LUND UNIVERSITY

DE RISU – Representations and Evaluations of laughter in Greek and Latin Literature

Papers presented at Colloquium Balticum XVI (Lund, November 6–9, 2018)

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DE RISU – Representations and evaluations of laughter in Greek and Latin literature

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Preface

Some twenty years ago the classics departments of five universities around the Baltic decided to create a network for mutual contacts and cooperation within teaching and research. The original participants were the universities of Greifswald, Lund, Riga, Tartu, and Vilnius. After some years, Marburg replaced Greifswald and, occasionally, other universities have also been involved (Helsinki, Poznań, Saint Petersburg, etc.).

The annually recurring *Colloquia Baltica* have become an important part of our activities. These are meetings where teachers and advanced students of the five universities present their ongoing research and its results. A great variety of themes have been discussed on these occasions, but many contributions have focussed on the adoption and impact of classical studies in north-eastern Europe. A volume with studies in that field of research was published in 2017: A. Jönsson & G. Vogt-Spira (eds.), *The Classical Tradition in the Baltic Region. Perceptions and Adaptations of Greece and Rome*. Hildesheim 2017 (Spoudasmata 171).

The individual colloquia have not generally resulted in the subsequent publication of conference volumes. However, when the sixteenth *Colloquium Balticum* was arranged by Lund University in November 2018, the organizers decided to publish this volume, which contains a fair selection of the papers presented at the colloquium.

The theme of the colloquium had been defined as "Representations and evaluations of laughter in Greek and Latin literature". The following pages demonstrate that this theme can be approached from widely different angles.

In the first paper of the volume, Vita Paparinska discusses the opinions of ancient theorists, primarily Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, on the effects of humour and laughter-evoking elements in literature and oratory.

The workings of irony and feigned seriousness in the philosophical context of Xenophon's *Symposium* are analysed by Gita Bērziņa. Claudia Zichi demonstrates how Plato, when laying out the model of his ideal state, handled the problem of

the laughter-provoking elements that normally occurred in public performances of his time.

In the ancient societies, irony and ridicule were frequently used for disparaging or stigmatizing adversaries and enemies, such as political rivals (Nijolė Juchnevičienė on Themistocles), an opponent in court of law (Dovilė Čitavičiūtė & Audronė Kučinskienė on Cicero against Verres), or grammarians of a different school (Jerker Blomqvist). When characterizing a person, historical or fictional, a writer could adduce inappropriate laughing and scornful mockery as signs of his moral depravity (Astrid Nilsson on Johannes Magnus' *Historia de regibus*).

The problems that present-day translators are met with when transferring the gelastic elements of ancient comedy into modern languages are studied by Johanna Akujärvi (Aristophanes) and Maria-Kristiina Lotman & Anna Shkuratova (Plautus).

Johanna Aujärvi   Jerker Blomqvist   Karin Blomqvist

Humour: Perspective of ancient theoretical writings

VITA PAPARINSKA

In the second book of Cicero's treatise *De oratore*, one of the speakers, Gaius Iulius Caesar, makes a noteworthy statement. He says that he has done studious research on humour but has found no proper Greek study of the subject, only collections of witticisms. Those authors who had tried to formulate rules and principles of humour, had been unsuccessful in their attempts.[1]

The comment on the non-existence of Greek humour scholarship is an overstatement. Plato speaks about the causes and effects of laughter. Aristotle expresses his opinion on laughter and laughter-evoking pronouncements in several of his surviving works, though the discussion generally amounts to a few paragraphs within a discussion of another area. Besides, antiquity has preserved some testimony on the Greek humour scholarship. Diogenes Laertius mentions Theophrastus' treatise Περὶ γελοίου.[2] Quintilian refers to a Greek study on humour that had been entitled Περὶ γελοίου,[3] and he notes that precepts for the employment of humour have been established by Greeks and Romans.[4] By "Romans" Quintilian primarily means Cicero, whom he calls "the peak of eloquence" (*vir praecipuus in eloquentia*)[5] and who was the first theorist of antiquity to discuss humour and its various aspects from a systematic perspective[6]. Cicero's comprehensive treatment of humour was re-established by Quintilian himself.[7]

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[1] Cic. *De or.* 2.216.
[2] Diog. Laert. 5.46.
[3] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.22.
[4] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.11.
[5] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.3.
[6] Cic. *De or.* 2.216-290, Cic. *Orat.* 26. 87-89.
[7] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3

A caveat about terminology

1. The general, most often used terms of the four ancient theorists (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian), whose opinions and pronouncements are considered in the paper, are the Greek γέλως and the Latin *risus*. The problem is that both lexemes denote, *first*, laughter as a physical act and, *secondly*, a laughter-evoking object. In most cases, however, it is not difficult to differentiate the meaning from the context.

2. If γέλως and *risus* denote the physical act of laughing, they are translated and referred to in the paper as "laughter".

3. If γέλως and *risus*, and their cognate lexemes τὸ γελοῖον/τὰ γελοῖα and *ridiculum/ridicula* denote a laughter-evoking object, the translation is "humour" (except in translation tradition confirmed cases). Hereby the paper relies on the Oxford English dictionary which defines *humour* as "the quality of being amusing or comic, especially as expressed in literature or speech."[8]

4. An additional argument for the choice of the term *humour* is its etymological history that proves that the modern meaning of the lexeme was latently inherent in the Greek lexeme χυμός already in the antiquity.

The literal meaning of χυμός is 'juice'.[9] Hippocrates probably was the first to apply the term to medicine in the meaning of 'fluid'.[10] As to the development of the lexeme χυμός into the notion of humour, Hippocratic writings are of special interest. The Hippocratic treatise *De natura hominis* discusses four vital bodily fluids of the human body – blood (αἷμα), phlegm (φλέγμα), yellow bile (χολὴ ξανθή), black bile (χολὴ μέλαινα).[11] The result of the balance and imbalance of bodily fluids is correspondingly good health and bad health. The notion of the bodily fluids is not denoted with a specific term – the idea is inherent in the pronoun ταῦτα. Hippocratic theory of the four bodily fluids re-emerges in the writings of Galen. Galen in his commentary on the Hippocratic treatise *De natura hominis* correlates four fluids, four seasons and four phases of human life, thus creating "a relationship between the elements (fire, air, water and earth) and the humours and, above all, a relationship between humours and character".[12] In reference to Hippocrates' four bodily fluids, Galen uses the term στοιχεῖα.[13] This is the term generally used to denote bodily fluids in the Greek medical writings of late antiquity when the theory of four temperaments (phlegmatic, sanguine, bilious and melancholic) be-

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[8] *OED*, s.v. *humour*.
[9] LSJ, s.v. χυμός.
[10] Hippoc. *VM* 18–19.
[11] Hippoc. *De nat. homin.* 40, 50.
[12] Jouanna 2012, 339.
[13] Gal. *In Hippocratis de Natura Hominis* 29.

comes dominant.[14] The term χυμοί appears but occasionally.[15] The corresponding term in Late Latin sources is *umor*[16] (literally 'fluid', 'liquid', 'moisture').[17]

During the Middle Ages, humour was understood as a quirky or odd character trait. It still did not have any association with laughter. In the sixteenth century, the idea of humour as a specific character trait led to it being used to refer to any behaviour that deviates from the accepted pattern of behaviour. Thus, a "humour" came to mean something odd, eccentric, or peculiar. The 16th/17th-century playwrights Ben Jonson and George Chapman popularised "the comedy of humours". This literary genre focuses on a character or characters, who exhibit unusual traits or "humours" that dominate their personalities. Because such people were often viewed as objects of laughter, it was a step in the direction of associating humour with laughter and with something that makes people laugh.

Today the field of humour studies is vast.[18] The approach of D. H. Monro, who proposed the classification of humour into Superiority theory, Incongruity theory and Release theory,[19] is generally, though not unanimously, accepted as "the three approaches actually characterize the complex phenomenon of humor from very different angles and do not at all contradict each other – rather they seem to supplement each other quite nicely."[20]

The objective of my paper is to provide an overview of the contribution of ancient theorists to the development of the three major contemporary humour theories. The paper is structured into three sub-divisions according to the role and pertinence of the superiority, incongruity and release elements. The translations of the Greek and Latin quotations are my own, although I have consulted the available English translations.

Superiority theory

Superiority theory makes a statement about the correlation of the one whose laughter is evoked and the object of his laughter. On the part of the person who laughs, the provoking element is confidence in his own superiority.

The canonical example of Superiority theory is Aristotle's comment on comedy in the *Poetics*:

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[14] For a detailed discussion see Jouanna 2012, 335–360.

[15] Anon. 1841, 303–304.

[16] *OLD*, s.v. *umor*.

[17] Relevant Latin texts are in Jouanna 2012, 351.

[18] Attardo 1994, Chapman & Foot 1976, Fantham 2004, 186–208, Grube 1995 70–102, 144–149, 187–191, Janko 1984, Janko 1987, Halliwell 1991, Keith-Spiegel 1972, Monro 1951, Raskin 1985.

[19] Monro 1951.

[20] Raskin 1985, 4.

ἡ δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὥσπερ εἴπομεν μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μέν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.[21]

Comedy, as we have said, is an imitation of inferior [people], but not altogether vicious, rather the laughable is a species of ugliness. The laughable is some flaw or ugliness that does not cause pain or destruction, an obvious example being the comic mask which is something ugly and distorted but not painful [to look at].

As Aristotle sees it, laughter is evoked due to a feeling of superiority over those one considers to some degree inferior in body or mind.

Superiority is evident in Plato's reference to comedy as a field of ugly bodies and ugly ideas (τὰ τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων).[22] In his view, citizens may not take part in comedy performances albeit they are advised to watch them as it is impossible to learn the serious without knowledge about its opposite, i.e., humour (τὰ γελοῖα). Comedy acting is to be left to slaves and foreigners[23] – this is a persuasive argument of social superiority.

Outside the framework of comedy, Plato and Aristotle advise to be cautious about use of humour. Aristotle, on the whole, seems to be unsure about the very appeal of humour. He gives a somewhat complex explanation that "since that which is in accordance with nature is pleasant, and that which is akin, is akin in accordance with nature, then all that is akin and alike is mostly pleasant mutually, as a man to a man, and a horse to horse, and a youth to a youth".[24] To illustrate this statement, Aristotle quotes Euripides – "since amusement, and every kind of relaxation, and laughter (γέλως) are pleasant, then the humorous things (τὰ γελοῖα) – men, words, or deeds – must also be pleasant."[25] Nevertheless, Aristotle argues that people delight more than they should in jesting (παιδιά) and derision (τὸ σκώπτειν), but derision (σκῶμμα) is a sort of abuse (λοιδόρημα). As some forms of abuse are forbidden by law, perhaps some forms of derision should be prohibited also.[26] Plato's opinion is similar – a composer of a comedy or of any iambic or lyric song should be strictly forbidden to ridicule (κωμῳδεῖν) any of the citizens either by words or by mimicry.

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[21] Arist. *Poet.* 1449a32–37.
[22] Pl. *Leg.* 816d.
[23] Pl. *Leg.* 816d–816e.
[24] Arist. *Rh.* 1371b12–15.
[25] Arist. *Rh.* 1371b35–1372a1.
[26] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1127b33–1128b9.

Plato's view of the pernicious effect of humour is especially strong. Unobtrusive transition of the feeling of superiority into malice was the aspect of humour that Plato was most concerned about when he spoke of laughing at those individuals whom we consider inferior. In the *Philebus* one of the interlocutors, Socrates, speaks of self-ignorant people who imagine themselves to be wealthier, better looking, or more virtuous than they really are. Such self-confidence is a vice and an evil, and it is ridiculous (τὸ γελοῖον). Yet, when we laugh (γελῶμεν) at such people, we experience a pleasant sense of superiority. Pleasure in somebody's inferiority is malice, and that is a deprecatory state of mind.[27] In the result, derisive humour is insidious to the speaker himself.

In the Roman world discussions about humour focus on the speaker's feeling of superiority over the object of his humorous pronouncement. The Aristotelian idea of directing laughter at some flaw or ugliness reverberates in Cicero's pronouncements in the *De oratore* that "the field or province of humour […] consists of some unseemliness and ugliness" (*locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi ... turpitudine et deformitate quadam continetur*)[28] and that "deformity and bodily defects provide good enough matter for humour" (*est etiam deformitatis et corporis vitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum*).[29]

Quintilian in the *Institutio oratoria* quotes this Ciceronian pronouncement and expresses his agreement with it.[30] There is an echo of Platonian *Philebus* when Quintilian points out the challenges that accompany humour – "the chief difficulty […] lies in the fact that a humorous pronouncement (*ridiculum dictum*) is generally untrue, and falsehood always involves a certain meanness."[31] His own remark that "humour is not far removed from derision" (*a derisu non procul abest risus*)[32] shows that he is aware that humour may be an expression of superiority and maliciousness on the part of the speaker.

In general, Greek theorists and their Roman counterparts agree that humorous pronouncements are evoked by ugliness and are the result of a feeling of superiority. Their explicit message is to be careful with the assertion of superiority in the form of laughter.

Incongruity theory

The tenet of Incongruity theory is that laughter is evoked by the perception of something incongruous, generally a conflict between a pronouncement and the existing conventions.

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[27] Pl. *Phlb*. 48d–50c.
[28] Cic. *De or.* 2.236.
[29] Cic. *De or.* 2.239.
[30] Quint. Inst. 6.3.8.
[31] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.6.
[32] Quint. *Inst.* 6 3.7.

A chrestomathic example of incongruity between what the speaker says and the accepted social norms as a laughter-evoking agent is Socrates' argument in Plato's *Republic*. One of the issues of discussion in the text is upbringing and education of guardians of the state. Socrates states that if the principle of gender equality is applied to this sphere, it would be incongruous with the existing practice, therefore laughable (γελοῖον) and met with derision (σκώμματα).[33]

Aristotle' statements on humour in speech are concerned with congruity / incongruity of its use in private speech and public speech. His baseline is propriety. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle argues that it is a virtue to be witty, charming and tactful, and to say the right things at the right place and time, like rest and leisure. Yet a possessor of tact will say and allow to be said to him only such things that are suitable to a refined person, and the jesting (παιδιά) of a refined person differs from that of a slave, as does that of an educated man from that of an uneducated man. There is no substantive method to distinguish what is allowed and what is not recommended, as much depends on the situation. A guideline might be that the difference between coarse jesting (βωμολοχία) and humour (εὐτραπελία) is just like the difference between the Old Comedy which relies on obscenity (αἰσχρολογία), and the New Comedy which relies on innuendo (ὑπόνοια).[34] In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle states that "humour (τὰ γελοῖα) may sometimes be useful in debates, and the advice of Gorgias was good – to confound the opponents' earnest with humour and their humour with earnest".[35] Yet humour is educated insolence (ἡ γὰρ εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ἐστὶν ὕβρις),[36] πεπαιδευμένη, but still ὕβρις. The target of the speaker's humour may be angered by the humorous pronouncement, as generally people are angry with those individuals who ridicule, mock, and scoff them, for it is taken for an insult (ὀργίζονται δὲ τοῖς τε καταγελῶσι καὶ χλευάζουσιν καὶ σκώπτουσιν. ὑβρίζουσι γάρ).[37] The conclusion is that although the use of humour is congruous with public and private speech, propriety should always be the primary consideration.

Cicero's and Quintilian's writings provide more information about Roman Incongruity theory.[38] There is much similarity between their opinions. The model is Cicero, whom Quintilian follows in a more practice-oriented presentation manner.

A major contribution of Cicero is the demarcation of laughter and humour research in the *De oratore*:

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[33] Pl. *Resp.* 452a–b.

[34] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1128a7–16.

[35] Arist. *Rh.* 1419b3–9.

[36] Arist. *Rh.* 1389b11–12.

[37] Arist. *Rh.* 1379a30–32.

[38] Cic. *De or.* 2.235–90, Cic. *Orat.* 26. 87–89, Cic. *Off.* 1.104; Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.

De risu quinque sunt, quae quaerantur: unum, quid sit; alterum, unde sit; tertium, sitne oratoris risum velle movere; quartum, quatenus; quintum, quae sint genera ridiculi.[39]

Concerning laughter, there are five areas that are subjects of consideration: one – what it is, another – whence it originates, a third – whether it becomes the orator to wish to excite laughter, a fourth – to what degree, a fifth – what are the several kinds of humour.

As to the phenomenon of laughter itself, Cicero explicitly delineates himself from its discussion. His argument is that he does not know anything about the nature of laughter, and that such a discussion would be impertinent to his study:

Atque illud primum, quid sit ipse risus, quo pacto concitetur, ubi sit, quo modo exsistat atque ita repente erumpat, ut eum cupientes tenere nequeamus, et quo modo simul latera, os, venas, oculos, vultum occupet, viderit Democritus;[40] *neque enim ad hunc sermonem hoc pertinet, et, si pertineret, nescire me tamen id non puderet, quod ne illi quidem scirent, qui pollicerentur.*[41]

As to the first, – what laughter itself is –, by what means it is excited, where it lies, how it arises, and bursts forth so suddenly that we are unable, though we desire, to restrain it, and how it affects at once the sides, the face, the veins, the countenance, the eyes, let Democritus consider; for all this has nothing to do with my remarks, and if it had to do with them, I should not be ashamed to say that I am ignorant of that which not even they understand who profess to explain it.

Quintilian views laughter as an almost mystical phenomenon – "[laughter (*risus*)] often breaks out against the will and extorts confession of its power, not merely from our face and voice, but it also convulses the whole body"[42] and admits that its essence is unclear:

Neque *enim ab ullo satis explicari puto, licet* multi *temptaverint, unde risus, qui* non *solum facto aliquo dictove, sed interdum quodam etiam corporis tactu lacessi-tur. praeterea non una ratione moveri solet, neque enim acute tantum ac venuste*

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[39] Cic. *De or*. 2.235.

[40] Democritus of Abdera in the ancient tradition is shown as perpetually laughing, therefore considered mentally deficient (Sen. *Ira* 2.10; Ael. *VH* 4.20).

[41] Cic. *De or*. 2.235.

[42] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.9.

sed stulte, iracunde, timide dicta aut facta ridentur; ideoque anceps eius rei ratio est.[43]

> For I do not think that anybody can give an adequate explanation, though many have attempted to do so, where laughter comes from, which is excited not only by deeds or words, but sometimes even by some touch of the body. Moreover, laughter can be excited in many ways, since not merely those words or actions which are sharp and graceful, but also at those which are foolish, ireful, or timid. Therefore, the nature of laughter is uncertain.

As the target audience of Cicero's and Quintilian's writing are present or future practitioners of rhetoric, both the theorists focus on those aspects of laughter, which, as they presume, could be of more interest and of greater importance to Roman public speakers. These areas are the stimuli of humour (*unde sit*), whether it becomes the speaker to wish to excite laughter (*sitne oratoris risum velle movere*), how far the speaker can go (*quatenus*) and the kinds of humour (*quae sint genera ridiculi*).[44]

For the discussion of Roman Incongruity theory, Cicero's and Quintilian's opinions will be presented in accordance with the above-mentioned questions. Although the oldest surviving Latin treatise on rhetoric – *Rhetorica ad Herennium* – does not deal much with humour, the few inherent references to it will be indicated.

First, Cicero's and Quintilian's statements on the stimuli for humorous pronouncements (*risus unde sit*) – unseemliness and ugliness – are mentioned within the overview of Superiority theory.

Secondly, the answer to the question whether a speaker should attempt to excite laughter (*sitne oratoris risum velle movere*), is, in its essence, a question about the congruity / incongruity of humour with the *persona* of a public speaker. In Cicero's view, it certainly becomes the orator to excite laughter (*est plane oratoris movere risum*). Hilarity creates good will towards the person by whom it is excited, and because all admire acumen which is comprised in a single word, mostly in the one who replies, and always in him who attacks, and because it proves the speaker himself to be a man of taste, of learning, of refinement.[45] If the case admits it, the speaker may begin his speech with some humorous topic (*ridicula*) that may evoke laughter or with some argument that has arisen from the present moment; e.g., a sudden noise or exclamation, or with something that he has already prepared, e.g.,

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[43] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.7.

[44] Cic. *De or*. 2.235.

[45] Cic. *De or*. 2.236.

a fable, a story, or other humorous material (*aliqua inrisio*).[46] All in all, Cicero emphatically argues that in a judicial situation "a joke and humour are pleasant and oftentimes extremely useful" (*suavis autem est et vehementer saepe utilis iocus et facetiae*).[47]

In Quintilian's view, the skill to evoke laughter (*risum movere*) by a speech is a laudable virtue. In court it "frequently diverts the judge's attention from the facts of the case, and sometimes even refreshes him and revives him when he has begun to be bored or wearied by the case".[48] This sounds very much like the statement in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* – "if the hearers have been fatigued by listening, one should begin with something that could evoke laughter (*risum movere*)."[49] Besides, in Quintilian's view, humour ([*risus*]) "frequently turns the scale in matters of great importance".[50] For him personally, an example of admirable use of humour is Cicero. whom he calls "the peak of eloquence" (*vir praecipuus in eloquentia*). Quintilian argues that Cicero often used fine humour in his everyday speech and more than anyone else – in court and examination of witnesses *(in sermone cotidiano multa et in altercationibus et interrogandis testibus plura quam quisquam dixit facete)*, but he also notes that Cicero was criticized for using humour in excess (*nimius risus adfectator*).[51]

As the writings of Cicero and Quintilian are practice-oriented, for them the question whether the skill to use humour in speech is a natural talent or it can be mastered, is crucial. On the one hand, both Cicero and Quintilian consider it to be talent that comes by nature rather than by art.[52] Yet Quintilian explicitly states that everybody with constant exercise during everyday activities can to some extent acquire the skill of speaking in a humorous manner.[53] On the other hand, Cicero's and Quintilians's writings on humour in themselves are a testimony that the use of humour can be learned and the practitioners of rhetoric should acquire from books some fundamentals of its use. All the more so because, as Quintilian notes, there are no teachers and no exercises to develop the ability to speak in a humorous manner and humour in rhetoric is a rarity.[54]

Thirdly, how far (*quatenus*) in the laughter-evoking pronouncements can the speaker go? The speaker should not display his wit on every possible occasion,

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[46] Cic. *Inv. rhet.* 1.25.
[47] Cic. *De or*. 2.216.
[48] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.1.
[49] *Auct. ad Her*. 1.10.
[50] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.9.
[51] Quint. *Inst*. 6.3.3–4.
[52] Cic. *De or.* 2.216, 219.
[53] Quint. *Inst*. 6.3.11–16.
[54] Quint. *Inst*. 6.3.14.

lest he creates the impression that he is doing his utmost to make his speech humorous or even presents himself as a buffoon.[55]

A major consideration is propriety.

The author of the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* defines humour (*iocatio*) as a pronouncement that can evoke modest and refined laughter (*risus pudens et liberalis*).[56] In Cicero's view, there are two kinds of humour. One kind is the refined (*elegans*), polite (*urbanum*), clever (*ingeniosum*), witty (*facetum*) humour, and it is well suited to a dignified person in certain situations. The other kind – vulgar (*illiberale*), impudent (*petulans*), vicious (*flagitiosum*), obscene (*obscenum*) – is impermissible.[57] Quintilian speaks of humour that is playful and lively (*lascivus et hilaris*), or abusive (*contumeliosus*), or bitter (*asper*), or gentle (*lenis*). He himself prefers gentle humour that is not intended to wound, but admits that it is permissible to speak abusively or bitterly against one's opponents in court.[58]

In relation to the propriety of humor, Cicero underlines moderation. Subjects for humour must be considered carefully. A close echo of the relevant Aristotelian statement is Cicero's argument that "those subjects are most readily jested upon (*luduntur*) which do not deserve violent hate or extreme compassion. Therefore all matter for humour (*materies ridiculorum*) lies in those defects which are in the characters of men who are not esteemed highly, nor are they calamitous circumstances, and who do not seem deserving to be dragged to punishment for their crime.[59] A good speaker should avoid everything that may seem incongruous with the occasion, or the feelings of the listeners, or his own. Such kinds of humour as buffoonery (*sannio*), mimicry (*imitatio*), distortion of features (*oris depravatio*) and indecency in language (*obscenitas*) may be funny but they are incongruous with public speech.[60] All in all, a speaker should never speak in a disgraceful manner. Unseemliness in language is not to be tolerated either in the forum, or in a company of well-bred people. Only those pronouncements are laughed at that "point out and designate something offensive in an inoffensive manner" (*quae notant et designant turpitudinem aliquam non turpiter*).[61]

Likewise, for Quintilian, propriety of humour is very important. As to the question, how far the speaker can go, in his view, the decisive factor is the occasion when the speaker makes the humorous pronouncement. In court as elsewhere, it is not suitable for the accuser to use humour in a terrifying case, nor for the advocate to speak in a humorous manner about an individual who merits pity. It is inhuman to hit a man when he is down, either because he is the innocent victim of misfortune or because such attacks may recoil on those who make them. Inso-

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[55] Cic. *De or*. 2.247; Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.30, 6.3.43.

[56] *Auct. ad Her*. 3.23.

[57] Cic. *Off*. 1.104.

[58] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.27–28.

[59] Cic. *De or*. 238.

[60] Cic. *De or*. 251–252.

[61] Cic. *De or*. 2.235–236, 251–252.

lence and arrogance should be avoided. Moreover, there are judges whose character is too serious to tolerate laughter. As for obscenity, it should not merely be banished from his language, but should not even be suggested. Likewise, it is most unbecoming for the orator to distort his features or use uncouth gestures and tricks like those that arouse laughter in a farce. No less unbecoming are ribald jests, and such as are employed upon the stage. Yet the look, manner or gesture may imply humour, provided that proper balance is always observed. Interestingly, Quintilian notes that humour should not be directed against whole nations or classes of society, or against rank and pursuits which are common to many. [62]

Fourthly, as to the kinds of humour (εἴδη γελοίων), in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle refers to having discussed them in his writing on poetics (ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς). [63] This material has not survived. The *Rhetorica ad Herennium* gives a long unstructured list of laughter-evoking agents the insertion of which would attract the attention of a fatigued audience. They are: fable (*apologus*), and plausible story (*fabula veri similis*), and mimicry (*imitatio depravata*), and ironical inversion of meaning (*inversio*), and ambiguity (*ambiguum*), and innuendo (*suspicio*), and mockery (*inrisio*), and naivety (*stultitia*), and exaggeration (*exsuperatio*), and recapitulation, maybe of the opponents' arguments (*collectio*), and pun (*litterarum mutatio*), and something contrary to expectation (*praeter expectationem*), and comparison (*similitudo*), and novelty (*novitas*), and inserted historical narrative (*historia*), and verse (*versus*), and interruption or hindrance of someone (*alicuius interpellatio*), and smile of approval (*adrisio*). Neither examples nor explanation of the laughter-evoking devices is provided. [64]

It is Cicero who is the first Roman theorist to construct a system of the kinds of humour (*genera ridiculi*). His detailed and technical classification is a major theme in the *De oratore*.

For Cicero, the fundamental tenet is incongruity. Cicero defines incongruity as a feeling of surprise after having anticipated a different outcome in an interaction or event – "of all kinds of humour none creates greater laughter than something contrary to expectation" (*sed ex his omnibus [ridiculis] nihil magis ridetur, quam quod est praeter exspectationem*), [65] and "the most notable is that kind of humour when we expect one thing and another is said; in such cases our own error excites laughter" (*notissimum ridiculi genus, cum aliud exspectamus, aliud dicitur: hic nobismet ipsis noster error risum movet*). [66] From the perspective of the speaker and speech correlation, "the graver and more serious the speaker is, the more humorous his pronouncements generally appear" (*qui quidem quo severior est et tristior, [...], hoc illa, quae*

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[62] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.29, 31–33, 34, 47.
[63] Arist. *Rh.* 1419b6.
[64] *Auct. ad Her*. 1.10.
[65] Cic. *De or*. 2.284.
[66] Cic. *De or*. 2.255.

dicuntur, salsiora videri solent).[67] Quintilian's argument echoes Cicero's statement – "[in the gravity with which a humorous statement is uttered] there is much attraction, and the attraction is more perceptible, because the pronouncements seem not intended to excite laughter" (*in quibus est quidem summa gratia, sed maior, cum captare risum non videntur*).[68]

Cicero distinguishes substantive humour and verbal humour (*ridiculum in re* and *ridiculum in dicto*[69] or *facetiae in re* and *facetiae in verbo*.[70] Due to consistent overlap, it is best to use humour *in re* and humour *in verbo* in conjunction.[71] In the *De oratore* and in the *Orator* Cicero introduces also another cross-division of humour – it is division of humour (*facetiae* in the *De oratore* and *sales* in the *Orator*) into extended humour (*cavillatio* in the *De oratore* and *facetiae* in the *Orator*) and a witticism (*dicacitas* in the *De oratore* and in the *Orator*). The difference between both kinds of humour is that extended humour is equally distributed through the speech, but the witticism is sharp and brief.[72]

Extended humour functions in two main forms – as a humorous inserted narrative (*fabella*) and mimicry (*depravata imitatio*).[73] Humour is inherent in the substance of the humorous comment and arises from it, thus it is humour *in re*. Cicero points out that humour which is inherent in substance and sense (*in re et sententia*), though its instances are infinite in the number, can be classified into a few kinds. Laughter is evoked by deceiving expectations (*exspectationibus decipiendis*), and by satire on the characters of others (*naturis aliorum inridendis*), and by humorous pronouncements about our own nature (*ipsorum [naturis] ridicule indicandis*), and by comparison with something worse (*similitudine turpioris*) and by dissembling (*stulta reprehendendo*), and by utterance of apparent absurdities (*subabsurda dicendo*), and by reproval of stupidity (*stulta reprehendendo*).[74]

Witticism is generally the humour inherent in the verbal expression (*in verbo*), sometimes also humorous pronouncements about substance (*in re*).[75] Technical means for producing verbal humour are ambiguity (*ambiguum*), and something contrary to expectation (*praeter expectationem*), and play upon words (παρονομασία), and humorous quotations (*versus facete interponitur*), and taking literally what is no so meant (*ad verbum, non ad sententiam rem accipere*), and allegory (*immutata oratio*), and metaphor (*translatio unius verbi*), and ironical inversion of a meaning (*inversio verborum*), and verbal contradictions (*verba relata contrarie*).[76]

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[67] Cic. *De or.* 2.289.

[68] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.26.

[69] Cic. *De or.* 2.243–244.

[70] Cic. *De or.* 2.248.

[71] Cic. *De or.* 2. 248.

[72] Cic. *De or.* 2.218, Cic. *Orat.* 26.87.

[73] Cic. *De or.* 2. 242–243.

[74] Cic. *De or.* 2.289.

[75] Cic. *De or.* 2.248–252.

[76] Cic. *De or.* 2.253–263.

Quintilian agrees with the Ciceronian division of humour into substantive humour (*in rebus*) and verbal humour (*in verbis*).[77] Likewise, he accepts Cicero's division of humour into extended humour (*facetiae*) and witticisms (*dicacitas*).[78] He defines and explains kinds of humour (*risus*) – refined pronouncements (*urbanitas*) and witticisms (*dicacitas*), and jokes (*iocus*), and humour that is graceful (*venustus*), or sharp (*salsus*), or facetious (*facetus*).[79] Quintilian's own contribution is cross-division of humour into three kinds according to the humour-inducing agent: others (*risus ex aliis*), ourselves (*risus ex nobis*), and things intermediate (*risus ex rebus mediis*). In the first case the speaker refutes or derides the arguments of opponents. In the second case the speaker speaks about himself in a humorous manner. The third case affects neither party, and it consists of cheating expectations, in taking words in a different sense from what was intended, and in other similar things.[80]

It is evident that Greek and Roman theorists examine congruity/incongruity of humour from two perspectives – *first*, congruity/incongruity of humour in speech and, *secondly*, substantive and verbal incongruity as humour producing agent. As the use of humour is generally considered congruous with public speech, the main aspects of discussion are – *first*, propriety of humour, and, *secondly*, kinds of humour with the focus on their applicability in speech.

Release theory

Release theory makes a statement about the effect of laughter on the person who laughs, namely, the release of built-up emotions.

From this perspective, Plato in the *Republic* recognizes the beneficial effect of the humour of comedy on the audience. His argument is that what we enjoy in others, will inevitably be reflected in ourselves. In the case of tragedy, the emotional environment is pity and fear. This provokes and releases melancholy feelings of the audience. With comedy, the situation is different. Comedy is an imitation humorous actions (τὸ γελοῖον), and the emotional environment is enjoyment and laughter. This relieves negative emotions of the audience by substituting them with positive feelings.[81]

As to Aristotle, the case is more complicated. In the *Poetics* Aristotle refers to a forthcoming discussion of comedy (περὶ κωμῳδίας ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν) – presumably, it would have included also the discussion of humour. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle notes that he has discussed humour (διώρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν

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[77] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.22.
[78] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.42.
[79] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.17–21.
[80] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.23–24.
[81] Pl. *Resp.* 606b–c.

τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς)[82] and its kinds (εἴϱηται πόσα εἴδη γελοίων ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς)[83] in a study on poetics. None of this material has survived.

In this respect, a short, anonymous and undated commentary on comedy – the *Tractatus Coislinianus*[84] – may be of value. From the point of view of literary theory or literary criticism, the *Tractatus Coislinianus* is generally viewed sceptically, as a low-quality mechanical compilation or epitome, produced by an author with insufficient knowledge and understanding of the subject. As the *Tractatus Coislinianus* is structured similarly to the discussion of tragedy in Aristotle's *Poetics* and the terminology, used by the anonymous author, is Aristotelian in many cases, the *Tractatus Coislinianus* may serve for the reconstruction of Aristotle's opinions on comedy.

An issue for consideration in relation to the release of emotions by the humour of comedy, is a phrase in the *Tractatus Coislinianus* – "comedy […] by means of pleasure and laughter achieves the release of such emotions" (κωμῳδία […] δι' ἡδονῆς καὶ γέλωτος περαίνουσα τὴν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν). From the context it is not clear what the author means by τοιούτων παθημάτων. This is the first reference to emotions in the text, so the inherent meaning of τοιούτων is uncertain. It is equally unclear what the author means by the παθήματα he mentions. Probably they could be the πάθη, enumerated in the *Nicomachean Ethics* – desire (ἐπιθυμία), anger (ὀϱγή), fear (φόβος), confidence (θάϱσος), envy (φθόνος), joy (χαϱά), friendship (φιλία), hatred (μῖσος), longing (πόθος), jealousy (ζῆλος), pity (ἔλεος).[85] If it is the negative emotions that the author has in mind, comedy through the laughter it excites, could provide purgation of the them.

Outside the field of comedy, the effect of humour-induced laughter is rarely discussed in the ancient texts, and the opinions are diverse.

Plato views the emotion release capability of laughter with much caution. As, in his view, temperance is a virtue, excess brings about corresponding counter-reaction.[86] Violent laughter provokes violent response (ὅταν τις ἐφιῇ ἰσχυϱῷ γέλωτι, ἰσχυϱὰν καὶ μεταβολὴν ζητεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον). Therefore, respectable individuals and even less so, gods, should not be shown laughing in an unrestrained manner (οὔτε ἄϱα ἀνθϱώπους ἀξίους λόγου κϱατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος ἄν τις ποιῇ, ἀποδεκτέον, πολὺ δὲ ἧττον, ἐὰν θεούς). Such scenes as the Olympian gods bursting into unquenchable laughter (ἄσβεστος […] ἐνῶϱτο γέλως) at the sight of Hephaestus' deformity, are unacceptable.[87]

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[82] Arist. *Rh.* 1372a1–2.

[83] Arist. *Rh.* 1419b6.

[84] Janko 1984, 19–41.

[85] Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1105b21–23.

[86] Pl. *Resp.* 563e.

[87] Pl. *Resp.* 388e–389a.

Aristotle's perception is quite contrary. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle mentions laughter (possibly resulting from a humorous pronouncement) as one of the agents that promote mildness as people are mild "when laughing (ἐν γέλωτι), in sport, at a feast, in prosperity, in success, in abundance, and, in general, in freedom from pain, in pleasure which does not imply insult, or in virtuous hope."[88] Otherwise, in Aristotle's writings there are no direct references to the emotion release function of humour.

Related to Aristotle's opinion of laughter as a calming agent are the few Cicero's and Quintilian's pronouncements on the release function of humour. Both the theorists are speaking about a judicial situation. Cicero mentions that humour (*risus*) mitigates and relaxes gravity and severity, and often, by a joke or a laugh (*ioco risuque*), breaks the force of offensive remarks, which cannot easily be overthrown by arguments.[89] Quintilian's statements are very similar –[laughter (*risus*)] dispels grave emotions"[90] and "very often [laughter (*risus*)] dispels hatred or anger".[91]

All in all, there are few references to the relief function of humour-induced laughter in the ancient writings, and these occur mainly in the context of the Greek discussion of comedy.

Conclusion

1. Humour was an issue of consideration and discussion in the Greek and Roman world, important enough for the most prominent intellectuals of their times to contribute to the discussion.
2. Greek theorists discuss humour, *firstly*, in connection with comedy, *secondly*, within the framework of rhetoric, *thirdly*, as an everyday generality. Roman theorists consider humour mainly from the perspective of rhetoric, and they are elaborate in providing guidance to its use in the public space.
3. If modern scholarship of humour is compared with the study of humour in the antiquity, similarities are evident. The considerable difference is that of the four major ancient humour theorists (Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian), none is a strict adherent of a single theory. An overview of ancient humour research, structured according to the three dominant modern theories proves that modern theories have their roots in the theoretical considerations of antiquity.

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[88] Arist. *Rh.* 1380b2–5.
[89] Cic. *De or.* 2.236.
[90] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.1.
[91] Quint. *Inst.* 6.3.9.

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Themistocles the Saviour
The Leader as a Trickster in Herodotus

NIJOLĖ JUCHNEVIČIENĖ

The Greek audience was familiar with the figure of the trickster type both via myths[1] and their earliest literary manifestations, such as the stories of Odysseus, Penelope, or Hermes in the Homeric Hymn.[2] The term "trickster" is often used to describe a clever hero,[3] who shamelessly subverts the existing norms and does not follow the traditional rules. However, through such unconventional behaviour, the hero is able to achieve positive results for everyone, including themselves. It is exactly their ability to overstep the boundaries and benefit from it that allows us to recognise the trickster.[4]

In Herodotus the motive of trickery and the trickster is very common. Smartness, wit, and courage to carry out a device usually guarantee success in *Histories*. Herodotus admires tricksters who are able to find a way out of the most difficult situations due to their ability to think quickly and "get what they want using techniques that are not always honest".[5] He "prizes artful deception and quick-think-

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[1] In the Greek tradition, the trickster is a controversial figure (Kirk 1982, 50). This is best proved by an example of Prometheus: he is a thief and a saviour, a hero and a criminal—a God, who violated the laws of Gods, a fighter and a reconciler. Salvation is reached through sinning. And, even though the saviour gets punished for it, he is able to outsmart his antagonists (Grottanelli 1983, 135).

[2] This article is not based on the anthropological approach. Though the *logos* about Themistocles rose mainly from the oral tradition, Herodotus reshaped his sources into a complex literary character who bears many Odyssean traits. Themistocles, like Odysseus, stands out from the rest because of his *mētis*. According to Thomas Van Nortwick, Homer links Odysseus to the premier trickster figures in the Greek myths (Van Nortwick 2008, 83).

[3] Carroll 1984, 106.

[4] See Grottanelli 1983, 120–139.

[5] Hollmann 2005, 279.

ing acts that promote self-preservation".[6] Μηχανή, τέχνη, σοφίη, δόλος, ἀπάτη, ἐπιστήμη are the keywords of "trickster" episodes of Herodotus' narrative.[7]

Herodotus' *Histories* is the first extant literary work presenting the characteristics of Greek political leaders.[8] Although Herodotus' historiosophical concept is mainly religious, it draws the attention to the importance of an individual within history; therefore, most of the time it is exactly the individual who determines a certain course of events.[9] For Herodotus, the main source of information on wars and, especially, on the Greek politicians who took part in them, was the oral tradition.[10] which was sometimes authentic, but mostly had already been turned into a legend.[11]

According to A. Hollmann, there are 69 instances of trickery in Herodotus.[12] The majority of them belong to the Egyptians, Persians, Lydians, and, as a rule, are told in the tales about the non-Greek past.[13] As Carolyn Dewald puts it, "[t]ricksters inside the narrative of Herodotus often exploit and thus expose to the reader of *Histories* the political machinations that lie beneath a seemingly innocu-

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[6] Lateiner 1990, 231.

[7] Lateiner 1990, 232–233

[8] Herodotus' reliance on other historians (Dionysius, Charon or Hellanicus) has been widely discussed, but is hardly provable (Hornblower 2004, 15–16; Fehling 1989; Fowler 1996, 80–81; Gould 1989, 40). The works of Hecataeus (and some other logographers) have influenced only some geographical and ethnographical parts of *Histories* (West 1991).

[9] Gentili&Cerri 1988, 61; G. Lachenaud refers to the perception of history in Herodotus as anthropocentric (Lachenaud 1978, 667).

[10] Cf. Luraghi 2006, 81: "... the knowledge about the past and about foreign lands and customs that forms the substance of Herodotus' *Histories* is best understood as originating from oral communication and transmission". On Herodotus' sources about the battles with Persians and his informants see Myres 1953, 212; Wells 1923, 89–107; Thomas 1989, esp. chapter 2.

[11] The transformation of history into a legend is already evident in Herodotus' narrative about the Persian wars (Cartledge 2007, 156–175). These events and their participants inevitably became the theme of the earlier literary works (Phrynichus' *Phoenissae, The capture of Miletus* and Aeschylus' *Persae* (O'Neil 1942), and in Simonides' poems). According to Plutarch, Simonides and Themistocles were friends by that time (Plut., *Them*. 5). Cf. Gehrke, 2002, 301: "Only eight years after the battle of Salamis, the tragedian Aeschylus brought the events and above all their meaning on stage in his *Persians*, in a genre which actually took its subject-matter from myth. And the victors of the Persian wars were soon put on a level with the heroes, as is shown especially by the Athenian dedication for Marathon at Delphi."

[12] Hollmann 2005, 280; 316–323

[13] E.g., the story about an Egyptian pharaoh Rhampsinitus and his treasure (2.121; a thief, who survived, is rewarded for his smartness—he gets the pharaoh's daughter as his wife); Cyrus' trick to use camels against Lydian cavalry; Deiokes' ruse in order to become king (1.96–98); Harpagus' trick to send a hidden message (1.123); the grave of Nitokris (1.187); Mykerinus' trick to prolong his life (2.133); Amasis tricks Cambyses (3.1); the trick of Darius' groom (3.85–86); the story about a doctor called Democedes, who tricked Darius and not only came back to his homeland but also married a rich woman (3.129.3–138); the story about queen Artemisia, who attacked a Persian ship and was praised for it by the Persian king as well as by Herodotus himself (8.87–88); the story about Zopyrus' deceit (3.154–160); the trickery of Alexander, the Macedonian prince, who killed Persian messengers and was not punished by the king (4.146, 5.20) etc.

ous surface".[14] Such political figures as Peisistratus (1.59, 1.60), Histiaeus (5.35, 5.106–107), Aristagoras (5.49–50), Kleomenes (6.66, 6.78, 6.79), and Artemisia (8.87–88) use tricks and deception to achieve their personal goals. All of them, except for one episode about Artemisia's devices, belong to the pre-war period. The only trickster from the most recent history from Herodotus' times is Themistocles—he cheats and tricks both his fellow-countrymen and the Persians 12 times in Herodotus' *Histories* (7.144, 8.5–two times, 8.19, 8.22–the twofold trick, 8.58, 8.60, 8.75, 8.109, 8.110, 8.111). However, his activities are meant not only to benefit himself, but first of all to save Greece.

Themistocles is one of the most enigmatic figures in *Histories*. He stands out from all the Greek politicians as the trickster *par excellence*. In the later Greek tradition, his activities as well as his political career are referred to as controversial—some accuse him of treason and condemn him, others glorify him as the saviour of Greece.[15] In *De Herodoti malignitate*, Plutarch accuses Herodotus of being a trickster himself because he told many lies about the Greek resistance and Themistocles in order to denigrate him.[16]

The tradition about Themistocles sometimes is referred to as *the myth of Themistocles* or *the saga of Themistocles*.[17] Its origins lie within the first extant works of Greek historiography, that is, in Herodotus' and Thucydides' *Histories*. Herodotus narrates about Themistocles as much as his activities are related to Xerxes' campaign, whereas Thucydides talks only about what Herodotus enigmatically mentioned in passing.[18] that is, about Themistocles' later fate (Thuc. 1.90–93; 135–138).

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[14] Dewald 2006, 154.

[15] The latter view is prevalent. Cf. Aesch., *Persae*, 355–364; Isoc., *De pace* 75.3; Xen., *Symposium* 8.39; Dem., *Adversus Leptinem* 73.2; Aeschin., *Epist.* 3.2.2; Diod. Sic. 11.54 (most probably, Diodorus retells Ephorus: see Westlake 1977, 106); Plutarch's *Themistocles*. Unfavourable tradition—Pl., *Leg.* 4.706 (cf. Plut., *Them.* 4); epigram by Timocreon against Themistocles (Robertson 1980; McMullin 2001), the lost pamphlet by Stesimbrotus from Thasos on Miltiades, Themistocles and Pericles (Gruen 1970). As Hanson puts it, "[t]o conservatives, Marathon was the last time that Athenian infantrymen fought gloriously for their own land—thanks to radicals like Themistocles" (Hanson 2014, 33). The treatment of Themistocles in later Greek tradition is analysed by McKechnie (2015).

[16] Plut., *De Her. malign.* 871.C.5 Τῶν τοίνυν αἰτιῶν τῶν κατὰ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀνέδην ἐμφορηθείς, ἐν οἷς κλέπτοντα καὶ πλεονεκτοῦντα λάθρα τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν οὔ φησι παύσασθαι περὶ τὰς νήσους, τέλος αὐτῶν Ἀθηναίων τὸν στέφανον ἀφελόμενος Αἰγινήταις ἐπιτίθησι (*After he had abundantly satisfied himself with the accusation brought against Themistocles – of whom he says that unknown to the captains he incessantly robbed and spoiled the islands – he at length openly takes away the crown of victory from the Athenians, and sets it on the head of the Aeginetans*. Transl. by W. Goodwin (Plutarch 1874).

[17] Lenardon 1978; Holladay 1987, 186; Hanson 2014, 17–37; Gardner 1898, 21–23.

[18] Hdt. 8.109.25 Ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἀποθήκην μέλλων ποιήσεσθαι ἐς τὸν Πέρσην, ἵνα, ἢν ἄρα τί μιν καταλαμβάνῃ πρὸς Ἀθηναίων πάθος, ἔχῃ ἀποστροφήν· τά περ ὦν καὶ ἐγένετο (*His reason for saying this was to earn credit with Xerxes, so that if he ever got in trouble with the Athenians, he would have somewhere to turn to. And in fact this is exactly what happened*. All quoted translations from Herodotus are by R. Waterfield (Herodotus 2008)).

Thucydides' story about Themistocles starts with the Spartans who were alarmed at the increased number of the Athenian navy and their success in the war with Persians (needless to say, both the building of the Athenian navy and its success in the sea battle was Themistocles' merit). The Spartan envoys requested that the Athenians should not fortify their city and should not build the wall. However, in this ambiguous political situation there comes a salvation–Themistocles took action. He gave political advice to the Athenians on how to keep peace with Sparta and get rid of the Spartan envoys (the Athenians promised to send their delegates to Sparta "to discuss the issues raised").[19] When the Spartans left, Themistocles exposed his cunning plan to the Athenians—they should start building the wall right away and send him as an envoy to Sparta immediately, while the other delegates should arrive later, when the wall was built to the defensible height. Thucydides does not comment on the reactions of the Athenians; it is obvious that Themistocles was the leader of the Athenians because they followed him without any discussion. After giving his instructions to the Athenians, Themistocles went to Sparta, but kept delaying his meeting with the officials under a false excuse. When confronted, he explained that he was waiting for the other delegates to come. When the news reached Sparta that the wall was high enough, Themistocles proposed that the Spartans should not listen to what the people say but go and see the situation themselves (1.90). Before the delegation left, "Themistocles sent a secret message to the Athenians about these envoys, telling them to detain them as unobtrusively as possible and not let them leave until he and his party were back in Athens" (1.91). The Athenians did as they were told, and only then Themistocles appeared at the Spartan assembly and "openly declared that Athens was by now sufficiently fortified for the safety of its own inhabitants and that, if the Spartans or their allies wished to make any representations in the future, they should come on the understanding that the Athenians took a clear view both of their own interests and of the common good" (1.91).

Thucydides' account about Themistocles is a story of political trickery and deception.[20] The Spartans pretended to remain diplomatic, but they were furious[21]: they were tricked because they believed in Themistocles' loyalty to them διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ[22]. As S. B. Ferrario has noted, the word *philia* may denote the trust-

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[19] All quoted translations from Thucydides are by M. Hammond (Thucydides 2009).

[20] Cf. Brown Ferrario 2013, 187: "Themistocles involvement is energetic and varied: he is the chief agent of the deception, from his initial recommendations as to how the Athenians should respond to the Spartans, to his elaborate plan for the construction of new fortifications, to his journey to Sparta to manage the duplicity personally (1.90.3–4)".

[21] Thuc. 1.92.1 οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀκούσαντες ὀργὴν μὲν φανερὰν οὐκ ἐποιοῦντο τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ... τῆς μέντοι βουλήσεως ἁμαρτάνοντες ἀδήλως ἤχθοντο. (*On hearing this the Spartans showed no anger against the Athenians. Nevertheless, without showing it, they were vexed at the failure of their plan*).

[22] Thuc. 1.91.1 οἱ δὲ ἀκούοντες τῷ μὲν Θεμιστοκλεῖ ἐπείθοντο διὰ φιλίαν αὐτοῦ. (*Their friendship for Themistocles led the Spartan authorities to believe what he told them*).

bonds of aristocratic friendship and emphasise his supposed dependence upon the aristocratic ethical code, but in the game of *Realpolitik* there is always a contrast between appearances and reality. Themistocles in Thucydides is the trickster and the expert in political game, he does not rely on the norms of the traditional political habitude. He uses tricks to the benefit of Athens. Thucydides does not call his acts a trickery; in his story, Themistocles is the first to use the new political discourse that characterises the Athenians in Thucydides' *History*.

It is clear from the narrative that Themistocles' intelligent leadership was the main reason for Sparta to falsely accuse him of treachery. The Spartans were afraid of him (Thuc. 1.135). Themistocles found out about the plan to arrest him in advance (Thuc. 1.136.1) and, in an attempt to escape death (Thuc. 1.136.5 τὸ σῶμα σῴζεσθαι), decided to leave for Persia and ask the Persian king for grace. Having escaped many dangerous situations due to his cleverness and cunning solutions, he managed to reach Artaxerxes and lived in his dominion, where he was provided with everything he needed and gained considerable influence (μέγας καὶ ὅσος οὐδείς πω Ἑλλήνων), because he proved himself to be intelligent (ξυνετός; Thuc. 1.138). Thucydides finishes his story about Themistocles by describing his character—it is the first analytical psychological essay in the history of Western literature. Thucydides stresses his inherent smartness and a discerning mind (οἰκεία ξύνεσις), a surprising skill to promptly (δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς) make the best decision in an ambiguous situation and foresee the possible sequence of future events (τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής) as well as positive or negative consequences of certain decisions (τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα).[23] Thucydides considered such exceptional intellectual skills to be necessary for politicians and thought it greatly missed in the reality of his day.[24]

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[23] Thuc. 1.138.3 Ἦν γὰρ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς βεβαιότατα δὴ φύσεως ἰσχὺν δηλώσας καὶ διαφερόντως τι ἐς αὐτὸ μᾶλλον ἑτέρου ἄξιος θαυμάσαι· οἰκείᾳ γὰρ ξυνέσει καὶ οὔτε προμαθὼν ἐς αὐτὴν οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἐπιμαθών, τῶν τε παραχρῆμα δι' ἐλαχίστης βουλῆς κράτιστος γνώμων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ γενησομένου ἄριστος εἰκαστής· καὶ ἃ μὲν μετὰ χεῖρας ἔχοι, καὶ ἐξηγήσασθαι οἷός τε, ὧν δ' ἄπειρος εἴη, κρῖναι ἱκανῶς οὐκ ἀπήλλακτο· τό τε ἄμεινον ἢ χεῖρον ἐν τῷ ἀφανεῖ ἔτι προεώρα μάλιστα. καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο. (*Themistocles was indeed a man who displayed beyond doubt, and more than any other, natural genius to a quite exceptional and awesome degree. Through the pure application of his own intelligence, and without the aid of any briefing or debriefing, he was a consummate judge of the needs of the moment at very short notice, and supreme in conjecturing the future, more accurate than any in his forecast of events as thay would happen. He had the gift of explaining clearly all that he himself undertook, and was not lacking in competent judgement on matters outside his experience: and he foresaw better than any the possible advantage and disadvantage in a yet uncertain future. In summary, the intuitive power of his mind and the speed of his preliminary thought gave Themistocles an unrivalled ability to improvise what was needed at any time*).

[24] This episode stands out from the whole excursus about Themistocles both stylistically and lexically; no doubt, it was written by Thucydides. However, the other parts of the excursus as well as their style and lexis show that, possibly, Thucydides was referring to some Ionic sources, too (Westlake 1977, 105).

Thucydides' narration about the end of Themistocles' life contributes to the legend of Themistocles. Though he doubts the veracity of the popular version that Themistocles poisoned himself when he was forced to fulfil his promise to the king to help him conquer Greece, and prefers the version that the cause of his death was an illness,[25] he adds that Themistocles' remains were secretly delivered to Athens and buried by his relatives.[26] Miscellaneous accounts of Themistocles' death and the history of the secret relocation of his remains back to his homeland indicate that Themistocles' life had been a legend already in Thucydides' days.

The events narrated later by Thucydides were well known to Herodotus, but he chose not to include them into *Histories*. The case of Themistocles in *Histories* is exceptional: the other political leaders of the wars with Persia (Miltiades, Leonidas, Pausanias, and others) have their 'past' and 'future', assumed from the time of the main narrative about them. It helps to summarise dramatic changes in their lives, applying the traditional ὕβρις–νέμεσις motive.[27] The story about Miltiades, the hero of Marathon, is shaped according to this pattern (Hdt. 6.135). Miltiades' downfall was the consequence of his owning and excessive desire of property

[25] Thuc. 1.138.4 νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δέ τινες καὶ ἑκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτόν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο. (*He died of an illness: though some say that he took his own life with poison, realizing that he could not fulfil his promises to the King*). Perhaps, Thucydides considered the idea that Themistocles poisoned himself by drinking the blood of an ox even less credible; therefore, he chose the general term φάρμακον. This theory was mentioned in the *Knights* (83–84), staged in 424 BC, which proves the version to be popular and widely known less than 35 years after Themistocles' death (Reckford 1987, 217). The blood of the ox as the cause of Themistocles' death is also named by Diodorus (9.58.3) and Plutarch (*Them*. 31.5–6; the less popular version by Plutarch is that Themistocles died from poisoning). The blood of the ox was thought to be poisonous, probably due to its fast coagulation (Marr 1995, 159).
[26] Thuc. 1.138.6 τὰ δὲ ὀστᾶ φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οἴκαδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φεύγοντος. (*His family say that at his own request his bones were brought back home and buried secretly in Attica, without the knowledge of the Athenians – burial of a man exiled for treason was illegal*). Plutarch (*Them*. 32) considers this version to be fiction and claims that he gained true information from his close friend Themistocles, the relative of the former (Θεμιστοκλῆς Ἀθηναῖος, ἡμέτερος συνήθης καὶ φίλος). Plutarch criticises Andocides' and Phylarchus' stories (but is reluctant to judge Thucydides' version) that Themistocles' remains were stolen by the Athenians from Magnesia and brought to Athens. According to Plutarch, this story was made up (ψεύδεται; πέπλασται) "to stir up conflicting emotions in his audience" (all quoted translations from the *Life of Themistocles* are by R. Waterfield (Plutarch 2008)). Nevertheless, *Life* ends in a passage where geographer Diodorus' conjecture is mentioned—that near the great harbour of Piraeus there is an altar–shaped tomb that belongs to Themistocles—and quotes the epigram of comic poet Plato, confirming this conjecture.
[27] The folk belief that Gods punish those who are too successful or too proud is typical of many nations (Grene 1961, 483). It is reflected in Herodotus in a pattern of *Gods' envy* (the dialogue between Croesus and Solon in 1.32, the great success of Polycrates in 3.40 etc.). This pattern is a dominant model of moralising in Herodotus (Hau 2017, 181). The straightforward moral didacticism is seemingly absent in Herodotus' *Histories*, but Lisa Hau recently has shown that the moral aspect in *Histories* does exist and "important events in *Histories* are often overdetermined, that is, brought about by a number of different and sometimes logically mutually exclusive causes, such as predetermination, divine vengeance, and purely human motivations" (Hau 2017, 184).

(6.41; 6.133), pride (his tyranny—6.137; 6.39; 6.104), selfish deception (6.132), anger and revenge (6.133), as well as aberration (6.134) and the crimes it caused (6.134).[28] Leonidas' tragic fate was predetermined.[29] whereas Pausanias fits into the pattern of the hybristic behaviour.[30] Themistocles' activities and the tragic peripeteia of his life would be just as suitable to illustrate the downfall of a corrupt political leader. However, Herodotus chose a different stylistic code for his Themistoclean *logos*.

Themistocles is a compositional link to the story about the fight against Xerxes. The description of his activities joins together the events that happened before Xerxes' campaign, the fight at Artemisium and Salamis, and the situation at the ally camp after the victory. He is introduced into the narrative *in medias res*, in the episode when the prophecy of the Delphic oracle was reported to the assembly and various interpretations of its true meaning were proposed (7.143). Such an introduction makes him stand out from all the other historical characters who are introduced in excurses or parentheses before the main narrative about them.[31]

Herodotus begins the story about Themistocles by describing the chaos in Athens following the vague and alarming answers from the Delphic oracle (7.140–142). The situation in Athens is hopeless, and neither priests nor politicians are able to come up with a solution. At this point, Themistocles is introduced into the narrative—until this moment, he was not mentioned in *Histories* at all. Themistocles appears as if out of nowhere.[32] He is a person without a political past: Ἦν δὲ τῶν τις Ἀθηναίων ἀνὴρ ἐς πρώτους νεωστὶ παριών, τῷ οὔνομα μὲν ἦν

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[28] See Lang 1984, 251.

[29] Introduction of Leonidas into the main narrative is highly elaborated: Herodotus gives his complete genealogy (7.204) in which he names 20 of his predecessors (the list starts and ends with Heracles). He is briefly mentioned before in 5.41, when Herodotus tells about the complicated matters in Anaxandridas' family and the coincidence (συντυχίη) that accompanied Leonidas' birth (5.39–40). Leonidas had no aspirations to become a king, but became one by another coincidence (7.205: Διξῶν γάρ οἱ ἐόντων πρεσβυτέρων ἀδελφεῶν, Κλεομένεός τε καὶ Δωριέος, ἀπελήλατο τῆς φροντίδος περὶ τῆς βασιληίης. *Leonidas had no designs on the kingship because he had two elder brothers, Cleomenes and Dorieus*), and had to accept his fate as a king of sacrificing his life to save Sparta. There are more coincidences in the Thermopylean *logos* that connect it to the genre of tragedy (Griffin 2006, 46–59; Immerwahr 1954, 16–45; Chiasson 2003, 5–35).

[30] Hdt. 5.32 [Ἀρταφρένης] στρατηγὸν δὲ τούτων ἀπέδεξε Μεγαβάτην ἄνδρα Πέρσην τῶν Ἀχαιμενιδέων, ἑωυτοῦ τε καὶ Δαρείου ἀνεψιόν, τοῦ Παυσανίης ὁ Κλεομβρότου Λακεδαιμόνιος, εἰ δὴ ἀληθής γέ ἐστι ὁ λόγος, ὑστέρῳ χρόνῳ τούτων ἡρμόσατο θυγατέρα, ἔρωτα σχὼν τῆς Ἑλλάδος τύραννος γενέσθαι. ([Artaphrenes] *gave the command of the expedition to a Persian called Megabates, who was an Achaemenid, and was his and Darius' cousin. (Years later – if there is any truth to the story – Pausanias of Lacedaemon, the son of Cleombrotus, wanted to become the tyrant of all Greece, and he got himself betrothed to Megabates' daughter)).*

[31] Before the main narrative about them, Miltiades (4.137), Leonidas (5.41), Pausanias (4.81), and even Darius and Xerxes (1.183), are mentioned.

[32] As Blösel puts it "Herodotus has him 'appear', in a theophany as it were, as deus ex machina, when everyone else was at an utter loss, and makes him rescue all by correctly interpreting the oracle of the wooden wall" (Blösel 2002, 180).

Θεμιστοκλέης, παῖς δὲ Νεοκλέος ἐκαλέετο (7.143)[33]. He is also the only politician of the Greco-Persian war epoch who is introduced into the narrative using the style of the traditional folk tale formula (Ἦν δὲ τῶν τις).[34] This kind of introduction points to the beginning of the *logos* about the most glorious victory of the Greeks—the victory at Salamis.[35] It also alludes to the narrative being about Themistocles, who, from the first lines of the story, is depicted as the saviour of Athens and of Greece.

The narrative of Herodotus' *Histories* is future oriented, its primary purpose is to save the glorious deeds from the oblivion, but he writes for the contemporary audience as well.[36] Herodotus' contemporaries, the Athenians, were well informed about Themistocles' activities and his family; during Herodotus' time, Themistocles' relatives lived in Athens.[37] It has been noticed that such an introduction into the narrative distorts historical truth, since in 480 BC Themistocles by no means was a novice in politics (ἐς πρώτους νεωστὶ παριών) or an unheard-of person (τις). Herodotus names his father Neocles, who was of the noble Lycomidae family, but says nothing about his mother, who was not Greek but either Thracian or Carian. According to Plutarch, Themistocles was a νόθος (Plut., T*hem*.1).[38] Although his origin, as Plutarch says, was "too humble to promise future distinc-

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[33] *Now, there was in Athens a man called Themistocles the son of Neocles, who had just recently risen to a position of prominence.*

[34] In this manner, in *Histories*, only the narratives about Candaules (1.7), Croesus (1.6), Deioces (1.96), Otanes (3.68), Kylon (5.71), Onesilus (5.104), and Periander (1.23) begin.

[35] Herodotus considers the battle at Salamis to be crucial in the wars against Persians (Cartledge 2007, 10). A more conservative opinion gave preference to the victory at Marathon, fought in a traditional way, where "[n]o walls or ships, or poor people, had been necessary to save Athens from the Persian hordes. Courage, more than mere numbers, mattered" (Hanson 2014, 18–19). Plutarch criticises Herodotus for devaluing the importance of Marathon (*De Her. malign.* 862D ἀνατέτραπται δὲ τῆς νίκης τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ τέλος εἰς οὐδὲν ἥκει τοῦ περιβοήτου κατορθώματος, οὐδ' ἀγών τις ἔοικεν οὐδ' ἔργον γεγονέναι τοσοῦτον, ἀλλὰ πρόσκρουσμα βραχὺ τοῖς βαρβάροις. *But the greatness of the victory itself is overthrown, and the end of that so celebrated action comes to nothing, nor does it seem to have been a fight or any great exploit, but only a light skirmish with the barbarians.* Transl. by W. Goodwin). The victory at Marathon was publicly commemorated in a painting in the Poikile Stoa, showing three phases of the battle, portraits of Callimachus and Miltiades, and the gods who, as it was believed, personally helped the Greeks (Paus. 1.15) Themistocles fought as a hoplite at Marathon, and Aristides possibly was one of the Miltiades' colleagues.

[36] So Bakker 2006, 92. Another view is that Herodotus wrote for the contemporary audience (Fornara 1971, 72). For the discussion, see Lianeri 2016, 1–55.

[37] Cf. Thuc. 1.138.6, quoted above n. 26.

[38] Plut. *Them*. 1 Θεμιστοκλεῖ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐκ γένους ἀμαυρότερα πρὸς δόξαν ὑπῆρχε· πατρὸς γὰρ ἦν Νεοκλέους οὐ τῶν ἄγαν ἐπιφανῶν Ἀθήνησι, Φρεαρρίου τῶν δήμων ἐκ τῆς Λεοντίδος φυλῆς, νόθος δὲ πρὸς μητρός, ὡς λέγουσιν… (*As for Themistocles, however, the circumstances of his birth were initially too humble to promise future distinction. His father Neocles (who was of the deme Phrearrhii and the tribe Leontis) was not a particularly eminent man in Athens, and of his mother's side he was of mixed descent*).

tion", Themistocles by that time undoubtedly was a well-known politician.[39] It is exactly this kind of Herodotus' introduction of Themistocles that gave grounds to the claims that Herodotus had a negative opinion about him.[40] I suggest that the profile of Themistocles can be interpreted differently.

The story about Themistocles' leadership starts with the episode of the interpretation of the Delphic prophecy (7.143). Themistocles' ability to rightly (κατὰ τὸ ὀρθόν) decipher the second prophecy is emphasised, after it was completely misunderstood, even by experts (χρησμολόγοι). After giving logical arguments based on philological analysis of the prophecy,[41] Themistocles advised the Athenians not to hide behind the wooden walls of Acropolis; instead, they should prepare for the sea battle with Persians, since those are the ships Pythia was talking about. The Athenians acknowledged Themistocles' opinion being more plausible than the in-

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[39] Probably in 493 BC (or 483: see Munro 1892, 333), Themistocles was elected an archon, so at that time he possibly was 44 (or 34) years old; the first date is more probable (Green 1998, 23; Hammond 1986, 210). Herodotus (7.173) writes that when the Greeks sent a land army to Thessaly to guard the pass through Olympus, probably in April 480, Themistocles was one of the *strategoi* (ἐστρατήγεε δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων μὲν Εὐαίνετος ὁ Καρήνου ἐκ τῶν πολεμάρχων ἀραιρημένος, γένεος μέντοι ἐὼν οὐ τοῦ βασιληίου, Ἀθηναίων δὲ Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Νεοκλέος. *The division commander who had been chosen to lead the Lacedaemonian troops, despite not being of royal lineage, was Euaenetus the son of Carenus, while the Athenians were under the command of Themistocles the son of Neocles*). According to L. J. Samons II, in the fifth century *strategoi*—including Themistocles, Aristeides, Cimon, Cleon and Alcibiades—acted both as military and political leaders (Samons 2007, 5). Aristotle names Themistocles as a political leader of the Athenians at that time, together with Aristides (*Ath. Pol.* 23.3 ἦσαν δὲ προστάται τοῦ δήμου κατὰ τούτους τοὺς καιροὺς Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου καὶ Θεμιστοκλῆς ὁ Νεοκλέους, ὁ μὲν τὰ πολέμια δοκῶν, ὁ δὲ τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινὸς εἶναι καὶ δικαιοσύνη τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν διαφέρειν· διὸ καὶ ἐχρῶντο τῷ μὲν στρατηγῷ, τῷ δὲ συμβούλῳ. *The champions of the people at this time were Aristides son of Lysimachus and Themistocles son of Neocles: Themistocles practised the military arts, while Aristides was skilled in the political arts and was outstanding among his contemporaries for his uprightness, so the Athenians used the first as a general and the second as an adviser.* Transl. by P. J. Rhodes (Aristotle 2002). There is certain proof about Themistocles' political influence before the battle of Salamis; he was influential enough to have political enemies (Gruen 1970, 98, n. 29).

[40] Plutarch (*De Herodoti malignitate*) claims that Herodotus voluntarily vilifies Themistocles because Herodotus himself is κακοήθης (855B, F), συκοφάντης (863A), δολερός (863E); he uses ψεύσματα καὶ πλάσματα (854E), διαβολάς (870C), καταψεύδεται (856E, 861E), διαβάλλει (862D, 865B). Herodotus' narrative about Themistocles is considered to be unfavourable by Peter Green (Green 1998, 23). Emily Baragwanath (2008, 293–295) is of opposite opinion. Wolfgang Blösel claims that Herodotus' story aims to acquit Themistocles of the charge of treason (Blösel 2002, 184). Daniel Gillis is of the opinion that Herodotus could have been affected by Alcmaeonid propaganda (Gillis 1969, 333–345); similarly in Podlecki 1975, 71, Gillis 1979, 53–58.

[41] Hdt. 7.143 *His argument was that if the oracle had really been directed against Athens it would have been phrased in harsher terms; rather than "Blessed Salamis", it would have said "Cruel Salamis" if the inhabitants were doomed to die there. No, the true interpretation of the oracle, he argued, was that the Persians, not the Athenians, were the target of the god's words.*

sights of the priests.[42] This episode, which discloses Themistocles' extraordinary intellectual skills as well as his ability to apply innovative methods and persuade others, is linked to the events of the very near past (parenthesis, providing the 'forgotten' or delayed information—7.144): it becomes evident that earlier, *luckily* (ἐς καιρόν), Themistocles had persuaded the Athenians to build ships from the profit received from the silver mines, supposedly for the war against Aegina, instead of distributing the money among citizens. This is the first one of Themistocles' "lies" that make up Herodotus' saga about him: he made use of the possible war against Aegina so that he could build the fleet for the war against the Persians. So, at the moment of the narrative, the Athenians, earlier having been "tricked" by Themistocles and having agreed with his opinion, had already built the ships. This innovation later turned Athens into a thalassocracy and into an empire.[43]

Themistocles is the main character in book eight, in which the Greek fleet is shown in action. But the narrative once again is concentrated on the battle of opinions and not on the naval strategies. The key notes of the story are Themistocles' *mētis*, his ability to foretell the future events and find out the best solution, as well as to persuade others with his vision of events. When words become inefficient and the unity cannot be achieved, Themistocles employs deception *in order to save Greece* (8.160 σῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα). However, the narrative discloses the other side of Themistocles, too: by doing good to Greece, he makes sure to benefit from it personally.

When the Greeks, having reached Artemisium, noticed myriads of Persian ships, they decided to run away in fright. The Euboeans ask them to wait until they take their women and children to a safer place, however, the polemarchos

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[42] Hdt. 7.143 Θεμιστοκλέος ἀποφαινομένου, Ἀθηναῖοι ταῦτά σφι ἔγνωσαν αἱρετώτερα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ τῶν χρησμολόγων… (*The Athenians decided that Themistocles' explanation of the oracle was preferable to that of the official interpreters…*).

[43] Thuc. 1.93.4 [Θεμιστοκλῆς] τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης **πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν** ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστὶ καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθὺς ξυγκατεσκεύαζεν (*He had been the first to advance the proposal that the Athenians should take to the sea: and now he was quick to help lay the foundations of the empire*.); Plut., *Them.* 4 **μόνος εἰπεῖν ἐτόλμησε** παρελθὼν εἰς τὸν δῆμον, ὡς χρὴ τὴν διανομὴν ἐάσαντας ἐκ τῶν χρημάτων τούτων κατασκευάσασθαι τριήρεις ἐπὶ τὸν πρὸς Αἰγινήτας πόλεμον. ἤκμαζε γὰρ οὗτος <τότ'> ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι μάλιστα, καὶ κατεῖχον οἱ νησιῶται πλήθει νεῶν τὴν θάλατταν. ᾗ καὶ ῥᾷον ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς συνέπεισεν, οὐ Δαρεῖον οὐδὲ Πέρσας—μακρὰν γὰρ ἦσαν οὗτοι καὶ δέος οὐ πάνυ βέβαιον ὡς ἀφιξόμενοι παρεῖχον—ἐπισείων, ἀλλὰ τῇ πρὸς Αἰγινήτας ὀργῇ καὶ φιλονικίᾳ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀποχρησάμενος εὐκαίρως ἐπὶ τὴν παρασκευήν. ([Themistocles] *was the only one who dared to come forward in the Assembly and argue that they had to stop the distribution. He proposed that they should use the money from the mines to build a fleet for the war against the Aeginetans, which was the most intense war being faught in Greece at the time and in which Aeginetans had control of the sea, thanks to the size of their fleet. This made it even simpler for Themistocles to win the Athenian people over to this point of view. He did not have to wave Darius or the Persians at them: their distnace from Athens made their coming seem a remote prospect and not one to cause people any particularly constant anxiety. Instead he opportunistically made use of the bitterness of his fellow citizens' rivalry with Aegina as a way of getting the fleet built*). The extraordinary character of Themistocles' actions is enhanced by the choice of words in these passages (πρῶτος, μόνος, ἐτόλμησε).

Eurybiades objects to it (8.4). Then they turn to Themistocles, and, after having paid him thirty talents, persuade him to stay. Themistocles comes up with an idea of how to persuade the others: he gives five talents to Eurybiades, pretending to grant it from his own money; whereas the last one to agree, the Corinthian Adeimantus, receives three talents from him (8.5). Having deceived both sides, Themistocles holds up the Greeks: he keeps their unity and the war spirit, yet, at the same time, he benefits himself from this situation.[44] Another trickery of Themistocles, in order to detach Ionians and Carians from the Persian army, was to plant an evil seed between the Persians and their Greek allies. Herodotus comments on the smart move of Themistocles by pointing out that, even if he had not succeeded, the king would still have been suspicious of their loyalty (8.19). So, in any case, Themistocles' trick proved to be worth it.[45]

When having gathered at Salamis, the Greeks find out that Xerxes has occupied Athens, they decide to sail away at dawn (8.56). After Themistocles returns to his ship, the Athenian Mnesiphilus warns him that it is a stupid plan and it will be disastrous for Greece (8.57 ἀπολέεταί τε ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἀβουλίῃσι). Instead, he suggests, if there still is at least a tiny possibility, finding another way to make Eurybiades change his mind (ἀναγνῶσαι Εὐρυβιάδην μεταβουλεύσασθαι). Themistocles at once understands his arguments (8.58 Κάρτα τε τῷ Θεμιστοκλέϊ ἤρεσε ἡ ὑποθήκη) and immediately goes back to Eurybiades' ship. Having presented Mnesiphilus' opinion as his own (ἑωυτοῦ ποιεύμενος), he persuades Eurybiades to call another council of the commanders (8.58). During the discussion (8.59–62), Themistocles is proactive: before Eurybiades says a word, Themistocles starts presenting strong arguments about why it is important to have a battle at Salamis; he has no doubts that the Greeks will win due to the strategical advantage of the place, and concludes that the freedom of Greece depends on the right decision of Eurybiades, which is to agree with Themistocles' opinion (8.60 Ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἐστι σῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἢν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ…). However, leaving Salamis would be perilous to Greece (8.62 ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα). Themistocles tries not to indulge the allies and does not relate Mnesiphilus' verdict verbatim and chooses a more

[44] Hdt. 8.5.3 Οὗτοί τε δὴ πληγέντες δώροισι ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἦσαν καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοεῦσι ἐκεχάριστο, αὐτός τε ὁ Θεμιστοκλέης ἐκέρδηνε. Ἐλάνθανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ἠπιστέατο οἱ μεταλαβόντες τούτων τῶν χρημάτων ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνέων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ [τὰ χρήματα]. (*So* [they] *were bribed to change their minds, and Euboeans got their way. Moreover, Themistocles himself made a healthy profit. No one knew that he had the rest of the money; the people who had been given some of it assumed that it had come from athensjust for the purpose to which it was put*.) Emily Baragwanath stresses "the tidy elegance of the manœuvre"(Baragwanath 2008, 293).

[45] This stratagem devised by Themistocles was repeated by Leotychides at Mycale (Hdt. 9.98 Ὡυτὸς δὲ οὗτος ἐὼν τυγχάνει νόος τοῦ πρήγματος καὶ ὁ Θεμιστοκλέος ὁ ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ· ἢ γὰρ δὴ λαθόντα τὰ ῥήματα τοὺς βαρβάρους ἔμελλε τοὺς Ἴωνας πείσειν, ἢ ἔπειτα ἀνενειχθέντα ἐς τοὺς βαρβάρους ποιήσειν ἀπίστους τοῖσι Ἕλλησι. (*Leotychidas' intention in thies exercise was the same as Themistocles' at Artemisium: either the Persians would not hear about the message, in which case he might win the Ionians over, or they would, in which case he might make them distrust the Greeks*). This is the last mention of Themistocles.

politically correct intonation instead.[46] He manages to persuade Eurybiades to convene a meeting, but to persuade the commanders is not an easy task (the meeting is described in detail in 8.59–63). Themistocles wins only because Eurybiades fears that Themistocles' threat to transfer Athens to Siris in Italy is no trick and can be realised;[47] but Herodotus does not comment on it.[48] Themistocles proves to be εὔβουλος, while all the others are, according to Mnesiphilus, ἄβουλοι.

After the council, the Greeks start preparing for the battle (8.64; 70). When they line up, the night falls. At the break of dawn, Themistocles has to return to his role of the saviour of Greece: the Peloponnesians find out that Xerxes has sent an army to Isthmus and is going to take Peloponnese (8.71), so they start getting ready to sail and fight for Peloponnese. The Athenians want to stay and fight at Salamis. This time Themistocles fails to persuade the Peloponnesians (8.75 ἑσσοῦτο τῇ γνώμῃ ὑπὸ τῶν Πελοποννησίων). Therefore, he has to turn to trickery again. He leaves a meeting unnoticed (λαθὼν ἐξέρχεται) and sends one of his slaves to the Persian king, with the message that Themistocles sent him in secret, because he is on the king's side and wants him to win. His suggestion to the king is to surround the Greeks at Salamis as fast as he can, since they are going to sail away. The Persians fall for the lie (8.76.1 Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγίνετο τὰ ἀγγελθέντα) and block the gulf. At this moment, we would expect a remark from Herodotus, questioning the fact of why the king trusts Themistocles, yet there is no comment about it. Themistocles is smarter, and that is why he succeeds.

While the Greeks are still arguing without knowing what has been done, Aristides,[49] who is back from exile, visits Themistocles and announces that the Greeks have been surrounded (8.79). In Herodotus' story, during a crucial moment for

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[46] Hdt. 8.60.5 ἔλεγε ἐκείνων μὲν οὐκέτι οὐδὲν τῶν πρότερον λεχθέντων, ὡς ἐπεὰν ἀπάρωσι ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος διαδρήσονται· παρεόντων γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἔφερέ οἱ κόσμον οὐδένα κατηγορέειν· ὁ δὲ ἄλλου λόγου εἴχετο, λέγων τάδε. (…*he did not mention his earlier point, that the fleet would disperse once they left Salamis, because it would have been inappropriate for him to cast aspersions with the allies there. Instead he tried a different approach.*)

[47] Hdt. 8.63.1–5 Ταῦτα δὲ Θεμιστοκλέος λέγοντος ἀνεδιδάσκετο Εὐρυβιάδης· δοκέειν δέ μοι, ἀρρωδήσας μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀνεδιδάσκετο μή σφεας ἀπολίπωσι ἢν πρὸς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἀγάγῃ τὰς νέας· ἀπολιπόντων γὰρ Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐγίνοντο ἀξιόμαχοι οἱ λοιποί. (*Eurybiades was won over by Themistocles' arguments – or rather, in my opinion, by his fear that the Athenians would pull out if he took the fleet to the Isthmus, because the Athenian presence was critical to the fleet as a whole: without it, they would be no match for the enemy*).

[48] As V. Zali has noted (Zali 2014, 304) "Greek debates are conducted in an antagonistic atmosphere and introduced by a battle-like and athletic language... [D]eception and force lead the way in the absence of common will and concord".

[49] In the ostracism of 480 BC, during which Aristides' supporters wanted to banish Themistocles, Themistocles won and, in the end, it was Aristides who was banished. During the time of Xerxes' campaign, ostracism was cancelled, and the exiles were granted the right to come back to their homeland (Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 22.8). According to R.W. Macan "[s]ome evidence and much probability support the view that Aristides was at this very moment one of the Athenian *Strategoi,* and had returned to Athens from exile, weeks or even months earlier" (Macan 2014, 296).

Greece, two former enemies[50] meet—the aristocratic leader Aristides, who, according to Herodotus, was ἀνὴρ ἄριστος the most just Athenian of that day,[51] and Themistocles, who, according to Plutarch, was a νόθος, but whom Herodotus names as the bravest, smartest, and most intelligent among the Greek leaders.[52] Themistocles admits to Aristides that it was he who encouraged the Persians, because he wanted to make the Greeks fight at Salamis at any cost in order to save Greece (8.80). Strangely, Aristides is not angered by Themistocles' 'treachery'. They both agree to act together and put Greece first.[53] In this episode "with a more than usually excellent moral"[54] the two Athenians—the leader of the aristocrats and the leader of demos—claim their unity in a desperate situation.

However, Aristides, "the best and most honourable man in Athens", is not the main hero of the story; his merits in the war against the Persians in Herodotus' version of events are minimal.[55] Since it is at variance with the surviving Greek tradition, it looks like Aristides was mentioned in the story only to inform the Greeks that they are surrounded and to help fulfil Themistocles' plan. He is granted the role of an honourable and just character in the story about a smart trickster. In folk tales of similar nature, secondary characters are usually put in contrast to the protagonist. As soon as Themistocles asks him, Aristides agrees to inform the Greeks about the blockade of the gulf (8.81). Themistocles explains his request by stating that if he, and not Aristides, was to tell it to the Greeks, they would think that he made it up and would not believe him.[56] In this way, Themis-

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[50] Hdt. 8.79.2 Οὗτος ὡνὴρ στὰς ἐπὶ τὸ συνέδριον ἐξεκαλέετο Θεμιστοκλέα, ἐόντα μὲν ἑωυτῷ οὐ φίλον, ἐχθρὸν δὲ τὰ μάλιστα. (*He presented himself at the meeting and asked Themistocles to come outside with him. Now, he was no friend of Themistocles – in fact, they were bitter enemies…*).

[51] Hdt. 8.79.1 τὸν ἐγὼ νενόμικα, πυνθανόμενος αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον, ἄριστον ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ἐν Ἀθήνησι καὶ δικαιότατον (*In my considered opinion, from all I hear about his character, he was the best and most honourable man in Athens*).

[52] Hdt. 8.110.1 δεδογμένος εἶναι σοφός, ἐφάνη ἐὼν **ἀληθέως σοφός τε καὶ εὔβουλος**; 8. 110.3 ἀνὴρ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων πάντων **ἄριστος καὶ σοφώτατος**; 8.124.1 πολλὸν Ἑλλήνων **σοφώτατος ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα**.

[53] Hdt. 8.79.12–14 Ἡμέας στασιάζειν χρεόν ἐστι <εἰ> ἐν [τε] τεῷ ἄλλῳ καιρῷ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῷδε περὶ τοῦ ὁκότερος ἡμέων πλέω ἀγαθὰ τὴν πατρίδα ἐργάσεται. (*The rivalry between us should only be about which of us will do our country more good – that goes not just for now, but for any other occasion too.*)

[54] Macan 2014, 296.

[55] Herodotus briefly mentions that Aristides, together with the soldiers, killed all the Persian soldiers in Psyttaleia (8.95). Other authors name him and Themistocles one of the two leaders of that time; his contribution to the success of Athens is equal to that of Themistocles' (Aesch., *Persae*, 447–471; Plut., *Aristeid.* 10; Arist., *Ath. Pol.* 28.2; Diod. Sic. 11.42; Nep., *Arist.* 1.2). Timocreon of Rhodes, a contemporary of Themistocles, in his invective that harshly criticises Themistocles, compares Themistocles to Aristides by contrasting them (Robertson 1980, 65). His poem is in itself an encomium to Aristides (Scodel 1983, 103).

[56] Hdt. 8.80.2 Ἢν γὰρ ἐγὼ αὐτὰ λέγω, δόξω πλάσας λέγειν καὶ οὐ πείσω ὡς οὐ ποιεύντων τῶν βαρβάρων ταῦτα… (*If I tell them, they'll think I'm making it up and they won't believe me, on the grounds that the Persians couldn't be doing any such thing.*)

tocles' reputation as a liar *par excellence* and political trickster is indirectly confirmed. However, the Greeks do not believe Aristides either (Herodotus deprives Aristides of any merit in the sea victory); they are only persuaded by the crew of a Tenean ship who has deserted the Persians and come to tell the Greeks that they were surrounded (8.82).

In the third part of the *Themistoclean logos*, which tells about the events after the victory at Salamis, Themistocles once again tries to persuade the Greeks to act wisely and destroy the bridges over Hellespont, so that the Persian army could not escape (8.108). Yet, the Greeks take the opposite view—they think that the Persians should be allowed to escape, for it would be impossible to defeat them in the hoplite battle. Seeing that he will not be able to convince the majority (8.109 Ὡς δὲ ἔμαθε ὅτι οὐ πείσει τούς γε πολλοὺς), Themistocles delivers a speech to his only supporters, the Athenians, in which he denies everything that he had ever said and convinces them to change their mind: it is better to let the enemies escape, rather than chase them; the glory of the victory does not belong to the Greeks, it belongs to the Gods and heroes.[57] Therefore, everyone should be able go home and take care of their families—let them rebuild their houses and farm their land (καί τις οἰκίην τε ἀναπλασάσθω καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω). In this episode Themistocles once again stands out as the smartest and the wisest in the political game: he gives up and pretends to support the opinion of the conservative majority. The Athenians, who were eager to destroy the bridges, give in to Themistocles' trickery (here is another paradox: in the previous episode, no one would have believed him, although he would have told the truth, and now they believe him, although he is lying). At this point Herodotus comments on why the Athenians did not detect any trickery: Θεμιστοκλέης μὲν ταῦτα λέγων διέβαλλε, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἐπείθοντο· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον, δεδογμένος εἶναι σοφός, ἐφάνη ἐὼν ἀληθέως σοφός τε καὶ εὔβουλος, πάντως ἕτοιμοι ἦσαν λέγοντι πείθεσθαι (8.110).[58] After the meeting, Themistocles immediately pursues his next scheme: he sends his slave to Xerxes for the second time, this time to tell him that he talked the Greeks into not destroying the bridges across Hellespont; therefore, the king has got a perfect possibility to retreat. Herodotus presents the following motive to

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[57] Hdt. 8.109 Ὡς δὲ ἔμαθε ὅτι οὐ πείσει τούς γε πολλοὺς πλέειν ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον ὁ Θεμιστοκλέης, μεταβαλὼν πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους (οὗτοι γὰρ μάλιστα ἐκπεφευγότων περιημέκτεον ὁρμέατό τε ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον πλέειν καὶ ἐπὶ σφέων αὐτῶν βαλόμενοι, εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ βουλοίατο) ἔλεγέ σφι τάδε (*The Athenians were particularly annoyed by the Persians' escape and were perfectly prepared to sail to the Hellespont on their own if the others refused to join them, so when Themistocles realized that he was not going to persuade a majority of the commanders to go to the Hellespont, he changed tack and addressed the Athenians*).

[58] *The Athenians were won over by Themistocles' disingenuous speech He already had a reputation as a man of some ability, but now that his competence had been demonstrated beyond a doubt, and his advice had been proved sound, they were ready to do anything he said*. This speech can be one of the examples that, according to V. Zali (2014, 312), Herodotus took a critical stance towards inter-Greek conflicts of that time and the contemporary rhetoric.

explain Themistocles' action: he did it in order to please the king, so that the king could grant him shelter, in case the Athenians change their opinion about him.[59] Herodotus justifies Themistocles' actions by stating that this truly happened (τά περ ὦν καὶ ἐγένετο).

At the end of the *Themistoclean logos* (8.111–112), his goal to benefit from the islands that supported Persians is mentioned: he pretended to demand the money for contribution, but actually, for himself. This episode brings the reader to the beginning of the story, when Themistocles received a lot of money from the Euboeans for persuading the Greeks to stay at Artemisium and kept most of it to himself (8.4–5). However, the second one is more critical towards Themistocles' actions (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαύετο πλεονεκτέων[60]). This way Herodotus proves his principle to present all opinions objectively,[61] still, this episode does not alter the general characteristics of Themistocles in *Histories*.[62] When telling about Xerxes' campaign, Herodotus presents his own opinion about the role of the Athenians in this war more than once—he calls them the true saviours of Greece.[63] Yet, in Herodotus' narrative the only representative of the Athenians (Aristides excluded) is Themistocles. It is he who gets all the glory of the victory at Salamis. Themistocles is the only leader who clearly perceives what is best in the new political circumstances, while the others do not; when there is no consent, he has to device new ways to implement his plan. Plutarch later generalised this tension between the traditional and the new as a rivalry between Themistocles and Aristides: *Aristides' character was moderate and conservative, and his political career was motivated not by a desire for gratification or reputation, but by the goal of maximizing the city's advantage to the fullest extent that was consistent with both safety and justice. He was therefore forced*

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[59] Hdt. 8.109 Ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἀποθήκην μέλλων ποιήσεσθαι ἐς τὸν Πέρσην, ἵνα, ἢν ἄρα τί μιν καταλαμβάνη πρὸς Ἀθηναίων πάθος, ἔχη ἀποστροφήν· τά περ ὦν καὶ ἐγένετο. (*His reason for saying this was to earn credit with Xerxes, so that if he ever got in trouble with the Athenians, he would have somewhere to turn to. And in fact this is exactly what happened*). Πάθος here means "personal calamity" (Powell 1938, s.v.).

[60] Hdt. 8.112 *This did not put an end to Themistocles' greed*.

[61] Hdt. 7.152.3 Ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω (καί μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα τὸν λόγον). (*I am obliged to record the things I am told, but I am certainly not required to believe them – this remark may be taken to apply to the whole of my account*).

[62] According to Blösel (2002, 196), Herodotus implies an analogy: "... as is Themistocles to the Athenians, so are the Athenians to the Greeks. During the Persian wars the Athenians—like Themistocles until Salamis—led the Greek defence against the Persians; but after the war, in the time of the league, the Athenians degenerated—like Themistocles after Salamis—into lawless oppressors of other Greeks and fell victim to exactly those vices which Herodotus attributes to Themistocles: πλεονεξία and *hubris*".

[63] Hdt. 7.139 Νῦν δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τἀληθέος...(*As things are, however, anyone who claims that the Athenians proved themselves to be the saviours of Greece would be perfectly correct…*).

time and again to assist Themistocles attempts to arouse the people of Athens and introduce major innovations.[64]

As Emily Baragwanath has stated, Herodotus' text "promotes an approach to the past that acknowledges the difficulty, even impossibility, of alighting upon such absolute truth."[65] Histories are open to the reader's response. What Herodotus does not like is a direct moralising; it will become popular later, in the histories in the Hellenistic age. However, what he does like is to tell a good story. He reshaped the material about Themistocles into the story about salvation through deceit and gave it an Odyssey-resembling touch. The *Themistoclean logos* plays on the contrast between appearances and reality. The real meaning of Themistocles' actions is hidden from the actors of the political theatre. When there is no unity, he manages to trick the Greeks, as well as the Persian king, in order to reach the only goal, which is to save Greece. Themistocles' trickeries overstep the limits of private life and gain a geopolitical dimension. Not expecting it himself, he becomes a tool for the Gods' will: thanks to him Xerxes' campaign starts as a tragedy and ends as a farce. Yet, Themistocles does not exclude himself while thinking of the freedom of his country: he is able to present his deceit that destroyed the Persians at Salamis as a good deed to the king; he also persuades the king that the Greeks' decision not to pursue the Persians was his own merit and, what is more, due to these deceptions Themistocles is able to save his life after many years.[66] Herodotus is silent about Themistocles' post-war activities, nor does he tell about the accusations of treachery and his exile. Herodotus' readers were well aware of these events that were open to interpretations. It is difficult to agree with W. Blösel's straightforward statement that Themistocles for the Greeks was a traitor *par excellence*;[67] Herodotus' and Thucydides' stories contradict to it.

In Herodotus Themistocles is only one of the *strategoi*, but Herodotus depicts Themistocles not only as the Athenian, but rather as the Panhellenic leader. We do not see him as a fighter in the sea battle, but only in political debates. Themistocles in *Histories* is an inventor of new rules of the political game. He breaks the aristocratic political code and, alike the Athenians in Thucydides' *History*, adapts himself to the new political reality, when only the intellectually fittest survives. Themistocles in Thucydides' *History* matches the image of a political trickster as well; his tricks are directed to overcome the new enemy—Sparta. He is regarded responsible of enmity between Athens and Sparta and pays his price for it: in the political game of the two powers—Athens and Sparta—Themistocles' trickeries

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[64] Plut., *Them.* 3 ...πρᾶος γὰρ ὢν φύσει καὶ καλοκαγαθικὸς τὸν τρόπον ὁ Ἀριστείδης, καὶ πολιτευόμενος οὐ πρὸς χάριν οὐδὲ πρὸς δόξαν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ βελτίστου μετ' ἀσφαλείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἠναγκάζετο τῷ Θεμιστοκλεῖ τὸν δῆμον ἐπὶ πολλὰ κινοῦντι καὶ μεγάλας ἐπιφέροντι καινοτομίας ἐναντιοῦσθαι πολλάκις, ἐνιστάμενος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν.

[65] Baragwanath 2008, 322.

[66] He probably came to Persia after 465 BC.

[67] Blösel 2002, 184.

lose their power and he becomes the victim of the machinations and trickeries of others.

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Aristophanes in Swedish:
Shocking to the modern reader[1]

JOHANNA AKUJÄRVI

1 Introduction

This study of Swedish translations of Aristophanes' comedies focuses on one spe-
cific and characteristic aspect of ancient comedy: its obscenity. Aristophanes
dwells upon such bodily parts and functions that for the sake of propriety tend
not to be spoken of throughout the early modern and most of the modern recep-
tion of Aristophanes; this has created and continues to create problems for trans-
lators of his comedies.[2] In the following a short translation history of Aristophanes
into Swedish, focused upon the translators' statements regarding problems of
translation and the intended function of the translations (section 2), is followed by
a study of the three Swedish translations of *Aves*: *Foglarne* (1868) by Hjalmar Säve,
senior master at a secondary grammar school, *Fåglarne* (1892) by the ecclesiastic
Johan Fredrik Håhl, and *Fåglarna* (1928) by the two young authors Hjalmar Gull-
berg and Ivar Harrie (section 3).[3] Here the translators and the translations are pre-
sented, the principles of their translation are described, and the contemporary re-
ception of the translations is discussed. Finally, the translators' strategies for han-

[2] See, for instance Kitzbichler 2014, 27–31, Lefevere 1992, 31–44, on 20th century English transla-
tions, in a chapter entitled "Translation: the categories. Lifelines, noses, legs, handles: the *Lysistrata*
of Aristophanes", and in particular Lubitz 2020.
[3] In the following, the comedies are cited by their Latin title when I refer to them in general; the
Swedish title is used for the individual translations.

dling Aristophanes' obscenity and scatology is studied in light of their overall principles of translation (section 4). Together with *Equites*, *Aves* is the Aristophanic comedy most often translated into Swedish. *Aves* was chosen for this study for three reasons: (1) the chronological spread of the translations, (2) one translation was staged, and (3) it is one of the least obscene of Aristophanes' comedies – its, relatively speaking, small amount of explicit obscenity and scatology makes it an easily managed object of study.[4]

2 Aristophanes in Swedish

The pattern of the Swedish translations of Aristophanes resembles that of Swedish translations of Greek tragedy.[5] In the early 19th century, ancient Greek tragedy began to be translated into Swedish, and the first Swedish translations of Aristophanes appeared shortly after that. Aristophanes has not been translated as frequently as the tragedians, but a significant number of translations have appeared, given

> [Aristophanes'] loving interest for the various phenomena of human digestion and excretion and [the fact that] his obstinate habit to mention the private parts by their right name at least once in every scene shock the modern reader as immensely as it amused the Athenian spectator,[6]

as Ivar Harrie put it in the 1920s, with a slight exaggeration. In the early 19th century a so-called faithful method of translation was established in Sweden, following German models, according to which the source text was to be rendered as faithfully as possible.[7] In the case of poetry translation, this method generally entailed that the translators strove to render the content of the source texts line by line, or at the least sentence by sentence, and to reproduce the metric patterns of the source text in the target text according to ever more rigid prosodic rules.[8] Texts like the comedies of Aristophanes, which were highly valued in some respects but shocking in other, caused particular problems for translators at a time when the ideal was to adhere to the faithful translation principle, as is shown below.

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[4] Henderson 1975, 82–86.

[5] On Swedish translations of the Greek tragedians, see Akujärvi 2015a and forthcoming studies of Greek drama on the Swedish stage; Henrikson 2015; and Nordgren 2015 for a brief survey of Swedish translations of Aristophanes.

[6] Harrie 1927, 154: "[Aristofanes] kärleksfulla intresse för den mänskliga digestionens och exkretionens olika fenomen och [att] hans envisa vana att minst en gång i varje scen nämna könsdelarna vid deras rätta namn choquerar den moderne läsaren lika kolossalt som det roade den athenske åskådaren."

[7] On the shift in Swedish translation praxis, see Mogren 1963, Wollin 1994, 2014; and, on the shift in translations of ancient literature, Akujärvi 2010a, 2014a, 2015b.

[8] See Akujärvi 2014a, 2015a och 2015b.

Problems involving Aristophanes' ethics and morals were discussed by the earliest translators. The first translator, Johan Henrik Thomander, later professor of theology at Lund University and bishop of Lund, declares in the preface to *Molnen* (1826) that Aristophanes' immorality is nearly proverbial, and admits that *Nubes* contains much material that is so offensive to the contemporary readers that it can hardly be covered up even with a translation that is "more improper" (*sc.* than the one that is the ideal).[9] By way of explanation of the result, he concludes by quoting August Wilhelm Schlegel, whom he calls an experienced translator, for his judgement of Aristophanes as being untranslatable for many reasons.[10] Despite the many problems he faced when working with Aristophanes, Thomander nevertheless planned to translate all of his comedies, excepting *Lysistrata*, which he judged too indecent to translate.[11] However, the intention was not realized. He translated *Thesmophoriazusae* and *Ranae* in the 1820s, and tried to get them published after *Molnen*. Advertisements for interested parties were published in newspapers still in 1828,[12] but the translations were printed only in his posthumous collected works in 1879.

After this first translation all of Aristophanes' comedies have been translated into Swedish, at least partially, excepting only *Ecclesiazousae*. The latest translation was printed in 1968. The appendix lists all the known translations, both the complete and partial ones (part 1); it also contains information on known adaptations of existing translations (part 2), and on known reworkings in Swedish (part 3); the order is chronological in each category. Looking at only the complete translations, there are:

- one translation each of *Pax*, *Plutus* and *Vespae*;
- two translations each of *Lysistrata*, *Nubes*, *Ranae* and *Thesmophoriazusae*;
- three translations each of *Equites* and *Aves*.

The partial translations that appeared in the 1830s and 1850s are so-called dissertation translations, that is, translations that were printed in dissertations to be publicly defended at the university.[13] In the 19th century, until about 1860, it was very common for students to have dissertations containing a translation of ancient Greek or Latin literature at defences for both practice (*pro exercitio)* and for the (master's) degree (*pro gradu*). The translation was most often not made by the student himself but by the *magister* or professor who presided at the public defence. That is the case with the translations of Aristophanes. Carl August Hagberg, later professor of modern languages in Lund and translator of Shakespeare, was the

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[9] Thomander 1826, VI–VII: "en mera oegentlig öfversättning".
[10] Id., VII: "den i öfversättareförmåga bepröfvade".
[11] Nordgren 2015, 176–178.
[12] For instance, a short paragraph in *Norrköpings tidningar* 1828-07-05.
[13] On dissertation translations, see Akujärvi 2014b and 2017a.

author of the translations that his students defended with him presiding. The beginning of *Equites* was published as a series of six dissertations (1831–1832, partial translation); a complete translation was printed by a publishing firm (1834), with the title *Demagogerna*, which Hagberg, following the German translator Christoph Martin Wieland, thought would be more comprehensible for the modern reader.[14] Only two parts of his *Acharnerne* appeared (1834); *Acharnenses* remains to appear in a complete Swedish translation. It is likely that the translations defended with Henrik Gerhard Lindgren (*Plutos* 1834) and Zacharias Göransson (*Grodorna* 1853) presiding were made by them rather than by the students, even if the question of authorship is harder to decide in the case of single dissertations than in the case of dissertation series.[15]

In the preface to *Demagogerna*, which is the only one of the above mentioned translations that is addressed to a readership outside the academy, Hagberg explains, as Thomander had done before, that his translation is not literal in those passages that offend decency.[16] Moreover, he clarifies that he aspires to render the sense of the text rather than its wording, since no author suffers as much as Aristophanes from being translated literally, without specifying what would be lost in the translation.[17] Therefore he warns

> whoever turns to this translation in search for a so-called "version" or a convenient short cut past the lexicon and grammar, the study of which should be finished before one starts to read Aristophanes.[18]

In other words: students cannot to rely on Hagberg's translation to guide them through the Greek text. This comment reflects the widespread use of literal translations by students of the classical languages; "version" is used about translations, particularly about the sort of literal translating intent to reflect the syntax of the source text practiced in schools.[19]

In the latter half on the 19th century Aristophanes was translated by Hjalmar Säve, Johan Fredrik Håhl, who will be studied below, and Alarik Hallström. Hall-

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[14] Hagberg 1834, XIII: "för nyare tiders läsare mera fattlig".

[15] It is likely that Lindgren is the author considering the facts that the dissertation contains the whole of *Plutus* (it is very rarely the case that a dissertation contains more than a partial translation even of a short piece of literature) and that the respondent was a young nobleman whom Lindgren tutored and whose father Lindgren thanks in the dedication. It is likely that Göransson is the author since the title page states that the dissertation is part one, that is: the first part of a planned series of dissertations, which came to nothing because of the reform of the university statutes that forbade students to defend the work of others; see Akujärvi (2014b) 27–32.

[16] Hagberg 1834, XIII.

[17] Id., XII.

[18] Id., XII–XIII: "hvar och en, som i denna öfversättning söker en så kallad »version« eller beqvämare ginväg förbi lexicon och grammatica, hvars studium bör vara undangjordt innan man börjar läsa Aristophanes." On "version", see *SAOB* s.v. "version" 1.

[19] On translations as help for language students, see Akujärvi 2010b and 2017b.

ström was senior master at a secondary grammar school and *Molnen* (1883) is his only known translation. In the introduction he claims that he did not learn about Thomander's *Molnen* (1826) until several years after he had finished his work on the *Nubes*, and explains that he hesitated to have it published when Thomander's translation was reprinted in his collected works (1879), but that he decided to do so nevertheless, taking into consideration the fact that research had advanced the understanding of the text in the meantime.[20] He even admits to having adjusted his own translation after that of his predecessor in several places.[21] When it comes to principles of translation, Hallström, like most other 19th century translators of ancient literature, focuses on matters of metre and prosody, in order to argue against what had become established practice and to insist that the laws for Swedish metrics should be derived from the Swedish poetic tradition rather than be imported from that of ancient Greece and Rome.[22] Hallström's *Molnen* is probably the most widely circulated Swedish translation of Aristophanes. It was broadcasted in August 1927 as radio theatre, according to the newspapers.[23] It is printed in several different anthologies of the classics, for instance in *Litteraturens klassiker*, the latest edition of which appeared in 2015.[24]

In the 20th century Aristophanes has been translated by Hjalmar Gullberg and Ivar Harrie (*Fåglarna* 1928 and *Lysistrate* 1932), a translating duo that will be discussed below, and by Tord Bæckström. In addition to the Homeric epics and several Euripidean tragedies, the journalist, critic, and translator Bæckström translated six Aristophanic comedies, more than any other Swedish translator.[25] Bæckström's translations were printed in pairs in the so-called Forumbiblioteket (Forum Library) series: *Kvinnornas sammansvärjning* and *Grodorna* (1957), *Getingarna* and *Freden* (1962), *Riddarna* and *Lysistrate* (1968). All but *Vespae* and *Pax* had been translated earlier. Except for the choruses, Bæckström's translations follow the source text closely, and they are unencumbered by the elevated tone that is not uncommon in translation of ancient literature. Their reception was mixed; due to their informal and unaffected style they were actable and some were staged.[26] For instance, his version was used for the criticised television theatre performance of *Lysistrate* with Lena Nyman playing the title role that was broadcast in March 1981.[27]

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[20] Hallström 1883, X.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Id., VIII–X. On the turning point that Hallström's translation represents for the discussion on metrics in the context of Swedish translations of ancient drama, particularly Greek drama, see Akujärvi 2015a.

[23] Inter alia in *Dagens Nyheter* 1927-08-14, 1927-08-27.

[24] Edited by Breitholtz 1961; previously printed in the anthologies edited by Schück 1902, and Böök, Hallström & Lamm 1927.

[25] For a list of Bæckström's other translations, see Cullhed (s.a.).

[26] Ibid.

[27] It can still be seen at SVT, Öppet arkiv: https://www.oppetarkiv.se/video/6592894/lysistrate, ac-

Bæckström's translations are the latest to date. But this does not mean that there has not been any interest in Aristophanes' comedies in Sweden after 1968. A number of adaptations and translations from source languages other than Greek have appeared; some of these are listed in the appendix. *Lysistrata* dominates with at least three adaptations directly for the stage: Jönsson (1986) translates a Norwegian adaptation,[28] Karlsson's [1999] version was played as summer theatre at the citadel in Karlshamn,[29] Althoff's [1998] heavily abridged version was played together with an adaptation of Euripides' *Medea* at Underlandet på Kilen in Stockholm in 1998.[30] The adaptation translated by Ax (1980) is an illustrated children's book based on *Pax* and *Lysistrata*; Helleskog (1989) translates the staging in the guise of a graphic novel by the German comics artist Ralph König; Werkmäster (2009) made an illustrated adaptation for Lättläst-förlaget (Easy-to-read-publishing). However incomplete this review may be, it is not complete without mention of *Flickorna* by Mai Zetterling (1968), a complex film permeated by contemporary debates on gender roles about the staging of and touring with *Lysistrate* and about how bits and pieces of Aristophanes' text are directly relevant in the lives of the actors. Bibi Andersson is splendid in the leading role as Liz, the actress who plays Lysistrate.[31]

3 Aves – Foglarne, Fåglarne, Fåglarna

The plot of *Aves*, in short: two elderly Athenian citizens, Peisetaerus [32] and Euelpides, tired of life in Athens with its duties in courts of law and political assemblies, have decided to emigrate. They have gone in search for the hoopoe/Tereus to ask him for advice on where they might live a life free of the hustle that they experience in Athens. None of Tereus' suggestions appeal to them. Then, Peisetaerus is struck by the fantastic idea to organize the birds and found a city – the famous Νεφελοκοκκυγία (v. 819) or *Molnfoglaborg* (Cloud-bird-castle, Säve 1869, 52), *Molnkukusborg* (Cloud-cuckoo-castle, Håhl 1892, 67), *Himlagökenborg* (Heaven-cuckoo-castle, Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 64) – in the air between man on

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[28] This is perhaps the same *Lysistrate* that was performed in 1981 at Nationaltheatret in Oslo directed by Stavros Doufexis; on this, see Østmoe 2015, 68–71.

[29] According to https://www.teatersmedjan.se/forestallning/fru-lysistrate-och-hennes-karringar/, accessed 2020-03-31.

[30] Data derived from a review of the performance, by Zern 1998.

[31] Today a feminist classic, its reception then was highly critical, see Larsson 2006, 92–93.

[32] This character is named "Peithetairos" in Säve and Gullberg & Harrie; "Peisthetairos" in Håhl, who explains that he prefers the orthography transmitted in the manuscripts, see Håhl 1892, 2. The edition used by both Säve and Håhl, Kock 1864 and 1876, respectively, prints "Peithetairos". I follow Dunbar in preferring "Peisetaerus," since that spelling not only suits the character well but appears also to be supported by the distorted pronunciation of the Triballian god να, Βαισατρευ (v. 1615); see Dunbar 1995, 128–129 and 724–725 *ad locc.*

earth and gods in Olympus. By a blockade of all commerce between man and gods, the birds regain their former position as gods, and by marrying *Basileia* Peisetaerus becomes king. Among Aristophanes' comedies *Aves* is exceptional in several aspects: its unusually small amount of obscenities, its scene of action, which is not Athens, its relatively few allusions to politics, war, and current events.

3.1 Hjalmar Säve – Foglarne 1869

Hjalmar Säve (1839–1870) studied at Uppsala University, graduating as master of philosophy in 1863. The following year he was appointed senior master of Greek and Latin at the secondary grammar school (högre elementarläroverk) in Gävle; in 1867 he attained the same position in Helsingborg. In 1870 he was appointed headmaster at the corresponding school in Karlskrona but died before he took office. He prepared several textbooks in both Greek and Latin and was compiling a Swedish-Latin lexicon when he died.[33]

Säve's *Foglarne*, printed in Helsingborg in 1869, is his only known translation. It was awarded the second prize by the Swedish Academy in 1868. In the 1860s and 1870s translations of Greek tragedies and other pieces of ancient literature were regularly awarded in the literary contests announced by the Swedish Academy. The contestants were often (secondary) grammar school teachers or students.[34] Like other prize winners, who had their translations printed, Säve mentions the price on the title page as advertisement.

Säve claims that *Aves* is the most brilliant and in all respects most excellent of Aristophanes' comedies.[35] By providing his translation with both introduction and explanatory notes, Säve intends to help those readers who are unfamiliar with Greek antiquity to appreciate the text.[36] A reader truly "unfamiliar" with antiquity will need the comments in order to take in Säve's very close translation: Aristophanes' allusions to contemporary events are translated unaltered – and need to be explained –, proverbial or idiomatic expressions are translated literally – and the translator explains their significance, generally at the cost of jokes being lost in the process. For instance, the treatment of ἐς κόρακας, literally "to the ravens", an imprecation used for saying "get lost!" and worse, in the opening exchange of words between Peisetaerus and Euelpides:

οὐ δεινὸν οὖν δῆτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡμᾶς δεομένους
ἐς κόρακας ἐλθεῖν καὶ παρεσκευασμένους

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[33] Biographical details according to Greete & Centerwall 1919.
[34] See von Platen 1986, 35–43 and 169–179 (list of the prize winners).
[35] Säve 1869, VII.
[36] Ibid.: "äfven den med den grekiska forntiden mera obekante läsaren skall kunna uppfatta och njuta."

ἔπειτα μὴ ᾽ξευρεῖν δύνασθαι τὴν ὁδόν; (*Av.* 27–29)[37]

(till åskådarne)
Säg, är det icke hårdt, att vi, som **till korparne**
ha ställt vår vandring och dertill väl oss förberedt,
nu blifvit bragte ur stånd att finna vägen dit!
> V. 27 Draga till korparne, ordspråk motsvarande vårt "draga för hin i våld"
> o. dyl. (Säve 1869, 3)

Backtranslation: (to the spectators): Isn't it bad that we, who are on our way **to the ravens**, and are well prepared for that, are unable to find our way there!
> V. 27 Go to the ravens, proverb corresponding to our "go to hell" etc.

The note to line 27 explains the Greek idiom; based on that information, the reader needs to reconstruct the joke, which turns on their failure to achieve what, according to the literal sense of the imprecation, is their goal.

Säve's translation is typical of its time: literal and scrupulously careful when it comes to reproducing the metrical patterns of the Greek source text. In so far as Säve discusses principles of translation, these relate to metre, specifically to the prosodic principles underlying his construction of the Swedish metre.[38] Säve comments on the metre in the notes. In an initial note to the first 208 lines he explains the construction of the (Greek) iambic trimeter, and every time the metre changes, Säve adds a note to explain how the relevant metre functions; in the case of lyrical passages and choral songs the schemata of the metric analysis are given to describe its metre.[39] Such an analysis is likely to have helped readers who are unfamiliar with Greek metres to understand that he is reading verse, and perhaps to scan it correctly.

A focus on metre and prosody is characteristic of the period, as can be observed in contemporary translations of ancient poetic texts and their reviews.[40] For instance, the review – or more correctly: the note on Swedish metrics (as the title states) with reference to Säve's *Foglarne* – by Magnus Dalsjö, senior master at the secondary grammar school in Kristianstad and future translator of Plato, is almost exclusively concerned with metrics.[41] Dalsjö scrutinizes the prosody, and gives an account of the verses where Säve failed to build the metre on correct prosodic rules. However, despite his lists of faults, Dalsjö does conclude that while Säve's verse may suffer from the occasional shortcoming, it nevertheless represents true progress in comparison both to older Swedish metrics and to previous metric

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[37] Henderson 2000, 17: "*(to the spectators)* Isn't it terrible that just when we're ready and eager to go to the buzzards, we can't find the way?"

[38] Id., VII–IX.

[39] Id., 1, 15 (the first occurrence of an anapaestic system), 16–17 (the first lyric passage) etc.

[40] See Akujärvi 2015a.

[41] Dalsjö 1869.

translations of Greek drama;[42] and summing up, he judges that the the shortcomings are neither too many nor too severe.[43] As to other aspects of the translation, its language and rendering of the content of the comedy, he declares that Aristophanes is recognizable, and that he has retained his mode of expression that is "light and playful, almost innocently jesting, but always in good taste to the highest degree,"[44] in the transformation of Greek into Swedish. Finally, he recommends *Foglarne* to all with an interest in drama, but in particular to "practicians and friends of metrics".[45]

3.2 Johan Fredrik Håhl – Fåglarne 1892

Johan Fredrik Håhl (1835–1918) was about the same age as Säve. Like Säve, he studied in Uppsala, where he became master of philosophy in 1860; he went on to study theology, was ordained in 1867, and promoted to doctor of theology in 1893. He made a career in the Church of Sweden and advanced to the position of *pastor primarius* at Storkyrkan (the Church of Saint Nicolai) in Stockholm.[46]

Håhl's *Fåglarne* (1892) and *Riddarne* (1898) are as far as is known his only translations. His other publications include sermons and various things related to his clerical office. As translator he works according to the same principles as Säve: his ambition is to create a translation that is literal and reproduces the metrical schemes of the Greek source text carefully. Håhl claims that his translation is completely uninfluenced by Säve's, for it was when he had finished that he discovered his predecessor's work.[47] He decided to print his own translation nevertheless, since, he explains, they have used different text editions. Actually, they use different editions of the same text edition with an extensive introduction and commentary by Theodor Kock; Säve used the first and Håhl the second edition.[48] Håhl asserts that the differences, particularly in the metrical analysis, between the two editions are extensive enough to justify the printing of a translation that renders this metrical difference – yet another sign of how central metre was to the translators. However, there are no obvious differences between the two editions, and, judging from the metrical analysis in the section "Angabe der Metra" at the end of the two editions, there are no divergences between them.[49] Håhl leaves it to the experts to compare the two translations and judge their value.[50]

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[42] Id., 261.

[43] Id., 269.

[44] Ibid.: "lätt och lekande, snart sagt oskyldigt skämtande, men alltid ytterst smakfullt."

[45] Id., 271: "verskonstens idkare och vänner".

[46] Biographical data according to Hellström 1951, 458.

[47] Håhl 1892, V.

[48] Kock 1864 and 1876.

[49] Kock 1864 and 1876, 248–254.

[50] Håhl 1892, V.

Like Säve, Håhl is thus very concerned about metre. In the preface, prosody is the only matter of translational principles that he discusses.[51] Håhl also comments on the metre, but instead of describing how the metric schemes work, as Säve did, he offers only the name of the metres in an abridged form, for example "jamb. trimeter" for lines 1–208, "anapaest. system" for lines 209–222, and for lyric sections he gives only the abstract schemata without describing the elements that make up the patterns.[52] Håhl's translation also has explanatory notes that compensate for gaps in the readers' knowledge. Although Säve and Håhl practice the same principles of translation, their results are different, since they constantly choose differently between existing alternatives. Despite their similarities, the divergences between them are easily seen in, for instance, the joke about not managing to find the way ἐς κόρακας (*Av.* 27–29; for the text, see above):

> Är det ej rent befängt, att vi, som hafva lust
> **Till korpar** draga hän[1]) och rustat oss därtill,
> Likväl i stånd ej äro hitta vägen dit?
>> [1]) När man tilltalar någon med uppmaning att draga till korparne, menar E., så är man ingenting mindre än villig därtill. Vi åter, som önska det på fullt allvar, kunna ej hitta vägen dit. (Håhl 1892, 5)

> Backtranslation: Isn't it ridiculous that we, who have the desire to go **to the ravens**[1]) and have prepared ourselves for it, nevertheless are unable to find the way there?
>> [1]) When addressing someone with the exhortation to go to the ravens, according to E[uelpides], one is anything but willing to do that. But we, who sincerely wish it, cannot find the way there.

Despite differences in choices of words and phrases, the translations of Säve and Håhl are similar in that they both render the idiomatic phrase literally and comment upon it. While Säve's note explains how the saying is to be understood and leaves it to the reader to figure out the joke, Håhl's note – a direct translation from Kock's commentary[53] – explains the mechanism of the joke but not how the reader is to understand the saying.

Håhl's *Fåglarne* appears to have passed almost completely unnoticed in contemporary newspapers, excepting occasional short paragraphs announcing its publication and advertisements of its being for sale in bookshops.[54]

[51] Ibid.
[52] Håhl 1892, 3, 21, 22–25.
[53] Kock 1876, 30 *ad* v. 28.
[54] E.g. in *Stockholms dagblad*, special edition 1892-09-25.

3.3 Hjalmar Gullberg & Ivar Harrie – Fåglarna 1928

Hjalmar Gullberg (1898–1961) and Ivar Harrie (1899–1973) were Scanians who studied at Lund University at about the same time. They were both editors of *Lundagård*, the Lund University student magazine, both finished their studies with the licentiate degree, and in time they were both successful as writers, journalists, authors, poets, and on the radio.[55] Their two translations of Aristophanes – *Fåglarna* (1928) and *Lysistrate* (1932) – are early works in their literary careers, so there is no need to delve into their extensive bibliographies. However, it must be mentioned that they continued as translators from both ancient and modern languages.[56]

The later translations they made on their own, but *Fåglarna* and *Lysistrate* they translated as a team. In the postscript to *Fåglarna*, they state that the end result is the fruit of close cooperation and that they are both equally accountable for the principles of translation as well as for its details.[57] In 1927 a sample of the translation was printed in the journal *Ord och Bild*; according to Harrie they had translated that section during the summer of 1925 as a pastime.[58] Moreover, Harrie had done his licentiate thesis in Greek on the *Aves*.[59] Harrie had thus been working on that text for a long time before the complete translation was made. When the commission for translating the comedy came from Olof Molander at the Royal Dramatic Theatre, they finished the translation in record time.[60] In 1928 they published the complete translation in book form and the comedy had its first performance 20 October at the Konserthusteatern in Stockholm, directed by Olof Molander, with music by Armas Järnefelt, choreography by Axel Witzansky, and decor and costumes after sketches by Isaac Grünewald, according to the programme. Greek tragedies, among others Sophocles' *Antigone* and *Oedipus Rex*,[61] had been performed earlier in Sweden, but with this staging Aristophanes was played for the very first time on a Swedish stage, as Claes Lindskog points out in the programme; the spectators were probably well aware of participating in a historic event.[62] According to Harrie, the source of inspiration behind the staging in Stockholm was a performance of *Aves* at L'Atelier in Paris, directed by Charles Dullin.[63]

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[55] Biographical details on Gullberg according to Fehrman 1967–1969, on Harrie according to Holt 2008, 25.

[56] On Gullberg as translator, see Bodin s.a.; on Harrie as translator, see Berggren & Holt s.a., both with bibliographies of their translations.

[57] Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 127: "Översättningen är frukten av ett intimt samarbete. För dess principer såväl som dess detaljer ansvara vi en för båda och båda för en såsom för egen skuld."

[58] Gullberg & Harrie 1927; see also Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 127 and Harrie 1955, 16.

[59] Holt 2008, 25; the title of the thesis is unknown; the manuscript appears to be lost.

[60] Harrie 1955, 16.

[61] See Harrie 1958, 132–139 for data on productions of ancient drama in Sweden until the 1950s.

[62] Lindskog 1928, 3.

[63] Harrie 1958, 116; Harrie dates the Paris production to 1926, but according to data on it collected in *Bibliotèque national de France* https://data.bnf.fr/fr/41399114/les_oiseaux_spectacle_1928/ (accessed 2020-04-03), its first performance took place in January 1928. The text used for it, an "adap-

Gullberg & Harrie's translation is radically different from the previous Swedish translations of *Aves* and Greek drama in general as regards the manner in which they strive to make it accessible to the recipient: not as a historical artefact that is understandable for students of antiquity or with the help of commentary, but as a piece of literature to be appreciated by both readers and spectators. Their statements regarding principles of translation are spread across the introduction to the sample in *Ord och Bild*, the postface to *Fåglarna*, and the theatre programme; the first and last of these are signed by Harrie alone, but they are assumed to express opinions held by both translators.[64] They speak consistently about the translation being both accessible to the reader directly and faithful to the source text. In the postface to *Fåglarna* they declare that they do not intend to present a dusty piece of curio from the history of literature, but a piece of living theatre.[65] A translation that "mechanically transfers the Greek text word for word and verse for verse", is doomed to fail both on stage and as a closet play because it would require extensive commentary.[66] They thus dissociate their translation from the kind of 19th century translations of which Säve's and Håhl's versions of *Aves* are representative specimens. They maintain that, if a translation copies the metre of the source text, it just creates a cacophony and, if a commentary is needed to explain allusions and to communicate content and jokes, it makes the non-philologist chuckle frigidly "concerning the history of literature", if it at all manages to convey the joke.[67] The differences to their predecessors become clear even in the little joke about not finding the way ἐς κόρακας (Av. 27–29; for the text, see above):

> Förbannat också — när man *önskar* dra
> **åt fåglarna** med allt sitt pick och pack,
> så kan man inte hitta vägen dit! (Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 9; italics in original)[68]

> Backtranslation: I'll be damned — when one has gathered one's traps and *wishes* to go to **the birds [≈ go to hell]**, then one cannot find one's way there!

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tion libre en trois actes" by Bernhard Zimmer, was printed in 1928, and known by Gullberg & Harrie at the time when they finished *Fåglarna*, see Harrie 1928, 12.

[64] Harrie 1927 and 1928; Gullberg & Harrie 1928a.

[65] Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 127.

[66] Harrie 1928, 12: "mekaniskt överflyttar den grekiska texten till svenska ord för ord och vers för vers".

[67] Harrie 1927, 156: "det isigaste »litteraturhistoriska skratt« hos en icke-filolog".

[68] The translation is identical in Gullberg & Harrie 1927, 157, except for a full stop instead of the exclamation mark at the end. In the abridged arrangement for radio, the comedy begins: "P: Var i all världen är vi nu nånstans? | E: Det går åt skogen. P: Dit kan du gå själv! | E: Förbannat också — när man *önskar* dra | åt fåglarna med allt sitt pick och pack, | så kan man inte hitta vägen dit!" (P: Where on earth are we? | E: It is going to the wood [≈ to rack and ruin]. P: You can go there yourself! | E: I'll be damned — when one has gathered one's traps and *wishes* to go to the birds [≈ go to hell], then one cannot find one's way there!) Gullberg & Harrie 1936, 5 (emphasis in the original).

By replacing the exact "ravens" with the less specific "fåglarna" (birds), which in Swedish can be used to euphemistically replace either the Devil or hell as the destination, Gullberg & Harrie create a joke that is construed with the same elements as in Aristophanes – that is, the concretisation of the literal sense of an expletive – and it works in Swedish without commentary.

Yet Gullberg & Harrie maintain that fidelity above all is a translator's duty. However, they redefine the concept and assert that fidelity is to capture the spirit of Aristophanic comedy rather than to convey the literal sense of the text and to reproduce the metric patterns.[69] Since Aristophanes created for the stage, the primary requirement on a translator is to produce an actable translation with the same elements as in the source text: a Swedish verse aiming to "capture the playful grace and flexible melody of the Aristophanic rhythms",[70] an adaptation that retains all the parts of the source text (including chorus and parabasis) and utilizes the same stylistic registers as Aristophanes does, both as regards the comical components – laughable situations, ridiculous notions, surprising changes, funny jokes, violations of the dramatic illusion, sharp witticisms, alterations between innocent quips, insolent crudities, and the most gross obscenities[71] – as well as literary allusions and allusions to contemporary events. Gullberg & Harrie have aimed to "make use of all the ideas and features of the original and to dress them in clothes that are immediately understandable and attractive to the modern Swede."[72] However, they feel forced to compromise with their aim for fidelity in two respects: they refrain from defamatory slurs and accusations directed at named partisans in political or literary factions and from stage directions true to the style of Aristophanes since that would have caused the director and actors problems and would have been construed as "indecently barbarous and grotesque with all its excessive antics – moreover, the police would have found themselves compelled to stop the performance at the outset as offensive to public decency."[73] The translators have thus compelled Aristophanes to "tone down and polish his manners" before letting him onto a Swedish stage.[74]

Gullberg & Harrie's translation did not attract as much publicity in the press as the performance did. Before the premiere the major Stockholm newspapers wrote about it, spurring the readers' expectations with reproductions of the costume sketches.[75] Reviews were illustrated with photographs of the most spectacu-

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[69] The following paragraph summarizes and quotes from Harrie 1928, 12.

[70] Id.: "fånga … de aristophaniska rytmernas okynnige [!] grace och mjuka melodi".

[71] The list is from Lindskog 1928, 5.

[72] Harrie 1928, 12: "… att ta vara på alla originalets infall och poänger och kläda dem i en för nutidssvenskar omedelbart begriplig och tilltalande form."

[73] Id.: "anstötligt barbarisk … och … grotesk i sina hejdlösa clownerier — f. ö. skulle polisen sett sig nödsakad att redan i början avbryta föreställningen såsom sedlighetssårande."

[74] Id.: "dämpa sin ton och förfina sina manerer".

[75] Anonymus 1928. On the reception, see also Svenbro 2011.

lar characters. The performance was full of verve and vigour, according to a reviewer; the spectators were dazzled by the colourful decors and costumes designed by Isaac Grünewald, and by "the young beautiful ladies' Venus-like bodies and plastic dances."[76] It was a success: "Any apprehensions that this Saturday's show of Aristophanes' *Fåglarna* … would be difficult to understand for those who were unfamiliar with Ancient cultural history, or too boring for the audience in Stockholm … turned out to be completely unjustified", begins another reviewer.[77]

Regarding the translation that is the foundation of the performance, the reviewers in both *Dagens Nyheter* and *Svenska Dagbladet* maintain that Gullberg & Harrie have what it takes to make an Aristophanic comedy actable in contemporary Sweden. A philologically and archaeologically correct production of an Attic tragedy does work on the stage, but if someone would dare to try the same with Old Attic comedy, that would emerge as a "monstrous mixture of incomprehensibleness and offensiveness", as one reviewer put it; what needs to be done is to rewrite, to "pour new wine in old bottles, to heed to its composition and idea, but at the same time update it and give the jokes a more or less obvious aim."[78] The same reviewer judged that Gullberg & Harrie have managed to create a "chemically dustless compound" between classical philology and poetry,[79] while the other wrote:

> Those who have gasped for breath when reading Säve's old translation from the sixties, will doubtlessly feel that their lungs are filled with air when they turn to Gullberg and Harrie's work.[80]

The reviewers also critiqued particulars, like the music,[81] the choice to dress the leading characters as Charlie Chaplin and a clown,[82] and the performance's frills and din that drown out "the lucid and wholesome line, that is Hellas",[83] in other words, essentially, the whole stage-setting.[84]

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[76] Escamillo 1928: "de unga sköna damernas venuskroppar och plastiska danser".

[77] N. S—g. 1928: "Eventuella farhågor för att lördagens föreställning av Aristophanes *Fåglarna* … skulle vara svårbegriplig för den, som var obevandrad i klassisk kulturhistoria, och för tråkig för Stockholmspubliken … visade sig fullkomligt obefogade."

[78] A. Ö. 1928: "monstruös blandning av obegriplighet och anstötlighet … att gjuta nytt vin i de gamla läglarna, att följa komposition och idé men samtidigt aktualisera och ge skämtet mer eller mindre kännbar adress."

[79] Id.: "kemiskt dammfri förening".

[80] Bergman 1928: "Den som kippat efter andan under läsningen av den gamla Säveska översättningen från sextiotalet får onekligen luft i lungorna när han tar till Gullbergs och Harries opus."

[81] P.-B. 1928.

[82] N. S—g. 1928.

[83] A. Ö. 1928: "den klara och sunda linjen, som heter Hellas".

[84] See also Den inbitne 1928 who criticises both translation, performance, and the enthusiastic reception of the two; a few days later a retort by Gullberg & Harrie (1928b) was printed in the same newspaper.

Gullberg & Harrie appear to have travelled with some sort of lecture and/or recitation tour of *Fåglarna*. An advertisement for their appearance for the local lecture club in Trelleborg, a city not far from Lund, informs that they have performed for a packed auditorium at the Göteborg university college, among many other venues throughout Sweden, but mainly in Scania. [85] The lecture/performance lasted an hour and a half and consisted of an introductory lecture by Harrie, followed by readings of excerpts from the translation. The event was reported to have been a veritable pleasure despite the poor acoustics of the lecture hall. [86]

Both *Fåglarna* and *Lysistrate* enjoyed some success after their first performances. A much abridged version of *Fåglarna* was aired in 1936. The radio arrangement of the play was printed in the series Radiotjänsts teaterbibliotek (Theatre library of the Radio Service) the same year. *Lysistrate* was also commissioned by the Royal Dramatic Theatre, although its first performance was at the Lund University student theatre and it was broadcast as radio theatre before it was played at the Royal Dramatic Theatre in Stockholm in 1934; after that it was performed at least once more. [87] The unabridged *Fåglarna* was reprinted with *Lysistrate* in 1954.

4 Obscenities

As already mentioned, *Aves* contains an exceptionally small amount of obscenities, considering that it is an Aristophanic comedy. Using Henderson's study *The Maculate Muse* as a guide, I have identified less than 20 obscene passages in *Aves*. [88] These are either explicitly obscene, where primary obscenities are used without beating about the bush or dissociating circumlocutions to mention genitals, excrement, or actions pertaining to them, such as πέος, βινέω, πρωκτός, πέρδομαι; or implicitly obscene, where metaphorically or figuratively obscene words are used to mention the same things. [89]

As regards implicitly obscene passages, their real intent may have been made manifest to the Athenian audience of 414 B.C. by the performance on the scene and by the context in which they occurred, even if no explicit verbal obscenities were pronounce. Double entendres are thus advantageous for a translator who wishes to clean up the text by weeding out its obscenities; in double entendres the innuendo can be ignored, since they can be translated as if they were unambiguous. In the following example, the obscenity lies in the interpretation of suggestive

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[85] Anonymous short paragraph in *Trelleborgs-Tidningen* 1930-01-20. On their touring, see also Svenbro 2011.

[86] —m. 1930.

[87] Harrie (1955) 20–21.

[88] Henderson 1975, 82–86.

[89] Henderson 1975, 35–54.

words (printed in bold). When the birds take the place of the gods, their sacrificial practices will change too:

ἢν Ἀφροδίτῃ θύῃ, **κριθὰς**[90] ὄρνιθι **φαληρίδι** θύειν
…
κἂν Διὶ θύῃ βασιλεῖ κριόν, βασιλεύς ἐστ᾽ **ὀρχίλος** ὄρνις,
ᾧ προτέρῳ δεῖ τοῦ Διὸς αὐτοῦ σέρφον **ἐνόρχην** σφαγιάζειν (*Av.* 565, 568–569)[91]

If one sacrifices to Aphrodite, one is to offer κριθαί "barley" to the bird φαληρίς "coot". κριθή is one of many agricultural terms used metaphorically to denote the male organ. The innuendo inherent in the name of the bird φαληρίς, because of its wordplay with φαλλός via the nearly homophonous φαλῆς (φαληρίδι ~ φαλῆτι ~ φαλλῷ), is reinforced by the double entendre of κριθή.[92] Thus, in the description of the remodelled sacrifice to Aphrodite there are two words that suggest the male organ. If one sacrifices a ram to Zeus Basileus, one is to begin by offering an entire, uncastrated (ἐνόρχης) gnat to the bird that is king, called ὀρχίλος "wren." It is a comic idea to check if a gnat has its testicles intact and to slaughter it by cutting its throat (σφαγιάζειν) rather than killing it by swatting it. In the description of the remodelled sacrifice to Zeus Basileus there are thus two words that are reminiscent of ὄρχις "testicle": the adjective ἐνόρχης that is used to describe uncastrated male victims of sacrifice and the name of the bird ὀρχίλος.[93] Neither of the words is obscene in and of itself; moreover, appreciating the paronomastic joke ὀρχίλος ~ ὄρχις is on about the same level as laughing at *infart* (entrance) or *utfart* (exit) as Anglophones have been observed to do in Sweden.

In the Greek, the potential obscenities are obvious, but they are nevertheless implicit since they depend on allusion and paronomasia. Thus, a translation may be regarded as correct even when it avoids such obscene, indecent or suggestive words as are current in the target language or some registers of if. Our translators:

Så, om Aphrodite man rökverk ger, må frön ock offras åt **sparfven** …
Skall åter en bock nedslagtas åt Zeus, så är pipar bland foglarne konung,
och åt honom då bör långt förr än åt Zeus **oskadade** myggor man offra.

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[90] πυρούς in the paradosis; since πυρούς recurs in the description of the next sacrifice v. 566, Dunbar 1995 adopts κριθάς, which was suggested by Brunck; Kock 1864 and 1876 prints γύρους suggested by Meinecke.

[91] Henderson 2000, 97: "… if the sacrifice is to Aphrodite, sacrifice nuts to the phall-arope bird … and if it's a ram sacrifice to Zeus the King, the nuthatch is a king bird, and it's to him, ahead of Zeus himself, that a gnat with intact nuts must be slaughtered." Note to "king bird": "It is unclear what bird *orchilos* refers to (perhaps the wren), and why it was a 'king' bird (perhaps a reference to the wren's gold crown or to Aesop's fable [Perry 434]); the translation preserves the pun on *orcheis* 'testicles.'"

[92] Henderson 1975, 112–113; 119–120; see also Dunbar 1995, 379 *ad loc.*

[93] Henderson 1975, 125; see also Dunbar 1995, 383–384 *ad locc.*

V. 565f. Peithetairos följer vid denna sammanställning af foglar med gudar icke folktron, utan rationellare grundsatser. … Aphrodite och Zeus [får] foglar, hvilkas grekiska namn innebära en anspelning på de egenskaper, som utmärkte dessa. (Säve 1869, 37)

Backtranslation: Thus, if an offering is burnt to Aphrodite, seeds need to be sacrificed to the **sparrow** … But if a goat is slaughtered to Zeus, then the plover is king among birds, and it is to him rather than to Zeus **unhurt** gnats should be sacrificed.
V. 565f. In this pairing of birds with deities Peithetairos adheres not to popular belief but to more rational principles … Aphrodite and Zeus [are given] birds, whose Greek names imply allusion to qualities that characterize them.

Om ett offer man ger Aphrodite, man bringe ett offer åt **sparfven** af korngryn. … Och om kunglige Zevs man offrar en bock — kungsfågeln är också en konung, — Åt honom man därföre, förr än åt Zevs, må slagta **ostympade** myggan. [4]
[4] Ordleken emellan fågelnamnet och myggans epithet har ej kunnat återgifvas på svenska. (Håhl 1892, 49)

Backtranslation: If a sacrifice is offered to Aphrodite, an offering of barley-grain is to be given to the **sparrow** … And if a goat is sacrificed to royal Zeus — the wren is also a king, — therefore the **unmutilated** gnat is to be slaughtered to him rather than to Zeus.[4]
[4] It has not been possible to render into Swedish the play on words between the bird's name and the gnat's epithet.

… åt **Nattskärran** sår man den **vildhavre** ut, som ägnades förr Aphrodite …
Kring Zeus stod det jämt en odör av bock: nu tar en Kungsfågel spiran.
Han är nöjd att bli bjuden ett praktexemplar **ur bikupans drönareharem**. (Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 48)

Backtranslation: … to the **nightjar** the **wild oats** are sowed that were formerly dedicated to Aphrodite … An odour of goats used to encompass Zeus: now the wren takes the sceptre. He is content with being offered a fine specimen taken from **the beehive's harem of drones**.

Both Säve and Håhl replace the coot with "sparv" (sparrow), a bird associated with Aphrodite, and create thus a tie between bird and goddess.[94] In the description of the second sacrifice all suggestions of testicles have been removed. "Bagge" (ram, a male of the species *ovis*) is turned into "bock" (goat, a male of the species *capra*), a closely related animal that is associated with lust and lechery in both Swedish and English. The gnat that is to be sacrificed is designated "oskadd" (unhurt, Säve) and "ostympad" (unmutilated, Håhl); the latter is more suggestive than the former, since mutilating implies deliberate cutting off of (bodily) parts. Säve adds

[94] Note that neither Säve or Håhl translate γύρους printed in Kock 1864 and 1876.

a note to explain that the Greek names of the birds allude to characteristic qualities of Aphrodite and Zeus; Håhl declares that he has not been able to render the Greek wordplay on the name of the bird and the epithet of the gnat, without clarifying whether that is due to its unsuitability for the Swedish reader or lack of equivalent wordplay.

Gullberg & Harrie replace coot with "nattskärra" (nightjar) – a bird whose name does not allude to testicles, but to nightly activities in both Swedish and English – and turn the new sacrifice into "sår sin vildhavre" (sow one's wild oats), that is, indulge in erotic promiscuity.[95] Like Säve and Håhl, they turn the ram into a goat, and add "odör" (odour) which enhances the filthy character of the animal. The sacrifice offered to Zeus' double is a "praktexemplar ur bikupans drönare-harem" (fine specimen taken from the beehive's harem of drones). They thus delete any mention of testicles, but "fine specimen" with "harem of drones" suggest that the victim – an insect, though not a gnat – is to be a well endowed specimen from a lustful and sensual context ("harem"), which creates an equally incongruous image as the slaughter of an uncastrated gnat in the source text.

A similar strategy can be observed in the next example, which illustrates the translators' treatment of explicit obscenity. The following passage appears in the same section where Peisetaerus describes how the birds are to establish their dominion over the gods. He advices them to declare a sacred war and to forbid the transit of horny divinities through avian territory with the intent to pay visits to mortal women:

> … καὶ τοῖσι θεοῖσιν ἀπειπεῖν
> διὰ τῆς χώρας τῆς ὑμετέρας **ἐστυκόσι** μὴ διαφοιτᾶν,
> ὥσπερ πρότερον **μοιχεύσοντες** τὰς Ἀλκμήνας κατέβαινον
> καὶ τὰς Ἀλόπας καὶ τὰς Σεμέλας· ἤνπερ δ᾽ ἐπίωσ᾽, ἐπιβάλλειν
> σφραγῖδ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὴν **ψωλήν**, ἵνα μὴ **βινῶσ**᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἐκείνας. (Αv. 556–560)[96]

In this section a number of vulgar and obscene terms are used, undermining divine magnificence and sullying any glory surrounding the lecherous gods' ravishment of mortal women. There are two words for the male organ and two verbs to describe actions performed with it. The organ, or the state that the gods are in, is denoted with the perfect participle ἐστυκώς; στύω is the standard improper verb for having or getting an erection, regularly with a connotation of aggressiveness. ψωλή is a vulgar substantive denoting a penis ready for intercourse, with the foreskin peeled back. μοιχεύω is a prosaic verb to describe the act of committing adul-

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[95] *SAOB* s.v. "så, v." 1 *e*, about the phrase "så sin vildhavre".

[96] Henderson 2000, 95–97: "… and deny the gods the right to travel through your territory with erections, the way they used to descend for adultery with their Alcmenes and Alopes and Semeles. And if they do trespass, then clap a seal on their boners, so they can't fuck those women anymore."

tery, in the sense of having sex with another man's woman (wife, daughter, mother, sister). βινέω is a standard verb for saying "fuck", but with a connotation of violent or illicit intercourse, which is the case with the women "seduced" by the gods.[97] Our translators:

> … och förbjuden de öfrige gudar,
> att de taga sig väg midt genom ert land, hvar gång som de **eldas af kärlek**,
> som de fordom ibland nedstego förbi oss, på väg till den sköna Alkmene,
> och till Alope, eller till Semeles **sköt**! Infinner sig sedan en gud här,
> då sätten ett lås på hans **sinliga drift**, att han mer ej qvinnorna **kränker**.
>> V. 558 o. följ. *Alkmene* födde med Zeus Herakles, *Semele* med densamme Bakchos, *Alope* med Poseidon Hippothoon. (Säve 1869, 37)

Backtranslation: … and forbid the other gods to travel through your territory every time they are **stirred by love**, as they formerly sometimes descended past us on their way to beautiful Alcmene, to Alope or to Semele's **lap**! If any god turns up here, put a lock upon his **carnal urge**, so that he won't **violate** women any more.
> V. 558 et seq. *Alcmene* bore Heracles to Zeus, *Semele* Bacchus to the same, *Alope* Hippothoon to Poseidon.

> … och förvägre de samtlige gudar
> Att igenom ert land sig taga en väg, när de **älskogslystna** så önska,
> Som när fordomdags de begåfvo sig ned för att ta' en Alkmene i **famnen**,
> Och en Alope, dertill en Semele ock, men komma de dock, så **försegle**
> Man deras **begär**²⁾ med en plomb, att de mista sin lust att dem mer **kurtisera** …
>> ²⁾ Ordet i texten är anstötligt. (Håhl 1892, 49)

Backtranslation: … and refuse all the gods to find a path through your territory, when they **desirous of lovemaking** wish to do so, as in days past when they descended to **embrace** an Alcmene, an Alope, as well as a Semele, and if they do come, seal their **lust**²⁾ with lead, so that they lose their desire to **court** them …
> ²⁾ The word in the text is indecent.

> … och vägra Olympens
> **libertiner** passage till jorden, var gång de drivas av **pålen i köttet**
> att spendera ett guldregn på Danaes säng och spela svan åt en Leda.
> Svävar ändå en gud genom rymden **på vift**, må han effektivt **steriliseras**,
> så att han **inte drar olycka över nån snäll familjeflicka** på jorden! (Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 47)

Backtranslation: … and refuse the libertines of the Olympus passage to earth, every time they are driven by the **thorn in the flesh** to spend a golden rain on Danaë's bed or play the swan to a Leda. If a god nevertheless is gliding through space **for a**

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[97] Henderson 1975, 112, 110, 151–152, see also Dunbar 1995, 377–378 *ad locc*.

romp, let him be **sterilized** effectively, so that he won't **ruin any nice girl from a good home** on earth!

It is not surprising that all translators tone down Aristophanes' vulgar expressions in this section, but it is interesting to study the differences in their strategies. In all three translations it is obvious that the gods are driven by desire: Håhl's gods that are "älskogslystna" (desirous of lovemaking) are perhaps slightly more lustful than Säve's who "eldas af kärlek" (are stirred by love); Gullberg & Harrie enhance and turn them into "libertiner" (libertines) who are driven "av pålen i köttet" (by the thorn in the flesh). This graphic phrase dates back to the Gustav Vasa Bible, the Swedish Bible translation from 1541, which, influenced by Luther's German Bible translation, translates the Greek phrase ἐδόθη μοι σκόλοψ τῇ σαρκί rather literally with "wardt migh giffuen en påle j kötet" (I was given a stake in the flesh, *2 Ep.Cor.* 12:7).[98] According to *Svenska Akademiens ordbok*, "påle i köttet" denotes a prolonged pain, formerly with the added meaning that this pain prevents conceitedness, as in the Bible passage above, but it is often used to denote a weakness that leads to temptation and carnal desires.[99] It is used in the latter meaning by Gullberg & Harrie. Moreover, for the modern reader "påle" (pole) awakens associations to "stake" (stake, also vulg. shaft), but it is uncertain whether this association to the male organ was present in the 1920s when Gullberg & Harrie made the translation.[100]

Säve and Håhl retain Aristophanes list of three women for whose "famn" (embrace) or "sköt" (lap) the gods long. Säve's commentary clarifies that all three named women bore children as a result of the gods' visits; without being explicit, it is clear what happened between them. Gullberg & Harrie not only reduce the list to two names but they also exchange Aristophanes' Alcmene, Alope, and Semele for Danaë and Leda, probably because Zeus' transformations into a golden rain and into a swan in order to approach them belong to myths that were better known to the Swedish audience and, perhaps, dramaturgically more effective.

Circumlocutions are used by Säve and Håhl to designate the male organ that is to be sealed in the case of infringement of the prohibition: "sinlig drift" (carnal urge) och "begär" (lust). Håhl adds a note to explain that Aristophanes' choice of words is offensive, a piece of information that allows the reader to conclude that the Greek Aristophanes is more dirty than the Swedish Aristophanes appears to be, regardless of whether he or she has access to the Greek source text or not. Gullberg & Harrie differ. "På vift" (for a romp) suggests that the gods are out on amorous adventures. In the description of the punishment – sterilization – the male organ is not explicitly mentioned by name. It is worth noticing that while the consequence of putting a seal on the gods' hard-on in Säve is that the women are no

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[98] Bibel 2000 translates "har jag fått en tagg som sticker mig" (I have a thorn that stings me).
[99] See *SAOB* s.v. "påle" 1 *α'*, on the phrase "(en) påle i köttet (äv. i ngns kött)".
[100] See *SAOB* s.v. "stake" 4 where the oldest instance of this meaning is from the 1960s.

longer violated (kränkta) and in Håhl that the gods lose their desire to court women ("mister sin lust att kurtisera"), sterilizing them does not actually put an end to the gods' escapades, only to the (unwanted) pregnancies that follow upon them: nice girls from good homes will not be ruined,[101] as they put it, but the gods can still do as they please since they are not castrated but only sterilized.[102]

The following sample exemplifies how the translators deal with scatological content. It comes from the *antepirrhema* of the parabasis (*Av.* 785–800) where the chorus lists some advantages of having wings in hypothetical situations that involve presence in the audience at the theatre. Three situations have to do with bodily functions. If one becomes hungry and bored during the tragedies, one could easily fly home, have a bite to eat and return to the audience – if only one had wings (787–789). If one suddenly feels the urgent need to pass a motion, there is no need to soil one's clothes but only to fly up, relieve oneself, catch one's breath, and return to one's seat – if only one had wings (790–792, see below). If an adulterer happens to spot the husband of his mistress in the council seats, he easily flies off for a visit and, having consummated his visit, flies back down to his seat – if only he had wings (793–796, see below):

> εἴ τε Πατροκλείδης τις ὑμῶν τυγχάνει **χεζητιῶν**,
> οὐκ ἂν **ἐξίδισεν** εἰς θοἰμάτιον, ἀλλ᾽ ἀνέπτατο,
> **κἀποπαρδὼν** κἀναπνεύσας αὖθις αὖ κατέπτατο.
> εἴ τε **μοιχεύων** τις ὑμῶν ἐστιν ὅστις τυγχάνει,
> κᾆθ᾽ ὁρᾷ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς γυναικὸς ἐν βουλευτικῷ,
> οὗτος ἂν πάλιν παρ᾽ ὑμῶν πτερυγίσας ἀνέπτατο,
> εἶτα **βινήσας** ἐκεῖθεν αὖθις αὖ καθέζετο. (*Av.* 790–796)[103]

The quote above includes only the two situations that involve excrement and sex. The words (μοιχεύω and βινέω) used to describe the latter situation have been discussed above. The terms having to do with excrement are new. χεζητιάω "need to pass a motion" is a desiderative of χέζω "pass a motion"; χεζητιάω, just like its synonym χεσείω, is found exclusively in comedy and in commentaries and dictionaries, while χέζω is found only in comedy until the Imperial age when it is

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[101] See *SAOB* s.v. "olycka" 1 b α'.

[102] The radio version abbreviates: "… och vägra Olympens | libertiner passage till jorden, var gång de drivas av pålen i köttet | att spendera ett guldregn på Danaës säng och spela svan åt en Leda. | Nog härom!" (… and refuse the libertines on the Olympus passage to earth, every time they are driven by the thorn in the flesh to spend a golden rain on Danaë's bed or play the swan to a Leda. Enough said!, Gullberg & Harrie 1936, 12).

[103] Henderson 2000, 127: "And supposing some Patrocleides in the audience needed to shit, he wouldn't have soaked his cloak; no, he'd have flown off, blown a fart, caught his breath, and flown back here again. And if there's anyone among you who happens to be an adulterer, and sees the lady's husband in the Councillors' seats, he'd have used his wings to launch himself out of the audience, gone and fucked her, and then flown back here again."

found also outside commentaries and dictionaries; for instance, it is frequent in the biographies of Aesop.[104] ἀποπέρδομαι (aorist: ἀπέπαρδον) ″break wind″ is also a verb that is found only in comedy in classical Greek.[105] Unlike χεζητιάω and ἀποπέρδομαι, ἐξιδίω "sweat out" is not a common term for "evacuate one's bowels"; according to scholia it is an euphemism for ἐκτιλάω "excrete".[106] The interpretation of this passage is complicated by the allusion to a certain Patrocleides (Πατροκλείδης τις v. 790), who according to the *Suda* (χ 182) was a politician known by the sobriquet ό Χεσᾶς "the Shitter", probably because of a case of acute diarrhoea in public, rather than because he soiled his bed regularly, which is the explanation in the *Suda* entry. It has – plausibly – been suggested that Aristophanes' ἐξίδισεν echoes the euphemism used by Patrocleides when he had to talk about the accident publicly.[107] The incident was probably highly topical at the Dionysia in 414 B.C. – and, thanks to Aristophanes, scholars still speculate on what exactly happened, more than 2.400 year later. Our translators:

> Om bland Er en Patrokleides **råkade ha ett visst behof**,
> då han här ej tvunges linnet **smutsa**, utan flög' sin kos.
> Se'n han åter **gjort ifrån sig** och andan hemtat, han kom' igen.
> Der som åter någon ibland Er blifvit **kär** i nästans fru,
> samt på rådets bänkar mannen sett här sitta någonstäds,
> nå, så lyfte han vingen samt begaf sig bort ifrån Er strax;
> **segersäll** han kom' igen och återtog' sin plats. (Säve 1869, 51)

> Backtranslation: If among you a certain Patrocleides happened to **feel a certain need**, he would not be forced to **soil** his linen, but would fly away. And then, after **getting done** and catching his breath, he would return. And if someone among you were **in love** with his neighbours wife, and saw the husband sitting somewhere in the Council seats, well, he would be on his wings and leave you quickly – and return **triumphantly** and retake his seat.

> Om en Patrokleides bland er **råkar ut för visst behof**,
> Ingen fara skulle manteln löpa, nej han flöge bort,
> Och **ifrån betrycket lättad**, han tillbaka flöge hit.
> Om bland er någon önskar **kurtisera** annans fru,
> Och den skönas man han varsnar sitta här på rådets plats,
> Kunde han hos eder lyfta vingen, flyga bort igen,
> Därpå slå sig ned ånyo, se'n han **aflagt sin visit**. (Håhl 1892, 65)

> Backtranslation: If among you a certain Patrocleides happened to **feel a certain need**, his cloak would not be in peril, no, he would fly away, and **relieved from the**

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[104] On the verbs, see Henderson 1975, 187–189.
[105] On πέρδομαι and related verbs, see Henderson 1975, 195–199.
[106] For the following, see Dunbar 1995, 482–483 *ad loc.*
[107] Ibid.

embarrassment, he would fly back here. If someone among you wishes to **court** another man's wife, and sees the husband of the beauty here in the Council seats, he would be on his wings, and fly back and take his seat again **having paid her a visit**.

Eller om ni glömt er näsduk, när ni bytte om kostym,
ack, om vingar då er bure, gick det fort att hämta den.
Möter ni i foajén en herre, **i vars hus ni går
ut och in**, och han beklagar: »Ack, så tråkigt, att min fru
just i afton fick migrän och inte kunde följa med!» —
tänk så lätt ni slet er loss från dramats mest pikanta akt
för att flyga hem och **bota fruns pikantare migrän**! (Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 62)

Backtranslation: Or if you have forgotten your pocket handkerchief when you changed costumes, oh, if you were on wings, it would not take long to fetch it. If in the foyer you chance upon a gentleman, **in whose house you are a regular visitor**, and he regrets: "Alas, how unfortunate! My wife got a migraine this evening and could not accompany me." — Imagine how easily you could get away from the most racy act of the drama in order to fly home and **cure your lady's racier migraine**!

Säve's and Håhl's solutions are similar yet again. As in the samples quoted above, their translation follow the source text closely, within the limits of decorum. They maintain the allusion to Patrocleides, without any explanatory note. They retain the scatological references, but use milder terms and polite circumlocutions – "ett visst behov" (a certain need), "smutsa" (soil), "göra i från sig" (get done), and "lättad från betrycket" (relieved from the embarrassment). The sexual obscenities are toned down; with "rådets bänkar" and "rådets plats" (Council seats) both Säve and Håhl keep the allusion to special seats reserved for the members of the Council.

Gullberg & Harrie differ, again, and their overall principle of translation – to create a text that is immediately accessible for the modern reader/spectator – becomes especially obvious. Consistently they remove allusions to various *Realien* of ancient Athens that were unknown or little known in contemporary Sweden. Analogical to the replacement of Alcmene, Alope, and Semele with Danaë and Leda in the previous example, is the removal of both Patrocleides and everything having to do with a visit to the theatre in Athens in the 410s B.C. In their translation, the audience that is to be convinced of the advantages of having a pair of wings, is the theatregoing Swedish public of the 1920s. Immediately before the passage quoted here, they are asked to imagine what they could do if they had checked in a pair of wings in the cloakroom instead of their coat. The three situations involving bodily functions are transformed as follows. If one is bored stiff by a tedious drama by some domestic dramaturgist, one has the option of flying off to a fine restaurant for a breather in the entr'acte; if one notices that the pocket handkerchief is forgotten, one can fly back home to fetch it from the other costume (lines

1–2 in the quote above); if one runs into the husband of one's mistress and learns that she will not come to the theatre, one can easily fly off to her for some hanky-panky (lines 3–7 in the quote above).

Like Aristophanes, Gullberg & Harrie lists three situations in which the theatregoers may find a pair of wings useful. Just as in Aristophanes, the first situation has to do with food used to relieve the ennui caused by serious drama and the last concerns a love affair with the wife of a theatregoer. However, Gullberg & Harrie's second situation has nothing to do with the kind of urgent need that are best taken care of in the privy, but consists of two lines about a forgotten handkerchief. Thus, they have removed every vestige of scatological humour. By way of compensation, the sex-joke has been lengthened with one line.

These three examples are typical of how the translators treat obscenity and scatology. Implicit obscenity, where the impropriety lies in the double entendre of a word or expression is concealed in a translation if only the decorous meaning of a double entendre is translated and its indecent sense is disregarded; the edge is taken off of explicit obscenity by choosing more polished vocabulary; the same tactic is used in the case of explicit scatology. Säve and Håhl have similar strategies for handling these kinds of content. They tend to cover implicit obscenity, while they do reproduce both explicit obscenity and scatology, but in a more urbane guise. This follows from their governing translation strategy. Unlike Säve, Håhl adds, on occasion, comments on how the translation relates to the source, explaining that certain elements of wordplay and obscenity in the Greek cannot be rendered into Swedish, thus reminding those who are familiar with Aristophanes in Greek – and informing those who are not – that despite the translator's efforts a shift between source and target has taken place. Gullberg & Harrie tend to retain double entendres, but they tone down lewd language, and they avoid scatology. If the Greek refers to faeces and related matters, Gullberg & Harrie either transform it into indirect references to urine,[108] which is ironic considering how rare jokes on urination are in Aristophanes,[109] or into something completely different,[110] unless the faeces refer to bird droppings.[111] But they tend to retain or reinforce implicit obscenity, in particular if it concerns male lust aimed at women.

For instance, in the scene where Iris, the gods' messenger, is caught and sent back, at the beginning of Peisetaerus' interrogation of her, there are a number of ambiguous words, potential double entendres (*Av*. 1203–1220): Σαλαμινία (references to Salaminians tend to be connected with sexual innuendo in Aristophanes,

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[108] *Av*. 65–68, Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 11.

[109] See Henderson 1975, 194.

[110] *Av*. 1054–1057, Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 79; it is, however, unclear what sort of dirtying is intended.

[111] *Av*. 1114–1117, Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 83 "Våra vita små visitkort på statyerna i stan…" (Our white, small calling cards on the statues in town…).

1204), τρίορχος ("buzzard", a name with likely wordplay on τρεῖς ὄρχεις "three testicles", that is, exceptionally lewd, 1206), προσῆλθες ("approach" with a possible double entendre in the intent or manner, "approach sexually", 1212), σφραγῖδ᾽ ἔχεις ("be stamped" with the possible obscene sense "be marked with semen", v. 1213), σύμβολον ἐπέβαλεν ... σοι ("put a mark on you", with practically the same obscene sense as σφραγῖδ᾽ ἔχεις, 1214–1215).[112] Säve ignores the double entendres.[113] Håhl translates τρίορχος with "lysten falk" (desirous or lecherous falcon), where the added suggestive adjective is a concession to the double entendre in the Greek, and to line 1215 he adds a note explaining that "sigill … tryckt på dig" (stamp … fixed on you) translates an obscene question.[114] In Gullberg & Harrie's version the whole section is imbued not only with sexual innuendo but also with contemptuous taunts directed at Iris, suggesting that she is a prostitute, using both the suggestive elements in the Aristophanic source text and new, added, innuendo.[115]

Checking Iris' identity, Peisetaerus demands to know her name and address. Olympus is her residence, she says, and Peisetaerus suggests that she is a conscript "i himlens lätta Garde" (lit. in the heavenly light Guards), that is, that she is a prostitute.[116] Iris identifies herself with her name and Homeric epithet, Ἶρις ταχεῖα, which Gullberg & Harrie translates "Iris, lätt på fot" (lit. Iris, light of foot), which is an ambiguous phrase that can be interpreted both as "quick" or "loose", particularly when applied to the virtue of women (≈ Iris, of easy virtue).[117] Peisetaerus' suggestive exclamation "Ahaa!" shows that he interpreted it *in malam partem*, while her offended and interrogative echo "Ahaa?" shows that that was not what she meant. Next, Peisetaerus invites any bird-bachelors who feels like it to embrace Iris. Indignant at the suggestion Iris protests. Peisetaerus' tone hardens, now demanding to know through what gate (κατὰ ποίας πύλας, v. 1208) Iris entered. Iris' indignation in Gullberg & Harrie's translation reflects that they have Peisetaerus inquire not about the city gate, but about the "portgång", viz. the at times deep and often covered portals or dark archways that gave access to the courtyards formed by the houses in a city block, which gave shelter to prostitutes and vagrants.[118] Dismissing Iris' outrage as feigned,[119] Peisetaerus asks whether Iris has reported to the police station, been inspected, and had her passport stamped. In light of Iris' (yet again) indignant response,[120] this question is best un-

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[112] See Dunbar 1995, 615–620 *ad locc*.
[113] Säve 1869, 76–77.
[114] Håhl 1892, 97–99.
[115] Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 89–91.
[116] *SAOB* s.v. "garde" 4.
[117] *SAOB* s.v. "fot" 1 c β.
[118] Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 90: "Vad menar karlen? Iris i en portgång!" (What does he mean to say? Iris in an archway!).
[119] Id.: "Låt bli att spela dam och vara pryd!" (Don't pretend to be a lady and act prudish!).
[120] Id.: "Upprörande!" (Outrageous!).

derstood as one more suggestion of her being a prostitute. State regulation of prostitution ("reglementering" in Swedish, "la réglementation" in French), had been abolished in Sweden in 1918, but women continued to be monitored and controlled with the support of vagrancy legislation.[121] The regulation prescribed that "working girls" were to be registered at the prostitution office (Peisetaerus asks if she registered at the police station), examined for venereal diseases (Peisetaerus asks if she was inspected), and after that they were to regularly report for examination. The women were given booklets, a kind of sanitary certificate with information on their name, number, and state of health, that they were to carry at all times and keep updated by presenting themselves for the regular examinations (Peisetaerus asks if Iris' passport was stamped at the right place). In addition to suggesting prostitution, Peisetaerus' question to Iris, whether she has had her passport stamped, has another layer of innuendo, which becomes clear in Iris' answer: "På mig har ingen karl satt någonting!" (lit. No man has put anything on me). "Sätta på" has well known colloquial connotations of intercourse in Swedish; these are strengthened by the stage directions. To Peisetaerus' question, asked "ambiguously", Iris responds like a "decent girl" – indeed, her reply can also be rendered "No man has screwed me!" Peisetaerus pursues his line of inquiry, and suggests that there is something improper about Iris' doings, that she is "på vift" (on the loose) and enjoying herself, like a *glädjeflicka* (fille de joie), and walking "på gatorna" (the streets), like a *gatflicka* (streetwalker), to take two synonyms for prostitute that suggest themselves from Peisetaerus' lines. Finally, when she protests and asks where she may go, she is told that it is indifferent, as long as she keeps away from the forbidden place. Again: certain areas and haunts were forbidden for the regulated working women. In sum: There are double entendres and sexual innuendo in the source text. From that starting point, Gullberg & Harrie have created a scene of interrogation of Iris by Peisetaerus – the man in charge who even threatens to let his minions loose on her: "Har någon fågelungkarl lust | att krama flickan lite?" (Does any of you bird-bachelors feel like hugging the girl a bit?)[122] – filled with disparaging insinuations regarding Iris' morals and occupation, including some sexual innuendo.

Similarly, Gullberg & Harrie develop statements about explicit male lust by adding suggestions about the object of desire being for purchase:

Εὐ.   ἆρά γ᾽ οἶσθα ὅτι
ἐγὼ διαμηρίζοιμ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν ἡδέως (*Av.* 669–670)[123]

Euelpides   Säg, vet du hvad?
Jag gerna, älskogslysten henne om lifvet tog! (Säve 1869, 44)

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[121] On the regulation of prostitution in Sweden, see Svanström 2006.
[122] Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 90.
[123] Henderson 2000, 113: "Know what? I'd be glad to spread those drumsticks!"

Backtranslation: *Euelpides*: You know what? Desirous of lovemaking, I would gladly take her round the waist.

Euelpides   Ja, vet du, att isanning jag
Så gärna skulle vilja henne ta' i famn. (Håhl 1892, 58)

Backtranslation: *Euelpides*: Yes, you know, I would truly very gladly take her in my arms.

Euelpides [skälvande]   Ja, jag står på spänn!
[nalkas NÄKTERGAL med otvetydiga avsikter] Vad kostar du för natten, läckerbit? (Gullberg & Harrie 1928a, 55)

Backtranslation: *Euelpides*: [trembling] Yes, I am all tensed up! [approaches NIGHT-INGALE with unmistakable intentions] How much do you cost for the night, sweetie-pie?

Aristophanes' ἐγὼ διαμηρίζοιμ᾽ ἂν αὐτὴν ἡδέως "I would gladly spread her thighs" (for the verb, see also below), is unambiguous: Euelpides is seized by lust for Nightingale at the sight of her, and would not mind having a go at her. His lust for Nightingale is obvious in both Säve, Håhl, and Gullberg & Harrie, but the latter, by adding "What do you cost…?", suggest that Euelpides is not only struck by her beauty, but that there is something else, perhaps in her clothes, manners or character that awakens his lust. However, Peisetaerus' rebuke "Hut, karl! Antastar du en bättre dam | en fin gudinna?" (Shame on you, man! You dare molest a respectable lady, a nice goddess?) – an addition in comparison to the source text – also suggests that Euelpides' suggestion can be taken as an indication of his character.

5 Concluding words

Aristophanes was first translated in Sweden after the faithful, domesticating principle had been established as the accepted mode of translation. Translators of Aristophanic comedy faced and face other challenges than those of Attic tragedy, for instance. It is evident that the 19th century translators of Aristophanes were torn between the demands of the principle to be faithful to the source text and of propriety: what would be tolerable language for Aristophanes in Swedish? The short history of Swedish translations of Aristophanes showed that the earliest translators discussed problems relating to the content of Aristophanes comedies, problems that cannot be covered up even in an "improper translation", in Thomander's words, that is "improper" according to the standard of his time.[124] Later

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[124] Thomander 1826, VI-VII: "oegentlig öfversättning".

translators refrain from discussing Aristophanes' improprieties; the only problem of translation that Säve and Håhl discuss is the metre. In their prefaces they explain that the commentary is designed to help readers unfamiliar with Greek antiquity to understand the translation and give the impression that the commentary overcomes all remaining problems with the text. However, Gullberg & Harrie call the readers' attention to the shockingly obscene and scatological qualities of Aristophanic comedy both in paratexts to the sample printed in *Ord och Bild* and in the theatre programme, where they explain that they have worked hard to make Aristophanes presentable before letting him onto a Swedish stage.

Given the time and context of the translations, it is expected that all translators present an Aristophanes who is less coarse in Swedish than in Greek. What is interesting to observe is their strategies, how their handling of the obscene and the scatological content is in accordance with their overall principles of translation, in short, to see what is tolerable and what is not. Säve and Håhl tend to cover up implicit obscenity, but they do reproduce explicit content, though toned down to better accord with propriety. Håhl's notes reveal that his *Fåglarne* is less obscene than Aristophanes' text. In Gullberg & Harrie's *Fåglarna*, Aristophanes has been forced to tone down his language and to improve his manners, as Harrie put it in the theatre programme. This meant that scatology was defused into jokes suggesting urination or turned into something completely different, that coarse explicit obscenity was toned down, and that implicit obscenity was retained. Moreover, their translation gives the impression that sexual innuendo is boosted at times, particularly with reference to male lust. However, this tendency is difficult to quantify, since their translation is not literal, and since they strive to retain the comic points of the source but transform them in order to appeal to the contemporary audience. In this context it is worth noting how the translators handle the reference to homoerotic paederasty, when, to prove their seniority, the chorus of birds remind the audience of all the lovers who have conquered their beloved with a gift of a bird:

> πολλοὺς δὲ καλοὺς ἀπομωμοκότας **παῖδας** πρὸς τέρμασιν ὥρας
> διὰ τὴν ἰσχὺν τὴν ἡμετέραν **διεμήρισαν ἄνδρες ἐρασταί**,
> ὁ μὲν ὄρτυγα δούς, … (*Av.* 705–707)[125]

> Mång **yngling** så skön, som försvor all lust, samt redan vid ungdomens gräns var,
> har i kraft af vår makt af **en älskande vän** dock lockats och narrats till **älskog**,
> ty en vaktel af en han bekom … (Säve (1869) 47)

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[125] Henderson 2000, 117–119: "Many are the fair boys who swore they wouldn't, and almost made it to the end of their eligible bloom, but thanks to our power men in love did get between their thighs, one with the gift of a quail…"

Backtranslation: Many a beautiful **youth**, who relinquished all lust under oath and was at the brink of adolescence already, have by the power of our might been tempted and lured into **lovemaking** by **a loving friend**, for one was given a quail…

Så hafva till älskog **trånande männer förledt** med den kraft, som vi ega,
Mång' **gosse** i början af fägringens vår, fastän han försvurit att älska,
Med skänk af en vaktel … (Håhl (1892) 60)

Backtranslation: So have **men yearning for lovemaking** with the power that we possess **seduced** many a **boy** in the beginning of the prime of his bloom, although he had relinquished love, by giving a quail …

Vår sång i den ljuva månaden Maj har hjälpt mången yngling på traven
någon kväll, när det skymde i parken, och Hon var svår att komma till tals med.
(Gullberg & Harrie (1928a) 58).

Backtranslation: Our song in the sweet month of May has given many a youth a start in the twilight as the sun was setting in the park, and She was being unreasonable.

διεμήρισαν ἄνδρες ἐρασταί "men in love have come between the thighs" of many beautiful boys (πολλοὺς καλοὺς … παῖδας) who had sworn not to let any such thing happen. In Aristophanes' Greek text there is no question about the sex of both concerned, the age difference, or activity. In Säve's version beautiful youths are lured by loving friends into lovemaking; the sex of the seducer is implicitly but not necessarily male. Håhl's version is clear on all three points. Gullberg & Harrie transform the old seducer into a youth who begins to have some success in his courtship of his girl, assisted by the singing of the birds in spring time. Homosex is turned into heterosex; consummated seduction has become the first steps of courtship. They thus create a scene designed not to shock readers or spectators, but bound to become dated quickly due to their global translation strategy of making the texts easily accessible for a theatre audience, which entailed not only eliminating and alleviating obscenities, removing obscure references, and replacing them with contemporary references (as compensation) – how many gentlemen worry about a forgotten pocket handkerchief at the theatre?[126]

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[126] Harrie 1955, 16 comments on the translation having become dated due to their transposing Aristophanes' allusions to contemporaneous phenomena to allusions topical in the year 1928.

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Appendix

1. Translations

Nub.	Thomander: *Molnen. Lustspel af Aristophanes.* Stockholm.	1826
Eq., part	Hagberg: *De comoedia Aristophanis quae inscribitur ΙΠΠΗΣ dissertatio.* Uppsala.	1831-32
Eq.	Hagberg: *Demagogerna. Lustspel af Aristophanes. Öfversättning.* Uppsala.	1834
Pl.	Lindgren: *Aristophanis Comoedia quae ΠΛΟΥΤΟΣ inscribitur. Dissertatio.* Uppsala.	1834
Ach., part	Hagberg: *Aristophanis comoedia quae ΑΧΑΡΝΗΣ inscribitur. Dissertatio.* Uppsala.	1835
Ran., part	Göransson: *ΑΡΙΣΤΟΦΑΝΟΥΣ ΒΑΤΡΑΧΟΙ. Grodorna. Lustspel.* Uppsala.	1853
Av.	Säve: *Aristofanes' lustspel Foglarne.* Helsingborg.	1869
Ran., Thesm., Nub.	Thomander: *Skrifter af Joh. Henr. Thomander. III. Tal och öfversättningar.* Lund.	1879
Nub.	Hallström: *Molnen. Lustspel af Aristophanes*. Uppsala.	1883

Av.	Håhl: *Fåglarne. Lustspel af Aristophanes.* Linköping.	1892
Eq.	Håhl: *Riddarne. Lustspel af Aristophanes.* Stockholm.	1898
Av., part	Gullberg & Harrie: "Scener ur Aristophanes' Fåglarna. Från grekiskan", *Ord och bild*.	1927
Av.	Gullberg & Harrie: *Fåglarna. Lustspel med sång av Aristophanes från Athen. Tolkat från grekiskan för svensk scen.* Stockholm.	1928
Lys.	Gullberg & Harrie: *Lysistrate. Ett kvinnodrama. För svensk scen.* Stockholm.	1932
Thesm., Ran.	Bæckström: *Aristofanes, Kvinnornas sammansvärjning (Thesmoforiazousai), Grodorna (Batrachoi).* Stockholm.	1957
Vesp., Pax.	Bæckström: *Aristofanes Getingarna, Freden. Översättning från grekiskan.* Stockholm.	1962
Eq., Lys.	Bæckström: *Aristofanes Riddarna, Lysistrate. Översättning från grekiskan.* Stockholm.	1968

2. Adaptions of translations

Av.	Gullberg & Harrie: *Fåglarna. Översättning och radiobearbetning.* Stockholm.	1936
Lys.	Gullberg & Harrie: radioarr. av Cl. Hoogland, *Aristofanes Lysistrate.* Stockholm.	1959
Lys.	Gullberg & Harrie: rev. av I. Harrie, *Lysistrate. Komedi av Aristofanes; för Göteborgs stadsteater reviderad och prologförsedd.* Göteborg.	1968
Lys.	Gullberg & Harrie: arr. av D. Helldén, *Lysistrate av Aristofanes. Komedi för soli och kör, stråkkvartett, flöjt, klarinett, fagott, horn. [Musiktryck].* Stockholm.	[1988]

3. Translations of adaptions

Lys.	Ax: *Aristofanes Fred.* Bearbetade av Sofia Zarambouka. Stockholm.	1980
Lys.	Jönsson: *Lysistrate, eller Kärleksstrejken av Aristofanes; översättning och bearbetning från norska.* Uppsala stadsteater.	1986
Lys.	Helleskog: *Lysistrate. Fritt efter en komedi av Aristofanes i regi av Ralf König.* Stockholm.	1989
Lys.	Althoff: *Lysistrate*	1998
Lys.	Karlsson: *Fru Lysistrate och hennes kärringar fritt efter Aristofanes.*	[1999]
Lys.	Werkmäster: *Sexstrejk nu! sa Lysistrate Aristofanes pjäs återberättad.* Stockholm.	2009

Σπουδαιογέλοιον in Xenophon's *Symposium*

GITA BĒRZIŅA

Introduction

Symposium is an important phenomenon of both ancient Greek social culture and literary tradition. One of the characteristics crucial to its essence, procedure, and understanding, either as a cultural practice or as a literary paradigm, is its serio-comic aesthetics, the mixture of the serious and its opposite – the non-serious, playful or comic. Even though the form may differ, the opposition can be observed in all sympotic texts.

However, in the *Symposium* by Xenophon, which is one of the classical sym-posia texts, the combination of the contrastive aspects of the serious and the non-serious has been relatively little studied. This is partly due to the overall contro-versial perception of Xenophon's works and often diametrically opposed interpre-tations of his texts in previous scholarship[1]. For a long time, *Symposium* has been perceived only as a Socratic dialogue, studied exclusively from the perspective of elements, features and problems typical of such a text. When the studies focus on the sympotic character of the work, in the foreground, a depiction of the reality and environment of the banquet, as well elements and characteristics integral to symposium as a cultural phenomenon, has been studied, as it can, for example, be vividly observed in the well-known work of J. Martin[2]. Only in the last few decades there has been a change in interpretations, and particularly beginning with the works by B. Huss[3], where the seriocomic aspect has also been detected as important.

Expanding the research of subtle social, cultural, psychological and other con-cepts in texts of different genres and, moreover, carrying out the detailed analysis of sympotic texts by various authors, more and more specific characteristics and

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[1234] Halliwell 2008.
[234] Halliwell 2008.
[34] Halliwell 2008.

aspects of these texts, previously considered as unimportant or peripheral, have been highlighted. Particular attention is also paid, among other features and concepts, to the aspect of laughter and its diverse use. S. Halliwell's *Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity*[4] should be mentioned, for example, as an important research work in this respect. Halliwell, thoroughly examining the phenomenon of laughter, offers his observations on various developments in Greek culture and pays his attention also to Xenophon's *Symposium*, addressing the role of laughter within the bounds of sympotic protocol and balance between the serious and the play in his text. In addition, K. Jazdzewska[5], for instance, has compared the expression of laughter in the *Symposia* by Xenophon and Plato. However, in these works, the focus is mostly on one separate perspective and, as a result, only individual aspects have been outlined.

Although the seriocomic aesthetics, i. e. the combination of the contrastive aspects of the serious and the non-serious, is crucial for the interpretation and understanding of Xenophon's *Symposium*, up to now it has not been the focus of scholarly attention with the exception of a few studies. Several researchers[6] have acknowledged it, but a more detailed discussion can be found only in B. Huss[7], who writes about the intention and literary technique of Xenophon's *Symposium*.

Continuing the above-mentioned research perspective, the aim of the present paper is to develop the study of seriocomic dimension in Xenophon's *Symposium* and to analyse in detail the manifestations of manifold serious and non-serious, playful or even apparent comic elements, and to illuminate above all the mixture of the contrastive elements and features in different ways, aspects and on various levels (subject and structure, characters and their activities, situations and development of communication, as well as language).

As the title of the paper suggests, the term σπουδαιογέλοιον has been chosen and used as the keyword for the research. The word derives from the Greek σπουδαῖον ('serious') and γελοῖον ('comic') and implies the mixture of the serious and the comic.

As R. B. Branham (writing about the seriocomic dimension in Lucian's texts) points out, the term σπουδαιογέλοιον is "a coinage meant to yoke qualities naturally contrasted as opposites and it served to point to a paradoxical quality in the seriocomic figure itself which, while comic and amusing on the surface, frequently emerges as – in some sense – earnest, with a claim to our serious attention."[8]

However, the nature of the comic can be diverse, from slightly amusing and funny to absolutely ridiculous[9]. Thus, in the paper, the term is interpreted rela-

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[4] Halliwell 2008.

[5] Jazdzewska 2018.

[6] E.g. von Fritz 1935, 31; Waterfield 1990b, 220; Gera 1993, 136; Alvino 2018, 545.

[7] Huss 1999a.

[8] Branham 1989, 27.

[9] Complex nature and manifold manifestations of the comic and laughter have been pointed out and studied in various research works. See, e.g., Halliwell 1991, 2008.

tively broadly, covering the use and combination of serious and in various degree comic (not only laughable, but also amusing and playful) elements or, in other words, analysing the mixture of σπουδ-concepts with γελ-concepts, as well as παιδ-concepts. Such broad interpretation and employment of the term is based on both the multiform usage of the contrastive aspects in ancient texts[10] and previous scholarship on a wide variety of ancient authors[11].

Xenophon's Symposium *as a sympotic text*

Xenophon the Athenian ranks among those ancient Greek authors whose texts appear to be well-known in the ancient literary heritage and who, nevertheless, in the course of time has received an extremely discrepant evaluation. One of Xenophon's works the reading of which is highly controversial is *Symposium*.

On the one hand, it is a Socratic dialogue, on the other hand, it is an example of sympotic literary tradition, which to a certain extent explains the existent contradictory estimations and interpretation problems of the text.

Xenophon is regarded as one of Socrates' associates. Considering the purposeful representation of the famous Athenian philosopher (quite often with an apologetic aim) in his works, the *Symposium* is for the most part perceived as a Socratic text in which the author reflects the conversations of the philosopher with his adherents and other interested people. Thus, in the *Symposium* as a Socratic dialogue, mainly the portrayal of Socrates has raised scholarly interest, and countless analogies and borrowings from other Socratics, especially from Plato, have been found[12]. Compared with Plato, it is generally acknowledged that Xenophon lacked the ability to fully understand and appreciate Socrates' philosophy and methods used.

However, the *Symposium* represents a classical literary sympotic text as well. Common feast is a significant phenomenon of ancient Greek social culture from time immemorial, and it is most manifest in the symposium of the archaic period[13]. Even though the scope and manifestation may differ, the representation of feast/banquet can be traced back to various literary texts in nearly all literary genres. In the 4th century BC, the description of symposium based on a certain sociocultural practice develops also as a subgenre of a literary dialogue with stable characteristic features of content and form, and Xenophon's work is one of its classical examples. Acknowledging the fact, the research works devoted to Xeno-

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[10] Concerning the literary symposium, see, e.g., the second sub-chapter.

[11] Giangrande 1972; Branham 1989; Segoloni 1994, 217; Huss 1999a, 397–398; Fain 2010; Ferriss-Hill 2015 etc.

[12] See, e.g. Hug 1852, 639–640; Hug & Schöne 1909, xvii–xix; Körte 1927; Gallardo 1972; Thesleff 1978, 158–163; Waterfield 1990a; Huss 1999b, 449–453; Waterfield 2004; also Huss 1999a, 381–382; Gray 2010, 21–22.

[13] Murray 2012a, 1418; more broadly see, e.g. Murray 1990; Slater 1991; Wecowski 2014.

phon's text still highlight only the activities, realities and characteristic elements of the symposium as a cultural phenomenon[14].

However, Xenophon's *Symposium* is an original literary work. Although the author borrows many elements from other sources, he moulds his text by combining both above-mentioned traditions in concordance with his own artistic purposes, and it should be perceived as a complete whole.

The literary symposium

Literary symposium represents conversations of wise men in a sympotic context, portraying historical individuals in an everyday setting without an epic or tragic distance[15]. Moreover, as it has already been indicated in ancient texts (which, on the whole, pay extremely scant attention to the qualities of this literary form), one of the most characteristic features is σπουδαιογέλοιον, the mixture of the serious (σπουδαῖα) and its opposite – the non-serious, playful or comic (παίγνια/ παιδιά, γελοῖα)[16].

Plutarch, e.g., in his *Quaestiones convivales* (*Sympotic Questions*) when speaking about different essential aspects of symposium defines it as a blend of serious and playful words and activities: κοινωνία γάρ ἐστι καὶ σπουδῆς καὶ παιδιᾶς καὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων τὸ συμπόσιον 'the symposium is a communion of serious and playful discourse (lit. words) and actions' (*Quaest. conv.* 708d).

In addition to that, he describes both authors of classical symposia – Plato and Xenophon – as mixing the serious with its opposite, the playful, in their sympotic works: τὰ δὲ φιλοσοφηθέντα μετὰ παιδιᾶς σπουδάζοντες εἰς γραφὴν ἀπετίθεντο '[the account of the guests] holding a serious philosophical discussion with a touch of playfulness was preserved in writing' (686d); cf. συνέσεως ἄκρας φιλοσοφοῦντα μὴ δοκεῖν φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ παίζοντα διαπράττεσθαι τὰ τῶν σπουδαζόντων 'it is the top of wisdom to philosophize, yet not appear to do it, and in playfulness to do the same with those that are serious' (614a); also τῶν ἀληθινῶν φιλοσόφων καὶ τὰ σκώμματα καὶ οἱ γέλωτες τοὺς μὴ παντελῶς ἀτρώτους κινοῦσιν ἁμωσγέπως καὶ συνεπιστρέφουσιν 'the very jests and laughter of true philosophers move and make attentive in some way or other those who are not altogether insensible' (614a).

Similar combinations of contrasts in sympotic context can be found also in some other late ancient authors who are aware of the specific phenomenon of sympotic culture and somehow refer to this sympotic tradition cultivated in the course

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[14] See, e.g., Martin 1931; also footnote 25 in this paper.

[15] Strelnikova 1989, 137.

[16] In one way or another, it can be traced back to all descriptions of ancient symposia, already beginning with Homer's epics and various texts of ancient lyric poetry. For the *spoudaiogeloion* in Greek literature, see, e.g., Giangrande 1972; for the *spoudaiogeloion* as a characteristic element of sympotic poetry, see, e.g., Segoloni 1994, 217; Huss 1999a, 397–398.

of several centuries. Thus, e.g. Athenaeus in the same manner as Plutarch in his use of lexis records this mixture of the above mentioned opposing qualities in his *Deipnosophistae*, a voluminous work on all aspects of the symposium: οὐ … παίγνια … ἀλλὰ … σπουδάσματα 'not ... playthings, but ... serious things' (Ath. 15.63)). In his turn, Julian, Roman emperor and a satirist, distinguishes the aspect of verbal communication in his dialogue *The Caesar* by emphasizing the comic content which is characterized by the word γελοῖα alongside the serious one: μὴ πάντα γελοῖα λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα 'to say not only laughable/funny, but also serious things' (Jul. *Caes*. 314d). And similarly, Macrobius, a Roman writer and philosopher, in his *Saturnalia* records the combination of the serious and its opposite qualities in sympotic conversations: *sed erit in mensa sermo iucundior, ut habeat voluptatis amplius, severitatis minus* 'but the conversation at the table will be more pleasant, in order to have more pleasure and less severity' (Macr. *Sat*. 1.1.2). Finally, the rhetor Hermogenes singles out the combination of comic and serious persons and matters as a key characteristic of Socratic symposia:[17] συμποσίου Σωκρατικοῦ πλοκὴ σπουδαῖα καὶ γελοῖα καὶ πρόσωπα καὶ πράγματα (Herm. *Meth*. 36).

As M. Kislova[18] has already indicated, ancient authors confine themselves to the bare mention of the terms of the serious and its opposite (the playful/comic) as well as the mixture of both. Words and activities, persons and matters are mentioned as key elements. Moreover, as it turns out, the acting persons, the performed actions and activities in which these persons participate, as well as verbal communication, i.e., their mutual expressions and conversations, are all reflected in a definite way, namely, by means of mixing aesthetics. However, ancient sources do not provide more detailed and extensive explanations. In addition, as demonstrated by the above-mentioned statements, if the serious side is characterized more or less homogeneously (mainly by means of lexical units of the same stem), then at least two words – παιδιά and γελοῖα – are attributed to the description of the opposing side.

However, a comprehensive study of relevant ancient sympotic texts shows that different contrastive aspects can be interconnected on a large scale. The serious in both content and form is yoked to its opposite in various degrees: beginning with the playful and funny, the ludicrous to the ironic and sharply sarcastic.[19]

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[17] More on Socratic symposia in Hirzel 1895, 359; Martin 1931, 1–5.

[18] Kislova 1973, 158.

[19] See, e. g, Kislova 1973 on the types of comic; Jazdzewska 2018 on laughter in Plato's *Symposium;* Guthrie 1975, 56–65 for a general discussion of play and serious in Plato; Branham 1989 about the σπουδαιογέλοιον in Lucian's texts; Jazdzewska 2016, Nikolaidis 2019 on laughter and Jedrkiewicz 1997, ch.1-2 on seriocomic in Plutarch's symposium (*The Banquet of the Seven Sages*); also Abramowiczowna 2013.

Manifestation of σπουδαιογέλοιον in Xenophon's Symposium

The contrast between seriousness and play and, at the same time, the combination of these opposites is introduced by Xenophon with the first words in his narrative. In the first sentence of his *Symposium*, Xenophon announces that it is worth relating not only the serious deeds of great and good men but also what they do in their lighter moments:

> ἀλλ' ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα οὐ μόνον τὰ μετὰ σπουδῆς πραττόμενα ἀξιομνημόνευτα εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰ ἐν ταῖς παιδιαῖς.

> To my mind it is worthwhile to relate not only the serious acts of great and good men but also what they do in their lighter moods *(Symp.* 1.1).[20]

This is a statement that asserts the author's aim and declares the content of his *Symposium*. It clearly indicates the half-playful, half-serious tone as a key feature of Xenophon's dialogue, which displays Socrates and a few of his companions (Kritoboulos, Hermogenes, Antisthenes, and Charmides) at the symposium hosted by the rich Kallias in honour of his beloved Autolykos, victor in the pankration at the Panathenaea.

Although in Xenophon's words a special emphasis is laid on the deeds (τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔργα), throughout the text, the blending of the serious and the playful or apparently comic manifests itself in different ways, aspects and on various levels.

Already the subject matter of Xenophon's dialogue and the combination of two different traditions – ethical pursuits of Socrates and symposium as a specific social phenomenon characteristic of the ancient Greek culture – in essence assume the synthesis of contrastive aspects. Activities of *kaloi kagathoi*, serious ethical quests and intellectual conversations questioning the good and the right are placed in the non-serious context – in a banquet setting, the integral elements of which are wine, jokes, music and dances.

Although the origins of this phenomenon can supposedly be traced back to historical reality and it was already a kind of tradition by other Socratics to portray Socrates and his conversations in a sympotic environment,[21] Xenophon consolidates these traditions for his literary aims and exploits the mixture of manifold serious and non-serious, even obviously comic elements.

First of all, it is clearly manifested on the level of characters. Socrates is the main character in several of Xenophon's works intended and written as serious (*Memo-*

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[20] Translations of passages in *Symp.* closely follow Todd 2013.

[21] See, e.g., Dover 1965, 15–16; Waterfield 1990b, 219; Kennedy 2017, 97–98. The most striking example – Plato's *Symposium* – is dated c. 385–370 BC. Presumably, Xenophon created his work approximately at the end of the 360's, and he was influenced not only by Plato's *Symposium* and borrowed elements from his other dialogues (e.g., *Phaedrus*), but also from the texts of other Socratics (e.g., Antisthenes, Aeschines).

rabilia, *Oeconomicus*, *Apologia Socratis*). He is portrayed as conversing with different companions on most diverse topics, but the moral, ethical aspect is constantly present, as well as a pervasive didactic element. Socrates in Xenophon's view manifests himself as a striking *kalos kagathos* – an ideal personification of Xenophon's moral canon (i.e., the ideal moral man).

In the *Symposium*, Socrates and his companions (with their ethical ideas and values related to the serious dimension) are invited by Kallias, and act and converse throughout the various sympotic situations alongside characters representing a completely different dimension, viz. Philippos the jester, an uninvited guest (a typical character of the literary symposium),[22] and a Syracusan, the entertainer with his little troupe of artists – two beautiful girls and a boy. The jester and the entertainers belong to another (lower) social status and possess different ethical characterization (to be more precise – they lack a specific ethical profile), and with their practical, entertaining activities for the guests of the symposium and involvement in discussions with Socrates and his companions they provide a more specific and detailed characterization of the moral philosopher and his companions. It is essential that in conformity with the banquet situation (as can be seen below) the non-serious dimension is developed throughout the symposium also in the character and activities of Socrates and his companions.

The combination of opposite aspects throughout the text discloses itself also in the close connection between various sympotic activities, especially entertainments (παιδιά), and conversations as characteristic elements of σπουδή. In Xenophon's text, not only the regular depiction in terms of these different activities, amusements and verbal exchanges is essential, but especially the close interchange between the two. Symposiasts, Socrates being the first, react to a definite activity (amusement), and "delightful sights and sounds" (θεάματα καὶ ἀκροάματα ἥδιστα as emphasized by Socrates himself (2.2)) serve as an impulse for particular subject matter for conversation. For example, first of all, the splendid beauty of young Autolykos evokes reflections on the effect of beauty and its importance in combination with ethical qualities (1.8-10), and it is closely connected to the solemn speech about love by Socrates in chapter eight as well.

In addition, σπουδὴ καὶ παιδιά (or γελοῖα) are combined on the compositional level. Just as the description of the beauty of young Autolykos and its effect is counterbalanced by the hilarious entrance and first activities of Philippos the jester, so is the highly serious Erotikos Logos of Socrates balanced by the erotic mime, the performance of 'Dionysus and Ariadne' in chapter nine. The topic of the importance of physical beauty is presented further also in the form of a mock beauty competition between Socrates and Kritoboulos (promised in 4.19–20; fulfilled in ch. 5).

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[22] On stable sympotic motifs, characters and situations, see Martin 1931; Strelnikova 1989, 143–154; on the uninvited symposium guest, see also Fehr 1990.

Kallias' proposal to offer some perfume to the symposiasts leads to a statement on *kalokagathia* as a distinguishing *scent* for a free man and causes reflection on the teachability of *virtue* (2.3–6; cf. 2.9–10, 10–12). The tumbling of the dancer into the hoop set all around with upright swords motivates the thought on teachability of courage (2.11–14). The young boy's dance incites jocular conversation about dancing and the importance of physical training and a harmonious body. There is an explicit moment of roaring laughter of those present as a reaction to Socrates' dead-pan (μάλα ἐσπουδακότι τῷ προσώπῳ 'with a very solemn face') that he would like to learn how to dance, that is further supplemented with jocular remarks from Charmides and Kallias (2.15–20).[23] However, the comic exhaustion of Philippos the jester after the dancing and his demand for the big cup of wine (so characteristic of the sympotic tradition!) motivates reflections by Socrates on moderate use of wine and its effect (drowsing grief, awaken joy; 2.23–25) that are again subverted by the jester.

The interchange of both dimensions is clearly apparent also at the beginning of chapter three, as the symposiasts naturally come from the musical interlude to the main discussion of the dialogue on what each guest is most proud of:

> ἐκ δὲ τούτου συνηρμοσμένη τῇ λύρᾳ πρὸς τὸν αὐλὸν ἐκιθάρισεν ὁ παῖς καὶ ᾖσεν. ἔνθα δὴ ἐπῄνεσαν μὲν ἅπαντες, ὁ δὲ Χαρμίδης καὶ εἶπεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ὦ ἄνδρες, ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔφη τὸν οἶνον, οὕτως καὶ αὕτη ἡ κρᾶσις τῶν τε παίδων τῆς ὥρας καὶ τῶν φθόγγων τὰς μὲν λύπας κοι-μίζειν, τὴν δ᾽ ἀφροδίτην ἐγείρειν. ἐκ τούτου δὲ πάλιν εἶπεν ὁ Σωκράτης, οὗτοι μὲν δή, ὦ ἄνδρες, ἱκανοὶ τέρπειν ἡμᾶς φαίνονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ τούτων οἶδ᾽ ὅτι πολὺ βελτίονες οἰόμεθα εἶναι, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν οὖν εἰ μήδ᾽ ἐπιχειρή-σομεν συνόντες ὠφελεῖν τι ἢ εὐφραίνειν ἀλλήλους; ἐντεῦθεν εἶπαν πολ-λοί, σὺ τοίνυν ἡμῖν ἐξηγοῦ ποίων λόγων ἁπτόμενοι μάλιστ᾽ ἂν ταῦτα ποιοῖμεν.

> After this the boy, attuning his lyre to the flute, played and sang, and won the applause of all; and brought from Charmides the remark, "It seems to me, gentlemen, that, as Socrates said of the wine, so this blending of the young people's beauty and of the notes of the music lulls one's griefs to sleep and awakens the goddess of Love." Then Socrates resumed the conversation. "These people, gentlemen," said he, "show their competence to give us pleasure; and yet we, I am sure, think ourselves considerably superior to them. Will it not be to our shame, therefore, if we do not make even an attempt, while here together, to be of some service or to give some pleasure one to another?" At that many spoke up: "You lead the way, then, and tell us what to begin talking about to realize most fully what you have in mind" (*Symp.* 3.1–2).

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[23] For a detailed analysis of the scene, see Huss 1999b, 383–389.

The above passage discloses several aspects crucial for the symposium as a social phenomenon of Greek culture – mutual involvement of all symposiasts present in banquet activities, universal benevolence, amusement as an integral element of the symposium, as well as joy and pleasure experienced by the guests, while troubles and worries are put aside.[24] However, Xenophon deliberately produces shifts in these aspects by making them the basis for the intellectual conversation on the subject matter of each symposiast's most praised asset.

Joy is an essential form of psycho-emotional expression for a person and a distinctive element of the Greek symposium, a kind of ethical principle, an integral part of sympotic behaviour and feelings. It is characteristic of *kaloi kagathoi*, with Socrates in the forefront, as depicted by Xenophon. However, it can be provided not so much by practical symposium activities (playing the lyra, singing) as by intellectual conversation, in which, in accordance with the aesthetics of the literary symposium, it is possible to demonstrate one's prudence, values and ideals, as well as to get to know the values and ideals of the companions. That is a means for acquiring knowledge, to become more intelligent and better (i.e., corresponding to the essence of Socratic conversation – to guide to goodness, to virtue). In this respect, the lexemes ὠφελεῖν ('to help', 'to be of use') and εὐφραίνειν ('to cheer', 'to delight', 'to give pleasure') used in close conjunction by Xenophon are noteworthy, and it is natural that the dominating character in these conversations is Socrates.

However, it should be added that the character and the development of conversation in the context of this symposium are specific, too. Although Socrates and his companions are leading speakers, the exchange of dialogic and sometimes even polylogic replies (utterances) differs significantly from the nature of discussions disclosed in other Socratic texts (also by Xenophon himself). According to the dynamic and variegated sympotic setting, first of all, the issues discussed change quite rapidly. Secondly, a number of interlocutors converse freely on a particular topic, without extensive conversation developed between two interlocutors as is largely characteristic of the Socratic dialogues. A striking example is the central discussion on what each guest is most proud of, where, within the range of approximately four Teubner pages, eleven interlocutors speak in turns.

Thirdly, different issues are mostly introduced and outlined but they are not developed in an expanded exchange of utterances (replies), and sometimes a discussion is clearly broken off without being developed. For example, according to the dynamic and non-serious sympotic environment Socrates does not engage in an extensive discussion on the teachability of *kalokagathia*, but postpones the question for another occasion; instead, he is more interested in watching a performance of one of the young dancing girls (2.6–7).

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[24] For essential categories of banquet ideology, among them being joy and pleasure as a basic value of Greek symposium, see, e.g., Smith 2012, also Henderson 2000.

Finally, it is significant that the playful and often apparent comic element is relevant throughout the sympotic conversations. For example, Socrates and other interlocutors make regularly jesting remarks, express their views on various issues jokingly, answer questions playfully or paradoxically, and symposiasts frequently tease each other. Some instances:

Socrates declares with a very solemn face that he will dance (2.17), prides himself on his knowledge of the art of matchmaking (3.10) and claims to be physically more attractive than Kritoboulos (4.19; 5.7); Kallias claims he possesses the wisdom necessary for making men better, and equates this skill with his most well-known attribute, wealth, declaring that giving money makes people more just (4.1); the poor Antisthenes is proud of his wealth (3.8), whereas the poor Charmides is proud of his poverty (3.9), etc.

Moreover, throughout chapter four, when each symposiast explains what his most prised asset is, the guests' accounts (e.g., of Kallias, Nikeratos, Kritoboulos, Charmides, and Antisthenes) are supplemented with humorous and jesting remarks, comments or even exchanges of replies of those present (e.g., 4.5, 7–9, 19–28, 33, 45). The utterances of Philippos and the Syracusan are evidently comic (4.50–55). The speech of Socrates is paradoxically funny because in the end he attributes the eulogized qualities of a matchmaker not to himself but to Antisthenes (4.61–64).

However, at the same time some seriousness remains. Themes and issues that emerge, displayed or discussed briefly or at length by the symposiasts (such as, for example, the above-mentioned topics of beauty, teachability of virtue, physical development, moderation, etc.), are not accidental or selected at random. At first glance, they may seem non-serious, but they are in fact serious and are elsewhere developed in serious contexts. According to the carnival nature of the symposium, Xenophon breaks the usual oppositions and combines the contrary aspects and elements, reverses the characteristic traits of characters, their activities and the effect of these activities, as well as the traditional development of various themes.

It is explicitly displayed also on the surface structure of the text. Serious and playful or comic elements and features – both separately and put side by side in juxtaposition or interaction – are explicitly marked in Xenophons' language.

The serious (σπουδή) layer is most remarkably represented, e.g., in lexemes with a largely abstract meaning, characteristic of Socratic dialogues, referring to virtue and knowledge, ethical qualities and intellectual values: nouns (σοφία 'wisdom', φιλοσοφία 'love of wisdom', 'philosophy', καλοκἀγαθία 'nobleness', 'goodness', ἐπιστήμη 'knowledge', σωφροσύνη 'soundness of mind', 'temperance', δικαιοσύνη 'righteousness', 'justice', ἀδικία 'wrong-doing', 'injustice', ἀνδρεία 'manliness', τέχνη 'art', ἀρετή 'goodness', 'excellence', δύναμις 'power', 'faculty', ψυχή 'soul', κάλλος 'beauty', λόγος 'word', 'saying', 'speech', 'conversation', διδάσκαλος 'teacher'), verbs (ἐπίστασθαι 'to know', διδάσκειν 'to teach', ὠφελεῖν 'to help', 'to be of use', λέγειν 'to say', 'to speak', ἐξηγεῖσθαι 'to lead the

way', ἡγεῖσθαι 'to lead the way', 'to suppose', 'to believe', μανθάνειν 'to perceive', 'to understand', νομίζειν 'to acknowledge', 'to consider', 'to believe'), including verbal adjectives, important for the Socratic discursive tradition (διδακτόν 'that can/ought to be taught/learnt', μαθητόν 'that can/ought to be learnt'), and adjectives (ἀγαθός 'good', 'noble', καλός 'beautiful', ἐσθλός 'good', 'noble', ἄξιος 'worthy', ὠφέλιμος 'helping', 'useful'), etc. Such terminology is widely used in both Plato's philosophical texts and various Xenophontic texts that reflect Socrates' conversations on diverse topics concerning ethics. In Xenophon's *Symposium*, it marks the presence of intellectual themes, even if the expansion and deepness of their development is different.

On the contrary, the non-serious (παιδιά) layer is represented, first of all, by words characteristic of sympotic environment and texts: both nouns (δεῖπνον 'meal', 'dinner', ἀνδρών 'the banqueting hall', τράπεζα 'table', οἶνος 'wine', ποτόν 'drink', φιάλη 'bowl', κύλιξ 'drinking-cup', λύρα 'lyre', αὐλός 'flute', ὄρχησις 'dancing', 'dance', ὄρχημα 'dance', 'dancing', χρῖμα 'unguent', 'oil', φθόγγος 'sound', αὐλητρίς 'flute-girl', ὀρχηστρίς 'dancing girl', οἰνοχόος 'cup-bearer', ἀφροδίτη 'love', 'pleasure') and verbs (κατακλίνεσθαι 'to lie at table', δειπνεῖν 'to dine', ἐσθίειν 'to eat', κιθαρίζειν 'to play the cithara', ὀρχεῖσθαι 'to dance', αὐλεῖν 'to play on the flute', σπένδειν 'to make a drink offering', παιανίζειν 'to chant the paean', ἄδειν 'to sing', ἑστιᾶν 'to feast', 'to give a feast', πίνειν 'to drink', διψῆν 'to thirst', εὐφραίνειν 'to cheer', 'to delight', 'to give pleasure', τέρπειν 'to delight', 'to cheer', ἐγχεῖν 'to pour in'), etc.

These lexemes denote various elements and attributes characteristic of the sympotic setting, as well as cover the usual participants of the banquet, their activities and emotions crucial for a Greek symposium. The scope and multiformity of this lexicon explicitly disclose the attention Xenophon paid to creating a realistic setting for his literary symposium.[25] The detailed description of the environment with words of precise, explicit meaning highlights the social and everyday dimension, which contrasts with the above-mentioned intellectual and moral dimension.

The contrastive synthesis is still more explicitly marked by the use of a vocabulary with clear meaning denoting the comic or laughter: nouns (γέλως 'laughter', σκῶμμα 'jest', γελωτοποιός 'jester'), adjective (γέλοιος 'comic', 'amusing'), and verbs (γελᾶν 'to laugh', ἀναγελᾶν 'to laugh loud', γελωτοποιεῖν 'to create/make laughter', ἐπισκώπτειν 'to laugh at', ἐκκαγχάζειν 'to burst out into loud laughter').[26] In the ancient Greek language, one can find different lexical units which can be used for the description of appropriate human behaviour, namely,

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[25] It is no coincidence that some scholars have noted that Xenophon's *Symposium* is one of the best and most detailed symposium reflections in ancient literature (see, e.g., Gera 1993, 135; Waterfield 1990b, 219). See also Gallardo 1972, 173–174: "Xenophon's [Symposium] is more true to life in the atmosphere it creates", Murray 2012b, 1418: "Xenophon's *Symposium* is more realistic."

[26] For laughter vocabulary and laughter *per se* in Xenophon's *Symposium*, see Jazdzewska 2018, 194–199.

various degrees of laughing (from a light smile to guffaws), and definite manifestations connected with it.[27] In Xenophon's *Symposium* such a variety cannot be observed. Covering all main parts of speech, words with the root γελ- obviously dominate in this group.

Their use in the text is naturally connected, first of all, with activities of the jester (γελωτοποιός!). Already on his arrival without invitation, he consciously emphasizes laughter as the expected effect produced by his presence: ἥκω δὲ προθύμως νομίσας γελοιότερον εἶναι τὸ ἄκλητον ἢ τὸ κεκλημμένον ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ δεῖπνον 'So I have come here with a will, thinking it more of a joke to come to your dinner uninvited than to come by invitation' (*Symp.* 1.13).

Kallias, the host of the symposium, reacts by indicating that guests are overflowing with seriousness but lack laughter (οἱ παρόντες σπουδῆς μὲν μεστοί, γέλωτος δὲ ἴσως ἐνδεέστεροι 'the guests, though well fed on seriousness, are perhaps rather ill supplied with laughter' (1.13). Thus, he reminds of the dual essence of the symposium and hints that it first and foremost is within the field of a jester's competence. Philippos immediately sets about to perform his duty, though initially unsuccessfully:

> δειπνούντων δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ Φίλιππος γελοῖόν τι εὐθὺς ἐπεχείρει λέγειν, ἵνα δὴ ἐπιτελοίη ὧνπερ ἕνεκα ἐκαλεῖτο ἑκάστοτε ἐπὶ τὰ δεῖπνα. ὡς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐκίνησε γέλωτα, τότε μὲν ἀχθεσθεὶς φανερὸς ἐγένετο. αὖθις δ᾽ ὀλίγον ὕστερον ἄλλο τι γελοῖον ἐβούλετο λέγειν. ὡς δὲ οὐδὲ τότε ἐγέλασαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ἐν τῷ μεταξὺ παυσάμενος τοῦ δείπνου συγκαλυψάμενος κατέκειτο.
>
> No sooner were they engaged in their dinner than Philip attempted a witticism, with a view to rendering the service that secured him all his dinner engagements; but on finding that he did not excite any laughter, he showed himself, for the time, considerably vexed. A little later, however, he must try another jest; but when they would not laugh at him this time either, he stopped while the dinner was in full swing, covered his head with his cloak, and lay down on his couch. (*Symp.* 1.14).

After some time, Philippos imitates imperfectly the dance performed well by the young boy revealing his beautiful and harmonic body and, therefore, praised by those present. The jester's imperfect imitation creates a parody of the dance and a comic contrast in which every part of his body appears to be even more ridiculous than by nature: ἀνταπέδειξεν ὅ τι κινοίη τοῦ σώματος ἅπαν τῆς φύσεως γελοιότερον 'he made a burlesque out of the performance by rendering every part of his body that was in motion more grotesque than it naturally was' (2.22). The jester shows his deformity – ugliness, weakness, imperfection. He consciously displays his physical and moral inferiority, and guests are laughing (ἡμεῖς διψῶμεν

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[27] See, e.g., Eire 2000; Sommerstein 2000.

ἐπὶ σοὶ γελῶντες 'we are thirsty with laughing at you' (2.23)) and are made aware of their superiority. In this passage, we can clearly perceive laughter as the manifestation of superiority.[28]

However, the essence of laughter and its manifestation in Xenophon's text is rather complicated. It is remarkable that the symposiasts do not initially laugh at the jester, he fails to rouse laughter of those present, while Socrates, on the contrary, quite soon manages to make them laugh by stating his intention to dance, as well as – after a while – by taking pride in his knowledge of the art of matchmaking:

> ὀρχήσομαι νὴ Δία. ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἐγέλασαν ἅπαντες. καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης μάλα ἐσπουδακότι τῷ προσώπῳ, γελᾶτε, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοί;
>
> "I will dance, by Zeus." This raised a general laugh; but Socrates, with a perfectly grave expression on his face, said: "You are laughing at me, are you?" (2.17).

> … ἐπὶ τίνι μέγα φρονεῖς, ὦ Σώκρατες; καὶ ὃς μάλα σεμνῶς ἀνασπάσας τὸ πρόσωπον Ἐπὶ μαστροπείᾳ εἶπεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγέλασαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ…
>
> "But what of you, Socrates? What are you proud of?" Socrates drew up his face into a very solemn expression, and answered, "The trade of procurer." After the rest had had a laugh at him, … (3.10).

Thus, it is significant that this vocabulary applies also to other symposiasts and especially to Socrates, marking the multiform nature of humour and laughter.

Only the so-called low, prosaic, superficial laughter is appropriate for the jester, i.e., the laughter concerning matters which are common, pertinent to everyday life, but which, at the same time, seem incongruous and worth being laughed at (γέλως), whereas humour and laughter that refer to Socrates and other representatives of his intellectual circle belong to another dimension (much more παιδιά). The humour that Xenophon wants his reader to recognize is more complex and nuanced. Various passages with different lexemes (as much as Xenophon varies it) throughout the text testify to that.

Conclusion

Not only the above-mentioned expressions with different forms of γέλως and γελᾶν, but also the introductory sentence and a series of other passages in various degrees mark free, humorous, joyful behaviour of Socrates and his companions within the sympotic context. It is significant, that it is Socrates who in some respect controls the suitability of laughter, i.e., the proper behaviour of the symposiasts at

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[28] As a tradition it goes back to Homer's *Odyssey*, see Fehr 1990, 186.

this banquet of *kaloi kagathoi* by preventing the guests from excessive mutual teasing: ἄλλην που δόξαν γελοίαν κίνδυνος ἡμῖν προσλαβεῖν 'but we run the risk of getting a different sort of reputation, one that will bring us ridicule' (4.8).

A passage such as καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἀναμὶξ ἔσκωψάν τε καὶ ἐσπούδασαν 'in this way they combined joking with seriousness' (4.28) and those discussed above (including the author's introductory phrase) highlight the purposeful synthesis of antithetical elements, features and dimensions by Xenophon and his reckoning on the audience's (readers') ability to recognize it. Contrastive usage of the lexemes with opposite meanings directs the reader's attention and functions as striking signals of the presence of irony in Xenophon's text. Accordingly, the purposeful employment of opposite linguistic elements conforms to comprehensive combination of contrastive aspects in Xenophon's text. The dialogue repeatedly attests the mixture of σπουδή and παιδιά or γελοῖα in both content and form to disclose the author's aim.

Beside the apology of Socrates that in some sense can be detected in all Socratic works by Xenophon, Xenophon's *Symposium* – by portraying Socrates and his conversations in a sympotic environment – illustrates the sense of humour, play and laughter as crucial characteristics of *kalos kagathos*, as an integral part of harmonious human ideal that discloses itself in suitable activities of an individual according to respective situations.

Abbreviations

AJP = The American Journal of Philology
BICS = Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies
CPh = Classical Philology
CQ = The Classical Quarterly
LSJ = A Greek-English Lexicon. Compiled by H. G. Liddell & R. Scott. Revised by H. S. Jones. Ninth ed. Oxford 1940 (1992).
OCD = The Oxford Classical Dictionary. Ed. by S. Hornblower, A. Spawforth & E. Eidinow. Fourth ed. Oxford 1949 (2012).
RhM = Rheinisches Museum für Philologie

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The moral problem of vile and laughter-provoking dancing in Plato's *Laws*

Claudia Zichi

Preliminaries

This article sets out to explore Plato's judgement on what he calls the φαῦλον, 'vile', type of dance in book 7 of the *Laws*. More specifically, I will focus on the passage 816d3–817a1, which is often interpreted as one of Plato's most explicit assessments of comedy in the *Laws*.[1] Even though there is no doubt that the passage offers important insights to Plato's views on comedy—given that the Athenian here (i) defines what pertains to laughter as *amusements* (ὅσα μὲν οὖν περὶ γέλωτά ἐστιν **παίγνια**, 816e10) and (ii) gives an established and general definition of what 'comic laughter' ought to be by stating that these amusements are "what we all call comedy" (ἃ δὴ κωμῳδίαν πάντες λέγομεν, 817a1)[2]—, I will argue that what is mostly at stake in this section of the text is Plato's standpoint on bodily movements: he claims that certain dances reproduce the moral behaviour of citizens and that, therefore, it is necessary to define certain movements as risible and not to be taken seriously.

Moreover, I intend to show how a 'morally correct' classification of dances, both the noble ones and the vile, reflects the Athenian's proposition that the citizens of Magnesia should, from a young age, undergo training in the correct appreciation of pleasure and pain. The aim of this training is, as we shall see, to feel hatred towards shameful bodies and thoughts (αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων, 816d5) and thus to grow reluctant to speak shameful words and perform shameful movements/actions. Instead, the well-educated citizen will feel

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[1] Giuliano, 2005, 24–66, Jouët-Pastré, 2000, 2005 and 2006, Halliwell, 1991, Prauscello, 2013b, 319–342; Trivigno, 2019, 14–32.

[2] On comedy as 'play' in the *Laws*, see Jouët-Pastré 2006, 89–95; 2005, 48–49, 2000 305–306, and Prauscello, 2013b, esp. 326–342.

pleasure in representing (through choral dances) the words and gestures of the noble and good man.

More specifically, I will show that the Athenian's insistence on the classification of dance types, and thus his clarification of the moral dangers of imitation in choral dance, is fundamental for two main reasons: (i) it helps clarify his definition of παιδεία given in book 2 (654c3–d3); and (ii) it sheds light on the phenomenon of 'kinaesthetic empathy' and the power of choral performance to influence moral behaviour. The concept of 'kinaesthetic empathy' is here defined as the ability to experience empathy merely by observing the movements of another human being. In this perspective, choral dance is seen as an activity that, by emotionally bringing together performer and spectator, reinforces certain moral behaviours in the city of Magnesia.

Before we proceed to these two main sections of the paper, it should be noted that the so-called φαῦλον dance is never explicitly defined by the Athenian. Its risible movements may be deduced in opposition to those that characterise the serious and noble dance. The passage under discussion merits quotation in full:

> Τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν καλῶν σωμάτων καὶ γενναίων ψυχῶν εἰς τὰς χορείας, οἵας εἴρηται δεῖν αὐτὰς εἶναι, διαπεπέρανται, **τὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμῳδήματα τετραμμένων, κατὰ λέξιν τε καὶ ᾠδὴν καὶ κατὰ ὄρχησιν καὶ κατὰ τὰ τούτων πάντων μιμήματα κεκωμῳδημένα, ἀνάγκη μὲν θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν·** ἄνευ γὰρ γελοίων τὰ σπουδαῖα καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσεσθαι, ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ αὖ δυνατὸν ἀμφότερα, εἴ τις αὖ μέλλει καὶ σμικρὸν ἀρετῆς μεθέξειν, ἀλλὰ αὐτῶν ἕνεκα τούτων καὶ μανθάνειν αὐτὰ δεῖ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι' ἄγνοιαν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὅσα γελοῖα, μηδὲν δέον, δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσθοις προστάττειν μιμεῖσθαι, σπουδὴν δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ εἶναι μηδέποτε μηδ' ἡντινοῦν, μηδέ τινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων, μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε ἄνδρα, καινὸν δὲ ἀεί τι περὶ αὐτὰ φαίνεσθαι τῶν μιμημάτων. ὅσα μὲν οὖν περὶ γέλωτά ἐστιν παίγνια, ἃ δὴ κωμῳδίαν πάντες λέγομεν, οὕτως τῷ νόμῳ καὶ λόγῳ κείσθω (816d3–817a1).

> For fine bodies and noble bodies, the question of the kind of dancing we have claimed was right for them has been fully dealt with. **When it comes to ugly bodies and thoughts, and those who turn themselves to laughter-provoking comic performances through speech, song, dance and the imitations of all these that are object of comedy, it is necessary to observe and get to know them**.[3] For, if someone is going to be one who understands, he

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[3] Translation of the *Laws* is by Griffith, 2016, here slightly modified: "and the people who go in for buffoonery for comic effect, whether in speech, music, dancing, or the representations employed

cannot learn what is serious without what is laughable, nor any of two opposites without the other.[4] But it is not possible for someone to practise both things, if he is going to partake of even a small part of virtue, and indeed it is just for this very reason that he must learn the laughable, so that he will not ever do or say through ignorance what is laughable, if he does not have to. The imitation of such things must be imposed upon slaves and hired strangers and there should never be any seriousness whatsoever about these things, nor should any free person, either woman or man, be seen learning [i.e. to practise] these things, and something novel must always appear in these imitations. As far as laughter-provoking amusements, which we all call comedy, are concerned, let this be established by law and argument.

What the Athenian here says about the ugly bodies and thoughts and the comic performances that imitate them is that it is necessary to observe and get to know them (ἀνάγκη μὲν θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν, 816d8). It is not specified what kinds of movements are discussed here, why these choral performances are risible, what they entail, or when they are usually performed. We are told only that they provoke laughter (τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμῳδήματα τετραμμένων, 816d6) and that the imitation of them, through speech, song, and dance, is a matter for comedy (κατὰ τὰ τούτων πάντων μιμήματα κεκωμῳδημένα, 816d8).

The question that naturally arises is: to what type of comic performances is the Athenian referring? The passage occurs in a broader discussion of the types of dance performance that are to be allowed in Magnesia (814d8–817e4). At 814e the Athenian proposes a division of dance in two main types, one that imitates the most beautiful bodies and one that imitates the ugly ones: while the former is σεμνόν (*noble*) and σπουδαῖον (*serious*), the latter is φαῦλον (*vile, low*) (814d8–e5). The Athenian, when distinguishing between the noble/serious and the vile/low, points out that these two types of dance may be further divided into two subcategories:

> περὶ δὲ τῆς ἄλλης κινήσεως παντὸς τοῦ σώματος, ἧς τὸ πλεῖστον μέρος ὄρχησίν τινά τις προσαγορεύων ὀρθῶς ἂν φθέγγοιτο, δύο μὲν αὐτῆς εἴδη χρὴ νομίζειν εἶναι, **τὴν μὲν τῶν καλλιόνων σωμάτων ἐπὶ τὸ σεμνὸν μιμουμένην, τὴν δὲ τῶν αἰσχιόνων ἐπὶ τὸ φαῦλον, καὶ πάλιν τοῦ φαύλου τε δύο καὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου δύο ἕτερα** (814d8–e5).

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by any of these buffoons, we are obliged to examine these and make a judgement about them". The translation follows Schöpsdau (2003, 596) in taking τῶν … τετραμμένων as masculine instead of neuter, and τούτων πάντων as objective genitive of μιμήματα.

[4] Griffith, 2016: "since it is not possible for anyone planning to be wise in judgement, to study what is serious in isolation of what is ludicrous, or anything which has an opposite in isolation from that opposite". In general, Griffith reads μαθεῖν as 'study' which is here instead always translated with 'learn'.

When it comes to whole-body movement of any other kind, the greater part of which might properly be termed 'dancing', we should think of it as having two forms, of which **one is the representation of the movement of more beautiful bodies to create something noble,[5] the other of the movement of the uglier bodies to create something vile. Of this vile type there are again two forms; and of the serious type a further two.**

Thus, the first type of dance, the noble/serious one (through the imitation of beautiful bodies and noble souls, 815a8–b1, 816d3), is further divided in warrior dance, which imitates the movements of the courageous soul (815a–b), and peaceful dance, which imitates those of the moderate soul (815e–816b). At this point, after the illustration of the noble/serious varieties, one would expect the discussion to move on to the vile type of dance, the one that imitates shameful bodies and thoughts (τὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων, 816d5).

However, what follows is a brief treatment of risible imitations in diction, song, and dance that are the subject matter of comedies and the reasons why they should only be performed by slaves and hired strangers (δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσθοις προστάττειν μιμεῖσθαι, 816e6). Neither these representations nor the following discussion of tragedy illustrate precisely what the Athenian means by vile/low dance.[6] According to some commentators, there is a type of dance, however, which is brought up in the middle of the discussion of the noble/serious dance, and which could be read as a type of φαῦλον εἶδος: "any dance which is Bacchic in character, or any of the dances which follow that pattern" (815c2–d4). These types of dances, which imitate drunk people during initiatory rites, are deemed inappropriate for citizens:

> τίς οὖν αὕτη, καὶ πῇ δεῖ χωρὶς τέμνειν ἑκατέραν; ὅση μὲν βακχεία τ' ἐστὶν καὶ τῶν ταύταις ἑπομένων, ἃς Νύμφας τε καὶ Πᾶνας καὶ Σειληνοὺς καὶ Σατύρους ἐπονομάζοντες, ὥς φασιν, **μιμοῦνται κατῳνωμένους, περὶ καθαρμούς τε καὶ τελετάς τινας ἀποτελούντων,** σύμπαν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος οὔθ' ὡς εἰρηνικὸν οὔθ' ὡς πολεμικὸν οὔθ' ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται ῥᾴδιον ἀφορίσασθαι· διορίσασθαι μήν μοι ταύτῃ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ὀρθότατον αὐτὸ εἶναι, χωρὶς μὲν πολεμικοῦ, χωρὶς δὲ εἰρηνικοῦ θέντας, **εἰπεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι πολιτικὸν τοῦτο τῆς ὀρχήσεως τὸ γένος,** ἐνταῦθα δὲ κείμενον ἐάσαντας κεῖσθαι, νῦν ἐπὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν ἅμα καὶ εἰρηνικὸν ὡς ἀναμφισβητήτως ἡμέτερον ὂν ἐπανιέναι (815c1–d2).

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[5] Griffith, 2016: "to create an effect of dignity".

[6] According to Griffith, 2016, the passage at 816d–e turns out to marginalise the two forms of performance mostly celebrated in Athens, comedy and tragedy. Still, the fact that tragedy is excluded from this classification does not imply that the Athenian intends to relegate it to a lower level. See Schöpsdau, 2003, 589.

What is this type of dancing, and how must we distinguish the two types? Any dance which is Bacchic in character, or any of the dances which follow that pattern, in which, as they say, **people represent drunken Nymphs, Pans, Silenuses, and Satyrs** (these being the names they give them) in the performance of certain rites of purification and initiation—this whole category of dance cannot easily be defined as either peacetime or martial—nor is it easy to define what it aims to do.[7] So, the most correct definition, in my view, is pretty much to put it in a different category from the martial, a different category from the peacetime and say **that this category of dancing has nothing to do with the running of the city.** There it lies, and there let it lie, while we return to the martial and the peacetime, which indisputably are within our domain.

It appears clear from the passage that this form of dance should not be interpreted as the *vile* type, as the Bacchic dances are not even to be discussed. The Bacchic dance, in fact, can be regarded neither as martial nor as peacetime, and its aims (ὅτι ποτὲ βούλεται 'what she wants', 815c7) are not easily defined. Clearly, this constitutes a major problem for a legislator who is trying to build a moral program of education; the Bacchic dance, unlike other types of dance, is not considered as an object of dispute (τὴν τοίνυν ἀμφισβητουμένην ὄρχησιν δεῖ πρῶτον χωρὶς τῆς ἀναμφισβητήτου διατεμεῖν, 814b7–c1).[8] Moreover, it would be surprising to find a description of the φαῦλον type of dance in the middle of the argumentation around the σπουδαῖον type of dance.[9]

Given that the Athenian is attempting, in book 7, to set out and define the choral dances that are most inclined to inspire certain 'correct' moral behaviours, the problem with the Bacchic dance appears to be the impossibility of pinpointing its social role. Still, it should be noted that in other parts of the dialogue the Athenian also highlights the beneficial aspects of ecstatic performance. For instance, in book 7 (788a–789b) the perpetually rocking movement practised by mothers and nurses to calm down infants, thanks to its beneficial influence on the soul, is likened to ecstatic song and dance as practised by the Bacchants when they are victims of frenzy ("just as the remedies used by the frenzied Bacchants, who employ a combined movement of song and dance", 7.790d2–e4).[10]

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[7] Griffith, 2016: "it can't easily be defined at all, in fact."

[8] Schöpsdau, 2003, 587–588, and England, 1921, 300–301. Besides the impossibility for the Athenian to categorise this type of dances, the interpretation of such rites was often controversial, as Folch, 2015, 218, points out: "ἀμφισβητουμένην must also refer to the internal ideology of the poetry itself; for such performances inspire debate among the interlocutors precisely by programmatically evading definitive interpretability".

[9] So Schöpsdau, 587–588, while Moutsopolous, 1959, 136–140 and Morrow, 1960, 370 argue that this type of dances is the second subcategory of the low type (together with comedy).

[10] 790e2–4: καθάπερ ἡ τῶν ἐκφρόνων βακχειῶν ἰάσεις, ταύτῃ τῇ τῆς κινήσεως ἅμα χορείᾳ καὶ μούσῃ χρώμεναι. Translation above is mine.

Similarly, books 1 (633d–e) and 2 (666b–671c) deal with the institutionalization of the Dionysiac festivals, sympotic drinking and the beneficial effect it can have on the malleability and psychological renewal of the soul (671b–c).[11] In this sense, the ecstatic and Bacchic dances represent a regulated festival culture, which is essential for the project of the *Laws*. The only type of drinking that the Athenian explicitly bans is the one conducted neither "lawfully and in an orderly manner" (μετὰ νόμων καὶ τάξεως) nor directed toward the development of 'temperance' (σωφρονεῖν, 2.673e4–5). At 7.815b–c, however, the ecstatic dance appears to be unfit for adult citizens.[12]

The difficulty with the Bacchic dance in book 7 thus lies in the fact that it cannot offer a univocal exemplum of behaviour for the citizens, a model, on which or against which citizens can define themselves. Since it is to be left out of the discussion, it should not be considered in the 'correct' classification of dances that the Athenian is here making. A precise identification of the φαῦλον dance envisaged by the Athenian is beyond the scope of this paper, which aims instead to lay the ground for a discussion on the moral implications of certain choral dances in the comprehensive educational program proposed by the Athenian.

The Athenian's definition of paideia and the implications and danger of a certain type of dance

In this section, I will demonstrate how the passage in book 7 on the classification of dance in Magnesia, especially the division between a σπουδαῖον and a φαῦλον type of dance, mirrors the considerations of the Athenian at 653b–c. More specifically, I will show that, in the view of the Athenian, every choral performance (that is, every combination of music and dance, cf. 654b3–4) should aim to inspire in the citizens pleasure in experiencing the representation of good and noble gestures, and at the same time reluctance and refusal in front of the vile ones. Let us start with the definition of παιδεία developed in book 2:

> Λέγω τοίνυν τῶν παίδων παιδικὴν εἶναι πρώτην αἴσθησιν ἡδονὴν καὶ λύπην, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀρετὴ ψυχῇ καὶ κακία παραγίγνεται πρῶτον, ταῦτ' εἶναι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ ἀληθεῖς δόξας βεβαίους εὐτυχὲς ὅτῳ καὶ πρὸς τὸ γῆρας παρεγένετο· τέλεος δ' οὖν ἔστ' ἄνθρωπος ταῦτα καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις

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[11] For the psychological benefits of training the irrational pleasure and the aesthetic implication of wine-drinking as discussed in book I and II of the Laws, see Belfiore, 1986, 421–437.

[12] Linforth, 1946, 161–162, regards Plato's assessment of telestic and Bacchic dance as ambiguous: "[t]hough the tone of his [i.e. Plato's] words expresses dislike for some dances of this kind, he does not explicitly condemn them all and is satisfied in the end to leave the question unsettled, merely insisting that they are distinct from the four kinds [of dance] which are unquestionably acceptable, and remarking that they are after all not a matter of civic interest". In general, on Plato's treatment of Corybantic dances, see Linforth 1946, 129–134.

πάντα κεκτημένος ἀγαθά. **παιδείαν δὴ λέγω τὴν παραγιγνομένην πρῶτον παισὶν ἀρετήν**· ἡδονὴ δὴ καὶ φιλία καὶ λύπη καὶ μῖσος ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐγγίγνωνται μήπω δυναμένων λόγῳ λαμβάνειν, λαβόντων δὲ τὸν λόγον, **συμφωνήσωσι** τῷ λόγῳ ὀρθῶς εἰθίσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν προση-κόντων ἐθῶν, αὕτη 'σθ' ἡ **συμφωνία** σύμπασα μὲν ἀρετή, τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τεθραμμένον αὐτῆς ὀρθῶς ὥστε μισεῖν μὲν ἃ χρὴ μισεῖν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους, στέργειν δὲ ἃ χρὴ στέργειν, τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀποτεμὼν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ παιδείαν προσαγορεύων, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν ὀρθῶς ἂν προσαγορεύοις (653a5–c4).

Well, I maintain that with children, their first childish perception is pleasure and pain, and that it is in these that goodness and badness first make their appearance in the soul. As for wisdom and opinion which can be relied on, well, you're lucky if they make their appearance even in old age—certainly the person who has acquired them, and all the good things that go with them, is a complete human being. **Now education, I maintain, is this good-ness as it is making its first appearance in children**; if pleasure, friendship, pain and hatred arise in the proper way in the souls of those who cannot as yet grasp the reason for them, and if, when they do grasp the reason, their feelings are consonant with that reason because they have been correctly trained by the appropriate habits, **then this consonance is in general called human virtue,** while the part of which has had a proper upbringing where pleasure and pain are concerned, **so that, from the very beginning to the very end, they hate what they should hate and love what they should love—well, separate off this part in your account and give it the name "education" and in my opinion at least you will be giving it the right name.**[13]

Education is defined as a training that encourages citizens "to hate what they should hate and love what they should love" from the beginning to the very end. The concordance between reason and senses of pleasure and pain can be defined as virtue (1.644–45 and 2.653b–c). Already in book 1 (643e3–644a2) education, παιδεία, is conceived as training from childhood in goodness, which prompts the young to become a perfect citizen, which implies understanding both how to rule and how to be ruled correctly. In order to achieve that aim, a correct upbringing with the correct perceptions of pleasure and pain is necessary. Following this ar-

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[13] The principle at the base of the education that is here laid down recalls *Resp*. 2.366c, 3.401c–402a. According to such principle every child should feel a natural instinct that attracts him/her to the Beautiful (i.e. to the Good in a moral sense) while at the same time it fills him/her with distaste for the Ugly (i.e. the bad). This idea that is very present in book 2 (cf. 653b–c, 654c–d, 656b, 660a) and is repeated later at 3.689, 6.751d, 752c is emphasized by the constant opposition in the passage between verbs indicating "love" (στέργειν, χαίρειν, ἀσπάζεσθαι) and "hate" (μισεῖν, δυσχεραίνειν).

gumentation, the Athenian establishes that all young creatures are unable to stay still and continuously try to move and express themselves through jumps and leaps and whatever kind of sounds (653e).[14]

Now, unlike all other animated creatures, which perceive neither order nor disorder in their movements, the gods—i.e. Muses, Apollo and Dionysus, who were assigned to men as their companions in the celebration of festivities (653d)—have imparted to mankind "the sense of rhythm and harmony together with the sense of pleasure" (ἡμῖν δὲ οὓς εἴπομεν τοὺς θεοὺς συγχορευτὰς δεδόσθαι, τούτους εἶναι καὶ τοὺς δεδωκότας τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, 653e5–a3), and they are the ones who promote our movements through dances and choirs (654a).[15] Therefore, the first education is to be ascribed to the Muses and Apollo (θῶμεν παιδείαν εἶναι πρώτην διὰ Μουσῶν τε καὶ Ἀπόλλωνος, ἢ πῶς; 654a6–7). The Athenian then defines χορεία as the combination of dance and song (654b3–4) and as 'educated', πεπαιδευμένος, he who is able to dance and sing well (ᾄδειν τε καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι δυνατὸς ἂν εἴη καλῶς, 654b6–7).

The criteria for what are to be considered beautiful in dance and music are well developed in books 2 (655a8–b6; 669c–670e) and 7 (798d–801a). At 655a8–b6 it is said that the gestures or cadences of the courageous person and the cowardly person are to be called respectively good and bad (καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν ἔχει τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀνδρείων καλά, τὰ τῶν δειλῶν δὲ αἰσχρά, 655b1–2). Moreover, "melody and movements associated with excellence of soul or body—whether true excellence or some likeness of it—are in all cases good, whereas those associated with badness, by contrast, are entirely the opposite".[16] Furthermore, at 669c–670e the representation, both through words, melodies, and rhythm, has to be made by respecting the nature and essence of the original (ὅ τέ ἐστι πρῶτον γιγνώσκειν, 669b1), and this entails some difficulties since the poets—never the Muses!—might do wrong and mix elements that belong to different characters:

> οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖναί γε ἐξαμάρτοιέν ποτε τοσοῦτον ὥστε ῥήματα ἀνδρῶν
> ποιήσασαι τὸ χρῶμα γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος ἀποδοῦναι, καὶ μέλος ἐλευθέ-
> ρων αὖ καὶ σχήματα συνθεῖσαι ῥυθμοὺς δούλων καὶ ἀνελευθέρων προσ-
> αρμόττειν, οὐδ' αὖ ῥυθμοὺς καὶ σχῆμα ἐλευθέριον ὑποθεῖσαι μέλος ἢ
> λόγον ἐναντίον ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς, ἔτι δὲ θηρίων φωνὰς καὶ

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[14] 2.653d7–e3: φησὶν δὲ τὸ νέον ἅπαν ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τοῖς τε σώμασι καὶ ταῖς φωναῖς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν οὐ δύνασθαι, κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἀεὶ ζητεῖν καὶ φθέγγεσθαι, τὰ μὲν ἀλλόμενα καὶ σκιρτῶντα, οἷον ὀρχούμενα μεθ' ἡδονῆς καὶ προσπαίζοντα, τὰ δὲ φθεγγόμενα πάσας φωνάς.

[15] 654a3–4: ἣ δὴ κινεῖν τε ἡμᾶς καὶ χορηγεῖν ἡμῶν τούτους, ᾠδαῖς τε καὶ ὀρχήσεσιν ἀλλήλοις συνείροντας.

[16] 655b3–6: ἁπλῶς ἔστω τὰ μὲν ἀρετῆς ἐχόμενα ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος, εἴτε αὐτῆς εἴτε τινὸς εἰκόνος, σύμπαντα σχήματά τε καὶ μέλη καλά, τὰ δὲ κακίας αὖ, τοὐναντίον ἅπαν. A similar ethic evaluation of music is found at *Resp.* 3.398c–399c.

ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὀργάνων καὶ πάντας ψόφους εἰς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἄν ποτε συνθεῖεν, ὡς ἕν τι μιμούμεναι (669c4–d3).

> The Muses would never get things so wrong as to write words appropriate for men, and then give them the colouring and melodic cadences appropriate for women (τὸ χρῶμα γυναικῶν καὶ μέλος); nor would they combine the melodic form and movement of free men with the rhythms of those who are slaves, and not free—or the rhythms and movements characteristic of those who are free with a melody or words opposed to that rhythm. Nor again would they combine, in the same piece, the voices of animals, humans and instruments and all kinds of noises, while still claiming to be representing one single thing.

By mixing tunes and postures that do not belong together, the poets will provoke the laughter of men: "these are just the kinds of things which human poets are forever weaving together in a senseless jumble—to the great amusement of people (γέλωτ' ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων) in whom, to use Orpheus' phrase, 'delight's bud has reached full flower'" (669d2–4).[17] This passage helps clarify the risible type of rhythms and cadences that were conveyed by the poets, and which could—hypothetically—be included in the classification of the φαῦλον form of dance discussed in book 7. Such combination of rhythm and cadence is defined as the wrongdoing of the poets, in that they do not imitate the true essence of the original.

Finally, at 798d–801a it is established that (i) everything that pertains to music and rhythm is imitation of the habits of the best and worst men ("we said that the business of rhythm and music in general was a question of imitation of the behaviour of people who were better or worse", 798d7–8)[18]; and (ii) that these are the laws regarding public and sacred songs and every choral dance.

In the passage from book 7 discussed here (816c–d), the Athenian declares that it is necessary to examine and recognise (θεάσασθαι καὶ γνωρίζειν, 816c8) performances of ugly bodies and thoughts and those performances that provoke laughter (τῶν αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ γέλωτος κωμῳδήματα τετραμμένων), the imitation of which is a matter for comedy (τὰ τούτων πάντων μιμήματα κεκωμῳδημένα, 816d5–8). It is important to know them in order to avoid saying or doing something ridiculous (μανθάνειν αὐτὰ δεῖ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι' ἄγνοιαν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὅσα γελοῖα, 816e4–5). In other words, one should see certain movements so as not to repeat them in one's daily life.

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[17] 669d2–4: ποιηταὶ δὲ ἀνθρώπινοι σφόδρα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐμπλέκοντες καὶ συγκυκῶντες ἀλόγως, γέλωτ' ἂν παρασκευάζοιεν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσους φησὶν Ὀρφεὺς λαχεῖν ὥραν τῆς τέρψιος.

[18] 798d7–8: ὡς τὰ περὶ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν μουσικήν ἐστιν τρόπων μιμήματα βελτιόνων καὶ χειρόνων ἀνθρώπων.

It is a question of training and repetition through habits, gestures, and words that belong to morally good men. In this perspective, the discussion appears to be strictly related to the Athenian's illustration of the educative in book 2 (653a5–c4): when a citizen is accustomed, from a young age, to rejoice at certain movements and to ridicule others, by spontaneously feeling aversion for them, he will grow eager to imitate the movements of the good and noble man and at the same time resistant to the imitation of the low and risible gestures that belong to the vile man. It is therefore important to observe and be familiar with choral performances that provoke laughter, because they enable the individual to distance himself/herself from them. Once the spontaneous perceptions — that should occur from youth — of pleasure and disdain are aligned with the rational motives that lie underneath them, this 'accordance' (συμφωνία, 653b6) may correctly be called virtue.

The feeling of hatred and disdain that should characterise the experience of certain comic performances is to be understood in relation to the Athenian's requirement that the legislator should force "slaves and paid foreigners to perform such imitations" (δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένοις ἐμμίσθοις προστάττειν μιμεῖσθαι) and that no free man should engage in such performances, neither man nor woman (μηδέ τινα μανθάνοντα αὐτὰ γίγνεσθαι φανερὸν τῶν ἐλευθέρων, μήτε γυναῖκα μήτε ἄνδρα, 816e5–9). Clearly, the noble form of dance should be imitated by citizens, while the low type should be ridiculed, and citizens are encouraged to distance themselves from such imitations.

Folch, in his historical reading of the *Laws*, notes that "where non-citizens were coerced to perform before citizen audiences outside Athens, their performances were employed as object lessons of how *not* to behave, thereby naturalizing the sociopolitical hierarchy by humiliating low-status performers."[19] However, what is at stake in the *Laws* is not so much the political humiliation imposed on the slaves or the paid strangers (816d) who are forced to perform ridiculous movements, but rather the necessity for the citizens of Magnesia to feel the socio-moral distance between performer and spectator. For the legislator it is of the utmost importance to avoid any form of empathy between the citizens and the performers of the ridiculous spectacle that they are watching/experiencing.[20] A risible choral dance performed by an 'other' can be kept under control because there is no risk of 'contamination' when the performance is not carried out by a fellow citizen.

From this perspective, the citizen, when laughing at the spectacle, will share no complicity in the unworthiness of the event. As Jouët-Pastré aptly notes, the citizen can never recognise himself in the comic spectacle, he has no part in it, and therefore the disreputable movements cannot be seen as belonging to the reality

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[19] Folch, 2015, 199. In Folch's interpretation, this passage entails a range of "formally distinct but substantively interrelated genres" of which comedy is the most prominent, and can be considered as its archetypal genre.

[20] Similarly, *Republic* (395c–d) citizens are not allowed to perform comedies in which they imitate what is inconvenient and low, cf. Jouët-Pastré, 2005, 47–53.

of Magnesia.[21] Such a distance cannot be achieved by the spectator watching tragedy: the empathy with the grievances, the mourning, and the tears of the performer will inevitably lead the spectator to embrace the world view of the performer.[22] This is the Athenian's major problem as he attempts to convey a set of moral values different from those conveyed by the poets.

With the risible representations discussed by the Athenian at 816d, the question is altogether different. Firstly, they are considered παίγνια, 'amusements' (816e10), which means that they are deprived of the ambition to represent something true—which was the core of Plato's conflict with his contemporary poets (cf. the words addressed by the Athenian to imaginary poets at 817a). Secondly, seen from this perspective, it becomes clear why citizens are not allowed to perform certain ridiculous movements: they do not belong to the behaviour of a well-educated citizen, who is supposed to be aware of the difference between noble (σπουδαῖον) and vile (φαῦλον) dance. While (s)he should enjoy the former through imitation and performance, (s)he should enjoy the latter only at distance and by watching others, not fellowcitizens.[23] The strong emotional bond between performer and spectator that is envisaged by the Athenian is further discussed in the next section.

The concept of 'kinaesthetic empathy' and its role in the classification of dance in Magnesia

In *Kinesthetic Empathy in Creative and Cultural Practices* (an investigation of how individuals, defined as 'embodied subjects', create emotional meanings through arts and cultures), Reynolds defines the concept 'kinaesthetic empathy' as "the ability to experience empathy merely by observing the movements of another human being." The 'dance's body' is regarded as a movement that involves both dancer(s) and spectator, rather than any specific, individual dancer. More importantly, this concept is treated in the work as a movement across and between bodies, and one which may impact modes of perception and ways of knowing. Recent studies on choral performances in the fifth century, and on the link be-

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[21] Jouët-Pastré, 2005, 47–48. In a similar vein, Folch, 2015, chapt. 4, 189–202 talks about the "the performance of alterity".

[22] For the view of tragedies as offering "a whole view of the world" and being interpreted as vehicles for certain values see Halliwell, 2002, esp. 98–106.

[23] Cf. also Halliwell, 2008, 487 on the distance provided by professional stagings. A similar view on the performing of choral dance was current at Sparta: Plutarch (*Lycurgus* 28.10) tells about the Helotes who were forced by the Spartiates to sing songs and dance risible dances (ᾄδειν καὶ χορείας χορεύειν ἀγεννεῖς καὶ καταγελάστους), while the citizens laughed at them. Similarly, when the Helots were ordered by the Thebans—who had captured them—to sing works of Terpander, Alcman, and Spendos, they claimed they were not allowed because their masters forbade it (28.5). According to Plutarch, this behaviour well suited the proverb that 'the freeman (τὸν ἐλεύθερον) is most free in Sparta and the slave (τὸν δοῦλον) most enslaved' (*Lyc*. 28.5).

tween the individual and the collective through the dancing rhythm, indicate how such phenomena were employed by Plato in the constitution of Magnesia.[24]

In book 2, where the conversation revolves around festive and theatrical contexts, the Athenian establishes that the audience should be trained or re-trained to take delight in "the pleasurable rhythmic and harmonic perception of song and dance" (τὴν ἔνρυθμόν τε καὶ ἐναρμόνιον αἴσθησιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς, 2.654a2–3, cf also 2.653c–654a), which was the gift of Apollo and Dionysus given to humans in the first place. Citizens will experience the "joy" (χαρᾶς, 2.654a5) of dancing in or observing choruses (χορούς, 2.654a4), but only as far as these representations imitate the inclinations and actions of virtuous people. The idea is that by appreciating the performance of choral representations of virtuous action, one (re)learns to enjoy the qualities of virtue itself (2.654b–d, 2.655b).[25]

Kowalzig defines as 'bodily social' the physical property that allows the individuals' rhythmic impulse to converge with that of the chorus, as if there were a transcendent force merging the individual body with collective rhythmicity. In this sense, choral dance fulfils a fundamental social role in creating ties between citizens (this being, at least, the aim of the gods when offering dance as a gift to humans).[26] The idea encouraged by the Athenian is that the city of Magnesia will act 'in unison', i.e., that the citizens will praise and blame unanimously and through their shared capability to rejoice and feel pain for the same things (ἐπαινεῖν τ' αὖ καὶ ψέγειν καθ' ἓν ὅτι μάλιστα σύμπαντας ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίροντας καὶ λυπουμένους, 5.739d1–3).

As pointed out by Peponi, the bodily movements are never autonomous from the content of the song that they accompany.[27] Thus, in the passage regarding comedy (815d–816a), dance is to be considered the bodily language that accompanies and complements the spoken word: "body is thought of as an extension to voice" and is so deeply connected to the vocal activity that it is to be considered part of the same expressive mechanism.[28] It is necessary to stress this point in order to

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[24] Both Kowalzig (2007) and Kurke (2007) have demonstrated that communities were particularly affected by choral performances that shape their mythical narratives. In this sense, the power of persuasion of choral performance in the fifth century appears to be thoroughly in tune with the choral theories set out by Plato. Jackson, 2016, argues for crediting choreia in the fifth, fourth and third centuries BCE a persuasive impact that in many ways outweighed the persuasions of *logos*, given the evidence of both literary and epigraphic sources that testify and hint to the power of choral performances to persuade and shape the attitudes both of those citizens who take part in the performance and the spectators who make up the broader community.

[25] For choral performances as a dimension of the human that is central to the political project of the *Laws* see Folch, 2015, 71–80.

[26] Kowalzig, 2013, 171–212. Also, by linking the concept of rhythm to the collective dimension, Kowalzig regards the integration of individual and collective rhythmic feeling in the 'bodily social' as the specific element which ultimately allows the political and moral stability of society, in that it controls the communal life.

[27] Peponi 2009, 59.

[28] Peponi, 2009, 58–60.

better understand the Athenian's shift from discussing forms of bodily move-ments to his imaginary dialogue with the 'serious poets', i.e. authors of tragedy.

Jackson, in her study on persuasion exercised by non-verbal activity, demon-strates how Plato's choral theory in the *Laws* suggests an already existing under-standing of (and already existing attitudes towards) the potency of choral perfor-mance. In terms of impact, choral performance was seen as the most powerful way to persuade in the ancient world. It is made clear in both book 2 and book 7 that it is necessary to love and imitate what is good and to loathe what is bad. Clearly, a citizen who has been trained to feel such hatred towards shameful bodies and thoughts (αἰσχρῶν σωμάτων καὶ διανοημάτων, 816d5) will grow reluctant to perform their movements, words, and actions, while, on the contrary, he will feel pleasure in representing (through the choral dance) the words and gestures of the noble and good man. By stirring up the 'correct' emotions in the performer, the Athenian makes sure that these will pass correctly over to the spectator.

It is for these reasons that a correct classification of dances is fundamental for the Athenian's program of education. In other words, engaging in choral perfor-mance (whether as spectator or performer) enables the citizen to reach a particu-larly emotional and receptive state of mind, which is key to the achievement of civic virtue. The imitation carried out by the poets, which is condemned in the *Republic*, has a place in Magnesia because what is to be sung and danced is ulti-mately submitted to the direction of the lawgivers. The citizens, by shaping (the performer) and being shaped (the spectator) are essentially led to persuade each other to be morally 'good'.[29] In this perspective, the biggest societal danger iden-tified by the Athenian is to accept wicked habits and enjoy their assimilation. It then becomes inevitable to imitate the source of such pleasure, even though one is ashamed of praising it (656b1–7).[30] In the Athenian's opinion, there is no external factor worse than this in the education of the young.

Conclusion
Finally, it appears that, for Plato, the power of choral performance is to be found in the harmony of movement and music and in the values that they wordlessly promote. In this perspective, a correct definition and classification of choral dances will instruct citizens, from a young age, to "love what they should love and hate

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[29] Prauscello, 2013a, 259 speaks in similar terms of the mimêsis in the *Laws*—'[In the Laws mimêsis] is active at both a representational (mimêsis qua representation) and performative level (mimêsis qua enactment)'.

[30] 2.656b1–7: Πότερον εἰκὸς ἢ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ταὐτὸν εἶναι ὅπερ ὅταν τις πονηροῖς ἤθεσιν συνὼν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μισῇ, χαίρῃ δὲ ἀποδεχόμενος, ψέγῃ δὲ ὡς ἐν παιδιᾶς μοίρᾳ, ὀνει-ρώττων αὐτοῦ τὴν μοχθηρίαν; τότε ὁμοιοῦσθαι δήπου ἀνάγκη τὸν χαίροντα ὁποτέροις ἂν χαίρῃ, ἐὰν ἄρα καὶ ἐπαινεῖν αἰσχύνηται· καίτοι τοῦ τοιούτου τί μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φαῖμεν ἂν ἡμῖν ἐκ πάσης ἀνάγκης γίγνεσθαι;

what they should hate". When experiencing comic performances that represent "ugly bodies and thoughts", citizens of Magnesia will inevitably recognise in those gestures and words something vile, low, something that should be laughed at, and not assimilated in their everyday behaviour. It is a question of a 'spontaneous obedience' to a new set of values, encouraged by the legislator, which has its base in the instinctive pleasure felt by citizens when experiencing certain serious and noble performances. The resulting symphony between these emotions and the citizen's rational faculty is what the Athenian has defined as virtue in book 2 (653a5–c4) and it represents the aim to which all educational efforts should be directed.

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Γραμματικῶν περίεργα γένη
Making fun of grammarians

JERKER BLOMQVIST

In a colloquium that is devoted to the study of laughter and laughing in ancient literature, it is not out of place to start by laughing a little bit at ourselves, or at classical philology, which is our profession, or—more suitably, perhaps—at our professional colleagues of antiquity, the ancient 'grammarians', the γραμματικοί or *grammatici*, who were the first to practice what we now call classical philology. In the ancient texts there appear a considerable number of passages in which the reader is invited to laugh at these colleagues of ours.

Consider, e.g., this declaration:

εἰ μὴ ἰατροὶ ἦσαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν τῶν γραμματικῶν μωρότερον.

If there were no doctors, nothing more stupid than the grammarians would exist.[1]

That sentence appears in the *Deipnosophistae* of Athenaeus of Naucratis.[2] The *Deipnosophistae* is a report on a luxurious dinner party at a dignified Roman's residence, imagined to have taken place shortly before 200 AD. The guests at the table represent the learned professions of their time, and their speeches and disputes fill more than 1,500 pages in the printed edition. The person who makes the comment about doctors, grammarians and their (alleged?) stupidity is the sophist Ulpianus, who has a grammarian's keen interest in the correctness of language, although he disavows being called a grammarian himself.[3] The person he speaks to

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[1] The translations of Greek and Latin texts are my own, although sometimes inspired by others.
[2] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 15.666a/15.2.13–15.
[3] Ulpianus cannot be identified with any person known from other sources; cf. *RE* 2.17, 567 and *PIR* 3, 56. He may be a fictitious character.

at the moment is a doctor. In these circumstances the utterance cannot be intended to be abusive or insulting; it is meant as a joke, a case of good-humoured bantering between two friends at a well-laden dinner table.

However, looking through ancient texts with satirical or sceptic content, we will find that both grammarians and doctors are repeatedly targets of attacks of a much less good-humoured kind than that of Ulpianus. The attacks range from mild irony, through ridicule, scorn and moral rebuke, all the way to invectives and downright abuse. Book 11 of the *Anthologia Palatina*, with its collection of sceptic epigrams, provides numerous examples,[4] and doctors and grammarians seem to be mocked more often than other professionals, which is what Ulpianus' utterance implies.[5] The two professions could even be ridiculed in one and the same short epigram, as in *AP* 11.401, which condemns both a doctor's professional incompetence and the irrelevance for practical purposes of a grammarian's teachings.[6] We are told that a doctor had sent his son to a grammarian's school, and the first text that the grammarian put into the boy's hands was the beginning of the *Iliad*. It starts with the ill-boding word μῆνιν, meaning 'wrath', and then, in the following lines, continues with equally lugubrious vocabulary to describe the destiny of the unhappy victims of the Trojan war. When the doctor became aware of the content and wording of that beginner's book, he took his son out of the school and, when he met the grammarian, he explained why:

> Σοὶ μὲν χάρις, εἶπεν, ἑταῖρε·
> αὐτὰρ ὁ παῖς παρ' ἐμοὶ ταῦτα μαθεῖν δύναται·
> καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ πολλὰς ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προϊάπτω
> καὶ πρὸς τοῦτ' οὐδὲν γραμματικοῦ δέομαι.

Much obliged, mate," he said, "but the kid could learn that from me. I also 'send forth a mass of souls into Hades', and I need no grammarian for that.

The prevalence of doctors and grammarians among the victims of mockery and ridicule in antiquity was recognized as a fact by Eustathius, the twelfth-century metropolitan of Thessalonike, known for his commentaries on the Homeric epics and other ancient poetry. Eustathius quotes the same saying as Ulpianus, and also

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[4] On satirical epigrams in antiquity see Brecht 1930 and Longo 1967; on satire in Hellenistic epigrams: Blomqvist 1998; on early Imperial period: Nisbet 2003 and 2007; on late antiquity: Galli Calderini 1988, 276, 290–294; on satire against grammarians: Brecht 1930, 30–37, Mazzoli 1997 and Blomqvist 2008.

[5] Examples of satire against grammar or grammarians are *AP* 11.10, 138, 139, 140, 143, 278, 279, 321, 322, 335, 347, 399, 400, 401 and 437. Cf. also the schoolmaster Palladas' complaints on the grammarian's lot: *AP* 9.169, 173, 174, 489, 10.97, 11.378. Doctors are ridiculed in *AP* 11.112–126, 333, 334, 382 and 401.

[6] The Palatine MS ascribes *AP* 11.401 to a Λουκιανός, probably Lucian of Samosata, but the author is mostly thought to be Lucillius. Cf. Longo 1967, 22, n. 19; Mazzoli 1997, 107; *contra* Aubreton 1972, 23–24, n. 3, 215, n. 2; Nisbet 2003, 178–179.

tries to find the reason why doctors and grammarians are so often denounced for stupidity.[7] Medicine and grammar, he says, are particularly complex sciences. They are characterized by a βαθύτης καὶ λεπτολογία, 'profundity and subtlety', which is beyond the grasp of the layman, and to the uninitiated these sciences must appear close to foolishness or even lunacy—ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ φρονεῖν is the phrase Eustathius uses.

That explanation is of course flattering to the grammarians—and to us, their modern colleagues. Shall we believe that grammar and medicine are that complicated—or were that complicated in twelfth-century Thessalonike? There is an alternative explanation, less flattering, but perhaps more credible. It asserts that the ancients commonly felt a general aversion against in particular grammarians and doctors, an aversion that originated from childhood experiences. Doctors and grammarians, it is said, were the first persons from outside their own families and households that children would meet, and both were unpleasant, even frightening, acquaintances. Doctors pinched and squeezed their limbs when examining small children, they prescribed distasteful potions, forbade delicacies, even used knives and branding irons when treating injuries,[8] and memories of such experiences would decide the adult person's attitude toward doctors.

The grammarians, whom children first met with, were the teachers of the elementary schools where boys were sent.[9] The torments they encountered there were not only the first lines of the *Iliad* but also the teacher's brutal methods for establishing discipline among his students. Horatius remembered his teacher Orbilius as *plagosus*, 'fond of flogging',[10] and *ferula* and *scutica*, 'cane and whip', were among the educational instruments this teacher used, if we are to believe Suetonius.[11]

Whip and cane seem to have belonged to the standard equipment of Greek elementary teachers, too.[12] An epigram by Phanias (second or first century BC?)[13] depicts the schoolmaster Kallon who, when retiring, dedicates to Hermes the σύμβολα ἀγωγᾶς παιδείου, 'the attributes of his educational profession'. These include a leather strap (ἱμάντα), which could be used for whipping schoolboys,

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[7] Eustathius, *In Iliadem* 3.243.20–25 van der Valck. For a different version of Ulpianus' joke see Konstantinos Manasses, Ἀρίστανδρος καὶ Καλλιθέα, frg. 25 οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν μωρότερον γραμματικῶν ἐν βίῳ, ἂν γῆν μὴ περιέτρεχον τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ παῖδες.

[8] Cf. the cook's allegations against the doctor before a jury of children in Plato, *Gorgias* 521e–522a.

[9] Pappenheim (1874, 16–17), a German nineteenth-century *Gymnasialprofessor*, declared that Sextus Empiricus must have written his *Against the Professors* (*Adv. mathematicos* 1–6) early in his life, since the vehemence of his attack on the grammarians proves that Sextus still had his sufferings at school in fresh memory. A colleague of Pappenheim's argued against his conclusion (Haas 1883, 12–14) and, actually, the *Adv. mathematicos* 1–6 is the last of Sextus' preserved works, not a product of juvenile rancour (see, e.g., Cortassa 1981).

[10] Horatius, *Epistulae* 2.1.70–71.

[11] Suetonius, *De grammaticis* 9.3.

[12] Cribiore 2001, 65–73, in a section with the heading "Whip-wielding masters".Y

[13] *AP* 6.294 (*HE* 2972–2975).

and a rod (νάρθηκα), which is qualified as κροτάφων πλάκτορα νηπιάχων, 'banger of childish skulls'. We are perhaps prone to interpret this poem as a denunciation of the schoolmaster's brutality and nothing else, but that is hardly the intent behind it. In the environment in which the poem was conceived, whips and canes were regarded as normal and even necessary tools of the teaching profession.[14] The text rather belongs to the scoptic genre.[15]

Thus, we are supposed to laugh when we read this epigram, but what are we supposed to laugh at? Where is the fun? These are questions that we must often ask ourselves when we meet ancient texts that promise to be funny and amusing, for the ancients did not always laugh at the same things as we do. The intended readership of this poem were supposed to laugh at the person of Kallon, and to laugh scornfully at that, when they realized that the fearsome schoolmaster had been transformed into a miserable creature, badly clad and shod,[16] whose limbs had been fettered by 'grey-haired fatigue', πολιῷ γυῖα δεθεὶς καμάτῳ, with the result that he could no longer keep on flogging schoolboys to earn himself a living and buy a decent set of clothes. Scornful comments on the poverty of grammarians and their low position in society are common,[17] and this epigram is likely to follow the same line. Adults with painful memories of brutal teachers had little respect for the teaching profession.

At the outset, I said that ancient grammarians are our colleagues in our profession as classical philologists. That does not apply to teachers on the elementary level, such as Kallon, in the epigram mentioned above, and his colleagues, but rather to a species of γραμματικοί who made their first appearance in the Hellenistic period and were often linked to learned institutions financed by the Hellenistic kings, such as the Mouseion and the Library of Alexandria and similar establishments at Pergamum or elsewhere. These grammarians devoted themselves to studying the Greek language and its manifestations in literature on a scholarly level; they made reliable editions of the classical texts and wrote commentaries on them; they created grammatical handbooks and brought together the vocabulary of Greek and other languages into dictionaries. They were the founding fathers of

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[14] An anonymous epigram (*Anthologia Latina* 96) stigmatizes a teacher for causing disciplinary problems because he used his cane too sparingly.

[15] Cf. Beckby 1965, *ad loc.*: "Spottepigramm.".

[16] This is likely to be the general meaning of the cryptic lines 3–4; cf. *HE, ad loc.*

[17] Juvenalis, *Saturae* 7.215–229, Ausonius, *Commemoratio professorum Burdigalensium* 8.6, 10.20–21, 25, 49–50. Horatius' teacher Orbilius is reported to have been very poor and to have written a book with complaints of the wrongs that the grammarians of Rome must suffer (Suetonius, *De grammaticis* 9). The schoolmaster Palladas of Alexandria repeatedly complaints of his poverty (*AP* 9.169–175). *Grammatici* in Rome were often slaves or freedmen; see Christes 1979, Agusta-Boularot 1994, 654-655, 675–676, 718–724.

classical philology and, in that sense, we are their colleagues.[18] They were philologists, just as we are.

But this sort of grammarians were denoted by the same Greek term as the elementary teachers; they were also called γραμματικοί, and they became the targets of scorn, ridicule and mockery to the same extent as the schoolmasters. Partly, this may be due to terminological coincidence: the satirists were not able to, or did not care to, distinguish one group of γραμματικοί from the other. Terms did exist that denoted only the schoolmasters, thus distinguishing them from the philologists, e.g., γραμματιστής and γραμματοδιδάσκαλος,[19] but they were not in frequent use. The Latin language, on the other hand, had a common term for the elementary teacher, viz. *ludi magister*, and the Greek loanword *grammaticus* was mostly, although not exclusively, reserved for scholarly professionals.[20] However, the clarifying terminology did not prevent Roman writers from pouring scorn over their *grammatici*.

This general negative image of our ancient colleagues, which dominates in both Greek and Latin texts of antiquity, motivates us to ask the question if they deserved this reputation. Were they actually as incompetent, as useless and as insufferable as the texts want us to believe? And, if not, why are they depicted in that way? In order to answer these questions, I will, in the following, analyse a selection of anti-grammarian texts in more detail and then suggest a possible historical background to the negative attitudes to which they testify.

First, we concentrate on the epigrams of the *Anthologia Palatina* that are devoted to grammarians. They generally depict our ancient colleagues as pretentious humbugs, as pests both to the poets, whose works they pick to pieces and fail to understand, and to their immediate audience, who must listen to endless lectures on insignificant linguistic details and absurd pseudo-problems of interpretation. This attitude to grammarians is effectively illustrated by a group of four epigrams composed in the first century AD, which attack well-known Alexandrian scholars. The authors of the epigrams are Philip of Thessalonike, compiler of one of the ancient epigram anthologies (*AP* 11.321, 347 = *GP* 3033–3040, 3041–3046), Lucillius, a productive composer of satiric epigrams (*AP* 11.140), and the more anonymous Antiphanes (*AP* 11.322 = *GP* 771–776).

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[18] On the early history of classical scholarship see, e.g., Pfeiffer 1968.

[19] Bécares Botas 1985, *s.vv.* From γραμματοδιδάσκαλος Timon of Phlius created γραμμοδιδασκαλίδης, 'schoolmaster's off-spring', which he applied as a disparaging epithet to Epicurus (Diogenes Laertius 10.2), excluding one short syllable in order to make the word manageable in a hexameter; *pace* LSJ, it is not synonymous with γραμματοδιδάσκαλος. The Biblical γραμματοεισαγωγεύς is not a synonym either but refers to some sort of minor official in the Jewish kingdom who was entrusted with the handling of documents (γράμματα; cf. Caird 1968, 465; LSJ, *Supplement*, *s.v.*).

[20] Cf. Suetonius, *De grammaticis* 4.

Antiphanes' epigram opens with what could be called a broad-spectrum invective: γραμματικῶν περίεργα γένη, 'meddlesome tribes of grammarians' (322.1).[21] Meddlesomeness or overzealousness may take different manifestations, as appears from the chapter on that vice in Theophrastus' *Characters* (ch. 13). Περιεργία is defined there as προσποίησίς τις λόγων καὶ πράξεων μετὰ εὐνοίας, 'a certain misappropriation of words and deeds with good intent'. Theophrastus singles out some inadequacies of the περίεργος that were also imputed to the grammarians, e.g., a delusional belief in one's own competence[22] and an excessive attention to trifling details.[23]

The grammarians are accused of meddling with poetry, thus trespassing into a field belonging to others; they are 'digging for roots in others' poetry' (ῥιζωρύχα μούσης ἀλλοτρίης; 322.1–2), and they pride themselves with a renown actually belonging to real poets, e.g., Erinna (ἐπ᾽ Ἠρίννη δὲ κομῶντες; 322.3) or Callimachus, 'whom they brandish as a shield' (ὃν ὡς ὅπλον ἐκτανύσαντες; 321.3).

At the same time, they attack these poets with venomous criticism, not even sparing Callimachus from their evil tongue (οὐδ᾽ αὐτοῦ κείνου γλῶσσαν ἀποστρέφετε; 321.4). They reveal themselves as Μώμου Στυγίου τέκνα 'offspring of Stygian Momos' (321.1). *Momos*, here qualified as with an epithet referring to the world of Hades, was fault-finding personified, a grudging and actively malevolent creature; Μῶμος was a denigrating term that poets could use about their unfair critics, as Callimachus did.[24] Other invectives by which the epigrammatists stigmatize the grammarians include ποιητῶν λῶβαι, 'scourges to poets (322.5)', τῶν μεγάλων κηλῖδες, 'blemishes to the great ones' (322.3), and εὐφώνων λαθροδάκναι κόριες, 'bugs secretly biting the eloquent' (322.6). The phrase τελχῖνες βίβλων, 'demon foes of books' (321.2) is noteworthy, since Callimachus used, in the *Aitia* prologue, Τελχῖνες as a nickname for his critics.[25] Thus, paradoxically, two of the words by which the satirical epigrammatists denigrate Callimachus and other grammarians—Μῶμος and Τελχῖνες—are used by Callimachus for denouncing his own critics.

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[21] On the following pages the four epigrams are referred to only by their numbers in book eleven of *AP*.

[22] *Characters* 13.6 ἀτραποῦ ἡγήσασασθαι, εἶτα μὴ δύνασθαι εὑρεῖν οἷ πορεύεται 'leading the way on a path, but then not finding the goal he is heading for'.

[23] *Characters* 13.10 γυναικὸς δὲ τελευτησάσης ἐπιγράψαι ἐπὶ τὸ μνῆμα τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τῆς μητρὸς καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς γυναικὸς τοὔνομα καὶ ποδαπή ἐστι, καὶ προσεπιγράψαι, ὅτι οὗτοι πάντες χρηστοὶ ἦσαν, 'when his wife dies, inscribing on her tomb the names of her husband, her father and mother, of herself and where she was born, and adding "They were all good people"'.

[24] Cf. Callimachus, *Hymn to Apollo* 113 ὁ δὲ Μῶμος, ἵν' ὁ φθόρος, ἔνθα νέοιτο. On the character of Momos and a textual problem in this line, see Blomqvist 1988.

[25] *Aetia* frg. 1.1 μοι Τελχῖνες ἐπιτρύζουσιν, 'the Telchines mutter against me', 1.7 Τελχῖσιν ἐγὼ τόδε, 'to the Telchines [I say] this'. The Telchines appear in ancient Greek folklore as skilful but evil-minded and invidious metal-workers and magicians. See the extensive commentary on *Aetia* frg. 1 in Harder 2012.

Unusual word formations are frequent in these poems. Lucillius, e.g., finds space for no less than three *hapax*es in his six-line poem, ἀοιδομάχοις, γραμματολικριφίσιν, νηπυτιευόμενοι (140.1–4).[26] The words are etymologically transparent but semantically obscure.[27] The poet may have created them himself in order to challenge the grammarians to demonstrate their linguistic expertise by offering meaningful interpretations of them.[28] When they fail, that proves their incompetence and exposes their conceit.

When the grammarians are censored as παρὰ δεῖπνον ἀοιδομάχοις λογολέσχαις, 'chattering poet-fighters at the dinner-table' (140.1), the epigrammatist takes aim at their impact on innocent people in their immediate surroundings. At parties they prattle all the time, but only about their own tedious stuff. No joke comes out of their mouth and no wine goes into it (οἷς οὐ σκῶμμα λέγειν, οὐ πεῖν φίλον; 140.3).[29] When Antiphanes, disregarding the distinction between schoolmasters and professional philologists, describes the grammarians not only as ποιητῶν λῶβαι but also as παισὶ σκότος ἀρχομένοισιν, 'a gloomy darkness to children beginning [their schooldays]' (322.5), he has in mind another group of persons who risked being harassed by them.

What sort of studies were these grammarians devoting their time to, since they evoked such resentment and contempt—genuine or feigned—among the epigrammatists? It is their interest in the smallest details of the language that becomes the prime target of ridicule. Philip mocks at their partiality to monosyllabic personal pronouns like μιν and σφιν (321.5), which no longer were current in contemporary speech but known only from Homer and other archaic or archaizing texts. The label συνδέσμων λυγρῶν θηρήτορες, 'hunters for miserable particles'

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[26] Other *hapax*es, or near-*hapax*es, applied to grammarians in the four epigrams include ἀκανθοβάται, ἀκανθολόγοι (cf. Mazzoli 1997, 100, n. 5), λαθροδάκναι, ῥιζωρύχα, and Περικαλλιμάχους (cf. below). Phanias' epigram on Kallon (*AP* 6.294, discussed above) contains the unique or extremely rare words ἐρημοκόμου, πανακείταν (for which another *hapax*, πυρικοίταν, has been conjectured!), πλάκτορα, προποδαγόν, συγχίδα and φιλοκαμπέα. Herodicus (cf. below) offers γωνιοβόμβυκες.

[27] Ἀοιδομάχος is a compound of ἀοιδός, 'singer', or ἀοιδή, 'song', with -μάχος, 'fighting', so it is made up of recognizable elements. In its context it is reasonable to suppose that the word is meant to describe the grammarians as "fighting against the poets", but other interpretations are possible too. The second element of γραμματολικριφίσιν (a dative plural) is a nominalization of the Homeric adverb λικριφίς, 'crosswise', 'sideways' (LSJ *s.v.*). The precise reference of the compound can only be guessed at. Existing translations ('puzzle-headed grammarians' [LSJ], 'slippery dominies' [Paton], 'Verdrehte Grammatikerinnung' [Beckby], 'glossateurs' [Aubreton]) are educated conjectures but no more. The verb νηπυτιεύομαι is derived from νηπύτιος, 'childish' (on post-Homeric use of this word, see Agosti 1989, 110–115), and the phrase νηπυτιευόμενοι Νέστορι καὶ Πριάμῳ implies that the grammarians had some sort of infantile but otherwise unspecified activities going on with the oldies of the Trojan war.

[28] In a similar way, Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. mathematicos* 1.316–317) presents the grammarians with an obscure epigram and challenges them to decode it; cf. Blomqvist 1971, 13–18.

[29] On grammarians as alleged party poopers see especially Nisbet 2003, 30–34

(321.5) aims at their seemingly pointless fondness for a number of small words, the functions of which were hard to grasp even to the grammarians themselves[30] and which, in later grammatical terminology, are identified just as "Greek particles".[31] A non-initiate may fail to recognize the necessity of writing voluminous books about words with only two or three letters.[32]

Except for studying such minimal and seemingly irrelevant elements of the language, the ancient grammarians were also charged with discussing problems of text interpretation that were of no consequence for the understanding of the poems they claimed to explicate. According to the epigrammatists, the grammarians would, e.g., devote time to discussing whether the Cyclops kept dogs (ζητεῖν εἰ κύνας εἶχε Κύκλωψ; 321.6). Since the Cyclops had a herd of sheep, and since shepherds tend to have dogs as helpers, a grammarian, when commenting on the *Odyssey*, could find a pretext for a digression on the question what members of the Cyclopean household might have been left unmentioned by Homer. The epigrammatists assume that their intended audience will realize that the relevance for serious text interpretation of such speculations will be nil.

A different sort of pseudo-problems included the attempts to disentangle the family relations of mythological or historical figures, e.g., speculations about the father of Proteus (τίνος ἦν Πρωτεύς; 347.4). Sextus Empiricus, in his *Against the grammarians*, gives a list to exemplify what sort of facts about prominent personalities of the past could be revealed by what the grammarians regarded as serious-minded research:

> that Plato the philosopher was first called Aristocles and that, when a youth, he had an ear pierced and wore an earring, and that Pythias, Aristotle's daughter, was married to three men, first to Nicanor of Stageira, a consociate of Aristotle, secondly to Procleus, a descendant of Damaratos, king of the Lacedaemonians (who had two sons by her, Procleus and Damaratos, who both studied philosophy with Theophrastus), and thirdly to the doctor Metrodorus, a disciple of Chrysippus of Knidos and teacher of Erasistratus, who had the son Aristotle.[33]

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[30] E.g., Dionysius Thrax who, in his grammar (1.1.96.3–100 Uhlig), declared a considerable portion of the Greek particles to be just παραπληρωματικοί, 'expletives', that could provide a poet with extra syllables needed for making a hexameter complete without tampering with its meaning.

[31] This term actually refers to a number of heterogeneous words for which no collective definition can be given; cf. Berenguer Sánchez 1992, Revuelta 2014 (ch. 1. 'Definition').

[32] Twentieth-century examples of such books are Denniston 1934, Ruijgh 1971 and—on a less grand scale—Blomqvist 1969. They continue being produced in the third millennium: Bonifazi, Drummen & de Kreij 2016.

[33] Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. mathematicos* 1.257–259. For more examples of historical facts collected by grammarians see Seneca, *De brevitate vitae* 13.2–6, *Epistulae morales* 88.6– 8, Juvenalis, *Saturae* 7.234–236, Ausonius, *Commemoratio professorum Burdigalensium* 22.5–14.

The detailed information amassed in this way is impressive by its sheer bulk, but Sextus concludes that, apart from being totally useless (πρὸς τῷ τελέως ἀχρηστεῖν), this stockpiling reveals no professional expertise (οὐδεμίαν ἐμφαίνει τεχνικὴν δύναμιν) but can be performed by just anyone who is meddlesome enough (ἄλλως δὲ περίεργος δυνήσεται ποιεῖν).

The identity of these grammarians is made clear when the epigrammatists mention some of them by name, often in combination with not very flattering designations of their followers. These are called "grammatical muddle-heads of Aristarchus"—or whatever is meant by γραμματολικρίφισιν (140.2)—or "Zenodotus' puppies" (σκύλακες; 321.2). Callimachus is alleged to have a following of either dogs (πρόκυνες; 322.4) or soldiers (στρατιῶται; 321.3). Some members of these bands could even secure the questionable honour of being described as "Super-Callimachuses" (Περικαλλίμαχοι; 347.6).[34]

There are two things to comment with regard to these names. Both Aristarchus of Samothrake and Zenodotus of Ephesus are well-known Alexandrian grammarians. The presence of Callimachus among these allegedly ridiculous figures is a reminder that Callimachus, who is today primarily known as a poet, even as one of most brilliant poets of his time, highly estimated also by later Roman writers, was active as well in the same fields as Zenodotus and Aristarchus. One of his achievements was the Πίνακες, a fairly complete catalogue of the collections of literature in the Alexandrian library; the catalogue is said to have filled 120 papyrus scrolls.[35]

His renown as a poet was not above discussion in his own lifetime. Antiphanes called his followers πικροὶ καὶ ξηροί, 'bitter and dry' (322.4), and 'dry' is here used in the sense of 'dull' or 'boring', which would hardly be a compliment to a poet. Becoming dry in this sense was thought to be one of the dangers that threatened a poet who used water for drinking purposes. "Shame on those who drink water, suffering the madness of moderation!", as one of Callimachus' contemporaries put it,[36] and when Lucillius condemned those 'to whom drinking [of wine, presumably] is no fun' (οἷς ... οὐ πεῖν φίλον; 140.3), water-drinking was not the alternative he recommended to them.[37]

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[34] Περικαλλίμαχος is a hapax. On prefixed περι- corresponding to *super-* see LSJ *s.v.* περί F.III–IV.
[35] For other examples of poets who were also grammarians, see Mazzoli 1997.
[36] Antigonus of Carystus *AP* 9.406.5–6 (*GP* 71–72): φεῦ τίνες ὕδωρ / πίνουσιν μανίην σώφρονα μαινόμενοι. Editors (not *GP*) put a question mark at the end of this sentence, i.e., τίνες is interpreted as an interrogative pronoun. It is more likely a relative. On relative τίς, see LSJ *s.v.* τις B.II.c–d; BDR § 298:4; BDAG *s.v.* τίς 1.β.ϸ, and cf. *GP, ad loc.*
[37] Against water-drinkers also: *AP* 9.305, 11.20, 23, 24, 31, 13.29 (= Cratinus frg. 199 Kock/*203 Kassel-Austin), Horatius, *Epistulae* 1.19.1–3. Against Callimachus: *AP* 11.130.3–6, 11.275. Cf. Rubensohn 1891; Brecht 1930, 33, n. 198; Giangrande 1968, 160; Knox 1985.

The other remarkable feature in these names is the *absence* of one name from the list. One famous and well-known Alexandrian grammarian never becomes the target of the epigrammatists, viz., Aristophanes of Byzantium. We have no reason to believe that Aristophanes was less fascinated than Zenodotus and Aristarchus by μιν and σφιν and other monosyllabics or less devoted to water-drinking than Callimachus, but his name is missing from the epigrams that denounce the grammarians for those things. Other detractors of grammarians do mention Aristophanes, e.g., Sextus Empiricus.[38] So why does he *not* appear in the satiric epigrams of the first century together with the other Alexandrians?

In order to find an explanation of that anomaly I think we must go back a few hundred years, from the texts of the first century AD that we have just discussed, to a piece that stems from the mid-second century BC.:[39]

Φεύγετ᾽, Ἀριστάρχειοι, ἐπ᾽ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης
   Ἑλλάδα, τῆς ξουθῆς δειλότεροι κεμάδος,
γωνιοβόμβυκες μονοσύλλαβοι, οἷσι μέμηλε
   τὸ σφὶν καὶ τὸ σφῶν καὶ τὸ μὶν ἠδὲ τὸ νίν.
τοῦθ᾽ ὑμῖν εἴη δυσπέμφελον· Ἡροδίκῳ δὲ
   Ἑλλὰς ἀεὶ μίμνοι καὶ θεόπαις Βαβυλών.

Go away from Hellas, Aristarcheans, across the wide expanse of the sea, more scared than the brown deer, secretive whisperers, monosyllabics, you who care for σφιν and σφωιν, for μιν and νιν. And may your travel be a stormy one! But for Herodicus may Hellas and god-born Babylon remain forever!

The epigram is an attack on the Alexandrian grammarians, named after Aristarchus of Samothrake. They are accused of devoting their time to the same insignificant small words as the "hunters of miserable particles", whom we have met in the first-century AD epigrams, and of chattering on incessantly about their findings in secluded corners—that is the likely reference of γωνιοβόμβυκες—, having, if we interpret the epigram literally, even themselves become some sort of monosyllabics, μονοσύλλαβοι.

This epigram does not appear in the *Anthologia Palatina* but was quoted by Athenaeus in the *Deipnosophistae*.[40] Its author was Herodicus of Babylon, who mentions his name and birthplace in the two last lines of the poem. About Herodicus we know with reasonable certainty that he was a grammarian. Thus, we have here a grammarian who attacks other grammarians, and it is not a case of good-humoured bantering, as it was when Ulpianus made fun of himself and his doctor friend at the dinner party. Herodicus is malicious and wishes for his ad-

[38] Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. mathematicos* 1.44.
[39] Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae* 5.222a/5.65.12–17.
[40] *Deipnosophistae* 5.222a/5.65.12–17 (*FGE* 233–238). On this epigram and its "funzione archetipica" for later Greek epigrammatists, cf. especially Mazzoli 1997, 99–108.

dressees a tempestuous voyage towards an undefined but presumably repulsive destination. Why would a grammarian invoke disaster on his own colleagues? The answer is that Herodicus, though a grammarian, was not an Alexandrian grammarian, and that makes all the difference.

His date and identity are somewhat problematic,[41] but Herodicus most probably belonged to the grammatical school of Pergamum and was a disciple of its founder Crates of Mallos. The two schools of Alexandria and Pergamum were rivals.[42] The Pergamene grammarians considered themselves to be greatly superior to the Alexandrians. They preferred to describe themselves as critics, not grammarians, and claimed to have attained an accurate understanding of archaic literature and to be able to explain its hidden meanings. Inspired by Stoic philosophy, they operated with an allegorical method for text interpretation. The study of minute linguistic details was not valued highly by the Pergamenes.

The rivalry between Alexandria and Pergamum was not restricted to the field of grammar. Rather, the disagreement of the grammatical schools was a repercussion of the rivalry on the political level that existed between the royal houses of Alexandria and Pergamum. Both the Ptolemies of Alexandria and the Attalids of Pergamum strived to secure their positions in the Hellenistic world not only with armies and navies but also by sponsoring literature, fine arts and science on a grand scale. With promises of financial benefit, access to well-equipped libraries and laboratories, and a privileged lifestyle, they tried to attract scholars, writers and poets to take up residence in the learned institutions of their capitals. Their agents are likely to have been present in important cities all over Alexander's former empire.

Aristophanes had established himself as a respected and successful member of the Alexandrian school. However, according to a note in the *Souda* lexicon,[43] he once decided to leave Alexandria and to join the Pergamene school instead. The text of the *Souda* is not quite clear,[44] so we do not know if this was on his own initiative or if he had been approached by the agents of the Attalid king. The text describes the planned move as "fleeing to Eumenes" (πρὸς Εὐμένη φυγεῖν),[45] which implies that Aristophanes was considered to have broken the loyalty he owed to king Ptolemy. When his plans were detected, he was consequently imprisoned for some time by his royal employer. Could the preference for Pergamum that he had demonstrated be the reason why the name of Aristophanes is missing from the epigrams that mock grammarians?

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[41] *FGE*, pp. 62–63.

[42] For a characteristic of Pergamene scholarship, see Pfeiffer 1968, 234–251; on Crates of Mallos in particular: Asmis 1992.

[43] *Souda, α* 3936. Only the latter part of the entry concerns Aristophanes; more about him in *α* 3933.

[44] Cf. Pfeiffer 1968, 172, n. 3.

[45] The Eumenes in question was Eumenes II Soter, who reigned 197–160.

Since he was a disciple of Crates of Mallos, Herodicus was personally involved in the antagonism between the Pergamene and Alexandrian schools. His epigram is not directed against grammarians in general but against a specific grammatical tradition that had developed in Alexandria. If Aristophanes had revealed himself to be a friend of Pergamum, Herodicus had good reason not to mention his name.

When Antiphanes, Philip and Lucillius wrote their poems 300 years afterwards, the Pergamene school had ceased to exist, 'Aristarcheans', 'Callimacheans' and 'Zenodoteans' were equivalent with grammarians in general, and, even if the Alexandrian school was still flourishing, its controversy with Pergamum on the correct way of understanding poetry had faded away; literary feuds were fought by other combatants and over other issues. Had Philip and his contemporaries nevertheless reason to spare Aristophanes from their attacks?

Perhaps not, but the conventional character of these epigrams is obvious,[46] as demonstrated by both form and content. They belong to a literary tradition, a tradition that had its origins in the rivalry between the kings of Pergamum and the kings of Alexandria, but which manifested itself also in a rivalry between the grammatical schools of the two capitals. The tradition was, as far as we know, started by a Pergamene poet-cum-grammarian and, still in the first century AD, its influence may have been strong enough to save Aristophanes from being bundled up with the rest of the Alexandrians.

The conclusion must be that the epigrams discussed here essentially express what the professors of Pergamum wanted to be known about the professors of Alexandria. They are the fossilized remains of an intra-academic strife for prestige and, as such, their reliability does not stand a serious test. In Sweden we have a saying that goes: "What is truth in Berlin and Jena, is just a bad joke in Heidelberg."[47] That could be applied to the learned centres of the Hellenistic world as well. Consequently, Herodicus and his first-century epigones are not to be taken earnestly. Our ancient colleagues were not an assortment of pretentious humbugs, muddle-headed fanatics or miserable, long-suffering hunters for two- and three-letter words.

As for the rivalry between the two learned centres, history seems to have demonstrated the superiority of the Alexandrian tradition. The allegorical method of text interpretation, once favoured by Herodicus and his Pergamene contemporaries and eagerly adopted by some later exegetes, has gone the same way as the Hellenistic kingdoms and belongs to history. Crates of Mallos, the founder of the Pergamene school, should deserve better but has now a reputation that is "not

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[46] Cf. Mazzoli, who points out that the same conventional and traditional character is present also in Ausonius' epigrams (Mazzoli 1997, 112–114).

[47] In Swedish: "Det, som är sanning i Berlin och Jena, / är bara dåligt skämt i Heidelberg." The quotation stems from Gustaf Fröding's poem 'Vad är sanning?' in his book *Gitarr och dragharmonika* of 1891.

very enviable. Although posterity has admired his learning, he is regarded as something of a crank."[48] Modern philologists, who work with textual criticism, lexicography, grammatical analysis, and aesthetic evaluation of literature, confess themselves to the Alexandrian tradition founded by Aristarchus, Aristophanes, Callimachus and Zenodotus.

Epimetrum

Now, if grammarians, and in particular the Alexandrians, were such a common target of ridicule that even other grammarians mocked them, does that mean that no-one diverged from the mainstream and honoured grammarians, in epigrams or otherwise? Other professionals were celebrated by laudatory epigrams, even doctors.[49] Were grammarians refused that sort of tribute?

Not completely, it appears. In the Greek epigraphic material, there exist about a dozen sepulchral epigrams that commemorate deceased grammarians. Public obituaries tend to be eulogizing, and so do these epigrams. They are private inscriptions, composed or commissioned by dutiful family members or close friends. However, some of them emphasize that the deceased grammarian was of importance not only to his relatives or other individuals but also to the city where he was born or where he practised his profession. Thus, an epitaph in Byzantium celebrates the Bithynian Theodorus, who "in Athens acquired a great name for grammatical expertise" and "won fame for the city of Byzas"; when dead, the city "like a mother" welcomed him and took him to her bosom.[50] The monument of the grammarian Magnus—"great among the Muses"—in Phrygian Miletoupolis, bears witness to his widow Ionis' piety but also admonishes his friends to "remember that he was the first to give your sons a taste of literature."[51]

In the *Anthologia Palatina* such celebrations of grammarians are scarce. The only examples are from the sixth century AD, when grammarians had acquired a respected position in society[52] as guardians of the classical heritage and dispensers of its spiritual treasures. When Damocharis—poet and grammarian—died, "the foundation of holy grammar was ruined" and "the Muse's lovely lyre is silent", Paulus Silentiarius' commemorative epigram states, and Kos, his native island,

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[48] Quoted from Asmis 1992, 138. Asmis demonstrates the quality of Crates' theory of poetry.

[49] E.g., *AP* 7.158, 508, 9.597, 16.269–274, Posidippus 95 (=*P.Mil.Vogl.* VIII 309, col. XIV 30–37).

[50] *GVI* 1479 ἐν δ' ἄρ Ἀθήναις / γραμματικῆς τέχνης οὔνομ' ἔδεξο μέγα·/ Βύζαν<τ>ος δὲ πόλει κλέος ἤραο, καί σε θανόντα / μήτηρ ὡς λαγόσιν θήκατο δεξαμένη (Byzantium, second century AD). Cf. Agusta–Boularot 1994, 704–706, Staab 2018, 49.

[51] *GVI* 1182 τὸν μέγαν ἐν Μούσαισι ... εὐκλέα Μάγνον ... εὐσεβίης μέγα τέκμαρ Ἰωνίδος ... ἀλλά, φίλοι, μνήσασθε ... πρῶτος ὃς ὑμετέρους υἷας γεῦσε λόγων (Miletoupolis in Phrygia, second century AD). See Staab 2018, 42–44. With a similar phrase, τὸν ἐν Μουσαῖσιν ἄριστον, his daughter Nereis honours the grammarian Nereus in Abrettene, Mysia; see Agusta–Boularot 1994, 698.

[52] On this development, see Kaster 1988; on the authority of grammarians in late antiquity, Viljamaa 1993.

"mourns once more as for Hippocrates".[53] Julianus of Egypt praises the grammarian Theodorus for having "recalled to life myriads of book pages, snatching them from oblivion"[54] and equates the grammarian's demise with the irreversible death of the whole mass of "ancient singers of songs".[55]

In these late poems the ancient grammarians are finally given their rehabilitation. The nostalgic words and phrases used by the poets indicate their recognition that the classical period belonged to the past and that essential changes had occurred. In that situation, the grammarians were called forth to save what could be saved of traditional values. But the poems breathe pessimism. The people of late antiquity and early Byzantinism were conscious that the total obliteration of their hereditary culture was a possibility and might even be imminent. In their immediate perspective they may have had reason for that pessimism but, seen over centuries, the death of some sixth-century grammarians did not bring complete disaster to classical culture. Upheavals were coming, but not entire annihilation. The classical philologists of today continue the tradition of the Alexandrian grammarians, sometimes, perhaps, with a certain streak of the same περιεργία.[56]

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[53] *AP* 7.588.4–6: φεῦ, τὸ καλὸν Μούσης βάρβιτον ἠρεμέει, / ὤλετο γραμματικῆς ἱερὴ βάσις. ἀμφιρύτη Κῶς, / καὶ πάλι πένθος ἔχεις οἷον ἐφ' Ἱπποκράτει.

[54] *AP* 7.594.2–4 βιβλιακῶν μυριάσιν σελίδων, / αἷσιν ἀνεζώγρησας ἀπολλυμένων ἀπὸ λήθης ἁρπάξας.

[55] *AP* 7.595.1–2 κάτθανε μὲν Θεόδωρος· ἀοιδοπόλων δὲ παλαιῶν / πληθὺς οἰχομένη νῦν θάνεν ἀτρεκέως. An epigram by Paulus Silentiarius (*AP* 7.606) probably concerns the same Theodorus.

[56] My thanks to Lauryn Rilla Blomqvist for correcting my English! The remaining mistakes are my own.

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How to translate Plautus' humour

Maria-Kristiina Lotman & Anna Shkuratova

1. Introduction

Humour is one of the most universal phenomena in human communication. There are probably no written or oral cultures that do not know humour. It evolves even in the most catastrophic of circumstances; it can unite and comfort people and help them cope with trauma or mortal fear.[1] At the same time, humour can be a form of aggression,[2] a tool used to enforce or contrast oneself with others. Literature, too, is permeated by humour. It is an inseparable part of comical and entertaining texts, but it is also used in more serious genres, both in epic[3] and tragic[4] forms. Therefore, translators must constantly struggle and deal with humour.

What are the main difficulties related to translating humour? The first challenge is to identify it. A seemingly simple task may turn out to be quite a stumbling block: although humour has been defined in many ways, there are no universal definitions to satisfy all researchers of humour.[5]

If a translator decides to approach a unit as humorous, the next question will be how to treat it in translation. In order to solve this, the function of certain humorous devices in the source text must first be determined. This can be rather complicated, since in literary texts, the functions of humour differ from those of ordinary communication, often being multi-layered and multi-purpose. In addition to serving the aim of amusement, humorous devices can be part of character creation, have an ideological role (for instance, derision of an enemy or a hostile

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[1] Cf., e.g., Solomon 2011.
[2] Shuster 2012.
[3] Clarke 1969.
[4] Gregory 1999–2000, Wallace 2013.
[5] For a more detailed account, see Gulas & Weinberger 2006, 21–37

worldview, unification of a group, and so on), but also be playful and push the boundaries of a genre, way of expression or language.

Next, it is useful to understand the working mechanism of the particular humour device. The complicating factor here is that humour can be expressed in most forms of human communication, both non-verbally and verbally, and, in the latter case, on all the levels of languages in their richest nuances.

After studying the humour mechanisms within the source text, the optimum strategy for translation is selected. There are devices for which the equivalents are found easily, but in order to transmit more subtle language- and culture-specific humour, which sometimes seems impossible to convey, a translator needs to be more creative and resourceful.

This paper is devoted to the technical aspect of humour translation through the example of three translations of Plautus. The humour of Plautus is a very rich and complex source material, the study of which is a challenge in itself. Consequently, its translation is an even bigger problem: there are those who think that much of his humour cannot be translated at all.[6] Nevertheless, Plautus is translated. We have chosen to focus on translations of Plautus' comedy *Pseudolus* into three different languages and with different solutions—a translation into Estonian by Ain Kaalep (1971), into Russian by Alexey Artyushkov (1933), and into English by Paul Nixon (1933), and in comparing these texts, we will observe which of Plautus's jokes are conveyed and which strategies are used. For the analysis of the original text, we have selected the standard Oxford Plautine edition by W.M. Lindsay (*T. Macci Plauti Comoediae*, 1913–1915).

2. Humour and Plautus' Pseudolus

2.1. Types of humour

Different kinds of humour have been discerned and typologized in many ways.

For instance, a distinction has been made between verbal and non-verbal humour. Verbal humour relies on the use of language and can be further divided into written and oral humour, while the latter can be supported with such paralinguistic signs as intonation, inarticulate sounds, and so on. Non-verbal humour can be based on various visual, auditory, tactile and other codes. Additionally, a distinction has been made between referential and verbal humour.[7] Referential humour is based on the meaning of a text and is not dependent in any way on the phonological pattern of textual units. Verbal humour plays with sound structure as well.

As regards the aspect of intention, the distinction has been drawn between intentional humour, which can be both prepared and spontaneous, unintentional

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[6] Cf., e.g., Luce 1982, Leon 1930.

[7] Cf., for instance, Attardo 1994, 95–96.

humour, which occurs as a result of the random coincidence of circumstances,[8] and failed humour.[9]

Our study draws on the taxonomy offered by Arthur Asa Berger, which has a level of detail and a systematic nature useful for translators and translation studies.[10] According to this approach, there are four main categories of humour: humour based on language, humour based on logic, humour based on identity and humour based on action.[11]

In language-based humour, Berger differentiates between the following humour techniques: allusion, bombast, definition, exaggeration, facetiousness, insults, infantilism, irony, misunderstanding, excessive literalness, puns/wordplay, repartee, ridicule and sarcasm.

Even though Berger claims that this list should be exhaustive and has not found anything else to add, we nevertheless added several devices during our own analysis. For example, obscenity can be added here—for Plautus, things are sometimes funny simply because they are indecent.[12] Register or dialect can also be funny in itself, etc.

In logic-based humour, Berger points out absurdity, analogy, catalogue, coincidence, comparison, disappointment, ignorance, mistake, repetition, reversal, rigidity, theme/variation and unmasking. But one could also add all kinds of manipulation of reality, stratagems, etc. Lying could also be mentioned here: when the audience is aware that something is a lie, but the direct addressee is not, it may be funny.

Plenty of comic devices in literary texts are also built on identity. For this, Berger has differentiated between the following techniques: before/after, burlesque, caricature, eccentricity, embarrassment, exposure, grotesque, imitation, impersonation, parody, scale and stereotype.

For action, the classification is again more general and includes fewer techniques: chase, slapstick and speed. One can certainly add a number of other techniques (repetition, slowness, accident, farce, falling down, being stuck or trapped, etc.), but since such humour is non-verbal, it is not relevant to the case of interlingual translations, so we will set this category aside for the remainder of this paper.

2.2. Humour techniques in Plautus' Pseudolus

Pseudolus is a play with a stereotypical plot that takes place in Athens, where a young lover, Calidorus, is trying to save his meretrix, Phoenicium, from a pimp

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[8] Cf., e.g., Freud 1905, Martin 2007, 14–15.
[9] Hale 2018.
[10] Berger 1993, 2005.
[11] There are other taxonomies as well; compare Shibles 1997.
[12] Cf. Richlin 1992.

called Ballio. Calidorus' father's clever slave, Pseudolus, offers the young man his help to save the girl. He devises a plan and secures Phoenicium for Calidorus.

Humour is multi-layered in ancient comedies, and one can observe most of the aforementioned humour techniques, often several simultaneously. Unfortunately, we only have texts to work with, and, in our analysis, we have relied solely on textual material, leaving out different reconstructions of performance.

For our study, we first mapped the humorous devices and techniques in Plautus's *Pseudolus*. We counted the humorous units one by one and, in doing this, we also relied on some of the previous studies on Plautus's humour and puns, especially those by Mendelsohn, Lowe, Fontaine and Gunderson 2015.[13]

In this comedy, we determined the instances of individual jokes and grouped them in accordance with Berger's classification. As a result, in *Pseudolus* we identified altogether 48 different kinds of humour mechanisms which were realized in 349 humorous units: 77% in the language-based, 18% in the logic-based, and 5% in the identity-based categories, respectively. Thus, the vast majority belonged to the language-based category, as expected.[14] As for action, we observed several occasions of verbal descriptions of funny activities and classified these under caricature, description or other suitable techniques of this kind,[15] and therefore the category of action is not detailed separately in our analysis. This, however, does not mean that none of Plautus' jokes relate to action, but that we cannot analyse them by any means other than reconstruction of the performance, which we decided not to do for this paper.

We emphasise that quantity does not necessarily mean importance here: the proportion of humour units based on logic and identity is not high, but they are very important from the standpoint of the comedy's plot, being related to its twists and turns, and therefore contribute considerably to the comical level of the story. For example, Pseudolus' plan relies on identity changes, while the complex logic of the cash plot is especially elaborate here and adds to the comic tension of the play.[16]

Among the more specific techniques used, the most important are sound play (ca 14%), exaggeration (9%), wit (nearly 9%), puns (nearly 8%), ridicule (5%) and different figures of thought such as comparison, metaphor and metonymy (together about 12% of the cases). In addition, devices such as bombast, irony, allusion, derision, metatheatrical comment, excessive literalness, and specialised vocabulary also deserve to be mentioned. Other techniques are present to a lesser extent.

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[13] Mendelsohn 1907, Lowe 2004, Fontaine 2010 and 2012, Gunderson 2015.

[14] Cf. Mendelsohn 1907, Fontaine 2010.

[15] For more details about caricature, see Berger 1993, 26.

[16] For more details, see Lowe 2004.

3. Translating Plautus' humour
3.1. On the translatability of humour

When the translatability of humour is discussed, we can recognize a certain analogy with translating poetry. This similarly raises the questions: can humour be translated at all? Does the translator of humour have to be a humourist, or can it be translated analytically, with purely technical means? Can humour be constructed in a translation or should it rather be spontaneous and immediate? On the other hand, is it necessary to have a great sense of humour in order to translate comic texts?

There are no unanimous answers. Some paraphrase Frost and maintain that humour is what gets lost in translation, while others argue that humour is always translatable; compare, e.g., this declaration by Low: "In my view, claims that jokes are untranslatable have two main sources: either translators' incompetence (jokes are indeed lost, but no serious effort has been made to find equally humorous substitutes) or a narrow notion of translation, combined with an unrealistic standard of success."[17] There are researchers who claim that the translator of humour must have a great sense of humour,[18] while others dismiss this as a myth and claim that, instead of a sense of humour, the translator has to have skills to create humour, techniques which can be learned and improved.[19]

The difficulties of translating humour are primarily related to its language- and culture-specific elements. Sometimes it can seem impossible to recreate linguistic humour, while cultural humour can be obscure to the target audience in a close translation. However, it is easier to translate devices like bombast, exaggeration, irony, lie, and so on, as they are more universal, and thus their recreation needs less effort in most languages. Jokes based on logic, identity and action are also less difficult to reproduce.

In the case of translating humour, one also needs to consider the purposes of the translation. If the main aim is to convey the content of the text, the translation does not always intend to render all the humorous levels and devices of the original. We often see such solutions in the case of children's literature, where the story is conveyed, while many additional meanings, such as allusions and culture-specific elements, are omitted. When the purpose is to convey particular elements related to the expression plane (for instance, versification or rhetoric structure), the translation may omit at least some of its comic effect. When the primary goal is to recreate its humorous impact, certain elements of both the expression and content plane can be omitted. Yet, in order to be accepted as a translation, a functional translation has to convey certain other codes as well. For instance, one may replace

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[17] Low 2011, 59.
[18] Cf. Bruździak 2011, 6.
[19] Shibles 1997.

a funny story with another one that results in a comic effect in the target text —
but is it still a translation?

All of the aforementioned approaches to translation are used in practice, and
for every goal, there are strategies to be implemented in order to fulfil it. In the
next part, we will treat the main strategies of humour translation.

3.2. Strategies of translating humour in Plautus' Pseudolus

After identifying humorous techniques used in the original text, we proceed our
analysis with the study of if and how these were transmitted in the selected trans-
lations. Rather than focusing on the successful translation of a joke, which in the
case of drama texts is highly dependent on performance, we will pay attention to
the mechanisms of jokes and study the different strategies used to convey these.

For this stage, we based our work on several earlier accounts, especially those
by Veisbergs, which is devoted to the translation of idioms, but has proved to be
useful also in the analysis of humour translation; Delabastita, which focuses on
the translation of puns; and Mateo, dedicated to the translation of irony.[20] Since
the present approach is more general, these accounts have been adapted and con-
verged. The following study of nine strategies does not claim to be exhaustive:
several less important procedures could be added on one hand and, on the other,
even finer distinctions could be made to show various subtypes for each strategy.

Each of the analysed translations has its own peculiarities. Paul Nixon's Eng-
lish translation aims at producing a clear and easily readable, yet close, translation.
In order to achieve this, the poetic form is not conveyed, and, in the case of lin-
guistic and culture-specific items that cannot be rendered exactly, functional
equivalence is the preferred strategy. Such an approach is usually considered to
be domesticating, as it reduces the foreignness of the target text.[21] Alexey
Artyushkov's Russian translation, however, is a poetic translation which conveys
the metrical structure of the text, attempting to create a verse form that is easy to
read and perform. At the same time, the translator has also paid attention to other
elements of the expression plane, including various sound plays, puns and
images. Artyushkov's translation has strong foreignizing elements but on some
levels uses domesticating strategies as well. The Estonian translation by Ain
Kaalep is first and foremost oriented toward recreating the metrical qualities of
the original. It aims for an accurate transmission of Plautine meters, reproducing
these in Estonian quantitative verse. Special attention is paid to the sound struc-
ture, and most sound plays are rendered as well. This method results in a elabo-
rated and poetical translation with strong foreignizing tendencies, while its per-
formability and readability sometimes suffer.

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[20] Veisbergs 1997, Delabastita 1996, 134, Mateo 1995.
[21] See also Venuti 1995.

As far as we know, none of these translations was created directly for theatrical use, but rather as a reading version, the purpose of which is to provide those interested in classical literature or theatre studies with a translation (Nixon's translation), or as a poetic version, where special attention is paid to the poetic qualities of the text (Artyushkov's and Kaalep's translations).[22] Nevertheless, we hypothesize that the translators kept in mind the possible staging of their work as well and likely gave some thought to the performability of the text.

3.2.1. Equivalent transformation

In the case of an equivalent translation strategy, the humorous unit from the source text is translated with an equivalent from the target culture that approaches the original formally, semantically, and stylistically. In this way, for example, not only logic-based or non-culture-specific identity-based humour can be translated, but also techniques relying on language, such as exaggeration, irony, sarcasm, bombast, and other devices, which do not play on the multi-layered meanings or connotations of words.

Compare, for example, the following example from the English translation of *Pseudolus*, in which the wit of the source text is successfully conveyed with this strategy:

> CAL: *eho, Pseudole,*
> *i, gladium adfer.*
> PS: *Quid opus gladio?*
> CAL: *Qui hunc occidam–atque me.*
> PS: *Quin tu ted occidis potius? nam hunc fames iam occiderit.* (*Pseud*. 348–350)

> CAL: Ha! Go, Pseudolus! Bring a sword!
> PS: A sword? Why that?
> CAL: That I may end his days, and mine!
> PS: Why not just end your own? For his will soon be ended by starvation. (Nixon 1980, 187)

On the other hand, sometimes a particular linguistic joke is lost when translated with such a method. Compare, for example, the following excerpt from *Pseudolus*:

> PS: *atque hoc, ne dictum tibi neges, dico prius:*
> *si neminem alium potero, tuom **tangam** patrem.*
> CAL: *Di te mi semper servent. verum, si potest,*
> *pietatis causa—vel etiam matrem quoque.* (*Pseud.* 119–122)

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[22] For more details about different categories of drama translations, see Wiles 2007, 364.

PS: […] I tell you this beforehand–if no other victim's to be found, I'll **touch** your father for it.
CAL: (quite revived and hugging Pseudolus ecstatically) God for ever keep you for me! But filial duty leads me to suggest that if possible you–even try my mother too. (Nixon 1980, 161)

Here the English verb does not convey the same double meaning of the Latin verb *tango*, which means at the same time 'to trick' and 'to touch',[23] but follows the original mechanism in a more general way, playing with the meanings of the English verb *touch*, which still allows for different interpretations.

Bar chart 1. Occurrence of equivalent transformation strategy in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

As bar chart 1 shows, equivalent transformation is the preferred strategy in all three translations. Thus, the translators opt to stay as close to the source text as possible and attempt to reproduce the jokes with the same mechanisms as in the original. In all the studied translations, it was the preferred strategy to convey language-based jokes (in ca 64% of the cases in the Estonian and Russian translations and in more than 70% of the cases in the English translation). Most frequently, content-related devices, such as hyperbole, wit, bragging and ridicule, were rendered using the equivalence strategy, but in all three translations at least some effort was made to render sound effects and other formal devices.

3.2.2. Loan translation
With loan translation, the unit from the source text is translated literally and, consequently, a novel use in the target language occurs. Often, this approach to translation results in humour that can be understood only by those who are familiar with the source language and/or culture. For example, in Plautus' case, *nomina loquentia* often lose their meanings in translations when they are simply translit-

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[23] See also Mendelsohn 1907, 132.

erated. As a consequence, it is harder to transmit the constant word plays associated with these names in the comedies.

Loan translation, or calque, is sometimes used to translate idioms, special lexicon, pejoratives, etc. Compare the following example from the Estonian translation of *Pseudolus*:

> PS: *Quid fles, **cucule?**[24]* (*Pseud*. 96)

> PSEUDOLUS
> Ära, **kägu**, nüüd nuta! (Kaalep 1971, 22)

> Backtranslation: PS. Do not cry now, cuckoo!

Here the Latin *cuculus* is translated literally into Estonian *kägu*, which does not have the same pejorative co-meaning as the Latin word. The English translator has chosen the same strategy and translated the utterance word by word: "Why weep, you cuckoo?" The Russian translator, on the other hand, has chosen a functional equivalent дурашка ('silly').

Bar chart 2. Occurrence of loan translation strategy in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

Bar chart 2 above demonstrates that this strategy is not widely used in the studied translations of *Pseudolus*. All three translators have reserved it mostly for names or for special lexicon (for instance, the list of gibberish plant names in 831–836 is imitated by all of them). In all the studied translations, it is most often used to convey language-based humour and, in a few cases, logic-based humour, but we did not observe any instances of rendering identity jokes in this way.

Although literal translation is generally viewed as an ill-advised method, it also has a positive and enriching aspect. Many connotations, expressions, and phrasemes have been transmitted to other languages and adopted by them in this

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[24] PS. Why weep, you cuckoo! (Nixon 1980, 159).

way. For example, a number of studies have shown how vernacular languages have been enriched with loans used in Bible translations, as demonstrated, e.g., by Hebrew loans in Estonian and by vestiges of Bible translation in Latvian.[25]

3.2.3. Functional equivalence

When the comic effect cannot be maintained with equivalent or loan translation in the case of language- and culture-specific humour, often the functional equivalent strategy is chosen. For example, a word play can be replaced in the target language with another word play, an image with another image, an allusion with another allusion, an idiom with another idiom, etc.

Bar chart 3. Occurrence of functional equivalence in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

Bar chart 3 above shows that, although it is not as amply used as equivalent translation, this strategy still has a firm place in all the studied translations. It occurs mostly in translation of language-based jokes, especially puns, wit and cursing, but sometimes also for translating logic-based jokes; there were almost no instances of rendering identity-grounded humour this way.

It is a challenging strategy that allows translators to put their skills and creativity on display. Below is an example from the Russian translation of *Pseudolus*:

BAL: *Quia pol qua opera credam tibi*
*una opera **alligem fugitivam canem agninis lactibus**.*[26] (*Pseud*. 318–319)

Баллион
Тебе

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[25] See Ross 2004, Veisbergs 1999, 67.
[26] Bal: Lord! Because I'd as soon trust you as tie up a runaway dog with a string of lambs' intestines. (Nixon 1980, 183)

Верить–это все равно что **в огород козла пустить**. (Artyushkov 1997, 236)

Backtranslation: Bal: To believe you is the same as to let a goat in a vegetable garden.

The translator has replaced the Latin phrase '*tie a runaway dog to a string of lambs' intestines*' with a Russian functional equivalent '*to let a goat in a vegetable garden*'. In addition to idioms, the other items translated this way are mostly pejoratives, curses, invectives, some culture-specific elements and word plays.

3.2.4. Extension/explanation
With this strategy, additional information is inserted into the translation to clarify the translated unit. Thus, obscure words can be translated using a clearer expression, but sometimes new segments or even sentences are added to the translation to allow for a more understandable reading of the text.

Bar chart 4. Occurrence of extension/explanation in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

Bar chart 4 above shows that extension is almost entirely avoided in the English translation (it occurs only once); there are a few examples in the Estonian translation, mainly pertaining to language-based humour; meanwhile, the Russian translator makes the most use of this strategy for conveying language- and logic-based humour, especially puns and metaphors. In the following excerpt, we see word play with the *nomen loquens* 'Harpax' ('robber' or 'grappling-iron' in Greek); compare:

PS: *sed quid est tibi nomen?* HARP: *Harpax.* PS: *apage te, Harpax, hau places; huc quidem hercle haud ibis intro, ne quid ἅρπαξ feceris.*[27] (*Pseud.* 653–54)

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[27] Ps. Very well. But what is your name?
Har. Harpax.

Псевдол

Как же звать тебя?

Гарпаг

Гарпагом–ну, **багор**.

Псевдол

Чего? Пошел

Прочь! Багор не по нутру мне. В дом и не входи сюда:

Подбагришь еще, пожалуй, что-нибудь! (Artyushkov 1997, 258)

Backtranslation: Pseudolus: How should I call you? Harpax: Harpax, that is, a grappling iron. Pseudolus: What? Get out of here! Grappling iron is not for me. Do not enter this house, or else you will grapple something out of here.

The name Harpax is simply transliterated, but to it the Russian 'багор' ('grappling-iron') is added in the translation, in order to introduce a play on the secondary meaning of the character's name in the source text and thus allowing for the same stem verb 'подбагрить' to be used in the Russian version of Pseudolus' reply.

3.2.5. Substitution

When substitution is used, the unit of a source text is translated with a unit that is different from the original item semantically, formally and/or stylistically, with an aim to maintain the humorous effect of the source text. Here again, single words can be substituted, as well as entire phrases or even stories. See bar chart 5 on next page for data on the use of this strategy in the studied translations.

This is, thus, an equally accepted device in the Estonian and English translations but is used to a lesser extent in the Russian one. In all three translations, it is most frequently used to convey language-based humour, especially puns, grammatical humour, and sound plays, but also logic-based humour, including metaphors, metonymies and comparisons.

A case of substitution can be seen in the following example in which a Latin word play is replaced with a different figure, which is intensified with a sound play:

PS: *Ecquid is homo scitust?* CHAR: *Plebi scitum non est scitius*. (*Pseud.* 748)

PS: Astute, is he? CHAR. Astute as a statue. (Nixon 1980, 229)

Ps. (in feigned alarm) Avaunt, Harpax! You like me not! By gad, you shan't get into this house, that's sure! No harpy acts here! (Nixon 1980, 217)

Bar chart 5. Occurrence of substitution in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

3.2.6. Compensation

If the effect of a certain unit in the source text is omitted, it can be compensated for by being recreated elsewhere in the target text. It is not always easy to identify an intended compensation, since it may be difficult to decide what exactly it compensates for in the text. In our analysis, we counted only instances of clear compensation, and the frequency of this solution does not seem to be high. This is also the case in the Estonian translation, despite the fact that compensation has been an accepted and promoted strategy in Estonian translation culture since at least the 1960's.[28] The results are shown in bar chart 6:

Bar chart 6. Occurrence of compensation in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

The following example demonstrates compensation for sound effects:

CAL: *audin? furcifer* [*quae loquitur?*]

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[28] See also Lotman & Sütiste 2017

*satin **magnificus** tibi videtur?* PS: *pol iste, atque etiam **malificus**.*[29] (*Pseud*. 193–194)

Псевдол
Слышь, что говорит, **мерзавец**? Тон какой **высокий** взял!
Калидор
Так же **высока** и **подлость**. (Artyushkov 1997, 227)

Backtranslation: Pseudolus: Do you hear what he is saying, this bastard? What a high tone! Calidorus: The vileness is just as high.

In the source text, the comic effect is created with the rhyming words *magnificus* and *malificus*. In the Russian translation, the rhyme is lost, but there is instead a stem repetition with высокий and высока (*high*).

3.2.7. Intensification

Sometimes it is possible to transmit the humorous device, but its effect becomes weaker. In such instances, translators may look for additional means to intensify it. Roman writers of comedy already used this strategy to spice up the humour of their source texts by adding funny rhymes, alliteration and word plays.

The use of this technique in the analysed translations is shown in bar chart 7.

Bar chart 7. Occurrence of intensification in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

No clear instances of intensification were found in the Russian translation; in the Estonian translation, it was always used for language-based jokes. This device can be exemplified with the following example from the Estonian translation, where the sound repetition *santi* and *sant* ('cripple', 'wretched') is intensified with the

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[29] Cal. (aside to Pseudolus) Do you hear how the jailbird talks? Hasn't he a magnificent air?'
Ps. Gad, yes! Also maleficent. (Nixon 1980, 169)

rhyming word *kanti*, meaning 'to the tune of' or 'about', the use of which is not necessitated by the original content:

CAL: ***misere miser*** *sum, Pseudole.*[30] (*Pseud*. 13)

CALIDORUS
On **santi kanti sant** mul, Pseudolus. (Kaalep 1971, 17)

Backtranslation: CALIDORUS: I feel about wretchedly wretched.

3.2.8. Omission

This is the strategy through which a humour-creating mechanism in the source text is either left completely untranslated or is reduced by certain meaningful levels, losing its original effect. One could argue that omission or non-translation is not a translation strategy at all, but if we approach literary translation as a complex activity in the course of which multiple codes are used, we see that omission, or at least simplification, is to a certain extent inevitable; thus, omission can be a separate solution or function together with some other translation strategy. Occasionally, a whole segment is left untranslated, or sometimes the omission just involves a kind of stylistic or linguistic level (for instance, register or dialect) or a certain double meaning, allusion or connotation that is difficult to convey.

Bar chart 8. Occurrence of omission in translations of humorous units in the analysed texts

In conformity with the rest of the results, this strategy is least used in the English translation. Here, the translator focused on finding at least functional equivalents to convey the humorous effects where they would have been lost with equivalent transformation. On the other hand, in the Estonian and Russian translations, jokes were omitted in numerous instances. In almost all cases, this happened with lan-

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[30] Cal. Oh, I'm miserable, Pseudolus, so miserable! (Nixon 1980, 151)

guage-based humour (ca 16% of language-grounded jokes were omitted in the Estonian translation and ca 20% in the Russian translation). In all translations, puns and sound plays were most frequently left untranslated, but sometimes also hyperbole, wit and allusion. Compare the following example, which in the original alludes to the *Clouds* by Aristophanes, followed by a comparison with Socrates, which loses its original effect when the allusion is omitted and *per nebulam* is translated with the Russian word туманно ('foggily', 'vaguely'):

> CAL: *sunt quae te volumus percontari, quae quasi*
> *per **nebulam** nosmet scimus atque audivimus.*
> SIM: *Conficiet iam te hic verbis, ut tu censeas*
> *non Pseudolum, sed **Socratem** tecum loqui.*[31] (*Pseud.* 462–465)

> Каллифон
>   Мы кой о чем желаем расспросить тебя,
>   Слыхали так **туманно**, так неявственно.
> Симон
>   Забьет тебя словами, сам признаешь ты:
>   Не *лгун* Псевдол, **Сократ** с тобой беседует. (Artyushkov 1997, 246)

> Backtranslation: Callipho: We want to ask you something, we heard it so foggily, so vaguely. Simo: He will beat you with words, you admit it yourself: Pseudolus is not a liar, Socrates is talking to you.

Similarly, the same omission can be seen in the Estonian translation. In the English translation, however, the allusion is conveyed: "There are some matters about which we wish to question you, matters we know of and heard of ourselves in a **cloudy** sort of way."

3.2.9. Paratexts

The main paratexts, which can be used to explain the humorous effects of the source texts, are footnotes, endnotes, sometimes fore- or afterwords, and also, in the case of theatre texts, stage directions.

As for the humorous elements in the analysed translations, these were explained with metalingual comments most frequently in the Russian translation, while the English translation only had a few comments in these cases. The results are shown in bar chart 9:

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[31] Call. There are some matters about which we wish to question you, matters we know of and heard of ourselves in a cloudy sort of way.
Si. (to Callipho, peevishly) He'll soon talk you into thinking you're having a dialogue with Socrates instead of Pseudolus. (Nixon 1980, 199)

Bar chart 9. Occurrence of metalingual comments in translations of humorous units of the analysed texts

Compare the following example:

> *sed iste servos, ex Carysto qui hic adest, ecquid sapit?*
> CHAR: *hircum ab alis.* PS: *manuleatam tunicam habere hominem addecet.*[32]
> (*Pseud.* 737–738)

> Ну, а этот, из Кариста,–хватит духу у него?
> Харин
> Да, ужасный дух козлиный у него под мышками.
> Псевдол
> Стало быть, носить он должен с рукавами тунику[1].
> (Artyushkov 1997, 263–264)
> [1] Чтобы скрыть запах, нужно носить тунику с рукавами.

Backtranslation: Well, and this one from Carystus, is there enough spirit for him? Charinus: Yes, a terrible goat smell under his armpits. Pseudolus: So, he must wear a tunic with sleeves.[1]
> [1] In order to cover the smell, one has to wear a long-sleeved tunic.

4. Summary

To sum up our study, we conclude with the following observations:

1) Domesticating strategies in all three reviewed translations (equivalent transformation, substitution, extension) prevailed over foreignizing strate-

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[32] Ps. But that slave who is here from Carystus—has he any sense?
Char. A strong one of goat in the armpits.
Ps. A long-sleeved tunic would be becoming to that chap. (Nixon 1980, 227)

gies (loan translation or accurate translation). This could mean that the translators kept in mind the performability of the text.

2) In all three translations, there were instances in which it seemed impossible to convey a humour technique, which was therefore omitted. Compensation as a device for realizing the same effect in other places was an exceptional solution. In cases like these, paratexts are sometimes used to make metalingual comments; while these lack immediate comic effect, they allow readers to understand the joke or a stage director to recreate it on stage using additional (paralinguistic or non-verbal) means.

3) All translators worked hard to convey the comic mechanisms of Plautus' extremely particular expression plane: they rendered various sound plays, stem and verb repetitions. Plautine puns were conveyed if possible, and numerous functional equivalents were also used when necessary.

Humour is a universal phenomenon, but there is neither an optimum nor a consistently efficient solution in the translation of humour. Humour is highly sensitive to culture and language. It often happens that a unit or device that is funny in one language is not funny in another; thus, equivalent transformation of the source humour would not have the original comic effect. Therefore, another translation strategy becomes a necessity, and a successful translation of humour utilises freedom and creativity to apply different techniques depending on the purposes of translation and the possibilities of the target language.

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Name Substitution as Ironic Offense in Cicero's Verrine Speeches[1]

Dovilė Čitavičiūtė & Audronė Kučinskienė

In the courtroom, Cicero was not only an intelligent and ruthless opponent, but also, if one managed to cross him, a fiend with a tongue like a whip. Quintilian reports that some contemporaries reproached him for being, among other things, *in salibus aliquando frigidum* (Quint. *Inst.* 12.10.12). According to Plutarch, Cicero was famous for his wit, and his rather indiscriminate, biting jests caused many people to dislike him (Plut. *Cic*. 27).[2] Macrobius tells us that he was called *consularis scurra* (Macrob. *Sat.* 2.1.12) but comes to the conclusion that it is precisely his jokes that got a few guilty clients acquitted (2.1.13). One just needs to remember the light, facetious tone of *Pro Murena,* which Berry has called "Cicero's funniest and most enjoyable speech (unless one prefers *Pro Caelio*)",[3] to see the impact which the orator's humour could have on the verdict. Cicero himself seems to have recognised and appreciated that the brilliance of an orator's wit enables him to influence the audience's opinion,[4] and he often used it to deprecate his opponents and prove his point in court or in the senate. However, many of Cicero's jokes are deeply sarcastic and vicious, e.g., when Cicero impersonates Clodius nonchalantly

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[1] The material of this paper was first presented as part of a presentation at the Colloquium Balticum XVI Lundense *De risu. Representations and evaluations of laughter in Greek and Roman literature* (Lund, November 7–9, 2018), and we greatly profited from valuable comments and suggestions from the audience. Errors are our own.

[2] Τὸ μὲν οὖν πρὸς ἐχθροὺς ἢ πρὸς ἀντιδίκους σκώμμασι χρῆσθαι πικροτέροις δοκεῖ ῥητορικὸν εἶναι· τὸ δ' οἷς ἔτυχε προσκρούειν ἕνεκα τοῦ γελοίου πολὺ συνῆγε μῖσος αὐτῷ (Plu. *Cic.* 27). "Now, this use of very biting jests against enemies or legal opponents seems to be part of the orator's business; but his indiscriminate attacks for the sake of raising a laugh made many people hate Cicero" (transl. by Bernadotte Perrin).

[3] Berry 2000, xvii.

[4] Cic. *De Or*. 2.253–289, *Orat.* 88.

telling his sister to let her lover go and take up any of the men who come to the gardens by the Tiber for a swim (*Cael.* 36), as if she were a whore in a Plautine comedy, calls Marcus Antonius *immani taetraque belua* (*Phil.* 4.12) and *miserae mulieris fecunditas calamitosa* (*Phil.* 2.58), and makes puns on Verres' name to call him a boar.[5]

Much research has been done on Ciceronian invective,[6] as well as humour and irony,[7] which are often intertwined between themselves. Arena suggests that in order for invective to be effective, three conditions have to be met: the orator has to marginalise the opponent, manipulate the audience's emotions, and win over the audience so that it "conspire[s] with him against his victim".[8] While humour is one way in which Cicero achieves these goals, this paper will be concerned with some of the less obvious offense tactics which Cicero employs in the Verrine speeches. We will concentrate on the cases where the unusual use of a name or its substitution for another word expresses contempt for the opponent, and distances the speaker from the person to whom he refers. We have chosen the *Verrines* for our analysis because name substitutions are extremely frequent there. We aim to discuss how Cicero's strategic, understated, and offensive addresses and use of referential words (*iste* and *homo*) help him alienate Verres from the Roman interest in the eyes of the jury. Furthermore, we shall see that the tactics to be discussed are applied consistently throughout the *Verrines*, not only in the passages of invective, thus thoroughly maintaining the (illusion of) distance from the defendant. Our paper consists of three parts: in the first, we will discuss how Cicero employs the word *homo* to vilify his opponents; the second part will consider the humour inherent in overstepping the boundaries of polite address; and in the third part, the marginalising effects of the pronoun *iste* will be explored.

Less than human: Cicero's pejorative "homo"

It is well known that Cicero often uses the noun *homo* as a vehicle for irony. While he is not the only classical author to do so, he does seem to enjoy it more than others.[9] Some research has been done on the usage of *homo* in Roman literature. Dickey notes that Cicero usually addresses someone as *homo* in a derogatory way. By using the address *homo* exclusively as an insult, Cicero seems to stray from the norm rather than dictate it. Both in the early Roman literature (e.g., Plautus) and in post-classical authors (e.g., Marcus Aurelius), the address *homo* is almost always

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[5] For Cicero's puns on Verres' name, see Kučinskienė 2018.
[6] See, for example, Arena 2007; Nisbet 1961; Corbeill 2002; Craig 2004; Koster 1980; Hickson-Halm 1998; Dunkle 1967.
[7] See, for example, Chahoud 2010; Fantham 2004; Rabbie 2007; Canter 1936; Corbeill 1996; Haury 1955; Holst 1925.
[8] Arena 2007, 155.
[9] Spevak 2014, 304-309.

used in conjunction with adjectives which carry a positive meaning. According to Dickey, such usage "may have been characteristic of [Cicero's] style or of the Latin of his day, but if the latter, the feature did not last".[10] Santoro L'Hoir notes that Cicero uses the word to refer to slaves or men of lower social rank in a neutral way, or to praise them, or to disparage an upper-class opponent who would normally be called a *vir*.[11] It may surprise no one that Cicero consistently deploys *homo* with caustic sarcasm when it comes to Verres. The following discussion focuses on the different ways in which Cicero weaponizes *homo* against his opponents in the *Verrines* and how it relates to the general usage of the word.

Unmodified "homo"

Homo, even used without any modifiers and non-ironically, can carry a nuanced subtext which plays into Cicero's rhetorical tactics. For example, in the *Divinatio in Caecilium*, Cicero uses it to refer to the Sicilians whom he was representing at court:

> *ut aut eos homines spes falleret qui opem a me atque auxilium petissent, aut ego, qui me ad defendendos homines ab ineunte adulescentia dedissem, tempore atque officio coactus ad accusandum traducerer* (*Div. Caec*. 4).[12]

According to Santoro L'Hoir, *homines* is a standard way to refer to non-citizens.[13] However, it also emphasises the helplessness of those people, their inability to actively defend themselves as true *viri* of the state would,[14] which enforces Cicero's self-representation as a defender of the (Sicilian) people.

This great potential for nuance becomes not only a convenient tool for emotional manipulation, but also an inexhaustible source of clever witticisms, and a peg on which to pin downright slander. Further on in the *Divinatio in Caecilium*, Cicero tells a story of a freedwoman, whose property and freedom Caecilius, the quaestor, has taken away, but Verres, having found out, orders that her loss is to be compensated. Verres, however, kept a considerable amount of that money to himself in the end, which evokes a snide comment from Cicero:

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[10] Dickey 2002, 190-191.

[11] Santoro L'Hoir 2018, 16-27.

[12] "Either I must disappoint these people who had come to me for help and succour, or circumstances were forcing upon me a duty of turning prosecutor, after giving myself from my earliest youth to the task of defending the prosecuted". English quotations from the *Divinatio in Caecilium* and the *Verrines* are from Greenwood 1989.

[13] Santoro L'Hoir 2018, 19-20.

[14] Santoro L'Hoir 2018, 11-15.

est adhuc, id quod vos omnis admirari video, non Verres, sed Q. Mucius. quid enim facere potuit elegantius ad hominum existimationem, aequius ad levandam mulieris calamitatem, vehementius ad quaestoris libidinem coercendam? [...] **sed repente e vestigio ex homine tamquam aliquo Circaeo poculo factus est Verres**; *rediit ad se atque ad mores suos* (*Div. Caec.* 57).[15]

The mention of the Circean cup points us towards the wordplay *Verres* (the name) – *verres* (a boar). One would immediately assume that *homo* is used here in a broad sense which does not contain a socio-political connotation, but rather just means "a human being", as opposed to an animal. By juxtaposing *homo* and Verres' name, Cicero implies that he is less than human. However, Cicero has performed one more transfiguration a few seconds earlier, by sarcastically likening Verres to the famously just governor of Asia, Quintus Mucius Scaevola. The following laudatory rhetorical question describes what (supposedly) made Verres a good governor: one has to have tact (*elegantia*), to do justice (*aequitas*) by those in trouble, and to be severe (*vehemens*) towards the unruly. But these qualities just as easily could be taken to extrapolate on what it is to be *homo,* as both *homo* and *Mucius* are meant as the opposites of *Verres*. At this point one has to wonder why the characteristics of a man of the state (*vir*) are so generously applied to a *homo.* The hierarchy *dei– homines–bestiae* may have influenced the choice of words, but it would do just as well to remember that Homer speaks of *men* (ἀνήρ, e.g., *Od*. 10.327) being turned into beasts or rendered *unmanly* (ἀνήνορα, *Od*. 10.301) by Circe, words which would be best translated into Latin as *vir* and its cognates, not *humans* (ἄνθρωπος—*homo*). It may be because Cicero cannot bring himself to call Verres a *vir* in a political sense—and never does.[16] As Santoro L'Hoir notes, "*Viri* are connected with the welfare of the Republic; *homines* are not".[17]

What concerns us even more are the cases in which *homo* replaces a person's name, both referentially and in an address. Before further analysis, it may be useful to make a few general points. For men of the upper classes, the standard of politeness to address or refer to each other in an official context was by double names, usually *praenomen* and *nomen* or *praenomen* and *cognomen*.[18] However,

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[15] "So far, as I see you all notice with surprise, Verres is not Verres but a perfect Scaevola. Could he have added more gracefully to his public reputation, or relieved a poor woman in distress more equitably, or checked his wanton subordinate more energetically? <...> But suddenly, as though he had drunk of Circe's goblet, he turned in one flash from a man into a Verres, became the hog that his name suggests, and resumed his proper character."

[16] Cicero calls Verres a *vir* only two times in the Verrine orations (2.2.192 and 2.5.81), both occur in the context where Cicero is mocking Verres for being effeminate, by juxtaposing *vir* to *mulier*.

[17] Santoro L'Hoir 2018, 22.

[18] Adams 1978, 145. To give just a few examples from the *Verrines*: P. Scipio or P. Africanus, T. Albucius, Q. Mucius, Cn. Dolabella, Cn. Domitius etc. The double-naming by *praenomen* and *cognomen* was more usual for aristocracy, while *praenomen* and *nomen* were more often used for people of lower rank (Adams 1978, 157&165). This rule does not apply to Verres, because we do not know his third name: he might not have used it, like Cn. Pompeius did not, or we simply do not have

Cicero in most cases addresses and refers to Verres not by two names, but just the one—*Verres*—which is, in our mind, rather demeaning. Even more offensive is the substitution of a name with another word. Opelt notes that *homo* can be used instead of a demonstrative pronoun to express disdain.[19] It is the best Verres can get from Cicero, but even that often comes with a pinch of sarcasm, which strips away the very connotations which could make *homo* more than a contemptuous place-holder for a name:

> **Homo**, *ut aliquo modo in provinciam illum revocaret, hanc excogitat rationem <...>, si haec ratio potius quam amentia nominanda est* (*Verr.* 2.4.40).[20]

Cicero, the craftsman of word and wit that he is, tailors the semantics of *homo* to fit his portrayal of an avaricious madman. While spoken with disdain, *homo* alone would simply be a rather standard quip at Verres' expense, and *excogitat rationem* ("devise a plan") would paint the pejorative picture of a crook. However, the *amentia* at the end of the sentence unexpectedly turns it into a philosophical joke. Just as in the case discussed above, Cicero abuses the philosophical connotations of *homo* by pointing out the faculties which separate us from non-humans. A *homo* is a rational creature, capable of coherent thought, which Cicero points out when he muses if Verres' *ratio* ("plan", but also "reason, judgement"),[21] which he *(ex)cogitat* ("devise", but also a derivative of "think"),[22] should rather be called *amentia*. By doubting if Verres' *ratio* is actually rational, Cicero cleverly suggests to his audience that there is very little which is human about Verres: just as the *crimen navale* (*Verr.* 2.5.80-138) shows his inhumanity, so his failed attempts to let himself off the hook reveal his sub-human intellect.

Whichever layer of the two *homo* jokes one takes, Verres is singled out and marginalised as a lesser person (not a *vir*) or even as a lesser being (not even properly a *homo*, but a beast, a madman). In the first case, the jury would have found it difficult to sympathize with a crook who does not carry out his civic duties; in the second case, no self-respecting Roman would have compromised himself by associating himself with a person so defective in character and intellect.

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any extant record of it. Researchers do not agree whether Verres is a *nomen* or a *cognomen*. (Cowles 1917, 2).

[19] Opelt 1965, 213, and Schwameis 2019, 345.

[20] "To get him back somehow to the province, **Verres** devised the plan–if the word "plan" can be applied to anything so frantic <...>". The replacement of a name with *homo* or *iste*, which will be discussed later, causes some difficulties to translators, because it is hardly possible to follow the text due to Cicero's strategy of avoiding Verres' name. This can be seen in Greenwood's translation; for clarity, he reinstates the name Verres even where there is a substitute in the original Latin.

[21] OCD, s.v. *ratio*, 7 and 14.

[22] OCD, s.v. *excogito*.

"Homo" modified with a positive adjective

As an address, *homo* with a positive adjective always acquires a sarcastic tone in Cicero's speeches[23] and is often reserved for his worst enemies. He, e.g., addresses Verres as *sancte homo ac religiose* (*Verr.* 2.5.49), and Mark Anthony as *homo diserte* (*Phil.* 2.8), etc. Such a referential *homo*, a *homo* that refers to a specific person, can be more versatile: coupled with one or more positive adjectives, it is usually reserved for praising a person of lower social standing or ironically praising a member of the upper class.[24] However, it is always pejorative when Cicero refers specifically to Verres. Most of the positive adjectives pegged onto *homo* and referring to Verres are ironic in the strict sense of the word,[25] e. g., speaking about Verres' lack of refinement and taste, Cicero calls him *homo intellegens* (*Verr.* 2.3.87), speaking about Verres' abuse of his judicial power—***iste homo** omnium **aequissimus** atque **a cupiditate remotissimus*** (*Verr.* 2.2.91)[26] and ***hominem** in edictis praetoriis, in censoriis legibus tam **prudentem**, tam **exercitatum*** (*Verr.* 2.3.17).[27]

Sometimes Cicero has even more fun with the adjectives denoting generally positive characteristics which are not considered archetypal Roman *virtutes*. The meaning of such adjectives does not need to be completely reversed with irony, but rather the semantic nuances can be exploited for a humorous effect. For example, discussing Verres' actions in the wake of the *crimen navale*, Cicero calls him a shrewd man: *iste in tabulas refert; obsignat signis amicorum **providens homo**, ut contra hoc crimen, si quando opus esset, hac videlicet testificatione uteretur* (*Verr.* 2.5.102).[28] Verres indeed acted with foresight as he falsified evidence to avoid the consequences of his wrongdoing, but he did so selfishly, and was not prudent, because it was not a very good plan[29] and he still got caught. The context does indeed support the meaning of the epithet, but it turns out to be another meaning than the one which first comes to mind.[30]

Sometimes Cicero uses more complex modifiers, such as double negatives, which constitute a figure of speech. In this example, a litotes:

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[23] Dickey 2002, 191.

[24] Santoro L'Hoir 2018, 18-20.

[25] Schwameis 2019, 36.

[26] "this paragon of disinterested impartiality".

[27] "you <...> showing so much judgment, and gaining so much experience, with praetors' edicts and censors' regulations".

[28] "<...> which Verres caused to be written down and sealed with his friends' seals, with the far-sighted intention, we may assume, of using this testimony in case of need as a defence against the charge we are considering".

[29] See Butler (2002, 65-68) on Verres' infamous unsuccessful attempts to tamper with evidence during his praetorship in Sicily.

[30] Which is the very essence of the rhetorical figure *ironia*, see note 50.

*te vero, Caecili, quem ad modum sit elusurus, quam omni ratione iactaturus, videre iam videor; <...> qui tibi aestus, qui error, quae tenebrae, di immortales, erunt, **homini minime malo**!* (*Div. Caec.* 45).[31]

One of the key points in Cicero's argumentation in the *Divinatio* was that the prosecutor should have upright character as well as outstanding intellectual and rhetorical skills. The phrase *homini minime malo* comes as a checkmate for Caecilius, giving him two mutually exclusive and equally unfavourable options. First, the anaphoric *enumeratio* and the rhetorical exclamation for the immortal gods create a sense of over-the-top pity for Caecilius, a (supposedly) "decent man" (*homini minime malo*), who, according to Cicero, therefore lacks the cunning to escape the twisted questions and arguments of Hortensius, the virtuoso puppet-master of the court. If, however, Caecilius were to argue that he would, in fact, be capable to hold his ground against Hortensius, then one would have to call him the opposite of *homo minime malus*, which, unfortunately, would be an *in*decent man. By deliberately blurring the (linguistic) distinction between morality and intellectual dexterity, Cicero sets the very trap which he has warned Caecilius to beware: *utrum dixeris, id contra te futurum* (*Div. Caec.* 45).[32]

"Homo" modified with a negative adjective

When it comes to usage, Dickey calculates that in a direct address, Cicero most often appends a negative adjective to *homo*,[33] for example, *homo stultissime et amentissime* (*Verr.* 2.1.102), *homo improbissime atque amentissime* (*Verr.* 2.1.48), *homo amentissime* (*Verr.* 2.3.141; 2.4.19; 2.5.11; 2.5.47), *homo audacissime* (*Phil.* 2.43), etc. Santoro L'Hoir notes that *homo* with pejorative adjectives is most common in the speeches written at the times when Cicero felt most disadvantaged: the *Verrines*, the speeches against Clodius and Piso, and the *Philippics*.[34] This referential *homo* followed by a negative adjective is the most politically charged of the three possible modifications and is often applied to those whom Cicero considers public enemies, represented by the trope of *audax homo*—the opposite of *bonus vir*.[35]

In the *Verrines*, we come across *homo* with negative modifiers most often in passages of solemn indignation. For example, describing the importance and the scale of the upcoming trial, Cicero equates the wicked man Verres with wickedness it-

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[31] "But as for you, Caecilius, I can see already, in my mind's eye, how he will outwit you, and make sport of you in a hundred ways; <...> Heaven help you, poor innocent, how you will be confused, and distracted, and befogged!"

[32] "whichever you choose, your choice will tell against you". On the use of dilemma in this episode see Craig 1985, 444; Craig 1993, 47-66; Kučinskienė 2010, 75-76; Kučinskienė 2018, 230-231.

[33] Dickey 2002, 190-191.

[34] Santoro L'Hoir 2018, 25.

[35] Santoro L'Hoir 2018, 22.

self: *ut mihi non unus homo improbus opprimendus sit, id quod Siculi petiverunt, sed omnino omnis improbitas <...> exstinguenda atque delenda sit.* (*Div. Caec.* 26)[36] or, introducing the accused in *actio prima* for the very first time, a crucial time to engage the emotions of the jury, he calls him an already condemned man: *reus in iudicium adductus est C. Verres, homo vita atque factis omnium iam opinione damnatus* (*Verr.* 1.2).[37] This mode of referring to a person is meant to express righteous indignation of the orator and to paint a vivid picture of an opponent's moral depravity.

Cicero employs *homo* with a pejorative adjective in somewhat less serious contexts, too. The subtle difference between the previously discussed examples and the following one is that while the former vilify someone on the account of his turpitude, the latter disparages and belittles his character. For example, Cicero does not content himself with simply calling Verres a madman for trying to falsify the evidence after the naval disaster: *Derisum esse credo hominem amentem a suis consiliariis* (*Verr.* 2.5.103). The verb *credo*, a common indicator of irony in Cicero,[38] and the *derisum*, emphatically positioned at the beginning of the sentence, show contempt and perhaps even amusement. Even more so if we remember that the quote at hand comes right after Cicero sarcastically calls Verres a *providens homo*, as discussed above. One gets the feeling that, in this context, the adjective "stupid" would not be an inaccurate translation of *amens*. As with the unmodified *homo*, here Cicero depicts Verres as less than human, and even meriting ridicule (therefore, no compassion) for it.

The unexpected "tibi, Quinte" in Verr. 2.5.176

Another instance of irony through an unusual use of names in the Verrine orations, which is often overlooked, occurs in the fifth book of the *actio secunda*. Here Cicero addresses his opponent Quintus Hortensius Hortalus by his first name: *Nulla **tibi, Quinte,** cum isto cognatio, nulla necessitudo* (*Verr.* 2.5.176).[39] According to Dickey,[40] at least in the Roman Republic, the *praenomen* was an address reserved for family members,[41] unless the speaker wanted to express contempt for the ad-

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[36] "I have not only to do what the Sicilians ask me, not only to crush one particular rascal, but <...> I have to extinguish and exterminate all rascality of every kind".

[37] "Gaius Verres appears, to stand in trial before you: a man already condemned, in the world's opinion, by his life and deeds".

[38] There are many instances of *credo* accompanying an ironic phrase or thought: *Rosc. Am.* 134, *Div. Caec.* 22, 34, *Verr.* 2.1.31, 81, 2.2.107, 157, 2.3.8, 118, 191, 2.4.43, 59, 102, 149, 2.5.67, 78, Font. 29, Caec. 7, *Clu.* 182, *Agr.* 1.18–19, 24–25, *Cat.* 1.5, *Cat.* 2.14 etc.

[39] For the full quotation and its translation see below.

[40] Dickey 2002, 63-64.

[41] This is how Cicero refers in the *Verrines* to his cousin L. Tullius Cicero, who travelled with him through Sicily and helped gather evidence (*frater Lucius* – *Verr.* 2.4.25, 145). This does not mean contempt or denigration of any kind, but, on the contrary, a close association. The *frater*, of course, indicates a familial relationship and does not allow for a pejorative meaning which we see in Hor-

dressee. This kind of address is peculiar not only in this particular speech, but in the whole corpus of Ciceronian speeches. We have come across very few analogies: *Sexte* (*Quinc*. 38 and 40; *Caec*. 102; *Mil*. 33), and *Sexte noster* (*Dom*. 47). These addresses carry a negative, ironic undertone. In *Pro Murena*, Cicero constantly addresses his opponent Servius Sulpicius Rufus, who supported the prosecution, by his *praenomen* (*Servi*—*Mur*. 9, 10, 21, 30, 43 etc.). In this case particularly, there may not be a pejorative subtext. Servius Sulpicius Rufus was Cicero's friend whom he supported in the election; however, after Sulpicius lost, Cicero took up the defence of his victorious opponent, L. Licinius Murena. Thus, it is most likely that in this case, the familiar address *Servi* is meant to emphasize their amicable relationship, much like in Cicero's dialogues, where interlocutors find themselves among friends and address each other by first name. However, it can also be an idiosyncrasy of ancient Roman naming conventions: according to Adams, some unusual aristocratic *praenomina*, such as Servius and Appius, are so rare that they serve as *cognomina*.[42]

On the one hand, considering how carefully Cicero chose his words, we would argue that the address *tibi, Quinte* in *Verr*. 2.5.176 is not supposed to offend Hortensius; it could be understood as a token of Cicero's favourable attitude towards Hortensius, rather like in the case of Servius Sulpicius in *Pro Murena*.[43] The two had already faced each other as opponents in the case of Quinctius in 81 BC. After the trial of Verres, both would go on to work on several court cases together, for example, those of Gaius Rabirius, Lucius Murena, Publius Cornelius Sulla, and Titus Annius Milo. In fact, in his treatise *Brutus*, Cicero remembered Hortensius, who had already passed away at the time, with great fondness (*Brut*. 301–303; 328), and, in 45 BC, dedicated to him the non-extant philosophical treatise, *Hortensius, sive de philosophia*. Cicero's address then could be compared to the way in which some British boarding-school graduates address their old classmates: "old boy".

However, the level of unceremonious familiarity in *tibi, Quinte* is outright insulting, because it is incongruent with Cicero's and Hortensius' social standing as well as the occasion as it is. There is a glaring difference between the public positions held by Cicero, a newly elected aedile, and Hortensius, the *consul designatus* and his senior by eight years. Besides, the formal setting of a high-profile courtcase such as this one emphasizes the need for certain decorum of language, including the way in which the involved parties should address each other. Such informality should seem especially improper, when we take into account the fact

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tensius' case. Another example akin to *frater Lucius* in Ciceronian corpus is the address to his son, *Marce fili / mi Marce*, and his brother, *frater Quinte / mi Quinte* etc.

[42] Adams 1978, 153.

[43] On Cicero's relationship with Hortensius, see Cic. *Brut*. 1; Enos 1988, 24-26. Stone (2018, 307) points out that, even though Hortensius was among those who personally benefitted from Verres' illegal activities, Cicero is careful not to start a feud with him and avoids accusing him directly.

that the address appears in the context of a scandalous court case in which Hortensius himself is involved.

Thus, we argue that a trace of irony in the remark is evident. Cicero's overarching argument *In Verrem* is that it was not Verres', but the court's reputation which was really on trial. Just before he addresses Hortensius, Cicero appeals to the judges' sense of civic duty and justice in general. If they succumbed to Verres' bribery and manipulations, they would risk the indignation of the Roman people and possibly lose their seats in the upcoming election (*Verr.* 2.5.172–173). He then turns to Hortensius (*Verr.* 2.5.174–177), addressing him by his *cognomen*, briefly but sternly admonishes him against foul play, and reminds him that by defending such a crook as Verres he stands to lose the people's confidence in him as a consul. Having done away with the solemn argumentation, Cicero slips into a more earnest tone and questions the benefit of socializing with Verres at all:

> *Nulla **tibi, Quinte,** cum isto cognatio, nulla necessitudo; quibus excusationibus antea nimium in aliquo iudicio studium tuum defendere solebas, earum habere in hoc homine nullam potes. Quae iste in provincia palam dictitabat, cum ea quae faciebat tua se fiducia facere dicebat, ea ne vera putentur tibi maxime est providendum* (*Verr.* 2.5.176).[44]

The unexpectedly casual address *tibi, Quinte* creates, for a brief moment, an air of frankness and derails the speech into a side-remark, which should create a comical effect.

A frustrated Cicero is spelling out the obvious for a fellow statesman, serving a checkmate to a delusional friend who needs to get his senses together: "Let's be real, mate, you don't have an excuse". Cicero does not even allow that Hortensius might be defending Verres because he really believes him to be innocent. The only plausible excuses—the *cognatio* and the more general *necessitudo*—are not applicable in this case. The piece of advice that follows, although so elegantly expressed, is essentially just a cliché of conventional wisdom: "watch it, so it doesn't come back to bite you". Thus, the familiar address opens a rather chummy reminder for Hortensius to switch to the right side of history—and thus save his reputation. The jury is also reminded that it is namely his association with Verres (*hic homo* and *iste*) which threatens Hortensius' reputation—an *exemplum* best to be avoided by respectable men.

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[44] "Quintus, this man is not your kinsman, he is not your personal friend; of the pleas by which you have often in the past, in one trial or another, excused your lack of impartiality, none are at your disposal in your defence of Verres. When he was governing his province he used to say, openly and frequently, that he was doing what he was doing because he had confidence in you; and unless you are very careful, it will be thought that he had good reason for saying that".

"Iste" as a substitute for a name

The third aspect of Ciceronian irony we wish to discuss here is the usage of the pronoun *iste* instead of a person's name. As far as it is known to the authors of this paper, it has not been thoroughly researched. There have been some mentions of Cicero's ironic *iste*, but they are extremely brief and usually concerned with one specific instance.[45] The most exhaustive account can be found in a commentary for the fifth speech of the *actio secunda*. Levens takes note of the *iste* in *Verr.* 2.5.9, saying that "this pronoun primarily indicates a person or thing which the speaker associates with the person addressed, rather than with himself; by a natural extension of usage it can indicate any object from which the speaker wishes to disassociate himself, and can thus express the tone of disdain. Throughout the speech it will be found habitually applied to Verres".[46] Schwameis similarly comments on the *istius* in *Verr.* 2.2.9 that the demonstrative pronoun acquires negative connotation especially at the court because one's opponent would usually be seated at the opposite side.[47]

We have looked through all Cicero's speeches, searching for any instances of *iste* referring to Verres. We have left out the instances where *iste* applies to anything or anyone else than him. In figure 1 (on next page), the coloured bars show the number of times Cicero refers to Verres as *iste* in his speeches (including standalone *iste* and such cases as *iste homo* and *iste praetor*, but excluding phrases further modified with an adjective) and the white bars show the number of paragraphs in the same speeches. Only the 24 speeches with the highest frequency were included in the figure. Admittedly, this is not a perfectly accurate way to calculate the results, and our count may have been subject to human error, but it is enough to show the overwhelming difference between the *Verrines* and other speeches. If one divides the times *iste* is used by the number of paragraphs of a particular speech, one can clearly see that in the Verrine orations (except *Div. Caec.*) Cicero refers to Verres as *iste* about one and a half to six times more often than he refers to anyone in this manner in any other speech. Finally, the *Divinatio in Caecilium* in this regard falls into the top half of all Cicero's speeches.

In the *Divinatio* (73 paragraphs), Cicero refers to Caecilius as *iste* six times, to Verres—one, and rather unexpectedly, one time even to himself—in imagined direct speech, discussing his intention to become the prosecutor (*Quid sibi iste* [Cicero] *vult? Div. Caec.* 34). In the *actio prima* (56 paragraphs), *iste* is used instead of

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[45] For example, Spevak 2010, 312; Krostenko 2001, 275-276; Crawford 1994, 246 and 251.
[46] Levens 1980, 73.
[47] Schwameis 2019, 143.

Figure 1

Verres' name 15 times, including such impressive references as *iste homo amens* (*Verr*. 1.15), *iste homo potens* (*Verr*. 1.25), while the name itself comes up only 9 times. The *actio secunda* speeches, accordingly: *Verr*. 2.1 (158 paragraphs) contains 160 *iste*-references; *Verr*. 2.2 (192 paragraphs)—222; *Verr*. 2.3 (228 paragraphs)—154 (plus one *iste* referring to Verres' son, *vester iste puer praetextatus* – *Verr*. 2.3.159); *Verr*. 2.4 (151 paragraphs)—175; *Verr*. 2.5 (189 paragraphs)—108. Moreover, in *Verr*. 2.2, Cicero first mentions Verres by name only in the twelfth paragraph, after referring to him as *iste* six times; in *Verr*. 2.4—only in the seventh paragraph, after 10 references by *iste*.

It is not likely to find a single explanation of why Cicero chooses to substitute names for *iste* in the Verrine speeches. However, a closer investigation and comparison to Cicero's other speeches will lead to some insights. If we look at the distribution of *iste* in the Verrine speeches particularly, we may see that, on the one hand, there are no *iste* references in solemn passages of heightened emotion, such as the epilogue in 2.5.179–189, in which Cicero addresses the gods whom Verres offended. On the other hand, Cicero employs the pronoun with exceptional frequency in vivid descriptive passages which are saturated with sarcasm. In episodes of vivid description, irony is exceptionally relevant, and we argue that substituting a name for the pronoun *iste* or a longer phrase with *iste* significantly in-

creases the ironic tone of such episodes, thus creating a distance between the accused Verres and the jury and Cicero himself.

Let us look into one such *egressio* in *Verr.* 2.5.25–39. Here Cicero paints a picture of Verres as a decadent, dissolute and negligent leader. There is some evidence that Hortensius delivered or at least prepared a speech *Pro Verre*,[48] in which he employed the *topos* of *bonus imperator* and argued that all the thefts, extortion and other crimes he committed were actually insignificant in comparison to his achievements as the *gubernator* who ensured public safety in his province which at the time was facing the Third Servile War.[49] If Hortensius had successfully shown that Verres dutifully and competently defended his province, then all the accusations in Cicero's fourth speech of Verres embezzling sacred works of art would have lost their weight in the eyes of the jury. Unfortunately, Hortensius' defence speech *Pro Verre* is no longer extant, but Frazel argues convincingly that Hortensius must have based his speech on the *topos* of *bonus imperator*, which would have lent him significant advantage in court.

In our chosen segment, Cicero employs the very same *topos* and, in an impressive twist of irony,[50] shows that Verres in Sicily was anything but "the good commander". In this *egressio*, Cicero does not simply list the various ways in which Verres was an incompetent magistrate and general, but rather pretends to praise his shrewdness with which he fulfilled his duties. The vivid descriptions of him doing just that, however, reveal a picture entirely inconsistent with what one would expect from *bonus imperator.* We hear Cicero refer to Verres with this trope, but we see in our minds a *levis amator*, or a *vir mollis*:

> *Hic ita vivebat **iste bonus imperator** hibernis mensibus ut eum non facile non modo extra tectum, sed ne extra lectum quidem quisquam viderit; ita diei brevitas conviviis, noctis longitudo stupris et flagitiis continebatur* (*Verr.* 2.5.26).[51]

Without doubt, the characterisation *bonus imperator* in this context is ironic, and the pronoun *iste* only strengthens that irony. Cicero also adds the pronoun when discussing Verres' debauched lifestyle: ***Iste praetor severus ac diligens**, qui populi Romani legibus numquam paruisset, illis legibus quae in poculis ponebantur diligenter*

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[48] See Alexander 1976.

[49] Frazel 2009, 126-127.

[50] Irony (*ironia*, εἰρωνεία, *dissimulatio, illusio, inversio verborum*, Lausberg 1990, § 582-585) is understood here as a figure of thought which inverts the meaning of a sentence or phrase, so that one thing is said, but another meant (<...> *dissimulatio est, cum alia dicuntur ac sentias*, <...> *cum aliter sentias ac loquare*, *De or.* 2.269; *alia dicentis ac significantis* dissimulatio, *De or.* 3.203; *contra ac dicat accipi et sentiri velit*, *Orat.* 137).

[51] "Here this excellent commander of our forces spent his winters in such a fashion that it was not easy for anyone to see him out of doors or even out of bed: the short days were passed in continual feasting, and the long nights in continual debaucheries and immorality."

obtemperabat (*Verr.* 2.5.28);[52] and he calls Verres *iste novo quodam genere imperator* (*Verr.* 2.5.29),[53] pretending not to be outraged by Verres' blatant neglect of his praetorial duties in favour of all kinds of indecency. Further on, he blurs the line between the *topos* of *the good commander* and *the effeminate lover* even further and calls him *iste Hannibal*, because Hannibal was known for valuing brilliance and achievement more than noble descent, and, according to Cicero, that is exactly what Verres did by taking a lover of low birth. It seems that the ironic epithets applied to Verres would not work as well without *iste*, which functions as an indicator of ironic inversion of meaning and an intensifier of that irony.

In these vivid descriptions saturated with irony, we come across the pronoun *iste* with exceptional frequency. In a few paragraphs (*Verr.* 2.5.25–39) we encounter four ironic characterisations of Verres (*iste bonus imperator*, *iste novo quodam genere imperator*, *iste praetor severus ac diligens*, *iste Hannibal*);[54] *iste* instead of his name comes up ten times, but his name, Verres, only once. Most importantly, *iste* is used to emphasize Verres' lack of statesmanship and decency, which in turn should make the accused repulsive in the eyes of any (doubting) juror.

The same *topos*, the *bonus imperator*, is exploited for Cicero's ironic purposes in the *crimen navale* episode (*Verr.* 2.5.80–138). Here Cicero narrates Verres' malpractices and negligence which culminated in the loss of the navy, after which Verres unjustly sentenced all high-ranking naval officers (*nauarchos*) to death for what was his own fault. It is one of the episodes in *Verr.* 2.5 where irony is masterfully incorporated in the technique of vivid description. Like in the passage discussed above, Cicero paints an exceptionally vivid picture of Verres, clad in robes soft and bright enough to be deemed effeminate and surrounded by a host of women in his party-camp on the shore of Ortygia, watching his fleet leave the harbour for a battle against pirates (2.5.86)[55] as well as the picture of the pirate ships navigating the Great Harbour of Syracuse unhindered (2.5.95-100). Finally, in a poignant final instalment of the hilarious narrative, Cicero tells us how the praetor, having heard

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[52] "For this strict and thorough governor of ours, who never in his life obeyed the laws of Rome, was none the less most careful to observe all the laws prescribed for the drinking wine".

[53] "this new variety of military commander".

[54] Similar characterisations also have an ironic connotation: *istum virum fortem* (2.3.187), *iste homo Venerius* (2.5142), *iste homo barbarus ac dissolutus* (2.5.148), *iste homo amentissimus* (2.5.118), *iste homo innocens* (2.5.136), *iste homo ingeniosus et peracutus* (2.2.127), as well as the sarcastic epithet for Verres' son, *vester iste puer praetextatus* (2.2.159) etc. Furthermore, in some cases *iste* and *homo* come together in one phrase.

[55] Cicero's narration is so lively that Quintilian even quotes this episode as an example of ἐνάργεια / *evidentia* / *repraesentatio,* or the vivid description: *Plurimum in hoc genere sicut ceteris eminet Cicero: an quisquam tam procul a concipiendis imaginibus rerum abest ut non, cum illa in Verrem legit:* 'stetit soleatus praetor populi Romani cum pallio purpureo tunicaque talari muliercula nixus in litore', *non solum ipsos intueri uideatur et locum et habitum, sed quaedam etiam ex iis quae dicta non sunt sibi ipse adstruat? Ego certe mihi cernere uideor et uultum et oculos et deformes utriusque blanditias et eorum qui aderant tacitam auersationem ac timidam uerecundiam* (Quint. *Inst.* 8.3.64).

about the destruction of the fleet, punishes the poor, innocent captains of the ships, *nauarchos*, for his own folly (2.5.101–123).

Cicero's ability to captivate his audience's imagination and transport them to another place with nothing but beautiful prose serves a practical purpose. Vasaly argues that the element of vivid description is crucial in the Verrine orations, because it helps to keep the audience interested in the matters which happened in Sicily, a remote province about which few Romans knew enough to care personally, according to Vasaly.[56] Narrating events and vividly describing images is a more effective strategy of engaging the audience than simply listing events or objects.

Our research has shown that in the entire *crimen navale* episode, (*Verr*. 2.5.80–138) Verres' name appears only eight times, while it is substituted by *iste* 31 times. Unlike in the *egressio* discussed previously, there are no ironic characterisations except one, *iste praetor diligens* (*Verr*. 2.5.86), and *iste* is used independently throughout the passage. To quote but a couple of examples:

> *Hic dies aestivos* **praetor populi Romani**, *custos defensorque provinciae, sic vixit ut muliebria cotidie convivia essent, vir accumberet nemo praeter ipsum et praetextatum filium – etsi recte sine exceptione dixeram virum, cum* **isti** *essent, neminem fuisse.* (*Verr*. 2.5.81).[57]

> *Tam diu in imperio suo classem* **iste praetor diligens** *vidit quam diu convivium eius flagitiosissimum praetervecta est <...>. Stetit soleatus praetor populi Romani cum pallio purpureo tunicaque talari muliercula nixus in litore. Iam hoc* **istum** *vestitu Siculi civesque Romani permulti saepe viderant.* (*Verr*. 2.5.86).[58]

> *Haec posteaquam acta et constituta sunt, procedit* **iste** *repente e praetorio inflammatus scelere furore crudelitate; in forum venit, nauarchos vocari iubet. Qui nihil metuerent, nihil suspicarentur, statim accurrunt.* **Iste** *hominibus miseris innocentibus inici catenas imperat. Implorare illi fidem praetoris, et quare id faceret rogare. Tum* **iste** *hoc causae dicit, quod classem praedonibus prodidissent.* (*Verr*. 2.5.106).[59]

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[56] Vasaly 1993, 104.

[57] "Here **this Roman governor**, this warden and protector of our province, spent the days of summer giving daily dinner-parties to women, with no men at table except himself and his young son – and as they were the men, I might well have said that no men at all were present".

58 "All **that our governor** saw of this fleet that was under his authority was during the time it sailed past the scene of his shameful carousals; <...> That Roman governor stood there on the shore in slippers, wearing a purple Greek cloak and long-skirted tunic, and leaning on one of his women; and often enough before that had any number of Sicilians and Roman citizens seen **him** in this costume."

[59] "This plan made and agreed upon, **Verres** hurried off from the governor's residence to the market-place, hot with his wicked, insane, cruel purpose. **He** sent for the captains, who promptly appeared, having no fear or suspicion of any trouble; whereupon he ordered the poor innocent fel-

Cicero sometimes makes a point of using Verres' name as little as possible in the passages of vivid description and especially in the episode of the *crimen navale*. The orator employs ornate narrative to transport his audience to far-away places and times past and make them care about what transpired. Thus, the vivid description becomes the perfect substrate for emotional manipulation, the second of Arena's three conditions for successful invective mentioned in the introduction. The pejorative *iste*, either incorporated in ironic epithets or, later, fired off on its own, signals to the audience that the defendant, Verres, is worthy of contempt.

Another characterisation which Cicero frequently uses instead of Verres' name is *iste praetor*[60] / *isto praetore*[61] / *ante istum praetorem*.[62] This seemingly unremarkable phrase usually occurs in a context where Verres' crimes are discussed, such as his speculation in grain and extortion of the richest farmers, *aratores*, and other unlawful practices and immoral behaviour.[63] *Ante istum praetorem* often emphasizes

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lows to be arrested and chained. They protested earnestly against this treatment, and begged to know the reason for it; to which **he** replied that they had betrayed the fleet to the pirates."

60 *Verr*. 1.14, *Verr*. 2.1.101, 2.1.105 (*iste praetor designatus*), and the previously quoted *iste praetor diligens*—2.5.86.

[61]*Verr*. 2.1.119, 2.1.136, 2.2.11, 2.2.33, 2.2.39, 2.2.63, 2.2.125, 2.2.131, 2.2.136, 2.2.187, 2.3.39-40, 2.3.50, 2.3.60, 2.3.66, 2.3.70, 2.3.109, 2.3.225-6, 2.4.62, 2.4.116, 2.5.58, 2.5.88, 2.5.114, 2.140.

[62] *Verr*. 2.1.115, 2.1.155, 2.2.122, 2.4.46.

[63] To give just a few examples: <...> *a Chelidone, quae* **isto praetore** *non modo in iure civili privatorumque omnium controversiis populo Romano praefuit, verum etiam in his sartis tectisque dominata est* (*Verr*. 2.1.136). – "<...> Chelidon, the woman who, **so long as Verres was praetor**, nor only controlled the civil law and all the private controversies of the nation, but also lorded in all these matters of maintenance contracts." — *Haec omnia* **isto praetore** *non modo perturbata, sed plane et Siculis et civibus Romanis erepta sunt* (*Verr*. 2.2.33)—"All these rights, **throughout this man's term of office**, were not simply disturbed but taken clean away from Sicilians and Roman citizens alike." — <...> *Apronium Veneriosque servos, – quod* **isto praetore** *fuit novum genus publicanorum, – ceterosque decumanos procuratores* **istius** *quaestus et administros rapinarum fuisse dico* (*Verr*. 2.3.50)—"<...> Apronius, and the slaves of Venus – the new class of tax-gatherers **that dates from Verres' praetorship** – and all the rest of the tithe-collectors, were his agents and assistants, and robbed other people to make money for himself". — *Atque* **isto praetore**, *iudices, non solum aestimandi frumenti modus non fuit, sed ne imperandi quidem; neque enim id quod debebatur, sed quantum commodum fuit imperavit.* <...> *Quid autem potest esse in calamitate residui quod non ad miseros aratores* **isto praetore** *per summam iniuriam ignominiamque pervenerit?* (*Verr*. 2.3.225-6). – "And further, gentlemen, **when Verres was governor**, not only was there no limit to the rate of commutation, but there was none to the amount of corn demanded; <...> And what further disaster can there be in store that has not already descended on those unhappy farmers **under the governorship of Verres**, accompanied by the extremest forms of injustice and insolence?" — <....> *forum Syracusanorum, quod introitu Marcelli purum a caede servatum est, id adventu Verris Siculorum innocentium sanguine redundasse, portum Syracusanorum, qui tum et nostris classibus et Carthaginiensium clausus fuisset, eum* **isto praetore** *Cilicum myoparoni praedonibusque patuisse* (*Verr*. 2.4.116). – "<...> of how the market-place of Syracuse, saved from the stain of bloodshed when Marcellus entered the city as conqueror, ran red with blood of innocent Sicilians when Verres arrived there as governor: of how the harbour of Syracuse, closed in these days against the fleets of both Rome and Carthage, was free and open, **when Verres was governor**, to a Cilician galley and its pirate crew".

the contrast between the state of affairs before Verres and the disorder which swept the province during Verres' praetorship. In most cases, *iste praetor* sounds contemptuous and offensive, and casts a shadow of doubt on Verres' character.

The pejorative connotation of this name substitute is enriched with the pun (*paronomasia*) *praetor* – *praedo*, which Cicero does not fail to exploit on every occasion in the *Verrines*. It appears for the first time at the beginning of the *actio prima*. Cicero, having just called Verres a *homo* for the first time (*adduxi enim hominem*), goes on to call him other ingenious epithets by which he briefly alludes to the many crimes committed by Verres during various times in his life, which Cicero would detail in the *actio secunda*: *depeculatorem aerari* (= *Verr*. 2.1.33–43: *quaestura*), *vexatorem Asiae atque Pamphyliae* (= *Verr*. 2.1.44–102: *legationes*), *praedonem iuris urbani* (= *Verr*. 2.1.103–158: *praetura urbana*), *labem atque perniciem provinciae Siciliae* (= *Verr*. 2.lib.2–5). In the episode of the city praetorship, Cicero uses the similarly sounding words to create a pun: while he was the city praetor (*praetor urbanus*), Verres acted as a robber of the city's laws (*praedo iuris urbani*). In the *actio secunda*, Cicero uses this *paronomasia* a few more times (*Verr*. 2.4.21, 2.5.54, 2.5.122), and creates even more sophisticated wordplay by adding a third similarly sounding noun *praeda*, "spoil", "profit" (*classis esset in Sicilia <...> quae **praedam praetori** non quae **praedonibus** metum adferrent* (*Verr*. 2.5.63)).[64]

Bearing this in mind, the name-substitutions *iste praetor* and *iste praedo*,[65] even when they are not in the same sentence and not linked together by an antithesis or other rhetorical devices as discussed above, but nevertheless used frequently and interchangeably, do not let Cicero's audience shake the spectre of this sarcastic wordplay and thus manipulate the audience's sympathies away from the predatory Verres.

We can therefore conclude two things: on the one hand, when *iste* comes in conjunction with a personal characterisation which functions as a substitute for Verres' name, it serves as an intensifier of irony (as the characterisation is often seemingly positive, if taken out of context). On the other hand, the constant and frequent substitution of a person's name for stand-alone *iste* is an expression of contempt, or, to use Adams's term, "no-naming". Avoidance of a person's name is a deviation from the norm and the substitution of Verres' name for other words is one example. Inappropriately naming one's opponent, whether the name substitute is the overly familiar *praenomen*, or the irreverent *homo* and *iste*, is a characteristic tool (though not a compulsory component) of invective,[66] well-suited to remind the audience of the opponent's transgressions and otherness. Applied con-

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[64] "the Sicilian fleet <...> better fitted to put gold into the governor's purse than to put fear into the pirates' hearts".

[65] *Verr*. 2.1.152 (*ab isto praedone ereptum*), 2.3.76 (*istum praedonem frumentarium*), 2.4.95 (*ad istum praedonem religionum*); see also 2.4.24 (*isti praedoni ac piratae Siciliensi*), 2.2.45 (*ex ista reperietis hereditate ita **istum praedatum** ut perpauca occulte fecerit*).

[66] In *Cat*. 2 and *Phil*. 2, Cicero also uses *iste* instead of the opponent's name very frequently (see fig. 1).

sistently, such tactics subtly marginalise the opponent and, in some cases, even help arouse contempt and anger in the audience, thus adding towards successful invective.

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Laughter in Johannes Magnus' *Historia de regibus* (1554)

Astrid M.H. Nilsson

The *Historia de omnibus Gothorum Sueonumque regibus*, or the *History of all the Kings of the Goths and the Swedes* (from now on *Historia de regibus*) is a major historical work, both as regards its influence and its size: it was the ideological foundation of Swedish politics for over a century. It is a folio of some 800 pages. Laughter has however proved very rare: There is roughly one laugh in every 100 pages, or eight laughs in total. In the following, I shall discuss laughter in this work, written by the Swedish archbishop Johannes Magnus (1488–1544). He describes the history of the Goths from the Flood to the early 1520's in 24 books, arranged as a series of biographies of Gothic kings: the external kings (descendants of those who left Sweden in 1430 BC and are said to gradually have conquered Europe), and the internal kings (descendants of those who remained in Sweden). The work could be described as a history of persons because of its biographical arrangement, which hints at its value from a pedagogical point of view: *historia magistra vitae*.

1. Introduction

The aim of the present article is to show who laughs, why, and to what effect, and finally attempt to explain why there is so little laughter in the work. There are certainly references to "humour" in a wide sense, for example to jokes or derision, and one could argue that these should also be included. Such references are by no means uninteresting, but it is not explicitly said that someone laughs; that someone thinks something is a joke does not guarantee that they are laughing, and my focus will be the act of laughing itself.

The eight cases of laughter in the *Historia de regibus* have been found partly through my previous knowledge of the work, partly with the help of the recent

Swedish translation by Kurt Johannesson, which exists in a searchable version. I then studied the corresponding passages in the Latin original.[1] The noun *laughter*, with synonyms, does not offer alternative translations into Swedish (on a stylistic level suitable for Johannes' work, that is) which makes it highly improbable that I have missed cases in my search for *skratt* 'laughter'.

First a few words about the author, Johannes Magnus. He was born in 1488 in Linköping in Sweden and received his first education at the cathedral chapters in his hometown and in Skara, another cathedral city of Sweden. As a young adult, he left Sweden to study at various universities on the continent and returned in 1523 as a papal legate. He was then made archbishop of Uppsala, where he remained until 1526 when he went to Poland to negotiate a marriage for the Swedish king, Gustavus Vasa. Johannes was never to return to Sweden but spent the rest of his life trying in vain to persuade the pope, the cardinals, and anyone else with power, to reinstate Catholicism in the increasingly Protestant Sweden. He died in Rome in 1544, was buried in St Peter's Church, and had his two historical works published posthumously by his younger brother Olaus.[2]

2. Background: views on laughter

Laughter in Johannes' time was nothing to laugh about, as we shall see in the following. I shall address three partially interlinked aspects of laughter: a social aspect, a moral aspect, and an aesthetic aspect. The two first aspects are the most important.

According to the view of Aristotle, repeated by others during centuries, the ability to laugh was a characteristic peculiar to humans.[3] This did not imply freedom of laughing for anyone, anywhere, or at anything, but it was used for discussions about the nature of laughter, and for works prescribing who was allowed to laugh, as well as under what circumstances.[4] Laughter had of course been of interest much earlier. In his biography of the great orator, Plutarch described Cicero as being fond of jests in all circumstances possible, to the point of offending people.[5] Quintilian discussed the use of laughter for an orator in his *Institutio oratoria*. Ovid addressed the question of female laughter, and of how to laugh in a becoming way, in the *Ars Amatoria*, which suggests an aesthetic aspect of laughter.[6]

With the advent of Christianity, another important point had been added: that Jesus is never said to laugh in the Bible. As laughter was typical for humans, how-

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[1] Magnus 1554, Johannesson & Helander 2018.

[2] For a fuller biography, see Nilsson 2016, 36–45.

[3] Arist. *PA.* 3.10/673a2–31; Ferm 2008, 135, Flanigan 2015, 51, Łabno 2009, 363, Bakhtin 1968, 68.

[4] O'Rourke Boyle 1999, 718.

[5] For more about Cicero, laughter and humour, see Beard 2014, 100–111.

[6] Plut. *Cic.* 4, 27 and 38, Quint. *Inst.* 6.3, Ov. *A.A* 3.279–290.

ever, it was impossible to repress it entirely, so moderation was advocated; smiles were preferred to laughter.[7] People striving to be good Christians should thus refrain from laughing, and the Church fathers usually advised against laughter.[8] This moral aspect applied particularly to monks and to the clergy in general, but godly people of sense, the learned, and the higher social classes should also have enough self-control to avoid laughter, at least excessive amounts of it. Letting loose to the point of laughing uncontrollably was the hallmark of jesters, of the insane, and of the lower social classes.[9] In short, the moral and social aspects are interlinked.

The social aspect of laughter can also be illustrated through the learned Renaissance debate about ancient comedy, which included the question of the comic, the ridiculous, and of laughter. Twelve of Plautus' plays had been rediscovered in 1428, providing much more material than had previously been known, at a time when one often acquainted oneself with Plautus mainly through excerpts from medieval florilegia.[10] Terence, as is well known, was one of the most important authors used in schools. The two playwrights were contrasted against one another, and then, Terence was depicted as the superior playwright, who had delighted the higher social classes. Plautus, on the other hand, was presumed to have aimed his plays at the common and uneducated people in order to provoke laughter.[11] This could be studied in real life in the Renaissance, as plays by both authors were performed in translation, for example in Ferrara in the late 15th century.[12] The moral aspect, closely linked to the social, touched on the way of laughing, and on the object of laughter: excessive, uncontrolled laughter was considered a sin, as was laughing for the wrong reasons.[13] The fact that jesters were not held in high regard was not only due to social considerations (because they did not belong to the upper classes; they were outsiders), but also to moral ones, because their witticisms could be inappropriate, and cause people to laugh without moderation and at the wrong things. The persons depicted in older paintings bear witness to the importance of the moral and social aspects of laughter as they often look very serious: in order to look elevated both morally and socially, and so, to show oneself as being virtuous, a calm and composed exterior was recommended. None of the woodcut illustrations in the *Historia de regibus* for example, shows laughing or smiling people.

Apart from these two aspects, an aesthetic one can also be discerned as a reason for the unsmiling faces in paintings. Dentistry left a lot to be desired in earlier

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[7] Łabno 2009, 372, Ferm 2008, 46, 65, 67, 137, Flanigan 2015, 51.

[8] Flanigan 2015, 50, 52, Bakhtin 1968, 73, Resnick 1987, 93, Kries 2002, 2, Johnston 2002, 17, Jones 2014, 35, Ferm 2008, 15–16.

[9] Ferm 2008, 35, 56, 59, Casagrande and Vecchio 1979, 914, Jones 2014, 33 and 54, Kries 2002, 2, 8.

[10] Hardin 2007, 789–791.

[11] Hardin 2007, 808 and 811.

[12] Hardin 2007, 790.

[13] Flanigan 2015, 45, 50–51, Ferm 2008, 15.

times, and a reason not to smile or laugh exceedingly on portraits could be the fact that displaying one's teeth, or what was left of them, would not make for an appealing portrait. In a famous portrait of Louis XIV of France, for example, the king is tight-lipped and unsmiling, probably partly due to the fact that he had no teeth left. The finest dentistry available to a monarch in the second half of the seventeenth century could not prevent him from losing all his teeth; from a certain age, tooth loss was to be expected for everyone.[14] While this question has no bearing on a written text, it could be relevant for Johannes Magnus' attitude to laughter and thus play a certain role for its presence in his works anyway.

A combination of the aesthetic and moral aspects can be found in Erasmus, a contemporary of Johannes Magnus, who found laughter unseemly–partly because of how people look when they laugh, partly for moral reasons: one could and should employ one's time much better.[15] In his *Il Cortegiano*, Baldassare Castiglione, another writer, contemporary with Johannes Magnus, discusses humour, outlines a brief theory of laughter and presents a number of jokes in the form of witty pleasantries intended to delight (and possibly make someone smile), but definitely not to make people burst out laughing. He suggested that vice or deformities were acceptable targets for laughter – with moderation, of course. In that manner, laughter could be used for didactic purposes, as once suggested by Cicero in *De oratore*.[16] The (still) infamous Pope Alexander VI Borgia, for example, could have his title and numeral *papa Alessandro vi* read out in full not as "Pope Alexander the Sixth", but as "Alexander, pope by force", in a Latin pun.[17] As a joke at the expense of a pope well-known for indulging in vice, it could probably cause a smile or two.

According to some medieval writers, laughter could actually be used in church for similar didactic purposes, but with great moderation, and sometimes even jesters could make people laugh for the right, pedagogical reasons.[18] Laughter could thus be acceptable, provided that it could teach–which incidentally reminds one of the important function of history as *magistra vitae*.

2.1 Words for laughter

In Johannes Magnus, two different Latin words for laughter are used: *cachinnus* and *risus*. The former is used twice, the latter six times. According to the *Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, *cachinnus* and *risus* can be synonyms, but *cachinnus* can also mean 'immoderate laughter'.[19] The same is stated in *OLD*, where we are told that the

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[14] Jones 2014, 17–18, 28–29.

[15] Jones 2014, 33, O'Rourke Boyle 1999, 717.

[16] Jones 2014, 29–30, Grudin 1974, 200, Bakhtin 1968, 95. See Cic. *De Or.* 2.54–71, esp. 2.60.

[17] Grudin 1974, 201.

[18] Ferm 2008, 77–79, 92–97.

[19] *ThlL*, s.v. *cachinnus*.

words can be synonyms, but *cachinnus* means a louder version of *risus*. In Lewis & Short, the words are referred to as possible synonyms, too, but *risus* is also translated as 'laughter' or 'laughing' and *cachinnus* as 'loud laugh' or 'immoderate laughter'.[20] In the *Historia de regibus*, there are four examples of *risus* in the phrase *risus immodicus* 'laughter without measure', while *cachinnus* is never found in combination with that adjective. This could possibly suggest such a difference as in the translations from the dictionaries above, but it is hard to tell from so few cases. Johannes Magnus clearly means laughter, however, in each passage, which is the matter of importance for the purpose of this article.

3. Laughter in Johannes Magnus

In the following, I shall present the eight instances of laughter in Johannes Magnus' work under three different headings, according to who is laughing, and discuss why they laugh as well as to what effect. The question of why there is so little laughter in the work will be addressed in the concluding discussion.

3.1 Individual laughter

Johannes Magnus makes an elaborate comparison between the ancient tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius, and the equally ancient Swedish monarch Grimmerus. The material used in the parallel between these two in all likelihood draws on a famous anecdote about Dionysius, found in Valerius Maximus' *Facta et dicta memorabilia*, under the heading of sacrilege.[21] The quotation below shows only the part where laughter is referred to:

> *Ille* [Dionysius] *multis* **cachinnis**, *& scurrili irrisione sua sacrilegia extollere non erubuit: hic* [Grimmerus] *vero vt in omnibus aliis, ita etiam in suis enormissimis sacrilegiis, se scurram scurrarum, & protomimum inuerecunde ostendit.*[22]

Both rulers enjoy plundering temples and Dionysius even laughs about his exploits. The words *scurrili irrisione* 'buffoonlike ridicule' as regards Dionysius, and *scurra* 'jester' and *inverecunde* 'irreverently' in relation to the Swedish tyrant Grimmerus, add to the description of them. The effect of laughter in the portrayal is striking. We see not only a ruler who laughs, but one who is prepared to commit

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[20] *OLD* and Lewis & Short, s.v. *cachinnus* and *risus.*

[21] Nilsson 2016, 228. See Val. Max. 1.1, ext. 3.

[22] The former [Dionysius] was not embarrassed to extol his sacrileges with many **laughs** and jesting mockery: the latter [Grimmerus], just as in everything else, so also in his horrendously enormous sacrileges, shamelessly showed himself a buffoon of buffoons and a chief jester (Magnus 1554, 131; the bold type here and elsewhere is mine, as are the translations).

sacrilege, a serious crime in itself, and whose attitude to his own sacrilegious exploits is expressed with laughter.

In the parallel, it is not explicitly said that Grimmerus laughs, but as the similarity between the two rulers is stated several times, it is reasonable to presume that he, too, is laughing. Both are branded as jesters with the words *scurra* and *scurrilis* respectively, words used for singling out improper joking already in Antiquity.[23] A king, who held the highest power and social status in his realm, was of course expected to have certain moral standards, and, if he behaved as a jester, it was an abomination, from a moral point of view. Kings and gods (as individuals, that is) should not laugh in this fashion.[24] A jester could only be king during a carnival, when everything was turned upside-down and the norms reversed, as suggested not least by Bakhtin in his famous study of Rabelais, another contemporary of Johannes Magnus.[25]

This parallel is a case in point when it concerns Johannes Magnus' tendency to compare the Classical heritage to the Gothic, similar to the frequent use of classical models for writing, but at a much smaller scale. Above, a ruler from Sweden in an ancient past and a ruler from Antiquity are portrayed as each other's mirror images. They commit the same kind of crime, and find amusement in vice, in their own highly reprehensible actions. They are even said to have lived at about the same time.[26] Other cases where Johannes Magnus draws parallels or makes comparisons between the Goths and Antiquity are, for example, when he labels the strong and wise Gothic hero Starchaterus *alter Hercules* 'another Hercules', compares Theodoric the Great to the ancient Roman emperors and finds him superior to all of them, or suggests that the Gothic king Boroista was a better ruler than Sulla, despite the fact that Sulla was a Roman and Boroista a "barbarian".[27] This is a device for portraying the Goths in a positive way, rather than as barbarians; the abhorrent behaviour of Grimmerus suggests that he is not a proper Goth.

There are similar situations as the Dionysius-Grimmerus sacrileges in the portrait of King Gostagus, although there is no explicit mention of laughter. Gostagus thinks it a joke to walk around with a group of robbers and beat up or kill the unfortunate people they happen to meet on the road. Elsewhere, he too is described as *scurra*.[28] Gostagus finds pleasure in disregarding his duty of upholding his kingdom and taking care of his subjects, i.e., in being a tyrant, just as Grimmerus and Dionysius do.

Another case of reprehensible laughter is found in the section on a fourteenth-century Swedish king, Albrecht of Mecklenburg (ruled 1364–1389). When his sub-

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[23] Beard 2014, 152–155.
[24] Resnick 1987, 97.
[25] Bakhtin 1968, 81, Ghose 2002, 35, cf. Johnston 2002, 18–20. For an overview of the critique of Bakhtin, see Beard 2014, 60–69, cf. Ferm 2008, 140–142.
[26] Magnus 1554, 131.
[27] Magnus 1554, 172, 330, 122–123, cf. Johannesson 1982, 127, 132, 137.
[28] Magnus 1554, 299.

jects, the Swedes and Goths, come to him with complaints, they are received with laughter, insults and blows and then sent away without having had their matters resolved. The laughter here is apparently of importance, because it is presented not only in the main text but also in a printed marginal comment (which means that it is found in the index of the work as well):

> Praeterea Sueones, & Gothi suas causas coram Rege, vel eius iudicibus dicturi, **cachinnis**, & improperiis, immo non raro verberibus excipiebantur, atque sine omni consolatione reiiciebantur.

> In the margin: Sueci causas suas dicturi **cachinnis** & uerberibus reiiciebantur.[29]

The implication is clear: here too, a king, whose sacred duty is to uphold faith and justice in his kingdom and to take good care of his subjects, fails to fulfil his duties, and behaves as a tyrant. His laugh is one of derision and contempt, and for his subjects at that, who should evidently neither be derided, nor shown contempt by their king. This case is similar to the one with Dionysius/Grimmerus: a ruler behaves in an appalling manner and the monstrosity in his behaviour is further emphasised by his laughter. Dionysius, Grimmerus and Albrecht of Mecklenburg are all rulers who laugh at their own deliberate failure to do their duty adequately. Their laughter is particularly inappropriate as rulers ought to set a good example to their subjects *and* do their duty to them: it is wrong with regard both to the social and to the moral aspect of laughter.

In 13th century Sweden, King Valdemar and his brother Duke Magnus fight each other for the throne. King Valdemar is married to a Danish princess, Sophia, but when Sophia's sister, Princess Jutta, comes to visit, she ends up in the king's bed in a scandalous love affair. Valdemar even has to go to Rome to ask forgiveness for his crime, made even worse, of course, by the fact that Jutta and Sophia are sisters. Johannes does not portray King Valdemar in a favourable light; his brother and opponent Duke Magnus is the hero.

When word reaches King Valdemar that Magnus is approaching with an army of mercenaries, Valdemar's reaction is to laugh uncontrollably and to prophesy that what awaits his brother is something less than a kingdom:

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[29] Furthermore, the Swedes and Goths who came to present their complaints to the king or before his judges were received with laughter and insults, not rarely even with blows, and sent away without any help. [In the margin:] The Swedes who came to present their complaints were sent away with laughter and blows. (Magnus 1554, 678 [667]. The number on the page is 667 but should have been 678. The number in square brackets refers to the erroneous number printed on the page. I mark the page numbers this way to prevent confusion as there are some erroneously numbered pages, for example two with the number 667, one after 666 and one instead of 678, the one of interest here).

> *Quo audito, Valdemarus, resoluta **immodico risu** bucca, respondit:*
> *Aliquid minus in eius sortem, quam regnum adueniet.*[30]

King Valdemar's laugh is out of ridicule and disrespect for his brother, a laugh that expresses his vanity, because he feels superior. Later, he is overthrown when Magnus is victorious and becomes king. As a noble Gothic hero, he forgives his brother, but to no greater avail, because Valdemar proves treacherous and comes back time and again in vain attempts to retake the throne.

Valdemar, with his history of adultery and blatant untrustworthiness, is clearly not a good Goth, or a good ruler, for that matter – it is Magnus, the king-to-be, who embodies the warlike virtue of the Goths and who consequently succeeds in his endeavour to take over the throne. I regard this as an important part of Johannes' attempt at depicting the Goths as virtuous and warlike, and at removing the brand of "barbarian" from them.[31] As all those who have laughed so far have been kings, it is also a valuable lesson in kingship, the art of ruling, and the characteristics of good and bad kings.

In Italy, during the attempts of Byzantium to restore the Roman Empire, a scenario similar to the one with Valdemar and Magnus arises. The plans of the brave Gothic king, Teias, are ridiculed by the enemy commander Valerianus, who thinks that Teias is heading into an ambush. But Teias takes a different road and unexpectedly approaches Bologna on his way to Rimini. This sudden move terrifies Valerianus, his laughter is turned to terror, and he leaves, together with his army, in a great hurry to prevent Teias from taking over cities that were held by Byzantium:

> *Quam profectionem Valerianus Tanneti praefectus irridens, putabat*
> *Teiam ad apertas Graecorum insidias peruenturum: sed Teias [...] Bono-*
> *niae [...] appropinquabat. Qua ex re Valerianus perterritus, **risum** in*
> *timorem conuertit [...].*[32]

Johannes Magnus does not add explicitly that this served Valerianus right (and suggests nothing of the sort about King Valdemar either), but the end of the phrase, where it says that the laughter was turned to terror, gives the impression that this is precisely what is suggested. We know little of Valerianus' qualities as a commander, but portraying him as terror-stricken and rushing away when the

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[30] When Valdemarus had heard this, he laughed uncontrollably and answered: Something less than a kingdom will fall on his lot (Magnus 1554, 628).

[31] Cf. Johannesson 1982, 114–138, esp. 116, 127, 132, 137.

[32] Valerianus, the prefect of Taneto, ridiculed this march and believed that Teias would march straight the way into the ambush laid by the Greeks, but Teias approached Bologna. This frightened Valerianus greatly and he turned his laugh into fear (Magnus 1554, 470).

Goths act in an unexpected manner does not give the impression that he is a particularly good commander.

This is also part of the depiction of the Goths and of the armed forces in Italy during the attempts of reuniting the Roman Empire, and serves to emphasize the Gothic bravery and bellicosity through the sudden change in Valerianus when he understands that his plans have gone awry. The Valdemar-Magnus case and the Valerianus-Teias case are similar, as the Gothic bravery prevails despite the mockery from others who believe themselves superior.

During an earlier phase of the war in Italy, the Greek/Byzantine commander Bellisarius notices that the Romans tremble at the sight of the approaching Goths, and he laughs without measure at this. The Romans do not take this well, and to avoid their hatred, he claims that he was laughing at the Goths. But he does not manage to convince the Romans: they think that they are being mocked and ridiculed by him, and hate him for it:

> *Bellisarius vero instructam hostium aciem ex aggere contemplatus, simulque Romanos pauore concussos attendens, **immodicum risum** patulis buccis emisit, iussitque milites nihil prius attentare, quam ipse signum dedisset.* […] *At ille* [Bellisarius], *ne eorum odio exponeretur, sese Gothorum simplicitatem risisse simulabat; quod adiunctis bobus machinas aduehere posse sperarent, quasi boues inermes, aut extra machinam praecessissent, cum tamen a capitibus vsque ad tibias satis muniti incederent.*[33]

In this case, we see a commander, deriding persons subordinated to him just before battle: in other words, Bellisarius is ignoring his duties as a commander, in a way reminiscent of what the kings portrayed earlier did when they maltreated their subjects. It is a derisory, contemptuous laugh which suggests contempt for those of lower rank. What all these five cases of individual laughter have in common is that it is persons of high social standing who laugh: three kings and two commanders. The uses for and effects of their laughter have also been presented. Firstly, laughter is used as a contrast to emphasise the pugnacity and bravery of the true Goths, as those who laugh are sooner or later somehow defeated. Secondly, their laughter signals an anomaly, something grotesque, as superiors who maltreat and ridicule their inferiors, or commit heinous crimes such as sacri-

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[33] From the battlements, Bellisarius pondered the enemy army that had organised itself below, and when he simultaneously looked at the Romans, who were shaken by fear, he laughed immoderately with his mouth wide open and ordered the soldiers not to undertake anything before he himself had given them the sign. But he [Bellisarius], in order not to expose himself to their hatred, pretended to have laughed at the stupidity of the Goths, because they hoped to move the siege engines by yoking unprotected oxen to them, when the oxen were actually clad in armour from head to foot (Magnus 1554, 379).

lege, and laugh about it. This has a bearing on the moral aspect of laughter, because the persons laughing are ignoring their moral obligations and should know better, and on the social, because the persons laughing are important and powerful. All in all, from a moral perspective, individuals in prominent positions who laugh is not a good sign.

3.2 Group laughter

So far, we have seen high-ranking individuals laughing. In the following two cases, we have instead groups of people of lower or undetermined rank laughing. Just before an attempted Gothic attack on the walls of Rome, for example, Bellisarius rides around to encourage the Roman defenders as battle will eventually ensue. The Romans laugh at him. They think that because he very recently fled before the might of the Goths, it is ridiculous that he is encouraging others before facing the Goths in battle. The comment is added that great unhappiness soon followed the imprudent laugh. The unhappiness in question arose from the fact that the Romans were unaccustomed to hardships they suddenly had to endure because of a war:

> *Bellisarius interim his imminentibus periculis, equo circumuectus Romanos ad bene sperandum hortabatur. Qua exhortatione Romanis (vt inquit Procopius)* **immodicum risum** *de se praebuit, quod cum nuper hostes ipse vix effugisset, ad bene sperandum alios hortaretur, Gothosque contemnendos affirmaret, quorum primum impetum vix potuerit sustinere. Deinde non longe post* **imprudenti risui** *grauissimus dolor subsecutus est.*[34]

Taken together with Bellisarius' laugh (cited above) at the Romans, which is found only a few pages after they laugh at him, we do not see an ideal relation between a superior and his inferiors: each party sees the other as a cowardly object of boundless ridicule. In addition, we see here another case of laughter that makes the Goths stand out as warlike and brave, as Bellisarius, the Byzantine general, is ridiculed for having fled from them. This is also part of Johannes' endeavour of removing the label of barbarians from the Goths.

Returning to the books about the internal kings, back in Sweden, Johannes presents the aforementioned King Gostagus as one of the worst tyrants in history,

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[34] While peril was imminent, Bellisarius went around on horseback to exhort the Romans to be of good courage. Because of this exhortation (as Procopius says) the Romans laughed immoderately at him, because he, fresh from barely escaping his enemies, exhorted others to be of good courage, and also as he claimed that the Goths should be disdained, when he had hardly been able to sustain their first attack. Then not long after the imprudent laugh, the most acute pain followed (Magnus 1554, 376).

guilty of all sorts of horrible behaviour. In the beginning of his biography, his parents are portrayed, as part of explaining his unspeakably horrible character.[35] His mother is said to be married to one man, but available to all. His father is described as a nobleman who stutters in a stupid way and is regarded as ridiculous to the point that everyone who hears him speak laughs uncontrollably:

> *Filius hic erat cuiusdam nobilis viri ignoti nominis, qui ab omnibus adeo ridiculus aestimatus erat, vt eo loquente, siue ignauiter balbutiente, cuncti qui aderant,* **immodico** *ora* **risu** *laxarent.*[36]

The *immodicus risus* here is explicitly described as a laugh out of ridicule, a kind of disability humour, as it is the idiotic way of speaking of Gostagus' father that provokes laughter. There is no clearly defined group who laughs; it is simply "everyone within earshot", which can include anyone from other members of the nobility to the lowliest of servants. It is similar to the previous laugh at Bellisarius, because in both cases, a group is ridiculing a single individual for a character trait: cowardice for Bellisarius, stupidity for Gostagus' father. The manner of laughing is, in both cases, without measure (*immodicus*), in a way similar to the ἄσβεστος γέλως 'unquenchable laugh' in the latter part of the Odyssey, in book 20, where Penelope's suitors ridicule Odysseus who has returned in disguise.[37] In the cases of Bellisarius and Gostagus' father too, a deformity in someone is laughed at, although their deformities lie in their character traits, which border on vices, not in their physical appearance. Here, as in the cases of laughter in the Odyssey, the laughter is in proportion to how ridiculous the object of laughter is perceived, no matter if it is a good-natured laugh or a vicious one, as opposed to in the cases of individuals laughing, where their laughter reflects their amoral character. As said earlier, laughing at vice – as well as at hypocrisy – was acceptable.[38]

"Negative" laughter that mocks and derides others was quite frequent in earlier literature; it was not until the 18th century that so to speak benign laughter out of joy and happiness gained ground.[39] Laughter in Old Norse literature, with which Johannes had at least some familiarity, often arose from malevolence, and branded the laughing individuals as evil, or signified social disruption.[40] This is obvious when touching on those laughing individuals in Johannes Magnus – the rulers and commanders. The laughter of these unsympathetic figures reminds one of portrayals of tyrants in Antiquity, for example Suetonius' portrayal of Caligula.

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[35] See further Nilsson 2016, 253–257.

[36] He was the son of some nobleman of unknown name, who was regarded by everyone as so ridiculous that when he spoke, or rather stuttered in a stupid manner, everyone who was present laughed uncontrollably (Magnus 1554, 298).

[37] Hom. *Od*. 20.346–394 (several occasions).

[38] Grudin 1974, 202.

[39] Ghose 2002, 35, 43, Kries 2002, 1.

[40] Kries 2002, 8.

The emperor suddenly bursts out laughing at a banquet, at the hilarious thought that he could have his guests killed if he wanted to.[41] A typical characteristic of a bad emperor in Antiquity was that he laughed in the wrong way, in the wrong place, or at the wrong things.[42]

The seven different laughs in Johannes Magnus discussed so far point in the same direction: all of them signal that something is wrong, if with the laugher himself or with the object of laughter. There is not a single laugh that does not originally arise from contempt or ridicule. Laughter is used to show either that something is morally wrong with an individual or to ridicule vice. As we shall see in the last laugh, this is not always the case. Laughter is however still used in some way to portray the Goths as brave and warlike.

3.3 Heroic laughter

The one remaining laugh adds to the depiction of the Goths as brave and warlike, but apart from that, it is of a different character than the other seven:

> [...] *non mors ipsa terrorem eis incutere valuisset, vt quandoque in duello morientes, **soluto in risum ore**, per summam doloris dissimulationem spiritum efflauerint, tamque inuicto animo fuerint* [...][43]

Here, it is claimed by Johannes that the brave Goths, when mortally wounded, laugh in the face of death to make it seem that they do not feel any pain, that their spirits are still unbroken, that they are fearless. Compared to the other seven cases of laughter, this is different because the Goth who is laughing is sympathetic, brave, even heroic, if in tragic circumstances. I refer to this as *heroic laughter*, laughter that shows contempt for pain and danger, and fearlessness even in the direst of circumstances. It also serves to preserve the reputation for bravery of the hero for posterity. In the Icelandic/Norse sagas, it is quite a frequent trope that a dying hero laughs to show that he is undaunted even before his own death.[44] Winning, to the Vikings, meant never giving up, which does not imply emerging unscathed (or alive, for that matter) from a sticky situation.[45]

Johannes seems to draw on the Old Norse/Icelandic tradition here, rather than on the classical, and to think that this Gothic custom will be perceived as odd by his colleagues in the European Republic of Letters. Otherwise, he would not have

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[41] Suet. *Calig*. 32.

[42] Beard 2014, 132.

[43] [...] not even death itself could frighten them; when they were dying after a fight, they concealed their pain by laughing, let out their final breath, and remained undefeated in spirit (Magnus 1554, 240).

[44] Kries 2002, 8, Shippey 2018, 14, 29, 37, 50, 53, cf. Łabno 2009, 366.

[45] Shippey 2018, 26.

provided a longer explanation than usual to the laugh; apparently, he does not expect anyone to just know how Gothic warriors approached death. Had he modelled this custom on something from Antiquity, it would seem natural to refer to this source of inspiration and so create another parallel between the Gothic past and Antiquity. But Johannes does not: he presents it as something specifically Gothic/Swedish, which it was (although this does not rule out the existence of possible parallels in classical literature). When the Icelandic sagas were more systematically brought out into the light, for example in an edition from 1689 of many of the major death scenes, the jesting attitude to death fascinated the readers.[46]

As in the other cases, we see both a moral and a social aspect of laughter: the laughter comes from an individual characterised by bravery and defiance even before death itself, and the person laughing is a Gothic warrior, which gives him a certain social status. This laugh is similar to the other individual laughs as it serves to depict the Goths and shows the moral qualities of a laughing person. It is however different from them too, as the moral qualities causing a heroic laughter are positive.

4. Concluding discussion

The aim of this article has been to show who laughs in Johannes Magnus, why, and to what effect, and I shall now attempt to explain why there is so little laughter in the work. As we have seen, most people who laugh are individuals of high rank. Their laughs are reprehensible because they laugh at the wrong things: at their own failure to do their duty, or at others who are not to be ridiculed. There are also two cases where an entire group of people laughs out of ridicule for someone else. These laughs have mainly negative connotations both with regard to *who* is laughing and to *why* they laugh. Johannes emphasizes this by the example of describing kings as jesters for their behaviour, which is obviously a serious reproach. The cases of persons who laugh out of vanity, because they think themselves superior to their enemy, but who are later defeated, can also be regarded as a form of reproach, and the persons laughing are punished for their laughs. Group laughter is more acceptable, but still not positive. The one laugh standing out is the heroic laughter, where the dying warrior is rewarded for his laugh, as this makes him go down in history as a hero.

One effect of the laughter in the work is that it serves as a tool for depicting the Goths, in Johannes' endeavour to reinterpret them as noble and courageous, not as the quintessential barbarians. Laughter, from this perspective, highlights weaknesses and moral deficiencies in non-Gothic or unworthy Gothic persons and so makes the actual, noble, brave Gothic characteristics stand out in contrast.

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[46] Shippey 2018, 14–15.

In the beginning of this article, I briefly outlined three aspects of laughter: a moral, a social, and an aesthetic aspect. The moral aspect suggests moderation, and laughter only for proper and morally justifiable reasons. The social aspect links "moral" and moderate laughter to higher social classes, and "immoral" and uncontrolled laughter to the lower strata in society. The norm is thus turned upside-down when people of high social status indulge in immoral and uncontrolled laughter. This signals that something is wrong. The aesthetic aspect is not as important in a work of literature as in a portrait, for example, but a vivid description of a historical figure laughing without measure has an aesthetic aspect to it, if chiefly in the reader's imagination.

Due to the arrangement as a series of biographies, Johannes' work can be seen as a work about persons. I regard this as part of the concept of *historia magistra vitae*, where *facta et dicta* are written down for posterity, to be remembered, and to be used as examples for future generations to to admire, learn from and emulate. Most of the individual kings portrayed by Johannes are indeed excellent and brave Gothic regents, well worthy of imitation by others. And so, naturally, they do not laugh: actually, there is not a single case even of heroic laughter among these monarchs, despite the fact that several warrior kings perish bravely on the battlefield and could have occasion for undaunted heroic laughter at their own approaching death.

Laughter, as we have seen, is used very sparingly. The scarcity of laughter in the work makes it very striking when someone actually laughs: laughter stands out in the depiction of a person or event and thus makes it more memorable. This is important with regard to the idea of history as a teacher for life, *historia magistra vitae*, as Cicero put it, the notion that you could learn from the deeds and sayings, or *facta et dicta*, of the great individuals of the past. This idea was not only crucial to Cicero and his contemporaries, but also in the Renaissance. Learning from something obviously implies that the learner has to remember the lesson that has been taught. This could for example be achieved through vivid depiction, which made the deeds of legendary Goths stand out and come to life in a reader's mind, despite the absence of actual images of laughing persons.

The laughter in Johannes' work is best explained from this perspective. The idea of a ruler who plunders the temple of the gods is for example a striking image in its monstrosity, but the idea of a sacrilegious plunder accompanied by uncontrollable laughter is even more striking. The same goes for the only positive laugh in the entire work, the heroic laughter of a dying Gothic warrior: the image of someone fatally wounded, who still musters enough courage for a laugh of defiance in the face of death, is very dramatic and thus memorable. By capturing the reader's attention with such striking and memorable images, a writer could ensure that particularly important elements remained in his or her memory.[47] Grotesque

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[47] Cf. Flanigan 2015, 47.

or strange elements were designed to strike the reader, just as the odd, the grotesque, or the repulsive stand out elsewhere.[48]

To conclude, laughter in Johannes Magnus' work is used as a device related to *historia magistra vitae*: by making particularly important examples particularly memorable, they are more likely to be remembered. From this perspective, laughter is a didactic tool, designed to make a reader remember history and historical figures better, for his or her own benefit. Consequently, the scarcity of laughter, the immoral and improper laughs in the work, and the often uncontrollable way of laughing, make laughter stand out more, which in turn renders it more memorable. It is not to be regarded as connected to humour in a modern sense, but fits into the long-standing tradition of using laughter for didactic purposes as touched on above. Laughter in Johannes Magnus, it would seem, was indeed no laughing matter.

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1. Abbreviations

CJ = *The Classical Journal.*

Historia de regibus = Magnus 1554, see below.

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OLD = *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. Ed. by P.G.W. Glare & C. Stray. Second ed. Oxford 2012.

RBen = *Revue bénédictine.*

RenQ = *Renaissance Quarterly.*

ThlL = *Thesaurus linguae Latinae.*

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