building a common European foreign- and security policy and a distinctly European security order (Bildt 1992a).

With these words Bildt sends the message that there is nothing ideologically that prevents him, or should prevent Sweden, from full European integration — including membership in Nato, *if* such actions proves to serve the national interest. Sweden’s integration in the EU can prompt situations where interests are better served by taking part in alliances.¹⁶ As a step in this direction he suggests that it would be difficult for Sweden to remain neutral if a conflict develops in its geographical proximity, for instance in the Baltic states. He opens up a dialogue and

¹⁴In 1993, the commission validated the suspicions that Sweden had been less neutral than statesmen had given light of.

¹⁵It was held one year after his government left office. 52,3 % voted in favour of joining the EU.

¹⁶Later, he explicitly argues that it is possible that Sweden should abandon both neutrality and nonalignment if “it turns out that our security policies are more efficiently served by doing this, by for instance joining a defence alliance. The security of the Swedish people can in fact be better served by joining an alliance than by standing outside” (Bildt 1992b).

prepared the work for joining Sweden to the Nato's *Partnership for Peace Programme* (which it joined in 1994).¹⁷ It is not unreasonable that these actions were, as some have argued, part of a greater plan to finally join Sweden to Nato (Dahl 2014).

Realism Against New Wars 1.0

One consequence of the centre-right government's revision of Sweden's foreign policy was that it compelled a political reaction from the SAP, who still had segments in the party that felt that the SAP was abandoning important issue-reputations by moving closer to the EU. Partly as a consequence of the bold changes by the centre-right government and partly as a response to critical segments in their own party, in 1992 top-segments in the SAP start emphasising that with the EU Sweden is better placed to contribute to peace and stability in the world — a long-standing issue-reputation in the SAP. This should be understood as yet another blame avoidance strategy by the SAP. It builds on the arguments initiated earlier, where the outcome of peace and security is the same but to deliver this the policy must change. Now it adds to that argument that with the EU the party can elevate SAP-policies to a new — regional — level. This blame avoidance strategy is what sets of a policy change in the SAP where it gradually, but decisively, moves toward developing an entirely new organisational purpose for the Armed Forces. When this debate unfolds, the Armed Forces and the Moderate Party will favour continuity — the “realist” perspective — whereas the SAP moves towards the New Wars camp. With risk of oversimplification, the centre-right government and the Armed Forces perceived the changes in Europe in the early 1990s as moving from stability and certainty to instability and uncertainty.¹⁸ The Head of the Army, Åke Sgrén, believed Sweden had to preserve a large territorial defence: “We should stay at today's levels. If we reduce it will take at least four to five years to recapture what we have done away with. The

¹⁷With this Sweden committed itself to greater transparency and information sharing in the development of their defence and to in the long term develop the organisation to better fit the West-European standard, to facilitate interoperability.

¹⁸Of particular importance to them was that the Russian activity around the Baltic Sea would most likely increase. During the cold war the Russian military had been scattered all across Eastern Europe. With the collapse these are instead concentrating in strategically important areas around the Baltic Sea, moving closer to Sweden. It was a widespread belief in the Swedish military that even if the Russian political elite wanted change, this was hardly true for the Russian intelligence services and military (Gustavsson 2006). These branches perceived the talk about democratisation as signs of weakness, defeat and adjusting to the enemy's political system. In the Russian intelligence services and military the cold war mentality still persisted.

defence against an invasion will always be the first priority. Why do we otherwise need a military?” (Sagrén 1990). The Supreme Commander, Bengt Gustavsson, similarly believed it was too early to draw any conclusions about the geopolitical development. In a text from 1990, with the title ‘Towards a more uncertain future’, he asks whether “the bipolar world we have grown used to, and which have at least since the Cuba Missile Crisis enabled a certain amount of predictability and relative stability, is on the way of being dissolved?”, answering that little can be known, but that “we are certain that we are headed toward a more uncertain future. It is far from certain that we are moving toward a more secure and stable Europe” (Gustavsson 1990).¹⁹ The centre-right government was equally careful not to prematurely cash in the peace dividend. According to Bildt, Russia still operated or had recently operated mini-submarines in Swedish waters, carrying both special military forces, ammunition and weapons (Bildt 1990a). A report by Gustavsson pointed to a similar conclusion (Gustavsson 1991a). Similarly, Björck made it clear to which camp he belonged to: “I belong to that group which, from my experiences, do not believe in stability in our part of Europe... The instability will increase [and] we are moving from traditional threats into a period of instability and uncertainty” (Björck 1991a). For the government and the Armed Forces, the post-cold war period was not so much a new “order” as it was an *absence* of order. There is a hopeful possibility for a new order, yet to have settled.

With the challenges posed to the party on the EU, the SAP had to develop a policy toward the EU that worked internally and with the changing governing context. It “had to consider what role to play in Europe’s evolving security order and how to respond to the new security context” (Lee-Ohlsson 2009: 124). More than just finding a role, the SAP had to find a solution that allowed the SAP to enter the EU without cutting off its distinctive approach to foreign policy. Its solution was to stress a to that point underreported benefit of joining EU, namely the possibility for Sweden to take on the role as norm-entrepreneur and “upload” Swedish foreign policy to EU-level, championing among other things crisis-management, peace-building and peace-keeping capability (Brommesson 2010; Lee-Ohlsson 2009). By coupling the EU to the party’s tradition of international solidarity, the SAP could provide a

¹⁹In a later text where he writes about his views of the collapse of the Soviet Union at the time, he writes that he was convinced that “No government would benefit by a military leadership that disregards the possibility of military threats. Potential conflicts are difficult to forecast and an aggressor will always premiere the element of surprise. *The formation of the Armed Forces must therefore be such that it is flexible enough to preserve the peace, be stabilising and deterring a wide spectrum of threats*” ([emphasis in original] Gustavsson 2006: 38).

bridge to the most critical segments in the party and persuade them of the benefits of joining. The party thus begins a change in the “selective emphasis” from territorial defence to expeditionary missions and in this process contests and redefines the debate on organisational purpose from “old wars” to a growing relevance and importance of “new wars”. Starting in 1992, both Ingvar Carlsson and Pierre Schori begins to talk about Sweden’s historical ties with Eastern Europe and that, by being a member of the EU, Sweden can mould Europe in SAP-ideals:

EC today and EU tomorrow will be what the member-states, governments and parliaments make of it, nothing else. It will be exposed to the same political struggle between Left and Right, between those who want to protect and improve society (“a citizen’s and labourers Europe”) and those who believe that the market should have all say... The EC will be the next level, the European level, next to the national, for political engagement (Schori 1992a).

The message by Schori is that there is “nothing to fear” because the SAP will place the same demands in the EU as it does at home. Being a member, Sweden will “upload” its policies to a regional level more than “downloading” someone else’s (Schori 1992b). Framed in this way, the goal of the membership is one of building a “Europe and world in peace and freedom, with economic and social progress” (Ibid). In the long run, it is even possible that the EU can serve a platform for uploading SAP preferences onto the global stage, as the party had done for decades with its membership in the UN:

In the same way as with the UN, the EC and later the EU will be what the citizens and their government makes of it. What we want with the EC will tell much what we want for our own society and what we want with Europe generally (Schori 1992b).

In a process that others have denoted “normative Europeanisation”, the SAP began to argue that the interests and values of Sweden and the EU converged, at least as it concerned foreign policy (Brommesson 2010; Brommesson and Ekengren 2007: 131). On helping the global poor, the EU was described as a beefed up means for doing in principle the same as Sweden had done throughout the cold war. The same applied to peace-building and peace-enforcement missions. What Sweden for many years had done on its own would now be the goal of an entire continent of states, at least if Sweden (and the SAP) could set the order of things.

The policy change is helped by the emerging conflict on the Balkans.²⁰ European nations, Schori argues, have a moral imperative of preventing the conflict but in its current state Europe lacks the political tools, something which the SAP can change by becoming a member (Schori 1992b). With the existential threat gone, it is not only possible to redirect defence budgets to e.g. welfare, it is equally morally demanded that the Armed Forces redraw its organisational purpose to better assist in conflicts abroad. With this move, the SAP could offer continuity and renewal. It is a policy where the SAP can offer a distinctively SAP-marked and morally progressive alternative to the centre-right government which still talked about the threat from Russia — being trapped in “cold war way of thinking”. For even if the Moderate Party prioritised membership in the EU, it did not advocate internationalism. The Armed Forces could participate in peace-keeping missions, if circumstances permit. But in 1992 there are, according to Björck, no such circumstances. The budgetary situation prevented any extra duties, Europe was still unstable and the Armed Forces had to set its own house in order. In Björck’s own words on a possible Swedish engagement in the Balkans:

The purpose of the Swedish Armed Forces is to defend Sweden.
Our Armed Forces have no global role to play. Our Armed
Forces will accept its responsibility if there is a political need

²⁰When the Soviet Union collapsed countries that had been under its control for decades began a process for independence. Movements toward independence was especially pressing in the Balkans, where the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was an unstable political creation marked by different and often fractious ethnic groups. In the 1991, Slovenia and Croatia breaks free from Yugoslavia. A short while later, in early 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina passed a referendum for independence from Yugoslavia. This was supported by the Bosnian Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but rejected by the Bosnian Serbs, who had boycotted the referendum. Following the declaration of independence (which gained international recognition), the Serbs (led by Radovan Karadžić and supported by the Serbian government of Slobodan Milošević) mobilised their forces against the Bosnian Muslims. The war soon spread across the country and the world could watch a brutal war accompanied by indiscriminate shelling of cities and towns, ethnic cleansing and systematic mass rape. It was only a matter of time before the UN assembled a peace-negotiator and would ask European countries to help put an end to the fighting. In early 1992, the UN created a peacekeeping force, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), with the purpose of providing humanitarian aid to all victims of the war and to remain “passive and impartial,” and finding a “middle way between traditional peacekeeping missions that ‘sustain’ a peaceful environment and large-scale enforcement operations that use active military force to ‘create’ such an environment”(Hillen 1995). In the first year of the war the question of ethnic-cleansing was not a major issue, but soon enough it was hard for peacekeepers to ignore the atrocities that were occurring once they were on the ground. Media could at the same time display shocking images of brutal fighting and cleansing to the world — galvanising Western nations to do something about the conflict (the so called “CNN-effect”).

to participate in an international deployment, as soon as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs is prepared to come up with the money. There is no need nor possibility for the Defence Ministry to finance operations in foreign countries (Björck 1992c).

By inserting an argument on finances, Björck hoped to kill the debate, since the ministry for foreign affairs had no such resources, even if it was historically its responsibility to finance international operations since these were traditionally carried out for foreign policy reasons and not for reasons having to do with national security. Given that the ministry for foreign affairs has made it clear that it has no resources for funding a deployment, the issue was acted out for the government.

The SAP reasons differently. To them, it is of critical importance that Sweden participates in the UN-led campaign on the Balkans, *even* if such a deployment — breaking with tradition — must be financed by the Armed Forces. As expected, Björck rejects the proposal. “It will cost 2,5 billion annually, and I don’t think it will be very popular once we begin receiving body bags at our airports” (Björck 1993a). Schori is not satisfied and hands in a motion to parliament with the title “A more offensive policy for human rights”, stating that Sweden *always* has extended its moral demands at home to people beyond Swedish borders — carefully underscoring that what the SAP argues for is part of living up to a Swedish tradition, defended and championed by the SAP:

For us social democrats the struggle for human rights is as old as the party itself. It is a natural part of our international engagement. ...Freedom and equality is a precondition for the possibility for people to develop, both as individuals and together with others — both in Sweden and in other countries. Solidarity means to put oneself in the shoes of others, compassion and care, but also a willingness to level the playing field economically and socially. The solidarity does not stop at our borders, it encompasses all people. With this moral foundation, it is a given for us social democrats that promoting human rights is exceptionally important in our foreign policies (SAP 1993a).

The debate continues and in early 1993 the SAP hands in another motion to parliament suggesting that the Armed Forces develop a standing international brigade of 4,500 thousand soldiers, which the Armed Forces must pay out of their own pocket (SAP 1993b). In yet another motion, the SAP explicitly couples this suggestion to the party’s policies on a more integrated Europe:

The SAP believes that it is a duty for Sweden to stand up and protect the civilians, stop the violence and contribute to a lasting peace in Yugoslavia. It follows from our engagement in international solidarity, our desire for a new European peace-order and our obligations to the UN Charter (SAP 1993c).

At the same time, the UN's peace-negotiator in Bosnia, David Owen, declares that the UN would welcome a Nordic contribution to the Balkans. Because Sweden chairs the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and is an eager soon-to-be member of the EU, the foreign ministry responds that "it would be difficult to turn an offer down" (af Ugglas 1993a). Yet such a participation, Björck stresses again, has to be financed from the foreign ministry: "UN-troops have never been paid for by the defence ministry and will not this time either" and "Sweden has nothing to do with this conflict, our soldiers have the sole purpose of defending Swedish territory, not participating in international missions. If we participate we must cancel appropriations and shut down regiments, creating mass unemployment" (Björck 1993b). Schori calls the government's refusal "scandalous" and a sign that the defence ministry "still lives in the cold war" (Schori 1993). Ingvar Carlsson presents yet another motion to parliament arguing that "nobody can chose to stand outside the [Bosnian] tragedy, not as a human being, not as European, and not as citizen of the world" (SAP 1993b). It takes care to emphasise that the crisis on the Balkans is a European problem, that needs European solutions:

As a European cultural nation, we have not only a duty to intervene, we have a moral and political duty. ...In the SAP we place great weight in international solutions and instruments for dealing with these sorts of conflicts. We need a stronger UN, but we also need stronger regional organisations, ... the end of the cold war has created new possibilities for such [regional] organisations (SAP 1993b).

The SAP is successful in their argumentation — for in May the government decides on deploying a UN-peace-keeping unit of 1,000 soldiers, of which 850 will be deployed in the same summer.²¹ With this de-

²¹The defence ministry is never convinced of the appropriateness of the Bosnia mission. This becomes evident in 1993 and 1994 when the defence minister repeatedly complains that expensive defence material is worn out in Bosnia. In the spring of 1994 Björck, as an example, growls with the Minister of Development Aid Alf Svensson, on the wear and tear of Swedish military Airplanes, and who should finance these costs. The defence minister refuses, arguing that: "These are no development aid aircrafts, they are part of our national military defence. We need them at home" (Björck 1994a).

cision, the organisational purpose of the Armed Forces is redefined, in the same way that the organisational design of the Armed Forces had been redefined a year earlier. Because even as the Armed Forces are put under a heavy task of streamlining its organisation, it must set scarce resources — its most modern equipment — to raising an expeditionary deployment.

For both the centre-right government and the SAP the deployment to Bosnia is a result of the coming EU membership. For the government it is part of showing goodwill to the EU. For the SAP it is more than this. The arguments for deployment is a manifestation of the moral dimension to their EU-argument. Moreover, the issue of the EU is important because through it the two parties give their respective answers to how it views the development of Sweden in the post-cold war era, at least as it concerns foreign-, security-, and defence policy. It is visible that the SAP, pressured by economic rationale and intra-political conflict falls back a moral argument for joining the union. This argument quickly matures into the party's answer for Sweden in the post-cold war period. With risk of oversimplification, it is the peace-dividend applied to foreign affairs — with the threat of old wars gone, Sweden had a moral obligation to do other things with the Armed Forces. The Moderate Party had few internal problems on the EU policy, why they do not develop a similar moral dimension to their foreign policy or injects peace-keeping missions as a new purpose of the Armed Forces.

3.3 Back to Universality?

In 1994, the Armed Forces get a new Supreme Commander, Owe Wiktorin. Early on, he makes clear that his priority is modernising the Armed Forces and that he is no fan of expeditionary missions. The conscripted cohort should shrink in size to allow modernisation. To Wiktorin, there is no conflict between military service and an Armed Forces that put a premium on quality: “You should not do away with military service just because you demand quality. To the contrary, military service is the only possible solution for a military with a task such as ours, defending a large territory without help from others” (Wiktorin 2017). The system with military service is still necessary for producing a credible deterrent, ensuring high quality in the recruitment of officers, and gauging defence willingness in society. “Without military service, the entire organisation would collapse, like a house of cards” (Ibid). Above all, given Sweden's neutrality and large territorial size there is no other alternative to military service. Echoing the arguments of his predecessor, for the Armed Forces the end of the cold war had

not given reason to reconsider the organisational design of the Armed Forces. In the foreseeable future it will still have to rely on universal enlistment tests, a high intake in conscripts, refresher exercises and a credible war-time placement. Organisationally, the cold war system was a “highly functioning, effective and a stable order, enabling long term planning for a strong and autonomous national defence” (Ibid).

The SAP wins the election in 1994. In the manifesto, the party pursued the ideas first formulated in 1992 of cashing in the peace dividend, by suggesting a ten percent reduction of the defence budget. As in 1992, it justifies this with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but now it also couples the need for efficiency and rationalisations with a need to restore balance in the public finances. According to the new Minister of Finance, Göran Persson, the cuts were supported in broad segments in the party: “In the contacts with my colleagues I met a widespread willingness to cut back on the defence, ten percent was way too little, they said!” (2008: 504). The new defence minister, Thage Peterson, is however sceptical, and persuades Persson to satisfy with a five percent cut. In his first meeting with Wiktorin, Peterson asks him to draw up a proposal on how to shrink the Armed Forces, but also — following the policy change from the early 1990s — how the Armed Forces can level up its expeditionary capability. Wiktorin rejects both inquiries. The conflict concerns not so much the financial reduction (which Wiktorin naturally opposes), as *how* the Armed Forces should achieve this given the evolving doctrine change from territorial defence to international engagements, which he sees no use of. Wiktorin wants to prioritise modernisation and a smaller military service which focuses on quality, beyond this, he argues “nothing is sacred” (Wiktorin 1994a). Peterson on the other hand is of the reverse opinion. He wants to restore the universality policy and increase the expeditionary capability (1999: 542). Peterson’s position was that nothing was holy except preserving a universal service and that the government will “hold on to the principle of universal military [because it] is a historical and uniting element in our democracy” (Peterson 1994a; 1994b; Peterson 1995a). If a choice is necessary between modernisation and universality, the latter must “trump the needs of the Armed Forces” (Peterson 1995b). As his predecessor Roine Carlsson, Peterson suggests that the universality policy can be preserved by reducing the length of the training. It should be noted that the universality policy here makes a revival, but with the added twist that the Armed Forces must still shrink and rationalise with a smaller budget, shutting down regiments and cancelling modernisation. The only part which should not shrink is the size of the conscripted cohort.

Peterson’s push for expeditionary capability is later in the year

supported by the Special Defence Committee's (SDC) report in May. Against the view of the Headquarters, it states that Russia is headed toward democracy and no longer poses a security risk to Sweden (SDC 1995a: 65). Other threats, including natural disasters and wars within nations, so called "new wars", are instead what the Armed Forces should be prepared for, by creating "small mobile units with high military preparedness" (Ibid: 113-114, 124). Wiktorin immediately rejects also this view, arguing that "everyone hopes for a more peaceful future, but military assessments must be based on realities — not on hopes of a better world" (Headquarters 1995: 2). Writing from a realist perspective, he argues that with the balance of power gone in Europe, there is an increased potential for war in the region, and that Russia still has substantial military capabilities (Ibid: 1-2). The purpose of the Armed Forces must therefore remain unchanged. In this pursuit, military service must remain, but move from quantity to quality by allowing the cohort to fall to 23,000 conscripts per year (Ibid: 2; Wiktorin 1995a). As a token of the seriousness of the situation — and the conflict between the defence ministry and the Headquarters — Wiktorin encourages officers in his organisation to "help bring forth arguments for why a strong defence is needed, even in the future" (Wiktorin 1995b).

Realism Against New Wars 2.0

In the middle of June 1995, a number of states meet in London to discuss the escalation of violence by Bosnian Serbs against UN protected regions in Bosnia. The discussion concerns whether the UN mission (UNPROFOR), in which Sweden participates with 800 soldiers, should be permitted to move from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement, and more assertive means for achieving peace. Peterson renounces the idea on the argument that Swedish soldiers are neither sufficiently trained or equipped for offensive actions. The comment spurs a heated chain of reactions. A number of the parties, especially the Liberal and the Moderate Party (but equally members from the SAP) denounces Peterson's "lack of faith" in the Swedish soldiers. Wiktorin has no doubt that Swedish soldiers are capable for peace-enforcement ("it sounds like the defence minister believes we are deploying velvet-soldiers to Bosnia") but questions whether expeditionary missions are what the Armed Forces should be doing, "for us, the missions were of dubious use, to say the least" (Wiktorin 2017; Wiktorin 1995c). The Head of the Armed Forces' International Centre, Karlis Neretnieks, adds that even if the mission is humanitarian, the soldiers engage in offensive actions on a daily basis: "It is a balancing act. Our training is a compromise, and to my taste a successful one. But it means that we are neither pure humanitarian

soldiers nor combative ones” (Neretnieks 1995). The commanding officer on site, Colonel Ulf Henricsson insures that the Swedish soldiers are highly qualified for offensive actions: “We have the personnel, training and equipment. All wars are dangerous, but the Swedish soldiers are just as good as the French, the British and the Danish” (Henricsson 1995).²² The debate in the summer of 1995 reveals two important pieces of information. The first is that the notion of expeditionary missions moves from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement and most politicians are comfortable with this. The second is that the conscripts are widely believed as capable of participating in this change without great adjustments to the organisation, suggesting that the movement to new wars did not produce an “external chock” to the Armed Forces.

In the fall of 1995 the conflict on the Armed Forces’ organisational purpose and design continues between Wiktorin and Peterson. Wiktorin arranges a meeting with the SDC to reiterate that the Armed Forces should not change, but still prioritise deterring hostile intent and preventing intruders from exploiting Sweden’s strategically important territory: “If we can manage to defend our nation we can also manage the spectrum of other threats. We cannot make long-term predictions on the nature of threats” (Wiktorin 1995d). He steps up the argument by suggesting that if the political leadership fails to understand the continued need for a territorial defence, this will push Sweden into joining the Nato: “[i]t surprises me that no attention has been drawn to this implication” (Wiktorin 1995e). This is the first time in many decades that a Supreme Commander expresses such view, though a stream of high ranking officers immediately second his criticism and conclusion, and so does the Moderate Party — demanding “more *realpolitik* and less ideology” (Moderate Party 1995a; 1995b). As his predecessor Pierre Schori accused Anders Björck, Peterson criticises the Armed Forces for being caught in “a cold war way of thinking”, lacking “basic knowledge about defence” and failing “to see that the world has changed” (Peterson 1995c).

Wiktorin’s strategy failed. When the SDC publishes a second report in the fall it suggests that the Armed Forces increase its expeditionary capability threefold, moving from 400 to nearly 1,400 soldiers that can be deployed (SDC 1995b). It also recommends an increase in the conscripted cohort to 30,000 and 10,000 “civilian” conscripts that will form a new “civilian defence” (Ibid: 19). In addition to this, it capitalises on the principle of efficiency, introduced by the Moderate Party in 1992,

²²In an interview, one of the squad leaders on site similarly expresses that: “It is not possible for politicians back home to say what we can and cannot do. The Swedish soldiers cannot be reduced to B-soldiers. We have good equipment and good training. When we are provoked we have to respond offensively” (Ibid).

that the Armed Forces should be allowed to shrink in peacetime, and swell in the case of war (Ibid: 12). Wiktorin was not impressed: “You cannot just ‘turn off’ and ‘turn on’ a defence organisation like that. With this approach, there would be long periods with no real demands on the organisation. Psychologically, it would rip the organisation apart, by draining the employees of motivation and energy. Nobody wants to serve in an organisation where ‘passivity’ is the watchword” (Wiktorin 2017). The most serious flaw in the existing defence policy, according to Wiktorin, was that there was a dangerous gap between stated goals and available resources (Wiktorin 1995f). To stress the seriousness of the situation, he suggests that there is nothing that prevents Russia from an unprovoked attack on Sweden within a three year period: “If I am frightening people by telling the truth, then it is worse than I thought” (Wiktorin 1995g). But at this point the battle is already lost for Wiktorin. With the SDC’s two reports, Peterson sets out to write the first of two defence bills that will make up the 1996 Defence Decision. The first promises a “new way of thinking” by reducing the defence budget with ten percent, increasing the expeditionary capability and that these missions will, from now, be part of the purpose of the Armed Forces (Peterson 1995e). He wants the Armed Forces to begin “structural changes” as soon as possible, and that it is “acceptable” if this process “produces a deterioration of the operative functions, effectiveness and abilities of the military to meet large armed attacks on our nation” (Ibid). At the same time as the budget must shrink, the Armed Forces must revert back to the universality principle. This is especially important when other European states are moving toward professional armies:

There is a risk that the Armed Forces become a professional army. The government cannot accept this. Our People’s Defence, with its broad public engagement, is a great asset. It is necessary to consider the social benefits of a universal military service... [it] creates a good society where all citizens do their fair share for the public good (Ibid).

In a last attempt to set the political leadership straight, Wiktorin writes an article in Sweden’s largest newspaper:

We cannot proceed on hopes of a more peaceful future. ...There are still large military capabilities in our geographical proximity. There are still great risks for conflict and the future is still uncertain. I am convinced that the national defence, also in the future, must be organised for the purpose of preventing an armed attack (Wiktorin 1995h).

Peterson, together with foreign minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén, rebut by urging the Armed Forces to let go of cold-war way of thinking. Instead of working for peace by beginning in national defence, “[t]he work for peace and security must begin in with an international perspective and from there move to the national” (Peterson & Hjelm-Wallén 1995). Sweden is well equipped for such a doctrinal change: “[W]ith our rich experiences [of peace-keeping], we have do our part..., both as it concerns the possibility to help the people in former Yugoslavia and, in the more long-term, building a new European defence and security community” (Ibid). Within the SAP leadership there is even an idea that the Ministry of Defence can be jumbled together or be ruled directly by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. To the Minister of Finance, and later Prime Minister, Göran Persson this development would only be natural. For him, the developments in the post cold war order, especially the notion of the widened security notion, leads to the conclusion that: “the defence capabilities have to be determined together with the foreign policies at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Defence policy will eventually become a natural part of the foreign ministry. It will become difficult to motivate a Parliamentarian Committee for defence questions in parliament. The SDC can also be removed. The shrinking scope of the defence organisation will also lead to a situation where it is, on a strict budgetary level, treated as any other policy area” (Persson 2008: 240).

According to Wiktorin, the Armed Forces perceived the new purpose on expeditionary missions as “a political invention” (Wiktorin 2017). As civil servants we accepted it, but we did not support it” (Ibid; Wiktorin 1996a). When Wiktorin presents his ideas on how to realise the government’s wishes he is far from satisfied: “I have departed from the tradition of proposing my own thoughts as Supreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces. The plan is entirely dictated by the terms set down by the political leadership”, the commanders of the Armed Forces have been “run over” (Wiktorin 1996b; 1996c). The Moderate Party agrees, arguing that “the disarmament of Sweden has started too early. The development in Russia is highly uncertain” (Moderate Party 1996a). In Wiktorin’s plan, the ambitions on defending the national capability will be scaled down to maintaining the capability of preserving territorial integrity, whereas the expeditionary capability will grow to 1,400 soldiers. Though he rejects Peterson’s wishes on a short term service, and proposes a reduction of the cohort from 33,000 to 22,000 (Headquarters 1996). The justification for this is given from the Director of the National Service Administration (NSA), Jan Tänneryd, who believes that with the organisational reduction there will, naturally, also be a reduced need of conscripts (Tänneryd 1996a). Wiktorin also rejects the idea on

a “civil service” on the argument that this is not the task of the Armed Forces: “The foundational idea behind the duty to serve is training to defending the country militarily, this principle should not be violated” (Headquarters 1996: 6).

When the SDC presents its report in August 1996, the case for re-drawing the purpose of the Armed Forces has “only been strengthened” (SDC 1996: 120). In the second bill, Peterson promises a “modern” and “pioneering” Armed Forces, capable of dealing with the “threats of tomorrow, and not those of the past” (Peterson 1996a). Ignoring Wiktorin’s proposal, Peterson wants the Armed Forces to conscript 10,000 civilian conscripts, 29,000 military conscripts, introduce a short-term service, reduce the budget by ten percent, and boost the expeditionary capability by creating one expeditionary battalion that can be deployed within 30 days. Most important of all, from now on the Armed Forces will have to pay for the expeditionary missions, and the Armed Forces should no longer be designed to meet an armed attack on the nation (Government 1996: 55). The Moderate Party responds that expeditionary missions in no way contribute to Swedish security (Moderate Party 1996b). The chairman of the party, Carl Bildt, charges the SAP for lacking knowledge of military affairs and for being irresponsible: “We have in Sweden decided to no longer have the capability of independently defending our country against another country” (Bildt 1996).

Chapter 4

CONVERSION

In early 1997, rumours have it that Peterson will step down to be replaced by the SAP's representative in the SDC, Britt Bohlin. She is considered a strong candidate by virtue of her belief in a "revolution in military affairs". Not so much in technology as in "tearing down old thinking" and "unnecessary and tradition-laden structures" (Bohlin 1997). The rumours were partly right. Peterson steps down but is replaced by the Minister for Commerce, Björn von Sydow.

With a new defence minister Wiktorin grabs the opportunity for improved relations with the defence ministry. In the spring, he regularly meets with Sydow to share his thoughts and as a novice Sydow appreciates his visits (Sydow 2013; 2015). Soon enough it however becomes apparent that the two have strong disagreements on the central issues on organisational purpose and design. Unlike Wiktorin, Sydow believes Russia is less a risk than before, that the expeditionary perspective is important and part of the future, and that the universality policy is important. Sydow, in other words, continues the priorities of his predecessor. In addition, like Pierre Schori, he believes that Sweden should be a norm-entrepreneur in developing a European defence structure with joint operations (Sydow 1997a). If European states can pool their defence capabilities they can scale down their independent forces and improve their preparedness for new wars. To Sydow, the end of the cold war meant that conflict between states would be replaced by conflict within states, within Europe and elsewhere, and "the capability to deal with these have taken centre stage. Crises must be dealt with as swiftly as possible" (Ibid). Apart from continuing the trajectory set out by his predecessors, Sydow describes that he was personally convinced on this way ahead at a visit to a Nato-led exercise in Göteborg in the spring of 1997. He describes the visit as an "eye-opener", with a policy

consequence that Sweden “must prioritise our expeditionary capabilities. Our task must be to contribute to the peace in Europe, this is the point with it all” (Sydow 1997b). Also on the issue of organisational design he, initially, continues the policy set out by Peterson. In the first few months Sydow avoids the issue on universality policy and mainly refers to the 1996 Defence Decision, which supports the universality policy. This approach soon proves untenable because it is not supported by the opposition or the Armed Forces, and in the summer of 1997 the National Audit Office publishes a report with the conclusion that the Armed Forces every year enlists eleven percent too many servicemen, something which the committee had shown and estimated already in 1992. This kind of information leads Sydow to “look into a possible change” but that for the time being the policy still stands that the service must “encompass as many as possible” (Sydow 1997c). During the party congress later in the year it is decided that yet another parliamentary committee should examine how to proceed. In the directive, he stresses that “it is absolutely necessary that we preserve a universal military service, but that there is still reason to examine how to use the system” (Sydow 1997d). The task of the committee will be to examine how to reduce the defection rates and the proper length of the training, and whether the enlistment tests ought to be adjusted (Government 1997). The committee will present its suggestions in February 2000, and until then the universality policy still stands.

4.1 A New Military Service?

In November, the Headquarters informs the Defence Ministry that the Armed Forces have a deficit of “somewhere” between 10 and 12 billion. The Headquarters blames the government, arguing the deficit is a consequence of combining higher international ambitions with universality, whereas the defence ministry argues it is a deliberate attempt by the Headquarters to ruin the 1996 Defence Decision (Wiktorin 1997a; Defence Ministry 1997). The new situation brings long-lasting consequences to the development of military service, and confronts the SAP with some difficult decisions on what principles it wants to govern its defence policy in the post-cold war period. For even if the the SAP’s strategic usage of military service in the 1900s (initiated by Branting and developed by Hansson) had served the party well, it is an at heart antimilitarist party. Whether it is creating political rights, integrating the working class in society, creating a People’s Home, institutionalising social welfare and building the precondition for foreign policy neutral-

ity, military service has been an essential instrument to further these causes. It has been a method that had served the party well, but also entangled it with vested interests in preserving a highly demanding defence structure. In size and expenditure, in what it expects of citizens and locking the defence organisation to a, at the time, increasingly idiosyncratic design. To a growing rate, the 1990s suggested this would become a problem for the party. Changes in the political landscape and the security environment stood head to head with everything that had worked to institutionalise military service and serve SAP interests over the course of a century. Painstaking choices surfaced and, inevitably, political risks. No one has expressed this dilemma better than the Prime Minister at the time, Göran Persson:

For me, as a politician, matters on national defence belong to a group of things which are difficult for the SAP to manage. We have a pacifist tradition since the very foundation of the Party. It was about the fight against the sword, the capital, the altar and the throne, and this tradition have always been strong. At the same time it is a fact that we are a popular party which, when we're doing well, will have half of the population as our electorate. And there is a large group of men, almost all men have done military service, and they have their own memories and opinions, and these are opinions you just cannot dismiss any way you want. This is why the Supreme Commander [Owe Wiktorin] has been so successful. [B]ecause there is a firm public opinion for a strong national defence. Somebody on TV said that, "if you've done your military service, you also want your son to do it." Well, one can think of this as a bit ridiculous, but unfortunately it is a political reality (Persson [2007] 2018).

Given this view, which I believe captures the essentials of SAP defence policy historically, what Sydow decides in 1997 and the coming four years is of historical importance to SAP defence policy. Prompted by the seriousness of the situation, Sydow decides to abandon the universality policy — at least temporarily. Given the political investments that the party in the last few years had made in redefining the debate on organisational purpose, from territorial to expeditionary defence, what Sydow had to decide was whether it was possible to achieve the new policy within the existing organisation, with universality policy and a reduced budget, or if he would be forced to move further and propose a professional army. The second option was no real option for Sydow since the SAP had a long-standing issue-reputation of defending military service. Because of this he is forced to work from within a structure that

is heavily biased against the expeditionary objective. The task will be to convert military service in such a way that it caters the new policy on expeditionary missions. The first step in this process is that Sydow responds to the budgetary chock in November 1997 by arguing that it is possible to save money by cancelling the refresher exercises and by reducing the number of enlisted servicemen.

Extraordinary measures must be taken to bring order in the Armed Forces. It is mine and the government's absolute will to preserve the principally important adjustment strategy, the People's Defence and internationalising the Armed Forces. It is especially important that the military modernises its expeditionary capabilities (Sydow 1997e).

In a reduced budget, the Armed Forces can still improve its expeditionary capabilities by tweaking the organisational design of military service. Sydow turns vice into virtue by arguing that the financial constraint should be seen as an opportunity for modernising military service in terms of its "meaning, shape and content" (Ibid). In the coming years, he wants to "open a new discussion, bring forth a new system, ...and try new ideas on what we can do with military service" (Ibid). The purpose of this change would be to "inject the service with new energy", ensure that it has a "future-looking feeling" in the sense that "those who are conscripted feel: what we do is 'the future'. It is meaningful. It is modern" (Ibid). To achieve this, he continues, "it is very important that we are active in expeditionary missions, so that the conscripts feel that 'Yes, this is a meaningful mission in life. I believe in my profession'" (Ibid). It can be argued that what Sydow wanted to do was to change the meaning, shape and content of military service, and that he now has begun to formulate changes in the first of those three parts — its meaning. Military service would be internationalised.

We should understand this situation as the first sign of conversion. The SAP has an objective of internationalising the Armed Forces, but other European states who have decided the same have opted for swapping from a conscripted to a professional army. This was not a politically possible alternative for the SAP, given the public support for military service and given the SAP's issue-reputation for defending an encompassing military service and its criticism of professional armies. To escape the problem Sydow believes that military service can be used in a new way to make it compatible with expeditionary missions.

In institutional theory, Jacob Hacker has formulated the basics of why policy makers turn to conversion. His description neatly captures the situation in 1997:

A set of actors is opposed to the ends of an existing policy. In the starkest calculation, they must decide whether to “work within” this extant policy framework to achieve their ends or “work outside” it by eliminating or replacing it. Seen this way, it becomes clear that two questions loom large. First, how easily can these actors achieve their aims through the existing policy framework? And, second, how costly would it be to replace it with a policy more closely tailored to the ends they desire? If the answer to the first question is “very easily”, then the actors may pass up challenging even a policy that would be relatively costless to change. If the answer to the second question is “very costly”, then they may try to work within even a policy framework that is heavily biased against the ends they seek (Hacker 2004: 246).

Whereas it can be argued (especially in hindsight) that military service is heavily biased against expeditionary missions, for Sydow at the time the belief was that military service could be transformed in its internal structure to suit the demands of expeditionary missions. In 1997, it is still unclear how this would be achieved, however. The only certain thing is that for the time being the SAP-government will depart from the universality policy and reduce the conscripted cohort.

That it is a SAP-government that does this can seem surprising since they, given their issue-reputation, would be the least likely to act in this way. But as the Nixon-goes-to-China dynamic suggests, the probability for substantial policy change is higher for parties that are the most unlikely to reverse their stance. When Björck pushed for adjusting the universality policy in 1992, the centre-right government was careful to defend the policy by referencing to the outcome of protecting military service, arguing even that there was a limit to how far the conscripted cohort could shrink. In contrast, now it is a SAP-government that decides to reduce the cohort in a way that would have been difficult for the centre-right government to do. The party’s historical association with military service means that the changes are perceived to be “objectively” motivated and will ensure that military service is preserved by giving it a new meaning, suited to the post-cold war context. Carl Bildt is however not impressed, calling the proposal a result of panic and that the only responsible thing to do is to increase the defence budget (Bildt 1998a). Sydow ignores the criticism: “Our situation is better than in any other time in the modern period” and “by participating in international missions we will demonstrate our solidarity with other nations and actively participate in building peace and reducing conflicts. This will be a new priority” (Sydow 1998a; Sydow 1998b).

To the argument that conscripts are legally bound to national defence, he argues that soldiers that have been deployed on missions gain skills and experiences which will benefit the national defence (Ibid). Wiktorin denounces Sydow's endorsement of the New Wars perspective and its supposed worth to Swedish security: "There is no association between deploying soldiers to Bosnia and defending the nation. If anything, the reverse is true. The Americans knows this better than any. The combat skills of American soldiers are generally lowered after being on a mission, where the tasks include mainly patrol, guard and escort", duties that are peripheral in inter-state war (Wiktorin 1998a). For Wiktorin, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the Armed Forces are heading towards a new organisational purpose, and it was a movement that he failed to grasp why it was given so much weight, since it had no support at all in his own organisation: "I do not understand where this reasoning originated — it was definitely not an idea coming from the military". It was "a political invention", far away from "a military analysis" (Wiktorin 2017). Soldiers on deployments learn how to deal with "cultural differences, calming situations, preventing escalation and keeping enemies at a distance". But these are not "skills we need in Sweden, we need combat skills at the level of battalion. At sea, on the ground and in the air. In a normal deployment you don't get that", Like the Moderate Party, Wiktorin believes the only way forward is coming forth with a new defence decision which could ensure a stable budget and reset the focus to territorial defence. From this point, a infected conflict develops between Sydow and Wiktorin (Hederstedt 2016). In his diary, Sydow writes that it irritates him that Wiktorin has chosen his "own path".

In the evening a meeting with Wiktorin. I emphasised that the... demands on new political decisions were not good. I told [Wiktorin] that the adjustment strategy and the internationalisation model proposed by Hederstedt will be a successful way of breaking into the old structures. It was a good conversation and I think he sees my possibilities if he does not force me and [the SAP] to dismiss the Headquarters' own thoughts since these are not demanded by us, constitutionally (Sydow 1998c).

In the spring of 1998, Sydow becomes increasingly reliant on his in-house advisor, General Johan Hederstedt (Hederstedt 2016). He had before held the post as the Armed Forces' International Operations Commander at the Headquarters. With the new organisational purpose, however, he was recruited to the defence ministry. He is one of few, possibly the only, general who shares the SAP's belief in the soundness of the New Wars development to the Armed Forces, and equally the need

to scale up the Armed Forces' capability in this regard. "When I entered the decision making process... I had a clear vision of what needed to be done with the Armed Forces. In short, I wanted to internationalise. The problem was that this vision of mine was not shared in the officer corps. My belief was the opposite of Wiktorin's" (Hederstedt 2016). Hederstedt believed in the importance of preserving military service, but that to achieve this it needed to find a new meaning, shape and content, as Sydow had argued. Hederstedt's job was to find a way of reconciling the new policy on organisational purpose to the old policy on military service, by updating the latter to modern demands, so that Sweden could avoid a swap to a professional army. Indeed, what Sweden had to do was to avoid the "disturbing homogeneity-movement" in Europe, where internationalisation automatically seem to mean abandoning military service (Sydow 2015). Instead of following this path, Sydow wanted a new "paradigm", where the public's engagement for a *nationally* oriented Armed Forces could be redirected to an *internationally* oriented Armed Forces. Whereas senior officers, including Wiktorin, believed this was financially, organisationally and operationally impossible — for Sydow and Hederstedt there was no conflict between the two. For them, internationalisation was more "a new 'way of thinking', an expression of willingness to help people in need" (Hederstedt 2016). Reconciling this with military service posed no problem, according to Hederstedt, since it would only build on an old Swedish tradition: "I have been on many missions and seen the fine work of our conscripted soldiers. It was my firm conviction that we could internationalise also with military service. I told Sydow that this was my absolute belief and conviction, and he agreed" (Ibid). The new direction was thus less a disruption than it was building on a well developed and cherished Swedish tradition. With the threat of national wars gone Sweden could use the Armed Forces for new purposes (Sydow 2015). An important reason for why the two were willing to push the new agenda was that they had "internationally minded allies" at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, including the foreign minister (Anna Lindh), the state and deputy state secretary (Dan Eliasson and Anders Bjurner) who shared their point of view. At the foreign ministry, the end of the cold war was a "revolution" where "the nature of threats were of a completely different order" where the need to "have international missions in the foreground showed that the shift was not only in focus, but in the paradigm" (Bjurner 2010: 37). Sydow and Hederstedt also had support in the Prime Minister who equally wanted to modernise the meaning of the Armed Forces and saw the opportunity to build something new and "finally break up the old structures from the time of Tage Erlander" (Persson 2007: 240). Together, these key actors "align" against "traditionalists" in the Armed Forces who were

more interested in preserving the status quo (Hederstedt 2016).

One important consequence of this was that Wiktorin now started to push hard at building a smaller and highly qualified conscripted army. Such a movement, he argued, was absolutely necessary since there would not be sufficient resources to both deal with territorial defence and expeditionary missions: “Within the existing budget, we cannot have both a defence against military invasion and do international operations. ... We *have* to choose” (Wiktorin 1998b). Although this was the actual meaning of the new policies from the government, the defence ministry believed that Wiktorin was looking at it the wrong way. The new policy was not a choice between defending Sweden and doing something else. The new purpose was what was needed in order to defend Sweden from new kind of threats. In his diary, Sydow writes that:

In the evening a long talk with Wiktorin. I appealed to him not to push me, and our entire disposition toward change, into an impossible corner with his strong writings on the need for an entire change of course. [He responded that] he was forced to such writing as a consequence of his organisation (Sydow 2013).

Wiktorin pushes on and suggests that the Home Guard should be reduced by thirty per cent, and that the Armed Forces should cancel refresher exercises and reduce the conscripted cohort with 4,000. “It is with great regret that I am forced to temporary interventions in military service”, and “[t]he low national capability can only be justified with promises of a better situation in the future” (Wiktorin 1998c; 1998d). According to him, the Armed Forces are forced to the measures because of the Defence Ministry’s failure to see that it is asking too much of the Armed Forces on the budget it has. The Swedish Association of Military Officers (SAMO) agrees: “at current there is no balance between the Armed Forces’ resources and the objectives” (SAMO 1998). Anders Björck equally agrees: “I am very worried. You destroy much of what has been built up over the decades. You take a lot for granted, that there will never more be a need for a defence against an invasion. I don’t see how you can be so sure of that” (Björck 1998). The Moderate Party’s representatives in the SDP and PDC, Henric Landerholm and Arne Andersson, similarly question the wisdom of prioritising expeditionary missions, when the Armed Forces is obviously struggling with financial problems:

The question on whether expeditionary missions should be a priority was decided with the 1996 Defence Decision. The Moderate Party opposed this because Sweden — as long as it is non-aligned — should not create expectations on giving help to others when we at the same time cannot receive help. The military should have an expeditionary capability, but as long as we stand outside of the Nato the defence of our own country must be our highest priority. Swedish defence is not helped by missions (Landerholm & Andersson 1998).

Sydow shows no signs of revising his position: “Our Swedish defence is based on the idea that all are in it together. Are reductions of this sort really the *only* way forward?”(Sydow 1998c). The defence ministry pushes on and at the end of April, Sydow and Hederstedt meet with the defence ministers from the Scandinavian countries and decide on creating a Nordic expeditionary brigade — the “Nordcaps” (Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support). It will consist of 4,000 soldiers who will be “on standby, ready to be used by the international community” (Sydow 1998d). Hederstedt calls the decision “a breakthrough of an idea that has been discussed for a long time” (Hederstedt 1998a). Sydow asks Wiktorin to develop a plan for “alternative structures” in the Armed Forces with the objective of having “a whole new thinking on the table next year” (Government 1998; Sydow 1998e).

Bargaining for a Doctrine

Since he became Supreme Commander in 1994, Wiktorin had been caught in an ongoing conflict with the Defence Ministry. To his mind, the Armed Forces should have modernised with new weapons and equipment, not with new designs and purposes. His plans were mostly revised or rejected. The problem was not so much that the Headquarters disagreed on the new priorities, as it was that it believed the government failed in offering a convincing alternative. The old defence was crumbling, but there was no coherent doctrine replacing it: “The political leadership persistently failed to produce anything resembling a doctrine. What we got were quarterly reports, demands on change and new conditions. The speed of change was too fast for any organisation to handle” (Wiktorin 2017; see also Haldén 2007). As another senior officer, Head of Army Paul Degerlund, put it: “We wanted clarity on the order of things, especially on the relation between the national and international, on design and purpose. But there was nothing. We searched

in vain. There was no steering or list of priorities. Everything was fluid and uncertain. We had no doctrine” (Degerlund 2017). In the summer of 1998, the Headquarters decided it “was left with no other alternative but to formulate their own doctrine” (Ibid; Wiktorin 2017). The Head of Army, Navy and Air Force took what they believed to be the most important ideas in the government and authored a plan for the future. When Wiktorin presented it he argued that: “We have now reached the end of the road... with the present financial situation it is not possible to both have an adjustment to war and develop a flexible expeditionary capability. For purely economic reasons, a choice is necessary” (Wiktorin 1998e; Headquarters 1998: 3). The purpose of the plan is to offer the Defence Ministry a plan that they can stick to, one that the Armed Forces can afford, and deliver with high quality in the output. It offers three options:

Adjustment. 18,000 conscripts per year and an organisation that shrinks during peace-time, with mechanisms that allows it to swell in war-time.

Internationalism. 18,000 conscripts per year, of which at least 3,000 must sign a contract to be part of an expeditionary unit. The Armed Forces should have the capability of deploying 1,500 soldiers on a mission. For this to be possible the *entire* organisation must be optimised to cater expeditionary missions, and will take at least a decade to get there.

Universality. 18,000 conscripts on regular training, and 17,000 conscripts on short-term training. Puts a premium to national defence, but a lower priority to modernisation and expeditionary capability.

Importantly, all options have the result of reducing the national defence capability, which is why Wiktorin argues that the options are only possible in times of peace. In times of a deteriorated environment, the government must rethink: “We are, in other words, taking a risk with these alternatives” (Wiktorin 1998f). The defence minister reacts with mixed feelings. He is not convinced that the options are “either or” and rejects the idea that internationalisation must involve trade-offs. Internationalisation and national defence must walk hand in hand (Sydow 1998f). He is however pleased with the boldness in restructuring the Armed Forces for the future, since it has become increasingly clear that the “tragic experiences from Bosnia iterate the need for capacity and readiness for quick interventions”, and that Sweden “has a special role to play” (Sydow 1998g).

The possibility to act on any of the alternatives are however undermined as the finance minister, Erik Åsbrink, announces that the government no longer will compensate the Armed Forces for technolo-

gical modernisation.¹ Sydow and Wiktorin were unaware of this and are chocked. The Moderate Party vacates their seat in the SDC and both the PDC and SDC demands that the government reverses the decision. Sydow hands in his resignation, which is rejected by the prime minister (Persson 2007: 219). The unexpected decision puts further pressure on the economy of the Armed Forces, and in December around 20,000 servicemen supposed to enlist in the following year does not know if they will begin their training or not. Thousands of them contact the NSA, “there is chaos at the NSA right now” an NSA employee comments to the media (NSA 1998). As in the winter of 1997, financial problems compels the Defence Ministry to list its priorities. With a limited menu of choices, Sydow opts for continuing the path he had set out a year earlier:

I am enthusiastic about developing a new Armed Forces, one prepared for the twenty-first century and where Sweden plays an important role in building a defence cooperation with other states. Our traditions, values, interests and assets are resources we must in our work for peace and security. I share [Wiktorin’s] view that the military must consist of a “core” with a capability of dealing with a plethora of challenges (national and international). It must consist of highly prioritised units which will create opportunities for participating in expeditionary missions (Sydow 1999a).

This prompts a second policy reversal by the SAP. By taking further steps toward expeditionary capabilities, Sydow does not rule out the possibility of employing ex-conscripts on short-term contracts: “What we need today is a group of highly prioritised and versatile units, and considerably fewer units than today” (Sydow 1999b). The turn is unexpected and unfortunate, because the Committee on Military Service (put together by Sydow a year earlier), is expected to present its suggestions for preserving a universal military service. Sydow now asks the Chairman of the Committee, Jan Lönnqvist, to sit tight for the moment: “[w]e will place the report in the cupboard for the moment, to let it mature” (Sydow 1999c). The Moderate Party expectedly criticises the direction, but the SAP is supported by the Centre Party: “We are at the start of a transformation unparalleled in the modern era. Even as it concerns the universal military service we need great changes. It is possible that we have to slaughter holy cows. We need to unite pragmatism with principles” (Centre Party 1999).

¹The so called “technology factor” was put into practice in 1948, then removed in the late 1950s, and then reinstated by the Moderate government in the 1992 Defence Decision.

The political instability surrounding the defence policies caused real damage to the perceived legitimacy of military service. Even though the government lowered the defence expenditure, it does not reduce the number of servicemen to match the smaller defence budget, creating a new system imbalance as in the late 1980s. The General Director of the National Service Administration, Jan Tänneryd, repeatedly reminded that the Armed Forces conscripted more soldiers than it needed. One consequence of this was that a growing share of the servicemen were conscripted to positions with dubious worth to the Armed Forces. As the General Director of the NSA put it:

The national defence was gradually disappearing, but the idea of universality somehow persisted. When the conscript was positioned on posts with dubious worth, and which could not even be justified in common sense language, the service was of course perceived as a waste of time by the conscript (Tänneryd 2017).

Second, the government could rarely conscript as many servicemen as it had ordered the NSA to enlist because of sudden cuts in the defence budget. In the usual order the NSA will immediately begin to enlist servicemen as soon as they get the political directives on how many to enlist. On every occasion that the policy makers changed the size of the cohort in the middle of the year the NSA had to adjust, which in reality meant that it had to inform many thousands of conscripts that they would, after all, not be serving. Often, this decision came just weeks or months before the service would begin. This damaged the credibility and faith in the system among the servicemen.

The decisive moment in a model such as military service is when the serviceman meets the enlistment officer. It is the first meeting with the “institution”. The serviceman do his tests and with these on the table the two of them agree, through mutual accord, on what the serviceman should do and when to start the training. Usually there are three options, and the serviceman is encouraged to choose what he wants the most. Together they decide, shake hands, and the serviceman returns home and plans his future. What happens at a growing rate between 1994 and 1999 is that the enlistment officer will have to get back to the serviceman and tell him that: “You know, what we shook hands on, that deal is no longer on the table” (Tänneryd 2017).

In some cases the enlistment officer could offer the serviceman to serve at a later point, in a different position and at a different regiment. At that

moment the serviceman had of course lost interest, was disappointed and demanded exemption, which was hard to deny him (Ibid). To the employees at the NSA it was beyond doubt that the policy makers' deficiency in upholding the stated policies had the effect of undermining the institution. The problem was not that the servicemen had lost their loyalty to the institution, the problem was that the political changes were damaging the servicemen's positive attitude to the institution. As Tänneryd further explains: "Still in the late 1990s all servicemen loyally showed up at the enlistment office, at the right time and at the right place — willing to do their duty. There was still an intuitive loyalty to the system. It was not until after the poor treatment in the enlistment process that the loyalty shrank and the credibility was damaged" (Ibid).

These issues are partly why Sydow presents a bill to parliament with proposals that depart from the universality policy entirely (Government 1999a). It starts by declaring that Russia no longer should determine the purpose and design of the Armed Forces. Instead, the design and purpose will move to better respond to new wars, including inter-state conflict and terrorism. "Expeditionary missions should be the guiding principle for the new organisation. We must try new alternatives and develop new units and methods for officers and conscripts, so as we prepare them for serving abroad and creating a stable influx of soldiers to new international units" (Ibid). The cohort will be reduced to 15,000 per year and the the servicemen will move from training for territorial defence to instead training for expeditionary missions. This view took the Armed Forces by surprise since the training of the servicemen was not an issue in the debate on organisational purpose. The Swedish troops in the Balkan missions had excelled and where "as good as one could wish... there was no reason whatsoever for adjusting the training of conscripts" (Degerlund 2017). In contrast, for the officers the problem was that Swedish soldiers were overqualified for the missions. Most of the time the missions demanded only a kind of "basic knowledge" which all conscripts trained for already in the first months of their service. The Moderate Party responds to the bill by abandoning all ongoing defence talks with the government, arguing the bill strips the national defence capability to critically low levels (Moderate Party 1999a; 1999b). Sydow rebuts that: "Our military enjoys exceptionally sophisticated equipment and great volumes of troops. An increasing number of people now ask: Is all this really relevant in this day and age?" (Sydow 1999d). A poll conducted by the SAMO reveals that 98 percent of their members are against the proposed reduction of the conscripts (SAMO 1999). To this Sydow promises that the reduction is only temporary and that in the future the "red line goes at around 18,000 servicemen, not less" (Sydow 1999e).

4.2 Converting Military Service

Wiktorin thus presents a new plan on how to adjust the Armed Forces (Headquarters 1999). As before, he stresses that “it entails an excessive risk in the long term perspective. I do not believe that the world in the future will be safe or without dangers” (Wiktorin 1999a; 1999b). This is why, he continues, “as a professional I reserve the right to warn the political decision-makers” that with the new direction Sweden in “a real sense abandons its national defence capability” (Ibid). Sweden will “at most” be capable of defending “Stockholm for a very short period of time” (Wiktorin 1999b). His suggestion is that the size of the cohort be reduced to 15,000 and that the expeditionary capability will grow to 1,500 soldiers capable of being deployed at the same time. To achieve this, the Armed Forces must every year employ 3,000 soldiers, which will be recruited from the conscripts. That is to say, one of every fifth enlisted conscript must be contracted. To avoid a situation where military service becomes a mere recruitment pool for expeditionary missions, he suggests that the Armed Forces sign three-year contracts with 3,000 soldiers and that they will make up the expeditionary units. According to Wiktorin, this was necessary to achieve the policy makers’ stated objective on expeditionary missions.²

Wiktorin’s proposal does not pass unnoticed. In the summer of 1999 the former alliance between the officer corps and Mr. Wiktorin is broken. A number of high-ranking officers from the Army criticises him for abandoning his principles and paying lip-service to the defence ministry. Mr. Wiktorin reacts with in an article in Sweden’s largest daily newspaper:

Many have suggested that [I] pay little heed to the public’s engagement in the military, the universal conscription or the possibility to recreate military capability. Let me be clear. [I have pointed out that it is] impossible to simultaneously include universal conscription, full readjustment capacity and an expeditionary capacity at the level asked by the government. We can do any of these three, but we had to choose. ...[In mid-May I] presented a new proposal, based on the directives from the government and parliament. In that situation there was strictly no other possibility than following the political directives (Wiktorin 1999c).

²“Our suggestion was a direct result of the demand for expeditionary missions. It was nothing we wanted, desired or asked for, simply because they had no value whatsoever for the national defence. Bringing in this idea was only to solve the problem of expeditionary deployments missions” (Wiktorin 2017).

When Sydow presents the government's bill for the 2000 Defence Decision it includes nothing of the proposal on employing soldiers. Instead, it iterates that the Armed Forces will not begin employing its soldiers, the way other European states do:

The Swedish military must be built and organised so that it becomes a concern for the entire people. It is of great importance that the citizens feel responsibility and to the best of their abilities participate in the defence of Sweden. This is best achieved in a system with military service. A system with employed soldiers cannot create the defence willingness and strength that a defence of the entire nation demands (Government 1999b: 109).

Instead, the Armed Forces will achieve the expeditionary objective by building on the ideas formulated in the end of 1997, transforming the meaning, shape and content of the military service. If this is successfully achieved, it is also possible that the Armed Forces can recruit one in five conscripts to serve in the deployments. "Sweden needs an Armed Forces that is smaller, with greater quality and versatility so that it can build an expeditionary capability. Instead of an invasion defence we need an expeditionary defence" (Government 1999b: 109). To this end, begging in 2000, the Armed Forces will be redrawn in both "scope and structure". Sydow regrets that this transformation had not come about earlier: "We should have done this earlier. It has been ten years since the fall of the Berlin Wall" (Sydow 1999f). As expected, the Moderate Party is critical of the bill, describing it as far too optimistic in a situation where the military constraints on Russia are relaxed, the Nato is expanding and with a growing sense of revanchism in Russia (Moderate Party 1999c). "It is important that the organisation modernises and improves its technical quality and mobility, it is however also important that the political decisions ensure that the military can, in the event of war, defend the entire nation — this can only be achieved with a nationally oriented military service" (Ibid). With the 2000 Defence Decision, Sweden entered a new era in defence politics. This is also manifest in that the government promotes Johan Hederstedt to Supreme Commander. Sydow begins the new year by declaring that "now it is time, after fifty years, to break the process that have prepared Sweden for an invasion along our coasts or through Finland" (Sydow 2000a). The Armed Forces must devote all of its resources to developing a "more contemporary organisation, with the right equipment, personnel and size" (Ibid). Volume will "no longer be a determinant for the development of the military" (Ibid). Instead, key factors will be quality, mobility and strength. The 2000 Defence Decision laid down the basic ideas, what now remains is breathing these

into life in the organisation by “reforming it from the ground” (Ibid).

For Hederstedt, combining military service with expeditionary missions is one of his most important priorities: “I have seen what our conscripts are capable of. They stand in a class of their own. They are immensely competent, even as international soldiers” (Hederstedt 2016). At the defence ministry, he publishes a text on how to reconcile military service with expeditionary deployments, *Internationalise the military!* (Hederstedt 1999). It became the “informal handbook” for how to reform the Armed Forces, which was “nothing short of an experiment” (Hederstedt 2016). But the peace and stability in Europe, and the democratisation of Russia, presented an ideal opportunity for experimentation which could, if it worked, bring about “actual change” in the world:

All of us, at least at the defence ministry, and later when I moved to the Headquarters, were in agreement that we were in a “strategic time out”. Given this we had a unique opportunity to experiment. We had a chance to redraw the structure of the organisation and, with our conscripts, bring about enduring peace in Europe, and the world generally. For me it was only natural to grab this rare opportunity: internationalise our organisation and make better use of our unique competences, especially our conscripts (Hederstedt 2016).

To bring about the change, the notion of the “People’s Defence” had to be redefined not only in organisational design, but equally the “mind-set” of the officers and enlisted servicemen. The expeditionary perspective had to be advanced, with new principles, norms and values. To Hederstedt, the time in basic training was an ideal opportunity to instil these normative changes, encouraging the servicemen and officers to take part in the transformation (Hederstedt 1999: 4). In line with Sydow’s belief, he believed the expeditionary dimension had to permeate the basic training to ensure that as many as possible would understand the change and then volunteer to serve in a deployment. One way of doing this is by reducing the conscripted cohort so that the Armed Forces only conscript servicemen that are motivated and interested in serving abroad, and then adjusting the basic training to build on this interest and motivation (Ibid: 11). With such an adjustment, the share of conscripts choosing to serve abroad could be tripled from seven to twenty percent, and successfully reconcile military service with the new organisational purpose (Ibid: 5). Indeed, according to Hederstedt pushing structural change was his condition for taking the job as Supreme Commander.

The size of the cohort would be reduced, the content of the basic training changed and the Armed Forces internationalised:

My request before taking the job was that we would internationalise and sharpen the competences of the military. We needed to toss everything that would not be needed. This also included military service. Conscripted could be kept, but in a reduced scale. I did not need that many conscripts (Hederstedt 2016).

To both Sydow and Hederstedt, it is however important that the changes are piecemeal and develop from *within* the already existing organisation: “we had to strike balance in order not to be perceived to go too far, politically” (Hederstedt 2016). Another point of caution was that the changes had to be able to be justified also in relation to the national defence. The Moderate Party and a considerable share of the officer corps were critical of the movement toward expeditionary capabilities. Though, both believed this criticism could be met by lifting an argument that the expeditionary missions in fact contribute to the national defence by “brining home lessons learned”. One of the “first things” Sydow realises when taking office is the need to improve the “real world skills” of the soldiers, and deployments abroad would be a way of doing this, “they need to be deployed to trying situations” (Sydow 2010a).³ Similarly, to Hederstedt the missions offered a unique opportunity for the Armed Forces to gain “real life experiences”, a chance soldiers rarely get (Hederstedt 2016). “The experience is that you are swung into a world where everything is real, not training. You’ll see the consequences of your actions immediately. Instead of an two-week exercise, you’ll have a full year of superb training, experiences that serve our defence extremely well” (Ibid). Hederstedt therefore does “all he can” to increase Sweden’s out-of-area operations (Hederstedt 2010).

What Sydow and Hederstedt wanted was a combination of change in the design and in the culture of the Armed Forces. For this to happen the 15,000 strong officer corps who did the training of the servicemen first had to get on board. The way to do this was to rid them of their prejudices against serving abroad by giving them a taste of what it meant to be on mission. In his first day in office Hederstedt consequently proposes all officers will have their employment contracts revised so that it becomes compulsory to serve at least two or three

³“I decided to increase the international missions in all international organisations: the Nato, the EU, the UN, you name it. We had to get on board. These missions are important because they motivate the soldiers and give them experience. But, importantly, the basis would still be military service and a national defence of Sweden” (Sydow 2015).

times abroad (Hederstedt 2000a). This marked a radical break with the existing system. During the cold war, the task of the officers were to train and lead conscripts in the event of war. The system was designed to produce vast amounts of conscripts led by a large officer corps. The officer's job description was "leader, educator, professional," and in that order (Government 1973). Senior officers even took it as their responsibility to instruct junior colleagues on the necessity of staying at home, train conscripts and defend the border (Fresker 2017). Volunteering for missions did not lead to professional merits or advance the career and was viewed with suspicion (Ydén 2008). "If one had an interest to serve abroad one was counteracted" (Fresker 2017). Career advancements were tied to schooling at the academies, not on operational experience (Ydén & Hasselbladh 2010: 39). With the new direction and experiences from deployments, these views however change. This was a development that Sydow and Hederstedt now moved into policy by conditioning employment on serving abroad.

With the new direction, Sydow had to reverse the work of the ongoing 1998 Committee on Military Service. When he appointed it he wanted it to examine how Sweden could preserve a universal service with reduced expenses. Now, he instead asks it to examine how military service can become more effective and tuned to expeditionary missions (Government 1999c). The former criteria on how many to conscript is removed. The committee should instead focus "more on recruitment" to the expeditionary units (Ibid: 113). In the end of March in 2000, the chairman of the committee, Ulf Lönnqvist, presents the report (Government 2000a). It states that the existing system is insufficient for achieving the objective of deploying 1,000 soldiers at the same time. For this to be possible the Armed Forces need to recruit between 2,000 to 3,000 soldiers. At the current recruitment rate, some seven percent, this will not be possible. Either the size of the cohort must increase considerably or the design must change to improve the possibility of attracting more soldiers for serving abroad. The committee recommends the latter. With what it calls a "recruitment perspective", military service can become "a more attractive option among the young" (Ibid). To achieve the expeditionary objective, the Armed Forces must "spread information", "create interest", and "enlist only the most suitable for service" (Ibid). If the Armed Forces can adjust in this way there are "great possibilities" that military service can be preserved, even with a new organisational purpose.

Revolutionary Generals

The deal between Sydow and Hederstedt was that Hederstedt would internationalise the Armed Forces but avoid a development toward a professional army. Shortly after he assumes his new job, Hederstedt however sends signals that he has had a change of heart. In the summer of 2000, he suggests that the reform cannot be achieved by only reforming the training of conscripts. It is likely that the Armed Forces must also begin employing soldiers. “We have to have at least one thousand soldiers ready for immediate deployment” (Hederstedt 2000b). Immediate deployment means the soldier should be mobilised and deployed within a few days, and this can only be achieved by employed soldiers who are immediately available. This capability, he adds, must be at least doubled (Hederstedt 2000c). What Sweden needs is nothing short of a “revolution in the organisation”, and realise that there is a “revolution in military affairs” going on, and Sweden must join it:

In the military we talk about a ‘revolution in military affairs.’ Knowledge about this revolution exists, but is concentrated to a small circle of high-ranking officers. I am anxious for sharing this knowledge to other parts of society. This is possibly the most important question for me, because the military is dependent on preserving the public’s engagement (Hederstedt 2000d).

Sydow’s new military advisor (Hederstedt’s replacement), Michael Moore, agrees. According to him, the expeditionary objective, just decided by parliament, cannot be achieved without employing soldiers (Moore 2000a). At the current recruitment rate, between seven and ten percent, the Armed Forces must either dramatically increase the conscripted cohort, or begin employing soldiers (Ibid). He develops his thoughts in a short book, *Revolution in the Swedish Military* (Moore 2000b).

Sweden has declared to, within a year or so, be able to deploy two battalions. Because of this the existing system will collapse. Those who apply for serving abroad *and* are suitable are too few. With the existing system we will have to conscript seventy thousand conscripts per year — completely unreasonable and an economic impossibility! (Ibid: 8).

Almost all European countries, he continues, have abandoned the idea of relying only on conscripted armies, something Sweden now also must do (Ibid: 9). Sweden must come to the realisation that there is “only one road to follow” (Ibid: 10). Hederstedt agrees, and has come to the

same conclusion (Hederstedt 2000f). Though, they find no support from the defence ministry. “Politically, military service was difficult, nearly impossible, to touch. Of course this was irritating because it prevented the reform from having full effect. Doubtless, it was necessary to move beyond conscription, but politically it was too sensitive” (Hederstedt 2016). Nor did the officer corps support the change, as a survey in 1999 and 2000 shows (SAMO 1999; 2000). Seven out of ten officers consider leaving the military, for reasons that they either no longer recognise their organisation and its purposes, and/or have (therefore) lost faith in their profession. Only four percent have high faith in the political leadership, and only between 35 and 47 percent have high faith in their own Supreme Commander. It is in disagreement with their Supreme Commander on nearly all key aspects of the reform. Only between 12 and 16 percent thinks its a good idea to make expeditionary missions compulsory. On the issue on preferred recruitment model it is more even, where half want only conscripts and half want conscripts and employed soldiers. The current policies, they argue, is setting Sweden on a path toward a professional army, which it believes is wrong (SAMO 2000c). The government, it continues, seems unaware of the long term consequences of their policies where “one thing leads to another” and “where the consequences and alternative paths are never fully thought through” (Ibid: 2). The gist of the problem is that it is unreasonable to expect that one can reduce the cohort by half at the same time as one doubles the expeditionary capability: “The equation, to on the one hand have high quality and increase the international engagements and, on the other hand, have a reduced conscripted cohort and reduced interest for military service, does not add up” (Ibid: 2).

A Smarter Military Service

Also Sydow denounces Hederstedt’s and Moore’s ideas. To Sydow’s mind, the suggestions on a professional army not only entailed a mere change to a policy on the Armed Forces, it stretched far beyond that and touched on what kind of society it was that Sweden wanted to be, as he put it:

We have in Sweden no tradition of employed soldiers or a standing army, the way they have in the US or in the UK. Over there, this model was helped, and even reflected, by the political and social systems. They are largely populated societies divided in socio-economic classes. We have neither of this in Sweden, we have reformed our society away from it, and we did not want it (Sydow 2015).

In this passage, Sydow reflects the strong tradition in the SAP of approaching the question on recruitment policy from a “sociological” perspective, taking into account what kind of norms and values the recruitment policy builds and signal in society. Taking after the American and British society was not something he wished for Sweden, why it was important that Sweden as far as possible aspired to preserve military service, even in the age of New Wars. This could be possible, he believed, by tweaking its internal mechanisms. Instead of following Hederstedt’s and Moore’s suggestions, the focus should instead be on changing the basic training of conscripts and enlistment of the servicemen. “Conscripts cannot be forced to serve abroad, but by introducing internationally minded exercises and a completely new structure for the basic training, it is my belief that we can insert an international way of thinking into military service” (Sydow 2001a). This means that the “servicemen we conscript in the future have to be given a relevant education and training, one that matches the needs we see today. [I]n the existing organisation, there are too many positions that are irrelevant, pointless or even free labour” (Ibid). What was needed was “fewer, but better qualified and trained units. We need smarter solutions, we have to be smart. We need to decrease military service and at the same time make it more effective. Smaller but more effective — this will have to be the Swedish model” (Sydow 2015). To achieve the new organisational purpose, the Armed Forces must begin with an active enlistment process where only the highly motivated and interest servicemen are enlisted to basic training, those who feel “strongly for what it is we are trying to develop” (Sydow 2001a). If this is conducted successfully, “one battalion in the new Armed Forces will be almost as strong as an old brigade” (Sydow 2001b).

Hederstedt is not convinced, and presents three alternative solutions, all of which include employed soldiers (Headquarters 2001a: 80-85). One is similar to what Wiktorin proposed in May 1999, with soldiers employed for a limited period on preparedness contracts. The units are “on call” and the can be immediately mobilised. It limits the expeditionary capability since all participation is based on voluntary engagements. Another is a mix between a military service and employed soldiers, but based entirely on voluntary engagements, removing the duty to serve, but with permanently employed soldiers. The last model is a standing army based entirely on employed soldiers and no conscripts. In all models, contracted soldiers are argued as a necessary condition for achieving the expeditionary objective. The SDC however disagrees. Even if it is high-time that the Armed Forces move steadily toward better expeditionary capabilities, and that this should “move as quickly as possible”, it is unwanted to begin employing soldiers (SDC 2001: 49, 56, 113-

114, 166). Instead the SDC follows Sydow's path of converting military service.

In September 2001, Sydow presents a new bill to this end, demanding that all operative planning, training and education of conscripts be tailored to suit the evolving expeditionary objective. Sweden will meet demands of the future with modern modifications to the existing system (Government 2001a: 21). With the correct adjustments, military service can become "the foundation of our work to increase Sweden's engagement in international operations" (Ibid). To achieve this, the expeditionary perspective must be the "governing principle for the yearly production of conscripts" (Ibid: 67). The proposed change rests on three pillars: motivation, incentives, and training.

Motivation. During the cold war, the serviceman's motivation to serve mattered little. The enlistment was decided on the results of the enlistment tests. With the reductions in the 1990s it became more important to enlist servicemen who expressed an interest in becoming an officer. The reason was that without enough officers, it could become difficult to train new conscripts in the future. With Sydow's new bill, the issue of motivation and interests is invoked again, but this time to ensure staffing of the expeditionary units and to avoid issues of fairness (Government 2001a: 11). Also this time the importance of motivation had to do with cohort reductions. When only one in five servicemen served, the "duty" to serve could raise thorny issues of why some served and not others. To avoid this it became necessary to enlist only servicemen who were willing to serve. What is more, in the new Armed Forces, what was needed was servicemen who were interested to join an expeditionary unit. Because of this, the *duty* to serve had no place. If the serviceman had no interest in serving, there was neither an interest from the Armed Forces in conscripting him — since the whole point of conscripting was to engage only those who were willing to stay in the Armed Forces. As the bill puts it: "motivation to serve abroad should, more than before, carry weight in the final decision [on who is enlisted]" (Ibid: 24, 36). Thus, with the new bill, the serviceman's willingness to serve abroad became part of the overall judgement on his *suitability* to serve, on par with physical and mental skills and abilities. When the Armed Forces were reduced and directed toward expeditionary deployments, it was important that those engaged in it added net-value. The idea that there was a value in all serving, building a collective psychology on the importance of doing one's part, was thus dropped.

It is well known that any endeavour is better executed if there is a willingness to do the job. The individual who is best suited is also one who believes in his work and finds

it relevant for the military and for himself. It is against this background that the government turns away the model where all young men are recruited without finding good cause for it. It is also against this background that the individual's motivation to serve will weigh heavily in the enlistment procedure. The selection process should, according to the government, place considerable weight to the individual's willingness of serving abroad (Ibid: 19-24).

With the new policy, if two servicemen have the same enlistment results but one seems more motivated to serve he will be the one that is enlisted (Ibid: 37).

Incentives. One implication of removing the duty to serve was that the Armed Forces must begin actively *recruiting* soldiers. Instead of "passive" enlistment the Armed Forces would have to attract and convince the best in a cohort to serve. To this end the Armed Forces are instructed to create incentives for serving. One part of this was to inform the conscripts about the good he would do by taking part in expeditionary deployments, and that the Swedish Armed Forces made a difference in the world. Another part directly concerns financial compensation. Before, the conscript was compensated with 50 SEK per day and an "end of service" premium of 4,500 SEK. The 2001 bill increases the daily payment by 30 percent to match what the state grants in student loans to those who study at university. It also adds a tax-free end of service bonus of between 24,000 and 39,700, depending on the length of service. In addition to this the Armed Forces increase the housing and family benefits to the conscripts and becomes more generous in travel allowances. The idea with these changes was to minimise the perception that doing military service would be an economic loss for the individual. As the bill puts it, with free accommodation and meals, doing military service would create an economic situation comparable to having a part time job (Ibid: 41).

Training. Given that the organisational purpose had changed, a number of elements in the current basic training had "lost their meaning", prompting "considerable changes" (Government 2001a: 30). What was needed was to insert the expeditionary objective in the basic training of the conscripts. Partly because the conscripts needed the training early on to speed up the process from basic training to actual deployment, but also to use the basic training as a way of stimulating interest and curiosity about going on deployment. As Sydow puts it, the service had to be developed so that the conscripts "already at home got a taste of what it would mean to go abroad" (Sydow 2015). The only problem is that the law stipulates that conscripts only can be trained in ways

that benefit national defence (SFS 1998/99: 74). This has to do with the moral justification for forcing citizens to give up a year or more for serving in the Armed Forces. For the government this is a problem since conscripts are the sole recruitment source for the expeditionary missions. To escape the problem it is therefore argued in the bill that it cannot be morally justified to train conscripts for a kind of war (national wars) that no longer is expected, and that the the task of the Armed Forces is to take the means necessary for achieving its organisational purpose (Ibid: 30). The bill thus reverses the moral justification for serving. Whereas before it was argued that it was not morally justified to train for anything else than national war, it is now argued that it is not morally justified to train for a war that is not likely to happen. In the future, it must therefore be judged as natural to prepare the conscript for national wars and expeditionary missions (Ibid: 19).

Earlier, it was the view that conscripts could not be forced to participate in training directed against service abroad. The time has come for a new perspective on this matter. The government is of the opinion that the ongoing change of the Armed Forces means that one can now look differently on that. It is important that the conscripts develop a capacity for expeditionary service. This training is prioritised (Government 2001a: 11, 41).

What is more, the existing laws give “many degrees of freedom” in interpreting the meaning of “war”. “The war we imagine and train for is no longer what it used to be” (Ibid: 30). Whereas training that “only has significance for international missions” is a direct violation of the law, it is fully possible that conscripts can be trained for both national defence and for deployments, if the latter can be said to benefit the national defence (Ibid: 21). How much the conscripts are trained for what kind of war “cannot be explicitly stated”, but must be the “responsibility of the individual officer to decide” (Ibid: 30). With the new adjustments to military service it is also possible to remain at the current level of 15,000 conscripts per year, and not revert to 18,000 as the bill in 2000 promised.

It has earlier in this dissertation been argued that policy makers engage in conversion because the outcome is more important than the mode for reaching the outcome. This is why policies change as societies change, to ensure that the outcome remains the same. While this may be true for many policy areas, military service stands out because the mode for reaching the outcome has historically been as important as the outcome itself. The conversion strategy ends this by placing all energy on the new outcome, and changing the mode. It marks a shift were the

SAP moves to a policy otherwise held by the Moderate Party, in the sense that what matters in defence policy is the efficient functioning and output of the Armed Forces, not traditions or processes of how the outcome is created — this is a visible influence of New Public Management. Indeed, the reversal proposed in the 2001 bill does not take place in a political vacuum. It should be understood as a result of the strategic adjustment that the SAP began in 1992 where it moved the selective emphasis from a territorial defence (Realism) to expeditionary missions (New Wars) which, as I have argued earlier, was partly a result of the EU-debate. The change in organisational purpose would sooner or later raise a discussion on the suitability of military service. The changes with the 2001 bill, with its emphasis on market norms including individual motivation, output-orientation over tradition, efficiency and financial incentives followed a broader trend toward the public sector that could be seen by both governments during the 1990s. As others have noted, the SAP continued to pursue the market-type reforms implemented by the centre-right government from 1991 to 1994 (Premfors 1998). It has even been argued that the SAP in the late 1990s completed the Moderate government's introduction of NPM in the early 1990s (Larsson et al. 2012: 4). It was the modernisers in the SAP, true to the ideas of the Third Way, of which Sydow belonged, that pushed this direction (Blomqvist & Rothstein 2000; Whyman 2003). Once this group came to key positions, the debate on market-norms as a way of addressing ineffective public administrations disappeared and instead moved to how the state best could create more effective, cost-efficient and output-oriented public policies. The adjustments of military service, that began in 1998 and was put into policy with the 2001 bill, reflects this movement also in defence policy. These changes were arguably necessary for the party because without them the party would risk losing a, to them, important institutional weapon. From this perspective the changes in 2001, even if they upend many of the values previously held dear by the SAP, is still not irrational or counterintuitive for the SAP. The 2001 bill is a result of the experiences from the late 1990s, both on conscripting more than the government could afford (with the legitimacy problems this raised) and the need to scale up its international engagements as a way of reinventing its foreign policy. Failure in delivering the expeditionary soldiers could risk a debate on whether it would not be more useful to swap to a professional army — a debate the SAP did not want. To escape these problems the party is compelled to new policies. This is the same kind of reasoning that the SAP used in other policy spheres, including welfare. As Klittgaard has put it: “If social democratic strategists have reason to perceive particular policy problems as a threat to welfare state legitimacy, they may be prepared to implement market-type

reforms if these are believed to prevent loss of legitimacy and declining welfare state support” (2007: 173). And as argued elsewhere, the SAP were better equipped than the Moderate Party to pursue such substantial changes to institutional features of Swedish society since it was the party that had created these institutions in the first place, and therefore could escape thorny accountability pressures.⁴

With the 2001 bill the effect is that seen from the outside, Sweden still relies on military service, as conventionally understood. Seen from the inside, however, a number of changes are taking place. The previously sacred principle of universality is replaced with selective recruitment. Only servicemen that want to serve are enlisted and servicemen who are interested in deployment are prioritised. The principle of conscripting all service in an effort of sustaining the social norm of collective responsibility is replaced by a principle that rewards individual interest. All servicemen are still bound by the law to serve if called upon, but this principle is side-tracked by a new policy that values individual motivation and financial incentives for serving. The political communication used to spur interest and install a sense of duty to serve changes from stressing the worth of collective responsibility to participating in missions. What emerges in the early 2000s is thus a military service that has dwindled in size, is governed by efficiency and output, and new social nodes for the purpose of strengthening the Armed Forces’ expeditionary capability.

⁴As Kitschelt have argued, parties to the left “enjoy more credibility in protecting the system than right-wing market reformers” (Kitschelt 2001: 275).

Chapter 5

DISPLACEMENT

The 2001 bill has a number of practical implications to military service. The terminology in the Armed Forces swaps from Swedish to English, and the conscripts are enlisted to train and be recruited to expeditionary missions (Agrell 2011). The training ranges from civil wars in collapsed states to preventing ethnic cleansing.

The conscripts trained primarily for peace-enforcement, which meant only new things. We rebuilt training grounds, added new ones, including pretend-camps which were replicas of the one we had used in Kosovo and the one we were setting up in Afghanistan. We built entire villages in the way they look in some parts of the world. We had to mimic the places we wanted our conscripts to be deployed to (Hederstedt 2016).

The exercises were designed to stimulate an interest in the conscripts and officers. A way of motivating them for deciding on deployment.

According to the law, the introduction of the new elements was only possible if these also contributed to the national defence. In reality, this became impossible (Ibid). In theory, the distinction between the territorial and the expeditionary collapsed because policymakers and senior officers instructed junior officers and conscripts that the missions served the national interest since they would reduce the risk of, for instance, terrorism. In his study of the Swedish defence transformation, Wilhelm Agrell have accurately called the new doctrine the “Afghanistan doctrine” — the idea that Sweden is best defended by working for peace elsewhere (2011; 2013). This was the narrative behind the New Wars perspective, that Sweden was nested in complex web of global risks that knew no boundaries and had to be defeated at their original sources,

which often meant far away from national territory. This reasoning motivated that at home, in the regiments, one could move from training for territorial defence to training for expeditionary missions — even if the law was clear that such actions were not permitted. It was equally argued that the missions served the national interest since the soldiers were taught important skills by engaging in real combat, skills that could be used at home to defend Sweden.¹ In practice, the distinction between territorial and expeditionary training collapses due to a lack of resources: in equipment, personnel, money, and time.

Sure, both objectives require an ability to “fight the enemy”. Sometimes we said that “OK, now we also have to train for national defence.” The only problem was that there was no time, and the two could rarely be combined easily. They require different commands and skills. In the international, we train to interpose, mediate and so on. Not to kill. The units we use are smaller, on the level of platoon, squad or fire-team. In the national, we train for proficiency in “neutralising the enemy,” different combat techniques, tactical movements and coordination between large units, mainly on the level of battalion. You see two different things. Of course this was a dilemma. No doubt. In general it is possible to say that from 2000, the training of conscripts focused on international deployment. The national perspective was pushed to the background. No doubt about that (Hederstedt 2016).

The territorial and the expeditionary could be combined in intelligence, command structure and in interoperability with other nations. It was harder to reconcile the different war-fighting skills.

In almost all units, the internationalisation meant improvement. The only exception was armed combat, which we stopped training for on the level of battalion at all, I must say. The new direction improved how the units operated in small teams, platoon and below. But we rarely operate on such small levels in the national defence, where the rule is that we train at least on the level of battalion. The Americans criticised us for our deficiency in this area, arguing that our international ambitions hollowed out our national capabilities (Ibid).

¹The 2001 bill explicitly stated this: “[a]ctivities that point to international co-operation bring educational merit and enriches the experiences of the soldiers in ways that are beneficial to the national defence. It is the government’s belief that [training for international missions] strengthens the individual’s capability and preparedness in the event of war” (Government 2001b: 31).

In addition, as the movement toward expeditionary deployments becomes more pronounced, the officers and conscripts had to get used to a new praxis of being less reluctant in using violence. When the kind of missions changed from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement, as it did with Kosovo and Afghanistan, the level of risk increased. According to the head of the SAMO, Lars Fresker, this had the implication that the soldiers had to abandon the old praxis of not using violence, to instead being prepared to use violence if necessary. “It was necessary to foster a culture where the soldier never hesitate to use his weapon” (Fresker 2017). To achieve this change well before deployment, the soldiers had to begin training already as conscripts. Taken together, by 2004 it was clear in theory and in practice that deployments was “the name of the game”.

The earlier order of the day, with national defence and training conscripts, was more or less replaced by deployments and training for missions. Among the officers it was widely held that no one made a career by training conscripts, but they did by engaging in expeditionary missions. In every year, the training of conscripts lost in career status (Fresker 2017).

What the government wanted to achieve with these changes was to punctuate the Armed Forces’ scepticism against deployment. According to Hederstedt, “he could immediately see changes in the attitudes and training of conscripts” (Hederstedt 2016). Training for deployment “became the new norm” and the territorial defence was “downgraded as a secondary priority” (Ibid). Not so much because the national defence was no longer important, but the *territorial* part of national defence was no longer important. In the first few years of the 2000s, and as the New Wars perspective suggested, training for expeditionary missions and national defence was perceived as two sides of the same coin. When this view began to permeate the organisation, especially in the younger staff, the norm-structure that had reproduced the institutional basis for military service was seriously weakened. In spite of this, Hederstedt was not satisfied. To help galvanise the social change in society that he believed was necessary he wished Sweden would participate not only with 40 soldiers in Afghanistan, but with 400 (Hederstedt 2002b). In early 2002, parliament had voted in favour of a bill proposed by the government to send 45 soldiers to Afghanistan, as part of a multinational task force, ISAF (*International Security Assistance Force*) (Government 2002). In light of this Hederstedt again asks the government again for permission to begin employing soldiers. “By creating units which can be used within hours we give ourselves freedom of action” (Headquarters 2002: 105). He also wants the Armed Forces to step up their recruitment efforts

by actively targeting interested servicemen with “large and targeted adverts, investments” and financial incentives (Hederstedt 2001d). One should also consider a new practice where entire units are recruited at the same time instead of recruiting at an individual basis. The virtue of this would be that the group psychology would create pressures toward deployment (Headquarters 2002: 109).

5.1 A Reinvented Moderate Party

In September 2002, the SAP wins the general election. The defence minister Björn von Sydow steps down and is replaced by the Secretary General of the Church of Sweden, Leni Björklund.² Simultaneously with the change in the SAP there is a larger change going on in the Moderate Party.

In the 1990s, the Moderate Party distinguished itself by refusing the expeditionary focus and with arguments on a strong national defence. As Göran Persson puts it in his memoirs: “The Moderate Party was never part of the defence decisions, they had a vested interest in separating themselves from the government’s defence reforms” (2007: 236). To be sure, the Moderate Party invested much in communicating an approach to defence policy that was different from the SAP’s. In the early 2000s, however, there are signs of change. A new generation of leaders take over with the consequence that the criticism of expeditionary missions persists, but is less principled. In the party’s motions it no longer presents an *alternative* reality, only a different version of it, slowly accepting the New Wars perspective. It is possible to say that between 1998 and 2003 the party struggles with which path to choose between Realism and New Wars. On the one hand it has a historical legacy, image and issue-reputation of taking the *national* in the national defence seriously. But the meaning of this is becoming more complex with the arguments that the national no longer and necessarily entails the territorial, as the party used to argue. If the New Wars perspective is true, then it raises an important policy dilemma for the party since the Moderate Party is a party with an issue-reputation of taking *defence* issues seriously. If defence now means taking expeditionary deployments seriously, then maybe the party must revise its policies. In the early 2000s, this is what the party does. This movement is however not only motivated by a changing security climate, it is also motivated by a felt need in the party of renewing itself and better align its policies to a changed governing context. With the poor election results in the

²Björklund has unfortunately declined an interview, on the argument that she has no memories from the period (Conservation over telephone, October 5, 2015).

2002 election, it had become increasingly visible to the younger generation in the party that the time had come for a strategic adjustment, with a new ideological road-map for the future.

The most visible sign of the change in the Moderate Party is that it in 2003 elects a new chairman, Fredrik Reinfeldt. To escape a poor election result in 2006 he believes it is necessary to move the party toward the centre by branding it as the new party for the working class — directly challenging the SAP’s dominance in this electorate. For Reinfeldt, the poor election result in 2002 had to do with an inability of the party to renew itself, and relying too dogmatically on traditional issues-reputations such as: tax reductions, deregulated labour market, the market in favour of the state, social conservatism and the moral primacy of the nation state. As he put it in 2004, the poor results in 2002 had to do with doubts, in the electorate, on whether the Moderate Party could reconcile tax cuts with stable public finances (Reinfeldt 2004). To avoid such doubts, Reinfeldt wants to “develop the party” and make it more “contemporary” by encouraging its members to become “self critical”, “challenge old truths” by “leaving no stone unturned” (Reinfeldt 2003; 2005). The party sets out on a strategic adjustment with a new ideological direction that involves a number of policy reversals. For the change to be credible it must challenge old conceptions and signal to society that the party has a genuine willingness of reinventing itself to better meet the new conditions in society (Reinfeldt 2006a; 2006b). What Reinfeldt does, is adjusting the Moderate Party to the dominance of social democratic perspectives in Swedish society. It eschews the Thatcherite liberalism by appealing directly to middle income voters, combining an active state in social welfare with a belief in private companies, embraces the welfare model and the “work-first policy”, combines tax cuts for low and middle income workers with cuts in unemployment and sickness benefits. In the words of the vice chairman of the party, Gunilla Carlsson, the party changed costume from being the party “with the flag on the mast, championing the monarchy, and so on” to being a party that “loves the entire country” and speaks for “all people who work” (Carlsson 2017).

Together with a small group of likeminded, Reinfeldt dislodges the party from the conservative right and moves it toward the centre. The aim is that in the election of 2006 “the new moderates” will “stand against the old social democrats” (Reinfeldt 2005). If the Moderate Party was “radically liberal” during the 1980s what happened in the early 2000s was that the party moved toward the centre (just like it had in the 1960s) (Boréus 1994; Ljunggren 1992; Lindbom 2010).

Other scholars have argued that the Moderate Party began to adjust its policies in the 1980s in an ambition of reaching beyond its core

electorate (Ekengren & Oscarsson 2011; 2013; 2015).

Was the reinvention “strategic” or was it only the consequence of a new generation of politicians who had grown up in a welfare state, and internalised its values? Other scholars have discussed the issue, pointing out that it is only expected that even liberal politicians who grow up in a welfare state will internalise at least some of its values. As Anders Lindbom have argued: “the distinction between ‘real change’ and ‘strategic change’ becomes pointless [when]... a publicly financed [welfare system] has been institutionalised and outmanoeuvred private alternative... [In such situations even] the liberal electorate will be affected if the system is dismantled” (Lidbom 2010: 144). To be sure, liberal politicians in Sweden can be argued to be, comparatively speaking, more left than elsewhere as a consequence of the institutionalisation of the welfare state in Sweden. While this is certainly true I believe it is useful to distinguish between “natural” and “strategic” change for our purposes because the reinvention was unambiguously connected to moving the party to the centre in an attempt of increasing its popularity.

Regardless, it is fairly well established that the changes in the party in the early 2000s had the result that “the entire project of the New Moderate Party in some sense have been about how Reinfeldt and his closest associated accepted parts of the social democratic welfare state” (Ekengren & Oscarsson 2015: 159; see also Lindbom 2008). What is more, the direction of the (new) Moderate Party signalled above all that it was more interested in pragmatism than in ideology (Lindbom 2010: 146; Ekengren & Oscarsson 2015: 161).

Reinfeldt’s reinvention of the Moderate Party will lead to substantial consequences for the party’s defence policies. The reason is that defence was a sphere of politics which the party had a distinctively traditional perspective, championing territorial defence, a large defence budget and a strong national defence with the purpose of deterring Russia. These were traditional values, closely associated with the Moderate Party. They symbolised everything that the new Moderate Party wanted to disassociate itself from. Instead, the Moderate Party would have to embrace the more modern touch that the SAP offered, with a focus on expeditionary missions and the emergence of New Wars.

Employing Soldiers

Beginning in 2004, both the SAP *and* the Moderate Party have more or less the same defence policies. Incidentally, this happens at a point when a growing number of people involved in the reform believe that a choice has to be made on whether or not to proceed with the conversion strategy or if it is wiser to swap to a professional army. Hederstedt states

that the reform has come to a crossroads in the sense that parliament and government must make up its mind on what kind of defence they want (Headquarters 2003: 11). Expeditionary missions must be the “the most important priority”, but this can only be achieved by permitting professional soldiers (Ibid: 41-42, 49). Permitting these is of “decisive importance to the future development of the military, and the government’s ability to realise the international aims of the Armed Forces” (Ibid: 12). The SDC has had a change of heart and agrees, arguing that whether the government accepts professional soldiers or not will be “single most important question for the future” (SDC 2003a; SDC 2003b: 64). At the same time, the Parliamentary Defence Committee (PDC) publishes a report pointing to a similar conclusion, urging the decision makers to make up their mind on what kind of Armed Forces they want for Sweden (Thulstrup 2003: 41). There is a constant fight over scarce resources, and initiatives to satisfy the expeditionary objective is eroding the social basis of the conscription system: “The reform has created a new mindset. That there is a duty to serve no longer matters. If a serviceman begins his training and then changes his mind, nobody will stop him from leaving. ‘I want to go home’ is all he needs to say” (Thulstrup 2017; Thulstrup 2003: 40). If Sydow’s conversion strategy is allowed to continue the result will, in the long run, be that “the legitimacy of the conscription system will be seriously questioned in the near future” but the expeditionary objective will still be far from achieved (Ibid: 42). “What was needed was a principally oriented decision on which recruitment model one wanted. It was obvious that the idea of mixing voluntary recruitment within a system based on a duty to serve was untenable” (Thulstrup 2017). In the spring of 2004, defence minister Björklund thus announces that she is not against the idea of employing soldiers, but that it will be important to minimise the size of this group and that they be employed on short contracts (Björklund 2003d). This decision is helped by the new Supreme Commander, Håkan Syrén. He believes the attempt to convert military service has failed, and that what it needed is “profound change” and that the Armed forces should have a “zero vision” meaning that all enlisted servicemen later proceed to deployment (Syrén 2004a). The defence minister agrees, defending her choice of Syrén as someone capable of “pushing the reform forward” (Björklund 2003e). What now begins is a further series of adjustments in which the conscripted cohort will be further reduced and where all who are conscripted should at the end of the training decide to sign up for deployment (Headquarters 2004a: 22). A smaller conscripted cohort can be combined with a growing expeditionary ambition if, and only if, the government permits setting up one battalion of only employed soldiers that sign a two year contract. The plan is welcomed

by the defence minister (Björklund 2004a; 2004b). With this change, the SAP engages in another policy reversal that sets the party's policy on military service in a direction that defies its previous standpoint. As with the 2001 bill, the argument is that the change is necessary to protect military service as it will prevent the already growing debate on a professional army. The SDC similarly embraces Syrén's ideas and sees no problem in "complementing" military service with segments of employed soldiers (SDC 2004: 97). Presented as a way of protecting military service, the 2004 Defence Decision thus asks the Armed Forces to set up two battalions of employed soldiers, where half can be deployed within ten days of a decision (Government 2004a: 12, 106). The plan is that these soldiers will be deployed together with soldiers from other Nordic states, in a so called "Nordic Battle Group" that will be part of a European expeditionary force. With a new zero-vision of enlistment, the size of the cohort will be reduced to between 8,000 and 10,000. This means that one in every three enlisted servicemen must decide to sign a contract for deployment in order to achieve the objective of two expeditionary battalions.

With a more selective service only a limited number of the servicemen will have the skills, be interested and willing to be deployed. During this period the NSA therefore has to pick the servicemen with care to avoid "deadweight", high defection rates and to ensure that as many as possible decide to sign up for deployment. According to the director general at the NSA, "barley one in five lived up to the new demands, the rest fell away as 'unsuitable' for service" (Körlof 2016). As a comparison, before these changes the share of "unsuitable" servicemen was negligent. In 1994 it was 12 percent, whereas by 2005 the group had increased to 61 percent of all tested servicemen (NSA 1994; 2005). One consequence of this was that the physical enlistment tests had more or less played out their role. The NSA could already beforehand estimate that a majority of the tested servicemen would not be enlisted. For this reason it developed a new form of online "pre-enlistment tests" where the servicemen answered questions about their health and interest in deployment. Those who still were of interest to the Armed Forces after completing the form would be contacted to do the actual enlistment test. This is how another institutional feature of military service was pushed to the sidelines (Tänneryd 2017; Körlof 2016).

Active Recruitment

One consequence of the 2004 decision is that the pressure increases on the Armed Forces to recruit the best and most talented. To achieve this it launches an elaborate recruitment campaign to identify, select,

attract and retain the most capable servicemen. For the first time in history, the Armed Forces commission an advertisement bureau to put forth information campaigns about the benefits of serving and going on deployments. The campaign runs in Sweden's largest newspapers, radio and TV stations and has its own website (Lorentzon 2005).³ It targets men in the ages between 15 and 22, as well as their parents. In Sweden's largest daily newspaper, it has an advertisement covering two pages. It shows two soldiers of different sexes, one wearing the traditional green uniform and the other the new uniform developed to suit desert environments. In the advertisement, Syrén explains that the "new desert uniform is a great illustration of the Armed Forces' transformation. All soldiers work for Swedish security, though not necessarily at home." In the new Armed Forces, he continues, the conscript is not only a student, but also a colleague. The centre-right opposition applauds the new direction, but believes it is not enough. In 2005, the defence spokespersons from the four centre-right parties produce a motion to parliament suggesting that the time has come for Sweden to move to a fully professional army (Centre-right Alliance 2005).⁴

³As the Chief of Press at the Headquarters, Karin Lorentzon puts it "We want to reach out to capable recruits who want to do military service, get them and their parents to understand what the service in reality means today" (Lorentzon 2005). The Headquarters also produces two short films, filmed in South Africa. In one of them a truck filled with civilians and armed men (appearing frightened) roll into a small African town destroyed by violence and men with weapons. Buildings are on fire, a group of men point their weapons at the truck, trying to stop it from moving forward. With difficulty the truck advances and reaches a small hut where they cast their votes in what appears to be a political election. A text appears: "A better world requires a new Swedish military. And a new kind of soldier." According to the ad-agency, the purpose of the film is to evoke sympathy and emotions that create interest and willingness to participate: "With it we want to give examples of what kind of work Swedish soldiers do when they are deployed. It is about having the capability to deal with complex situations and having a well developed capacity for empathy" (Brenemark 2006).

⁴"In the situation today it is the Alliance's belief that there has to be a change in the centre of gravity in the Armed Forces. We have to move from a model of enlisting conscripts to recruiting voluntary soldiers, men and women. Military service should be seen as a possibility if the security situation changes" (Centre-right Alliance 2005).

5.2 Completing the Reform

In September 2006, the Moderate Party takes office together with the three other centre-right parties in parliament. The election victory is explained by pointing to the party's strategic adjustment that had begun a few years earlier. "Tonight people who never before have voted for us have voted for us. We want every one to feel a home in the new Moderate Party" (Reinfeldt 2006a). When Reinfeldt opens parliament, he sends the message that new Moderate Party should not to be confused with the old, stating that "Sweden must be a country that sticks together, where the social and regional cleavages are reduced. ...We want solidarity and welfare for all" (Government 2006a). He equally presents a new path on security- and foreign policy, promising a more active Sweden in international affairs, increasing development aid, intervening in humanitarian crises and building international treaties to address transnational ills, such as climate change (Government 2006a). The most significant part of the speech is however what it does *not* mention: defence policy. Historically, prime ministers from the party have always spent at least a few minutes talking about foreign policy and defence policy, iterating the party's priority of keeping a strong defence and that such issues are high on the government's agenda. That Reinfeldt fails to bring this up is of course no coincidence. It is part of a strategic calculation to disassociate the party from an issue-ownership that is believed to constrain more than enable the party. This is also why the party in the election campaign spent no time lifting the difficult state of the Armed Forces, and the SAP's continuous defence reductions. Given, the party's desire to disassociate itself from its old issue-reputation and strategic adjustment this makes sense.

Michael Odenberg is the new defence minister. Until then, he had served as the party chairman of the Parliamentary Group. According to him, he was appointed defence minister because there was weak interest among other senior members of the party (Odenberg 2017). That the party had lost interest in defence issues is also something that Odenberg's successor, Sten Tolgfors, corroborates:

For us who worked at the defence ministry the interest [in defence policy] was immense. We lived in the questions, so to speak, around the clock. Maybe a few others in party had an interest too, but in general I have to say that the interest was non-existent. The interest was instead mainly 'security policy' more broadly defined, as a foreign policy issue, with missions and so on. The interest for the military and defence issues was weaker (Tolgfors 2017).

This was part of a new attitude in the party where defence issues was no longer a prioritised issue or even part of the political agenda (Odenberg 2017). As chairman of the Parliamentary Group between 2003 and 2006, Odenberg could see the change first hand. “In the late 1990s, members of the party still discussed defence policy, but with the new leadership things changed. There were no important differences between us and the SAP on principally important questions of the kind on what we wanted the Armed Forces to do or even why we had an Armed Forces to begin with” (Ibid).

When Odenberg begins his new job the party has no plan on what to do (Ibid). Except one thing, promised during the election campaign: doubling the expeditionary capability (Ibid). Odenberg’s perspective in 2006 is that he will continue the already ongoing reform, but in a way that pays more attention to what is organisationally necessary to achieve the expeditionary objective — something that suits a party with a reputation of efficiency and pragmatism in defence policy. For Odenberg, this means that the new organisational purpose must be the yardstick in determining the organisational design, and he has no emotional or moral attachment to military service, the way that SAP politicians have. If privilege to outcome over tradition and process was emerging with the 2001 bill, it is now stepped up with a party that has a reputation for only valuing outcome and efficiency.

The Armed Forces is well ahead in developing a new praxis. In addition to what was suggested in the earlier chapter, the conscripts are now instructed to step up their skills in learning military commands in the English language, something that will be part of basic training (Engelbrektson 2007a). It can also be seen in the age-composition of the expeditionary units. According to the Headquarters, at least 75 percent of the 2,200 expeditionary soldiers should be staffed by soldiers in the ages between 19 and 20 years old, given the high physical demands of the missions (Headquarters 2007a). This stands in contrast to earlier deployments where higher age normally was considered an asset. In the Kosovo deployment the average age was 27, and historically it has been 32 (Engelbrektson 2007b; Wiktorin 2007). The officers in charge of the expeditionary units believe that there is a potential risk with having younger soldiers, since the situations on deployments often places a certain demand on personal maturity. Odenberg, however, does not agree. “As a recruit one has to decide, am I a grown up or not? At the same time it is important to communicate that a mission cannot only be understood as an exiting adventure for young boys” (Odenberg 2007a).

For Odenberg, the problem is not the direction of the reform, it is the slow pace and failure in pursuing the necessary changes to achieve

the new organisational purpose. The “greatest challenge” in the years ahead would be to “complete the enormously large transformation of the Armed Forces, from the old store-supplied defence apparatus, designed to fend off an invasion, to developing an expeditionary defence that can be used globally” (Odenberg 2006a). In spite of years of changes in design and purpose, the Armed Forces are still mentally and organisationally “locked in old structures” (Odenberg 2006b). Mainly because “military romanticism” from the SAP and older generation moderates. These groups have stood in the way and prevented necessary adjustments (Odenberg 2006c). “As the old structure disappeared, demands were coming in to me that we, the Moderate Party, the ‘defence party’, somehow had to ‘restore the order in Sweden’s defence policy’. To my mind this was not the right way to proceed” (Odenberg 2017). Bold changes would, admittedly, provoke many of their core voters but was in line with the party’s strategic adjustment to the centre. For Odenberg, it was obvious that the “era of mass armies” was over, and that what now was needed was a professional army (Odenberg 2006d). Large segments in his own party and in the SAP failed to see that it was not possible to hold on to old truths, such as military service.⁵ “It was still a holy cow. In spite of the fairly obvious flaws of the model there was surprisingly little talk about alternative models” (Odenberg 2007c). Even though most in his generation valued the service, society had changed and the Armed Forces had made it clear to him that they needed a professional army in order to realise their new objectives, and true to the party’s reputation “the military demands had to be the governing principle” (Odenberg 2017; 2007d; Odenberg 2007e). Odenberg also rejects the idea that Sweden even keeps a system based on military service: “In a normal year the cohort of possible servicemen is about 55,000. In 2007 we will enlist 5,000. This is the reality. One can talk about a universal military service as much as one wants, but we are already pretty far from that today” (Odenberg 2007e). The Head of Development at the Headquarters, Michael Moore, agrees arguing that as things are heading the Armed Forces will inevitably transform to a professional army: “We recruit only a few thousand conscripts per year and the development is toward a full professional army, even if a majority in parliament is still against it” (Moore 2007).

In May, 2007 Odenberg takes the first formal step in bringing the promised change by drawing up a framework for a committee that will

⁵At a large defence conference in early 2007, Odenberg stress the New Wars perspective and how the Armed Forces must be bold and think in new paths (Odenberg 2007b). After the speech Odenberg received of applause from his own colleagues, but equally from the SAP. The defence spokesperson from the SAP, Ulrica Messing, sums it up as: “In principle, I could have given the same speech” (Messing 2007).

examine the possibility of introducing a professional army. His idea is that the laws on military service would remain but will not be practiced in peace-time. In peace-time the Armed Forces would instead use soldiers on employment contracts, and in the case of war reintroduce military service. Odenberg's decision substantially changes a given policy, but it should not be understood as a policy reversal. Policy reversal points to a substantial policy change by a party that earlier have been associated with another value on the policy. Although the Moderate Party has previously supported military service, it has done so on the basis that it has proven the best way for achieving the organisational purpose of the Armed Forces. Military service has been part of upholding the party's issue-reputation in taking seriously the function, efficiency and ability of the Armed Forces to achieve its purpose, when this purpose was to defend the national territory. Now the organisational purpose had changed and military service failed in catering the needs of the Armed Forces' expeditionary objectives. This is what motivated Odenberg's decision (Odenberg 2017). The following question is however how it is possible for the Moderate Party to revert a policy that is "owned" by another party, given the prediction from partisan theory that parties refrain from these actions due to accountability pressures. By 2007 the accountability pressures have been weakened as a consequence of the SAP's earlier conversion of military service. The size of the cohort had dwindled for every year, the legal framework had been more or less abandoned in 2001 and in 2004 the Armed Forces had begun employing soldiers. It was also becoming increasingly clear that in spite of great efforts military service could not yield the necessary number of employed soldiers to the expeditionary units. The effect was that the "taboo" on talking about alternatives to military service was weakened and no longer associated with political costs. The case could even be made that talk of a professional army was part of taking defence policies seriously, a reputation the Moderate Party was careful to maintain.

The situation in 2007 can therefore be compared with how the Moderate government in the early 1990s pushed the issue on EU-membership and adjustment to the universality policy: even though it was policies which would intervene on issues "owned" by the SAP, the governing context had changed in such a degree that change was possible without being penalised. The case for SAP policies had been weakened and this enabled the Moderate Party to break new ground. It did this in the early 1990s, and now also in 2007.

On one point, Odenberg however disagrees with the SAP — the defence budget. To pull through with the reform the Armed Forces needed a realistic chance of achieving its organisational purpose. In

the summer of 2007, however, the minister of finance, Anders Borg, announces that the government will reduce the defence budget by ten percent in order to finance a tax cut to the middle-class, an important part of the party's strategic adjustment. The problem is that the defence minister did not know about this. "I had a loyalty to the government, and this means I could hardly tell the truth, that 'well, the finance minister can talk as much as he wants, but what he says is complete nonsense.' My only option was to deny and propose that the budget is still not decided" (Odenberg 2017). If the announcement is true, Odenberg's plans on getting the Armed Forces "back in order" would be off the rails. Supreme Commander Håkan Syrén reacts strongly, arguing that "further reductions will lead to devastating consequences and certain collapse of our entire defence capability" (Syrén 2007a). At this moment, little is however known on whether the finance minister's announcement is sanctioned by prime minister Reinfeldt, who is difficult to get hold on.

I tried to get hold of the prime minister, but it was impossible. He was on vacation, they told me, and could not be disturbed. The conflict was definitely worsened by his passivity. More importantly, his silence sent the wrong signals to our electorate, because with it it became apparent that defence politics was not important enough for him to interrupt his vacation. He did not give a single comment on the issue throughout the summer. This affected our credibility in defence politics negatively (Odenberg 2017).

The political editor at Sweden's largest centre-right daily newspaper neatly frames the problem by arguing that it will be easy for the leadership to justify the policy to juniors in the party, but it will be harder for local politicians who "all of the sudden must explain to their neighbours, colleagues, and themselves, why the moderates over night has changed its attitude on defence. Because if there is anything that have historically signified the party it is its concern for the basic functions of the state. Now it no longer appears to be so" (Linder 2007). The party's own defence group publishes an article in the same paper criticising the decision by arguing that it has no analysis behind it: "The defence budget can and should only be adjusted with consideration to defence and security policy" not to suit the policies of the finance department (Jernbeck et al. 2007). A few days later the authors are summoned to the chairman of the party's parliamentary group, Lars Linder (Nilsson 2017; Johansson 2015). He lets them know that they have embarrassed the party, asking them to pull back the article and vacate their seats in the defence group and in the PDC (Ibid).

At the end of the summer, Reinfeldt for the first time comments on the issue by saying that Borg is correct and that he will discuss the matter with Odenberg (Reinfeldt 2007a). At the same time, Odenberg receives suggestions from the Ministry of Finance on how the costs of the Armed Forces can be cut (Odenberg 2017). Reinfeldt, Odenberg and Borg agree that there will be reductions but that these will only be implemented gradually to avoid further turbulence in an organisation still struggling with earlier cuts imposed by the SAP. For this reason, the cuts will only be half of what Borg first had announced (Reinfeldt 2007b; Odenberg 2017).⁶ When the three meet a few weeks later, however, Reinfeldt has had a change of heart. The rest of the suggested cuts by the finance minister will be taken in 2010. At the same time, civil servants from the Ministry of Finance are placed at the Defence Ministry with the task of analysing how and where the organisation can be reduced. For Odenberg, these actions meant that if he would stay as minister of defence he would in not be in control of his own ministry, instead it would be remote-controlled by the Ministry of Finance (Odenberg 2017). This is why Odenberg believes that he has no option but to resign with immediate effect.

I have to be able to look myself in the mirror and see the soldiers, seamen and officers in their eyes too. With the current situation this will not be possible. Since I do not believe in what is asked of me as defence minister I have no choice but to resign (Odenberg 2007f).

After Odenberg's resignation Reinfeldt comments that cuts to the Armed Forces are necessary, and part of the party's new defence policies in which the Armed Forces will be scrutinised and judged as any agency. There will be no special treatment of the Armed Forces: "Those who are not prepared to reconsider how we use every penny of the taxpayers' money must also take this responsibility. No policy areas are holy" (Reinfeldt 2007b). The chairman of the PDC, Anders Karlsson (SAP), summarises Sweden's new defence policy as pursuing the same defence policy as the SAP "but with less money" (Karlsson 2007a).

Ideas on suspending military service was not a policy reversal since it jacked in to the party's reputation for efficiency and a well functioning Armed Forces. The policy on financial reductions and treating the Armed Forces as any other government agency is nonetheless a policy reversal with a strategic purpose of signalling that the party is headed in a new ideological direction that, in this issue, runs against the party's old

⁶Instead of four billion, the three agree to save 350 million in 2008, 620 million in 2009 and 980 million in 2010.

issue-reputations of treating the Armed Forces as a special interest. It amounts to what this dissertation has called issue-disassociation. That the cuts would be used to finance tax reliefs for low- and middle- income earners neatly captures the new direction in the Moderate Party.

5.3 Toward Suspension

The Minister of Trade, Sten Tolgfors, is appointed new defence minister. He takes up on Odenberg's plan for a committee to examine a transition to a professional army. Tolgfors believes a smaller but fully professional army will be possible for Sweden because in the future Sweden is best defended by participating in expeditionary missions and the Armed Forces will only need 5,000 soldiers for this purpose, something that is fully possible to recruit on a voluntary basis. Substituting the duty to serve with voluntary and paid service is possible because, he argues, a new mind-set is evolving in society where more and more young are interested in making a difference in the world: "The willingness to work in the Armed Forces is the result of an interest in making a difference, that is to say participating in missions. If one believes,... that the interest follows from the possibility of making a difference", recruitment can be voluntary, or at least as long as the Armed Forces are tasked with making a difference in the world (Tolgfors 2017). "In times such as today, the individual's own motivation and voluntary engagement will be fully sufficient" (Tolgfors 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2007d). What is more, soldiers who serve voluntarily will be more willing to stay on the job and will perform better than someone who is compelled by law: "The voluntary system has the benefit that since we already from the beginning ask the question 'Do you want to do this?'. If the individual is interested, the probability also increases that the person wants to stick around for a longer time" (Tolgfors 2017). At the same time, the new Moderate chair of the SDC, Göran Lennmarker, publishes the SDC's annual report, endorsing the New Wars perspective by pointing to risks of migration and civil wars in weak or collapsed states, and that the most pressing security issue for Sweden is "of course climate change" iterating that security is "about much more than the traditionally 'military' issues" (Lennmarker 2007a; 2007b; SDC 2007). With this report, the Moderate Party disassociates itself from the earlier dominant realist perspective in the party's defence policies.

As a consequence of the government's movement toward expeditionary missions, Supreme Commander Håkan Syrén in late 2007 suggests, in a report, that Sweden swaps from a conscripted to a professional

army (Headquarters 2007c). The premise of the report is its security analysis of the future. It notes that the development of Russia is mixed. There are “positive trends in economic growth and increased standard of living”, yet there are also worrying “political developments with an increasingly centralised political concentration of power and weakening of democratic principles” (Ibid: 13). It judges the military build up as “comprehensive” with growing military capability in the Baltic area and along its borders to Finland. Regardless of this it is still possible to conclude that the current security situation “places few demands on military effect on or near Swedish territory”. The national defence will in the future be limited to fending off unlawful territorial intrusions, protecting against terrorism and assisting society in natural disasters and emergencies. Instead the challenges in the future will be “transnational in their character which means that events far away from Sweden can have immediate effects also nationally” (Ibid). States are becoming more interdependent, with mutual sensitivity and vulnerability. Many threats, including climate change and terrorism, are transnational in character and can only be effectively addressed in cooperation with other states. Because of this the “majority of the units must have the ability to be used for missions globally, in Europe and on our territory” (Ibid: 15).

It notes that having an expeditionary capability is not something that will falter in the near future: “Demands on military effect far away from Swedish territory are expected also in the future”. The units must have the equipment and be structured in such a way that they can be deployed with immediate effect and together with other states (Ibid: 19). A better expeditionary capability is also motivated by a national perspective.

Great swaths of land in our territory lack a military infrastructure and local military units. Even if a situation where we will have to use military force today is small, and will be in the near future, the military must have the capability of expeditionary missions on our entire territory, at land and at sea. The big cities are especially prioritised. The Island of Gotland is an other area with a military vacuum which we must have the capability to deploy soldiers (Ibid: 16).

An important “dimensional factor” for the national defence is therefore that the military have an immediate capability to deploy soldiers both on national territory and abroad. Syrén in other words presents an argument for an expeditionary capability which takes the national defence as an equal concern. It has already been argued that the expeditionary units protect Sweden by preventing conflicts in collapsed and failed

states. It has also been argued that Swedish soldiers on missions improve the Swedish defence by bringing home lessons learned from real war. Now it is in addition suggested that the expeditionary capability improves Swedish security by enabling a fast military presence in now demilitarised areas of Sweden (Ibid: 17). It is an attempt to solve the dilemma on whether to opt for a national or international perspective. In order to develop the expeditionary capability to its full potential, there is no alternative but to replace military service with only employed soldiers. For this reason the Headquarters propose a reform that results in only using employed soldiers in peace time. The demand on increased expediency, accessibility and flexibility, internationally and nationally “can thereby be met” (Ibid: 41). The demand on accessibility and flexibility, two essential features of an expeditionary army, “can thereby be met” (Headquarters 2007c: 9, 41).

The system with military service... was developed for a national defence with the purpose of, within a limited economy, mobilise great volumes of soldiers. The system is not compatible with the future demands of a flexible expeditionary organisation (Ibid: 40).

In what Syrén suggests, the Armed Forces should instead every year recruit and train 4,300 soldiers. Of them 3,500 will continue as “rank and file” and 800 study to officer at officer school. His proposal is only “in the developmental phase” which he points out because there are still uncertainties on costs, number of soldiers and how to deal with the recruitment and retention problems that other European states with professional armies find themselves in (Ibid: 41). These are important question marks that must be straightened out before continuing to a professional army (Ibid: 51).⁷ In particular he notes that a professional army will place new demands on marketing and incentive structures, which are still unexamined, and professional armies will be sensitive to the state of the labour market. It is possible that the Armed Forces will have to lower the entry demands to attract a sufficient number of recruits (Ibid: 54). Given these uncertainties Syrén suggests that the new model must be introduced gradually and that the conscripted army will have to remain in place to at least 2012.

Following this, Tolgfors’s puts together a parliamentary committee to begin mapping out the framework for model based on employed soldiers:

⁷It estimates that 15 % of the recruits will leave their basic training before completing it and that 10 per cent will leave before having served the full 3 to 5 years. 70 % of the enlisted will chose to continue after basic training and sign a full time or part time contract. The remaining 15 % continue to the Home Guard (Ibid: 43).

A parliamentary committee will consider which constitutional changes and other changes are necessary to enable voluntary recruitment and training of soldiers that today serve according to the law of military service (Government 2007: 1).

Even though the SAP were critical of the suggested change, for Tolgfors the time for “adjustments” and “tweaks” to the old system had passed: “There was one system — military service — and it was well known and tried. We all knew it was not working. There is a certain logic in that a system that already exists and is known and has been remoulded several times and is still not working, is failing, has to be considered known and exhausted of alternatives” (Tolgfors 2017). With this directive, the government admittedly suggests a swap of recruitment model even though the SAP is against it, thus breaking with the tradition of reaching parliamentary unity on substantial changes in defence policy. According to Tolgfors, a number of contextual factors can be identified to motivate the government’s course of action. The SAP does not function as an oppositional party because it no longer produces any defence motions: “The SAP does not even present defence motions in parliament. In the end of 2007 it has been years since they presented anything of substance” (Tolgfors 2017). There is equally an apparent lack of leadership in the SAP, what it wants with the defence reform and who its defence spokesperson is. It is also visible, he suggests, that the SAP is torn on the issue. Key persons within the party appear open to a new model, as long as it creates better expeditionary capabilities. The SAP’s representative in the SDC, Håkan Juholt, and the SAP’s spokesperson in foreign affairs, Urban Ahlin are of this view, he argues. For Tolgfors the Committee could therefore be used to sway the SAP’s formal stance on military service. “There is in 2007 no given route for how to proceed. We are in a time of reappraisal and review. How can one know that [the SAP] will not accept the new system? When did they say that they did not do this? At what time and in what place? I do not believe one can put it like this. To me the question was politically open” (Ibid). What appears in 2007, to Tolgfors’s mind, is that the SAP is indecisive and that there is a possibility for the government to push the SAP to support a swap from conscripted to a professional army. It is also the case, he continues, that in 2007 any mention of a system with only employed soldiers is a “red blanket”. The exact meaning and virtue of having only employed soldiers is nonetheless unclear, because it has never been examined or publicly debated. The Committee is a possibility to break the taboo on discussing alternative models and finally move the reform onward toward a sustainable recruitment policy for the

future. Above all, echoing Odenberg’s criticism, it is also apparent that in 2007 the existing recruitment model no longer can be said to be “military service”. A decade of reforms has produced a hybrid model where the share of employed soldiers is on its way of outnumbering the share of conscripts. In addition, according to Tolgfors it was visible that the defence ministry and the Armed Forces already had their “minds in the new system” and that the process toward a professional army “already had begun” (Tolgfors 2017).

To be sure, the measures taken by the SAP in the earlier years to increase the recruitment to the expeditionary missions had not delivered as planned. The share of conscripts who did *not* apply for expeditionary missions still dwarfed the share who decided to sign up for deployment.⁸

Table 5.1: Interest for deployment among conscripts (%)

Year	Will apply	Have applied	Will not apply
2002-03	9	12	73
2003-04	17	11	72
2004-05	17	17	66
2006	23	18	59

Source: Headquarters 2004b, 2004c, 2006, 2007b

What accounts for the poor interest? One important reason is that the changes beginning in the 2001 bill placed an excessive faith in the serviceman’s stated interest to sign up for deployment at the enlistment test. The problem with this is that “interest” is a fluid variable in the sense that it varies over time and for reasons that the Armed Forces could not control. In addition, instead of strengthening military service, the introduction of “interest” weakened it by motivating a reduction in the cohort. By enlisting only interested servicemen the belief was that more of them would stay on, which made large cohorts unnecessary and presented a possibility to cut the “deadweight”, improve efficiency and keep costs down. The problem is that by reducing the cohort the institution of military service in society – the logic of appropriateness for serving – was weakened. One way to present the problem is that interest in serving in the Armed Forces is not linear, it is exponential. When you reduce the cohort, the weakening you do to the institutional

⁸When the third term is introduced in 2006, only 2,6 per cent apply and are admitted to a “third term,” 5 per cent have applied but are not been admitted. 92 per cent have not applied (Headquarters 2007b).

framework of military service will not be matched by the size of the reduction in number of soldiers. It will more likely be higher because by reducing the cohort military service disappears as a socially shared collective experience in society. By replacing the duty to serve with an interest to serve, and reducing the cohort, the policy removed the socio-psychological effect that had helped gauging the logic of appropriateness for serving. The new policy also made it easier for the conscript to leave basic training whenever he wanted, creating a new norm not only in society on serving, but in the Armed Forces as well. Finally, the 2001 bill rested on a false premise that the Armed Forces can become more efficient by recruiting only the best in the cohort. The problem with this assumption is that the normal distribution curve is constant in how many people that can be found in each category. The quantity of the best servicemen are not increased by cutting of the tail of the curve. The only result is that the cohort shrinks.

The 2001 bill proposed several new policies and these created new norms, norms that were preventing instead of facilitating an effective recruitment of soldiers to the Armed Forces.

Chairman of the committee is the long time servant of the SDC, Anders Svärd, from the Centre Party. As a former and leading member of the SDC, he was one of the architects of replacing the realist with the New Wars perspective and made it mainstream in Swedish defence policy. He believes a swap to a professional army is necessary because “the expeditionary objective had become more and more pronounced, but the Armed Forces were still struggling to achieve its objective — it was especially failing in recruiting enough soldiers” (Svärd 2017). What Sweden needed was a reform that made better use of their soldiers: “Instead of wasting money on training that never could be used we should be using our soldiers. Either we are at war at home or we are on mission abroad. Why should we otherwise pay for having soldiers, if we never used them?” (Ibid). He also believed that the conversion strategy suggested by Sydow was misguided: “What does voluntary military service even mean? One cannot both have and not have a duty” (Ibid). In contrast to Tolgfors, Svärd did not see the committee as a vehicle for political unity, because the committee was parliamentary. If there is not parliamentary unity on an issue one cannot expect unity in a parliamentary committee. To him it was obvious that the government had already decided that a swap would come and the task of the committee was to put forth the practicalities of making the swap as good as possible (Ibid). In spite of this, he continues, the work of the committee was disturbed by the fact that all members knew that the government thought one thing, the opposition another, the party elite one and the grassroots in all the parties yet another. The swap was, in

other words, far from enjoying broad political support.

In his first invitation to the committee Svärd stresses that “[w]e do not have very much time on our hands, barely a year. We have to work fast” (Svärd 2008a). According to Svärd, the most important aspect was to complete the already ongoing norm-change in the Armed Forces. The way that the Armed Forces look on soldiers has changed in the last few years, with new values and working conditions in which the conscript was seen more as a colleague than a serviceman. In the future this development had to continue, but with greater intensity. The typically military hierarchical order of things had to be replaced and the Armed Forces had to become a modern flat organisation, just like in the most successful business on the market. According to Svärd this had been a goal by the politicians for many years, but still much needed to be done (Svärd 2017). The Armed Forces had to study how successful companies attract talented people, working more with incentives such as generous wages, specified job descriptions, reasonable working hours and fair compensation. The goal had to be that there would be no difference between recruiting people to the Armed Forces and recruiting people to successful companies: “What I wanted was that it would make no difference if one works in Volvo or as a soldier on mission in Afghanistan. In both cases recruitment is dependent on offering attractive deals to the employees. Successful recruitment begins and ends with good and well specified conditions, regardless of what one is recruiting to” (Svärd 2017). The Armed Forces had slowly moved in that direction since 2001, as a consequence of Sydow’s bill, now the Armed Forces had to internalise these values and transform the organisation so that they became part of the organisational culture. The Armed Forces had to, in short, be professionalised.

One part of the committee’s work was to examine how other states had swapped from conscripted to professional armies and extract lessons from this information. At the time, there was no prior knowledge about the experiences of these countries: “Our knowledge of other European states was at best rudimentary at best, to put it like that” (Svärd 2017; Nilsson 2017). Unfortunately, the reports they receive amounted to alarming reading for a government set on imitating the swap in other European countries.⁹ With few real exceptions, the reports pointed out severe problems in the recruitment and retention of soldiers in a professional army. In spite of large efforts to amend the problem, with generous financial incentives, lowering entry-standards and social benefits, many states still wrestled with severe problems and in all countries the

⁹They receive responses from Australia, Denmark, Estonia, Egypt, France, India, Jordan, Canada, China, the Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Singapore, UK, Turkey, Ukraine, and the US.

costs of the professional model had exceeded the initial estimations, and that of military service.¹⁰ To make matters worse, the committee also receive two reports from the Swedish Defence Research Agency. The first points out that it is “dubious if one can reach the desired levels of recruitment both to basic training and to further employment on contracts” (Nordlund et al. 2008: 10). The reason is that experiences from other states show “the problems should not be underestimated. Neither in the possibilities of reaching the desired recruitment levels nor in the costs associated with developing stable recruitment” (Ibid). To achieve stable recruitment and retention the soldiers must earn at least 20 percent more than an equal job on the market, which seems far from possible given the defence budget, and the costs in a professional army has in most countries exceeded initial estimations by about 20 percent (Ibid: 64). The second report is equally sceptical (2010: 7).¹¹ It argues that the suggested swap in Sweden and the premises of it rests on “in many respects vague suppositions” and on assumptions that “are highly optimistic” (2010: 8, 21). It is highly likely that Sweden will need to recruit about four percent of the cohort to meet the basic demands,

¹⁰The report from the Netherlands (with the title “Great Recruitment Problems in the Dutch Armed Forces”) points out significant problems in the recruitment and retention of soldiers. The problem is not related to wages, and attempts with better incentives have failed, but in a general disinterest in society for involving itself in the Armed Forces. Soldiers and officers leave the military already four years of service. In 2006 the ratio between recruited soldiers and soldiers who leave the military is 1 to 341. The Dutch Navy and Army have between 30 to 40 percent vacant positions. For this reason the Minister of Defence has been forced to use “revolutionary measures” to prevent what the Dutch media calls the “exodus from the military,” for instance rewarding a 1 000 euro bonus to soldiers who persuade family and friends to enlist. The report from the United Kingdom (with the title “Personnel Problems in the British Armed Forces”) similarly describe retention and recruitment problems as acute, and if the trend is not turned it risks offsetting the military’s objectives. The British government has been forced to lower the entry demands which has decreased the quality of the military. At the moment the military escapes a systemic breakdown because they can recruit from the entire Commonwealth. As in the Netherlands it identifies the reason for the drop-outs to be the burden that expeditionary missions places on the social life of the soldiers. Efforts to amend the problem, with little success, is a well developed incentive structure, including free medical and dental care, high pension, university studies free of charge, low interest rates on mortgages, free food, bonuses after completed training, a thousand pound reward for recruiting a new soldier, increase the maximum age of recruitment (to 33 years) and increase the accepted Body Mass Index from 28 to 32 (clinically defined as fat). So far the measures have not mended the problem. The report from Australia paints a similar gloomy picture, with “profound recruitment and retention problems.”

¹¹Nordlund (and his associate Jonsson) will not be done with the final version of the report during the work of the Committee (to be ended in February 2009). Yet from May 2008 they will continuously inform the Committee of their findings. As the state in their final report: “The project has continuously reported its findings to the ongoing Committee on Military Recruitment” (Nordlund & Jonsson 2010: 3, 7).

but recruiting at this rate “is on the brink of what is possible on a voluntary basis”, and something that only the United States achieves, on occasion, and only at a high expense. To achieve the necessary recruitment levels one must probably lower the entry requirements, develop generous economic incentives and generally keep being politically creative by for instance recruiting citizens from other states to serve in the Swedish army, for instance in exchange for citizenship (just like the US, the UK, Belgium and Spain do) (2010: 8). Further, the hypothesis by the decision-makers is that 15 percent of the recruits will drop out before completing their training. The estimation is taken directly from the experiences of conscription. Experiences from other countries suggests that the defection rate increases with employed soldiers. It is not unlikely that the real number will be the double (as it is in Denmark and the Netherlands), why the assumption on defection “must be described as optimistic” (2010: 36). Finally, international comparisons suggest that in order to recruit 4,000 soldiers per year, the Armed Forces must have three legible applicants per position, meaning 12,000 qualified and interested applicants per year. According to the authors, this is far from realistic.¹² Given the many problems in the suggested swap the authors advise that it would be wise to have a plan B in mind (2010: 7).¹³

¹²Another uncertainty is the idea on part time-contracts, with soldiers that spend half of their time in the Armed Forces and the other half in a civilian job. This solution is not unique “but the great faith put into it, that it will solve the personnel policy and the international operations is” (2010: 33). According to the authors, “there is not a single country where three fifths of the soldiers are composed of part time soldiers who are planned to take part in expeditionary missions (2010: 33).

¹³The report by the Swedish Defence Research Agency fits well with a simultaneous report by the Nato. Sweden is among the last countries in Europe to swap from conscripting to employing their soldiers. For many European states it has already been several years since they changed system. A number of studies are begging to evaluate the efficiency of the new system (Bachman et al. 2000; Asch et al. 2004). One major study is by the NATO’s Research and Technology Organisation (RTO). The study examines recruitment and retention with employed models in Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. Its opening statement is that to many members it has proven difficult to recruit and that problems in retention are significant in all countries: “It is not unusual that 30 per cent or more of the enlisted recruits do not to complete their first term” and that many soldiers and officers seek more prospective careers outside the military (Nato 2007: 1-1). It identifies the problem as the model’s sensitivity to external factors. These include but are not limited to: (A) low unemployment rates; (B) incongruence between military and civil values; (C) operational intensity; (D) higher wages in the private sector; (E) geographical location of regiments; (F) promotion based on seniority rather than merit in the military; (G) shrinking demography of 18 to 24 year olds. Many members have tried to amend the problems with increases in wages and benefits, family care, quality of life programmes, targeted advertising, lowering entry standards, educational incentives, retention bonuses and short term contracts (Ibid: 2-2). These measures have so far not solved the problem: “Traditional recruiting, selection, classification and retention practices are no longer

In spite of the unanimous message, pointing out severe risks and problems, the reports are received with ease. For Svärd, the need to swap system was grounded in a belief that it was “the only principally correct system, given the way society was moving” (Svärd 2017). If the reports have any effect on the work of the Committee, it is an understanding that for the reform to succeed what is needed is strong political willpower, optimism and creativity:

I am an optimist, and would probably not have accepted the job if I wasn't. There were problems with voluntary recruitment, sure, but nothing that could not be managed by political willpower. The important part was that we introduced new modern principles to the military. It became clear that what would be needed is a high amount of optimism and willingness to think new and creatively. If we could do this we could deal with the problems that bogged other countries. This is why the Committee, in the end, proposed what it proposed (Svärd 2017).

Further, judging the soundness of the change was “not what we were supposed to do. The point of departure for me was that the existing model was old-fashioned and had to be replaced” (Ibid). Questions of more practical character could be “sorted out at a later stage with sufficiently smart and strong policies” (Ibid). Tolgfors reasoned similarly: “What we proposed was a stepwise reform. First we decided on the principles, and then we would gradually add concretion” (Tolgfors 2017). This is possibly why the reports were, in spite of the alarming information, not decisive in determining whether or not to proceed. As the representative in the committee from the Moderate Party, Rolf Nilsson puts it: “The focus was on drawing up a new model, not analysing empirical data, which was the job of the defence ministry and the Headquarters” (Nilsson 2017). What is more, in 2008 the NSA and the Headquarters

adequate to attract and retain the necessary military personnel to ensure the stability of readiness requirements” (Ibid: 2-1). In some cases the efforts have produced short-term gains, but at the same time resulted in negative long-term consequences. Across Europe the change to a model with only employed soldiers was motivated on a need for boots on the ground in conflict areas abroad. The report however suggests that the interest in the applicants is the military career, not deployment. Similar problems exist in all of the NATO members with only employed soldiers. The exception is Germany because it still uses conscription. Germany has been fairly successful in filling its ranks, and “conscription contributes to this positive result (at least 33 percent of the NCOs/Officers have been conscripts” (Ibid: 2C-2). Similarly, in the first years after the swap in the Netherlands (in 1996) there were few problems because there were many conscripts who volunteered after their service. It was not until a few years into the new system that problems could be identified (Ibid: 2D-2).

publishes two reports on the level of interest among the conscripts in serving abroad. The committee receives this information in the summer of 2008 (NSA 2008). The data covers only 2007, and the respondents are only already enlisted conscripts and students at the Officer Programme. Because of this the information does not apply for society in general. Further, most of the servicemen have already at the enlistment test declared a willingness of serving abroad. The data shows that at the enlistment tests 75 percent declared an interest in deployment. In the basic training this number has dropped to 45 percent and at the end of the training it has dropped further to 14 percent. To qualify for expeditionary service the conscripts must pass a third term. Only 8,5 percent (400 conscripts) have applied and of them more than a tenth were rejected. Based on these numbers, a report from the Headquarters comes to the conclusion that “[i]n order to reach the recruitment goals further actions are clearly necessary to increase the existing levels” (Headquarters 2008: 12).¹⁴

If the swap was associated with risks and uncertainties, why did the Moderate Party pursue it? The question is motivated since the party had defended the swap on the argument that it was part of its commitment to a well-functioning Armed Forces, a for them still important issue-reputation that had remained even after the general strategic adjustment in the party. The way in which the information is received arguably reveals that the swap is coupled to a commitment of opening a new chapter not only in the party’s own history, but in Swedish society generally. The Moderate Party wanted to kill a for the SAP “holy cow” and institutional weapon that worked in favour of the SAP (Agrell 2011). For the Moderate Party there was therefore a strategic interest in swapping the system, and this interest trumped its interest in being understood as a serious party when it came to defence politics. As Mats Johansson, a Moderate member of parliament and well known defence debater at the time has put it, the Moderate Party was primarily motivated to kill “holy cows” of the SAP, including the military service, as a way of signalling that Sweden had entered a new, post-SAP, era (Johansson 2015).

¹⁴According to the NSA, a high rate of the conscripts initially show a high level of interest in expeditionary service, but that this interest plummets at the end of the service (NSA 2008). In 2002, 55 percent of the conscripts initially states an interest but only 9,6 percent later enlist in an expeditionary unit. In 2003, the relation is 61 to 12,5, and in 2005 they are 67 to 10,5.

Conflict within the Parties

In the spring of 2008 a number of moderate members of parliament and local governments begin to voice their criticism (Johansson 2015; Nilsson 2017; Svård 2017). The party's regional chairman in southern Sweden, Lars-Ingvar Ljungman, together with several others complain that "we no longer recognise our party. Moderate voters have lost faith in the party's defence policy" (Ljungman 2008). The chairman in Stockholm, Erik Langby, similarly declares that "one truly has a hard time to recognise oneself in this mess and crisis of our national defence" (Langby 2008). Representatives from Enköping note that "there are worries in Moderate municipalities across the country, we no longer understand the party's stance on defence politics. Is our party no longer standing up for a strong national defence, as we always have?" (Godberg 2008). A poll conducted by the Swedish Radio shows that only three percent of the local politicians from the centre-right alliance believes the defence minister is "doing a good job" (SR 2008). More than one in five wants him to step down. When the party's defence group visited moderate politicians across the country, the leadership was fiercely criticised, "people were very disappointed" (Nilsson 2017). For many in the party, the decision to replace a conscripted with a professional army came as a surprise. It was not anchored in the party's own defence group and even less in the party generally: "All of a sudden the decision was there. I do not know when it was decided, we read it in the paper. The party was far from agreement. Many of us believed the reforms had gone too far", as Rolf Nilsson, member of the defence group puts it (Nilsson 2017). Johansson suggests that the shift was strategically correct, and something the party needed, but the leadership failed to explain in the party why it was needed. "In the first term of office the mood was bad. Either you were loyal to the leadership and followed their orders, you belong to the "new moderates" and will be rewarded with important jobs. Or, alternatively, you belonged to the "old moderates" and will be penalised and placed in the cold with small chances of a political career. Some of the old moderates were smart and swallowed their own opinions and joined in, others not so much" (Johansson 2015). The political priority in the first term of office was to "tear down sacred cows, and it included the party's special interest to defence and things like military service. No doubt about that" (Ibid).

Because of the strategically important interest in renewing the party, the leadership could justify these decisions and ignore the more traditionally minded moderates. For even though many agreed that the adjustments in economic policy were correct, the changes in defence policy was by many perceived as going too far: "Most of us wanted a

traditional Moderate defence policy: national orientation, increase the defence expenditure and keep an eye on Russia. It is no understatement that the party was split in two” (Johansson 2015). The party’s defence group together publishes an article, arguing that it is unfortunate that the party has abandoned one of its most valuable issue-reputations and that: “The politicians must become better in explaining what the military’s objectives are and why we have a military defence in the first place” (Jernbeck et al. 2008). In a clarifying comment, that equally reveals the connection between the strategic adjustment in the party and how this was connected to defence policy, prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt responds that:

The renewal of the Moderate Party is real. We do not have the ambition to be the party we once were. We want to become something new, fresh-looking and modern that respond to the problems in society we face today (Reinfeldt 2008a).¹⁵

As with the Odenberg-episode in 2007, the conflict within the Moderate Party in the spring of 2008 and the leadership’s response to it reveals the commitment by which the party is engaging in strategic adjustment, that this leads to policy reversal by disassociating old issue-reputations in an attempt of building new ones, and that defence policy is especially important in this pursuit. If the threat of resignation by a minister will not stop the party’s commitment to disassociating itself from its legacy, nor will criticism from members of the party’s defence group or local politicians. As Johansson observed, the choice for members that opposed the new path was either to step aside or join the new direction.

It should also be noted that a similar split could be seen in the SAP. Within left-wing segments in the SAP there is in 2007 a growing a criticism against the expeditionary movement. The criticism concerns the morality of Sweden’s new and more assertive policy on deployments, moving from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement, and together with Nato-members. The development originally spawned from traditional SAP’s ideas in the early 1990s, supported by the left-wing segment (Schori, Peterson, Theorin) and was then augmented by the modernising right-wing segment (Sydow, Hederstedt, Eliasson, Ahlin). Now, however, the left-wing segment believes the development has gone too

¹⁵The friction is covered in the news media and editorial pages. Defence expert Bo Pellnäs writes that “there is probably not a Swedish government in modern time that have managed the defence of the nation in as an uninterested and fumbling way” (Pellnäs 2008). It appears, he continues, that the party leadership “totally neglects its electorate” and are “confident that their traditional electorate will continue to vote in their favour regardless” (Ibid).

far and that there is a need for a halt. According to the critics the new direction in no way resembles the tradition once initiated by Olof Palme, and his scepticism toward violence and preference of working through the United Nations over Nato. The critics begin asking critical questions on why Sweden have soldiers in Afghanistan, why Sweden has abandoned its work on peace-keeping with the UN and why Sweden must reshape the entire Armed Forces for the purpose of participating in US-led military operations. Their message is that the SAP's new policies have spiralled out of control and must find its old roots, by immediately bringing home the soldiers from Afghanistan or, alternatively, redeploy them to peace-building missions in Africa. In articles, speeches and books they write that : "Sweden must bring home its soldiers from war-torn countries and never send them back again," and that they are "sickened when reading that the military now trains conscripts for being deployed to war-torn countries. Sweden's internationalism has become far too adventurous, where Sweden competes with other nations to deploy soldiers on military adventures" (Peterson 2007a; 2007b; Schori 2007a; 2007b; 2007c). In a petition they collect several hundred names from former high ranking members of the SAP and left-wing public intellectuals. Spokespersons in the SAP respond that: "If the coalition of states would leave Afghanistan it would mean a return of the Taliban and many steps backward on the positive development we have seen. We cannot accept this" (Ahlin et al. 2007).

Moving on, in the fall of 2008 the SDC, chaired by the Moderate Party, publishes a report that gives full support to the decision of swapping to a professional army (SDC 2008).¹⁶ It states that in the past decade the solution for the expeditionary missions has been to recruit former conscripts by transforming military service from the ground. One problem with the solution, it argues, is that it is unpredictable, prevents mobility and accessibility and that it creates two parallel organisations in the military: One with a national and another with an international orientation. The two share the same material, personnel and facilities, leading to frequent conflicts over resources and that both sides of the organisation suffer from a scarcity of resources. Another problem is that in the last few years the intake of conscripts has been decided by how many conscripts that are needed to staff the expeditionary units. This

¹⁶It argues that: "it is not realistic to use conscripts for any other situation than against an armed attack against Sweden — a scenario that we judge as highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. There is at the same time here and now a visible need of usable units that build on accessibility, flexibility and mobility for conflict management regardless of whether they occur globally, in Europe, in our proximity or in our own country. This can only be achieved if our soldiers are employed" (Ibid: 31).

has led the Armed Forces to recruit more conscripts than they in reality need, resulting in a huge waste of resources. The SDC therefore believes that: “it is not realistic to use conscripts for any other situation than against an armed attack against Sweden — a scenario that we judge as highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. There is at the same time here and now a visible need for accessible, flexible and mobile units for conflict management regardless whether they occur globally, in Europe, in our proximity or in our own country. This can only be achieved if our soldiers are employed” (Ibid: 31).

The recommendation by the SDC is significant. In the last decade the praxis has been that the government’s defence bills more or less mirrors the SDC’s reports. When the SDC thus recommends that military service be suspended, this presents the government with a possibility to declare that there is political unity for the swap. The only problem is that this time around the SDC’s report is special. For the SAP’s representative in the SDC, Håkan Juholt, has signed off on the change without anchoring it in his party — which still fiercely opposes the swap. According to Tolgfors, Juholt promised him he had his party’s support: “I asked Juholt: do you have the party behind you on this? And we shook hands that he had. All I needed to do was to promise him that I would put together a bill that reflected the recommendations by the SDC. I specifically remember it, it was at a dinner at the Bonnier Mansion, where the SDC celebrated the report” (Tolgfors 2017). In 2008, Juholt has served in the SDC for thirteen years. Between 2000 and 2007 he was its chairman, he is one of the architects on the movement toward the New Wars-perspective and has argued in favour of a higher expeditionary capability. He has a defence experience unparalleled by any other person in his party. It is even suggested that although he formally no longer chairs the SDC, informally he is still its chairman. It is therefore of great importance that a report that he has architected recommends a policy development that is at odds with the policy of his party, and in line with the government’s. It is not until the report is presented to the public that the SAP learns about Juholt’s “unilateral race in the SDC” (Sydow 2015). His party colleague and chairman in the PDC, Anders Karlsson, immediately summons Juholt to his office. As the formal defence spokesperson for the SAP he warns Juholt not to “move an inch without my approval” (Karlsson 2015). In an effort to amend the problem, Karlsson stresses to the media and Tolgfors that the SAP neither supports the SDC’s report nor have any plans on supporting the swap that the government is planning. In an interview with Swedish National Radio in August 2008, he promises that the SAP will present a motion in the fall where the SAP doubles the number of conscripts: “The number of conscripts have been shrinking for too many

years. We must up in entirely different levels, from four thousand to at least fifteen thousand” (Karlsson 2008a). He also publishes two articles pointing out that the intake for 2007, only a few thousand, is far too little and symbolises a trend that must be immediately reversed (2008b; 2008c). In the coming years it is necessary that the size of the cohort be increased to at least 15,000 per year. Sydow also reacts strongly: “When the final report came to me it was obvious that military service was too wiped out.” When reading the report he felt disappointed and surprised, because Juholt had throughout the process assured him that he defended the party’s position on the issue, “but then the final product landed in something completely different. Juholt pressed his personal view and not the party’s” (Sydow 2015). As a senior member of the party he have many talks with the party leadership: “Most of us were surprised. We thought that the we had a clear standpoint on the issue of military service. It appears that this was obviously not the case” (Ibid). In the late summer and early fall of 2008 Mr. Sydow and Mr. Karlsson do what they can to get the message across that the SAP does not endorse the SDC’s report. The damage is already done, however. As has become tradition, Tolgfors lets the SDC’s report form the foundation for the government’s defence bill, seeing the incident as an internal problem for the SAP and nothing he should consider when formulating the government’s stance (Tolgfors 2017).

A short time later, the committee presents its part-report, echoing the same conclusion that a swap is possible and necessary, though that a number of details are still in need of “deeper analysis, descriptions of consequences and proposals for new laws” (Government 2008a: 97). To have two brigades ready for deployment at any given time, the committee estimates that the Armed Forces must recruit between 7,000 to 9,000 soldiers per year (thus lower than initial estimations). To avoid possible problems in recruiting and retaining soldiers it suggests it is important to “brand” the Armed Forces as an attractive employee, investing heavily in information campaigns, advertisement and open days to the public. Young adults will be the most important recruitment group, why it is “especially important that the Armed Forces understands the values and motivations among the young and their view of the world” (Ibid: 113). In contrast to Syrén’s recommendation a of a gradual swap, the committee suggests it will be possible to begin with a professional army in 2010 (Ibid: 97; Svärd 2008a). Tolgfors concludes that with the support of the SDC and the committee the change can be put in the upcoming defence bill in the summer of 2009. He hopes that the vote in parliament can reflect broad political support across the aisles, if not “the centre-right alliance has a majority to decide on its own anyway” (Tolgfors 2008a).

Critics line up

In the fall of 2008, Russia invades Georgia and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Just a few days earlier, Tolgfors had argued that this kind of behaviour would be highly unlikely from Russia (Tolgfors 2008b). Earlier in the summer he similarly stated that “the political and geographical conditions for threats of the old kind are gone. To be sure, Russia has stepped up its political rhetoric, but does not have the ambition or the means for realising these threats” (Tolgfors 2008c). In the end of August it is obvious that the analysis is wrong. But Tolgfors argues that the speed by which the Russian aggression was conducted nonetheless supported the case for a smaller more mobile, flexible and accessible Armed Forces in Sweden: “What we have seen in Georgia is that speed is essential. It was not large armies, Russia has instead invested in rapid and accessible units” (Tolgfors 2008d; 2008e). His interpretation puts the focus on the operational tactic of Russia’s aggression. Experts however take the Russian behaviour as a signal that “old wars” maybe are not old, but still possible. They believe that the event compels the policy makers in Sweden to rethink and put back the territorial defence of Sweden as a top priority for the Armed Forces.¹⁷

Most important of all is that the SAP moves away from the New War perspective that it had championed for over a decade, to again stress a realist perspective. Former defence minister Björn von Sydow puts forth the argument that in a world where “there is no respect for the United Nations there must be a considerable military element in Sweden’s security policy, capable of deterring military threats in our region” (Sydow 2008a). Russia’s war against Georgia was “a war fought by conventional means”, which is why “Sweden must have a conscripted army, not an employed one” and that the time now has come for Sweden to “prioritise the defence of our territory” (Ibid). In coming years, Sydow continues, Sweden must reverse the development of the ongoing reform with a considerable increase in the intake of conscripts and that the

¹⁷Examples include the Director of the Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Thomas Ries: “the Russian behaviour is the culmination of a seven year trend” where the relations between the Russia and the EU have been deteriorating considerably. He therefore urges the decision makers to redraw its policies: “We have invested heavily in a heavily reduced but effective defence, but in this process we have done away with our national defence capability” (Ries 2008). From the Royal Defence College Professor Bo Huldt comments that the developments in Russia will serve as a wake up call for the Eu, the Nato and Sweden that “in fact, there still are things such as wars and invasions” (Huldt 2008). The Chairman of the People’s Party, Jan Björklund asserts that “Georgia is a neighbouring country to Russia, but so is Scandinavia. We live next to a great power that is rearming itself with authoritarian power interests (Björklund 2008).

focus on expeditionary missions has “gone too far”:

Our national defence must retake centre stage and in a more expressive way deter actors in our region from hostile actions, in an increasingly deteriorating world. The Russian political system and culture is set in a way that we cannot ignore, they may use violence to achieve political ends (Sydow 2009a).

The priority to “light” capabilities must be replaced by “heavy” and traditional military means, including large conscripted armies and tanks. Sweden’s expeditionary capability must not exceed one battalion: “Participating internationally must, in my view, take a lower priority [than has so far been the case]” and that “detering possible aggressors” instead must be the “highest priority” (Ibid: 18).¹⁸ The chairman of the PDC, Anders Karlsson (SAP) similarly asks if it is a “defence of the nation we want or is it a warring machine, engaging in wars across the world? Is this what we pay 40 billion a year for? People in the party had, for years, blindly accepted the New Wars perspective without understanding what they were doing. To me the expeditionary missions were absurd” (Karlsson 2015). The Russian aggression toward Georgia hence swayed the SAP to again favour the realist perspective with a focus on territorial defence. Similar developments could be seen in the parties that made up the centre-right government. As an example, the chairman of the Liberal Party, Jan Björklund, wants a substantially stronger national defence: “Our defence policies have been wrong... in 2004 we should have stopped with what we were doing, after the Russian war against Georgia there are too many warnings. ...we have to abandon our earlier thinking and begin anew” (Björklund 2009a). For the Moderate Party, these were disturbing news since the government just had decided on an entirely different development, the one put in place by the SAP in the 2000 Defence Decision. Tolgfors thus reacts to these arguments from the SAP and the Liberal Party by saying that it “only messes up the process” (Tolgfors 2009a).

At the end of January, Tolgfors adds a new directive to the committee on military service, asking it to include a plan on how the new

¹⁸Sydow later continues his argument for a re-nationalisation of the Swedish defence in an essay: “The question is whether there are threats and risks to Sweden that more than participating in international missions motivate that we reprioritise our own military defence for a direct defence of Sweden” (Sydow 2009a: 14). He answers in the positive and stress that the military must be redirected “to a situation with risks of war in our geographical proximity. We should prioritise military units for our territorial defence [with a] a comprehensive conscripted cohort” (Ibid: 15, 18).

recruitment system can be put in practice already in July, 2010 (Government 2009a).¹⁹ One day later, Syrén presents his plan on how to manage the swap to employed soldiers. He and his colleagues have had record short two months to prepare. He underscores that the new model, and the analysis it rests on, is marred by uncertainties, speculations and assumptions (Ibid: 5).²⁰ The most sensitive being whether the Armed Forces can recruit in sufficient numbers and then retain the soldiers for a more than four years, which it must to keep the economic calculus intact (Ibid: 31). In contrast to the committee's (preliminary) report, he believes it is unlikely that the Armed Forces can recruit more than 4,000 new soldiers per year, and even this will be a great challenge. To recruit at this level the Armed Forces need a pool of qualified candidates of at least 8,000 individuals, which is on the border of what can be assumed as realistic (Ibid: 31). Syrén's skepticism sits uneasily with the government's plan to introduce the new model already in the summer of 2010: "I can promise you that the discussions have been intense" (Syrén 2009a; Headquarters 2009: 1).²¹

With Syrén's report the regional chairman of the Moderate Party

¹⁹"In addition to its original task, the Committee should consider how a new recruitment model can be introduced by July 1 2010" (Government 2009a).

²⁰What the Headquarters has managed to put together is based on experiences from other states. It may very well be that these are not applicable to Sweden. This means, it stresses, the efficiency of the new model cannot be guaranteed, nor can the costs for the transition and operation of the new model. For the plans to work the soldiers must stay on the job for at least eight years. This will prove highly challenging, given that most of the soldiers will be young and tempted to change their occupation after only a few years. Similarly, the plan does not permit a higher defection rate than fifteen percent. International comparisons suggest that this is an optimistic figure that in reality will most likely be higher. In addition, the government wants the system to be composed of many part-time soldiers. There are few or no other countries that have tried this solution which increases the uncertainties even further.

²¹The officer at the Headquarters responsible for recruitment, Johan Fölstad, even believes that Syrén's report (which is more sceptical than the committee's) is even too optimistic. "It is complex and not yet ready. Great parts are still not sufficiently examined or planned. It is necessary that a great number of uncertainties are sorted out in the form of political decisions" (Headquarters 2009). He underscores that the transition will necessarily have to take several years and that it is likely that military service "will have to continue to at least 2011," and that even after military service is suspended the military must recruit at least 20 percent of the ex-conscripts for the new model to function" (Ibid). There is no realistic chance that the military can recruit more than maximum 4 000 soldiers per year, and that even this will be very challenging, since it is "internationally a very high percentage, and higher than most other countries that recruit on a voluntary basis" (Ibid). In order to recruit 4000 soldiers there must be a robust incentive structure in place, something Fölstad still has not seen a trace of from the defence ministry. For this reason it is the view of the Headquarters that conscription will have to remain even after parliament decides to change the system.

in Stockholm, Erik Langby, “expects that the government choose not to proceed as planned” (Langby 2009). The vice-chairman of the PDC, Rolf Gunnarsson, also member of the party, believes the government is taking the expeditionary direction too far and with too high risks (Gunnarsson 2009). The Green Party’s defence spokesperson Annika Nordgren Christensen is equally worried:

Today, we do not know anything about the new system. ...The economy of the new system is only guesswork. For me it would be prudent for the government to be careful. But the committee has received a new directive to suggest how to introduce the new system already in July 2010, a directive that, as before, has not been anchored with the political opposition. I am deeply concerned... The government is rushing the reform and with this risks jeopardising the entire project (Nordgren Christensen 2009a).

Experts from the Royal Defence College agree: “It appears that the government believes there will be no more wars in the region. I do not share this optimism at all. To my understanding the Russians have clearly sent the signal that they are willing and able to reconquer lost territory. There is a great danger in reducing the defence at this military at this moment, since it is a long procedure in rebuilding the military” (Huldt 2009). A number of high ranking officers and members of the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences equally voice their concern: “We cannot afford to abandon military service, since we lack the finances to pay for a sufficiently large and qualitative employed army” (Åkerman et al. 2009a). The former Supreme Commander in Finland, Gustav Hägglund, comments that “many European states that have travelled the same road have in return been caught in serious problems in the recruitment and retention of soldiers” (Hägglund 2009). Tolgfors rebuts by arguing that: “Sweden is not only protected at our national borders. Wars, conflicts and incidents must be prevented from reaching our borders” (Tolgfors 2009b). Anders Karlsson, the SAP’s spokesperson in defence, complains that the government is taking the reform toward “extremes” where the “national defence is placed in the background” and the “defence is allowed to take ‘the international’ as its point of departure on all issues”, with the risk of “jeopardising national security” (Karlsson 2009a). Adding to the criticism, in mid march an opinion poll shows that the swap lacks public support. 63 percent of the respondents want to keep military service (Sifo 2009). The greatest support comes from the young men — those affected by military service — with a 74 percent in favour (Ibid). In March, the new Supreme Commander, Sverker Göransson, equally expresses his doubts (Göransson 2009). For

a model with employed soldiers to be successful it depends on segments in society that naturally have an interest in the military and that the public knows what the Armed Forces are doing. He fears that after the many changes in the past decade there is at current no such knowledge (Ibid). From this point of view it is possible that the suggested transition is premature. The risk with the proposed swap, he suggests, is that the public's lack of engagement in the Armed Forces never is permitted to regain in strength, by now swapping to an entirely voluntary model: "It is harder than one might think to recruit soldiers on a voluntary basis" (Ibid).

The Vote

The government nonetheless pulls through with the proposed plan. In the end of March Tolgfors hands over the government's bill to parliament (Government 2009b). As of the first of July in 2010, military service will be suspended and replaced with a system based on soldiers who volunteer to contractual employments:

A new recruitment model will be introduced. The recruitment for all categories in the military will be based on voluntary engagement. If war, risk of war or other exceptional circumstances materialise the Armed Forces can, as before, revert to conscription. (Ibid: 1-2).

The arguments for the swap are by now well known. Military service does not correspond with the need to produce units that be deployed abroad (Tolgfors 2009d). There are no territorial threats against Sweden nor will there be in the near future (Government 2009: 77). Security is instead most effectively achieved in operations beyond Swedish territory. Since conscripts cannot serve abroad they are of no use to the Armed Forces (Ibid: 78). The bill notes that the change is comprehensive and will take time to implement. In peacetime, the most "demanding performances" will be carried out by 7,000 soldiers on full time contracts, 21,000 soldiers on part time contracts and a Home Guard amounting to 20,000 soldiers (Ibid: 49). It will be possible to recruit these soldiers, Tolgfors adds, because there is sufficient interest in society to work in the Armed Forces: "The need for soldiers can be managed without a legal duty. Given this it is difficult to justify a system based on coercive laws (Tolgfors 2009d). In June, the bill is accepted by 153 votes against 150.²²

²²Since the election in 2006 the parliamentary divide is as follows: the SAP, the Green Party and the Left party together have 171 seats. The Alliance for Sweden

Table 5.2: The vote, June 16 2009

Party	Yes	No	Absent
M	85		12
C	25		4
LiP	25		3
CDP	18		6
SAP		112	18
LP		19	3
GP		19	
Total	153	150	46

For Tolgfors, the most important part of the decision was that it signalled that new principles would govern the Armed Forces. “The decision was principally important. After it had been decided [in parliament], we could add concretion. It is also a question what other alternatives would have been possible, than starting with principles... and saying ‘OK, this is where we are going’, we will no longer have the duty to serve in Sweden” (Tolgfors 2017).

have 178 seats. M: Moderate Party, C: Centre Party, LiP: Liberal Party, CDP: Christian Democratic Party, SAP: Social Democratic Party, LP: Left Party, GP: Green Party.

Part III

CONCLUSION

Chapter 6

WHY SWEDEN SUSPENDED MILITARY SERVICE

By studying the policy process from 1990 to 2009 two causal concepts can be observed: deinstitutionalisation and issue reputation. I have earlier in this dissertation suggested that what sets the conscripted and the professional army apart are the means by which they move the individual into action. They are different in the “internal mechanisms by which organisations coerce or persuade members to act” (Hodgson 2006: 10). The conscripted army functions on a logic of appropriateness whereas the professional army functions on a logic of consequences. In military sociology one draws a similar distinction by using the concepts of “institutional” and “occupational” recruitment models. In the conscripted army, soldiers are persuaded to serve because they fulfil a socially defined role. In the professional army, soldiers are persuaded by the conditions of their employment contract.

That the two function on different logics is important for our purposes because, I argue, the effective functioning of military service *depends* on members to act “appropriately” (see Ch. 1). Servicemen must willingly conform to prevailing norms, rules and expectations in society on the need for serving, without pay, in the Armed Forces. In a liberal democracy it is not possible to, literally, *coerce* tens of thousands of 18 year old men to serve. States that use military service are dependent on the presence of supportive norms on serving in the military. This is why European states using conscripted armies have historically taken care to stress, in their political rhetoric, notions such as “collective responsibility”, “national union”, “civic duty”, “solidarity” and so on. They have equally taken care to develop policies that enact these values and norms

elsewhere in society. Universal social welfare being the best example of this. I have argued that during the 1900s the SAP was highly successful in tying their ambitions on universal welfare to universal military service (and vice versa), and this is a well known process for using military service which others have called the “school of the nation” theory (Krebs 2004). The two policy areas enacted the same norms and were mutually supportive, which partly explains why they both became institutionalised features of Swedish society. The point is that by opting for a conscripted army there is an associated functional imperative for creating and maintaining certain social imperatives in society (Huntington 1957).

In both armies, action takes place within an institutional framework, only different ones. What happens in the years between 1990 and 2009 is that there is a shift in institutional logics. The logic of appropriateness is no longer the “master logic” in the policies on military service. The policy-aim of keeping military service remains, but in the pursuit of achieving this aim in a new governing context the logic of appropriateness is weakened and supplanted by a logic of consequences. The outcome remains the same but the means for reaching the outcome changes. During the period it can be generally observed that changing the means for producing the same outcome was something that could be seen in other policy areas too. As an example, universal welfare was still the aim in the difficult welfare reforms but how to achieve it changed, for instance by introducing private alternatives. In Sweden’s recruitment policy the same kind of situation can be said to have applied. The outcome remained the same — keeping military service — but the means for doing this changed by moving from acting appropriately to acting “rationally”, appealing to individual interests, motivation and financial incentives. What makes military service special is that it is difficult to proceed in this way, because the means for realising the outcome are deeply associated with the likelihood of actually realising the outcome. Again, the functional imperative of military service is dependent on maintaining certain social imperatives. During the 1900s the SAP (and the Moderate Party) demonstrated a high level of understanding of this dynamic, but the governments from 1990 to 2009 failed in this regard. The policies failed in helping the Armed Forces to preserve its ability to generate action in its members or would be members. This is problematic since institutions are normative creations in the sense that “to be institutional, structure must generate action” (Tolbert and Zucker 1996: 179; Scott 2004). When a structure fails to generate action, it can no longer be said to be an institution. The institutional element is no longer present, and this creates pressing problems of efficiency and ensuring the stable functioning of the organisation.

I have described the process of this failure as deinstitutionalisation. The decision to suspend military service in 2009 was preceded by nearly two decades of deinstitutionalisation. Politically, the process was nurtured by changing the formal rules of military service: Removing the duty to serve, reducing the cohort, removing the sanctions for refusing to serve, moving from a national to an international perspective, placing greater emphasis on the quality of the servicemen, their interests and motivations. Although these were decisions that affected the formal framework surrounding military service, they also affected the norms of military service. As I argued in the first chapter: Policies create norms and changes in policies also changes norms in society. This is especially true for top-down, politically, created norms and institutions such as military service. The problem in the Swedish reform was that the new policies created norms that were rival to the ones that had supported and reproduced the institution of military service for over a century. Just as institutionalisation is a process where a policy area acquires value and stability, deinstitutionalisation differentiates the value and offsets stability (Huntington 1968: 12). From 1990 to 2009, the institution of military service was repeatedly undermined with new policies and these prevented its effective functioning, which opened up a debate and ultimately justified the decision on replacing the conscripted with a professional army. Deinstitutionalisation continued uninterrupted for reasons that had to do with partisan politics (more on this below) and as it did it became increasingly difficult for the institution of military service to reproduce itself and this obstructed its effective functioning, which led to questions on whether it was tenable to continue with military service at all.

The Swedish case thus supports the baseline thesis in institutional theory that the endurance of an institution depends on whether it is reinforced through interaction, socialisation and legitimation while at the same time working to holding other, alternative, behavioural prescriptions unimaginable (Clemens & Cook 1999: 446). The policies on military service from 1990 to 2009 weakened the interactions, socialisation and legitimation of military service at the same time as it encouraged an alternative behavioural script.

Moving on, in light of some accounts in institutional theory the Swedish outcome is not surprising. It has been argued elsewhere that “reactive informal institutions should be particularly susceptible to formal institutional change” (Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 20). As I argued in Chapter 1, the informal institution supporting military service was what can be called a “reactive institution”, as opposed to a “spontaneous institution” (Ibid). The informal norm-structure surrounding military service did not emerge spontaneously, but through skilled norm-

entrepreneurship by policy makers who provided supportive norms, social rules and expectations which were deemed necessary for providing the effective functioning and legitimacy of the “formal” set up of military service: the universal duty to serve, and accepting a penalty for not serving. Policy makers create informal institutions around formal schemes to help lower transaction costs, provide social interaction and coordination, to ensure an effective functioning of the formal set up. Informal institutions are in essence problem solving devices or “structures”. In the studied period, policy makers continuously failed to uphold these structures (they even worked against them) which had the consequence of diminishing the functioning and efficiency of the recruitment policy.

By changing the formal design of military service, the policy makers altered the incentives in the servicemen to participate in the institution, because the expected outcomes (social belonging, doing one’s part, avoiding social sanctions, and so on) were no longer present. Reactive informal institutions, such as military service, are particularly sensitive to changes in formal design because they develop as a direct consequence of incentives provided through formal rules. Now, changing the *content* of the formal rules (from 1997 to 2001) and/or the *enforcement* of them (from 1997 to 2009) has important consequences for the actors’ estimation of the costs and benefits of complying to the informal rules. By modifying the formal rules, as one did during the studied period, one also altered their social effects. Not only in the sense that the actors do not (need to) comply to the formal rules, but also in the sense that new incentives emerge for either abandoning or modifying their willingness to comply. Something which could be witnessed at the NSA, when servicemen for instance suggested that military service was “not for them” because they did not want to go to Bosnia or Afghanistan. When formal rules in reactive institutions are transformed, as in Sweden, the literature therefore predicts that institutional change may even be quite rapid (Helmke & Levitsky 2003).¹ In our case, changes in the formal design of military service were omnipresent, and these gradually eroded the effective functioning of military service. From this perspective it is not surprising that the centre-right government abandoned the few remaining parts of military service in 2009.

¹The same is not true for spontaneous institutions. As they put it: “change within spontaneous informal institutions should be less tightly coupled with formal institutional change. Because these informal institutions are the product of incentive structures that lie outside the formal rules, formal institutional change is less likely to have a direct or decisive impact on them” (Helmke & Levitsky 2003: 20).

The processes that led up to that decision can be divided into three sub-mechanisms of deinstitutionalisation: disruption, conversion, and displacement.

Table 6.1: Three sub-mechanisms of deinstitutionalisation

	Disruption	Conversion	Displacement
<i>Definition</i>	Disrupting established practice	Redeployment of existing institution to new ends	Differential growth of old over new practices
<i>Type of change</i>	Formal rules	Formal rules	Informal rules
<i>Mechanism</i>	Contestation	Redirection	Defection
<i>Years</i>	1990-1996	1997-2001	2002-2009

6.1 Disruption

The “disruptive” period stretches from 1990 to 1996. In the early 1990s the policy on military service is exposed to contestation. Not on the issue on whether or not to have military service, on this all agree, but on how it should be designed in the post-cold war context. For the first time in decades issues on the organisational design of military service became a topic in the political debate. It is difficult to say who it was that removed the shield that for decades had protected military service from political contestation. On the one hand it can be argued that it was the Moderate Party since it was the centre-right government that pushed ahead on adjusting the universality policy, arguing instead that the Armed Forces should only conscript as many as it needs, and not literally all servicemen in the cohort. On the other hand, it can equally be argued that the need for abandoning the universality policy had to do with the former SAP-governments’ failure in preventing a system imbalance between quality and quantity. It can however with certainty be argued that the SAP’s reluctance to adjust the universality principle between 1994 and 1999 intensified the disruption and led to the decision to convert military service. The prelude to this have their origins in three commitments by the SAP: 1) reducing the defence budget; 2) keeping universality and; 3) strengthening Sweden’s expeditionary capability.

In particular, commitments one and two raise complicated questions because they were conflicting goals but equally important for the SAP. Navigating around the conflict proves difficult and raises questions such

as: How many servicemen should serve? How many conscripts can the government afford? How many conscripts do the Armed Forces want/need? Should the length of service be divided to a short- and a long service? Which is more important, modernisation, universality or the peace-dividend? Should the Armed Forces create new functions, such as a “civilian defence”, to ensure that as many conscripts as possible serve? Should there be a “reserve” for conscripts that do not serve? These questions dominate the debate in the mid-1990s. They revealed that military service was no longer a stable policy-area with a given set of priorities that all parties, to the left and right, could agree on. The issue was made more complicated by the fact that the Armed Forces and the Moderate Party demanded modernisation and objected to defence reductions, universality and the New Wars perspective. Failing to choose between these goals, the consequence was that the Armed Forces enlisted more servicemen than they had resources for. New cuts in the defence reductions led to last-minute cancellations of enlistments. The consequence of the first action was that the problems identified with the system imbalance in the 1990s were still left unresolved, in spite of the 1992 decision. Servicemen were enlisted to positions that did not exist and were forced to train with outdated equipment. Last-minute cancellations left many conscripts disappointed, and with an involuntary gap year. After a few years of heated debate on the future of military service it was clear by 1998 that the SAP’s policy on universality was untenable. Either it had to finance the universality policy or it had to opt for something else. The government opted for the latter, which led to the period of conversion.

What led the parties to push policies to this point? The disruptive period is driven by a SAP reacting to two bold policies presented by the centre-right government, who acted on their issue-reputations. One was to move Sweden toward deeper political cooperation with Europe, by joining the EU. Part of this included modernising the foreign policy of neutrality to mean only “nonalignment”. Acting in this way the government followed the political development in Europe, where the fall of the Soviet Union had opened up a rare opportunity for democratisation in Europe and solidifying this moment in a European union of democratic states. Against this (positive) development the SAP’s skepticism toward European cooperation and strict interpretation of neutrality as “impartial” was quickly becoming outmoded. The leadership therefore does a strategic adjustment that is initiated with a policy reversal by applying for EU-membership. To sooth EU-sceptics in the party, the leadership suggests that the EU will present Sweden, and the SAP, with a unique possibility to “upload” its policies on a regional level and work for good in the world, picking up its issue-reputation of international

solidarity and working for peace in the world. When the SAP moves toward the EU it is also noticeable that the selective emphasis from territorial defence (Realism) to expeditionary missions (New Wars) is initiated.

The decision to join the EU marked the beginning of a strategic adjustment in the SAP's defence- and foreign policy that would be pursued with greater intensity in the coming years and mature to what Agrell has called the "Afghanistan doctrine" (2011; 2013). The centre-right government, meanwhile, pushed its issue-reputation on efficiency in the Armed Forces by moderating the universality policy in the 1992 defence decision. What was needed was a smarter organisational design that placed a premium on quality. In their motion, the SAP agreed in the sense that they believed that the time had come for Sweden to cash in the peace dividend. When the SAP reentered government in 1994 it reduced the defence budget and elevated the emphasis on expeditionary missions.

In the disruptive period we therefore see two parties that champion their respective issue-reputations, and one strategic adjustment in the SAP on the issue of EU. Prompted by the emerging EU, which is championed by the Moderate Party, the SAP swaps its EU policy and when it does so it also introduces the notion of New Wars to the Swedish defence debate, as part of its issue-reputation in international engagements. The Moderate Party stresses the notion of a more efficient Armed Forces as part of their issue-reputation, and successfully redefines the foundations of the policy debate on organisational design. The issues are still divided along the party-political spectrum and major issue-disassociations are still not presented. This would however change in the next period.

6.2 Conversion

Military service is "converted" between 1997 and 2001. Prompted partly by two defence reductions in 1997 and 1998 and partly by the unsustainable policy of universal military service in the light of this, and the new focus on expeditionary missions, the SAP government stakes out that the time had come to modernise the Armed Forces. One part of the modernisation entailed redesigning military service so that it catered the needs of the expeditionary missions. In the 1994 and 1996 Defence Decisions the New Wars paradigm had grown in importance, backed by a series of reports from the SDC. Although this development was criticised by the Supreme Commander and the Moderate Party, the government in the 2000 bill took the final step and decided that in the future, building an expeditionary capability would be just as important

as the national (territorial) defence. The new direction raised a difficult problem for the SAP because giving priority to expeditionary missions was what had led many European states to swap to a professional army. The problem for the SAP was that a similar policy was impossible in Sweden. Both because military service was an appreciated institutional feature of society, closely associated to the SAP. Doing away with military service was therefore not on the policy makers' menu of choice. To make matters more complicated, the SAP had initiated and committed itself to a heavy reduction of the defence budget. The Armed Forces would thus have to build an expeditionary capability at the same time as the organisation had to be reduced. This was a problem because the prevailing method until then was that the number of soldiers that could be recruited to the expeditionary stood in relation to how many servicemen the Armed Forces conscripted on a given year. Experience told that around ten to twelve percent of the conscripts could after basic training be recruited for deployment. Given that the expeditionary capability was about to swell to 1,000 soldiers, to begin with, this meant that the Armed Forces had to conscript 100,000 servicemen.

What was needed was a "conversion" of military service so that it could be preserved but serve new ends. To this end, the SAP-government redraws the organisational design of military service to produce higher efficiency in the actual output per conscript. It, in other words, takes up on the redefinition of the policy on military service that the Moderate Party initiated in the early 1990s, but adds several new dimensions to it. It can do this without being penalised by the electorate because the SAP "owns" the issue of universality, which is now being abandoned. It is highly unlikely that the Moderate Party could have done the same, without also risking difficult accountability pressures. The share of conscripts that moved on to deployment from basic training had to swell from ten to *at least* thirty per cent. It is against this background that the SAP-government abandons the universality policy and redraws the formal rules of military service. The duty to service is replaced by interest and motivation for going on deployments. Only servicemen that have sufficiently high scores on the enlistment tests are conscripted. By removing the duty to serve the penalty for not serving is also removed and the Armed Forces must become better at attracting qualified servicemen. The conscripts are therefore financially compensated with an increase in their daily allowance and end of service bonus, and the basic training changes to focus on expeditionary missions. The decision to convert was strategically important because it helped the SAP develop its New Wars perspective without doing away with military service. With the decision the purpose of Sweden's recruitment policy shifted from enacting equality, solidarity and doing

one's part to instead creating deployable soldiers. With these changes, the policies on military service changed from putting equal weight on the means and the outcome of the policy. Before, the means was just as important as the outcome — it was even part of the outcome —, now, however, the efforts are directed toward the outcome of producing deployable soldiers and adjusting the means for this purpose.

Whereas the disruptive period was the combined result of policies from the Moderate Party and the SAP, conversion is only the result of SAP-policy. Conversion is an example of a substantial policy reversal that is born out of two earlier strategic adjustments in the SAP: a) the movement from neutrality to being an active member of the EU; b) and associated with this the selective emphasis on expeditionary units and New Wars. With this change, the SAP disassociates itself from the universality policy and also the values it had enacted. In the early 2000s, the SAP has therefore transformed the foundational principles of Swedish defence policy: from universality to selective service in the organisational design (from “institutional” to “occupational”), and from territorial defence to expeditionary missions in organisational purpose (from Realism to New Wars). Given the change in organisational purpose, the ensuing change in organisational design was not surprising. Not primarily because the change was needed from a military point of view, but it was also expected from a political point of view. Without the conversion in organisational design military service would risk standing against legitimacy problems, the way it had in the late 1990s. These were risks that the SAP wanted to prevent since with such a development it could lose a for them important institutional weapon, since problems of this sort could raise the need for a professional army. The SAP was well placed for reversing the universality policy. As the Nixon-goes-to-China logic suggests, parties that own an issue-reputation are also best suited to reverse a policy.

In the disruptive period the SAP elevates its issue-reputation in international solidarity by giving selective emphasis on New Wars. In the period of conversion it adopts the issue-reputation of the Moderate Party by disassociating its issue-reputation to the universality policy and by arguing that the organisational purpose of Armed Forces should govern Sweden's defence policies. It moves from prioritising means, process, tradition and ideology to prioritising (efficient) outcome, which is what the 2001 bill was all about.

6.3 Displacement

By 2002, most of the formal changes that later will account for the 2009 suspension have been implemented. The period between 2002 and 2009 is one where the changes in the formal rules create path altering-dynamics in the informal rules of military service. There is differential growth between the logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequences and an alternative institutional form grows from within and displaces the institutional framework surrounding military service.

The four distinguishing traits of the conscripted army (Ch. 1) were weakened or removed all together to the privilege of the four traits of the professional army (Ch. 1). The support for the universality principle, the belief that serving is a duty, and that not serving should be penalised, and that such punishments are necessary for preserving the legitimacy of military service, that conscripts should serve without pay, and that they should serve for the purpose of defending the national territory, are all notions that disappear from the political debate and become perceived as redundant, unwanted, discredited and viewed as obstacles to the work in building a new defence organisation suited to the post-cold war period. In their place, new behaviours and ideas that only a few years earlier would have been taboo are actively pushed, accepted, viewed as necessary and desirable. The most illustrative example is that in 2004 the SAP-government accepts the idea of introducing smaller segments of employed soldiers as a way of protecting military service and preventing a swap to a professional army. In less than two years, thus, the notion of employed soldiers had been normalised. With this development, the debate shifted and the main concern became what measures the Armed Forces had to take to, on a voluntary basis and in competition with other actors on the labour market, recruit sufficiently skilled servicemen. When this becomes the overarching goal the idea of the Armed Forces changes to one where it becomes an actor on the market. Equally, the idea of serving as part of conforming to a collectively enforced norm is replaced by serving as part of realising personal interests and beliefs, attracted by financial incentives and information campaigns. The training is reformed from the ground with a premium on expeditionary missions. Exercises that served only territorial defence were degraded and exercises that could be used in deployments were prioritised. The Army constructed new camps, building replicas of the ones in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and trained in them to prepare the conscripts for deployment. The enlistment procedure was fixed with a “zero vision” of not enlisting one serviceman that would not decide to sign up for deployment. Only the servicemen with the highest scores and with a credible interest for wanting to go on deployment are

conscripted. Before, the principle was that Sweden's defence capability was a function of the willingness in society to defend the country. Now, the defence capability is instead a function of whether the Armed Forces can recruit the most qualified and interested individuals in society.

These adjustments enforce the belief that it is possible to reduce the conscripted cohort without offsetting the goal of recruiting to the expeditionary units. That displacement followed conversion is visible by looking at the enlistment statistics, and especially at the share of servicemen who are tested and later enlisted. It falls from 51 percent in 1998, the year when Sydow first formalised his belief in conversion, to 24 percent in 2006, when the SAP loses the election to the centre-right alliance (NSA 1998; 2006). Although this reduction is staggering, it was met with a belief that Armed Forces would become more efficient and could do more with less.

Table 6.2 shows how military service between 1990 and 2009 shifts in its institutional logic. It should be observed that most of the policies that account for the 2009 outcome were put in place already in 2001, by the SAP-government.

Table 6.2: From institutional to occupational, 1990 to 2009

1990-2000	Yes	No
Duty	x	
Universal	x	
Penalty	x	
Territorial	x	
Recruitment		x
Incentives		x
Advertisement		x
Contracts		x
Expeditionary		x
<hr/>		
2001-2009		
Duty		x
Universal		x
Penalty		x
Territorial		x
Recruitment	x	
Incentives	x	
Advertisement	x	
Contracts	x	
Expeditionary	x	

Displacement is largely a consequence of the 2001 bill because it removed the formal rules of military service. This raises the question on what kind of rules that institutions need in order to survive: formal or informal? Although I have argued earlier that formal rules (and policies) create norms, and that these norms are important in keeping the institution normative in the real sense of the term, it should at this point also be stressed that some institutions, such as military service, depend equally on formal and informal rules in order to thrive and survive (Helmke & Levitsky 2004). The institutionalisation of military service rested on equal presence of formal and informal rules. Rounding up citizens, putting them in uniform and coercing them by laws was a clear example of formal rules at play. These afforded the “formal” framework of military service and stipulated the conditions for “membership” in the institution. Formal rules were however not what enabled the effective functioning of the institution. This was the work of informal rules. Indeed, it can be argued that formal schemes typically pray on informal rules. The institutionalisation of military service during the 1900s demonstrated a high sensitivity to this condition. Without building a logic of appropriateness it would have been difficult to successfully put a universal duty into play. At the same time, the long-term survival of informal rules are contingent on the presence of formal rules, since they serve as reference points for the informal rules. They create the structure of the institution, open the possibility for introducing new members, determining inclusion and exclusion, passing it on to the next generation and keeping the informal rules alive over time. It is against this background that the absence and relaxation of the formal rules from 2001 and onward becomes problematic.

An important aspect to note in the final years of the reform is that both the SAP and the Moderate Party are internally divided, and possibly confused, on what it wants in both organisational design and in organisational purpose. In terms of organisational design there are different views in the SAP as well as the Moderate Party, and equally in terms of organisational purpose there are split views within both parties. It is possible to argue that the disruptive period of the 1990s are still present in a sense in the phase of displacement, as the real costs of the reform are being materialised. One backdrop of this was, as the Supreme Commander in 2009 put it, that the swap was premature, because the old system with military service had crumbled, but the new system was far from rooted in society. What Sweden in a sense was doing with the swap was to instal a recruitment policy with no firm social support in society, which further down the line would make it difficult to recruit soldiers (given the absence of a supportive institution, either occupational or institutional).

Why was not displacement prevented? During this period, the arguments by the SAP remained the same as in the previous years, when it argued in favour of conversion. In a series of blame avoidance attempts the new measures were argued as necessary to preserve military service in the sense that they would prevent a development toward a professional army. Above all, however, displacement is facilitated by the internal changes in the Moderate Party that began in 2003. Until 2003, the Moderate Party rejected the SAP's defence policies, and especially its defence reductions and priority to expeditionary missions. In 2003, however, and as a part of a reinvention of the party, it begins a strategic adjustment where it disassociates itself from territorial defence (Realism) and from viewing the Armed Forces as a special interest, at the same time as it elevates its reputation on producing an efficient and output oriented Armed Forces and adopts, or "steals", the SAP's focus on expeditionary missions (New Wars). As with the substantial policy changes in the SAP, the Moderate Party perceived itself to afford these changes because of its reputation in defending a strong territorial defence (although it did so less successfully than the SAP). With this change, both the SAP and the Moderate Party are in agreement on the basics of Sweden's future defence policy. The Moderate Party not only disassociates itself from issue-reputations, it also elevates its reputation for ensuring an efficient and functional Armed Forces. This leads them to examine how the conscripted army could/should be replaced by a professional army that is objectively speaking better suited to the Armed Forces' new organisational purpose. This was a natural development given the order of things in 2006. The purpose of the Armed Forces had changed, the conversion strategy had failed, and the party did not hold an ideologically defined relation to military service the way the SAP held. If a professional army was what the Armed Forces needed, the Moderate Party would not stand in its way by holding on to military service for "romanticist" reasons. Finally, arguing for an alternative to the conscripted army was no longer controversial in 2007 to 2009. As a consequence of the SAP's reforms, the assessment by the Moderate Party was that Sweden in reality no longer had "military service", as conventionally understood. With the SAP's substantial changes and cultivation of new norms, the taboo on a professional army had disappeared, thus taking away the accountability problems that otherwise would have prevented a ruling party from reversing an issue-reputation "owned" by another party.

6.4 Pragmatism Trumped Principles

The deinstitutionalisation of military service was driven in equal part by the SAP and the Moderate Party and as a consequence of their struggle to adjust to a new governing context. Parties are problem solvers and sensitive to contextual cues. In this pursuit they engaged in strategic adjustments and policy reversals. Both parties abandoned inherited issue-reputations that constrained them and elevated issue reputations that enabled them in a new governing context.

Apart from what has been listed above, a few observations can be made about the process leading up to the Swedish outcome in 2009. In Sweden, the swap from a conscripted to a professional army was the reverse of the European trend. The problem in Sweden was not a deficiency in social support of military service, as in many European countries (a so called “bottom up” suspension). The swap was led by policy makers who, in a series of gradual adjustments, piecemeal took away the stability of the policy area and the means for the institutional reproduction of military service *in a pursuit of preserving it*. Between 1990 and 2009 the SAP and the Moderate Party reexamine their issue-reputations. Both parties have pursued strategic adjustments and engaged in policy reversals. How they did this answers why military service was suspended in 2009. Both parties took advantage of issue-reputations that *enabled* them in a changing governing context, and both parties opted for *abandoning* issue-reputations that constrained them, and instead adopted the enabling issue-reputation *of the other party*. Instead of “taking the debate” and defending one’s point of view, both parties opted for pragmatism over principles. The SAP elevated its reputation for internationalism but abandoned its universality policy and scepticism toward the EU, to instead push issue-reputations belonging to the Moderate Party, namely efficiency, prioritising output over process, and European integration. The Moderate Party elevated its reputation for a functioning and efficient Armed Forces, but abandoned its reputation for a strong territorial defence and that the Armed Forces is a special interest, and adopted the SAP’s policy on expeditionary missions and a reduced defence budget. Both parties thus: (a) preserved enabling issue-reputations; (b) abandoned constraining issue-reputations; and, (c) when they abandoned outmoded issue-reputations they adopted the enabling issue-reputation of the opposing party.

Seen in this light the reform developed in a predictable pattern: It was only the enabling issue-reputations that survived and this defined how the reform developed from 1990 to 2009. Both the SAP and the Moderate Party acted as “problem solvers” and in this pursuit they were pragmatic more than principled, preferring disassociation and ad-

justment to the opposition above standing their ground on what had historically been principally important policies to the party. The ongoing preference for this course of action produced a reform consisting of two higher order objectives: recruiting soldiers to expeditionary missions by building efficient and output-oriented recruitment policies. The policy makers' preference for pragmatism over principles explains why military service was caught in deinstitutionalisation and why this process continued from disruption to conversion to displacement. Whereas the method worked well for the individual parties — in the sense that they solved current policy-problems and proved themselves capable of producing modern policies suited to a post-cold war context — it did not further the chances of military service to survive in the post-cold war period. Neither policies of efficiency nor expeditionary missions were part of what once enabled military service to become an institutional feature of Swedish society, or what had allowed it to reproduce itself during the 1900s.

6.5 Contributions

Until recently the institutional literature tended to address change with a focus on the presence of an external chock that punctuates equilibria, creating a new institutional path. In the 1990s and 2000s the literature has developed, identifying a wider spectra of sources for institutional change. Of the most frequently cited are conversion and displacement, among others. Both concepts tend to be associated with change and little attention has been given to how the two are, or can be, part of formally ending or replacing an institution. Institutional conversion has in particular been regarded as a useful way (for politicians) to adjust existing institutions to new ends without formally doing away with the institution (thus escaping public criticism). This possibility, or political strategy, has in turn led some to argue that conversion is in fact a way of conservation. Even if this is a possibility and examples can indeed be found that point in this direction, I believe it is useful to be equally attentive to the possibility that conversion leads to situations where an institution breaks down and must be replaced. Remaining attentive to this possibility is especially important if the aim of conversion is to preserve the institution, as was the case with the Swedish reform.

The Swedish case suggests that whether conversion leads to change and conservation *or* breakdown and replacement depends on what kind of changes you do, and this demands that before you do any changes one must map out the factors that in history have enabled the institution to reproduce itself, *if* the goal with conversion is to preserve the institution,

and not upend it. Indeed, the Swedish case also shows that tweaking the formal structure of an existing institution can be a way for (savvy) politicians to do away with institutions that they do not want but where they cannot explicitly suspend it with a direct political decision (what Pierson calls “systemic reforms” (1994)). In any case, if you take away or otherwise undermine the elements that in history have enabled the institution to reproduce itself over time or if you introduce alternative norm-systems that are “rival” to the existing norm-system, it is also reasonable to expect that the institution will not be conserved or only converted.

Moving on, with few exceptions “functionalism” has been the theoretical perspective in the literature on the European transformation from conscripted to professional armies. The approach has been to identify weaknesses in the conscripted army in light of changes in war and society, and point out these as reasons for the swap. In this pursuit the literature has paid little attention to that recruitment policy is tied up to politics, too. This omission is unfortunate since military service during the 1900s became an institutionalised feature and enactment of the modern European welfare state (arguably the most important political project in Europe during the 1900s). It is reasonable to expect that continent-wide changes in century old recruitment policies are also connected to political change and not only, or even primarily, to changes in war. By bringing “politics back in” we are in a better position to identify new causal mechanisms and concepts in defence studies. For the Swedish case, this was necessary since the existing literature failed to account for the Swedish outcome. For this reason this dissertation took an institutional perspective and complemented it with partisan theory. The purpose with this design was to better understand the relation between changes in war, society and politics and, importantly, to better understand how policy makers in a changing governing context deal with institutions that have taken on a life of their own. With this design the dissertation has reached different conclusions than earlier studies, both Swedish and European.

First, the swap was the result of a gradual process, which this dissertation has described with reference to the concept of “deinstitutionalisation”. *Second*, the outcome was unintended and due to a process that was driven by strategic policy makers who abandoned and championed different aspects of their political heritage, with the purpose of maximising their party’s relevance in a new governing context. Another observation is that the kind of alterations that they pushed in recruitment policy were simultaneous and of similar kind to changes in other policy areas. This connection, I believe, is important because it suggests that the changes in recruitment policy was part of a larger polit-

ical repositioning. It changes the causal mechanism and adds new causal concepts, such as: issue-reputation, strategic adjustments and policy reversal. These do not challenge the influence of for instance changes in the nature of wars. Instead, it places that development in its political context. “War” is one “variable” among many others in how recruitment policies change. This dissertation gives some evidence to the idea that changes in war were partly used strategically by political parties for reasons having to do with agenda-setting and partisan theory. *Third*, the process leading up to the swap was top-down and not bottom-up, as the European literature suggests. Earlier Swedish studies have reached a similar conclusion, but pointed out top-segments in the Armed Forces as the main top-segment actors. The argument on bottom-up pressure in the literature on the European transformation has a weakness in that it perceives the emergence of military service only, or mainly, as a consequence of culture, not as a consequence of politics. In other words, it (subconsciously) treats the institution of military service as a *spontaneous* creation rather than *reactive* creation. A product of culture, not of politics. This leads them to argue that cultural change leads to institutional change, because this change is rooted in the development of new societal attitudes or values. This perspective is dominant and a consequence of a failure to include an institutional perspective in the studies. Even if military service developed into an institution and took on a life of its own (which can lead to the idea that it is a spontaneous institution), I argue, one must look at its origins and by doing this one can observe that military service was a reactive institution and its welfare was dependent on a stable presence of formal rules, which functioned as constant reference points for keeping the institution alive over time. Thus, in contrast to the bottom-up literature, I find that the swap was driven by strategic policy makers and not actors in the Armed Forces or genuine cultural change. Further, the public’s support for military service persisted and during half of the studied period (1990-2000) the bulk of the Armed Forces objected to politically invented changes which they argued would undermine military service (such as the refusal by the SAP to prudently adjust the universality principle and the SAP’s introduction of expeditionary missions). Top-segments of the Armed Forces began to support the political direction only after 2000, after conflicts with Owe Wiktorin and after the Defence Ministry replaced him as Supreme Commander with an outspoken supporter of expeditionary missions, Johan Hederstedt, who by his own account was fairly alone in supporting expeditionary missions in the Armed Forces. His successor Håkan Syrén was equally selected on account of his willingness to complete the reform, but on a few occasions also he raised concerns about the need for a territorial defence but was criticised for

this by policy makers, from both the left and right. Even at the height of replacing the conscripted army, in the spring of 2009, the Supreme Commander expressed scepticism about the swap. I have thus found no convincing support to the idea that the Armed Forces were a leading actor in suspending military service.

Fourth and finally, what this dissertation has shown was that the institutional framework of military service collapsed as a consequence of deinstitutionalisation and that this was driven by political decisions. Deinstitutionalisation should however not be confused with a lack of public support for military service. The public's support for military service persisted throughout the period and it was the most favoured recruitment model among the alternatives. It should however be noted that military service was weakened for two reasons. As a result of policies, there was no longer a stable presence of norms, values and expectations in society that "instructed" citizens on how to act in regard to military service. The value of an institution is that it mobilises people to act in a desired way even in the absence of "repeated collective mobilisation or authoritative intervention" (Jepperson 1991: 145). Without this — without a supporting informal institution — it is difficult for a policy such as military service to function effectively. It should also be noted that at times the reform directly damaged the legitimacy of military service among the servicemen. The changes in enlistment at the end of the 1990s gave rise to legitimacy problems. The new policies in the early 2000s also changed the central role that military service had had in Swedish society. Although the support for military service persisted, the "the logic of appropriateness" that earlier had supported military service was severely weakened. I have addressed this issue as one where the analytical focus should be on what kind of norms policies produce and the importance that formal rules have in creating norms, especially if the norms are (to begin with) the result of top-down directives. With the new policies in the early 2000s, policy makers signalled that the old institution — resting on a logic of appropriateness — was no longer valid or expected of them.

Taken together, by applying an institutional perspective and including partisan theory, new causal concepts and mechanisms transpire and these give explanatory variety to the existing literature on the European transformation.

It is possible that the concepts and mechanisms in this dissertation can be useful as European states move to bring back military service. If there is one "policy lesson" to be held from this dissertation, it is the mutual dependence between formal and informal rules. Formal rules produce norms, and norms are important in building well functioning and efficient recruitment policies. Conscripted armies and professional

armies function on different logics, and these should not be mixed. Regardless of which recruitment policy one opts for, what enabled military service to survive, thrive and function for more than a century was that it became an institutionalised feature of Swedish society. This was possible in large part because military service was supported by a stable presence of formal rules and supportive policies in other areas, which enabled military service to become nested to other institutions in society that enacted the same kind of values and norms. This dissertation has given some evidence that loosening up that connection, taking away formal rules and encouraging the development of rivalry norms based on a different institutional logic also reduces the functioning and efficiency of the policy, at least for a recruitment policy based on military service. In building functioning, efficient and stable recruitment policies (either conscripted or professional), the Swedish experience suggests that this is something to bear in mind for the future. Sweden has by now reintroduced a limited form of military service. Yet whether military service can be reinstalled in Sweden and develop into an informal institution as in the 1900s ultimately depends on whether policy makers can recreate the institutional support for the policy. I have argued that the institution of military service was from the very beginning a reactive informal institution. This should give some weight to an argument that recreating the institution is possible, but that such a development will be conditioned on the presence of bold policies and political commitment.

Part IV

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles

- ALTO, Pami. 2006. *European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- ADAM, Gordon & Guy Ben-Ari. 2006. *Transforming European Militaries: Coalition Operations and the Technology Gap*. London: Routledge.
- AGIUS, Christine. 2012. *The social construction of Swedish neutrality*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- AMENTA, Edwin and Kelly Ramsey. 2010. 'Institutional Theory', in Kevin Leicht & Craig Jenkins (eds.) *Handbook of Politics*. Springer-Verlag: New York, pp. 15-39.
- AGRELL, Wilhelm. 1990. *Det välorganiserade nederlaget*. Stockholm: Ordfront.
- 2000. *Fred och fruktan*. Lund: Historisk Media.
- 2011. *Fredens illusioner: det svenska nationella försvarets nedgång och fall 1988–2009*. Stockholm: Atlantis.
- 2013. *Ett krig här och nu*. Stockholm: Atlantis.
- ALLISON, Graham. 1971. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little Brown.
- ALMOND, Gabriel & Sidney Verba. 1989. *The Civic Culture*. New York: Sage Publishers.
- ANDRÉN, Nils. 1989. 'Swedish defence: Traditions, perceptions and policies', in Joseph Kruzal et al., (eds.), *Between the blocs: Problems and prospects for Europe's neutral and nonaligned states*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 73- 106.
- 1991. 'On the meaning and uses of neutrality', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 26(1), pp. 67-83.
- ANDRÉN, Nils & Ynge Möller. 1990. *Från Undén till Palme: Svensk utrikespolitik efter andra världskriget*. Stockholm: Nordstedts.
- ARMEN, Alchian. 1950. 'Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory', *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 58, pp. 211-221.
- ASCH, Beth & James Hosek. 2004. *Looking to the Future: What does transformation mean for military manpower and Personnel policy?*, Santa Monica: RAND.

- AVANT, Deborah. 1993. 'The Institutional Sources of Military Doctrine: Hegemons in Peripheral Wars', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, pp. 409-430.
- 2000. 'From Mercenary to Citizen Armies: Explaining Change in the Practice of War', *International Organization*, Vol. 54, pp. 41-72.
- AXELROD, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- BACHMAN, Jerald et al. 2000. 'Who chooses military service? Correlates of propensity and enlistment in the U.S. Armed Forces', *Military Psychology*, Vol. 12, pp. 1-30.
- BALSLEV, Anders. 2002. 'Gensyn med blame avoidance-hypotesen'. Århus: Department of Political Science (special).
- BELFRAGE, Claes & Magnus Ryner. 2009. 'Renegotiating the Swedish social democratic settlement: From pension fund socialism to neoliberalization', *Politics & Society*, Vol. 37, pp. 257-88.
- BAUMGARTER, Frank & Bryan Jones. 1993. *Agendas and Instability in American Politics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- BENNETT, Andrew. 2006. 'Stirring the Frequentist Pot With a Dash Bayes', *Political Analysis*, Vol. 14, pp. 339-44.
- 2008. 'Process Tracing: A Bayesian Perspective.' in Janet Box-Steffensmeier et al., *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 217-270.
- BENNETT, Andrew & Alexander George. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- BENNETT, Andrew & Jeffrey Checkel. 2015. *Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BERGMAN, Annika. 2006. 'Adjacent Internationalism: The Concept of Solidarity and Post-Cold War Nordic-Baltic Relations', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 41, pp. 73-97.
- 2007. 'Co-Constitution of domestic and international welfare obligations: the case of Sweden's Social Democratically Inspired internationalism', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, pp. 73-79.
- BERMAN, Sheri. 1998. *The Social Democratic Moment: Ideas and Politics in the Making of Interwar Europe*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- 2006. *The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making of Europe's Twentieth Century*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 2011. 'Social democracy and the creation of the public interest', *Critical Review*, Vol. 23, pp. 237-256.
- BERGSTRAND, Bengt. 2007. Svenska försvarssatsningar under åren 1947- 2009 – En sammanställning av uppgifter i Statistisk årsbok, ESV:s rapporter och Försvarsdepartementets budgetar. FOI Memo 2067.

- BIDDLE, Stephen. 1997. 'The Gulf War Debate Redux: Why Skill and Technology Are the Right Answer', *International Security*, Vol. 22, pp. 163–74.
- 2004. *Military power: Explaining victory and defeat in modern battle*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 2005. 'Allies, Airpower and Modern Warfare: The Afghan model in Afghanistan and Iraq', *International Security*, Vol. 30, pp. 161–76.
- BIELER, Andreas. 2000. *Globalisation and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish Forces in the Struggle Over Membership*. London: Routledge.
- BJERELD, Ulf et al. 2008. *Sveriges säkerhet och världens fred*. Stockholm: Santérus.
- BJERELD, Ulf. 1992. *Kritiker eller medlare? En studie av Sveriges utrikespolitiska roller 1945–1990*. Göteborg: Nerenius and Santérus.
- 1995. 'Critic or Mediator? Sweden in World Politics 1945–1990', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, pp. 23–35.
- BJURNER, Anders. 2010. 'Ett UD-perspektiv på svensk säkerhetspolitiksk förändring efter det kalla krigets slut', in Kjell Engelbrekt & Jan Ångstöm (eds.). *Svensk säkerhetspolitik i Euorop och Världen*. Stockholm: Nordstedts, pp. 37–61.
- BLACK, Jeremy. 1994. *European Warfare, 1660–1815*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- BLAIR, Tony. 1997. 'The Principles of a Modern British Foreign Policy', Speech at the Lord Mayor's Banquet, London, 10 November.
- 1998. *The Third Way: New Politics for a New Century*. London: Fabian Society Pamphlet.
- 1999. 'Doctrine of the international community', Speech delivered at the Economic Cub of Chicago, 22 April.
- BLOMQVIST, Paula & Bo Rothstein. 2000. *Välfärdsstatens nya ansikte: Demokrati och marknadsreformer inom offentlig sektor*. Stockholm: Agora.
- BLOMQVIST, Paula & Christoffer Green-Pedersen. 2004, 'Defeat at Home? Issue-Ownership and Social Democratic Support in Scandinavia', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, pp. 587–613.
- BLYTH, Mark. 2001. 'The transformation of the Swedish model: Economic ideas, distributional conflict, and institutional change', *World Politics*, Vol. 54, pp. 1–26.
- 2002. *Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in The Twentieth Century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- BOOTH, Bradford et al. 2001. 'Are post-cold war militaries postmodern?', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 27, pp. 319–42.

- BORELL, Klas. 1989. *Disciplinära strategier. En historiesociologisk studie av det professionella militärdisciplinära tankesättet 1901–1978*. Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell International.
- BOREUS, Kristina. 1994. *Högervåg: Nyliberalismen och kampen om språket i svensk debatt 1969–1989*. Stockholm: Tidens förlag.
- BRADY, Henry & David Collier. 2004. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- BRODIE, Bernard. 1946. *The Absolute Weapon*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- 1978. 'The Development of Nuclear Security', *International Security*, Vol2(2), pp. 65-83.
- BROMMESSON, Douglas & Ann-Marie Ekengren. 2007. *Sverige i världen*. Malmö: Gleerups.
- BROMMESSON, Douglas. 2010. 'Normative Europeanization: The case of Swedish foreign policy reorientation', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 45, pp. 224-244.
- BROWNING, Chrisopher. 2007. 'Branding Nordicity', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, pp. 27-51.
- BUDGE, Ian & Dennis Farlie. 1983a. *Explaining and Predicting Elections. Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-three Democracies*. George Allen and Unwin, London.
- 1983b. 'Party Competition – Selective Emphasis or Direct Confrontation? An Alternative View with Data', in Peter Mair et al., (eds.), *West European Party Systems*. London: Sage Publications, pp. 267–305.
- BURK, James. 1992. 'The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military Service', *Defense Analysis*, Vol. 8, pp. 45-49.
- 1993. 'Theories of Democratic Civil-Military Relations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 29, pp. 7-29.
- BUZAN, Barry. 1991. 'New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century', *International Affairs*, Vol. 67, pp. 431-451.
- 1997. 'Rethinking Security after the Cold War', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 32, pp. 5-28.
- CAPOCCIA, Giovanni & Daniel Kelemen. 2007. 'The study of critical junctures: theory, narrative, and counterfactuals in historical institutionalism', *World Politics*, Vol. 59, pp. 341-69.
- CARS, Christian et al. 1986. *Svensk försvarspolitik under efterkrigstiden*. Stockholm: Probus.
- CHECKEL, Jeffrey. 2005. 'International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework', *International Organization*, Vol. 59, pp. 801–826.
- 2006. 'Tracing Social Mechanisms', *International Studies Review*, Vol. 8, pp. 362-370.

- CLASEN, Jochen. 2002. 'Modern Social Democracy and European Welfare State Reform', *Social Policy & Society*, Vol. 1, pp. 67-76.
- CLAUSEWITZ, Carl von. [1832] 1984. *On War*. (eds.) Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- CLEMENS, Elisabeth & James Cook. 1999. 'Politics and Institutionalism: Explaining Durability and Change', *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 25, pp. 441-466.
- COHEN, Eliot. 1985. *Citizens and Soldiers: The Dilemmas of Military Service*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- COLLIER, Ruth & David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- COLLIER, David. 2011. 'Understanding Process Tracing', *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 44, pp. 823-30.
- COLEMAN, William & Grace Skogstad. 1995. 'Neo-Liberalism, Policy Networks, and Policy Change: Agricultural Policy Reform in Australia and Canada', *Australian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 30, pp. 242-63.
- CRAWFORD, Beverly. 1996. 'Explaining Defection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia', *World Politics*, Vol. 48, pp. 482-521.
- CRAWFORD, Neta. 1991. 'Once and Future Security Studies', *Security Studies*, Vol. 1, pp. 283-316.
- CREVELD, Martin van. 1991. *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press.
- 1992. *On Future War*. London: Brassey's.
- CUKIERMAN, Alex & Mariano Tommasi. 1998. 'When does it take a Nixon to go to China?', *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 88, pp.180-197.
- DAHL, Ann Sophie. 1991. *Den moraliska stormakten*. Ystad: Timbro.
- 2006. 'Sweden: Once a moral superpower always a moral superpower?', *International Journal*, Autumn, pp. 895-908.
- 2014. *Du gamla, du fria: Moderat utrikespolitik från högerparti till alliansregering*. Stockholm: Medström.
- DAHLSTRÖM, Jan & Ulf Söderberg. 2002. 'Inledning', in Jan Dahlström and Ulf Söderberg (eds.). *Plikt, politik, och praktik: Värnpliktsförsvaret under 100 år*. Stockholm: Krigsarkivet, pp. 7-12.
- DALSJÖ, Robert. 2006. *Life-line lost*. Stockholm: Santérus.
- DANDEKER, Christopher. 1994. 'New times for the military: some sociological remarks on the changing role and structure of the armed forces of the advanced societies', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, pp. 637-654.
- 2006. 'Building Flexible Forces for the 21st Century', in Caforio, Guiseppe (eds.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*. Turin:

- Springer International Publishing, pp. 405-416.
- DAVIDSON, Janine. 2010. *Lifting the Fog of Peace*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- DENK, Thomas. 1999. *Värnpliktsutbildningen – En Politisk Socialisationsagent?*. Karlstad: Karlstad University, dissertation.
- DENHARDT, Robert & Janet Denhardt. 2000. 'The New Public Service: Serving Rather Than Steering', *Public Administration Review*, Vol. 60, pp. 549–559.
- DOWNES, C.J. 1985. 'To be or not to be a profession: the military case', *Defence Analysis*, Vol. 3, pp. 147-171.
- DOWNING, Brian. 1992. *The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- DOYLE, Mikael. 2005. 'Three Pillars of the Liberal Peace', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, pp. 463-466.
- DUFFIELD, John. 1995. *Power Rules: the evolution of NATO's conventional force posture*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- DUFFIELD, Mark. 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars*. London: Zed Books.
- EDMUNDS, Timothy. 2003. 'Political conditionality and security sector reform in postcommunist Europe', *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 3, pp. 139-44.
- 2005. 'A New Security Environment? The Evolution of Military Roles in Post-Cold War Europe', in Timothy Edmunds & Marjan Malesic (eds.), *Defence Transformation in Europe: Evolving Military Roles*. Oxford: IOS Press.
- 2006. 'What are armed forces for? The Changing nature of military roles in Europe', *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, pp. 1059-1075.
- ELSTER, Jon. 1989. *Solomonic Judgements*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- EKENGREN, AnnMarie & Henric Oscarsson. 2011. 'Party Elites' Perceptions of Voters and Public Opinion', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 34(1), pp. 101-122.
- 2013. 'Party Elites' Perceptions of Voting Behaviour', *Party Politics*, Vol 19(4), pp. 641-664.
- 2015. 'Ett liv efter Nya Moderaterna?', *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, Vol. 117(2), pp. 153-168.
- ENGELBREKT, Kjell. 2010. 'Den nya säkerhetspolitiken och dess betingelser', in Kjell Engelbrekt & Jan Ångström, (eds.), *Svensk Säkerhetspolitik i Europa och Världen*. Nordstedts: Vanda, pp. 9-19.
- ERICSON, Lars. 1999. *Medborgare i vapen: värnplikten i Sverige under två sekel*. Lund: Historiska Media.

- ESPING-ANDERSEN, Gøsta. 1985. *Politics Against Markets: The Social Democratic Road to Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 1990. *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 1999. *Social foundations of postindustrial economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- FEAVER, Peter. 1999. 'Civil-military relations', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2, pp. 211-241.
- FELD, Maury. 1977. *The Structure of Violence: Armed Forces as Social Systems*. London: Sage.
- FINER, Samuel. [1975] 2000. 'State and Nation Building in Europe: The Role of the Military', in Charles Tilly, (ed.), *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 84-163
- FORSSELL, Anders & David Jansson. 2000. *Idéer som fängslar*. Malmö: Liber.
- FREEDMAN, Lawrence. 1991. 'The Gulf War and the New World Order', *Survival*, Vol. 33, pp. 195-209.
- FUKUYAMA, Francis. 1989. 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, Summer, pp. 3-18.
- 2011. *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- GAMBLE, Andrew & Tony Wright. 2002. 'Introduction: The new social democracy', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 70, pp. 1-9.
- GARRETT, Geoffrey & Barry Weingast. 1993. 'Ideas, Interests, and Institutions: Constructing the European Community's Internal Market', in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.), *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 173-206.
- GEORGE, Alexander & Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- GHECIU, Alexandra. 2005. 'Security institutions as agents of socialization? NATO and the new Europe', *International organization*, Vol. 59, pp. 973-1012.
- GIDDENS, Anthony. 1998. *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 2001. *The Third Way and its Critics*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- GIGER, Nathalie & Moira Nelson. 2010. 'The electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment: Blame avoidance or credit claiming in the era of permanent austerity?', *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 20, pp. 1-23.

- GOLDMAN, Kjell. 1991. 'The Swedish model of security policy', *West European Politics*, Vol. 14. pp. 122-143.
- GOLDSTEIN, Joshua. 2011. *Winning the war on war: the decline of armed conflict worldwide*. London: Penguin.
- GOOCH, John. 1980. *Armies in Europe*. London: Routledge and Keegan Paul.
- GRANSTRÖM, Görel. 2002. *Värnpliktsvägran: En rättshistorisk studie av samvetsfrihetens gränser i den rättspolitiska debatten 1898-1925*. Uppsala: Juridiska Fakulteten vid Uppsala Universitet.
- GRAY, Colin. 2002. *Strategy for chaos: Revolution in military affairs and the evidence of history*. London: Frank Cass.
- GREEN-PEDERSEN, Christoffer et al. 2001. 'The politics of the "Third Way"', Workshop no.11, 29th ECPR Joint Sessions, 6-11 April, Grenoble.
- 2002, 'New Public Management Reforms of the Danish and Swedish Welfare States: The role of Different Social Democratic Responses', *Governance*, Vol. 15, pp. 271-294.
- GUSTAVSSON, Jakob. 1998. *The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership*. Lund: Lund University Press.
- HACKER, Barton. 1993. 'Military Institutions and Social Order: Transformations of Western Thought since the Enlightenment'. *War & Society*, Vol. 11, pp. 1-23.
- HACKER, Jakob. 1998. 'The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy', *Studies in American Political Development*, Vol. 12 pp. 57-130.
- 2002. *The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social Benefits in the United States*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- 2004. 'Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 98, pp. 243-260.
- HACKER, Jacob & Paul, Pierson. 2010. *Winner takes all politics*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- HACKER, Jacob et al. 2015. 'Drift and conversion: hidden faces of institutional change', in James Mahoney & Kathleen Thelen (eds.), *Advances in Comparative Historical Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 180-208.
- HALDÉN, Eva. 2007. *Den svåra konsten att reformera*. Stockholm: Försvarshögskolan.
- HALL, Peter et al. 1996. 'Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms', *Political Studies*, Vol. 44, pp. 936-957.

- 1993. 'Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in Britain', *Comparative Politics*, April, pp. 275-96.
- 2003. 'Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics', in Mahoney James and Dietrich Rueschmeyer, (eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 373-404.
- HALPERIN, Morton & Graham Allison. 1972. 'Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications', in Raymond Tanter and Richard H. Ullman, (eds.), *Theory and Policy in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 40-79.
- HALPERIN, Morton. 1974. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington: Brookings Institution.
- HALTNER, Karl. 1998. 'The definite end of the mass army in Western Europe?', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 25, pp. 7-36.
- 2006. 'The Decline of the European mass Armies', in Guiseppa Caforio (ed.), *Handbook of the Sociology of the Military*. Turin: Springer International, pp. 361-385.
- HARVEY, David. 2004. *A brief history of neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- HEDIN, Ola. 2011. 'Försvarets förutsättningar - en ESO-rapport om erfarenheter från 20 år av försvarsreformer', Rapport till Expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi. Finansdepartementet. Stockholm: Elanders.
- HILLEN, John. 1995. 'Killing with Kindness: The UN Peacekeeping Mission in Bosnia', Cato Institute Foreign Policy Briefing No. 34.
- HINTZE, Otto. 1975. 'Military organization and the organization of the state', in F. Gilbert (ed.), *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 178-215.
- HOBSON, John. 2003. *The State and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- HODGSON, Geoffrey. 2006. 'What are Institutions?', *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. XL, pp. 1-25.
- HOOD, Christopher. 1991. 'A Public Management for all seasons?', *Public Administration*, Vol. 69, pp. 3-19.
- 1995. 'The "New Public Management" in the 1980's: variations on a theme', *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, Vol. 20, pp. 93-109.
- HOGAN, John. 2006. 'Remoulding the Critical Junctures Approach', *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 39, pp. 657-679.
- HOLSTRÖM, Michael. 2011. *Den dolda alliansen: Sveriges hemliga NATO-förbindelser*. Stockholm: Atlantis.
- HUBER, Evelyne & John Stephens. 2001. *Development and crisis of the welfare state: Parties and policies in global markets*. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press.

HUNTINGTON, Samuel. 1957. *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*. New York: Vintage.

— 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. Boston: Yale University Press.

HUTTON, William. 1996. *The State We're In*. London: Vintage

IKENBERRY, John. 1998/1999. 'Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order', *International Security*, Vol. 23, pp. 43-78.

INGEBRITSEN, Christine. 2002. 'Norm entrepreneurs: Scandinavia's role in world politics', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 37, pp. 11-23.

INGESSON, Tony et al. 2018. 'The martial origins of democracy', *Democratization*, Vol. 25(4), pp. 633-651.

ISAKSSON, Christer. 2010. *Den nya vän(s)tern*. Stockholm: Ekerlid.

JABLONSKY, David. 1994. 'The Owl of Minerva Flies at night: doctrinal change and continuity and the revolution in military affairs', US Army War College, Carlisle Barrack.

JANOWITZ, Morris. 1960. *The Professional Soldier: a social and political portrait*. Glencoe: The Free Press.

— 1983. *The Reconstruction of Patriotism*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

JENSEN, Carsten. 2009. 'Determinants of welfare service provision after the Golden Age', *International Journal of Social Welfare*, Vol. 20, pp. 125-134.

JEPPERSON, Ronald. 1991. 'Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism', in Paul DiMaggio (ed.), *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 143-163.

JONES, Bryan. 1995. *Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: Attention, Choice, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

JONSSON, Ulf & Peter Nordlund. 2010. *Frivillighet istället för plikt: internationella erfarenheter och ekonomiska konsekvenser*. Stockholm: FOI.

JUNG, Helge. 1947. *Vårt framtida försvar. Överbefälhavarens förslag*. Stockholm: Norstedt och Söners förlag.

KALDOR, Mary et al. 1998. *The end of military Fordism*. London: Pinter.

— 1999. *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

— 2013. 'Comment on security cosmopolitanism', *Critical Studies on Security*, Vol.1, pp. 42-45.

- KARLSSON, Sten. 2001. *Det intelligenta samhället*. Stockholm: Carlsson.
- KEEGAN, John. 1993. *A History of Warfare*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
- KELLEHER, Christine. 1978. 'Mass Armies in the 1970s: The Debate in Western Europe', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 5, pp. 3-30.
- KENNEDY, Paul. 1993. *Preparing for the Twenty First Century*. New York: Random House.
- KESTNBAUM, Meyer. 2002. 'Citizen-soldiers, national service and the mass army: The birth of conscription in revolutionary Europe and North America', *Comparative Social Research*, Vol. 20, pp. 117-144.
- KIER, Elizabeth. 1993. 'Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars', *International Security*, Vol. 19, pp. 65-93.
- KING, Gary et al. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- KING, Anthony. 2011. *The Transformation of Europe's Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- KITSCHOLT, Herbert. 1994. *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- 2001. 'Partisan Competition and Welfare State Retrenchment: When Do Politicians Choose Unpopular Policies', in Paul Pierson (ed.), *The New Politics of the Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 265-304.
- KLITSGAARD, Michael. 2007. 'Why are they doing it? Social democracy and market-oriented welfare state reforms', *West European Politics*, Vol. 30, pp. 172-194.
- KOHN, Richard. 1997. 'How Democracies Control the Military', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 8, pp. 140-52.
- KORPI, Walter. 1978. *The working class in welfare capitalism: Work, unions and politics in Sweden*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- 2006. 'Power resources and employer-centered approaches in explanations of welfare states and varieties of capitalism', *World Politics*, vol. 58, pp. 167-206.
- KRASNER, Stephen. 1988. 'Sovereignty: an institutional perspective', *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 21, pp. 66-94.
- KRAUSE, Keith & Michael Williams. 1996. 'Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods', *Mershon International Studies Review*, Vol. 40, pp. 229-54.
- KREBS, Ronald. 2004. 'A School for the Nation: How Military Service Does Not Build Nations, and How It Might', *International Security*, Vol. 28, pp. 85-124.

- KREPS, David. 1990. *A Course in Microeconomic Theory*. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
- KRIESI, Hanspeter & Timotheos Frey. 2008. 'The United Kingdom: Moving Parties in a Stable Configuration', in Kriesi Hanspeter et al. (ed.), *European Politics in the Age of Globalization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 183-207.
- KUISMA, Mikko. 2007. 'Social democratic Internationalism and the welfare state after the golden age', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 42, pp. 9-26.
- LARSSON, Bengt et al. 2012. *Transformations of the Swedish Welfare State*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- LAU, Morten et al. 2004. 'Dynamic Costs of the Draft', *German Economic Review*, Vol. 5, pp. 381-406.
- LAWLER, Peter. 1997. 'Scandinavian Exceptionalism and European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 35, pp. 565-94.
- 2005. 'The Good State: In Praise of 'Classical' Internationalism', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 31, pp. 427-449.
- LEANDER, Anna. 2004. 'Drafting Community: Understanding the Fate of Conscription', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 30, pp. 571-600.
- 2005. 'Enduring Conscription: Vagueness and Värnplik in Sweden', Paper presented at Concluding Conference of the Nordic Security Policy Research Programme, No. 6, pp. 1-62.
- LEBOW, Richard. 2010. *Why Nations Fight*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- LEFEVERE, Jonas et al. 2015, 'Introduction: Issue ownership', *West European Politics*, Vol. 38, pp. 755-760.
- LEE-OHLSON, Fredrick. 2009, 'Sweden and Development of the European Security and Defence Policy', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 44, pp. 123-142.
- LEVI, Margaret. 1997. 'A Model, A Method, and a Map: rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis', in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, (eds.), *Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 19-41.
- LEVY, Jonah. 1999. 'Vice into virtue? Progressive politics and welfare reform in Continental Europe', *Politics and Society*, Vol. 27, pp. 239-273.
- LEVY, Jack et al. 2001. 'Continuity and Change in the Evolution of Warfare', in Maoz, Zeev and Azar Gat (eds.), *War in a Changing World*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 15-49.
- LINDBOM, Anders. 2002. 'Dismantling the social democratic welfare model?', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, Vol. 24, pp. 171-93.
- 2008. 'The Swedish Conservative Party and the Welfare State', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 27(2), pp. 129-150.

- 2010. 'Moderaterna och välfärdsstaten', *Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift*, Vol. 112(2), pp. 143-152.
- LINDWALL, Johannes. 2004. *The Politics of Purpose: Swedish Macroeconomic Policy After the Golden Age*. Departement of Political Science Göteborg university. Kungälv: Grafikerna Livréna.
- LIPSET, Martin. [1960] 1981. *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- LINDERBORG, Åsa. 2001. *Socialdemokraterna skriver historia: historieskrivning som ideologisk maktresurs 1892–2000*. Stockholm: Atlas Akademi.
- LJUNGREN, Stig-Björn. 1992. *Folkhemskapitalismen: Högerens programutveckling under efterkrigstiden*. Stockholm: Tiden.
- LÖDEN, Hans. 1999. *För säkerhets skull: ideologi och säkerhet i svensk aktiv utrikes- politik 1950–1975*. Stockholm: Nerenius and Santérus.
- LUEBBERT, Gregory. 1991. *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- LUTTWAK, Edward. 1990 'From Geo-Politics to Geo-Economics', *National Interest*, Vol. 20, pp. 17-23.
- MAHONEY, James. 2002. *The Legacies of Liberalism: Path Dependence and Political Regimes in Central America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- MALMBORG, Mikael. 2001. *Neutrality and peace-building in Sweden*. Houndmills: Palgrave.
- MANIGART, Philippe. 2003. 'Restructuring of the Armed forces', in Giuseppe Caforio, (ed.), *Handbook of the sociology of the military*. Turin: Springer International, pp. 323-343.
- MANN, Michael. 2003. *Incoherent Empire*. London: Verso.
- MARCH, James & Herbert Simon. 1993. *Organizations*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
- MARCH, James & Johan Olsen. 1995. *Democratic Governance*. New York: Free Press.
- 2008. 'The Logic of Appropriateness', in Michael Moran et al., (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 690-708.
- MCKENNA, Justin. 1997. 'Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France', *West European Politics*, Vol. 20, pp. 125-145.
- MERTON, Robert. 1936. 'The unintended consequences of purposive social actions', *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 1, pp. 894-904.
- MEARSHEIMER, John. 1990. 'Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', *International Security*, Vol. 15, pp. 5-56.

- MOLIN, Karl. 1974. *Försvaret, Folkhemmet och Demokratin: Socialdemokratisk riksdagspolitik 1939-1945*. Stockholm: Allmänna Förlaget.
- MÖLLER, Tommy & Ulf Bjereld. 2010. 'From Nordic Neutrals to post-neutral Europeans: Differences in Finnish and Swedish policy transformation', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 45, pp. 363-386.
- MOSKOS, Charles et al. 2002. *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces After the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- 1977a. 'From institution to occupation: Trends in military organizations', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 4, pp. 41-50.
- 1977b. 'The all-volunteer military: calling, profession or occupation?', *Parameters*, Vol. 7, pp. 2-9.
- 1986. 'Institutional and occupational trends in armed forces: An update', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, pp. 377-382.
- 1992. 'Armed Forces in a Warless Society', *Forum 13*, pp. 3-10.
- MUELLER, John. 1991. 'Changing attitudes to war: the impact of the first world war', *British Journal of political science*. Vol. 21, pp. 25-50.
- MUSIAL, Kazimierz. 1998. *Tracing roots of the Scandinavian model: Image of progress in the era of modernization*. Berlin: Humboldt-universität.
- NATO, 2007. Recruiting and Retention of Military Personnel, Final Report of Research Task Group HFM-107.
- NORTH, Douglass. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- NORTHEIM-MARTINSEN, Per. . 2016, 'New sources of military change - armed forces as normal organizations', *Defence Studies*, Vol. 16, pp. 312-326.
- NORDLUND, Peter et al. 2008. Personal och Förbandsverksamhet - internationella jämförelser, Policy Support to the Government, Swedish Defence Research Agency. Stockholm: Ministry of Defence.
- NORDLUND, Peter & Ulf Jonsson. 2010. Frivilliga soldater istället för plikt, Swedish Defence Research Agency. Stockholm: Ministry of Defence.
- NYGÅRD, Mikael. 2006. 'Welfare-Ideological Change in Scandinavia: A Comparative Analysis of Partisan Welfare State Positions in Four Nordic Countries, 1970-2003', *Scandinavian Political Science Studies*, Vol. 29, pp. 356-385.
- OLIVER, Christine. 1992. 'The antecedents of deinstitutionalization', *Organizational Studies*, Vol. 13, pp. 563-88.
- ORREN, Karen & Stephen Skowronek. 1994. 'Beyond the iconography of order: notes for a "new" institutionalism', in Dodd Lawrence and Jillson Calvin, (eds.), *The Dynamics of American Politics*. Boulder: Westview, pp. 311-32.

- OSBOURNE, David & Ted Gaebler. 1992. *Reinventing government*. New York: Addison-Wesley Publications.
- OSTROM, Elinor. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- PALMER, Robert. 1986. 'Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow: From Dynastic to National War', in Peter Paret (ed.), *The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 91–119.
- PARET, Peter. 1986. 'Napoleon and the Revolution in War', in Peter Paret, (ed.), *The Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 123–42.
- 1992a. 'Conscription and the end of the ancien regime in France and Prussia', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 53–74.
- 1992b. 'Nationalism and the sense of military obligation', in Peter Paret (ed.), *Understanding War: Essays on Clausewitz and the History of Military Power*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 39–52.
- 1993. 'Justifying the Obligation of Military Service', *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 57, pp. 115–126.
- PETERSON, Thage. 1999. *Resan mot Mars*. Stockholm: Bonnier.
- PETERSSON, Magnus. 2010. 'Försvarstransformeringen efter det kalla krigets slut', in Kjell Engelbrekt & Jan Ångström, (eds.), *Svensk Säkerhetspolitik i Europa och Världen*. Nordstedts: Vanda, pp. 147–168.
- PETROCIK, John. 1996. 'Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study', *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 40, pp. 825–850.
- PERSOON, Göran. 2007. Aldrig ensam, alltid ensam: samtalen med Göran Persson 1996–2006. Stockholm: Nordstedt.
- PIERSON, Paul & Theda Skocpol. 2002. 'Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science', Unpublished paper, pp. 1–33.
- PIERSON, Paul. 1994. *Dismantling the Welfare State?*. Cambridge: University Press.
- 2000. 'Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 94, pp. 251–267.
- 2000. 'The limits of design', *Governance*, Vol. 13, pp. 475–499.
- 2003. 'Big, Slow-Moving...and Invisible: Macrosocial Process in the Study of Comparative Politics', in James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschmeyer, (eds.), *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- 2004. *Politics in Time*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- POPPER, Karl. 1963. *Conjectures and refutations*. London: Routledge & K. Paul.
- POSEN, Barry. 1993. 'Nationalism, the mass army and military power', *International Security*, Vol. 18, pp. 80-124.
- [1984] 2017. *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- PRICE, Richard. 1994. 'Interpretation and Disciplinary Orthodoxy in International Relations', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 20, pp. 201-204.
- PREMFORS, Rune. 1998. 'Reshaping the democratic state: Swedish experiences in a comparative perspective', *Public Administration*, Vol. 76, pp. 141-159.
- RAPOPORT, David. 1962. 'A comparative theory of military and political types', in Samuel Huntington, (ed.), *Changing patterns of military politics*. Glencoe: The Free Press.
- RESENDE-SANTOS, Joao. 2007. *Neorealism, States and the Modern Mass Army*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- RIKER, William. 1986. *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- RIEKER, Pernille. 2004. 'Europeanization of Nordic Security', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 39, pp. 369-392.
- ROSEN, Peter. 1991. *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- ROSS, Fiona . 2000a, 'Beyond Left and Right: The new Partisan Politics of Welfare', *Governance*, Vol. 13, pp. 155-183.
- 2000b. 'Framing Welfare Reform in Affluent Societies: Rendering Restructuring More Palatable?', *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 20(2), pp. 169-193.
- ROTHENBERG, Gunther. 1980. *The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- ROTHSTEIN, Bo. 1996. *The social democratic state: The Swedish model and the bureaucratic problem of social reforms*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- 1998. *Just Institutions Matter: The Moral and Political Logic of the Universal Welfare State*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- RUTH, Arne. 1984. 'The Second New Nation: The Mythology of Modern Sweden', *Daedalus*, Vol. 113, pp. 53-96.
- RYNER, Magnus. 2002. *Capitalist restructuring, globalisation and the Third Way: Lessons from the Swedish model*. London: Routledge.
- SCHNEIBERG, Mark & Elisabeth Clemens. 2006. 'The Typical Tools for the Job: Research Strategies in Institutional Analysis', *Sociological Theory*, Vol. 24, pp. 195-227.

- SCOTT, Richard. 2004. 'Institutional Theory: Contributing to a Theoretical Research Program', Chapter prepared for *Great Minds in Management: The Process of Theory Development*, Ken G. Smith and Michael A. Hitt, eds. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press.
- 2008. *Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests*. Los Angeles: Sage.
- SEAWRIGHT, Jason & John Gerring. 2008. 'Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options', *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 61, pp. 294
- SEENBERG, Henrik. 2017, 'How stable is political parties' issue-ownership? Across-time, cross-national analysis', *Political Studies*, Vol. 65, pp. 475-492.
- SEGAL, David. 1983. 'Institutional and occupational values in the U.S. military', in Margiotta Franklin et al., (eds.), *Changing U.S. Military Manpower Realities*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- 1986. 'Measuring the institutional/occupational change thesis', *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 12, pp. 351-376.
- SEGAL, David and Young Hee-Yoon, Young. 1984. 'Institutional and occupational models of the army in the career force', *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 12, pp. 243-256.
- SHEINGATE, Adam. 2000, 'Agricultural retrenchment revisited: Issue definition and venue change in the United States and European Union', *Governance*, Vol.13, pp. 335-363.
- SHEPSLE, Kenneth A. 1986. 'Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions', in Herbert Weisberg (ed.). *Political Science: The Science of Politics*. New York: Agathon, pp. 51-81.
- 1989. 'Studying institutions: some lessons from the rational choice approach', *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Vol. 1, pp. 131-47.
- SKOGSTAD, Grace. 1998. Ideas, Paradigms and Institutions: Agricultural Exceptionalism in the European Union and the United States, *Governance* Vol. 11, pp. 463-90.
- SKÖLD, Nils. 1974. *Värnplikt och folkförsvar*. Stockholm: Centralförbundet Folk och Försvar.
- 1989. 'Säkerhetspolitik, strategi, operationer. Några tankar om utvecklingen i Sverige sedan 1945'. *Försvar i nutid* 4/89.
- SMITH, Alastair. 1995. 'Alliance formation and war', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 39, pp. 405-425.
- SNYDER, Jack. 1984. *Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- STEINMO, Sven. 2008. 'What is Historical Institutionalism', in Della Donatella et al., (eds.), *Approaches and Methodologies in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- STREECK, Wolfgang & Kathleen Thelen. 2005. *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- STRÅTH, Bo. 2000. 'Poverty, neutrality and welfare', in Bo Stråth, (ed.), *Myth and memory in the construction of community*. Brussels: PIE–Peter Lang.
- SVENSSON, Torsten. 2001. *Marknadsanpassningens politik*, Uppsala: Statsvetenskapliga föreningen, Uppsala University.
- TÅNNERYD, Jan. 2002. 'Inskrivningsväsendet under 100 år', in Jan Dahlström and Ulf Söderberg, (eds.), *Plikt, politik, och praktik: Värnpliktsförsvaret under 100 år*. Stockholm: Krigsarkivet, pp. 27-45.
- THELEN, Kathleen. 1999. 'Historical institutionalism in comparative politics', *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2, pp. 369-404.
- 2004. *How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States and Japan*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- THERBORN, Göran. 1989. 'Social Steering and Household Strategies: the macropolitics and the microsociology of welfare states', *Journal of Public Policy*, Vol. 9, pp. 371–97.
- THOMSON, Janice. 1994. *Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- TILLY, Charles. 1975. *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- 1990. *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1990*. Cambridge: Basil.
- TOFFLER, Alvin & Heidi Toffler. 1993. *War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co.
- TOLBERT, Pamela & Lynne Zucker 1996. 'The institutionalization of institutional theory', in Stewart et al. (eds.), *Handbook of Organization Studies*, Thousand Oaks: Sage, pp. 175-190.
- TOWNSHEND, Charles. 2005. 'The Shape of Modern War', in (ed.), Charles Townsend, *The Oxford History of Modern War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 3-19.
- TRÄGÅRDH, Lars. 2002. 'Sweden and the EU: Welfare State Nationalism and the Spectre of 'Europe'', in Lene Hansen & Ole Wæver, (eds.), *European Integration and National Identity: The Challenge of the Nordic States*. London: Routledge.
- TRESCH, Tibor. 2014. 'Europe's Armed Forces in Transition: From Conscription to all-volunteer forces 1975-2014', paper presented at the international workshop, 'Ten Years after Suspending Conscription: Transition and Transformation', Budapest, December 03-04.

- 2010. *Europe without soldiers?*. Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- VAN DER MEULEN, Jan & Philippe Manigart. 1997. 'Zero Draft in the Low Countries', *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 24(2), pp. 315-332.
- VASQUEZ, Joseph. 2005, 'Shouldering the Soldiering: Democracy, Conscription, and Military Casualties', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 49, pp. 849-873.
- WEAVER, Ole. 1992. 'Nordic Nostalgia: Northern Europe After the Cold War', *International Affairs*, Vol. 68, pp. 77-102.
- WAHLBÄCK, Krister. 1986. *The roots of Swedish neutrality*. Stockholm: Swedish institute.
- WALLANDER, Celeste. 2000. 'Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War', *International Organization*, Vol. 54, pp. 705-35.
- WALTZ, Kenneth. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: Random House.
- WENDT, Alexander. 1992. 'Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, pp. 391-425.
- 1999. 'Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional Design', *International Organization*, Vol. 55, pp. 1019-50.
- WHELLER, Nicholas & Tim Dunne. 1998. 'Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy', *International Affairs*, Vol. 74, pp. 847-870.
- WHYMAN, Philip. 2003. *Sweden and the 'Third Way'*. London: Routledge.
- YDÉN, Karl. 2008. "Kriget" och karriärssystemet: Försvarsmaktens organiserade i fred', Doctoral thesis, University of Gothenburg. Göteborg: BAS Publisher.
- YDÉN, Karl & Hans Hasselbladh. 2010. 'En kår på rätt kurs? En ESO-rapport om försvarets framtida kompetensförsörjning'. Stockholm: Fritzes.
- YDÉN, Karl & Joakim Berndtsson. 2013. 'Efter Afghanistan? Försvaret, Kriget och Svenskarna', in Lennart Weibull, Henrik Oscarsson & Annika Bergström, (eds.), *Vägskul*. Göteborgs universitet: SOM-institute, pp. 617-629.
- ZETTERBERG, Kent. 2002. 'Värnpliktsfrågan i svensk politik under 1900-talet, en översikt', in Jan Dahlström and Ulf Söderberg, (eds.) *Plikt, politik, och praktik: Värnpliktsförsvaret under 100 år*. Stockholm: Krigsarkivet, pp. 46-68.
- ZUCKER, Lynne. 1988. 'Where do institutional patterns come from? Organizations as actors in social systems', in Zucker, Lynne. (ed.),

Institutional Patterns and Organizations. Cambridge: Ballinger, pp. 23-49.

ÅSELIUS, Gunnar. 2005. 'Swedish Strategic Culture after 1945', *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 40, pp. 25-44.

Official Documents

- CENTRE-RIGHT ALLIANCE, 2004, Motion 2004/05:Fö21.
— 2005, Motion 2005/06: Fö10.
- GOVERNMENT, 1973, Prop. 1973:128, Kungl. Maj:ts proposition med förslag till principer för enhetlig befälsordning inom det militära försvaret.
- 1984. SOU 1984:71. Värnplikten i framtiden – Betänkande av 1983 års värnpliktsutbildningskommitté.
- 1990a. 'Vem skall göra lumpen?', *Expressen* 1990-05-30.
- 1991a. Direktiv 1991: 140.
- 1992a. Om värnpliktsutbildning. Proposition 1991/92: 101.
- 1992b. Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/97 samt anslag för budgetåret 1992/93. Proposition 1991/92:102.
- 1994a. Sverige och Partnerskap för fred. Proposition 1993/94:207.
- 1994a. Totalförsvarsplikt. Proposition 1994/95:6.
- 1995a. Försvarets kostnader och produktivitet. Departementsserie 1995:10.
- 1995b. Totalförsvaret i förnyelse - Etapp 1. Proposition 1995/96:12.
- 1996. Totalförsvaret i förnyelse - Etapp 2. Proposition 1996/97: 4.
- 1997. Översyn av totalförsvarspliktens tillämpning och andra pliktfrågor m.m.. Direktiv 1997: 109.
- 1998. Regeringsbeslut 6, 1998-05-20, återgivet i försvarsmaktens underlag till den säkerhetspolitiska kontrollstationen 1999 (1998).
- 1999. Försvarsmaktens personalförsörjning. Direktiv 1999: 84.
- 1999a. Förändrad omvärld - omdanat försva. Proposition 1998/99: 74.
- 1999b. Det nya försvaret. Proposition 1999/2000:30
- 1999c. Tilläggsdirektiv till 1998 års pliktutredning. Direktiv 1999: 85
- 2000a. Statens offentliga utredningar 2000:21. SOU 2000:21.
- 2001a. Bättre villkor för totalförsvarspliktiga. Proposition 2001/02:11.
- 2001b. Fortsatt förnyelse av totalförsvaret. Proposition 2001/02:10.

- 2002. Svenskt deltagande i en multinationell säkerhetsstyrka i Afghanistan. Proposition 2001/02: 60.
- 2003. Ur regeringsbeslut 28, planeringsanvisningar 2003-06-26, Fö2003/1456/MIL.
- 2004a. Vårt framtida försvar. Proposition 2004/05:5.
- 2006a. Regegrinsförklaringen. 2006-10-06.
- 2007a. En förändrad totalförsvarsplik. Dir. 2007:147.
- 2008. Delbetänkande Totalförsvarsplikten i framtiden. SOU 2008:98.
- 2009a. Tilläggsdirektiv till Utredningen om totalförsvarsplikten. Direktiv. 2009: 4.
- 2009b. Modern personalförsörjning för ett användbart försvar. Proposition 2009/10: 160
- HEADQUARTERS, 1985. ÖB Perspektivplan 85.
- 1988. Försvarsmaktsidé 2000.
- 1995. Försvarsmaktens underlag inför 1996 års försvarsbeslut - Etapp 1.
- 1996. Försvarsmaktens underlag inför 1996 års försvarsbeslut - Etapp 2 (Försvarsmaktsplan 1997).
- 1998. Försvarsmaktens underlag till den säkerhetspolitiska kontrollstationen 1999, HKV beteckning 23 200:72865.
- 1999. Försvarsmaktens Personalförsörjnings- och utbildningssystem för värnpliktiga, bilaga till HKV 23 200: 65817 Dokdatum 990519
- 1999. Förslag till framtida struktur för Försvarsmakten, HKV beteckning 23 200: 65490.
- 2001a. Försvarsmaktsidé och Målbild – Rapport 5 - Årsrapport från Perspektivplaneringen 2000-2001, HKV 2001-02-26 23210:62144.
- 2002. Idébilder och fördjupningsområden inför Försvarsbeslut 2004 Årsrapport från perspektivplaneringen 2001-2002.
- 2003. Årsrapport från perspektivplaneringen 2002-2003; Målbildsriktningar inför Försvarsbeslut 2004 – rapport 7.
- 2004a. Försvarsmaktens Budgetunderlag för år 2005 med Särskilda redovisningar.
- 2004b. Slutrapport Attitydprojektet utbildningsår 2002/03, HKV beteckning 16 700:61489.
- 2004c. Slutrapport Attitydprojektet utbildningsår 2003/04, HKV beteckning 16 700:78344.
- 2005. Årsedovisning.
- 2006a. Slutrapport Attitydprojektet utbildningsår 2004/05, HKV beteckning 16 700:62268.
- 2007a. '20-åringar i strid under EU:s flagg', Dagens Nyheter, 2007-01-28.
- 2007b. Slutrapport Attitydprojektet utbildningsår 2005/06, HKV beteckning 16 700: 71097.

- 2007c. Rapport från perspektivstudien hösten 2007 – Ett hållbart försvar för framtida säkerhet, HKV beteckning 23 382:63862.
- 2008. PM Slutrapport Attitydprojektet utbildningsår 2007, 2008-05-5.
- 2009a. Försvarsmaktens underlag för regeringens försvarspolitiska proposition 2009, HKV beteckning 23 383:51503. 2009-01-30.
- 2009. PM to Anders Svärd, Johan Fölstad, 2009-03-31.
- MODERATE PARTY, 1972, av herr Bohman m. fl. ianledningav propositionen 1972:1. Motion 1972: 294.
- 1973a. i anledning av Kungl. Maj:ts proposition 1973:135 angående vissa organisationsfrågor rörande armén. Motion 1973:2074.
- 1973b. i anledning av propositionen 1973:1. Motion 1973:241 av herr Bohman m. fl. Motion 1973: 241.
- 1978. Om den ekonomiska politiken. Motion 1978/79:1108.
- 1981. Säkerhets- och försvarspolitiken samt totalförsvarets fortsatta utveckling. Proposition 1981/82: 102. Motion 1981/82: 2262.
- 1994. Försvarspolitiken. Motion 1994/95:fö203.
- 1995a. med anledning av prop 1995/96:12 totalförsvaret i förnyelse. Motion 1995/96:fö1.
- 1995b. 'Välkommen tillnyktring', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1995-08-16.
- 1996a. 'Moderaterna kräver att försvarsbeslutet skjuts upp', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1996-03-15.
- 1996b. Sveriges säkerhet och försvar. Motion 1996/97:FÖ201.
- 1997/1998a. Försvarets personalförsörjning. Motion 1997/98: Fö209
- 1997/1998b. Sveriges säkerhet och försvar. Motion 1997/98: Fö211.
- 1999a. 'M och KD lämnar försvarsberedningen', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1999-04-28.
- 1999b. med anledning av proposition 1998/99: 74 förändrad omvärld – omdanad försvar. Motion 1998/99: Fö6.
- 1999c. med anledning av prop. 1999/2000:30 det nya försvaret. Motion1999/2000:Fö20.
- 2000. Personalförsörjning av Försvarsmakten. Motion 2000/01: Fö324.
- NSA, 1994-2009. Inskrivningsstatistik, Pliktverket.
- 2008a. Utryckningsenkät – utbildningsår 2007. Frekvenser för samtliga svarande samt per försvarsgren och försvarsmaktsgemensamma förband/skolor/centra 2008-05-05.
- 2008b. PM Pliktverket, Inskrivningskullens intresse för internationell tjänst (män och kvinnor).
- PARLIAMENT, 1992. Pliktutredningen, SOU 1992: 139.
- 2003. Försvarsmaktens utbildning, förbandsutveckling, förbandsomsättning, beredskap och operativ förmåga - utvärdering av försvarsbesluten 2000 och 2001, Utredning från Riksdagen 2003/04:URD1

- Parliament Protocol 1991a. RD 1990/91:23.
- 1991b. 1990/91:25.
- 1991c. 1990/91:36.
- PDC, 2001. Totalförsvarsbudgeten för år 2002, Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2001/02:FöU1.
- 2007. Vissa frågor rörande totalförsvarsplikt m.m., Försvarsutskottets betänkande 2007/08:FöU3.
- SAMO, 1998. 'Försvaret i otakt mot framtiden Färre värnpliktiga och krympt försvarsindustri när ÖB sparar 10 miljarder', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1998-02-17.
- 1999. 'Svenska vill behålla värnplikten', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1999-07-15.
- 1999. Officersförbundet Medlemsundersökning 1999, Rapport.
- 2000a. Officersförbundet Medlemsundersökning 2000, Rapport.
- 2000b. 'Värnpliktsarmé billig och kunnig', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2000-11-30.
- 2000c. Reformerad Allmän Värnplikt – En utredning om personalförsörjning och allmän värnplikt gjord av Officersförbundet, 2000-11-30. Stockholm: Officersförbundet.
- SAP, 1960. *Neutralitet, Försvar, Atomvapen: Socialdemokratiska partistyrelsens kommitté för studium av atomvapenfrågan*. Stockholm: Tiden.
- 1975. 'Försvar för fred', Rapport från SAP:s försvarspolitiska kommitté, Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartis 26:e kongress.
- 1992a. med anledning av prop. 1991/92:102 Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/97 samt anslag för budgetåret 1992/93, Motion 1991/92:Fö28.
- 1993a. En offensiv för mänskliga rättigheter, Motion 1992/93:U628.
- 1993b. med anledning av prop. 1992/93:254 Svenskt deltagande i av FN:s säkerhetsråd beslutade insatser för säkerställande av fred i f.d. Jugoslavien, Motion 1992/93:U27.
- 1993c. med anledning av prop. 1992/93:254 Svenskt deltagande i av FN:s säkerhetsråd beslutade insatser för säkerställande av fred i f.d. Jugoslavien, Motion 1992/93:U27.
- 2007a. med anledning av prop. 1991/92:102 Totalförsvarets utveckling till och med budgetåret 1996/97 samt anslag för budgetåret 1992/93, Motion 2007/08:Fö261.
- 2007b. Sverige tjänar på rättvisa, Motion 2007/08:Fi277.
- 2008. Ett modernt, effektivt och folkligt förankrat försvar, Motion 2008/09:Fö293.
- 2009. med anledning av prop. 2008/09:140 Ett användbart försvar, Motion 2008/09:Fö5.
- 2009b. Riksdagens protokoll 2008/09:131 Fredagen den 12 juni.
- SDC, 1995a. Sverige i Europa och världen, Ds 1995: 28.

- 1995b. Totalförsvarets utveckling och förnyelse, Ds 1995: 51.
- 1996b. Omvärldsförändringar och svensk säkerhetspolitik, Ds 1996: 51.
- 1998a. Svensk säkerhetspolitik i ny omvärldsbelysning, Ds 1998:9.
- 2001. Ny struktur för ökad säkerhet - nätverksförsvar och krishantering, Ds 2001: 44.
- 2003a. Säkrare grannskap - osäker värld, Ds 2003:8.
- 2003b. Vårt militära försvar - vilja och vägval, Ds 2003:34.
- 2004. Försvar för en ny tid, Ds 2004:30.
- 2007. Säkerhet i samverkan, Ds 2007:46.
- 2008. Försvar i användning, Ds 2008:48.
- SIFO, 2009. 'Svenskarna vill ha kvar lumpen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-03-22.
- SPF, 1965-1994. Psykologiskt försvar. Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar. Stockholm: Styrelsen för psykologiskt försvar.
- 1965-1984. Beredskapsnämnden för psykologiskt försvar. Stockholm: Beredskapsnämnden för psykologiskt försvar.
- 1989. Försvarsvilja, opinionsklimat och massmedier. Psykologiskt försvar. Rapport nr. 153. Stockholm: försvarsmedia.
- 1990. Opinion 90. Psykologiskt försvar. Rapport nr 156. Stockholm: Försvarsmedia.
- 1992. Opinion 92. Psykologiskt försvar. Rapport nr 160. Stockholm: Försvarsmedia.
- 1993. Opinion 93. Psykologiskt försvar. Rapport nr 165. Stockholm: Försvarsmedia.
- 1994. Opinion 94. Psykologiskt försvar. Rapport nr 166. Stockholm: Försvarsmedia.
- 1995. Opinion 94. Psykologiskt försvar. Rapport nr 167. Stockholm: Försvarsmedia.
- 1997. Opinion 97. Psykologiskt försvar. Meddelande 144. Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar.
- 1998. Opinion 98. Psykologiskt försvar. Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar
- 1999. Opinion 99. Psykologiskt försvar. Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar
- 2000. Opinion 2000. Psykologiskt försvar. Meddelande 156. Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar
- 2001-2008. Opinioner. Stockholm: Styrelsen för Psykologiskt Försvar
- THULSTRUP, Jörgen. 2003. Försvarsmaktens utbildning, förbandsutveckling, förbandsomsättning, beredskap och operativ förmåga – utvärdering av försvarsbesluten 2000 och 2001. October 2003.

Media and Interviews

- AHLIN, URBAN ET AL. 2007. 'Vi vill och kan bidra till ett säkert Afghanistan', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-04-07.
- ANDERSSON, Sten. 1990, RD 1990/91:23.
- BILDT, Carl. 1990a. 'Avslöjar hemliga nya uppgifter', *Expressen*, 1990-12-05.
- 1991a. Riksdagens protokoll 1991/92:6, 1991-10-04.
- 1991b. 'Från en motvillig till en engagerad europé', Utrikesfrågor.
- 1991c. 'Ny utrikespolitik unde borgelig regering', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1991-10-03.
- 1991d. 'Kohl gav Bildt en stående ovation', *Expressen*, 1991-12-16.
- 1992a. Riksdagens protokoll 1991/92:52, 1991-01-15.
- 1992b. Riksdagens protokoll 1991/92:119, 1991-01-25.
- 1991c. 'Anförande i Stockholm', Utrikesfrågor 1991, 1991-12-07.
- 1996. 'Regeringen klarar inte av EMU utan trycker i busken', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1996-12-31.
- 1998. 'Carl Bildt vill skrota gällande försvarsbeslut', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1998-01-16.
- BJÖRCK, Anders. 1991a. 'Obehagliga försvarsbeslut väntar', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1992-01-08.
- 1991b. 'Försvar i en värld utan fiender', *Expressen*, 1991-11-10.
- 1991c. 'Björck: Upprustningsminister?', *Expressen*, 1991-10-05.
- 1991d. 'Sparkad från Lumpen', *Expressen*, 1991-11-16.
- 1991e. 'Notan betalas', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1991-12-10.
- 1992a. 'Obehagliga försvarsbeslut väntar', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1992-01-08.
- 1992b. Riksdagens protokoll 1991/92:100, 1992-04-24.
- 1992c. 'Svenska FN-soldater till Somalia?', *Expressen*, 1992-09-26.
- 1993a. 'Förslag om stående FN-styrka avvisas', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1993-02-01.
- 1993b. 'Bosnientrupp blir alltför dyr', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1993-02-27.
- 1998. '91:an muckar. ÖB:s vill satsa på högteknologi i försvaret', *Expressen*, 1998-02-17.

BJÖRKLUND, Leni. 2002a. 'Perssons ofärdiga pussel', *Sydsvenskan* 2002-10-22.

— 2003a. 'Nye försvarsministern Leni Björklund underkänner till stora delar hur omvandlingen av försvaret genomförts', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2003-01-22.

— 2003b. 'Försvarsministern och ÖB oense om utlandsuppdrag', *Sydsvenskan* 2003-01-22.

— 2003c. *Sydsvenskan* 2003-02-24

— 2003d. 'Försvarsministern vill anställa soldater', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2003-03-09.

— 2003e. 'Bråttom med efterträdare till Hederstedt', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2003-11-04.

— 2004a. 'Svenska yrkessoldater rycker allt närmare', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2004-04-19.

— 2004b. Riksdagens protokoll 2004/05:8, 2004-09-24.

BJÖRKLUND, Jan. 2008, *Nyhetskanalen*, 2008-08-09

— 2009. 'Ska Sten Tolgfors bara hålla för öronen om det smäller?', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-01-21.

BOHLIN, Britt. 1997. 'Försvaret behöver ny struktur', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1997-01-07.

BORG, Anders. 2007. 'Borg till försvar för bantad budget', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-09-07.

BRANTING, Hjalmar. 1900. *Rickard Lindström Hjalmar Branting och Första Maj. En överblick*. Available at: <https://www.arbark.se/dokument/temp/bran1900-helsingborg.pdf>, accessed on 2015-06-07.

BRENEMARK, Thomas. 2006. 'Kampanjer på G: Stridzon Afrika', *Resumé*, 2006-05-18.

CARLSSON, Gunilla. 2017. 'Det nya arbetarpartiets resa – tur och retur', *Arbetet*, 2017-03-24.

CARLSSON, Ingvar. 1988. 'Anförande inför Deutscher Industrie und Handelstag', *Utrikesfrågor*.

— 1989. Riksdagens protokoll 1988/89:71, pp. 3, 44-46.

— 1990. 'Anförande vid SAP:s partikongress 1990-09-15', *Utrikesfrågor*.

— 1991a. 'Utdrag ur Regeringens skrivelse 1990/91:50', *Utrikesfrågor* 1990, pp. 289-290.

— 1991b. 'Roines order till överbefälhavaren: Håll tyst!', *Expressen*, 1991-06-27.

— 2003. *Så tänkte jag*, Hjalmarson & Höberg: Stockholm.

CARLSSON, Roine. 1990. 'Carlsson föreslår utökad försöksverksamhet med förkortad värnplikt', TT 1990-03-16.

— 1991a. 'Roine Carlsson till ÖB: Lämna inga försvarsförslag', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*. 1991-06-27.

- CENTRE PARTY. 1999. 'Centern öppnar för frivillig militärtjänst', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1999-02-15.
- DALSJÖ, Robert. 1999. 'Kosovokriget utmanar regeringen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1999-05-27.
- DEFENCE MINISTRY. 1991. 'ÖB får extra miljarder. Huvudlinjerna i nästa års försvarsbeslut redan klara', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1991-11-24.
- 1997. 'Miljardunderskott väntar försvaret', *Svenska Dagbladet*. 1997-11-11.
- DEGERLUND, Paul. 2017. Interview.
- ENGELBREKTSON, Karl. 2007a. 'Svenka utlandssoldater kan för lite engelska', *Sveriges Radio*, 2007-11-24.
- 2007b. '20-åringar i strid under EU:s flagg', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-01-28.
- FRESKER, Lars. 2004a. 'ÖB Håkan Syrén använder officerskåren som slagpåse', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2004-08-31.
- 2004b. 'Besked om uppsägning av officerare dröjer', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2004-11-01.
- 2017. Interview.
- FRID, Sven-Rune. 1992. 'Värnplikt kan bli civil', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1992-11-19.
- GODBERG, Siv. 2008. 'Moderat oro över försvarspolitiken', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2008-04-24.
- GUSTAVSSON, Bengt. 1990a. 'Försvaret inför år 2000', *Försvar för frihet och fred*. Stockholm: Allmänna försvarsföreningen.
- 1990b. 'Försvar på låtsas', *Expressen*, 1990-09-01.
- 1990c. 'Raines order till överbefälhavaren: håll tyst!', *Expressen*, 1991-06-27.
- 1990d. 'Efter den allmänna värnplikten: kvinnornas tur', *Expressen*, 1991-06-10.
- 1991a. 'ÖB: kränkningarna fortsätter', *Expressen*, 1991-03-01.
- 2006. Det "kalla kriget": några reflexioner, FOKK, nr. 9. Stockholm: Elanders Gotab.
- GÖRANSSON, Sverker. 2009. 'Nye ÖB tvekar inför anställt försvar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-03-27.
- HEDERSTEDT, Johan. 1998. 'Norden skapar egen FN-brigad', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-04-22.
- 1999. Internationalisera försvaret!. Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet.
- 2000a. 'Nye ÖB rustar upp för EU:s krisstyrka', *Aftonbladet*, 2000-06-25.
- 2000b. 'Nye ÖB ska förverkliga sin vision "I princip alla svenska förband ska kunna verka utomlands"', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2000-06-25.

- 2000c. 'Nye ÖB säger nej till kvinnlig värnplikt', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2000-06-30.
- 2000d. 'Förändring på bred front', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2000-07-01.
- 2000e. SvD 2000-09-08.
- 2000f. 'Vapeninsats hotar ej alliansfrihet', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2000-12-07.
- 2001d. 'Sveriges ÖB ska leda EU-armén', *Expressen*, 2000-11-21.
- 2002a. 'ÖB säger nej till ökad frivillighet för värnplikt', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2002-02-26.
- 2002b. 'Sveriges ÖB vill utöka styrkan i Afghanistan', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2002-07-24.
- 2002c. 'ÖB Johan Hederstedt vill ha ett bredare och mer flexibelt värnpliktssystem', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2002-12-05.
- 2003a. 'Försvarsministern och ÖB oense om utlandsuppdrag', *Sydsvenskan*, 2003-01-22.
- 2010. 'Så hamnade Sverige i krig', *Fokus*, 2010-02-11.
- 2016. Interview.
- HENRICSSON, Ulf. 1995. "'Vi är inga B-soldater'", *Expressen*, 1995-11-29.
- HULDT, Bo. 'Den politiska enigheten ignoreras', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2009-01-27.
- GP 2008-08-12
- HÄGGLUND, Göran. 2009. 'Avskaffad värnplikt får kritik', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-02-19.
- JERNBECK, Isabella et al. 2007. 'Försvaret får inte vara budgetregulator', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-07-29.
- 2008. 'Pengar får inte styra försvaret', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-05-22.
- JOHANSSON, Sten. 1992. 'Slutet för Sverige', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1992-01-05.
- JOHANSSON, Mats. Interview. 2015.
- JONSSON, Ulf. 2007. 'S varnar för Odenbergs förslag om slopad värnplikt', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-05-16.
- 2008a. 'Lumpen föreslås bli frivillig', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2008-10-30.
- JUHOLT, Håkan. 2007. 'Värnplikten på väg avskaffas', *Fokus*, 2007-08-30
- 2007a. 'Inriktning för försvaret stridsfråga', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-09-15.
- 2007b. 'Värnplikten har spelat ut sin roll', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-12-03.
- 2007b. 'Värnplikten kan avskaffas', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-08-30.
- 2009. 'Ny strid väntar om försvaret', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2009-01-04.

- KARLSSON, Anders. 2007a, 'Oppositionen värnar svensk försvarindustri', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-10-05.
- 2008. 'Krav på minskad svensk roll i EU-stryka', *Sveriges Radio Ekot*, 2008-11-10.
- 2008a. 'Tredubbla antalet värnpliktiga', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2008-08-11.
- 2008b. 'S vill öka antalet värnpliktiga', *Sveriges Radio Ekot*, 2008-08-11.
- 2008c. 'Beredskapskontrakt bättre än yrkesarmé', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-10-30.
- 2009a. Riksdagens snabbprotokoll, Protokoll, 2008/09:75 23, 2009-02-23.
- 2015. Interview.
- KÖRLOF, Björn, 2004a. 'Utlandstjänst kan bli billkor för värnplikt', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2005-04-04.
- 2007. '800 värnpliktiga får inte rycka in', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-04-14.
- 2016. Interview.
- LANDERHOLM, Henric and Andersson, Sten. 1998. 'Svärd och Juholt tar halvsanningar till hjälp', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-02-19.
- LANGBY, Erik. 2008. 'Intern kritik mot moderat försvarspolitik', *SR-Ekot* 2008-05-21.
- 2009. 'M-politiker kritiska till nedskärningar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-01-28.
- LENNMARKER, Göran. 2007a, 'Hård kritik mot ÖB:s hotbild', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-05-21.
- 2007b. 'Miljöutsläpp värsta hotet', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-12-05.
- 2007c. 'Säkerhet i skönmålning', *Sydsvenskan*, 2007-12-05.
- LINDER, PJ Anders. 2007. 'Hur försvarar man det man alltid varit emot?', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-09-07.
- LJUNGMAN, Lars-Ingvar. 2008a, 'Nya m betyder förnyat försvar', *Sydsvenskan*, 2008-05-23.
- LORENTZON, Karin. 2006. 'Kampanjer på G: Stridzon Afrika', *Resumé*, 2006-05-18.
- LÖVGREN, Thomas. 1993. 'Ung svensk ofta för svag för värnplikt', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1993-03-18.
- MESSING, Ulrica. 2007, 'Försvaret måste bli effektivare', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2007-01-15.
- MOORE, Mikael, 2000a. 'Förändring på bred front: stor militär förnyelse', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2000-07-01.
- 2000b. Revolution i det svenska försvaret. Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet.

- NERETNIEKS, Karlis. 1995. 'Ovisst kring svensk insats', *Göteborgs Posten*, 1995-07-19.
- NILSSON, Rolf & Isabella Jernbeck, 2008a, 'M försökte kväsa interna protester i försvarsfrågan', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2014-03-04.
- NILSSON, Rolf, 2007a. 'Partipiskan ändrade debattinlägg', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-07-28.
- 2007b. 'Rysk militär intar Östersjön', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-05-27.
- 2009. 'M-politiker kritiska till nedskärningar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-01-28.
- Nilsson. 2017. interview.
- NORDGREN-CHRISTENSEN, Annika. 2009a, 'Ny strid väntar om försvaret', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2009-01-04.
- 2009b, Bloggpost, 2009-02-12.
- NYGREN, Jan. 2009. "försvara våra värden", Röster om Sveriges försvar. Allmänna försvarsberedningen: Stockholm.
- ODENBERG, Mikael. 2006a, 'Jag är mycket, mycket nöjd', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2006-10-07.
- 2006b. 'Vi ska ha ett avspänt förhållande till Nato', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2006-10-28.
- 2006c. 'Nostalgi duger inte för nytt försvar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2006-10-29.
- 2006d. 'Militärromantik leder vilse', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2006-11-09.
- 2007a. '20-åringar i strid under EU:s flagg', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-01-28.
- 2007b. 'Ny värld kräver nytänkande', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-01-15.
- 2007c. 'Bred samsyn om vägvalet', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-06-22.
- 2007d. 'Svensk trupp slåss inte i Afghanistan', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-04-15.
- 2007e. 'Värnplikt läggs på is i fredstider', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-05-15.
- 2007f. 'Odenberg offrades i maktbråket', *Aftonbladet*, 2007-09-06.
- 2007g. 'Min efterträdare är uppenbarligen okunnig', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-12-16.
- 2017. Interview.
- PALME, Olof. 1970. Adress by the Swedish Prime Minister to the National Press Club, 1970-06-05.
- 1970. Anförande vid folk och försvars konferens i storlien, 1970-02-02.
- 1976. Anförande vid Plutonsofficersförbundets kongress i Stockholm, 1976-05-18.
- PELLNÄS, Bo. 2007, 'Reinfeldt mörklägger hotet från Ryssland', *Expressen*, 2007-10-01.

- 2008. 'Säkerhetspolitiken alliansens död', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-06-11.
- PETERSON, Thage, & Lena Hjelm-Wallén, 1995. 'Större möjlighet att lyckas nu', *Göteborgs Posten*, 1995-12-15.
- PERSSON, Göran. 2008. *Min väg, mina val*. Stockholm: Albert Bonniers förlag.
- [2007] 2018. *Aldrig ensam, alltid ensam*. Stockholm: Nordstedts.
- PETERSON, Thage. 1994a. 'ÖB avvaktar med att spara på värnplikten', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå* 1994-12-22.
- 1994b. 'Försvaret måste spara 1,8 miljarder', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1994-12-29.
- 1995a. TT 95-01-08.
- 1995b. 'Försvarsministern vill ha korttidsutbildade soldater', *Tidningarna Telegrambyrå*, 1995-01-29.
- 1995c. 'ÖB ser hot bortom horisonten', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1995-08-09.
- 1995d. 'ÖB överdriver hotet från öst', *Expressen*, 1995-09-02.
- 1995e. 'Regeringen vill banta försvaret men skjuter upp viktiga beslut', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1995-10-05.
- 1996a. 'Försvarsministern: Sverige får ett modernt försvar för framtidens hot', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1996-09-19.
- 2007a. 'Våga samarbete med Ryssland', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-05-24.
- 2007b. 'Ta hem de svenska soldaterna från Afghanistan', *Expressen*, 2007-02-20.
- PETERSON, Thage et al. 2007. 'Ta hem de svenska trupperna från Afghanistan', *Aftonbladet*, 2007-02-26.
- REINFELDT, Fredrik. 2003. 'Vi måste erövra s-präglade väljare', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2003-05-14.
- 2004. 'Vi lägger om vår ekonomiska politik', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2004-03-04.
- 2005. Moderaternas partistämman, 2005-08-26.
- 2006a. *Rapport*, 2006-09-18.
- 2006b. 'En första förklaring heter Göran Persson', *Expressen*, 2006-09-17.
- 2007a. 'Försvar på semester', *Sydsvenskan*, 2007-08-01.
- 2007b. 'Reinfeldt talade skatter', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2007-08-12.
- 2007c. 'Jag har talat med Tolgfors', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2007-09-05.
- 2008a. 'Nya m betyder förnyat försvar', *Sydsvenskan*, 2008-05-23.
- RIES, Thomas. 2008. 'Tolgfors oense med expertis om vikten av ny försvarsanalys', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2008-08-12.
- SAGRÉN, Åke. 1990. 'Värnplikt är en förmån', *Expressen*, 1990-07-16.

- 1991. 'Indragen värnplikt dyr för samh08ället', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1991-11-27.
- SCHORI, Pierre. 1988. 'Alliansfrihet och Europasamarbete', *Utrikesfrågor*.
- 1989. 'Ett säkert Sverige – Om hotbilder, styrka och svaghet', *Utrikesfrågor*.
- 1992a. 'Neutralitetspolitiken kan omprövas', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1992-01-14.
- 1992b. *Dokument inifrån, Sverige och storpolitiken i omvälvningarnas tid*, Stockholm: Tidens förlag.
- 1993. 'Snabb begäran om trupp', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1993-05-05.
- 2007a. 'Sverige ut ur Afghanistan', *Expressen*, 2007-03-30
- 2007b. 'Sverige ut ur Afghanistan', *Kvällsposten*, 2007-03-30.
- 2007c. 'Skicka svenska soldater till Afrika', *Aftonbladet*. 2007-02-12.
- SR, 2008. 'Tolgfors en belastning för alliansen', *SR*, 2008-12-30.
- SVÄRD, Anders. 2008a. Svärd, e-mail documented in archives on Utredningen om totalförsvarsplikten, Fö 2008:01, 2008-03-07.
- 2008b. 'Frivilligt göra värnplikten', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-10-30.
- 2009. 'Frivilligt göra lumpen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-06-25.
- 2017. Interview.
- SYDOW, Björn von. 1997a. 'Von Sydow tror på Alliansfriheten', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1997-05-31.
- 1997b. 'Övning för fred och kriser', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1997-05-27.
- 1997c. 'Värnpliktsutbildningen bör ses över', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1997-06-09.
- 1997d. 'Regler kring värnplikt utreds', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1997-09-18
- 1997e. Parliament Protocol. 1997-12-18.
- 1998a. 'Försvarets internationella arbete ska öka', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-01-19.
- 1998b. 'ÖB kräver nytt försvarsbeslut', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1998-01-19.
- 1998c. Diaries, 1998-02-03.
- 1998d. 'Nordiska länder bildar gemensam FN-brigad', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-04-22.
- 1998e. 'Sverige i täten i förnyelse av krigsmakt', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-05-24.
- 1998f. 'ÖB-rapporten: ÖB skrotar allmänna värnplikten', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1998-10-13.
- 1998g. 'Det är inte fråga om svenska "legostyrkor"', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-10-23.
- 1999a. 'Vissa typer av förband läggs ned', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1999-01-17.

- 1999b. 'Försvaret: von Sydow', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1999-02-03.
- 1999c. 'Värnpliktsutredningen stoppas "i skafferiet" av von Sydow', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1999-01-24.
- 1999d. 'Inte rimligt med ett invasionsförsvar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1999-05-04.
- 1999e. 'Smärtgräns nådd för värnplikt', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1999-07-16.
- 1999f. 'Von Sydow: Folkligt stöd för förändringen', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1999-10-19.
- 2000a. 'Nu ändrar vi inriktning på försvaret', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2000-01-21.
- 2001a. Värnpliktsnytt, 2001-02-13.
- 2001b. 'Ny militär revolution på gång', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 2000-01-22.
- 2002a. Riksdagens snabbprotokoll, Protokoll 2001/02:71, 2002-02-19.
- 2002b. Weekly letter from the Defence Ministry, 2002-05-04.
- 2008a. 'Ta försvaret av Sverige på allvar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-10-23.
- 2009a. Dags för Sverige att rusta upp mot Ryssland, Arbetarrörelsens tankesmedja.
- 2009b. *Gotlands Tidningar*, 2009-01-21
- 2010a. 'Så hamnade Sverige i krig', *Fokus*, 2010-02-11.
- 2010a. GP 2000-05-07?
- 2013. Diaries, 1997.
- 2015. Interview, 2015-04-15.
- SYRÉN, Håkan. 2004a. 'Nya nedskärningar väntar försvaret', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2004-01-17.
- 2004c. 'Svårt att spara försvarspengar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2004-08-18.
- 2004d. 'Officersfacket gräver skyttegravar', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2004-08-22.
- 2004e. 'Utlandstjänst kan bli villkor för värnplikt', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2005-04-04.
- 2007a. 'ÖB krävde besked av Reinfeldt om regeringens förtroende för honom', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-09-06.
- 2009a. 'Inte ens ÖB vill ha det här försvaret', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-01-31.
- THULSTRUP, Jörgen. 2017. Interview.
- TOLGFORS, Sten, 2007a. 'Tolgfors: Värnplikten avskaffas inte', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2007-11-21.
- 2007b. 'Sten Tolgfors spår fortsatt värnplikt', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2007-11-22.

- 2007c. 'Ny värnpliktslag kan bli försenad', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-11-08.
- 2007d. 'Värnplikten har spelat ut sin roll', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-12-03.
- 2007f. 'Försvarsbesparingar kritiserades', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-12-03.
- 2008a. 'Försvaret klarar i dag inte att värna Sverige', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2008-11-07.
- 2008b. 'Gemensamma förband med Norge en lösning', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2008-06-10.
- 2008c. 'Bollen har kommit i retur till Tolgfors', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-08-15.
- 2008d. 'Georgien-krisen är en täckmantel för oförmåga', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-09-09.
- 2008e. '20000 saknar militära uppgifter', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2008-08-17.
- 2009a. 'FP kräver stärkt försvar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-01-21.
- 2009b. Riksdagens protokoll 2008/09:75, 2009-02-23.
- 2009c. 'Svenskarna vill ha kvar lumpen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-03-23.
- 2009d. 'Frivilligheten stärker försvaret', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-05-08.
- 2017. Interview.
- TÄNNERYD, Jan. 1996. 'Vem får göra lumpen? Allmänna värnplikten en allt hetare stridsfråga', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1996-02-07.
- 2017. Interview.
- UGGLAS, Margaretha af, 1993. 'Bosnientrupp blir alltför dyr', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1993-02-27.
- WIDMAN, Allan. 2007. 'S varnar för Odenbergs förslag om slopad värnplikt', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-05-16.
- 2007a. 'Hård kritik mot ÖB:s hotbild', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-05-21.
- 2009. Riksdagens protokoll 2008/09:75 23, 2009-02-23.
- 2009a. 'Ny strid väntar om försvaret', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2009-01-04.
- 2009b. 'En tredjedel av armén läggs ned', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2009-01-27.
- 2009c. 'Den politiska enigheten ignoreras', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2009-01-27.
- WIKTORIN, Owe. 1994a. 'Allmän värnplikt och repövningar i farozonen när försvaret sparas', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1994-12-07.
- 1995a. 'Besparingar slår hårt mot värnplikten', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1995-06-02.
- 1995b. Försvarets Forum n. 4/1995.

- 1995c. 'Stabschef kritiserar regeringen', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1995-11-30.
- 1995d. 'Försvars-debatten oroar ÖB', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1995-08-09.
- 1995e. 'Sverige klarar inte militärt angrepp', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1995-08-09.
- 1995f. 'Hård ÖB-kritik mot försvarsberedningen', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1995-09-01.
- 1995g. 'Ryssland kan åter bli ett hot', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1995-08-15.
- 1995h. 'Vi behöver hjälp utifrån', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1995-09-24.
- 1996a. 'ÖB till hård kritik mot nedskärningar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1996-01-29.
- 1996b. 'ÖB överläter ansvaret till Riksdagen', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1996-03-04.
- 1996c. 'ÖB:s munkavle får hård kritik', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1996-03-04.
- 1996d. 'ÖB försöker ännu påverka försvarsbeslut', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 1996-08-15.
- 1996e. 'Rysslands armé kan snabbt restaureras', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1996-09-22.
- 1997a. 'Försvarsbeslut klaras utan nya pengar', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1997-12-12.
- 1998a. 'ÖB måste spara - och fördubbla FN-uppdragen', *Expressen*, 1998-01-19.
- 1998b. 'ÖB redo för hård nedskärning', *Expressen*, 1998-02-01.
- 1998c. 'Försvarsbeställningar slopas eller försenas', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1998-02-16.
- 1998d. 'ÖB vill ha nytt beslut om försvar', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-02-17.
- 1998e. 'Ryssarna inte längre hotfulla', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-10-13.
- 1998f. 'ÖB föreslår halverad armé', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1998-10-13.
- 1999a. 'ÖB kräver omprövning av svensk säkerhetspolitik', *Tidningarnas Telegrambyrå*, 1999-05-19.
- 1999b. 'ÖB varnar för mörkare världsläge', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 1999-05-20.
- 1999c. 'Fler nedläggningar kan behövas', *Dagens Nyheter*, 1999-10-19.
- 2000a. 'Stridbar ÖB vid vägskalet', *Göteborgs-Posten*, 2000-05-07.
- 2017. Interview.
- WIKTORIN, Johan. 2007a, '20-åringar i strid under EU:s flagg', *Dagens Nyheter*, 2007-01-28.
- 2007b, 'Försvarsmakten förlorar trovärdighet', *Svenska Dagbladet*, 2007-06-01.

ÅKERMAN, Kim et al. 2009, 'Vi måste bli fler - 9500 soldater räcker inte för att försvara Sverige', *Aftonbladet* 2009-01-16.

Lund Political Studies

1. Ruin, Olof. Kooperativa förbundet 1899-1929. En organisationsstudie. Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1960.
2. Vallinder, Torbjörn. I kamp för demokratin. Rösträttsrörelsen i Sverige 1886-1900. Stockholm: Natur & Kultur, 1962.
3. Petersson, Hans F. Power and International Order. An Analytic Study of Four Schools of Thought and Their Approaches to the War, the Peace and the Postwar System 1914-1919. Lund: Gleerups, 1964.
4. Westerhult, Bo. Kronofogde, häradsskrivare, länsman. Den svenska fögderiförvaltningen 1810-1917. Lund: Gleerups, 1966.
5. Wieslander, Hans. I nedrustningens tecken. Intressen och aktiviteter kring försvarsfrågan 1918-1925. Lund: Gleerups, 1966.
6. Söderberg, Olof. Motororganisationerna i Sverige. Bakgrund, grupperingar, aktiviteter. Stockholm: Rabén & Sjögren, 1966.
7. Sjöblom, Gunnar. Party Strategies in a Multiparty System. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1968.
8. Hydén, Göran. TANU Yajenga Nchi. Political Development in Rural Tanzania. Lund: Uniskol, 1968.
9. Lindeberg, Sven-Ola. Nödhjälp och samhällsneutralitet. Svensk arbetslöshetspolitik 1920-1923. Lund: Uniskol, 1968.
10. Westerhult, Bo. Underdåniga påtryckningar. Fögderitjänstemännens intressebevakning från 1800-talets början till år 1918. Lund: Gleerups, 1969.
11. Bergquist, Mats. Sverige och EEC. En statsvetenskaplig studie av fyra åsiktsriktningars syn på svensk marknadspolitik 1961-62. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1970.
12. Lundquist, Lennart. Means and Goals of Political Decentralization. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1972.
13. Bjurulf, Bo. An Analysis of Some Aspects of the Voting Process. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1972.
14. Stenelo, Lars-Göran. Mediation in International Negotiations. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1972.

15. Lindquist, Stellan. Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Record of Ghana. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1974.
16. Bjurulf, Bo. A Dynamic Analysis of Scandinavian Roll-Call Behavior. A Test of a Prediction Model of Ten Minority Situations in Three Countries. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1974.
17. Hermerén, Henrik. Regeringsbildningen i flerpartisystem, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975.
18. Johannesson, Conny. Studier över Svenska metallindustriarbetarförbundets förhandlingsorganisation vid förbundsförhandlingar – med samordning. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975.
19. Peterson, Carl-Gunnar. Ungdom och politik. En studie av Sveriges Socialdemokratiska Ungdomsförbund. Stockholm: Frihets förlag, 1975.
20. Bryder, Tom. Power and Responsibility. Contending Approaches to Industrial Relations and Decision Making in Britain 1963-1971. Lund: Gleerups, 1975.
21. Jönsson, Christer. The Soviet Union and the Test Ban: A Study in Soviet Negotiation Behavior. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975.
22. Kronvall, Kai. Politisk masskommunikation i ett flerpartisystem. Sverige – en fallstudie. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1975.
23. Liljequist, Gunnar. Distribution av kommunal service. Lund: Liber, 1977.
24. Lartey, George W. The Fourth Dimension: the argument against the theory of evolutionary stages of social development. Malmö: Gotab, 1977.
25. Weston, David. Realism, Language and Social Theories. Studies in the Relation of the Epistemology of Science and Politics. Lund, 1978.
26. Hagström, Bo. 1971 års länsförvaltningsreform. En utvärdering. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1978.
27. Skogmar, Gunnar. Atompolitik. Sambandet mellan militärt och civilt utnyttjande av atomenergi i amerikansk utrikespolitik 1945-1973. Malmö: Stenvalls Förlag, 1979.
28. Sannerstedt, Anders. Fri konkurrens eller politisk styrning? 1963 års trafikpolitiska beslut – debatten om innehåll, tillämpning och effekter. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1979.
29. Lidén, Anders. Security and Recognition. A Study of Change in Israel's Official Doctrine 1967-1974. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1979.
30. Magnusson, Håkan. Kommunerna och den regionala planeringen. En analys av länsplaneringen och den fysiska riksplaneringen. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1980.
31. Stenelo, Lars-Göran. Foreign Policy Predictions. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1980.
32. Lundell, Bengt. MBL utan avtal. Kommunerna och MBL. Helsingborg, 1981.

33. Norrving, Bengt. Kommunerna och bostadsförsörjningen. En analys av bostadsplaneringen. Lund: Liber, 1981.
34. Linderoth, Sven. Från konkurrens till monopol. En studie av lokal politisk och ekonomisk journalistik. Malmö: Dialog, 1981.
35. Forje, John. The One and Indivisible Cameroon: Political Integration and Socio-Economic Development in a Fragmented Society. Lund, 1981.
36. Adebo, Tarekegn. Ideological Trends in the Political Thinking of the Developing Regions: The Case of Sub Saharan Africa. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1982.
37. Elgström, Ole. Aktiv utrikespolitik. En jämförelse mellan svensk och dansk parlamentarisk utrikesdebatt 1962-1978. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1982.
38. Lindkvist, Kent. Program och parti: principprogram och partiideologi inom den kommunistiska rörelsen i Sverige 1917-1972. Lund: Arkiv för studier i arbetarrörelsens historia, 1982.
39. Bergström, Tomas och Lundell, Bengt. Från MBL till MBA. Kommunerna och MBL. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1982.
40. Hörberg, Thomas. Prediktion, osäkerhet och risk i internationella förhandlingar. En studie av svenskt förhandlingsbeteende vid förhandlingarna med Sovjetunionen 1940-41 om ett handelsavtal. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1983.
41. Geraedts, Henry. The People's Republic of China: Foreign Economic Relations and Technology Acquisition 1972-1981. Lund: Forskningspolitiska institutet, 1983.
42. Jerneck, Magnus. Kritik som utrikespolitiskt medel. En studie av de amerikanska reaktionerna på den svenska Vietnamkritiken Lund: Dialogos, 1983.
43. Stenelo, Lars-Göran. The International Critic. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1984.
44. Bergström, Thomas och Lundell, Bengt. Lokalt medbestämmande. Kommunerna och MBL. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1984.
45. Sjölin, Mats. Kommunalpolitiken i massmediernas spegel. En studie av dagspressen och lokalradions bevakning av fem kommuner. Lund: Dialogos, 1985.
46. Albinsson, Per. Skiftningar i blått. Förändringar inom Moderata Samlingspartiets riksorganisation 1960-1985. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1986.
47. Jonsson, Rolf. De okända förhandlingarna. Statens förhandlingsråd och regeringens MBL-förhandlingar. Lund: Dialogos, 1986.
48. Polak, Jiri. Dependence Patterns in the Soviet Bloc: The Case of Romania and East Germany. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1986.
49. Lundell, Bengt. Kommunerna och MBL. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1986.
50. Rothstein, Bo. Den socialdemokratiska staten. Reformen och förvaltning inom svensk arbetsmarknads- och skolpolitik. Lund: Arkiv, 1986.

51. Pierre, Jon. Partikongresser och regeringspolitik. En studie av den socialdemokratiska partikongressens beslutsfattande och inflytande 1948-1978. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1986.
52. Schmidt, Stephan. Pionjärer, efterföljare och avvaktare. Innovationer och deras spridning bland svenska primärkommuner. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1986.
53. Westerlund, Ulf. Superpower Roles. A Comparative Analysis of United States and Soviet Foreign Policy. Lund: Department of Political Science, 1987.
54. Lundquist, Lennart. Implementation Steering. An Actor-Structure Approach. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1987.
55. Stenelo, Lars-Göran, red. Statsvetenskapens mångfald. Festskrift till Nils Stjernquist. Lund: Lund University Press, 1987.
56. Nilsson, Ann-Sofie. Political Uses of International Law. Lund: Dialogos, 1987.
57. Bergström, Tomas. Konkurrerande eller kompletterande demokrati? Om företagsdemokrati i de svenska kommunerna. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1988.
58. Lindell, Ulf. Modern Multinational Negotiation: The Consensus Rule and Its Implications in International Conferences. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1988.
59. Stenelo, Lars-Göran, red. Makten över den decentraliserade skolan. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1988.
60. Lundquist, Lennart. Byråkratisk etik. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1988
61. Petersson, Harry, red. Vem styr förändringarna inom sjukvården – politikerna eller de medicinska professionerna? En studie av subspecialiseringen inom ortopedin. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1989.
62. Jonsson, Rolf. Fackligt inflytande och politisk demokrati. En analys av regeringens MBL-förhandlingar. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1989.
63. Johannesson, Bengt. Kommunal bostadspolitik. Lund: Kommunfakta Förlag, 1989.
64. Aronson, Torbjörn. Konservatism och demokrati. En rekonstruktion av fem svenska högerledares styrelsedoktriner. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1990.
65. Petersson, Bo. The Soviet Union and Peacetime Neutrality in Europe. A Study of Soviet Political Language. Göteborg: MH Publishing, 1990.
66. Lundquist, Lennart. Förvaltning och demokrati. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1991.
67. Höjelid, Stefan. Sovjetbilden i nordisk press. Svenska, norska och finländska reaktioner på sovjetiskt agerande. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1991.
68. Jansson, Per. Säkerhetspolitikens språk: Myt och metafor i svensk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs 1919-1939. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1991.

69. Johansson, Jörgen. Offentligt och privat i regionalpolitiken. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1991.
70. Lundquist, Lennart. Förvaltning, stat och samhälle. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1992.
71. Håkansson, Anders. Konsten att vinna ett val. En studie av fram- och tillbakagångar för socialdemokraterna i kommunalvalet 1988. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1992.
72. Ternblad, Klas. Planering i norm och handling. Studier av en epok av landstingsplanering. Lund: Wi, 1992.
73. Persson, Stefan. Dödlägen i internationella förhandlingar. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1992.
74. Sannerstedt, Anders. Förhandlingar i riksdagen. Lund: Lund University Press, 1992.
75. Lundquist, Lennart. Ämbetsman eller direktör? Förvaltningschefens roll i demokratin. Stockholm: Norstedts, 1993.
76. Gynnerstedt, Kerstin. Etik i hemtjänst. En studie av förvaltnings- och professionsetik. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1993.
77. Schartau, Mai-Brith. The Public Sector Middle Manager: The Puppet who Pulls the Strings? Lund: Wi, 1993.
78. Sjölin, Mats. Coalition Politics and Parliamentary Power. Lund: Lund University Press, 1993.
79. Stenelo, Lars-Göran och Norrving, Bengt, red. Lokal Makt. Lund: Lund University Press, 1993.
80. Iwanaga, Kazuki. Images, Decisions and Consequences in Japan's Foreign Policy. Lund: Lund University Press, 1993.
81. Tita-Ghebdinga, Legala. African and O.A.U. Diplomacy on Dual Paradigms of Self-Determination 1945-1985. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1993.
82. Lundquist, Lennart. Statsvetenskaplig förvaltningsanalys. Problem, trender och program. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1994.
83. Blom, Agneta P. Kommunalt chefskap – en studie om ansvar, ledarskap och demokrati. Lund: Dialogos, 1994.
84. Agevall, Lena. Beslutsfattandets rutinisering. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1994.
85. Andersson, Jan A. Nordiskt samarbete: aktörer, idéer och organisering 1919-1953. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1994.
86. Bengtsson, Hans. Förskolereformen. En studie i implementering av svensk välfärdspolitik 1985-1991. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1995.
87. Uhlin, Anders. Democracy and Diffusion. Transnational Lesson-Drawing among Indonesian Pro-Democracy Actors. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1995.

88. Kinnvall, Catarina. Cultural Diffusion and Political Learning. The Democratization of China. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1995.
89. Westlind, Dennis. The Politics of Popular Identity. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996.
90. Stubbergaard, Ylva. Stat, kris och demokrati. Lapporörelsens inflytande i Finland 1929-1932. Lund: Arkiv, 1996.
91. Sendabo, Teferi. Foreign Aid and State Sovereignty: The Ethio-Swedish Aid Co-operation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1996.
92. Mattson, Ingvar. Förhandlingsparlamentarism. En jämförande studie av riksdagen och folketinget. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996.
93. Larsson, Per. Regimförhandlingar på miljöområdet. En studie av förhandlingarna om LRTAP-konventionen. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1996.
94. Stenelo, Lars-Göran och Jerneck, Magnus, red. The Bargaining Democracy. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996.
95. McKnight, Utz Lars. Political Liberalism and the Politics of Race. Beyond Perfectionism and Culture. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996.
96. Steiner, Kristian. Strategies for International Legitimacy. Lund: Lund University Press, 1996.
97. Lundquist, Lennart. Fattigvårdsfolket. Ett nätverk i den sociala frågan 1900-1920. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997.
98. Andersson, Ronny. Medborgarna, politikerna och sjukvården. En studie av attityder och demokrati. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1997.
99. Kronsell, Annica. Greening the EU: Power practices, resistances and agenda setting. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997.
100. Thunborg, Annika. Public and Non-Profit Interaction: U.S. Assistance to Eastern European Media 1989-1995. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997.
101. Johansson, Karl Magnus. Transnational Party Alliances: Analysing the Hard-Won Alliance Between Conservatives and Christian Democrats in the European Parliament. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997.
102. Badom, Ted Gogote. Foreign Intervention in Internal Wars. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1997.
103. Söderholm, Peter. Global Governance of AIDS: Partnerships with Civil Society. Lund: Lund University Press, 1997.
104. Lundquist, Lennart. Demokratins väktare. Ämbetsmännen och vårt offentliga etos. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1998.
105. Gustavsson, Jakob. The Politics of Foreign Policy Change. Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership. Lund: Lund University Press, 1998.

106. Hall, Patrik. *The Social Construction of Nationalism: Sweden as an Example*. Lund: Lund University Press, 1998.
107. Sönne, Maria. *Administrative Reforms and the Quest for Foreign Investment in China – The Case of Shenzhen*. Lund: Lund University Press, 1999.
108. Aggestam, Karin. *Reframing and Resolving Conflict. Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations 1988-1998*. Lund: Lund University Press, 1999.
109. Tallberg, Jonas. *Making States Comply: The European Commission, the European Court of Justice, and the Enforcement of the Internal Market*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1999.
110. Hall, Martin. *Constructing Historical Realism: International Relations as Comparative History*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1999.
111. Spång, Mikael. *Justice and Society: Problems of Reformist Politics*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 1999.
112. Svedberg, Erika. *The "Other" Recreated: A Relational Approach to East-West Negotiations*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2000.
113. Ericson, Magnus. *A Realist Stable Peace: Power, Threat and the Development of a Shared Norwegian-Swedish Democratic Security Identity 1905-1940*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2000.
114. Bengtsson, Rikard. *Trust, Threat, and Stable Peace: Swedish Great Power Perceptions 1905-1939*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2000.
115. Stoltz, Pauline. *About Being (T)here and Making a Difference? Black Women and the Paradox of Visibility*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2000.
116. Bäckstrand, Karin. *What Can Nature Withstand? Science, Politics and Discourses in Transboundary Air Pollution Diplomacy*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2001.
117. Lundquist, Lennart. *Medborgardemokratin och eliterna*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2001.
118. Hedin, Astrid. *The Politics of Social Networks: Interpersonal Trust and Institutional Change in Post-Communist East Germany*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2001.
119. Sundström, Mikael. *Connecting Social Science and Information Technology. Democratic Privacy in the Information Age*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2001.
120. Jönsson, Christer, Jerneck, Magnus och Stenelo, Lars-Göran, red. *Politik i globaliseringens tid*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2001.
121. Gustafsson, Rune. *Syntes och design. Den intellektuelle politikern som konstnär*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2001.

122. Danjoux, Olivier. *L'Etat, C'est Pas Moi*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2002.
123. Jönsson, Kristina. *Translating Foreign Ideas into Domestic Practices. Pharmaceutical Policies in Laos and Vietnam*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2002.
124. Bengtsson, Marie. *Stat och kommun i makt(o)balans. En studie av flyktingmottagandet*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2002.
125. Björkdahl, Annika. *From Idea to Norm. Promoting Conflict Prevention*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2002.
126. Badersten, Björn. *Medborgardygd. Den europeiska staden och det offentliga rummets etos*. Stockholm: Bokförlaget natur och kultur, 2002.
127. Boussard, Caroline. *Crafting Democracy. Civil Society in Post-Transition Honduras*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2003.
128. Janson, Per. "Den huvudlösa idén": Medborgarlön, välfärdspolitik och en blockerad debatt. Lund: Arkiv, 2003.
129. Santesson-Wilson, Peter. *Studier i symbolpolitik*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2003.
130. Johnson, Björn. *Policyspridning som översättning*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen och Arbetslivsinstitutet, 2003.
131. Sundström, Mikael, Rosén, Malena och Hall, Martin. *En guide till mellanstatliga organisationer*. Lund: Studentlitteratur, 2004.
132. Sjövik, Kristian. *Demokrati bortom nationalstaten?* Lund: Department of Political Science, 2004.
133. Hellström, Lennart. *Brandts politiska tänkande. En studie i kontinuiteten i Brandts politiska tänkande*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2004.
134. Lindberg, Staffan. *The Power of Elections – Democratic Participation, Competition and Legitimacy in Africa*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2004.
135. Bexell, Magdalena. *Exploring Responsibility. Public and Private in Human Rights Protection*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.
136. Jerre, Ulrika. *Conflicting Logics? Implementing Capacity and EU Adaptation in a Postcommunist Context*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.
137. Rindeljäll, Teresia. *Democracy Beyond the Ballot Box. Citizen Participation and Social Rights in Post-Transition Chile*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.
138. Fernandez, Christian. *Medborgarskap efter nationalstaten? Ett konstruktivt förslag*. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.

139. Nilsson, Tom. Till vilken nytta? Om det lokala politiska deltagandets karaktär, komplexitet och konsekvenser. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.
140. Stripple, Johannes. Climate Change after the International: Rethinking Security, Territory and Authority. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.
141. Erlingsson, Gissur. Varför bildas nya partier? Om kollektivt handlande och partientreprenörer. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.
142. Strömvik, Maria. To Act as a Union. Explaining the Development of the EU's Collective Foreign Policy. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2005.
143. Niklasson, Tomas. Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change: Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956-1994. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2006.
144. Hellström, Anders. Bringing Europe Down to Earth. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2006.
145. Melander, Fredrik. Lokal Forskningspolitik: Institutionell dynamik och organisatorisk omvandling vid Lunds Universitet 1980-2005. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2006.
146. Hegeland, Hans. Nationell EU-parlamentarism. Riksdagens arbete med EU-frågorna. Stockholm: Santérus Academic Press, 2006.
147. Lundquist, Lennart. Att hantera humanvetenskapens tudelning. Malmö: Liber, 2006.
148. Ahrnens, Anette. A Quest for Legitimacy. Debating UN Security Council Rules on Terrorism and Non-proliferation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2007.
149. Alasfoor, Reyadh. The Gulf Cooperation Council: Achievements and Challenges. A Political Analysis to the Study of Regional Integration of the GCC States. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2007.
150. Hedlund, Maria. Demokratiska genvägar: Expertinflytande i den svenska lagstiftningsprocessen om medicinsk genteknik. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2007.
151. Bolin, Anna. The military profession in change – the case of Sweden. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2008.
152. Broman, Matilda. Taking Advantage of Institutional Possibilities and Network Opportunities. Analyzing Swedish Strategic Action in EU Negotiations. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2008.
153. Kalm, Sara. Governing Global Migration. Lund: Department of Political Science, 2008.
154. Rosén Sundström, Malena. Förankring av socialdemokratisk EU-politik. Med rum för demokratisk debatt? Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2008.

155. Dannestam, Tove. Stadspolitik i Malmö. Politikens meningsskapande och materialitet. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009.
156. Knaggård, Åsa. Vetenskaplig osäkerhet i policyprocessen. En studie av svensk klimatpolitik. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009.
157. Uçarlar, Nesrin. Between Majority Power and Minority Resistance: Kurdish Linguistic Rights in Turkey. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009.
158. Conrad, Maximilian. Between Communication and Community. EU Constitution-Making, a European Public Sphere and the (Un-)likelihood of Transnational Political Debate. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2009.
159. Scuzzarello, Sarah. Caring Multiculturalism. Local Immigrant Policies and Narratives of Integration in Malmö, Birmingham and Bologna. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010.
160. Strömbom, Lisa. Revisiting the Past. Israeli identity, thick recognition and conflict transformation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010.
161. Fägersten, Björn. Sharing Secrets. Explaining International Intelligence Cooperation. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010.
162. Karlsson, Rasmus. Three essays on our planetary future. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2010.
163. Lundquist, Lennart. Flocken i massamhället. Den politiska ordningens villkor och uttryck. Lund: Arkiv, 2011.
164. Lundquist, Lennart. Slutet på yttrandefriheten (och demokratin?). Stockholm: Carlssons, 2012.
165. Wahman, Michael. Uniting Against Autocrats. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2012.
166. Hultén, John. Ny väg till nya vägar och järnvägar. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2012.
167. Mukhtar-Landgren, Dalia. Planering för framsteg och gemenskap: om den kommunala utvecklingsplaneringens idémässiga förutsättningar. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2012.
168. Lund, Emma. Hybrid Governance in Practice – Public and Private Actors in the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2013.
169. Gustafsson, Nils. Leetocracy: Political participation, social network sites and inequality. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2013.
170. Persson, Anders. Defining, Securing and Building a Just Peace: The EU and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2013.

171. Melander, Stina. Kassakultur i förändring. Samspelet mellan organisationskultur och administrativa reformer på Försäkringskassan. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen 2013.
172. Hildingsson, Roger. Governing Decarbonization: The State and the New Politics of Climate Change. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2014.
173. Narby, Petter. Time of Crisis: Order, Politics, Temporality. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2014.
174. Pettersson, Jonna. Incalculable Community. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2015.
175. Rennick, Sarah Anne. The Practice of Politics and Revolution: Egypt's Revolutionary Youth Social Movement. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2015.
176. Fredén, Annika. Strategic Voting under Coalition Governments. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016.
177. Edenberg, Emil. Nothing more to see: Contestation of belonging and visibility in Russian media. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen och Malmö: Institutionen för globala politiska studier, 2016.
178. Nielsen, Tobias D. Words Matter in the Woods: Discourses on Deforestation in Global Climate Politics. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016.
179. Ingesson, Tony. The Politics of Combat: the Political and Strategic Impact of Tactical-Level Subcultures, 1939-1995. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016.
180. Altermark, Niklas. After Inclusion: Intellectual Disability as Biopolitics. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016.
181. von Schéele, Cecilia. The Void. Urban wasteland as political space. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016.
182. Gustafsson, Sofie. Medborgarskapande på olika villkor. Självbilder, skolkoder och syn på kunskap i den svenska gymnasieskolan. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016.
183. Knotz, Carlo. Getting Tough on Unemployment: Essays on the politics of unemployment benefit reform in affluent democracies. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2016.
184. Nilsson, Klas. The Money of Monarchs: The importance of nontax revenue for autocratic rule in early modern Sweden. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017.
185. Nyberg, Linda. Market Bureaucracy: Neoliberalism, Competition and EU State Aid Policy? Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017.

186. Andersson, Per. *Essays on the Politics of Taxation*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017.
187. Gusic, Ivan. *War, peace & the city: Urban conflicts over peace(s) in postwar Belfast, Mitrovica and Mostar*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017.
188. Fred, Mats. *Projectification | The Trojan Horse of Local Government*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.
189. Waaranperä, Ulrika. *Histories of land. Politicization, property and belonging in Molo, Kenya*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.
190. Engstrand, Sandra. *State Learning and Role Playing – International environmental cooperation in the Arctic Council*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.
191. Chaib, Josef. *Experts, Evidence, and Other Knowledge: The Government of Welfare Collaboration*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.
192. Boyer, Kurtis. *An Autocracy of Empathy: A Relational Approach to Understanding our Failure to Recognize the Moral Significance of the Nonhuman*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.
193. Hedling, Elsa. *Blending Politics and New Media – Mediatized Practices of EU Digital Diplomacy*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.
194. *Vänbok till Ole Elgström. The EU and the emerging global order*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2018.
195. Östbring, Björn. *Migrationspolitiska dilemman. Om idealism och realism i liberal politisk teori*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019.
196. Orange, Mia. *Sustaining Authoritarianism: Clientelism and Repression in Kyrgyzstan, Kenya, Tanzania and Kazakhstan*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019.
197. Möller, Ina. *The Emergent Politics of Geoengineering*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019.
198. Lindberg, Mårten. *Why Sweden suspended military service: tracing the policy process, 1990 to 2009*. Lund: Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019.

Why Sweden suspended military service



For little more than a century military service enacted cherished Swedish values of equality, solidarity and doing one's part for the common good. What started out as a military recruitment policy in 1901 matured into an institutional feature of Swedish society; appreciated by society, the conscripts, the Armed Forces and by political parties to the left and the right.

In a pursuit to preserve military service in the post-cold war period, governments to the left and the right initiated a reform in the early 1990s. In contrast to the political objective, however, it leads parliament to suspend military service in 2009. By tracing the policy process from 1990 to 2009, Mårten Lindberg answers why military service was suspended in Sweden, identifying new explanatory concepts and mechanisms.

Mårten Lindberg's dissertation focuses on the importance of institutions (written and unwritten rules, norms and social expectations) for the functioning and efficiency of public policy. It also points out the importance that public policy has in creating and maintaining institutions in society.

