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Citizenship and migration of the poor: Sweden during the 19th century

Sara Kalm
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Citizenship and migration of the poor: Sweden during the 19th century

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Modern statehood is often defined by reference to its bounded territory, over which its monopolization of violence and its various administrative powers is exercised. But the modern state is also a membership organization, defined by the institution and the principle of citizenship. What is distinctive about the modern form of citizenship is, among other things, that it is both internally inclusive and externally exclusive, it establishes legal equality so that the membership in the state transgresses all other memberships and allegiances, and defines membership independently from merely residence.

In this text I want to investigate the relationship between modern citizenship and the control of the movement of the poor. I will try to argue that modern citizenship was partly elaborated in response to the migration of poor people. Since the middle ages, assistance to the poor had been a responsibility for local parishes and municipalities. In the 19th century, overpopulation and destitution uprooted large segments of the population who became increasingly mobile. In this context the local organization of poor assistance became a source of contention between localities as each tried to shield itself from the influx of the unwanted poor. This in turn was an obstacle for the state that was striving for unitary internal sovereignty, forcing it to take on responsibility for the poor and thus to move towards homogenous citizenship.

My theoretical approach is largely historical sociological in character. The focus on the movement of the poor also brings in an element of social history into the account of the evolvement of the modern state. I rely principally on an element of Rogers Brubaker’s argument in *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992: chapter 3). My overarching aim is to contribute to the wider debate on the evolvement of the modern state in the long 19th century, which has so far often tended to overlook questions of membership or subsume it under territory.

*On method and data*

Sweden is my country case. Brubaker elaborated his argument in relation to Germany where he argued that the mobility of the poor precipitated the formation of confederative and later federative efforts. To take control over, and manage, the movement of the poor was thus important for shaping modern German citizenship towards its current “multilevel” structure in a context of gradual unification
(cf. Maas 2017). Sweden was in contrast a unitary state throughout the period, which makes it interesting to see whether any similar political process into modern citizenship took place there. Later on, and if time allows, I would like to develop this into a comparative study and bring in cases with differing politico-spatial makeups. I am primarily considering Austria, which at the time was the center of an empire, and the United Kingdom, which had an empire overseas. Alongside these differences these three countries experienced similar macro sociological processes, such as industrialization, urbanization, demographic transition, technological developments, the spread of liberal ideas etcetera – although at different paces. The data that I use on Sweden consists of secondary sources and legislation.¹

The study is delimited in several ways. Most importantly, perhaps, my focus is on domestic movement regulations. In the second half of the 19th century, there was also a large overseas emigration from among similar social strata that concerns me here. 1.2 million people, from a population that in 1900 amounted to 5.2 million, left Sweden between 1821 and 1930, mainly for the United States (Stråth 2012: 294). I will refer to emigration in passing, but my focus here is on movements and the forms of control exerted internally, within Sweden’s territory. Another delimitation is that I consider citizenship in its formal sense, as a juridical status. The two other main dimensions of citizenship are identity and rights (Joppke 2010). Of these, I will not take intersubjective notions of identity or nationality into account, whereas rights will only be treated secondarily to juridical status.

There is quite a significant earlier historical research on Sweden in the 19th century that directly or indirectly concerns the movement of the poor. This research makes up a large part of my data. Some of it take a broad perspective, as I do here, while others are delimited to a short time span or a single locality, which is then explored in detail. There is a relevant historical literature on topics such as vagrancy (Johnsson 2016; Edman 2008), unemployment regulations (Olofsson 1996; Wallentin 1982; Junestav 2008), correctional institutions (Nilsson 1999; Petersson 1983) and regulations

¹ In a future version, I plan to add a background section, in which I bring in information on migration regulations in different European countries. For this part I rely on data that Johannes Lindvall and I compiled as part of the STANCE research program. See http://www.stanceatfund.org Thanks to Moa Olin for excellent research assistance on this part.
particularly directed at the Roma population (Ericsson 2012; Montesino 2012). I also make use of literature written on relevant policy areas, such as the development of social policy (Berggren and Nilsson 1965; Montgomery 1951; Jordansson 2008; Åström 2008; Qvarsell 2008) and passport regulations (Lövgren 2018, 2000; Rosander 2008). I have not come across any study that specifically links up the migration of the poor to the evolvement of Swedish citizenship, the way that I do it here, which is how I hope to make a contribution.

Citizenship in state theory

Citizenship does not figure prominently in most works on state theory. By that, I mean that the shaping of the modern legal institution of citizenship as linked to statehood has not been given much attention. Quite long ago, Rogers Brubaker noted this weakness in the literature, that I would say, with some exception, holds true today:

Conceiving the modern state as a territorial organization and the state system of territorial states, political sociology has for the most part neglected citizenship and membership. It has made too little of the fact that the state is a membership association as well as a territorial organization; that the state constitutes itself, and delimits the field of its personal jurisdiction, by constituting its citizenry; and that political territory, as we know it today—bounded territory, within a system of territorial states, to which access is controlled by the state—presupposes membership, presupposes some way of assigning persons to states, and distinguishing those who enjoy free access to a particular state territory from those who do not (Brubaker 1992: 79).

In classic realist international relations theory, citizens are only conceived of as an element of state power. Its character can enhance

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2 For an overview of state theory, see Jessop (2016), especially chapter 1.
3 I am thinking primarily about the literature that historicizes passports and identity documents (e.g. Torpey 2000; Caplan and Torpey 2001; Salter 2000; Robertson 2010; Noiriel 1996). This literature discusses techniques for distinguishing between citizenries, but do not tend to confront the question of membership head on. The topic of the legitimacy of bounded membership has also become prominent in political theory since then (see Fine and Ypi 2016 for an overview) but this is normative and not historical in character and therefore beside the point here.
state power or be detrimental to it. To Hans J. Morgenthau, it is the relative size of the population that matters, along with its national character and morale – for instance the willingness to sacrifice one’s life for the nation (Morgenthau 1948: 91–104). A similar instrumental role is important in the historical sociology. Citizens are there often mentioned in relation to the evolving state’s extraction capacity: as tax payers, laborers and soldiers, and in the case of women, as reproducers of the nation. The better the administrative capacities of the state, this literature holds, the more effectively it can penetrate society and extract the needed capacities and resources from people and land (Tilly 1990; Mann 1993; Yuval-Davis 1997).

The literature emphasizes that the capacity to extract the needed resources from the population has to do with centralization but also with what Michael Mann calls “infrastructural power”: “the institutional capacity of a central state to ... penetrate its territory and logistically implement decisions” (1993: 59). The growing importance of statistics, censuses and other aspects of “information capacity” during the 19th century should be seen against this background (Brambor et al 2019). Through them, and through the dissemination of standardized forms of language and measurements, did citizens become increasingly “legible” – and thus governable – for the state in this period (Scott 1998).

Several authors have noted that the relationship between the state and its citizenry becomes more complex over time. People cease to be merely resources to exploit and subjects that shall be made to obey, and over time acquire more complex roles in the eyes of the state (Poggi 2003; Skinner 2008). Michel Foucault argues that the evolvement of the modern state since the 16th century has paralleled the ever-increasing importance of the population for state governing ambitions. The population is on the one hand targeted as a collection of individuals, who can be separated, trained and disciplined into existing norms. On the other, it is targeted as a biological, living entity that follows its own laws and regularities concerning nativity, mortality, fertility and so on. The latter, especially, demonstrates that the state often needs to use softer means of intervention, in contrast to coercion (Foucault 2007). Foucault’s account helps us to grasp how the state came to take on a greater responsibility for the welfare of its population. But it does not focus on the citizenry as a delimited membership in the modern fashion.
The notion of territory, in contrast to citizenship, is at the center of most definitions of the state. In Max Weber’s famous definition, the state is “the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory – and this idea of “territory” is an essential defining feature” (Weber 2004: 33). There has been a tendency in social theory, traditionally, to assume and not problematize what territory is, as has been argued by for instance Agnew (1994) and Brenner et al (2003). But later scholarship has proceeded in unpacking the concept and explore its various economic and social meanings (Poulantzas 2003; Harvey 2006) as well as its historical, philosophical and political meanings and dimensions (Elden 2013; Taylor 2003; Brenner et al 2003). Henri Lefebvre, for example, has argued that the state territory combines and “produces” physical space together with social space and mental space (Lefebvre 2009).

While the notion of territory has thus become explored and historicized in the literature, the same cannot be said about citizenship. Scholars have instead tended to ignore it, or to treat it as secondary to territory. Benjamin de Carvalho comments that “the historicity of the subjects of the state is still largely unexplored, or, even worse, now subsumed into the historical process of territorialization: overshadowed, so to speak, by the emergent hegemony of territoriality” (2016: 58). The assumption has generally been that the boundaries of citizenship has neatly coincided with those of the territory, from which has followed an unproblematized notion of citizenship. An example from the international relations literature is Barry Buzan, who puts territory and population together in his notion of the state’s “physical base” (Buzan 1991). Below, I will argue that citizenship needs to be understood separately from territory, and that the history of the two needs to be treated as partly distinct. I will also argue that, although unnoticed in Buzan and Lawson’s argument for the importance of the 19th century for understanding the state and the state system (2013), modern citizenship went through important developments in the period between the French Revolution and the outbreak of the First World War. These developments were in turn, I argue, partly precipitated by increased migration, especially of the poor.

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4 But see Benton 2010; Brett 2011...ADD
Migration, welfare and the state

Some neighboring work should be mentioned, before laying out the theoretical framework in the next section. Brown and Oates (1987) have developed a political economy argument about the relationship between the mobility of the poor and the centralization of poor relief. They hold that when poor relief is locally provided and financed, as was the case in Europe for most of the 19th century, the mobility of the poor will lead to inefficiencies. Local authorities will try to keep costs down by avoiding to take on responsibility for poor immigrants, effectively dumping them on their neighbors, which will lead to conflicts between them. Over time, central authorities will need to either put an end to internal immigration, or transfer the responsibility for poor relief to the national level (Brown and Oates 1987).

There is also a broader political science literature on the relationship between social policy and immigration policy, which focuses on levels of closure and openness. The “welfare chauvinist hypothesis” holds that the higher the level of welfare that a state provides to its citizens, the more restrictive it will be towards immigrants, since each of them represents a new potential cost. The restrictiveness may concern either admission policy, or the level of rights extended to newcomers (Freeman 1986). This hypothesis resonates with existing political debates, but research has shown that it often does not hold. In fact, the relationship is commonly the reversed, so that comprehensive welfare states demonstrate more openness to immigrants. The reason might be that the welfare state is associated with norms – of solidarity, assistance, and universality – that over time are spread and extended to newcomers as well (Boräng 2015; Sainsbury 2012; Crepaz 2008). “Over time” in the last sentence is an important qualifier. The cited research all cover the last decades only. Johannes Lindvall and myself have found evidence of welfare chauvinism in the 1880–1920 period. This may not contradict the mentioned findings but only mirror that the welfare state, and its associated norms, were new and not quite settled at that time (Kalm and Lindvall 2019). In another piece we identify evidence of restrictiveness linked to poor relief provisions at the local level for the pre-1880 era in several countries (Kalm and Lindvall 2018).

The above-mentioned works are relevant for understanding the linkage between social provisions and the control over the movement of the poor, but they do not explore further how this was historically
linked to the evolvement of the institution of citizenship. To this we will now turn.

The state as a membership organization

Historical accounts of citizenship tend to focus on the gradual evolvement of state-citizen relations in terms of rights. T. H. Marshall set the pace when he located the emergence of civil rights in the 18th century, of political rights in the 19th century, and of social rights in the 20th century (Marshall 1950). This can be called an “internalist” perspective on citizenship, and it disregards closure and boundaries. It can be contrasted with an “externalist” perspective, which approaches citizenship from the point of view of the state system. Boundaries and closures then take central stage. Citizenship appears as a divisive institution, that partitions the global human population into the subpopulations of different, discrete states, and distributes responsibility for their wellbeing onto the same. This makes it necessary to distinguish between one’s own and other countries’ citizens, and to be able to erect barriers to outsiders (Hindess 2000). The externalist perspective takes closure seriously, as it considers it a structural necessity that derives from the state system. But in contrast to the internalist perspective, it offers a static view of citizenship, and does not take into account how this state system model of citizenship evolved over time. What we need is therefore an account of citizenship that manages to combine internal and external perspectives, that can grasp its aspects of closure while putting it in a historically changing context.

This is what Brubaker accomplishes in his historical account of early German citizenship. His *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (1992) has been of great importance for migration, citizenship and nationalism studies. Perhaps most enduring has been his argument that the two countries significantly differ in their relationship to newcomers: France’s citizenship regime is “civic” in orientation, while Germany’s is “ethnic”. In this text I will instead focus on a less-remembered part of his argument, which – moreover

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5 The difference between domestic and international political perspectives has been described in these terms, the former being progressive and historical, the latter static and ahistorical (Walker 1993).
I have not found as clearly expressed in any other, more recent scholarship (ibid: chapter 3). The greatest advantage for me is that it allows me to connect the control over internal movements of the poor to state-making, by means of its effect on the evolvement of citizenship.

According to Brubaker, besides delimited territory and monopoly on violence, the state is also a membership organization. It is organized around a particular modern conception of citizenship as simultaneously internally inclusive and externally exclusive. It is thus “hard-on-the-outside and soft-on-the-inside” (Bosniak 2007: 245). Internal inclusiveness was accomplished through the evolvement of legal equality which put people in direct relation to the state. External exclusiveness was attained when rules for acquiring membership was specified and defined independently of residence in the territory. These factors make citizenship much different from other – earlier – forms of membership. I will go through them both in a little more detail.

Towards internal inclusiveness
Legal equality necessitates that the state is the only source of legitimate law, which furthermore covers the whole territory. This is established as part of the process toward internal state sovereignty, and signifies a radical break with the medieval period when legal orders were multiple and overlapping. Legal equality moreover involves that the relation between the individual and the state is direct, and not mediated by intermediate membership organizations such as guilds or estates. Such groupings had previously determined the individual’s legal standing, his level of privileges and duties – for the most part already at birth. When the state moved towards internal sovereignty, membership in the state needed to become more important than all previous memberships and allegiances (although not necessarily erasing them), and to create legal equality between citizens in their place. This occurred in a very radical manner in France, with the 1789 revolution. In most other countries, the process

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6 Bosniak and others have qualified this jurisdictional approach to citizenship, which appears to them unrealistically binary. In contemporary democracies, there are for instance a great number of denizens, rights-holding resident non-citizens. But in my understanding, it is still relevant for a historical study, since it was in the period here that this model of membership evolved. It should be understood as an ideal typical model, with defining features but never quite realized in practice.
was more piecemeal and slower, and continued into the 20th century. (It should be remembered that what concerns me here is principled and de jure equality, not de facto equality.) There were many steps along the way. It was significant when the state stepped in as regulator of the estates, even if they remained important: the point is that the state then ended their autonomous status. Another crucial development was the establishment of freedom of trade, of enterprise, and of labor. This caused a gradual decrease in the economic significance of the towns, it allowed people to make investments and take up professions that had previously been restricted to a particular group, and as we will see it also allowed people to move around in search for work. The mentioned legal developments were all in the economic domain. “To be sure, citizenship presupposes legal equality and legal equality was realized in the economic domain... The result was a unitary, homogenous space, within which all persons were formally free and equal economic actors” (Brubaker 1992: 61–62). The move “from status to contract” that Henry Sumner Maine (1861) saw as the defining shift from pre-modernity to modernity, was thus crucial for legal equality and internal inclusiveness.

The move towards legal equality meant that corporate membership lost significance to national and territorially defined law as shaper of life chances. But this is not enough to talk about modern citizenship – for this new form of membership to emerge it needs to be possible to exclude non-members. This is the second main feature of modern citizenship.

Towards external exclusiveness
The emphasis is on the possibility for closure, for defining the external boundaries of membership. These boundaries are moreover drawn between state members and non-members, which is not quite the same as between residents and non-residents. This contrast with an earlier period, when law was exerted over anyone inhabiting a particular territory, and the distinction between citizen and foreigner was not so important. It is significant that many European countries first during the 19th century developed legislation on citizenship, that clearly distinguished between members and nonmembers, and set up rules for the acquisition of membership at birth (ascription) and later in life (naturalization).
How did this occur? According to Brubaker, a main factor was the movement of the poor, and how this should be handled under conditions of liberal economic integration. “The connecting link was migration, more precisely the migration of the poor. Prussian state-membership was codified as a means of shielding the state against foreign poor, while preserving freedom of movement within the state.” (Brubaker 1992: 63). The connection to membership-based citizenship is elaborated in this longer quote:

In the early modern period membership and residence were not sharply distinguished. But to the extent that they were distinguished, residence, more precisely domicile, was the more fundamental category, while membership, that is, subjecthood, was understood to follow from it. Domicilium facit subditum – domicile makes the subject – was a universally accepted maxim. Membership had a territorial base. In the face of migrant poverty, just this was problematic. It left the state open to the accession of new members by osmosis, as it were, through entry and settlement in its territory, even without its knowledge or approval... Effective closure against the migrant poor required a sharper separation of membership and residence, and a reversal in their causal relationship. Domicile should be contingent on membership, not membership on domicile. Membership, defined independently of residence, should be the fundamental category (Brubaker 1992: 70).

As mentioned, in Germany as well as in most other European countries, the poor was for as long as can be remembered the responsibility of local authorities. For a long time, it was exclusively a matter for religious authorities, but became over time secularized. When the poor became increasingly mobile, the local authorities faced a new situation which called for new regulations, that ended up more restrictive in character: “Previously, de facto domicile had sufficed to establish membership ... Now towns increasingly made membership contingent on formally approved domicile. In this way local authorities could prevent the poor or persons who might become poor from establishing municipal membership and thereby a claim to municipal support.” (Brubaker 1992: 64, emphasis added). The distinction between one’s own and others was first made in relation to beggars, at the point when local beggars were allowed but foreign ones prohibited and deported. At a later stage, begging was forbidden completely, and the distinction that mattered most became responsibility for poor relief claimants. This led to frictions between
localities as all tried to externalize responsibility, with internal deportations and inter-municipal negotiations as consequences. When the state was striving for internal sovereignty, this could not be allowed, since it put peace and stability at risk.

When it moved towards legal equality, the tension was exposed. As peasants were freed from their previous masters, and as freedom of movement and occupation was established in law, it became very difficult to sustain the autonomy of municipal poor relief. Then the state began to interfere— not by taking over provisioning for the poor (as Brown and Oates 1987 would expect) but by entering as a regulator. This involved legally defining the relationship that localities had towards their poor and, crucially, to define when and to whom legal domicile should be extended. “The aim of the state was to coordinate membership policies so as to ensure the ‘full coverage’ of the population; ideally, everyone would be a member of some town or village commune.” (Brubaker 1992: 64–65). In practice it also involved that the municipalities’ authority to exclude the poor was limited to actual (and not just potential) poor relief claimants. In a next step, this dynamic was repeated at another level in Brubaker’s account of Germany. The importance of establishing bonds of responsibility for the poor became as important at the state level, as it had previously been at the local level. This led to a series of bilateral treaties that occasioned the formation of the German Confederation in 1815.

The state intervention in codification domicile at the local level – for the purposes of poor relief responsibility – directly preceded the codification of state membership at the national level. And it is through this codification that citizenship became “complete” in Brubaker’s account – i.e. as a membership status in the modern state:

Citizenship had crystallized as a formally defined and assigned status, distinct from residence. The citizenry was externally exclusive as well as internally inclusive. Citizens, regardless of Stand, town or province, stood in an immediate relationship with the state. Citizenship could henceforth serve as the legal point of attachment for certain common rights and obligations in the domain of immigration law, military service, or (later) political rights. It could serve as an instrument and object of closure.” (Brubaker 1992: 71).

The need to separate citizenship from residence, opened up for a conception of citizenship as based on descent rather than place of
birth, i.e. *ius sanguinis* rather than *ius soli*. In the case of Germany, this descent principle later came to take on ethnic characteristics.

**Sweden – social and legal contextualization**

We will now turn to the case of Sweden, to investigate whether the same pattern was present there. This involves detecting the process towards internal inclusiveness on the one hand, and towards closure and membership on the other, and to see whether considerations regarding the control over the movement of the poor appear to have been present. After a brief contextualization, the account that follows will be structured accordingly. To be clear, I do not treat this as a theoretically derived hypothesis but as a historically identified pattern, which is interesting to investigate in another country context. The different processes, discussed below, should also probably not be understood as actually separate, for their contemporaries – the division is made to order the data in a hopefully pedagogical way and to link back to Brubaker’s account (above).

In the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, there were intense concerns with “the social question”, in Sweden as well as in other European countries. Macro sociological processes such as industrialization, urbanization and demographic change deeply affected societies, created new elites but also new forms of poverty, vulnerability and associated problems. The social question was understood as covering many different social ills, among them prostitution, drunkenness, degeneracy and vagrancy (Edman 2008: 131; cf. Stråth 2016: chapter 2).

One factor was the enormous population increase during the 19th century. There were around 187 million Europeans in 1800 compared to 400 million a century later, and in Sweden the population rose from 2.3 million to more than 5 million in the same period (Sundbärg 1910: 11, 78–79). An effect was a steep decrease in landowning farmers. The pattern of young people taking over their family farm when their parents grew old, was broken in the early 19th century: there were not farms enough to sustain the growing population. What instead followed was a diversification of non-propertied farm workers into
different categories, as well as social declassification and poverty (Stråth 2012: 251).

A consequence was that poor people became increasingly mobile. When people could not support themselves in their farms and villages, they had to move in order to find employment and provide for themselves. As mentioned above, a sizeable share of them chose to emigrate, especially between 1880 and 1930, but there were also considerable internal movements. A new and mobile social underclass emerged. The elites regarded them with fear, as a threat to themselves as well as to the social order at large. But from the point of view of the elites, the mobile poor also presented an opportunity, in that it could provide cheap labor. A pool of “free”, waged labor, was needed when industrialization began to take off in rural locations as well as urban centers. Labor needed to be mobile and adaptable to new and shifting demands on the labor market, and the rural poor therefore also constituted a labor market resource (Stråth 2012: 251–253). Political debates and policies on this topic during the 19th century were therefore drawn in two conflicting directions. On the one hand controlling the movement of this “dangerous” population group, on the other satisfying the demand for labor.

The poor were the object of much governmental and legal strategies. A background condition for our discussion here is that employment was compulsory until 1885 (tjänstevåget). All able-bodied adults, who did not own property in the forms of land or economic resources, had to be employed by a master. The individual duty to support oneself was laid out as early as in the medieval laws (landskapslagarna). It was then established that each person who did not have sufficient means was obliged to work for the Crown, and this principle was continued in later, national legislation in the 16th century (Kjellson 1920: 167–169). Punishments for the unemployed were severe and over time have included flogging and having one’s ears cut off. Since the 16th century forced labor in service to the Crown was more common, and until 1824 so was forced conscription to the army (SOU 1923: 13–16; Nilsson 1999: 124–125; Rosander 1978: 11–12).

A crucial legal distinction separated those that enjoyed legal defense (lagförsvar) from those that did not, and hence were

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7 For instance: torpare, pigor, drängar, inhyseshjon, backstugisittare, daglönare.
“defenseless” (försvarlösa). The term legal defense came about with legislation on the nobility’s privileges in 1569 and 1617, where it originally referred to the freedom from military conscription that members of this social group enjoyed. It later took on a more general meaning, and essentially meant the protection from being treated as a vagrant, that members of all social estates that were engaged in any “proper” activity, enjoyed (Kjellson 1920: 170). Vagrancy (löstriveri) and defenselessness (försvarlöshet) were hence legal synonyms that justified coercive action (Johnsson 2016: 25).

Towards internal inclusiveness

The process towards legal equality is what creates the internal inclusiveness of citizenship, making it supposedly “soft-on-the-inside” (Bosniak 2007: 2451). It homogenizes by erasing previous barriers between people and locations and by putting individuals in direct relationship to the state (cf. Harvey 2006, chapter 12). I cannot grasp the full range of legal developments through which this was accomplished, but want to mention some of the most relevant ones, following Brubaker.

One concerns the role of the estates, the ständers. The four ständers – nobility, clergy, burgess and commoners – were represented in Parliament until 1866, when it was replaced by a bicameral system. But already at the time of the 1810 parliamentary reform was the system of the four estates – that was first introduced in the 17th century – considered outdated by many (Möller 2015: 21–34). The ständer had different privileges and roles. The nobility was exempted from most taxes, and held the highest offices. Its role was important, but it was not as dominating as in some other European countries, and feudalism did not really take hold in Sweden. The burgess were town-based merchants, who monopolized business and commerce, who took part in town governance and were subject to urban legal codes (ibid: 24; XXXX).

The privileges and monopolies were gradually abolished, as legal reforms created a homogenized economic space and steps were taken towards legal equality within that space of activity. Internal customs duty had been in place since 1622 to be paid by anyone who transported goods meant for sale into cities (lilla tullen), and this was
abolished in 1810 (Lövgren 2018: 47). Another old regulation that was abolished was the guild system. All burgess craftsmen had been organized in guilds (skrån), that controlled entry to and effectively monopolized the respective trades. The guild system heavily criticized from a liberal opposition that became more vocal from around the 1840s. The guild system was ended in 1846 for the countryside. In 1864, the more comprehensive law on freedom of commerce led to its abandonment in the towns as well (XXX).

Reforms that establishes freedom of exchange and commerce are necessary conditions, but they are not sufficient for economic spatial integration. For that to be accomplished, the freedom of movement of labor also needs to be in place (Harvey 2006: 375–376). To this we will now turn.

**Freedom of movement – regulating the movement of the poor**

I will be a little more detailed on the freedom of movement, since this is directly relevant for the topic at hand. For legal equality to be established, people need to be able to move freely and on equal terms across the territory. If we only consider passport legislation, this was obtained in 1860. But movement was regulated in other legislations as well, and I will therefore also consider vagrancy laws and master and servant legislation (tjänstehjonsstadvorn) that regulated legal defense (Wallentin 1983: 8–11; Olofsson 1996: chapter 2).

Today, we tend to take for granted that we are entitled to leave our country of citizenship, as well as to move about and settle freely within it. These are also recognized as human rights in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights from 1948. But historically they have been severely limited, and Sweden as in most other countries. Passports were required for both domestic and international travel until 1860. Travels abroad were generally forbidden in 1620. The reason was the felt need to increase the population, in line with mercantile thought, and particularly to retain needed able manpower, merchants and craftsmen. The nobility was exempted since among their privileges was the right to study and learn abroad. Members from the other ständer were allowed to go abroad, for instance for trade and learning their crafts, but they then needed proper documentations and permissions. There were tough punishments for those that travelled abroad without proper permissions and documentation. Losing inheritance rights was one example, and in the late eighteenth century one could be sentenced
to death if found guilty for the third time. The prohibition particularly targeted servants, who were mobile because they did not own any land and therefore more likely to leave. This group was not represented politically at either national or local level, which facilitated the prohibition (Lövgren 2018: 48–51, Losman 2005: chap. 25).

Passports for internal travels were required since the 16th century, and went through many different reforms since then. For a very long time it was not obvious that it was the role of the state to issue passport and to inspect them. The inns where travelers stayed overnight were for instance carrying out control over movements. They were ordered by law to keep records of travelers and to deliver these to the crown bailiff (kronofogden) (after 1917 to the police) (Losman 2005: chap. 25). Passports were also issued by many different authorities. The local administration (magistraten) was the main one, and the one that common people turned to. Other instances included military commanders, university chancellors, even the inspectors of student associations (Rosander 1978: 13). Employers – masters – provided certificates for their servants when travelling, so that they would not be mistaken for vagrants (Lövgren 2018: 95). The information given in passports were for a long time not uniform and standardized, especially not before 1812 (ibid: 149). They usually included destination, reason for travelling, duration of validity, and some description of physical appearance. But some categories of travelers (for instance Jews, Roma people, peddlers) were required to complement with health certificates since it was believed that they were spreading venereal diseases (Rosander 1978: 12). For the defenseless (ie unemployed) it was since 1824 required to include information on reputation in the passports (Lövgren 2018: 85).

Passport controls have served different purposes. In times of wars and coups has the control over spies, traitors and defectors been a core motivation. But a major purpose has always been to control the movement of the poor, and this was the primary purpose during the 19th century. The ambition was to prevent begging and criminality but also to defend the existing order from perceived social threats, associated with vagrancy and unemployment (Petersson 1983). This was the objective that motivated an 1812 law on domestic passports, and in 1823 and 1824 came new legislation that meant to make it more difficult for these “suspicious” people to acquire
passports. The norm was that people be employed, self-supporting and sedentary, and all mobile poor should be detected, compelled to work, or sent back to their localities that were responsible for them (Lövgren 2018: 71–72, 85).

The passport was an important tool for managing internal movements, and thereby to reach the objectives in other areas of legislation as well, for instance poor relief legislation (see below), vagrancy (lösdriveri) and the master and servant act (tjänstehjonsstadgan). It was the latter that specified who enjoyed legal defense and who was defenseless (försvarslös). Such legislation was negotiated by the ständers and supported by broad layers of the population (Lövgren 2018: 75).

The master and servant acts regulated working relations generally. The first is from 1664, and the last is from 1833. The 1833 act applied particularly to maids, farmhand workers, and statare. It specifies that the servant needs to be godfearing, faithful, hardworking, obedient sober and moral. The master was required to provide for the servant including in cases of illness. The master should treat him or her (literally: “it”) with kindness and compliance, if it so deserves. If not, with strictness and severity. The master had legal right to deliver corporeal punishment to servants, although this was restricted to the young in 1833. Mobility was regulated as it was prohibited for a servant to travel without permission from the master and to leave before the working year had ended. In those cases, masters were permitted to bring them back home with use of force (Tjänstehjonsstadgan 1833: § 1, 5, 7, 10; 14: 44; 50). The master and servant legislation expressed a patriarchal, hierarchical and pre-industrial view of society, in which having a master was a necessary condition for even being considered part of decent society. This view became outdated over the course of the 19th century, as waged labour expanded and labour market relations became more volatile and temporary. It was repealed in 1926, but then had for some time been out of use (Stråth 2012: 370).

The same law also regulated legal defense/ defenselessness, that had been introduced in the 17th century. § 1 explains who is

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8 Statare were married contract workers in larger country estates. Although it was men who were formally employed, it was often a requirement that the wives worked, too. The harsh labour, especially for women, is well documented. These workers were mostly paid in kind (stat). It was mainly basic foodstuff, such as grain, milk, potatoes and perhaps a chicken or a pig (Stråth 2012: 281).
considered having legal defense. Besides those that have employment, it includes among others those that with legal permission are engaged in the arts, in trade, studies, factories, crafts, shipping, those that own property, and those that receive poor relief. All others are required to attain employment, in order not to burden society (Tjänstehjonsstadgan 1833: § 1). The law did not take into consideration whether there were any employments available, but instead made this the responsibility of the individual.

If one was defenseless, one could be treated as a vagrant. An 1802 law explained that “each member of society has a duty to be of benefit to that society through proper occupation, and no vagrant or idler should be suffered, either in town or countryside” (my translation).9 A law two years later provided a broad definition of vagrancy, divided into ten different categories.10 Among them were ex-convicts, that either were unemployed or disobedient of their sentenced restrictions to visit certain cities or locations, moreover unemployed journeymen and discharged soldiers, foreign defectors, and all those that lack legal protection (försvarslösa) including Roma (zigenerare) and travellers (tattare). All these categories of people were to be sentenced to work for a non-defined period of time. Such sentences were to be passed by county governors, a state and not a local or municipal authority (SOU 1923: 17). The volume of sentenced vagrants grew steeply. The work companies and workhouses did not suffice, and vagrants continued to fill up prisons. Nilsson shows that the increase in prison inmates noticeable in this period was to a large extent attributable to vagrants. These had in most cases had not committed criminal acts but were only guilty of a “status crime” (Nilsson 1999: 121–123; cf. Johnsson 2016: 17–21).

Because of the practical problem of crowded prisons, the definition was narrowed in 1819, but this was soon criticized for being too lenient. A new master and servant act in 1833 in many ways returned to the earlier and harsher approach.11 A distinction was drawn between those that were only defenceless and those that were defenceless as well as depraved, that is, found guilty of certain

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9 “Var och en medlem i samhället är pliktig att gagna det allmänna med nyttig verksamhet; och skall ingen löstringsare, landskrykkare eller fattig lidas vara sig i stad eller på landet.” (Värvmingsstadgan 1802, quoted in SOU 1923: 16).
10 Förordning om allmänna arbetställen 1804.
11 Förordningen den 23 juni 1833 huru med försvarslösa personer förhållas borde.
crimes. The former was first allowed some time to find employment, and he was also issued a passport to travel to a destination where that could be obtained. If this was not successful, the defenceless person was taken into public care. He could be sent to a workhouse, or to the newly instituted *pionerlären* (later *kronoarbetslären*) – a work corps modelled on the military, where he would both work and receive moral education. In the last instance he was sent to a correctional institution, where he would be kept apart from criminals. The category of depraved *and* defenceless people, however, was to be sent directly to a correctional institution. For both groups, the punishments were not time limited (SOU 1923: 18–19; Nilsson 1999: 104, 121–126, 200–207). In 1846, a new regulation made punishments limited in time. Defenceless people who had committed some kind of crime were to be held for either three or four years, all others for two (SOU 1923: 20).

In 1860, passport laws were repealed. As in many other European countries, people could now and until the outbreak of the First World War normally leave and enter the country, and travel within the country, without passports. The reasons were the liberal and market-oriented ideas that had already dismantled the guild system and established freedom of trade and commerce. Liberal parliamentarians and commercial interest groups were upset about passports’ inefficiency and detrimental consequences for trade (Lövgren 2000).

At this point it is probably reasonable to say that freedom of movement for labor was established, which meant that an important step toward legal equality and internal inclusiveness was taken. But there were important exceptions, deriving from the enduring concerns with the mobility of the “deviant poor” (cf. Althammer 2014). The laws on defenselessness and compulsory labor were in force until 1885, and in the meantime the unemployed defenseless were not covered by the new freedom of movement. Other exceptions were former interns in workhouses, peddlers and

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12 There is a discussion between Marxists and liberals on the meaning of this freedom, in which I do not enter here. While liberals see the movement of wage labor as a great expansion of freedom, Marxists tend to emphasize that the condition of the wage worker delimits his freedom, as he has nothing more to sell than his labor power. This makes him exploitable, and the expanded freedom is clearly limited because it is conditioned on capitalism (see Harvey 2006: 380–381).
small-scale travelling tradesmen, who still needed passports (Lövgren 2018: 137–141).13

When defenselessness was removed from the legal vocabulary in 1885, a new law on vagrancy set in. Merely being unemployed was not reason enough to be considered a vagrant, who was defined in this law as somebody who roamed about from place to place, who did not have any means of subsistence, who did not seek employment, and whose ways of life threatens public security, order and morality. Edman underlines the durability of this vagrancy law. It was, with some changes and amendments, in force until 1965, when it was replaced by similar legislation on dangerous antisocial behavior (samhällsfarlig asocialitet). Only in 1982, with the reform of social services, was vagrancy finally removed from legislation. Edman therefore contends that the long 19th century for the vagrant was indeed very long: lasting almost into the new millennium (Edman 2008: 132).

Towards external exclusiveness

The second dimension of modern citizenship is its external closure. This foreign-citizen distinction becomes more important for distributing responsibilities and duties than those between older forms of social divisions (between estates and guilds etc) – which does not necessarily mean that these other belongings are abolished or irrelevant. The citizen-foreigner distinction, moreover, is formulated independently from residence. In Brubaker’s account an important factor was the distribution of responsibility for the poor.

Historically begging has been an important way of alleviating poverty, and much policy has centered on trying to suppress it (Dahlstedt et al 2019). Here, we are mainly interested in divisions between those that were allowed to beg and those that were not. In 1698, begging was restricted to those that counted as belonging to the locality. Begging for “foreigners” was prohibited and the guilty were

13 There were many other exceptions, targeting particular groups. The Sami population, in contrast to others, were forced to move about. Their nomad lifestyle was seen by authorities as defining them, and was a condition for their access to land, schools and housing (“lapp- ska-vara-lapp-politiken”) (Ericsson 2016: chapter 4).
deported (Lövgren 2018: 69). Later on, the main concern came to be about the responsibility for poor relief claimants.

**Poor relief**

The poor had for many centuries been the responsibility of local church parishes, and this was laid down in legislation in the 18th century. The poor and unproportioned tended to move to other parishes in search for work and livelihood, and often ended up claiming poor relief there. An ever more pressing issue was then to determine what parish that was responsible for a particular pauper, the one where he was born or the one where he moved, or some other one? In 1788 it was established in law that responsibility fell on the parish where the poor had right of domicile (hemortsrätt), which was usually where he was registered. The law also established that the local parish had the right to exclude the migrant poor and prevent them from settling if they were deemed likely to end up claiming poor relief. The parishes used this right very broadly, excluding not only those that could not work, but also unmarried mothers, families with many children, and others unwanted. This greatly limited the mobility of the poor, made them increasingly exposed to punishments for vagrancy, and very vulnerable in times of famine (Montgomery 1951: 40–46; Jordansson 2008). Another consequence was that municipalities avoided to register the mobile poor and thereby provide them with hemortsrätt, since they feared economic burdens. And since they were not registered, they could not attain passports, and since they did not have passports they could not move to find work, without running the risk of being detained as vagrants. Anna-Brita Lövgren therefore concludes that they were the “undocumented workers” of those days (2018: 148).

There were continuous struggles between parishes but also between the local level and the state. Given these difficulties the suggestion was raised to nationalise poor relief. This is precisely what theory would lead us to expect when the potential claimants of relief become increasingly mobile. The arguments that were raised was that this would relieve struggles between localities, ensure similar levels of support, and even out the costs for poor relief between parishes. The counter-arguments were that nationalisation would make poor relief more costly because control would become more complicated and inefficient. The responsibility therefore stayed at the local level (Montgomery 1951: 69–70). But legislation about
vagrancy and compulsory-service provided the national level complement.

The poor relief act of 1847 established that society did have a responsibility to provide scanty assistance to the poor. It also ended the parish right to prevent settlement. But the responsibility for poor assistance still lay with the parish of domicile. The law tones down the responsibility of masters, and instead puts the responsibility with local administrations. The role of the church is also reduced as a public poverty board (fattigvårdsstyrelse) shall be set up in every municipality. Those that applied for poor relief but were denied, were now given the right to appeal. The law also expressed a view of unemployment which at the time was new and controversial: those that on account of unemployment had so far been treated under vagrancy laws, should now be offered work instead of punishment (Stråth 2012: 372–374; Montgomery 1951: 99–107). The somewhat more understanding and softer approach to poverty was repealed with the law 1871. It limited the responsibility of state and municipalities. Poor relief was not to be offered to able-bodied adults. It was no longer the duty of municipalities to provide jobs in difficult times, and the right to appeal was removed. Forced labour was reintroduced as a punishment for vagrancy (Montgomery 1951: 113–119).

During the last two decades of the 19th century did the workers movement began to organize. There were increasing demands that poor relief be seen as a social right, retaining the dignity of the person rather than declassifying her. Moreover, under influence from Bismarck’s reforms in Germany did ideas of social insurances of various kinds appear. There were laws of worker protection for factory workers 1889, of state-backed health insurance 1891, of workplace accidents 1901, and of old age pension 1913. The poor relief law of 1918 reflected this move towards a rights-based view. Among other things, the level of assistance was now not just “scanty” but more comprehensive. Municipalities had responsibility to set up old age homes, and to pay for hospital care. The right to appear was reintroduced. Moreover, the practice to auction off the care of orphans and elderly poor to the lowest bidder was not made unlawful (Stråth 2012: 374–382; 409; Edebalk 2008; Qvarsell 2008; Åström 2008).

Brubaker argued in the case of Germany that there was a clear link between developments in poor relief policy and the establishment of modern citizenship. We can see this link in Sweden.
too. The citizenship legislation of 1894 was elaborated in cooperation with the other Nordic countries. This cooperation was initiated in 1888 because of the migration of poor people, the need to sort out who were responsible for what pauper, and to regulate repatriation (Ersbøll 2015: 8; Bernitz Lokrantz 2012: 2). In Sweden, there had been some regulations before, but it was now that “firmer nationality rules developed” (Bernitz Lokrantz 2012: 2). Among other things, it set out explicit rules for membership acquisition both through naturalization and at birth. It was the first time that *ius sanguinis* was established in law (ibid: 3), which signaled a type of membership not reducible to residence on the territory.

**Emigration**

Brubaker delimited his analysis to the internal migration of the poor. But it seems to me that in Sweden at least, membership was also worked out in relation to outwards mobility of the same group, that is, emigration. When labor was abundant, people starved, and the mobility of vagrants was threatening, authorities did not really object to people leaving. As we saw above, emigration was legalized in 1860. Emigration really took off with the failed harvests of the 1860s, and it peaked between the 1880s and 1920 (Stråth 2012: 295). After a while, the voluminous emigration started to be seen as problematic. This was partly because of nationalism and ideas about biological race that appeared towards the end of the century, and made some politicians deplore that the sons of the nation left and were replaced by “suspicious” foreigners. The latter were of “bad blood”– Jews and Roma in particular – or potential revolutionaries (Ericsson 2016: 164). But it was to no small degree due to the lack of labor power in certain sectors of the economy. A series of private initiatives tried to convince potential emigrants to stay home, and an ambitious official report was commissioned (*Emigrationsutredningen*) (Stråth 2012: 293–309. But the concerns raised by emigration also marked citizenship legislation. Authorities now had to specify under what conditions citizenship was retained or lost due to emigration. Return migration was quite considerable (200 000) so citizenship rules needed to be worked out with this in mind too. In the 1894 Act it was specified that emigrants lost their citizenship after ten years abroad, if they did not actively communicate that they wanted to retain it. But it was also possible to regain it, for those that returned and settled in Sweden. The condition was that they had not in the meantime acquired
another citizenship. In 1909 this was amended so that even those could regain Swedish citizenship upon resettlement in Sweden, provided that the other nationality was in a country with which Sweden had a bilateral agreement (the USA or Argentina), and provided that he renounced it when becoming again a Swedish citizen (Bernitz Lokrantz 2012: 3). We can therefore see that emigration too, and not only domestic migration, raised concerns which necessitated the formulation of citizenship rules that were partly independent from residence.

Summing up

In this paper I have tried to make the argument that the migration of the poor, and particularly the varied attempts at controlling it, was one important factor for the evolution of modern citizenship. Modern citizenship is here understood in a formal, juridical sense, as internally inclusive as well as externally exclusive. In turn, the establishment of modern citizenship has been, and is, a vital component of the modern state, which theories of the state tend to overlook.

I have picked up on Rogers Brubaker’s (1992) argument on the case of Germany, and attempted to see whether Sweden, a unitary state, followed a similar pattern. I have found that it did, on the whole, although there are differences in pace and sequencing. The first dimension was internal inclusiveness, and here we saw that Sweden like Germany followed a pattern of piecemeal reforms. Over time, the state became more important than previous social memberships, and various reforms established greater equality in the economic realm. When it comes to the movement of labor, there were desires both to free it up for the benefit of industry, and to suppress the movements of the deviant poor. Freedom of movement was established in 1860, but there were exceptions for vagrants and other perceived as deviant. The second dimension was external exclusiveness. We could see that the responsibility for the poor was for a long time at the local level. The role of the state grew when it specified rules for domicile and belonging in relation to responsibility for the poor. It also continuously worked out the distinction between the deserving and the undeserving poor, where
the former was entitled to poor relief and the latter treated as defenseless vagrants. Rules on national citizenship was worked out in cooperation with other Nordic countries partly to settle what jurisdiction was responsible for poor migrants. I also emphasized the importance of emigration, which turned out to be important in the Swedish case. The modern form of citizenship, which separated membership from residence, was worked out both in relation to the domestic and the international movement of the poor.

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